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### **ISLAMIC INSTITUTES AND STATE AUTHORITY IN RUSSIAN EMPIRE: A MYTHOLOGY OF INTERPLAY**

Because of the different historical, geopolitical and civilizational causes the Russian state had to incorporate and absorb non-Russian components of different peoples and confessions, among which one Islam and the Muslims took a major place. The process of their acclimatization and incorporation into a state with the brightly expressed religious idea was accompanied by ideological reflection held by both, Muslims and Orthodox. The goal of such reflection was to justify the presence of the Muslim people at the Orthodox state, to determine their status and to fix institutionally a definite system of relationships between them.

The interplay of the State authorities with Islamic religious institutions required in the appearance of a definite complex of knowledge of ideological or mythological nature, for successful functioning of which a complex of problems was required to decide. Among these problems we can name the following:

1. To create the model determining attitudes of the State to Islamic religion and the Muslim population and establish a permissible degree of religious liberalism and tolerance.
2. To legitimize non-Muslim authorities in the eyes of Muslim people themselves and their subordination of this authority.
3. To determine a degree of admissibility of usage of the Islamic traditional forms of social regulation inside (sharia, adat) by the State.

The goal of this work is the attempt to observe the process of creation and development of the mythological and ideological models of the Muslim-Orthodox relationship within the Russian state. From the point of view of a ratio of a state authority and religious ideology the doctrine of «restricted religious tolerance» is of a rather interest. This doctrine in relation to the Muslims permitted the existence of their religion, but foreboded its propagation and proselytism. It practically was a copy of the relationship model between authorities and the *zimmi* in the Islamic religious law (*al-fiqh*). Usage by the state of traditional Muslim legal and social institutes, and also non-Islamic ethnic mythology (A *White Khan* myth) for more efficient control the Muslim population merits attention, too.

It is necessary to mark, that the considered mythological and ideological complexes as a system of knowledge in many respects determined the State religious policy, relations with Islam and Muslims and their specificity. The gradual replacement of this system by a complex of positivist knowledge, including in a socio-political orb has resulted in the issue in its de-actualization having stipulated to a certain extent inaccuracy of State policy.

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### **GANDHIST TRADITIONS IN MODERN INDIAN POLITICS**

Within the decades which passed after M.K. Gandhi's death the Indian politics still follow or at least declare to follow his ideas in different aspects of social life. Any political party or organization, both moderate and extremist, mentions and quotes Gandhi as the supreme spiritual authority which is resorted for concrete ideological ends. At the same time, the Gandhian legacy has different value and meaning being engaged in foreign and home affairs respectively. As for international relations, the basic principles offered by Gandhi and Nehru are still vital and effective and hardly need any correction. But as far as the home affairs are concerned the Gandhist principles and methods are to be considered and used rather carefully with special attention to the fact that in the past they often gave results opposite to the desired. The spiritualization of public life and political activity as offered by Gandhi appeared to be inapplicable to the modern situation because of its maybe an illusory but still vivid Hindu context. Trying to avoid dangers arising from direct following the Gandhi's ideas, Indian political leaders concretize them in practical sense. The canonization of the Gandhi's personality also needs special correction towards this process' secularization for the benefit of the Indian national idea, free of religious intolerance.

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### **THE CHINGISIDES AND THEIR STATUS IN ASIA AND EAST EUROPE**

Before the foundation of the Mongolian empire, the title of the *khan* had been used as the prince's title while the *sultan* had been the highest temporal title of the sovereign. From the 13<sup>th</sup> century on the word *khan* was the sovereign's name proper in the Chingis Khan's state and its successors, and the word *sultan* became the title of every member of the Chingisides' dynasty. Even after the reception of Islam, the Chingisid *khans* kept on highly appreciating their parentage from pagan Temuchin. Those rulers which were not the Chingisides by birth endeavored to marry the Chingisid princesses. This way they became sons-in-law of the *khan's* family and got the title of *gurgan* (as Timur in Middle Asia or Mamai in the Golden Horde).

Starting with the 14<sup>th</sup> century, numerous descendants of Chingis Khan in Russia supplemented their ranks of nobility and became, equally with the posterity of Rurik and Gedemin, the third considerable group of Russian aristocracy. Those of them who had adopted Orthodoxy, at once got all the rights of the highest strata of the Russian elite.

The legal status of those Chingisides which stayed Muslims was registered officially at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century: the decree of February 22, 1784 extended to them all the privileges of the Russian nobility except the right to possess the Christian serves. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century the Romanovs' empire the title of *sultan* was the name of the Russian local administration officials in Kazakh Lands. As a rule, these people were Chingis Khan's descendants.

So, the Russian power acknowledged and used in its own interests the authority of the Chingisides held in permanent respect in traditional societies of Asia and Europe.

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### **THE EMERGENCE OF SOVIET COMMUNIST TERRITORIALITY**

Robert David Sack formulated the basic definition of territoriality as follows: «the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control

people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area». Although every individual and group must claim some space, the most extensive and diverse forms of territoriality have been developed by the modern state. Territoriality is both a source of the state's power as well as an outcome of the exercise of power.

My general thesis is that Soviet-Communist territoriality was distinctive and essential. The paper describes the emergence of territorial institutions at different scales of spatial organization. First, the study considers *macro-territoriality*, including the «liberation» of most of the former empire's lands, the establishment of international border controls, and the elaboration of a territorial system of administration. Uniform macro-territorial processes helped to shape the identity of the population, for instance by excluding «enemies».

Next, the paper considers forms of *meso-territoriality*. Especially important were the partially autonomous institutional realms which provided citizens with goods and services that would simply be marketed in other countries. Then the paper considers the same realms from the standpoint of production, focussing on the extension of surveillance and territorial control to the shop floor. Repudiation of the *a-territorial* market mechanism in favor of the plan meant that the state had to rely more on territorial strategies of control.

*Micro-territorial* institutions dealt with individuals. From the start, access to most places required written authorization, to the point that the population's mobility was governed by countless permits and documents. Over time micro-territorial constraints impinged on all place-making activities, and helped draw the boundaries between the individual, society, and the state in distinctive ways, for instance by shaping the concept and practice of privacy.

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## **POST-SOVIET ETHNICITY AND REGIONAL SOCIAL STUDIES**

Though preserving political semantics of the notion of *national self-determination*, the post-soviet ethnicity is still a potential source of ethnic alienations and conflicts. The practical experience has revealed that theoretical possibilities and resources of opposing to the mobilizing discourse of ethnicity in regions (*national provinces*) are extremely weak.

Facing the practice of ethnic mobilization, social studies lose their professional autonomy and independence and start promoting this practice theoretically doing it easily and sincerely.

In our mind, this position of social scientists results from the character of regional studies which is determined by the local socio-cultural context rather than by their integration into the Russian and world science. As a matter of fact, provincial social research is a model of classic scholarship («humanitarian sciences») which preserves its main evil, namely the metaphysical character. The socio-political practice is interpreted by provincial social scientists in terms of metahistory, and the human reality is completely limited by mystified subjectivity of the ethnos – nation.

So, regional social science excludes itself from the processes directing to the conceptualization of separate social practices and personal identities in the modern context, thus promoting not modernization but the archaization of provincial culture and society.

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#### **«JOINT GOVERNMENT» IN MESOAMERICAN HISTORY**

In the socio-political structure of the «nuclear» Mesoamerican societies hierarchically organized systems dominated. However, simultaneously with small polities and regional states there existed specific forms of political integration – the so-called confederacies, leagues or alliances. Archaeological and written sources indicate that they appeared in the late 1 mil. AD and were widespread all over Mesoamerica during the Postclassic period (900/1000–1530 AD).

The first known political units of this type appeared in Northern Yucatan in 9<sup>th</sup> century (Uxmal and Chich'en Its'a). These were multi-centre polities led by rulers, which were called *itah* («companion») of each other. Chich'en Its'a during its apogee (850–880) was ruled by three lords (K'ak'upakal K'awil, K'inich Kopol and Kokom). Each of the co-rulers had a specific title of his own and, probably, realized separate functions. This system can be called «joint government» (*multepal*), although in the Yucatan historical tradition this notion was used for the later Mayapan state. Archaeologically this structure is reflected in the settlement pattern. Early Chich'en Its'a was formed by 18 elite architectural groups, which consisted of a «range-type» residence, a patio group with a colonnade and an oratory.

Central Mexican «joint governments» date to the Late Postclassic. Famous Triple Alliance – the union of Tenochtitlan, Tezcoco and Tlacopan – attracted most of the attention and its structure is best known. The supreme power was the Alliance council, which made up all important decisions. Allies shared territory, directions of the expansion and tribute. At the same time in the internal affairs they were independent and Aztec domination became apparent only in the late 15<sup>th</sup>–early 16<sup>th</sup> centuries. Chalca-Amecamecan and Tlaxcallan (sometimes called «republic») and others were similarly organized.

Such a wide distribution of «joint governments» demands a thorough analysis of such a type of socio-political organization. They were able to resolve successfully the problems of territorial expansion and internal consolidation. They were stable enough and two known cases of their transformation into the hierarchical state structure (Chich'en Its'a and Triple Alliance) were accompanied by radical ideological reforms. Although some «unions» grew in the limits of ethnic groups, but they were mainly multiethnic.

«Joint governments» can be considered as an interesting example of combination of hierarchical and non-hierarchical principles within a single socio-political system. The formation and spread of this type all over Mesoamerica may be explained by the crisis of traditional regional polities as a response to centralization trends. This was also facilitated by intensification of cultural contacts between societies of different levels of the complexity and a mass movement of different ethnic groups in the Terminal Classic (Epicalssic) epoch.

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#### **POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY: SHORT HISTORY OF FORMATION**

Lewis Morgan stands at the border of scientific social anthropology. His mythological tripartite scheme, going back to the 18th century, was frozen by marxists and reduced to two stages (primitive vs. class societies with inarticulate military democracy in between). Thanks to Gordon Child, Morgan's scheme got its second breath, but outside of the Middle East the ideas of Neolithic and urban revolutions proved to have little heuristic value.

Child deals not with politico-economic but with cultural-economic evolution and treats city, state and civilization as synonyms.

Being a creator of scientific cultural anthropology, Franz Boas rejected not only evolutionism but also the comparative study of political structures. Leslie White directed his (not always fair) critics against Boas and claimed that «other factors remaining equal, culture evolves as the amount of energy harnessed per capita year is increased, or as the efficiency of the instrumental means of putting the energy to work is increased», and that culture is first of all a mechanism for using energy to produce work and only after it, to regulate the behavior that is not directly connected with subsistence or defence. White has not perceived the sphere of research where his theses could be applied, i.e. archaeology. The examples he uses are taken from ethnography and not quite convincing because of the inadequacy of the temporal scale.

Julian Steward created his cultural ecology as a model of multidirectional evolution stipulated by the environment. His hard attempts to discover adequate terminology were crowned by Marshall Sahlins and Elman Service with their four-stage scheme (band, tribe, chiefdom, state) which they enriched with economic ideas (reciprocity and redistribution) taken from Karl Polanyi. Robert Carneiro substituted tribe for autonomous village. American ethnologists remained indifferent to White's and Steward's ideas, but archaeologists applied them with great success in their reconstruction of state formation in Oaxaca, Central Mexico and Peru. Attempts to find chiefdom at the Middle East (Kent Flannery, Gregory Johnson) were discouraging but application of the same approach to Europe by Colin Renfrew helped a lot to organize and interpret the material on Neolithics – Bronze Age. Scandinavian archaeology has recognized chiefdom. Rank-and-file Soviet historians got their first understanding of chiefdom mainly from Leonid Vasil'ev (the case of China).

The evolutionary concepts of the politogenesis are usually connected with cultural materialism which has found its main supporter in Marwin Harris. Harris is an acute critic of weak points in non-materialistic approaches, but his own adherence to Marxist primacy of infrastructure over superstructure was not well considered. The illusions of such a kind were shared by Sahlins, the leading figure of Steward school. Clifford Girtz and Richard Adams, despite all difference between them, give us probably the most adequate understanding of the development of culture in general and of political organization in particular.

Girtz underlines both essential (not only metaphorical) similarity between genes and cultural patterns, and the difference between them. If genes are models *for* reality, cultural patterns are *also* models *of* reality, i.e.

symbols, signs. This approach had been developed already by Emile Durkheim, but the lack of the very notion of culture in Durkheimian vocabulary made his analysis somewhat cumbersome and not easily understandable (*social facts* and *judgements of value*). Most of humanitarians have adopted only one side of Girtz's conception (cultural patterns as signs, culture as text) but another side (cultural patterns as replicators not under control of our mind) is equally important.

Just this side of the problem is investigated by Richard Adams, who borrowed the ideas of Leslie White, Alfred Lotka and Ilya Prigogine. Cultural patterns are subject to natural selection and do not form any hierarchy in respect to their connection with technology, social organization or ideology. Better opportunity for survival, however, get patterns which – in accordance with the second law of thermodynamics – better conduce to the increase of the energy flow harnessed by people. Certain ideas or social patterns are «gatekeepers and energy-flow triggers» and either promote or block this process, but they can fulfill this role only if the potentially available supply of energy exists.

The patterns of natural selection never repeat neither in biology nor in culture. The results of selection are infinitely varied and unpredictable. Taking into consideration the existence of vast number of absolutely unknown factors, similar consequences from similar circumstances suggest not laws but tendencies in selection. Thence the impossibility of creation of complete classification of sociopolitical patterns, as well as impossibility to explain the initial emergence of these or other cultural and social forms.

The abandonment in the 90-s of the notion of chiefdom as a universally applied evolutionary stage is something more than just a closer definition of another classification. The exhaustive classification is unattainable. General studies in sociopolitical anthropology can concentrate on research on interdependence of separate factors crucial for the functioning of the sociopolitical units such as demographic density, population numbers, areal size, age and gender structure, work efficiency, total volume of harnessed materials and energy, degree of centralisation, ways of decision making.

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**CUSTOMARY LAW, SHARIA COURTS AND ISLAMIC  
TERRORISM: RE-THINKING THE LEGACY OF SOVIET  
ETHNOGRAPHY IN CONTEMPORARY NORTH CAUCASUS**

This paper is a study of power, law and illegality as they are practiced and treated by Muslim villagers in post-Soviet Highland Dagestan and Chechnya. Using both field and archival material collected during his expeditions in Dagestan in 1992-1997 and a variety of historical sources, the author regards the relations between different forms of power, violence and law with a special reference to post-Soviet Sharia or Islamic courts created and controlled by Islamic terrorist groups such as Islamic Army of the Caucasus headed by Baha ad-din Muhammed or Islamic Peace-making Battalion under the direction of the well known terrorists Hattab and Shamil Basaev. Up to the date, neither Russian nor Western scholars have examined this problem yet.

The paper aims at re-thinking the theoretical legacy of the Soviet ethnographic school. The latter used to regard Dagestan and Chechnya as well as other highland regions of North Caucasus as «traditional» and «closed» for external influences. But in reality they were always linked to wider sets of political relations first through local Muslim elite and then through the Soviet officials of local origin. The author argues that modern «traditions» of Muslim villagers as well as their «closeness» date back to state reforms of the late Imperial and Soviet times which were conceived and prepared by Russian and Caucasian ethnographers. Paradoxically they have set the foundations of a quick Islamization and criminalization of the Caucasian highlanders. The so-called «Islamic revival» that began in the Caucasus after the collapse of the Soviet rule is based on institutions of Muslim parish and Sharia courts formed within the borders of collective and state farms. Moreover, the Soviet propaganda of «anti-colonial Muslim movements of the 19th century» has much provoked the growth of contemporary Islamic terrorism in the region under consideration.

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## **POWER AND TABOO**

With the all variety of approaches to the phenomenon of power treatment, power finally always reveals in an asymmetric situation of people: groups, organizations, individuals in respect of material, physical, prestigious, information, and other kinds of resources at the subjects of relations on power's disposal. By means of this asymmetry, the principle of hierarchicity is constructed; the principle which is characteristic of any complex self-controlled system, including the human society. Just this principle determines its ability for being self-governed. The basic social function of power is the regulation of social relations by means of forming such an hierarchy for the purpose of preservation of the social system's integrity.

The appearance of the first social norms based on the division by sex and age was asymmetric initially. In the result, grown-ups occupied the leading position in relations with those younger, men – towards women. This kind of hierarchy defines the subordination of elements in modern social systems in many respects, alongside with other norms which arose owing to the amplified specialization of the social activity norms in the course of the historical process. At the same time, modern behavioral norms are based on the asymmetrical principle according to which dominators can do what subordinates cannot do. It is displayed both at the individual (interpersonal) and at the whole social system levels.

The asymmetry of behavior forms the psychology of the power relations. The essence of such relations consists in the opportunity (the ability) of some persons to impose their will on the others. It happens due to the appearance of a psychological hierarchy. As the result, social leaders receive an opportunity to render psychological compulsion on outsiders.

The psycho-physiological mechanism of interdiction which induces the subordinates' ambivalent feeling to dominators, forms the background of psychological compulsion. Fear is the most important component of such a feeling. The appearance of such an emotional attitude to the dominators is provided by the social norm of taboo which always serves as a «borderline» between behavioral norms of both the subordinates and the dominators. Taboo, thus being a social norm *par excellence*, simultaneously comprises an emotional and psychological charge ensuring the imposing of

the dominators' will on those at lower hierarchical levels of the system, *i.e.* the former's power.

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### **THE BENIN KINGDOM OF THE 13<sup>TH</sup> – 19<sup>TH</sup> CENTURIES: PREHISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF A MEGACOMMUNITY**

The proto-Bini came to the tropical forest in the 3<sup>rd</sup>–1<sup>st</sup> millennia BC. The period from the 1<sup>st</sup> millennium BC to the 1<sup>st</sup> half of the 1<sup>st</sup> millennium AD was characterized by the extended-family community formation. In the mid-1<sup>st</sup> millennium AD the hierarchical structure of chiefdoms embraced a part of communities.

With the coming to power of the «1<sup>st</sup> dynasty» of the *Ogiso* (late 1<sup>st</sup> – the early 2<sup>nd</sup> millennia AD) the period of chiefdoms' flourishing is associated. That also was the time of the first attempt at establishing a supra-chiefdom authority. But the central authority appeared weak. The *Ogiso* were heads of different chiefdoms, the strongest at the moments of the throne's emptiness. The then Benin may be characterized as a complex chiefdom with a «touch» of «autonomous» communities.

By the end of the *Ogiso* period the further prolongation of the situation when chiefdoms (and autonomous communities) bore the supra-chiefdom authority while the *Ogiso* governed by practically the chiefdom methods became impossible. The first attempt to overcome the political system crisis was the abolition of the monarchy in the 12<sup>th</sup> century. But it was impossible to govern Benin as a chiefdom any longer. So, soon the Benin City chiefs invited a prince from Ife «to settle peace and concord». He founded the new (*Oba*) dynasty in about 1200 AD. The *Oba* managed to establish effective supra-chiefdom authority and Benin City transformed into the stable political center.

The Benin Kingdom of the 13–19<sup>th</sup> centuries represented a specific kind of complex non-state hierarchically organized society, generally not less developed than the majority of early states. It may be called the «megacommunity» which structure is possible to depict as four concentric circles forming an upset cone: the extended family, the extended-family community, the chiefdom, and the megacommunity as such (the Benin Kingdom as a whole).

The community was the center of that society, as the basic institution it fastened together all the levels of the hierarchical socio-political structure. The fact that the community was of the extended polygamous family type was of fundamental importance because of its essentially hierarchical social structure and antidemocratic value system. This way the evidently hierarchical type of the Benin megacommunity was determined.

The megacommunity inherited many traits from the *Ogiso* Benin. But while simple and complex chiefdoms represent basically the same pattern, differences between them and the megacommunity are principal. In particular, the *Ogiso* did not possess a formalized and legalized apparatus of coercion. Thus, the megacommunity is a possible way of transformation of the complex chiefdom, an alternative to its disintegration.

But the megacommunity differed not from the complex chiefdom only, but from the state, too. Theories of the state center round the «specialized institution of managing the society». And a natural criterion of its existence is the existence of bureaucracy. Scholars are indebted to Weber for its most elaborated notion. But none of Weber's ten characteristic features of bureaucracy fits the Benin Kingdom administrators.

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#### **FAMILY SIZE AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION AS PRECONDITIONS FOR THE VARIABILITY OF EVOLUTIONARY PATHWAYS**

On the first level of analysis, the variability of evolutionary pathways may be reduced to two principally different groups, as any society, including societies with essentially similar levels of cultural complexity may be considered to be based either on the hierarchical or non-hierarchical background.

We suppose that the essential differences between hierarchical and non-hierarchical societies (at least the ones with the complex political

organization) could be connected, among many other factors, with the dominant type of the community. In particular, the extended-family community in which social ties are markedly vertical being expressed in the shape of kinship relations (elder – younger), and the values system is antidemocratic, is more characteristic of hierarchical complex societies.

Thus, the communal democracy is shown to be significantly and negatively correlated with the family size. The correlation between these two variables cannot be completely explained by the fact that both of them have rather a similar curvilinear relationship with the cultural complexity (measured in the paper by the number of the supracommunal levels and the community/settlement size). Hence, the family size has some independent influence on the communal democracy.

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#### **DYNAMIC PHASES OF EVOLUTION OF NOMADIC SOCIETIES (RAIDS, INVASIONS, MIGRATIONS)**

Due to the draining of climate in the end of the 2<sup>nd</sup> millennia B.C., zones of dry and desert steppes appeared in the territory extending from Kerulen to Volga. The emergence of the pasture nomadic system (PNS) turned out a form of the nomads' adaptation to new conditions of life. PNS was an important type of those peoples' economic organization. That was complete seasonal production cycle realized within the limits of pasture nomadic provinces. The emergence of this system dictated a high degree of the nomadic society's consolidation. But the nomadic society inevitably follows the extensive way of evolution. The permanent socio-demographic overproduction of potential heirs of herds and pasture provokes frequent raids for the sake of widening of the space under the nomads' control and profit extortion. Thus raids turned out to be a specific mode of nomadic production which also included road tolls collecting, communications protection, accompanying and guarding caravans, etc. The transition to the completed cycle of nomadism and from raids to invasions was the most fundamental term for the formation of nomadic empires. But the limitedness of the extensive way of the nomadic societies' evolution inevitably led to the destruction of social ties, the parcelling of societies into kin units. Forced migrations was among those processes' significant outcomes. So, raids –

invasions – migrations mark dynamic phases of the nomadic societies' evolution.

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### **SHAMANIC NATURE OF POWER IN THE TRADITIONAL NANAY SOCIETY**

According to traditional ideas of the Nanay, any power is of spiritual nature. People could acknowledge the leader's right to make decisions and to order about only if they believed that he had enlisted the spirits' support. Speaking about the shamanic nature of power, one should take into account not only the hidden power of shamans, but the power of actual leaders – the *dziangians*. It was believed that the *dziangians* got their ability to speak in public and to lead on from spirits. Like a shaman, he inherited these spirits from his ancestors, dreamt them and sacrificed to their images regularly. What is more, any other power, as they believe, has the same shamanic nature.

A Nanay shaman exercises power both upon the clan and the territorial unit. Well-being of the clan depends on what happens to the shaman in the world beyond, and it comes about regardless of his will. The shaman's power over the clan is revealed in the fact that he may choose which of his relatives to make suffer or die instead of him if he is in a dangerous situation in the world beyond.

The shaman's power over his clients (members of a territorial group) is manifested in the fact that having appealed to him at least once, a client finds himself involved into regular sacrifices to the shaman's spirits. The *dziangian* uses the same measures of compulsion in wielding his power. The bearers of the tradition believe that if people do not obey their shaman or *dziangian*, they will be punished not by the shaman or *dziangian* but by the power of spirits concealed behind them. That is why external manifestations of their power are occasional while internal ones are unnoticeable.

In the traditional Nanay society power is marked by the spirit of rivalry and competition. But as people have an opportunity to choose which of the shamans to appeal in a case of need, it even contains some elements of democracy. Shamans' great interest in clients and their jealousy of their

colleagues could be a result of the fact that the more people are united around him, the better his spirits treat him. The more relatives a shaman or a *dziangian* has, the more are possibilities for manipulating their souls for defending himself in a case of danger. The more clients a shaman has, the more sacrifices are performed to his spirits, the more benevolent they are and the better the shaman feels.

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#### **SOCIAL STATUS AND PROBABILITY OF ALMS GIVING: A QUESTIONNAIRE STUDY OF MOSCOW STUDENTS**

The aim of this study is to test whether alms giving has a strong ethological component, that is whether the motivation to donate to those in need is deeply rooted in human nature. To answer the question, we investigated the attitude of the adult urban population towards beggars. For the purposes of this study a special close-ended questionnaire was developed. It contained questions about the motives of alms givers, the main reasons for begging as imagined by respondents, and inclinations to donate to different categories of beggars (age, sex, health, ethnicity).

Analysis of data revealed the following: (1) Students with higher income donated significantly more frequent ( $R_k=0.152$ ,  $p<0.001$ ). This category expressed feelings of empathy more often as a leading stimulus of alms giving, than did poorer subjects. The sample was not homogeneous in socio-economic status. Students from Russian State University for the Humanities (RSUH) came from families with higher income compared to students from Moscow Civil Engineering Institute (MCEI) ( $R_k=0.124$ ,  $p<0.006$ ). Students from RSUH were less inclined to explain their motivation to donate by the principle of social justice ( $R_s=0.410$   $p<0.000$ ). (2) The social status of beggars was positively correlated with givers' quote motivation to donate. Different categories of beggars have different social status in Russian Culture. Former military servicemen, grandparents, children, women with a

child, disabled persons, all have higher social status in our society compared to person with a pet, non-professional musicians and alcoholics. (3) Beggars' ethnicity was among the main factors influencing givers' decision to donate. Students were offered a choice of donation priority in the direction of mothers and children belonging to different nationalities (Russians, Gypsy and Tajik). It was found that students chose Russian mothers significantly more frequently than Tajik mothers ( $\chi^2=258.1$ ,  $p<0.001$ ). But Tajik mothers were preferred to Gypsy mothers ( $\chi^2=61.7$ ,  $p<0.001$ ).

These findings can be interpreted as an outcome of status differences or as a function of ethnic relatedness. Gypsies have traditionally suffered from low social status in European societies, including Russia. By contrast, the social status of Tajiks in the very recent past was not as low, and though they are refugees now, they are still commonly ranked higher. Ethnic relatedness could also contribute to the differential altruism shown these groups, since Gypsies are an endogamous group while Tajiks have a higher rate of intermarriage with Russians. These two interpretations are compatible and interdependent, since ethnic relatedness influences group status. Principle component analysis was done on the basis of information contained in questionnaire. Two main factors stimulating alms giving in our sample of informants were revealed: PC1 (24.2% of variation) was called an ethological factor. Children and mothers with a child received the highest loading, while a pet and a person with pet received the lowest. This findings can be perfectly explained on the basis of the ethological theory of altruism. PC2 (18.8% of variation) was interpreted as an indicator of probable personal investment in social welfare. Thus, grandmothers and grandfathers received the highest positive loading, and alcoholics the highest negative. It is evident that both ethological and cultural factors influence individuals' alms-giving behaviour. In most cases the causes of individual preferences in favor of certain categories of beggars lies at the subconscious motivational level.

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**PEACEMAKING AS AN ETHOLOGICAL PHENOMENA:  
RECONCILIATION IN PRIMARY SCHOOL CHILDREN \***

The group of Russian primary school children were observed in form December 1997 to April 1998 in one of Moscow schools (twelve boys and eleven girls, totally 23 children). Observations were done as all-occurrence sampling, all cases of aggression and post-conflict interactions were registered. Aggressors were taken as focal individuals for this study, their post-conflict interactions were registered for 5 min periods (PC) and on the next day during similar time period (MC). Children were observed during free play time one-one and a half hour five days a week, outside on the play ground. Totally 106 post-conflict interactions were analysed by PC-MC and the time rule methods (Waal, Yoshhara, 1983; Aureli et al, 1994). 50 pairs were attracted, 22 dispersed and 34 neutral, children in this group turned to affiliate significantly earlier in PC than in MC ( $\chi^2=10.13$ ,  $p<0.01$ ). The frequency of the first affiliative contact in the interval from 15 sec to 1 min 14 sec was 2.4 times higher in PC (48) than in MC (20),  $\chi^2=10.74$ ,  $p<0.01$ . Absolute reconciliation measure,  $V=26.4$ ; relative reconciliation measure,  $R=38.9$ ; total affiliation,  $T=67.9$ ; relative amount of nonconciliatory affiliation,  $F=61.1$ . Aggressors were found to initiate reconciliation significantly more frequent ( $\chi^2=16.79$ ,  $p<0.001$ ). The time rule method demonstrated the fact of reconciliation both at the initiative of aggressor ( $D=0.356$ ,  $p<0.05$ , in the interval between 15 sec and 1 min 44 sec) and at the initiative of victim ( $D=0.357$ ,  $p<0.05$ , in the interval between 15 sec and 1 min 14 sec), thus victims were observed to reconcile earlier than aggressors. Noncontact affiliative patterns (addresses, apologizes, laughs and smiles, invites to play, tells a stories approaches with direct eyes contact) were used for reconciliation more frequent than contact ones (touches, contacts by hands, uses «mirilka», shares toys) (62:12,  $\chi^2=32.45$ ,  $p<0.001$ ). These results were compared with the data on another group of Russian

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school children as well as Kalmyk and American kids (Butovskaya, Kozintsev 1999; Butovskaya et al, 2000). It is concluded that reconciliation may be universal for children, but the level of reconciliation may be different both, between cultures and between groups within the same culture. No gender differences were found. No difference between dominant and subordinate children in reconciliation model were registered neither.

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#### **SPACE-ORIENTED BEHAVIOUR IN AN URBAN ENVIRONMENT REFLECTS A UNIVERSAL DOMINANCE-SUBORDINATION PARADIGM**

For most of their evolution humans lived in small groups composed of familiar individuals. Their interactions with strangers were rare, limited to special cultural events, and confined to the tribe. Interactions with strangers typically produce a fear response that develops in early childhood irrespective of cultural origin. Yet in mass-anonymous society individuals are subjected to frequent interactions with strangers. Urban dwellers seem to develop special strategies allowing them to survive successfully under such conditions. The aim of this paper is to test the hypothesis that individuals' spacing behaviour in public places is an outcome of dominance-submission compromises and automatic application of aggressive-buffering strategies. The event chosen for study was the approach and passing of individuals on footpaths. Observations were made for 2 hours daily from July to September 1999 on three Moscow footpaths, similar in size and infrastructure, located in the regions where people of different ethnic origin were known to be numerous. Ethological methods were employed with all occurrence sampling. Data on trajectories and behavioural strategies of passersby moving toward each other were registered on special check lists. At the initial stage of this

study, an ethogram of main behavioural patterns was created and all patterns were coded. Subjects were classified according to their age, sex, body size, quality of clothing, and apparent ethnic origin. Speed and trajectory of movement were also registered for both interactants. Data were processed using the SPSS-97 package. Total sample is 1528 individuals, or 764 interactions. The following results were received: 1. Large-bodied individuals dominated over approaching strangers by decreasing their distance ( $r_k = -0.06$ ,  $p = 0.016$ ); 2. Older people were found to avoid approaching strangers ( $r_k = -0.073$ ,  $p = 0.001$ ). Also, people tended to avoid older people ( $r_k = 0.123$ ,  $p = 0.0001$ ); 3. In general males dominated spatially over females ( $n = 357$ ,  $\chi^2 = 6.12$ ,  $p = 0.05$ ), and avoided proximity with other males ( $n = 357$ ,  $\chi^2 = 9.38$ ,  $p = 0.01$ ); 4. A significant positive correlation was found between social status and individual speed, but only for people of Russian and South-East Asian origin (Russians,  $n = 707$ ,  $r_k = 0.084$ ,  $p = 0.02$ ; Indians,  $n = 136$ ,  $r_k = 0.17$ ,  $p = 0.04$ ). No correlation between social status and individual walking speed was found for people of African, Far-East Asians and Caucasian origin. Conclusions: 1. The spatial behaviour of urban pedestrian interactions can be explained in the light of dominance-submission paradigm; 2. Spatial behaviour was highly influenced by cultural stereotypes; The spacing behaviour of people on the streets of this large multiethnic city can be interpreted ethologically. Males tended to dominate spatially over females, but avoided spatial confrontations with other males. Thus large size is an indicator that generally predicted dominance in competition between strangers over space. Speed is not a human-universal indicator of high social status but is applicable for certain European cultures, Russians being an example. Successful adaptation to urban life is intimately connected with the ability to follow universal and cultural-specific rules of spacing and trajectory-making.

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**BYZANTINE  
NUMISMATIC ICONOGRAPHY  
(THE IMAGE OF CHRIST CHALKITES)**

The paper deals with the network of the problems concerning the concept of numismatic iconography: coin images as a source for the historical research; relation between the icon worship and the coin design in Byzantium.

A coin, like an icon, represented the image (i.e. picture and name), namely that of a sovereign who had issued it. Placing the image of Christ (and later of the Blessed Virgin, the saints and other attributes of the developed Christian symbolics) on the coins had led to the constitution of a new «image of the Supreme power». From then on, it was personified in Christ, «King of the rulers», whose depictions varied immensely: up-to-the-breast or full-length; standing, sitting on the throne, crowning an emperor, etc. According to the opinions of many researchers, at least some of His images were reproduced from the renowned Constantinople icons that were especially revered by the emperors. Still it is difficult to say whether those depictions on the coins were intended for recognizing and functioning as conventional copies of the same icons held sacred. The accompanying inscriptions, being mostly epithets, theological definitions applied to Christ Himself (Emmanuel, Rex Regnantium), manifested no strict interdependence with the images. On the other hand, certain compositions (for instance, a monarch crowned by Christ or Our Lady, or by some of the saints) emerged under the influence of literary symbolics and had no figurative prototypes.

The events when a coin image was intended to proclaim consciously the appropriate sanctuary were rather seldom. One of such rare examples was the presentation of Christ endowed with the epithet «Chalkites» — the epithet very special and unique, for it reflected the image of Christ, His well-famed icon. Studying the coins of the «Christ Chalkites» type must prove

to disclose the connection between Byzantine icon worship and numismatic iconography, to define the proper status of the latter one, and to discover new sources for the history of the famous icon.

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**ETHNOGENESIS AND POLITOGENESIS:  
SOCIAL IDENTITY, FRONTIER AND ETHNOGENESIS  
AS AN ONGOING DYNAMIC**

Our paramount aim is to sample the embeddedness and the dialectic interaction between the ethos system, frontier realities and ethnogenesis, stressing the absolute centrality of power relationships. We will talk about the «frontier» in the broad sense of social delimitation, including mark areas, frontiers, borders and boundaries. On the other hand, we will refer to the politogenesis linked to the ethnogenesis and the frontier constructions, not only to the state genesis, but referring to «the political» in the broad sense of the word, inextricably related to the communication processes generated by social systems. Ethnogenesis and politogenesis often take place in areas where social interactions are highly densified (the frontiers), because the starting mechanism of each cultural group is centered on the relationship implementation. Moreover, each individualized space tends to generate an ethnos, and an ethnos is blurred, at the beginning, with the space; and the territorialization process endowed by the social system implies the building of diacritical frontiers. These frontiers has, mainly, two functions: an homeostatic mechanism that regulates and filter the relations with the environment (then, a semic tool used by political collectivities), and a specific field of cultural interaction that allows social communication and, the, may be a place of new systemic structuration and social genesis. To sample our theoretical position, we will take examples from Subsaharian Africa and Eastern Europe, areas with a strong frontier character and, then, with a large number of ethnosystem cristallizations. In these areas we can see how political frontiers influence the genesis and durability of the social system, and how they stand in a dialectical relation to the ethnic fission and fusion processes.

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**IDENTITY AND TRANSNATIONALISM: POWER, CHARITY, AND  
CLASS IN A MOSCOW FOOD AID COMMUNITY**

Rapid political and economic changes in Russia during the last decade have been accompanied by the expansion of transnational businesses in Russian markets. Particularly visible are fast food entities such as McDonald's and Pepsi-Cola, whose corporate goals are simultaneously to circulate new commodities through the Russian market and to create new classes of consumers who identify themselves through the consumption of these products and thus reflect the development of a stratified class system based on economic capital. The growth of these transnational food businesses has been paralleled by the development of transnational food aid charities in Russia. Foreign donors and aid workers first identify potential recipients according to low levels of economic capital and then circulate free or low-cost food items through these classes of 'non-consumers' -- generally pensioners, veterans, homeless persons, and single parents with many children. Thus, according to these models of transnational consumption, class identities correspond solely to economic capital and to the circulation of commodities through capital-based exchange networks. Nevertheless, these transnational food regimes frequently contrast with local, Russian emphases on the continuing significance of social capital and the distribution of this social capital through more informal exchange networks.

I propose to examine these transnational/local negotiations over class identities and the social relations among classes by considering data gathered during my ethnographic research in a transnational food aid community in Moscow (1997-1999). In the food aid community in which I have worked, foreign donors and aid workers diagnose Russian social problems such as poverty and hunger as symptomatic of unstable economic practices and limited economic capital. These outsiders' interpretations challenge those described by local Muscovite aid workers and recipients, whereby poverty and hunger result from precarious or nonexistent social relations that prevent informal distribution networks from operating effectively. Moreover, recipients' efforts to redistribute the food 'gifts' they receive from foreign charities through their own social networks both highlight the significance of these commodities as social capital and frustrate foreign aid workers who envision food aid as immediate solutions to economic problems.

These disputes over the classification and management of poverty and hunger as either economic or social issues reveal larger, more subtle debates about who has the authority to categorize Muscovites into class identities and according to what criteria. In this paper I will use this food aid program as a case study for addressing how members of a transnational community – insiders and outsiders, Muscovites and foreigners, aid workers and recipients – debate larger processes of class formation in Russia. In particular, I will consider the tensions that emerge as actors in this community offer competing versions of everyday Muscovite life by strategically manipulating social and economic capital and the means by which they circulate.

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#### **HIERARCHICAL STATUS OF MALES AND ITS DETERMINANTS IN FREE-RANGING HAMADRYAS BABOONS.\***

The males of hamadryas baboons play a special role in the existence and functioning of complex multilevel social system in these animals. Patrilocality characteristic for hamadryas baboons, as well as the relationships between adult males, determine the division of troop into the bands and clans. We studied the dynamics of hierarchical status of males in the troop of hamadryas baboons in Gumista Primate Reserve. The Reserve was founded in 1974 after the hamadryas baboons had been released in the ravine of Western Gumista in 20 km from Suchumy. The number of animals in the original free ranging troop varied in the range of 76-323 individuals. The observations were carried out during the period 1974-1992. The result of analysis of dyad agonistic relationships have been used for the evaluation of the male's rank. The result of the investigation showed the existence of two systems of dominance – submission within the troop of hamadryas baboons – the system of adult males' dominance relationships, and that of hierarchical relationships between females and young animals. Age is a crucial factor for rank acquisition in males hamadryas baboon. Before the sexual maturity young males compete for status with females and young animals. By the age of 4.5-6.5 years males usually outranked most of the females, the only

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acceptations are the few highest-ranking females. By the age of 7, males became absolutely dominant over females, At this age young males begin to compete for status with other adult males with in the troop. At the first stage, in the age of 7-9, the relative rank of a male is very low. Subsequently it increases and attains its maximum at the age of 13-15 years. The aging males (16 year old and older) show the decrease of relative rank. Hierarchical position of adult male in the troop was also influenced significantly by kinship relations with other males and association with certain clan with in the hamadryas community.

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### **THE CLASSIC-POSTCLASSIC TRANSITION IN THE CENTRAL MIXTECA ALTA, OAXACA, MEXICO**

Across highland Mesoamerica, in areas such as the Basin of Mexico and the Valley of Oaxaca, large regional states which have emerged during the Classic expand until they can no longer maintain control over their peripheral territories. At the end of the Classic, a roughly four hundred year trend begins in which these states contract, reinforce their boundaries, and finally balkanize into smaller units often described as «Mixtec Kingdoms». Although this sequence was thought to exist throughout the Highlands, new data from the central Mixteca Alta, a mountainous area between the Basin and the Valley, suggests that it is not universal. Specifically, there is no evidence of a hegemonic regional state in the Mixteca Alta during any period. This paper demonstrates the developmental differences between the Mixteca Alta and other regions in highland Mesoamerica by summarizing available archaeological evidence from previous full-coverage surveys and comparing this evidence with new data from the recently completed Central Mixteca Alta Settlement Pattern Project. These new data show that, during the Classic, several smaller polities divided up the Mixteca Alta and interacted on equal footing, as opposed to being dominated by a single regional core. During the Postclassic, the pattern remained much the same. The Mixteca Alta sequence does not contradict traditional models for the highlands, but instead suggests that they may only apply in broad valley settings. The discovery of this variation is typical of the kinds of insight possible when new data from poorly known areas are obtained.

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The Netherlands)

### **LIMITED COMPLEXITY. THE INDIAN TRIBES OF THE NORTHWEST COAST**

The Northwest Coast Indians are usually presented as tribal societies with a high degree of complexity. And, indeed, these Indians were rich (at least some of them), there **was** well-defined leadership (though over small groups mainly), they lived in villages, built wooden houses, and fished in large canoes. Their woodcarving was famous, and there was found a marked social inequality: nobles, commoners, and slaves». Yet the NWC Indians never formed a whole. They fell apart in a number of tribes, and spoke different languages. Tribes were scattered over numerous villages. In these villages there lived sometimes several family groups, but each one had its own chief. And, though there are found traits, characteristic of a complex sociopolitical organization, this organization was limited to the village mainly. This «independency» did not preclude alliances, trade and cooperation – but also fierce competition belonged to the characteristics of these tribes. To what extent their «complex» organization can be considered an 'alternative' for the state remains to be seen.

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### **THE INEVITABILITY OF THE STATE**

The origin of (early) states is presented here as consequence of a complex interaction of a limited number of factors (dominance of the economy, ideology, and the societal format). Changes – even small ones – in one or more of **these** factors trigger a series of developments that in the course of time produce different forms of sociopolitical organization. Human activities, even not immediately directed at state formation, play a crucial role in these developments. The state then, is the inevitable consequence of the efforts to solve the problems caused by the changes in the formative factors. This development occurs only when the solutions enforce each other. When one (or more) of the **formative** factors is underdeveloped, or solutions are

conflicting with each other, the development of more complex sociopolitical forms will not take place. When one or more of the factors becomes exhausted, stagnation of the developments or collapse of the organization occurs- The paper is based on the findings of the Early State Project, and will be illustrated with **case studies**.

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**DEMONSTRATING DEMOCRACY:  
«INTERNATIONALS» AND ELECTIONS IN  
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA SINCE THE DAYTON PEACE ACCORDS**

The Dayton Peace Accords, signed in November 1995, ended the four year war in Bosnia-Herzegovina between Croats, Bosniacs, and Serbs. However, Dayton is more than cease-fire and boundary agreements, it is also the blueprint for a new country and specifies, in many ways, how Europe and the United States want Bosnia-Herzegovina to look. Since Dayton, Bosnia-Herzegovina has been flooded by international governmental, non-governmental, and military organizations working on the reconstruction of all aspects of Bosnian socio-political society. This legal document justifies and legitimates all international interventions, and creates a paradoxical situation in the new sovereign Bosnian state where the «international community» (i.e., international organizations and their employees and/or volunteers) wields extraordinary power, both «repressive» and «productive.»

Democracy is just one of the many institutions that «internationals» are attempting to install. Although there are a variety of democratization projects such as «rule of law,» «political party» and «civil society» development, elections are considered the cornerstone of democratization schemes. Many resources are dedicated to ensuring that elections are «free and fair» including explicit detailing of rules and regulations, extensive training of election officials, multi-media advertising campaigns, and the presence of «neutral» observers at polling stations and counting centers. Democracy, as a cultural form, transcends the political domain though; I view democracy as a moral order, and elections as a medium through which complex social processes are enacted. Elections and democracy are tropes through which Western, modern culture is represented, and distinguished from Balkan (and perceived «non-modern») culture.

Using ethnographic data gathered from four of the five elections conducted under international auspices, this paper examines the cultural meanings subsumed in «international» legal, bureaucratic, and technical electoral discourses and practices. In particular, it uses the experience of international election voter registration, polling, and counting supervision (ESB) to identify how the multi- and trans- national election effort attempts to reconfigure Bosnian identities, and how the international community represents and produces democracy. The international aid mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina (of which elections and the larger democratization project are a part) through its assistance efforts contributes to the establishment, management, and ordering of modern social relations and forms of authority.

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### **RECIPROCAL KIN ALTRUISM? NAMESAKES IN TOLSTOY'S «WAR AND PEACE»**

Whereas reciprocal altruism amongst non-relatives is usually expected to be symmetrical (i. e., balanced), it is typically assumed that kin altruism is asymmetrical. As a matter of practice, older relatives, especially direct ancestors, give more in the form of physical and social resources to their descendants than they expect in return. Yet this is often accompanied by memetic means of recompense, usually in the form of memory cults, somewhat restoring the balance between generations. Such is reflected in naming practices in a wide variety of societies.

An unusual, but remarkable case in point is Tolstoy's «War and Peace». The masterpiece virtually constitutes a family shrine in that Tolstoy preserved memories of his forebears and, thanks to the structure of Russian naming practices, much of their actual names. The use of actual names for supposedly fictional characters in the novel will be compared with how names were appointed in his real family.

Indeed, preliminary results suggest that there is greater memetic reciprocity in the novel than in the actual family. Much as happens with the comparable frequencies of incest within the text and in the author's real family, it is suggested that art is a prime locus for supernormal stimuli.

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**GENDER, KINSHIP, AND ACTION POTENTIAL IN SLAVIC  
CULTURES: RUSSIA'S FEMININE SOUL REVISITED**

It is often said that Russian political culture stymies initiative. This trait set is a vestige of neurocultural adaptation to post-neolithic conditions as an "incipient system," enabled by the genome but selected by the group in response to the environment. Ethnographic and historical traces of its inception are found in the interplay of nomadic and horticultural populations, and the acquiescence to aggressive bands of foreign males. Young Slavic males suffered males-only genocide and were genetically dispossessed by conquest rape, their low status exacerbated by grandfatherly sexual rights to brides. The Indo-European word *\*'pitar'* ("father," cf. Latin *'pater'*) disappeared from Slavic, in favor of a (maternal) avuncular root, and elements of Common Slavic case and gender confirm the low status of young males. Females were likewise powerless, but their typical corporate response was subversion of control mechanisms, now a staple element of Slavic cultures.

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**IMPAIRED ACTION POTENTIAL IN SLAVIC CULTURES:  
A LEFTOVER ADAPTATION TO  
POST-NEOLITHIC CONDITIONS?**

It is often said that Russian political culture stymies initiative. This trait set is a vestige of neurocultural adaptation to post-neolithic conditions as an «incipient system,» enabled by the genome but selected by the group in response to the environment. Ethnographic and historical traces of its inception are found in the interplay of nomadic and horticultural populations, and the acquiescence to aggressive bands of foreign males. Young Slavic males suffered males-only genocide and were genetically dispossessed by conquest rape, their low status exacerbated by grandfatherly sexual rights to brides. The Indo-European word *\*'pitar'* («father,» cf. Latin *'pater'* ) disappeared from Slavic, in favor of a (maternal) avuncular root, and

elements of Common Slavic case and gender confirm the low status of young males. Females were likewise powerless, but their typical corporate response was subversion of control mechanisms, now a staple element of Slavic cultures.

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**MISRULE OF LAW: ASSUMPTIONS AND ALLISIONS OF  
WESTERN LEGAL REFORM IN THE FORMER  
SOVIET STATES OF CENTRAL ASIA**

Since becoming independent, the former Soviet republics of Central Asia have undergone profound systemic change. The previously closed societies of the region have been opened up to western products and western aid, not the least of which are western legal concepts, which optimistically promote the «the rule of law.» However, for a number of reasons, the reformers are making assumptions that do not apply in Central Asia as they do in other parts of the former Soviet Union, alluding assumptions about contract in societies still ordered by principles of status (to borrow the distinction made by Henry Maine).

For example, in Central Asia, as opposed to other parts of the former Soviet Union, there has never been a tradition of independent government. To a greater or lesser extent, depending on the area, various group interests take precedence over individual interests. The interests of the group may be the government, an ethnic group or a clan. In addition, the educational standards are woeful, and schools still reward students for being mediocre.

In such an environment, western-style individuality is foreign, as are the jurisprudential consequences of such individuality. Straightforward, linear approaches to problem-solving are ineffective, and attempts to change the legal culture in Central Asia are as ambitious as they are naïve. This is because there is not much of a formal legal culture in place to begin with. There is instead a normative culture: status over contract; norms, but not law.

The reforms continue, nonetheless, as westerners with influence change laws that lawyers and judges trained in the old system do not know how to apply. Our proposed paper would explore several case studies illustrating this disconnect between western reform and usual practice, including the following:

1) The 1999 Criminal Procedure Code of Kyrgyzstan which changes the model of prosecuting criminal cases from an inquisitorial (i.e. continental) to an adversarial (i.e. Anglo-American) one, while the prosecutor's office still dominates criminal trials, and the law faculties do not teach advocacy skills.

2) The attempts and frustrations of western assistance providers to establish a judicial training center in Tajikistan, where judicial independence appears repeatedly in the constitution and statutes on the courts.

3) The introduction of property rights in Kyrgyzstan, which was followed by a 5 year moratorium on sales in land, and attempts by western aid providers to educate citizens in their rights before the moratorium is lifted.

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### **USES OF CULTURE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP**

Citizenship is becoming an interdisciplinary meeting place for sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists and lawyers. At the root of the renewed interest in citizenship studies is its potential ability to address new supranational and transnational realities better than other institutions or forms of collective identity. In particular, there has been much discussion in international law and philosophical liberalism about the different models of citizenship and how they would accommodate the increasing need for collective or group rights, how they could be reconciled with liberalism's emphasis on individual/human rights. Most of the dominant arguments and exemplary cases make intensive use of anthropological concepts of culture and identity, to the point that they become part of the political legitimation of the actors involved. For example Kymlicka argues that true liberalism cannot judge a concept of culture as incompatible with individualism, since individuals can only make meaningful choices if they have had the opportunity to grow up into a culture which provides meaning and order. Cultures (in plural) are necessary for individual freedom and therefore liberalism cannot go on pretending that there are only individuals in the state. Very relevant legal and political consequences follow. I will analyze how this and other competing arguments are appropriated by supranational institutions of the European Union as forms of political legitimization and for the purposes of negotiating competing claims in policy fields that relate to

citizenship, such as cultural policy and affirmative action in Europe. This process poses many interesting questions to both anthropologists and political scientists. How can a supranational institution find legitimization in a concept of culture which originally refers to small groups or to nations? How can the protection of culture be construed to promote European integration? But more puzzling of it all, how is it possible that very similar ideas of culture and identity are put to work for opposing institutions within the European Union, such as the European Commission (which by and large represents the driving force of integration and centralized federalism) and the Committee of the Regions (which represents the protection of cultural diversity)? These questions will be documented with material from my research of European Union policy, but the answers and what anthropology would have to say are still in the air.

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#### **ON THE NOTION OF KOK IN THE TRADITIONAL POLITICAL CULTURE OF TURK MONGOLIANS \***

The phenomenon of *kok*, a notion which exists in the traditional political culture of Turk Mongolians, is discussed in the paper. The author bases in its interpretation on the principles formulated in lexical semantics, in accordance with which the essence of the word (its «lexical meaning») is not scientific but rather a «naïve» («philistine», according to L.V. Scherba) meaning of the corresponding object, sometimes aggravated by an essential attribute of the latter or by a fact expressed in the word (Apressian 1995). We must indicate simultaneously that notions with equal lexical expression though looking opposite, in fact may turn out polysemically forked long ago.

According to the author, *kok* as a notion reflects objects and facts connected with the socio-political culture, although Turk Mongolians associate it with the meaning already abstracted from that words' primary concrete semantics. The primary meaning of *kok* is the «sky», *i.e.* «celestial», «high». According to the author, this primary meaning («material contents») at the concept level evaluated and transformed into the meanings of 1) «blue/green» (as a descriptive characteristic of the colors), and 2) «socially high».

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The social mark of the status being separated from the primary meaning of the word, transformed into a new meaning (incarnation) – an external accessoire (attribute) of a high social status which existed since at least the «sianbi society» in the form of *kok* (*kukl/kfikil*, etc.) meaning a «certain hair-set which a person of a high social status had». The *kukyuk* (Makhmud Kazgariy) – the «noble people» among the Oguz Turkmen – are representatives of the status hair-set. They originated from the same tribe, family (*kok*). This blood (*kok*), root/origin (*kok*) characterize them as free men (*kok*) distinguishing from other members of the community.

In accordance with the series of the meanings emerged, the man belonging to this social strata is regarded as haughty (Kazakh *kekejyv*), supercilious (Karakalpak *kakai*), boastful and vain-glorious (Altai *koku*), eager to the influence the society (Kazakh *keyirektev*), and so on. High ranked people's clothes, weapon and certain parts of the horse's harness' colors were blue or green (the turquoise and green nephrite were used for making paints); pommels of saddles named *kok* (DTS, 312) were frequently decorated with the so-called «stone of victory»- *kok tash* – the «blue/green stone».

Thus, in the common comprehension the notion of KOK is expressed in a wide series of notions connected with the hierarchical structure of Turk Mongolians.

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#### **WERE EARLY ROMAN CURIAE KIN GROUPS?**

1. Wide-spread interpretation of early Roman *curia* as a kin group does not have any source ground and is a result of speculation.

2. The only fragment in the sources, that is used as an argument supporters of the conception of kinship society in the early Rome (Niebur, Mommzen, Gjerstad, De Francisci, Mayak) is Aul Gellius' quotation (Gell., 15,27,5) from the commentary of Laelius Felix to Quint Mutius (late 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC) reasoning on the kinds of assemblies: «*Cum ex generibus hominum suffragium feratur, "curiata" comitia esse, cum ex sensu et aetate "centuriata", cum ex regionibus et locis, "tributa"...*» («*When voting is based on the divisions of people, the assembly is curial; when it is based on qualification and age, the assembly is centurial; when it is based on regions and territories, the assembly is tributal*»).

3. *Genus* («genre») consists of numerous homotypic phenomena, resulted by *divisio* (division on a specific basis) and is contrasted with «species», a unique phenomenon distinguished within a genre by *definitio* («definition»). To see in «genera hominum» clans («gentes», sing. «gens») means to ignore strictly defined semantic of the notion «genus», especially for the times Quint Mutius and Labeon when a systematization of the knowledge was very popular, and the distinction between «genre» and «species» served as a base of various classifications.

4. Thus, analyzed text not only can not be used as the argument of kinship nature of *curia*, but also proves the contrary: *curia* is administrative unit, that unites groups of formally equal people, formed by artificial division of the whole (people) on homogenous parts.

5. This interpretation of *curia*, which is still valid only because of historiographic tradition, essentially distorts the history of early Rome, archaizing the level of social evolution reached by Mediterranean region in I mil. BC.

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#### **SOCIAL DIVISION OF LABOR, CONSTRUCTION OF CENTERS AND INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS: A REASSESSMENT OF THE STRUCTURAL-EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE**

This article critically examines some major assumptions of structural-evolutionary theory. This examination has accepted as valid one basic implication of this approach – namely the strong tendency, among human beings, to «expansion», and has examined the different dimensions of such expansion. But contrary to the classical evolutionary perspective, our approach has emphasized that the different dimensions of such expansions – especially the symbolic and the structural differentiation, need not always go together.

Of central importance in such a reappraisal is the distinction between, on the one hand, social division of labor which contains the core of structural differentiation and on the other hand what has been called the basic elite, function's — thnip.fimr.tinn'! or activities which are oriented to the problems generated by the very constitution of social division of labor, i.e. the constants of trust, regulation of power, construction of meaning and legitimation. The social activities oriented to these problems can be defined

as elite functions and which are indeed distinct from those engendered by the social division of labor.

This distinction has, however, not been fully recognized in the relevant literature and it is the examination of this distinction and its implications for sociological analysis that constitutes the skirting point, or the reappraisal, of structural-evolutionary perspective which is presented in this article and which is based above all on some of the research in comparative macro-sociology' which I have undertaken in the last three decades – starting with the analysis of the Political Systems of Empires. This reappraisal has accordingly emphasized that it is indeed the different combination of these dimensions that gives rise to the dynamics of societies and civilization which indicate a much greater variability than has been proposed in classical and contemporary structural-evolutionary analysis.

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#### **ETHNIC FEDERALISM AND ETHNOCRACY IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA**

The Russian model ethnic of ethnic federalism produces, and will be produce ethnocracy as a form of organization of a political authority on the territory of the «national state subjects» of Russian Federation. The ethnic elites outstanding on behalf of so-called «title ethnoses», usurp an authority in so called «national republics», outgoing from the concept of the priority right of the native peoples on all resources (including – resource of authority) in their ethnic territory.

Ethnocratic regimes in former Russian autonomies are made out by means of administrative extrusion of the quoters of «non-title» ethnoses from most prestigious and significant social and status niches (first of all – from sphere of administration, information, culture, etc.). Leaders and the ideologists of ethnopolitical structures construct the political myth, according to which a federalism represents the mechanism of implementation of «the right of nations on selfdetermination».

It became possible to legitimize ethnocratic regimes in the «ethnic» subjects of Russian Federation during 1990-s exclusively due to support of the federal Center. Weak Kremlin provided intellectual and material support to the ethnocrats in exchange for their political loyalty. The preservation in a

structure of Russian Federation of the subjects with ethnocratic forms of government will provoke strong conflict situations in the multi-ethnic regions. The state protectionism in relation to the ethnocrates may lead to the secession of the country and installation of the extremely right regime in Russia.

The transition from ethnocracy to democratic forms of the political system organization is possible only under the condition of waiving of the Lenin's principle of national selfdetermination. The process of the state structure deethnization should include: denunciation of the bilateral treaties between the Federal Center and subjects of the Russian Federation, liquidation of the scheme of federative relations based on such treaties, construction of the constitutional federation. It is imperative to equalize the statuses of all subjects of Russian Federation; and reduce the legislative acts of the subjects of Russian Federation conforming to the federal legislation and the Russian Constitution. Also it is necessary to cancel all subordinate legislation which establish «title ethnoses» privileges; and reduce the ethno-social structure in conformity with actual ethnic proportions of the population of the subjects of federation and country as a whole. In the long term the transition to one more rational «non-ethnic» principle of the administration conforming to the adopted economical and geographical demarcation.

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#### **THE IMAGE OF POWER IN STRUCTURE OF THE MYTHOLOGICAL SPACE IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA**

The structure of the mythological space in the political life of Russia is mainly based on the traditionalist model of the realization of the archetypes of mass consciousness. At the same time traditional image of the power and image of the state in contemporary Russia is considerably different from the understanding of the state power by its bearers and by public opinion. «Power» in the traditionalist sense is a transcendental force that has supernatural magic abilities to influence the world and Cosmos as a whole. The «power» is represented by the figure of the leader who is connected with the source of the force, and it is a base of the social and political hierarchy of the socium which depends on the bearer of the power as a responsible for the very existence of the society. Power rights in such a model can not be doubted, like the world order can not be doubted.

But the contemporary state power is a complex conglomerate of the instruments of governing the society. It is depersonalized by the bureaucratic institutions and is separated from the magic forces; and collective consciousness naturally perceives it as something external and hindering to the direct relations between the society with true power. That is why the image of the state power in the structure of the mythological space of contemporary Russia is fundamental. The effectiveness of political ideologies depends on the realization of the images of the power of traditionalist type personified by some political leader. Modern political technologies are also based on the adaptation of the archetypical images of the collective mentality, especially of those of the traditionalist type, to the conditions of modern political struggle.

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#### **THE SCYTHIAN ECONOMIC CYCLE IN THE NORTHERN BLACK SEA AREA HISTORY AND TYPES OF THE EURASIAN NOMADIC COMPLEX SOCIETIES**

The problem of socio-economic evolution of the Scythian culture is actual both in the vertical (the temporal – from archaic times up to the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC) and in the horizontal (the spatial – «Steppe – Forest-Steppe»; «Northern Caucasus and the Kuban river coastal area – the Northern Black Sea area [NBSA]») aspects.

New opportunities for the study of the steppe Scythian economy dynamics and its influence on the socio-economic landscape of the NBSA early nomads have opened recently. The history of the Steppe Scythia economics represents a cycle of three stages. A model of economy of its own corresponds to each of those stages. The economic evolution went hand in hand with the gradual increase of the Scythians' ethno-cultural consolidation.

The *extortionate economy model* was realized during Scythian campaigns from the Kuban and Northern Caucasus territory to Asia Minor when the Iranian tribes did not intend to solidify the entrapped terrains. This model formed the economic background for the rise of the «tribal unions» (the first stage, the 7<sup>th</sup> – early 6<sup>th</sup> centuries BC).

The *military economy model* was characteristic of the second stage (the 6<sup>th</sup> – the first half of the 5<sup>th</sup> centuries BC). It was relevant to the period of conquest of the forest-steppe and the NBSA steppe by the Iranian nomads. It

promoted the entrapment of new terrains and the chiefdom institutions' dominance there.

The «*cattle breeding*» *economy model* was introduced in the NBSA steppe belt in the second half of the 5<sup>th</sup> – the 4<sup>th</sup> centuries BC. This third stage corresponded to the unitary (ethno-culturally and socio-politically) steppe Scythian society in which many characteristic features of nomadic empires may be observed.

The hypothesis of the three economic models and their connection with the socio-political and cultural evolution of the Eurasian nomads' complex societies is affirmed in the paper by numerous archaeological evidence.

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#### **ANNALISTIC-WRITING IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES: THE PROBLEM OF FUNCTION IN THE SYSTEM OF POWER**

Different societies of the Early Middle Ages (Ireland, Anglo-Saxon England, Frankish state, West Slavonic countries, Old Rus' and others) produced similar written texts: the annals. These texts contain descriptions of events taking place in each year. The structure of these texts is quite definite: they consist of the annals ('*annal*' in singular means an annual article, piece of text concerned with the events of one year). The annals (annual articles) consist of entries each covering a single event. These entries can equally be brief or detailed but each of them is no doubt the least unit of the annalistic text. Even the wordings with which such entries start are similar in different countries (see i.e. Old English «*on þys ilcan geare*» or Old Russian «*въ то же лето*» – both mean «in this same year»). So called 'barren annals' (annal-number indicated with no text after it) are also typical for these texts.

Each annalistic text is a result of activity of many persons (generally anonymous) writing the annals year by year or retrospectively (both were typical), compiling, editing, inserting additions or alterations, erasing or rewriting. Even inside a single manuscript we can see an eternal work of different scribes, inserting, correcting or erasing the material (i.e. the Parker Chronicle or the Annals of Inisfallen). An annalistic text itself is organized so that it can be easily proceeded with new entries or supplemented with new information — its structure is open to additions.

It is natural to suppose that production of these texts is a feature of a definite stage in the development of society. The question is what was the social function of these texts or, in other words, what tasks the early medieval society completed by writing the annals. The fact that in many cases the annalistic-writing was initiated by political power (secular or religious) also makes us think about the social function of the genre. Some theories concerning the function of the annalistic-writing in the Middle Ages are already produced (those by Ch. Plummer, M. D. Priselkov, D. S. Likhachev, I. N. Danilevsky and others) but the problem is far from being resolved. The task of this report is not to suggest an answer but to draw attention to the importance of this problem.

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### **HIERARCHY VS. HETERARCHY: BIOLOGICAL ESSENCE VS. HUMAN NATURE**

Power and authority is a common phenomenon, both in human, and animal society. Human societies have the peculiar mechanism of the social control and organization called heterarchy. The key difference between the hierarchy and heterarchy seems to be the level and subject in a reflexion of a behaviour of a decision maker. Here a decision maker is a person met a necessity to make a choice of the pattern of a behaviour, in rather wide sense. The reflexion necessary to act within the framework of the situation of hierarchy should be called "outer" one, while the latter should be called the "inner" one. The difference between these two types of a reflexy is that the former provides a persons (who is a decision maker) to act immediately, while the latter provides a person with a tool to evaluate the prolonged consequences of a behavioural act. Another essential thing is that this latter is the key tool which provides a person with means to arrange the communication which includes not a physical person, but a public institution. Six-years long observation of the dynamics of the social norms occurred in marginal groups of young people with deviation in their behaviour allows to stress that the essential shortage among the means of the social control in such sub-cultural group is a lack of the "outer" reflexy. The process of a reparation of the shortage mentioned above is still unclear, and requires more studies. We believe, a heterarchy appears when social norms are "smooth", unstable, or are absent, since here one needs to reflect norms and strategy of

behaviour. This makes a heterarchy rather wide spread in children's and unadult's stratae where the general rules are not so strictly executed and various social experimentalism is often promoted. In oppose, the heterarchy among the adults is not so side spread since its efficiency is rather low in a communication with, say, law enforcement institutions, i.e. in the situations with strict norms and explicit social regulation.

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**IDENTITY AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AMONG  
COMMERCIAL NOMADS: THE SPECIAL ROLES OF  
DISREPUTABLE BEHAVIOR, ASSEMBLY AND FIGHTING**

Civilization, by definition, involves rules, regulations, and the management of people. Yet for centuries, small amorphous populations of artisans, traders and entertainers have existed within—yet largely outside—the rules and regulations of complex societies. Gypsies are undoubtedly the most familiar of these «alien» groups, but they are only one of many similar populations: «Tinkers», «Resande», «Luri», and «Ghorbat» are some of the names by which other groups have been known. In seeking a unifying concept and category, researchers have suggested the labels «commercial nomads», «peripatetics», «service nomads», «symbiotic nomads», and «non-food producing nomads». All use nomadism as their defining feature, although some groups of artisans, traders and entertainers have been sedentary for centuries.

How have such scattered and fundamentally non-communal groups resisted incorporation into the State, while lacking their own formal political structures? Some degree of social separation from outsiders is fundamental to the preservation of these groups' distinct identities and their continued existence. The manner in which it is achieved, however, varies from group to group and over time within groups. This paper will examine how separation from the State is maintained, paying special attention to the role nonconformity and «disreputable» behavior play in creating and re-enforcing boundaries between group members and mainstream society.

The paper will also examine how group identity and internal solidarity are achieved among these physically scattered and highly, independent peoples. How do group members maintain a shared identity and handle internal disputes as well as other functions normally performed by

«government,» without overarching political structures? How do they create community and structure out of nucleation and individualism? This paper will examine the special importance group members attach to assembly and the multiple functions it serves. It will also examine informal, mechanisms of social control including fighting and the dual purpose the latter serves. The paper suggests that what these groups lack in formal political organization or structure they make up for by periodic assembly and intense, emotional interaction.

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### ***SHPIONKA V SINAGOGE: THE ART OF ETHNOGRAPHY AND PROSTITUTION AMONG POST-SOVIET RELIGIOUS JEWS***

This paper explores my role as an ethnographer at the Moscow Choral Synagogue. Following Jean-Paul Dumont's research strategy in which he used himself as a «discovery procedure» to understand the «chain reaction» that his encounter with the Other produced, I investigate how my presence at the synagogue acted as a catalyst for a crisis brewing between the synagogue administration and its congregation. The congregation consisted mostly of a small group of elderly religious Russian Jews who were completely dependent on Western Jewish organizations for religious and financial support. Rabbi Silverstein, an Orthodox Jew from France, headed the administration as the Chief Rabbi of Moscow. He wanted to streamline the synagogue decor to make it more «businesslike» and «Western» in order to attract Russian Jewish youth. I discuss how the elderly congregants resisted this plan by telling narratives about synagogue corruption, drawing on metaphors of prostitution and the mafia. In so doing, they redefined themselves as intellectuals who, like those during the Soviet period, espoused «moral intelligence» to unveil the corruption of the state in order to transform it according to their vision. I then show how Rabbi Silverstein used the Soviet strategies of surveillance and paternalistic redistribution to co-opt these narratives to his best advantage in the name of progress. As an ethnographer, I was pulled into the power struggle. Some synagogue regulars made denunciations of corruption in my presence so that I too could witness the «immoral» behavior of the administration, while others accused me of being the rabbi's spy. This paper suggests how modernity in Russia consists of reformulations and rearticulations of Soviet practices in the name of both

capitalist «progress» and the «preservation» of the past.

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### **ANCIENT ROOTS OF IMPOSTURE**

The study of imposture spills new light on the origin of power, specifics of collective and individual psychology and formation and transformation of the archetypes. The impostor proclaims himself to be king or envoy of God and heads any national movement (Gussenko). Thus he not only identifies himself with a particular person, but also coordinates his behaviour with the certain model, which has been accepted in the collective consciousness, i.e. with archetype. Chistov emphasizes messian character of «king-saver», that can be used for any applicant for a throne. The person, standing on a post the chiefs of state or in the deputies of parliament, tries to show, that he corresponds to the certain model in national consciousness. Usually it is considered, that the imposture has a basis in Christianity. But roots of this phenomenon much more ancient. Thus, in ancient Italy any person could cause on a duel the priest of Diana Nemorensis to kill it(him) and to become a priest himself (Freizer). In 16<sup>th</sup>–18<sup>th</sup> centuries there was a belief that the chief of the rebels should be a sorcerer and have special «marks» (star, month or cross, etc ). Such marks were on a body of Dimitri I, and Pugachiov showed them to his accomplices. The belief about «marks» is pre-Christian in its nature. In Russia true king should be supported by Kosaks, probably, as the group that carried ancient traditions, and atamans also had magic power.

It is necessary to note, that the image of Messiah is also pre-Christian. It is possible, that its prototype is the cultural hero - patron, who, according to ancient myths, brought the fire, gave customs and laws, and created sky and earth etc. Features of the saviour and cultural hero were combined in the image of Prometheus. Dmitri the Impostor, who wanted to give welfare to the people, invited scientists and intended to open the university in Moscow. The people recognized him as a prince because he corresponded to mass representations about the son of Ivan the Terrible, and his program corresponded to people's expectations reflected in folklore. The cultural hero of an ethnos frequently is identified with the ancestor. But Dimitri – son of the tzar – in popular believes is perceived as the elders, and people feel themselves to be a single group, a kind of a family, and also take

Dimitri as a common son. Here are the analogies with prince Ivan and Ivanushka the Fool, who had their wonderful assistants (Meletinski). On Dimitri's example we can observe the love attitude of the people to the impostors, who represent an ancient archetype of the kinship.

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### **AFRICAN ROOTS OF MESSIANISM**

In the Bible the term Mashiah (Messiah) designates the persons who are carrying out divine mission – priests, prophets, and kings. The prophets sometimes compared the unworthy leaders to an ideal fair king. Messiah is a providential saviour, intermediary between a God and people. Messianist expectations of the eschatological times resulted in the appearance of various sects, various persons were proclaimed Messiahs. Messiah acts as a leader and demiurg. There is a connotation Messia – demiurg – leader. It is characteristic to Moses and Prometheus. Moses and Prometheus combine the features of both demiurg and cultural hero. Their African origin is undoubtful. Prometheus in Greek mythology is connected to Libya (Northern Africa). Athena, also born in Lybia, helped Prometheus. She combines features of demiurg and cultural hero, and her symbols – owl and snake – are mythological patrons and ancestors. Arachna the rival of Athena, transformed in a spider, is her antropomorphous analogue, female aspect of cultural hero and demiurg. The spider is an ancient mythic image, animal that represents creative activity, crafts, and diligence. In Western Africa spider was esteemed as the most ancient alive essence. It is possible, that the image of Arachna has African origin.

Turning to mythology of the people south from Sakhara, we find a lot of similar examples. These legends mix up with the legends about the leaders and kings. In the legends of Bantu-speaking people of the area of Great Lakes the ancestor Riangombe took care of the people. Shillucs (Sudan) saw king as an embodiment of the ancestors. Epic Bantu hero Lianga defeated giant snake and cannibals. He finds the sun and closes it with the cobweb.

There is a difference between Messiah and cultural hero. Messianism is directed to the future, while the archetype of the cultural hero is directed to the ancient times. However, «Golden Age» of the messianism is partially transformed ideal of archaic society.

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### **POLITOGENESIS: GENERAL AND LATERAL BRANCHES**

The tendency to regard the historical regularities as being the same always and everywhere results in gross perversion of historical reality. For example, concurrent political processes are declared consecutive stages of the State formation. Besides, the features of the mature State are illegally spread on its early forms and thus it becomes impossible to find a «normal» early State practically anywhere.

No doubt, there were not one but many models of politogenesis in the time of the transition from primitive societies to more complex (both socially and as for the modes of production) ones. Often these models are most specific, but it is incorrect to consider them pre-state for they are equal to the early State by complexity, functions and reasons for the formation.

Therefore, the branch on which the features of the State accustomed to us are guessed retrospectively, is only one of the politogenetic branches. But as most of the other models were abolished (absorbed) or transformed into States at further stages of politogenesis, it is more efficient to recognize the «state» branch of the politogenesis as general and the other ones as lateral.

But the latter were represented not by pre-state societies but by those quite comparable to early States by the range of the political organization functions. Therefore, it is expedient to designate them as analogs of the State. The «analog of the State» notion underlines both typological and functional resemblance of such political and socio-cultural forms to the State on the one hand, and structural differences between them as well as the absence of any prospects for the «analogs of the State»'s further evolution along alternative to the State pathways, on the other hand. The introduction of this notion permits to describe the processes of politogenesis and sociogenesis more adequately. Later on most of the analogs transformed into states. However, specific conditions were necessary for such a transformation.

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**CONFORMITY AND DISSIDENCE:  
A STUDY OF THE FRAGMENTATION OF  
SOCIOCULTURAL NORMS AND ORDER IN RURAL OAXACA**

The objective of this paper is to study the social, political and legal implications of the religious fragmentation in the rural indigenous communities of Oaxaca, Southern Mexico. The paper is based on the 18 months' fieldwork carried out in the Zapotec and Chinantec communities of the Sierra Juárez, a mountainous region in the Northern part of the state of Oaxaca. Special attention is paid to the religious conflicts that have arisen between Catholics and Protestants during the past decades, due to the rapid increase of religious "dissidence" in the traditionally Catholic communities of rural Mexico, and in fact the whole post-colonial Latin America.

Concentrating on the concrete topic of religious fragmentation but looking at the relationships between religious groups in the legal and political framework, and extrapolating from the particular ethnographic context of Oaxaca, the paper aims at scrutinizing three broader issues:

The theoretical discussion of the concepts like "sociocultural norms", "order", "law", and "community," as well as the relationship between "customary" and "positive law", and "communal" and "individual rights" in the post-colonial context.

The analysis of the implications of disorder, normative heterogeneity and the existence of different interest groups within indigenous communities as a result of social change and globalization.

The study of how order is maintained or re-established, and how conflicts are resolved in the conditions of different and often opposing interests.

To address the first issue, the paper tries to demonstrate that the current conceptualization of "community" in Oaxaca, as elsewhere in Mexico and Latin America in general, is the result of the simultaneous interplay between pre-colonial indigenous identities, the legacy of colonial politics, as well as the contemporary policies of the post-colonial nation-states. In the particular ethnographic context of Oaxaca, all these have contributed to the ideal of "legal, social and religious homogeneity", and the so-called "communal ideology".

To analyze the normative heterogeneity that social change and globalization bring along, special attention is paid to the influence of the increasing presence of the non-Catholic religious groups on communal

identities, norms and order, and the reasons of massive conversions among the indigenous population. It will be argued that where the opposition between Protestants and Catholics has turned into an explicit conflict, the underlying reasons of that confrontation should not be explained in terms of the differences between religious ideologies, but the real conflict takes place in the legal and political field, where different social groups employ different legal means and discourses in their competing quests for power, thus constructing their particular legal identities in the previously homogeneous community.

Finally, the mechanisms of maintaining or re-establishing "communal consensus" are studied by looking at the ways religious conflicts are resolved, and trying to explain why in some communities social equilibrium has been achieved relatively easily, while in others violent confrontations have erupted. It will be shown that the phenomenon of religious fragmentation has led to entirely novel social discourses within the indigenous communities themselves, centered around the concepts like "pluralism", "tolerance", "human rights", etc.

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#### **ALTERNATIVE AUTHORITY ON NORTHERN CAUCASUS**

Crisis of identity in Chechen Republic partially caused by the economical situation after the first Russian-Chechen war (1995-1996), has resulted to marginalization of the Chechen ethnicity. Poverty and unemployment have gained the highest level. On the other hand, in consciousness of the citizens of the republic the image of the enemy was fixed. This image associates with the Russian soldier-colonialist. All this has created beneficial conditions for perception of the «vahhabit's doctrine».

So-called «vahhabits» appeared in Chechen Republic approximately in the beginning of the 90-s. Initially this movement had no wide occurrence and was not supported by the population. However, after end of the war a problem of non-predatory building rose before the people. Both Chechen and Russian governments could not solve this problem. New movement quickly took the form critical to existing institutions, accepting the ideas of «refinement of Islam» from pagan and national traditions reinforced by the money. Thus, the «vahhabits» began to construct their own own power

structure with rigid hierarchy and subordination. From the very beginning they acted as opposition of the Maskhadov's policy.

The basic purpose of these structures was consider to be building of the independent theocratic state on Northern Caucasus, including Chechnya and Dagestan. It is necessary to mark that these ideas do not find support among the population of these regions. Even more, the «vahhabit's doctrine» in the Caucasian interpretation promotes destruction of Chechen traditional culture. In the period of the second Chechen war the term «vahhabit» is accepted by the inhabitants of the Chechen Republic as a synonym of words: «gangster», «destroyer». While this doctrine crashed on Caucasus, but it can still receives the «second breath» as the consequence of «the humanitarian catastrophe» in this region.

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#### **THE QUESTION OF «FORM & SUBSTANCE» IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM: «SEPARATION OF POWERS» IN THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE POST-SOVIET CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES**

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, all the independent states faced the problem of self-governing. As the governance requires certain laws, the new states needed their own legal system through which they would regulate the country. The answer to it became the writing of documents with the highest legal power – individual constitutions. For the post-communist Central Asian states 'constitutionalism' was a new concept. They all used the notion of the 'separation of powers' as a basic principle of the government's structure.

Soviet rule was a good example of the constitutions that were adopted but not followed. So the new states were challenged to write «legal papers» which would be practiced by the government. As the western states have proven through history, governments based on interpretation of constitutions properly seemed to be stable. So, the independent states referred to the basic principles of the western-style constitutions in their own. This does not mean that these constitutions are the same; they do have specific traits. But nevertheless, they all can be analyzed as one document when we focus on the concept of 'separation of power.' For this we can use the constitutions of Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan.

The reason for examining the constitutions of these countries – and not of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, or Kazakhstan – is because the government of Kyrgyzstan gives more liberties to the people in practice, and Turkmenistan's does the least. This fact – if it is shown on the continuum – can be used to reflect the political condition of all Central Asian countries where Kyrgyzstan stands at the beginning of the scale and Turkmenistan at the end.

This paper will study the theory of 'separation of powers' given by John Lock and Charles Montesquieu, compare the way this concept is used in the constitutions and governmental practices in the western states, and show how it is applied as in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. It will show how and in which cases this concept works, and in which it does not.

This is an important topic, as it will take a closer look at the constitutions of the Central Asian countries and at the way they work in real life, analyzing the problem of «form & substance». The countries' legal systems influence all aspects of state life, including economic issues, which determines the countries' standing in the international arena. The political condition of these countries is an example of the fact that the «separation of powers» is used to the advantage of the presidents in Central Asia, as they are doing their best to stay in power by changing the constitutions, or pushing it to its full extent, as in Turkmenistan, where the president is chosen «for life.» Therefore, the paper will suggest possible solutions to the problem created by dissimilar interpretation and practice of the «separation of powers.»

The main sources for the research will be John Locke's *Second Treaties on the Civil Government* (1690); Montesquieu's *The Spirit of Laws* (1748); Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* (1835-1840); Central Asian and western Constitutions; articles from magazines and newspapers, and from the Internet; speeches of the presidents.

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### **BULGARIAN MENTALITY AND THE NEIGHBOURHOOD: ONE CENTURY AFTER THE TURKISH OPPRESSION**

Regarding the global tendency for proliferation of identities in the world, the issue of this paper will be the formation of Bulgarian national consciousness. The Bulgarians and their neighbours, the Turks, have been cohabiting for centuries which itself designed a noticeable model of communication between two communities both of which are forts of

extremely different civilizations: they belong to different religions but the dramatic co-existence stimulated a coherence between separate languages and religious traditions; the mentioned co-existence adhered two political regimes, and thus changed the so-called socio-cultural gene of the Bulgarians. This way it predetermined the collective historical memory of the Bulgarian nation.

The matter I will point out in my paper will be the common inter-cultural dialogue between the two identities, therefore the social and political perspective of their past and present-future relations. The latter are known as «komshoulouk», a Turkish word that corresponds to «neighbourhood» in the sense of exchanging values and traditions between *we* and *them* which has already defined an almost similar *cuisine*; a lot of Turkish words and phrases have invaded Bulgarian language; certain Muslim rituals are still kept by Bulgarians in the highly Islamised (southern) regions of the country, etc. Obviously I am talking about certain cultural fields that have settled common points of (Balkan) mentality.

Today the Turks in Bulgaria are a minority group which has the strongest feeling of its identity and group affiliation in comparison to other minority groups. One cannot neglect the so-called «*Islamic Factor*», that has been discussed especially after the Bosnia war and the Kosovo war. Bulgarians also have a definite fear of the «*Muslim axis*» that is presumed to be spread from the former Soviet Islamic republics through Turkey, southern highly Islamised regions of Bulgaria, Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania. Turks are adopted as a potential source of political tension, having in mind the cultural and religious aspects that conspicuously discerns the national identities.

So, the issue of this paper stems from where is the boundary between the negative nuance of the collective Bulgarian memories, regarding the Turks, and the present appeal for establishing inter-cultural bridges between two nations (Bulgaria and Turkey), as well as between a nation (Bulgaria) and a minority group (the Turks living in the country).

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#### **CULTURAL CAPITAL, LIVESTOCK RAIDING, AND THE MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF TRADITIONAL PASTORALISTS**

In the past I have argued that many Middle Eastern and Central Asian pastoral nomads maintained residential mobility as a political and

military strategy as well as an economic one. Mobility conferred a military advantage that they used to resist control by sedentary states, and to extort wealth from sedentary neighbors. In this paper, I argue that pastoral nomads enjoyed a second type of military advantage in addition to mobility. This second advantage can best be described using the concept of cultural capital. Cultural capital consists of skills learned as part of a particular cultural tradition that enable people to occupy a specific economic or political niche in relation to neighboring culturally different groups. Pastoralists have most of their wealth in the form of livestock and livestock is a form of wealth that is especially easy to steal. As a consequence, in the past, many pastoral nomads devoted a large amount of effort both to protecting their own livestock from raiders and to raiding other groups to steal livestock. This activity provides young men with the equivalent of military training. They became skilled cavalymen. These military skills combined with several other factors to make many pastoral nomadic groups militarily formidable, and allowed them to occupy a particular economic and political niche among Middle Eastern and Central Asian societies. The other factors included residential mobility, forms of political organization such as segmentary lineage system, and control of arid regions that were good areas of refuge from state control. As a result of their military effectiveness, these groups often maintained a high degree of independence from state control and often allied themselves militarily with neighboring states or supplied mercenary troops for neighboring states. They also used their military advantage to raid and to extort wealth from, neighboring sedentary people.

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**ORGANIZATOIN OF POWER IN THE COMMUNITIES OF THE  
KALAHARI BUSHMEN AND  
WESTERN DESERT AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINES**

The power relations are defined in judicial literature as the kind of social relations where the subject of power can control the behavior of the object of power, using in ultimate cases the direct physical coercion. In other words: if a subject of power does not possess the means of forcing the object of power into behavior, accordant with the wishes of the subject, the latter

does not have with the object the social relations of the power type. Such a definition of power will be accepted in the present article as a working one.

Judging by the definition given above the relations of power in the traditional societies of the Kalahari Bushmen (!Kung, Nharo, /Gwi) unite together only bilateral kindreds, but not bands. In the Western Desert of Australia (among the Pitjantjatjara and the related tribes) the power relations in times of the major ceremonies, united together the dialectal tribes (up to 200 persons). Hence from we may conclude that the level of power integration among the Pitjantjatjara was higher than that among the Kalahari Bushmen. In view of the fact that the Western Desert Aborigines lived in harsher, in comparison with the Kalahari Bushmen, ecological conditions a natural question arises: why should the former have had higher levels of social (power) integration than the Bushmen? (One must bear in mind that the extreme ecological environment tends to exert disintegrating influence upon the social organization of the hunter-gatherers).

It is rather obvious that the higher levels of power integration among the Pitjantjara are connected with the existence among them of traditions to gather periodically for to perform the cycles of major (and ultimately important, from the point of view of the Aborigines) rituals. The question stated above then, may be rearranged like follows: why did the Aborigines have these tribal rituals whereas the Bushmen lacked them?

We propose the ultimate cause to explain the functionally paradoxical difference in the levels of power integration between the Pitjantjara and the Bushmen to be the factor of diffusion of the clan organization (and rituals alongside with it) to Australia in the 4<sup>th</sup> millenium B.C. from South India (via Indonesia). So far we have only indirect evidence of such diffusion. It runs like follows:

1. Around 4000 BC there appeared in Australia the microlith cultures and dingo. Previous Australian stone tool kits had been very archaic, stemming from the «flake tradition» common for both Australia and New Guinea in the Upper Pleistocene times. Six kilo-years ago the dingo-dog must have been carried across a 50-kilometer stretch of open sea in a kind of a canoe. Morphological analogues of the dingo skeletons are so far found only in Northern India, the living dog breeds of New Guinea and Indochina being of much smaller stature.

2. Pama-Nyungam linguistic family had split apart not earlier than 5 kilo-years ago (k.a.), i.e. around the time of the microlith appearance. There are some traits in the morphology of the Dravidian languages which unite them with the Pama-Nyungam languages, the fact, which might best be explained by the existence of a Pre-Dravidian substrate in the languages of South India with the genetic affinities with the Pama-Nyungam languages.

3. There is essential structural resemblance (even in some non-functional details) between the Dravidian kinship term system and that of Kariera and some related tribes of Western Australia.

4. Tribal rituals among Australian Aborigines are performed in as «mysteriae» depicting the aboriginal mythical past and the deeds of the mythical ancestors, whereas the «normal» for of the nomadic foragers are rituals of shamanistic type.

5. Clan organizations are rather exceptions for the nomadic foragers, and there are some essential reasons to explain the existing cases (like Athapaskans or Algonquins), similarly with the present case, by cultural diffusions from more complex societies and not by independent local evolutions.

Summing the above-written we propose (as a tentative hypothesis) that the clan structures were introduced into aboriginal Australia at about 6 thousand years ago from outside, together with the tribal rituals and the levels of power integration exceeding that of the typical band societies. Nothing of the sort has happened in the history of South African Bushmen.

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**A CRITICAL DEATH AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE: LAW,  
KNOWLEDGE, POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE  
BRITISH/IRISH BORDERLANDS**

This paper addresses problems that intersect both postcolonial and postsocialist analyses. It examines issues of social order(s) (the rank ordering of positions and values) in modern nation states, social worth, the construction of 'truth' in episodes of state violence, the questions over compensation that the cultural power of states engenders in violent situations, the relationship of the legal issues involved to the politics of cultural recognition, and the processes entailed in extending the accountability of states in situations of violent conflict. The paper does this through an ethnographic account of a 1988 killing inflicted by a British soldier on an unarmed, Irish nationalist young man who had just walked through a border checkpoint on his way to play in a Gaelic football match between that army fortification and the British/Irish border. The state claims the death was caused by a firearms accident but local Irish nationalists do not believe this version of the event. Their local cultural practices represent the killing quite

differently, and that nationalist political community has struggled for the last twelve years to have their narratives recognized and their calls for justice heard. This paper tracks these struggles over representation and the development of a Northern Ireland-wide group, Relatives for Justice, to which the family of this young man has affiliated. It depicts the cultural practices, particularly the narratives, that this emergent group deploys to extend its networks both within Northern Ireland and globally: they have established connections to anti-racist groups in England and human rights groups in Guatemala. It analyzes the cultural practices of this group as decolonizing ones and shows how those practices make organizing for justice across cultural/political difference within Northern Ireland very difficult. Protestant unionists (British nationalists) who live in the border region have had innocent family members accidentally killed by the British security forces in what Irish nationalists believe was a state «shoot-to-kill» policy in the 1980s and early 1990s. These Protestant unionists, mostly women, cannot join in the claims and arguments of the Relatives for Justice publicly although, in secret, they have contacted the group. This situation indexes the importance of colonizing practices in the construction of unionist identities and the function of these identifying processes in making the efforts of these two communities to form joint political institutions under the new peace agreements extremely difficult.

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### **CONTROL IN GLOBAL HISTORICAL PROCESS**

The concept of a state as the instrument of suppression of all classes of society by the ruling class is not right enough. Consequently, the conclusion that the state dies in the high phases of social development essentially looks like an error from the point of view of the theory of administration which require a society as a super-system, mastering a potential of development.

Already in primitive society a specialized formation – management system – shaman-elder structure steadily existing at digenesis became its existing. Such structures consisted of those who lived long and righteously and had a great life experience. They were some kind of public memory and could form the concept of the solution of the arisen problem on the basis of past experience. Except them, the structure also included those who had

capacity to prophesy the future without dependence from reasoning on the basis of his and another's personal past experience estimated a condition of the nature and society. On the basis of a past experience and shamanistic forecasts of the future this structure correlated the purposes of public activity, formed the concept of their achievement to this and conducted it in life. In the classless society the shaman-elder structure served to the whole society and was open for the all families and clans depending on their actual, merits before company. During class flaking of society this picture considerably has changed.

Shaman-elder structure has dissolved: shamanism was transformed to hieratic priesthood having its own structures, including the secret ones; elderliness was transformed to the «superstrain» or elite which became a social base of a state machinery structures. The rest society rested in agricultural, trade and craft effecting sphere. It corresponds the 4-5-caste division of many ancient societies.

The further history of mankind is possible is to esteemed from the point of view of general administrative theory as interplay of these three members, as explicitly will be made in the report.

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#### **SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF AUTHORITY**

In the seizure and containment of a political authority always there was an informational and psychological aspect. The authority, founded extremely on force, interdiction and forcing, usually have been loosen to the authorities, founded on love both honoring of the Governor and faith in his sacred mission (charisma).

The force and stability of an authority is measured by quantity and quality of its «resource», on which it rests. The resource is perceived as combination of means, usage of which provides an influence on the object of the authority conforming to the vector of the purpose of control. Availability of resource and its rational usage provides stability of control and predictability of its results.

Among resources of a authority it is possible to name financial and economic, political and legal, power, demographic, informational and psychological components.

The information resource of an authority should be perceived as knowledge in a sense of concentration of cultural and historical experience and his administrative aspect; the structuring of this knowledge as a concept of system development, that allows to forecast and model social processes. The knowledge is one of the main resources of an authority. (Priests and astrologists as the first political advisers).

The psychological resource of an authority is a combination of psychological technologies as ways of targeted and predictable effect on personal and mass consciousness to obtain indispensable intellectual, emotional and behavioral reactions from «the object of control». The psychological technologies are based on comprehensive knowledge and count of the «psychological factor».

Development of information technologies results in change of resource balance of an authority for the benefit of informational and psychological. The informational and psychological fundament of an authority acquires especially great significance. A «virtualization» of a power takes place – image of the Leader instead of person of the Leader.

We can see the transformation of «charisma» from sacral to virtual with the help of special informational-psychological technologies. From the governor not actual possession by features of the charismatic person, and following the logician «of «checkerboard» is required. The special role in this process belongs to mass media.

Such process combined to the crisis of administration in modern Russia conducts to the crisis of authority and necessity to recover its actual status, founded on the concept of control and concrete administrative technologies. In the report the main psychological technologies used in the modern political life will be reviewed and analyzed.

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#### **THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT KAZAKHSTANS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES**

In the period after 1945 in overwhelming majority of the Asian and African countries the authoritarian regimes were established. These was caused by predominance of traditional economy, the absence of a mechanical production, and extensive agriculture. Second, many of the liberated

countries have not yet formed national self-consciousness, despite of existence of the statehood. The tribal division in these countries favoured to struggle for the power. Third, the absence of democratic traditions is connected with undeveloped legal and political system, low level of literacy. Such situation results in the usurpation of the power by clan groups. The important factor is also faith of the population in the state on behalf of kind ruler.

Countries under transition of 1990-s demonstrate both resemblance, and difference with the phenomena having a place in 1960-70-s. For years of socialism there were considerable shifts in mechanization of the production. However, although higher technical education was available in USSR, automatization of the production was not so wide spread.

Can this situation cause dictatorship? The analysis of th Kazakhstan example demonstrates, that the population will hardly support the power of dictator. However, at the same time mass leaning of the population can easily create conditions for the state of emergency, and then direct installation of dictatorship. Thus, further social differentiation in Kazakhstan, and in other countries of CIS can result in destabilization not only inside these states, but also can call the intergovernmental conflicts «brothers» within the former Soviet Union.

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### **THE COMMUNITY-CASTE SYSTEMS**

In complex societies which can be conditionally called post-primitive the development of a specific type of communes, *i.e.* the communal–caste society (the communal-caste-tribe society) can be observed. An interlacing of patrimonial, mixed patrimonial and neighboring communes with caste, servile and other communes was characteristic of such societies.

Two or three principal units combined in a complicated manner, form the basis of the communal-caste system: the community, caste and, as the third unit, either a tribe (in more primitive cultures) or the estate (in more developed ones). One can trace a continued development of communal organizations like sworn brotherhood, secret societies, priestly collegia, communal civitas, military-nomadic hordes at the early stages of feudalism and that of feudal clans, artisan guilds, religious orders, brotherhoods and other corporations of the kind at the higher stages of feudalism. A

combination of primitive sociality (brotherhood, mutual assistance) with the feudal one can be found within communal organizations of the feudal formation. Some organizations of the communal type were incorporated into the political structure as its bodies. Such were the secret societies in the countries of Tropical Africa, peer groups or sworn brothers in the early states of different regions (*e.g.*, among the Mongolian and Turk peoples) where they made up princes' bodyguards, and battle squads where they represented embryonic forms of state-military structures.

But in other cases the community development went along the line of the communal-caste (communal-caste-tribe) systems formation. Such systems existed among ancient Indo-Europeans, in the early states of Arabia, Turkmenistan, ancient India, Indochina, in the pre-state societies of Indonesia, Oceania, Eastern and North-Eastern Africa and Sahara. Their dependent position in complex societies was shaped up through the hierarchy of tribes, communes and castes and through the system of religious mentality, taboos and rituals which acquired the character of religious coercion. This safeguarded feudal exploitation even in the absence of a state. Typical examples can be found in Africa (the Tuareg tribes confederation, the Somali) and in Southern China (the I [Nosu]). With the dissemination of tribes to the periphery of the *ekumene*, to Central and Northern Europe, Siberia, Southern Africa the community-caste systems disintegrated quite often, the bonds of dependence of some community groups from others were weakened or totally disappeared. But under other conditions these systems and bonds, characteristic of them spread, ramified and became more complicated and rigidly organized internally. Finally, two or several community-caste systems could join a single one (India serves as a clear although an extreme example).

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**DEMOCRACY, CHRISTIANIZATION AND UNILINEAL DESCENT  
GROUPS: A CROSS-CULTURAL COMPARISON \***

It is shown that the presence of the unilineal descent groups is negatively correlated with the communal democracy; this correlation is especially strong for the complex traditional societies ( $\Phi=-0.49$ ;  $\Gamma=-0.84$ ). As the «deep christianization» (i.e. the christianization which lasted for a few centuries making a deep impact on the respective cultures) of complex societies correlates negatively and strongly with the presence of the unilineal descent organization ( $\Phi=\text{Rho}=-0.7$ ) and as the communal democracy correlates positively with the supracommunal one, this suggests that the christianization of Europe might have contributed to the development of the modern democracy there through the important role which it played in the destruction of the unilineal descent organization in this region.

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**POLYGyny VS MONOGAMY:  
DEMOCRACY VS NON-DEMOCRACY?**

The communal democracy is shown to be significantly and negatively correlated with polygyny. In its turn the communal democracy is demonstrated to be positively correlated with the democracy of the supracommunal structures.

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What could account for the «democratizing» influence of the monogamy? It seems reasonable to connect it with the difference in the socialization practices within polygynous vs. monogamous families. The «non-democratizing» influence of the polygyny might be connected, among other factors, with the well-known «father-absence» factor. It has been shown by various authors that the boys raised within the environment consisting mainly of women tend to develop personalities inclined towards aggressive domination-oriented behavior. It has also been shown that the development of the above-mentioned personality strongly correlates with the lack of the parental warmth, whereas such a lack is most typical for the polygynous families (especially for the non-sororal ones) characterized by the low degree of co-wives' co-operation – as a result, the co-wives are left too often face-to-face with their children without any hope for external assistance. It is well-known that such a situation provokes the lack of sufficient parental warmth and affection, excessively severe punishment of children, which tend to produce the aggressive domination-oriented personality specified above. One would expect that the presence of the respective modal personality would contribute to the prevalence of the non-democratic power structures.

Consequently, we suggest that the fact that the modern democracy developed in Europe (i.e. the very region which already in the Late Middle Ages, due to the influence of Christian dogmas, was characterized by the highest proportion of complex societies with small monogamous families and democratic communities) might not be a coincidence.

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#### **CORRUPTION NETWORKS IN RUSSIAN PRIVATIZATION**

According to the Corruption Perceptions Index 1999, the Russian Federation shares the 78th place with Ecuador in the list of 99 countries of the World arranged from "highly clean" Denmark at the top to "highly corrupt" Cameroon at the bottom. Today, most analysts agree that corruption distorts the market, impedes foreign investment, and ultimately hinder any attempts to resolve the economic crisis (Black et al., 1999; Frye, 1998). It is argued that this phenomenon originates in the socialist shortage economy, when the consumers' main concern was how to find information about the availability of goods and how to gain access to them. Both problems were solved with the help of one's social network. One of the principal outcomes

of the recent Russian privatization as a whole has been materialization of the latent informal ties that had developed under state socialism (Black et al., 1999).

The very nature of corruption makes its investigation significantly complicated because the illegal networks are driven primarily by the need to maximize concealment rather than to maximize efficiency (Baker and Faulkner, 1993). In this work, a corrupt pattern of the large enterprise privatization in Russia (1995-1998) has been investigated within the framework of social network analysis, and a three-component network model has been built. We define a corruption network as a structure of special relations between legal economic agents, bureaucrats and criminals, which provides exchange of services and information for receiving profit from illegal and semi-illegal business practices. It has two principal features: first, the relations are based principally on the exchange of information, and second, the ties are reciprocal. Corruption networks are thought of as hypergraphs, which implies that the same actor may be a member of several networks simultaneously. In the Russian case, these main components are political/official network, financial/industrial ownership network, and mass-media ownership network; each one providing an actor with different informational benefits.

Corruption networks have played an important role in defining the political and economic situation in Russia, due to many informal ties that have contributed to depleting political, financial and media resources from the public domain and accumulating them in the hands of the so-called kleptocrats. This study aimed to explore the structure of elite business actors involved in different types of managerial misdeeds during the large enterprise privatization in Russia (1995-1998). The data set was constructed using the data reported by Black et al. (1999) as well as the data acquired through the content analysis of Russian electronic media accounts; then, a number of methods, including estimation of different centrality measures (Scott, 1992), was applied. The main findings of the analysis indicated that the structure of the kleptocrats' political connections was less centralized than the pattern of co-ownership, and identified Boris Berezovski and Vagit Alekperov as the most influential actors of the Russian corruption network.

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### **ON THE ROLE OF PASTORAL-NOMADIC SYSTEMS IN POLITOGENESIS OF THE KAZAKHSTANS STEPPES NOMADS**

It is argued in many studies devoted to the nomads of the Kazakh steppes that the borders of their ancient and medieval ethno-political units were entirely dependent on and thus coincided with the natural division of the territory. The theoretical background for this hypothesis is provided by the «pastoral-nomadic system» concept the adepts of which apply to the fact that borders of each of the three Kazakh *juz* coincided with naturally-geographic regions limits in the 19<sup>th</sup> century when the *juz* were closed, self-sufficient economic complexes, *i.e.* the pastoral-nomadic systems within which a complete seasonal migrations cycle was realized. Just from this it is concluded that large societies of the nomads stood apart from each other and carried out economic activities within the limits of the same regions in the past, too.

We consider such an approach to the problem of the nomadic communities borders in the distant past as incorrect. In our opinion, the borders of a large tribal associations of the early iron age and medieval nomads did not coincide inevitably with pastoral-nomadic systems of the 19<sup>th</sup> century Kazakhs in terms of neither amplitudes or directions of seasonal migrations nor their routes density or concentration of wintry camps.

First, the Kazakh *juz* nomads' camps which, as believed, were ideally included into the borders of natural-geographical regions in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, still in 16<sup>th</sup>-17<sup>th</sup> and even in the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century essentially differed from what was established after the incorporation of Kazakhstan into the Russian Empire. Second, the historical sources give a set of examples of nomadic cycles caused by political and ecological factors. These cycles are far from the «classical» circuit of the pastoral-nomadic systems, too. Third, for the periods which are lack of written sources, there are reliable archaeological evidence according to which «wintry camps» of the nomads were located just on spots where they never existed in the «classical» pastoral-nomadic systems time. All this testifies that the

hypothesis under consideration does not take into account such factors as periodic humidifying and drying up of the steppe, the loading on pastures (dependent on demographic and other processes), various political and social collisions.

As to our mind, the exaggeration of large pastoral-nomadic systems' influence on the process of the nomads' ethno-political integration not only simplifies extremely the problem of the nomadic societies' borders in the distant past, but also provokes incorrect estimation of the degree of economic and ethnic stability in the region in the last three millennia.

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### **THE MODERN AFRICAN POLITICAL LEADERS: BASIC FEATURES AND AUTHORITIES**

1. The modern African state and political leaders show some features of traditional relations such as charisma, usage in imperious attitudes (relations) of ritual, symbols and other attributes of the potestarian model of power.

2. The charismatic qualities are the reason of an authoritarian type of power, which is based on ethnic communications, clientism, nepotism, religion. As a result, such phenomenon as personification of power is widely spread.

3. A figure of leader incorporate both the authority of power and authority of the person. Being at the head of the states and governments, chiefs of parties in power and ideologists, the African leaders have huge authorities, practically not restricted. The president in Africa not only maximum official, but also a symbol of the Nation and State. The authority of the leader promotes the rise of the state global status and its influence in the world.

4. The leaders who have come in power at the period of political changes of 1980-90-s have to use the methods of so-called educated authoritarianism («authoritarianism of development», «authoritarianism of modernization») to be held for an authority in conditions of political instability and difficult economic problems.

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### **HIERARCHY, POWER, AND SOCIAL COMPLEXITY**

The hierarchy is a structurally important component of the vital functions of any system. Its predestiny is to establish its inner order. However, the hierarchy has another side. The hierarchical relations are asymmetric and, by virtue of this principle, in the human society some of its members lead and predominate while other obey and exercise. On this basis, it is apparent that the hierarchy always implies a latent control: it is necessary for the system's integrity but it also determines the ropes of its separate components.

The hierarchical relations can be found in the world of plants and among animals and people. The animals' hierarchy can acquire two shapes: as forming a «caste» system of social insects like bees, wasps, ants, termites, or as the dominance relations among the higher animals.

Can the human society exist without the hierarchy and inequality? Some philosophers and scholars, like Marxists attempted at demonstrating that inequality and stratification were not eternal, for example, being absent in the primitive society. However, no system is able to exist without an organizational hierarchy. There were many attempts throughout history to construct a society without hierarchy and stratification. But all of them came to a dismal close. Christianity first promoted the appearance of egalitarian communities but then raised a powerful pyramid with the Pope, cardinals and inquisition.

Robert Michels showed by the example of trade union organizations of the twentieth century how the organizational hierarchy arises. A particular savory to his analysis lies in the fact that he turned to social-democratic parties as an example. A complication of an organization inevitably gives rise to the establishment of the structural hierarchy. This implies the emergence of special persons which reshape the administrative functions. At once or little by little, these persons try to take an advantage of their status for the enrichment or receipt of new privileges. But who are these persons? Psychologists believe that the thirst for power is quite often peculiar to people with the inferiority complex. This is the reason for the former fighters for quality change's rather frequent transformation into the most brutal dictators.

The familiarity with these ideas make one more and more convinced of that modern changes in political practice are trifling. Replace some variables in the pattern drawn and substitute a trade union by a group of neighboring villages; trade union dues by gifts and tributes; a party organizer with a chief, and you obtain a typical pattern of the transformation of a chiefdom into an early state. A study of the current political processes employing anthropological methods can allow to obtain further insight into the politogenesis peculiarities in the archaic societies. Paraphrasing Marx, one can say that the key to the anatomy of polities of our ancient ancestors is concealed in the anatomy of the present-day societies.

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### **NOMADIC SOCIETIES IN EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE**

The social evolution among the pastoral nomads has been worse studied than the problems of general evolution. Ethnohistorical studies of contemporary pastoral peoples of Asia and Africa show that the extensive nomadic economy, low density of population, absence of a settled way of life do not assume a necessity for any legitimated hierarchy development. Thus, one can assume that the state system has not been intrinsically necessary for the nomads.

In my opinion, three subsequent (in the order of increase in the political system complexity) levels of the pastoral nomads cultural integration can be revealed: (1) the acephal segmentary clan and tribal formations; (2) the «secondary» tribe and chiefdom; (3) the «xenocratic» nomadic empire (the supercomplex chiefdom) and «quasi-imperial» pastoral polities of smaller sizes. The supercomplex chiefdom was a specifically nomadic alternative to the state. The change-over from one level to another could happen both from a lower to a higher one and *vice versa*.

The degree of centralization of a nomadic society is stands direct relation to the quantity of neighboring agricultural civilization. From the World-System approach viewpoint, the nomads have always played the part of «semi-periphery» which has consolidated into a common space different regional economics (local civilizations, «world-empires»). In every local regional zone, the political structurization of the nomadic «semi-periphery» was in direct relation to the size of the «core». That is why trading with oases

or attacking them, the nomads of North Africa and the Near East united into the «tribal confederations» of chiefdoms, the nomads of the Eurasian steppes which existed in the margins of ancient Rus established «quasi-imperial» state-like structures, while in Inner Asia, for example, the «nomadic empire» has become such a way of adaptation.

Thus, the imperial and «quasi-imperial» organization of the nomads in Eurasia first developed, on the one hand, after the end of the «axial age», from the mid-first millennium BC when mighty agricultural empires (Ch'in in China, Maur in India, the Hellenistic states in Asia Minor, the Roman Empire in Europe) appeared, and on the other hand, in those regions where there was enough space for exercising the nomadic pastoralism and where the nomads were forced to protracted and active interaction with more highly organized agricultural urban societies.

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#### **SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE TRANSBAIKAL HSIUNG-NU \***

The social structure of the Hsiung-nu had many levels of hierarchy. The highest level of the social pyramid was occupied by the *Shan-yu* (the supreme ruler) and his relatives (the Luan-ti clan). The representatives of other noble clans, tribal chiefs and service nobility were ranked the next. The major mass of economically independent ordinary pastoral nomads occupied the step below them. At the bottom of the social pyramid was reserved for different categories of the lawless population: impoverished nomads, semi-vassal settled people, captives-tributaries being engaged in agriculture and handicraft and, possibly, for slaves.

We attempted at the extension of our knowledge of the Hsiung-nu social structure by the way of studying the differences in the nomads' burials. The materials from four best excavated cemeteries in the Transbaikal area:

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the Ivolginskaya and Cheremukhovaya pads, Derestuisky Kultuk, the Ivolginsky cemetery (342 burials in total) were selected by us for the analysis. The study of the cemeteries of the Transbaikal Hsiung-nu revealed a complex social structure, the presence of an hierarchical system of ranks traced in different sex-age and ethnic groups of the society.

The richest burials were concentrated in the Ilmovaya pad cemetery. Here, three ranks are identified in the burials of both men and women. The men's burials of the Cheremukhovaya pad and Derestuisky Kultuk are combined into several different groups which, possibly, reflect the nature of the lates' activities during their life-time. In the female burials of the Cheremukhovaya pad, two groups were revealed. No differentiation was remarkable for the female burials of Derestuisky Kultuk. Four hierarchical ranks for men and five for women were identified in the Ivolginsky cemetery. A certain differentiation of children's burials into «rich» and «poor» ones can be traced (the most pronounced differences were found for the Ivolginsky cemetery were 3 or 4 groups were identified). However, it should be borne in mind that a part of children's burials, including some not poorest ones, was related to sacrificial practices.

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#### **«DYNASTIC RACE» IN ANCIENT EGYPT: OLD THEORY AND NEW DATA**

The process of the Ancient Egyptian state formation is still a matter for discussions. According to one of many theories, the statehood was «brought» to the Nile Valley by invaders from the Near East which conquered Egypt and formed the ruling elite of the society. As the so-called «diffusion theory» supporters argue, besides the idea of statehood, Egypt enjoyed strong stimules for cultural development including backgrounds of writing, architecture, fine arts as a result of that conquest.

The theory of the «import of statehood» from the Near East was formulated for the first time by the British archaeologist Peatry in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century but it still has supporters among Egyptologists. To the Peatry's mind, the conquerors formed the dominating race and significantly differed physically from the Nile Valley autochtones. This conclusions were confirmed by craneological studies of Predynastic and Early Dynastic burials of Nakada and Abidos.

But recent archaeological surveys of cultural horizons of the brink of the 4<sup>th</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> millennia in Egypt provide extensive new archaeological evidence that does not confirm the Peatry's theory of several races (the dynastic and conquered ones) which as if existed in the Early Dynastic period.

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### **CONTEMPORARY FORMS OF STATE GENESIS**

The state came into being with the appearance of definite stratum in the society which professionally exercised control over the products of others' activity. It was the stratum that was capable to organize the concentration of the resources not connected with of the producers' vital requirements.

The appearance of such a stratum became possible when the combination of the following factors emerged:

1. The societal ability for producing the amount of resources that exceeds the minimum which is necessary for reproduction.
2. The existence of culture assuming the aggression
3. When it is impossible to avoid the aggression

The most widespread model of the political systems genesis in Europe was that of conquest. The conditions necessary for the political systems genesis, stated above, are still existing in the greater part of the world. Life regularly gives us examples of new attempts to launch such politogenetic processes . Nowadays they can be observed in the «criminal structure». For this purpose we compare Russian «criminal» organizations with feudal structures in the early medieval Europe. «Mafia» pursues the same purposes as the early states did. This is the alienation of recourses («razvesti»).

Both structures are characterized by the similarity of hierarchy what is revealed in the following:

1. The significance of the kin-based relationship for the dominating group membership (typical not for Russian but for Caucasian criminal groups).
2. Organized control over the income from a particular territory.
3. An hierarchical subordination of groups, their corporative solidarity («brigady»).
4. The availability of titles which determine the personal status in the corporation («otmorozok», «byk», «avtoritet», «vor v zakone»).

5. The corporativeness of the legal system («ponyatiya»).
6. Its restricted effect. Stability is supported by a balance of powers rather than by elaborated legal systems.

So we can assume the similarity of these two ideological systems. It is revealed in the following:

1. Aggression is the main value. A person's estimation depends on the results of this aggression.
2. Prestigious economics. The size of the experience is the criterion for the resultativeness of the personal aggressive strategy.
3. The corporativism of life style («bratva»)
4. The similarity of art (chivalrous and «criminal» literature). The plot is based on a specific version of the dominating values realization through the aggressive strategy. As a rule, the real practice differs from declared ideals, perceived corporatively.

By extending the problem from this standpoint, we pursue two main objects: we would like to revise the existing approaches both to the nature of state and to the criminality.

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#### **POWER STRUCTURES IN NOMADIC SOCIETIES: COMMENTS FROM ARAB TRIBAL NOMADIC SOCIETIES**

This paper explores the logic of power and its processes from the information and observations of Arab *bedu* groups, in particular the *Rwala bedouin* of southern Syria and northern Saudi Arabia.

*Bedu* society sees itself as founded on moral premises of equality before God, individual autonomy and thus honour defended. Participation in *bedu* society is achieved through tribal identity by descent, and by the reputation gained through competent actions.

The function of tribe is to provide and ratify identities of individuals. This enables processes of guarantee, sponsorship, protection, and recompense to be fulfilled. These processes generate enmeshed networks for production and distribution, and to rights to safety of persons and property, and to restitution if such rights were breached.

Power is thus embodied through participation in horizontal networks activated by individuals as members of groups. It is «power to enable» rather than «power over». Leaders are brought into being by the demands of specific situations. Anyone has the potential to lead. *Shaikhs* have a particular

function of mediating between tribal members and agents of other tribes or between their own tribes and representatives of alternative forms of government, e.g. centralised states.

Being nomadic made this form of power possible although it did not demand it. In the past, nomadism secured honourable livelihood for *bedouin*. Currently, with many functions of mediation, production and distribution abrogated by nation states, *bedouin* ideology maintains itself, but less visibly, in arenas other than nomadic.

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### **RUSSIA AND ISLAM: INTER-CIVILIZATIONAL CONTACT AND INTERACTION**

Historically, Russia is not Europe and Asia only but also an outcome of a kind of synthesis which resulted in a junction of European and Asian traits and the appearance of a new socio-cultural quality. Just therefore the Russian «type of civilizational development» seems to be a result of interaction between different civilizations. The contribution of the Slavs, Northmen-Varangians and Byzantines to the syncretic Russian civilization is not disputed by anybody now. But the contribution to this civilization, made by Muslim neighbors and inhabitants of the Russian state during the 13th-20th centuries, is more disputed.

At the same time the contribution of Muslims was very important. Such scholars as V.V. Bartold, G.V. Vernadski, G. Gaziz, L.N. Gumilev, R. Pipes, N.S. Trubetskoy, E. Hara-Davan, and M.G. Khudiakov wrote about it. They stressed that after the islamization of the Golden Horde a very intensive development of economic, political, military and human ties between Russia and the Muslim World began. Muslim nobles became ancestors of many Russian aristocratic families. The practice of the Golden Horde's khans and other Muslim rulers – from Kazan to the Crimea – became the most important part of the Russian political culture. The state experience of the khans was introduced into this culture, which had already been acquainted with semi-oriental political traditions of Byzantine. The integration of the Muslim elite into the Russian aristocracy facilitated the perception of some customs, habits and political machinery of the Muslim World by the Moscow court, as well as its army organization, diplomatic etiquette, rules of behavior, elements of architecture and art, various terminology and nearly the

same model of social relations. It is interesting to note that in the eyes of the Muslims living on the territories annexed by Russia, the Moscow tzars were considered as successors of the Golden Horde khans.

The hard historical experience of the pre-revolutionary Russia, the USSR, and especially of the post-Soviet Russia proved that the totalitarian centralism based on medieval traditions and acting regardless of national interests and peoples' rights has become a bankrupt. The same refers to the break and destruction of vital ties between the Russians and the Muslims. These ties are based not only on common geography, history, economics and politics, but they are also deeply rooted in a thousand-years old contact of civilizations cemented by a protracted interaction, inter-influence and mutual understanding in the process of their lasting life together.

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### **SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE RUSSIAN TOTALITARISM IN THE 19<sup>TH</sup> – EARLY 20<sup>TH</sup> CENTURIES**

The political system of Russia which formed in the 19<sup>th</sup> – early 20<sup>th</sup> century has not once been analyzed by foreign scholars. In the result of discussions, is characteristic as "autocratic" has become applicable to it most frequently. As for Russian scholars, they studied the political system mainly in the context of the revolutionary movement history. Now it might be productive to find out the social and political features of the Russian political system.

The first of these features was the recognition of the priority of ideology over practice of the country's development. Every political program or fundamental law were proclaimed by the state institutions for the sake of determining the limits of reforms. Such a situation was typical for all the main stages of Russia's development. For example, the "Great reforms" of the 1860s were limited by laws and finally stopped because the ideological principles based on totalitarian ideas were still actual.

The second feature was connected with the existence of a specific social group, which was created for the protection of hierarchy within the governing system and for defending the authority from the society. This social group was the bureaucracy which supported the political line of the state and was loyal to the autocratic ideology.

Another feature of Russian totalitarianism was concentration on the

internal interests' realization. The authorities' capability to impose their decisions to the society resulted from the militarization of the every-day life and mentality of people. For example, military settlements both provided resources for economic development and prepared people to the defense of the Russian internal interests. The best publicists of the country supported the official pan-Slavist ideology.

All these features made Russian totalitarianism of the 19<sup>th</sup> – early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries not only frightful for Western democratic systems, but also formed its immobility in the situation of social changes.

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### **HETERARCHY AND GENDER IN MIDDLE-RANGE SOCIETIES**

Over the past 30 years, archaeologists have examined numerous cases of prehistoric «middle-range» societies, conveniently labeled chiefdoms, from several parts of the globe. Although diverse, these are non-egalitarian but non-state societies, usually (but not always) agricultural, and commonly characterized by a complex intertwining of ceremony, ritual, economics, and political power. Not surprisingly, many studies of prehistoric chiefdoms focus on their evolutionary position and potential, examining them in light of the state societies that ultimately replace them in many parts of the world. This perspective has yielded important and useful research but it tends to define social complexity predominantly in terms of degrees of hierarchy and state societies as somehow the «goal» of social change. At the same time, studies of prehistoric gender relations, status, and ideology have received increasing attention.

In this paper, I will integrate these two research traditions, utilizing the concept of «heterarchy» to develop working models of gender in chiefdom societies. Heterarchy, which emphasizes the importance and complexity of both lateral and vertical social relationships is useful for illuminating the various possibilities of gender systems in these middle-range societies. These possibilities may include social hierarchies that subordinate all or most women; more or less separate but interdependent hierarchies of males and females; or, social arrangements in which status, gender, and kinship are interrelated in other complex ways. Examples will be drawn from prehistoric societies in Europe and North America. The goal is to demonstrate how a focus on heterarchy enriches our understanding of

prehistoric chiefdoms by encouraging an examination of social relationships other than simple hierarchy.

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### **SOCIAL COMPLEXITY: NECESSITY OR CHANCE?**

Change to complexity shows a mixture of patterns of randomness and regularity. The intriguing question is: what causes these patterns? Is the «outbreak» of social complexity random, deterministic or both, and why? My approach to change and complexity derives from Joseph Ford's assertion that *Evolution is chaos with feedback*. I assume that the process of change involves randomness, which goes through a dissipative stage. Dissipation, as Lorenz discovered, is an agent of order, which, as Ruelle pointed out, develops around an attractor (energy is always pulled toward an attractor). Certainly the attractor is not a fixed point, and energy enters the system and drains out. The problem is to find out the attractor which may sustain the level of energy needed for a complex structure to emerge and advance.

Mathematically modeled equilibrium shows all the conditions which are necessary for a stable system to change in a predictable, linear way (if the influx of energy stabilizes). If a system is pushed into far-from-equilibrium condition, nonlinear relationships prevail. In this stage systems do strange things. They become sensitive to external influences and small input yields huge effects. The entire system may reorganize itself in a way which strikes us as bizarre. Randomness with direction can produce surprising complexity.

My approach considers the idea of dissipative structures which arise out of nonlinear processes in nonequilibrium system. A change in one or more parameters of the system may cause unpredictable behaviors which could be subsequently modeled as chaotic. The onset of chaotic behavior occurs when one or more factors determining the population's equilibrium changes causing unpredictable responses (behavior) to the new stress. The key question is: what kind of change (increase or decrease) and of what factor(s) is causing the system to act chaotically? And further: can that order and organization arise «spontaneously» out of disorder and chaos through a process of «self-organization?» In other words: are these changes spontaneous or patterned? Prigogine says that in a far from equilibrium condition, new types of structures may originate spontaneously, and we may observe transformation from disorder, chaos, into order. New dynamic states

of matter – dissipative structures – may originate, reflecting the interaction of a given system with its surroundings. Such interaction of a system with the outside world, its embedding in nonequilibrium conditions, may become, at certain condition (Benard instability) the starting point for the formation of new dynamic dissipative structures. In Prigoginian terms, all systems contain subsystems, which are continually «fluctuating.» At times, a single fluctuation or combination of them may become so powerful, as a result of positive feedback, that it shatters the preexisting organization. At this moment – called a singular moment or bifurcation point – it is impossible to determine which direction the change will take: whether the system will disintegrate into chaos or leap to a new, more differentiated, higher level of order or organization – a dissipative structure, which require more energy to sustain. Dissipative structures are essentially reflections of the global situation of nonequilibrium producing them. The parameters (distance and time scales) describing them are macroscopic even on a molecular level. The concept of change initiated at a bifurcation point is not free of several deterministic laws, however. They take over the system once the *b*-point has been reached and the next step chosen. From that moment onto the next *b*-point, deterministic laws of nature regulate the system's existence. The question of the limits of complexity has often been raised. Indeed, the more complex a system is, the more types of fluctuations that threaten its stability. How then can systems as complex as ecological or human organizations possibly exist? How do they manage to avoid permanent chaos? The stabilizing effect of communication, of diffusion processes, could be a partial answer. There is a competition between stabilization through communication and instability through fluctuation. The outcome of that competition determines the threshold of stability.

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#### **THE ESSENCE OF AUTHORITY AND ITS SYMBOLISM IN AFRICAN TRADITIONAL CULTURES**

It is usual to see the notions like the «king» or «emperor» as denoting traditional rulers in the Africanistic literature. Such definitions are not absolutely correct. The essence of the traditional rulers' authority in Africa south of the Sahara is basically different. Every ruler was a sacred and ritual person there. A specific hierarchy of their sacred features existed. Any

leader of a family, village, district, chiefdom or early state was to guarantee the well-being of his own subjects within these social units through his sacred essence. The hierarchy of the rulers' sacred features was symbolically expressed in a set of special artifacts or signs of the authority. There were special leopard skin coats, umbrellas, bracelets and bangles, beads and necklaces axes and swords, bells and so on. Specific kinds of drums had especially important significance and meaning. They were both signs of the authority and objects which could symbolically substitute for the leaders in precolonial times. Besides the sacralized ruler, there also was a merely political or war leader in many precolonial African cultures. But as for the early states, there often was only one leader which concentrated both ritual and political authority in his arms. Such rulers preserved the sacred features of their predecessors. Many African early states were islamized or baptized, so their political systems enjoyed strong external influence. But the traditional role of former symbols of authority remained as significant as before even in such cases as for example Songhay, Sennar or Ethiopia.

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**SPATIAL RELATIONS AS INDICATOR OF FAMILY HIERARCHY  
IN THE DRAWINGS OF  
6-7 YEARS OLD TWINS**

Pictorial representations of family were studied in 21 pairs of monozygotic (MZ) and 26 same sex dyzygotic (DZ) 6-7 years old twins. The size of figures, drawn by children was used as a quantitative measure for estimating (a) the sizes of three other family members figures –father, mother and cotwin; (b) the distances from the author's figure to the others three kin; (c) the distances between the figure of cotwin and others. The mean proportions of mother's, father's and cotwin's figures were 1.48; 1.38; 1.04. The comparison of mean values and dispersions was carried out between MZ and DZ twins. There were no statistically significant differences in the sizes of relative's figures, but the distances between figures were generally larger in drawings of DZ twins. The mean distance to mother's figure was 1.53 in MZ group and 2.11 in DZ group ( $p < 0.01$ ). Similar peculiarities were registered

for cotwins. The mean distances from cotwin to mother were 1.41 in MZ group and 2.19 in DZ group ( $p < 0.01$ ). There were also statistically significant gender differences in spacing. The distances to mother's figure were 1.34 in girl's sample and 2.88 in boy's sample ( $p < 0.01$ ). For the cotwin the same distances were 1.45 in girls and 2.31 in boys ( $p < 0.05$ ). Taken together, these findings provide initial evidence for the importance of biological determinants for child's organization and representation of the spatial relations in drawings.

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### **THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURES IN THE BRONZE AND EARLY IRON AGE SOCIETIES OF THE SOUTH OF EASTERN EUROPE**

The search of new approaches to the study of ancient societies formerly considered as «primitive» is one of the positive present-day historical science phenomena. In particular, it concerns a reevaluation of the level of social and cultural development of the Bronze and Early Iron Age steppe and forest-steppe Eurasia population «non-primitive» features of which are becoming more and more evident. The degree of their development can be determined by means of comparison with: 1. Classical civilizations of the Ancient East and the Mediterranean; 2. Later nomad societies of the 1<sup>st</sup> millennium BC; 3. Historically and ethnologically reconstructed transitional stages from the primitivity to the civilization.

The first approach generally leads to unsatisfactory results as we deal with societies and cultures that differ in levels of historical development and social integration. The second way of comparison seems to be more perspective though it is difficult to find the types of archaeological sources comparable in some fundamental indications. Relevant information can be obtained by the study of: a) patterns, types and dimensions of settlements that various demographic and social data provide; b) dimensions of dwellings indicating family type and structure; c) differences in dimensions of funeral constructions denoting the degree of social heterogeneity; d) location of prestigious burials in the structure of burial grounds and separate mounds.

A diachronic investigation of the Bronze and Early Iron Age societies of the South of Eastern Europe demonstrates their significant structural differences. The latter had a more complicated social and political

organization. The main features that distinguished them from the Bronze Age societies were as follows: 1) the emergence of a 2-3 level hierarchy of settlements within separate microdistricts; 2) the existence of large fortified town-sites functioning not only as trade and craft centers, but also as important administrative ones; 3) the wide spread of dwellings occupied by small patriarchal families while in the Bronze Age dwellings of from 50-70 to 150-300 m for large family communities entirely prevailed; 4) the construction of separate «royal» and «retainer» necropolises for the dominating aristocratic military elite, the existence of which in the Scythian society is confirmed by antique sources (Herod., II, 167; PS-Hyp., De aere, 22, 30; Luc., Scyth., 1,3,5; Amen., XII, 27). Their evidence leave no doubt that the Scythians and later the Sarmatians had not only the nobility but also the state system with ruling royal dynasties. Both large mounds of local nobility and Herodotus' mentioning the «tzars» of Budini, Geloni and Melancheleni (Herod., IV, 102, 119) confirm the existence of some authority structures in the steppe and forest-steppe regions.

Beginning with the Scythian period, it is possible to determine the estate society division. As it is well known, members of different estates were buried in different necropolises or in different parts of the same necropolis in such a society. It looks like even the most illustrious burial sites of the Middle Bronze Age (Sintashta is the best example) do not fully match with this criterion. In one mound of the type it was possible for a «forefather» of a high rank to be buried first while his ordinary ranked descendants were buried later. In another one a common man could be placed in the main burial and one of the latest and most peripheral grave pits could yield a burial of an upper class person. Grounded on the phenomenon described, it is proper to characterize the Bronze Age societies not as estate or even stratified but as «ranked» ones (Fried) since the inheritance of buried persons' social status can not be traced. The social rank attribution was determined not by birth but according to individual physical and professional skills as well as by personal merits. The notion of «circumstantial rank» could be more relevant for characterizing the situation when organized military structures emerged in societies during wars and long distance migrations. This hypothesis fits well the phenomenon of quick rise and equally rapid fall of chariot-warriors in the cattle-breeding societies of Eurasia in the 17<sup>th</sup> – 16<sup>th</sup> centuries BC.

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### **THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL RANK IN FEMALES OF FREE-RANGING HAMADRYAS BABOONS \***

The social organization of hamadryas baboons is considered to be based mainly on the males-females bonds. Males are viewed as group integrating sex. The social role of females and the role of female-female bonds for group cohesion in hamadryas baboons are far less recognized. The aim of our study was to monitor the dynamics of rank acquisition in hamadryas baboon females in Gumista Reserve. The data were collected in 1974-1992. It was found that positions of females inside the troop can be characterized by two ranks – the one being an intratroop rank, and the other her intraharem rank. The two ranks are in correlation with each other. Although, all females were incorporated into the joined network of social relationships, no correlations between daughters and mothers ranks were found. The age-dependent dynamics of the female's individual rank, similar to that reported for females of *Presbytis entellus*, was observed. The rank of females gradually increased from the low at the age 4-6, to maximal at the age of 9-16. At later ages it was slowly decreasing. The dynamics of social ranks in females of hamadryas baboons was in close correlation with the age-dependent dynamics of their fertility and fitness. The direct influence of males on the females hierarchical position was demonstrated in this study.

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### **PALACE SERVANTS/EUNUCHS IN THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES**

The medieval Islamic history provides a series of examples of palace

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servants/eunuchs' ascending to the state power. Several famous eunuchs such as Munis (the Abbasid Caliphate), Kafur (the pre-Fatimid Egypt), Barjawan (the Fatimid Egypt), Faiq and Jawdhar (al-Andalus) were among the most prominent figures of their times. In fact, eunuchs' rise to power deserves consideration as a particular phenomenon of the mediaeval Islamic history. In this report I intend to study this phenomenon and determine the conditions necessary for its implementation.

The eunuchs' influence at the court was primarily based upon their closeness to the sovereign. As eunuchs owed everything they had to their master, they were boundlessly loyal to him. The ruler, in his turn, saw his servants on a day-by-day basis and was able to evaluate everyone's abilities and loyalty. A servant of proven loyalty could be charged with a mission of state importance which considerably raised his prestige. Such trusted eunuchs gradually acquired influential allies at the court and sometimes turned into leaders of courtly parties. Occasionally they ran the state treasury and thus were well provided with funds. All this enabled eunuchs to intervene politics and, in some cases, to influence the state power. A eunuch, however, could not rule effectively and had to rely upon either a weak and dependent monarch or a consent of major political forces to back or at least to tolerate his power. Failure to comply with one of these conditions could destroy a powerful eunuch. A strong ruler could put him to death at any time for the eunuch remained a servant no matter how influential he was. The political equilibrium which eunuchs had to achieve was rather fragile. A destruction of that equilibrium or the rise of a hostile political force was likely to remove eunuchs from the political scene.

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#### **AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME AND THE CONTEXT OF CONDITIONALITY**

Law always emerges in a context. But the surround is often less well known than the formal product. When a new piece of law is supposed to solve an old problem it is important to know how this problem has been conceived by the drafters and others. What I plan to explore here is the context of a piece of international law that emerged from the U.N. in 1994. The logic of the Convention to Combat Desertification, as it was called, was

closely related to the logic of contemporaneous development programs being played out in West Africa.

Being both a lawyer and an anthropologist, I was hired as a consultant in relation to some of these West African projects. I had a number of occasions to participate in planning and reviewing meetings participated in by donors, administrative agencies, African officials, European government representatives, technical advisors and others. These meetings were sometimes in Paris, sometimes in other centers ranging from the Cape Verde Islands to Berlin. I also had occasion to visit West Africa, visit rural villages, and talk with African officials of many different ranks. What this paper will do is to link the legal document, the text of the treaty itself, to these fieldwork-like observations of the many different interested parties, from villagers in West Africa to European participants at official meetings.

Methodologically this attempts to break new theoretical ground with respect to the field of production and application of certain transnational laws in the post-colonial world. It places the transnational treaty and the policies it expresses in the context of the exceedingly complex arena in which the numerous interested parties are competing with each other to try to define and control what is happening. The power politics of donors and the economic strategies of the national governments of developing countries are seen as they claim to address the realities of rural life today. The rural dwellers have their own views. And meanwhile, the transnational treaty-designers couch their plans in terms that describe benefits for all.

The Convention was an international agreement about the management of environmental resources in drought-stricken areas, referring particularly to Africa (United Nations, General Assembly, Elaboration of an International Convention to Combat Desertification...etc.1994). But the agreement is not just about the environment. That was the functional wedge by means of which a major political change was to be implemented.

Three levels were targeted for change. At the international level, the Convention proposes the establishment of multi-state, intergovernmental regional authorities. That is, it allocates to regional authorities above the level of the state the responsibility of designing and coordinating regional action programs. The African country parties are to «promote regional cooperation and integration» (Annex 1, Article 4, Section 1b: 34 of draft text). The Convention also commits the signatory states to developing their own related national action programs regarding resource management. And they are to do so while «strengthening reforms currently in progress toward greater decentralization, resource tenure as well as reinforcing participation of local populations and communities» (Annex 1, Article 4, Section 2b:35 of draft text). The cooperation of rural dwellers is obviously intrinsic to

implementation since they are the people who, in fact, live on and use the relevant resources, and constitute by far the majority of the population of the countries involved. It is a package that looks to many different political levels. The Convention manages to combine a populist rhetoric about rural populations and the reform of and decentralization of national governments within a larger design. The big-scale plan is of new, high-level centralized international organizational controls. The paradox is clear.

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### **SOCIETY, STATE, AND POWER IN THE MIRROR OF MASS CONSCIOUSNESS IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA**

Modern mass consciousness reflects the contradictions and paradoxes of the society. But there is an explicit tendency to the stabilization of the consciousness, to the formation of the space identification, which is defined by common values or stereotypes based on the following criteria: 1) mythological character of the mentality of the Russians; 2) preservation and rehabilitation of the socio-cultural stereotypes of the Soviet times. The shock after the exposure was replaced by the «rationale» comparison of the epochs, use of the «Soviet paradigm» as the universal measure system. «Soviet paradigm» defines the specifics of the comparison parameters of three periods – Stalinist USSR, Brezhnev USSR and contemporary Russia – represented in the sociological study by RNIS and NP in the end of 1998. In all the age categories the identification with the Brezhnev epoch was the highest, and with the modern Russia was the lowest.

Peculiarities of mass consciousness define the primary directions of relationship of the society, individuals and state. Russian socio-cultural model postulates priority of the interests of the society, expressed in the state policy, guarantees of the personal rights, and reflects Russian stereotypes of «the common welfare», sacrifice in the name of the society. The Soviet stereotype of unimportance of the material well-being is still valid in the Russian society, although the majority of the population lives in poverty.

New values – wealth, necessity to maintain the family – are already present in mass consciousness, but 80% of the requested consider this to be a function of the state. The paternalistic model of the state exists on the level of the images and ideal values, being connected with myth of «good tzar» and «strong hand», which is able to oppose the chaos and to guarantee the order

and security. Power and its bearers are accepted through a glass of the oppositions «the good – the evil», «we – they». The image of mythological evil is a form of the defense of the power, that tries to hide its mistakes and defeats. Without this image the model of Russian statehood can be easily destroyed; there is a danger of «the political inversion» when the vector of the evil turns to the power itself.

Mass-media influence on the mass consciousness, constantly creating the images of the enemies, feeding the unfaith in the state, the power, and the law, and, thus, devaluating main cultural categories. At the same time some processes develop out of the influence of mass-media, for example, the aspiration to restore lost values, such as collectivism, justice, spirituality.

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**DEALING WITH THE STATE AND FOREIGN CAPITAL.  
STRATEGIES OF RESISTANCE AND COLLABORATION IN  
CZECH VILLAGE POLITICS**

The paper deals with the question of empowerment of those people in whose name revolutions are made, development projects are conceived and non-governmental organisations speak in international meetings. It critically examines the issue of popular participation in radical institutional change and investigates the ideas and strategies of actors at the grassroots level. What ideas do people develop about the world they want to live in and how does their local knowledge relate to development projects and assistance schemes? To what extent are they victims or strategists in times of rapid social change?

The distinction between right and left, pro-market and pro-communism does not make sense in Czech village politics today, where political fights are intensely linked to relations of love and hatred dating far back into the communist era and to moral convictions and material interests going beyond political-ideological boundaries. Nevertheless the intense fight between two factions in the village Mokrovousy in the Cesky Kras around a nature protected area exploited by a big lime stone quarry, that I will analyse here, plays precisely with these political categories mixing them with personal feelings and resentments. Alliances from communist times shape village politics and the strategies towards external actors such as regional and national administrations, European funds and citizen initiatives.

The question is how do the actors on the local level make their grievances and objectives understood to central authorities. To what extent can they translate their frames of reference and worldviews into official language and be listened to and understood. Or to what extent is it not language but action in the form of strategies of resistance and refusal, and also collaboration that establishes communication with central authorities and sympathetic supporters.

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### **THE ALBANIAN`S VALUES MUTATIONS AND THE OBSTACLES TO THE DEMOCRACY IN ALBANIA**

The overthrow of the communist system in Albania, which had imprisoned the Albanian society for half a century was followed by the immediate destruction of a whole system of false values. This is provide by the fact that none of these previous propagated values or such terms as : the new man, socialist love, proletarian morale etc, do not exist any more.

Although, the people turn the head back to remember something from their past, this retrospective does not happen not because they like the values of a failed political, economical, morale system, but because they can not be separated from the nostalgia and which is more important they believe more in a false value system than a society without codified qualities, morally, politically or juridical. To have a democratic regime order all the parameters of the real democracy are needed: the consolidated institutions, independent power, democratic press independence, a respected minority, a whole participation in the operation of the institutions.

Can we say that Albanians have a democratic regime during these years? Formally, yes. In practice the answer is different. The well known parameters of the democracy were not respected, which means that the institutions were not set up. The powers remained dependent on each other, the press was manipulated. The political minority was not respected and high panels of democracy were boycotted. In reality the Albania democracy was too partial.

As a consequence it degenerated into anarchy (1997) risking the final distruction. But exactly when the democracy was in the fire of anarchy it, with the help of the international factor was reactivated in Albania, surviving from its own ashes, with the same features and vices.

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### **SOCIAL JUSTICE IN MESOPOTAMIA AND ISRAEL: HIERARCHY AND POWER-PLAY**

The societal quest for justice and equity is already reflected in the earliest societies of Mesopotamia and Israel. Through the ages this quest has manifested the ambivalence of power, ideology and disillusion. The lofty ideals of social justice are often prone to perversion and the safeguard of power positions.

The paper investigates the measurements and the programs of socio-economic reform in ancient Mesopotamia and royal efforts to establish justice through the announcement of special decrees (*Miṣarum-edicts*), in status comparable to contemporary moratorium decrees. The initial goal of these decrees was to redress social and economic imbalances. This royal responsibility towards social justice had gradually lost its significance and continued as mere royal ideology. The decrees continued into the Neo-Assyrian period with the *Anduraru* decrees, but here their effectiveness was soon neutralized by stipulations of contractual law.

During the Deuteronomistic movement (six century BCE) in ancient Israel's history a grand program was propagated that would ensure a just system for society with full acknowledgement of the rights of the marginalized sectors of society. The religious and moral ideas of this movement were coined amongst the pastoral «people of the land» (*'am ha'arez*) who gained access to power in the time of Josiah. However, through the lack of power and the corruption of the official institutes of the state these ideals were eroded, and eventually remained ineffective ideals.

These historical situations remain relevant pictures of the impasses between religious and ideological ideals, on the one hand, and historical realities of power to the detriment of justice, on the other hand.

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**ANCIENT NEAR EAST (2<sup>ND</sup> MILLENNIUM BC):  
A CASE OF «PSEUDO-ABSOLUTE MONARCHY» ?**

Such term, as «absolute monarchy», covers in reality quite a broad spectrum of political forms, sometimes almost opposite to each other from socio-psychological point of view. One «pole» here is occupied by actual autocracy of Achaemenian-Hellenistic type, where the king is regarded to be a personification and highest source of socio-cultural norm; so no one can criticize and condemn his actions, being not changed into an enemy of regime. «Everything that does great king must be accepted as just» (Arr. IV. 9, 7) and at least stands higher than level of ethical estimation by his subjects does. The opposite «pole» is occupied by such political systems as Middle or New Egyptian and New Hittite. The king here is formally an «absolute ruler» as his activity is not subjected to appeal to any instance or limited by any official norm. In both cases he is sacralized and allotted by solar divinity. Nevertheless his subject of any rank is allowed and expected to judge his actions, have a different opinion on it and openly express it or make a complaint to the king himself about the latter's incorrectness, remaining a loyal and respected member of society and not opposing himself to the king as political enemy («Khufu and the wizards», «Tudkhalias' Annals»). Moreover it is thought that the king can become a criminal and then even the sharpest opposition and open insurrection are sanctioned as righteous (glorified accusation of king in «Ipuwer's Speeches», justification of Hattusilis III' usurpation in his «Apology»). Thus the king is not impeccable embodiment of norm, the latter exists independently among his people as a base of their sanctioned evaluation of the king himself, who is subject not to political, but to ethical trial of his people, and accepts this trial as natural and authoritative (voluntary and extensive self-apologizing of Hattusili before his subjects). The king is not a source, but the highest servant of norm, and functional, not self-sufficing character of his office is fully recognized. Such a «pseudo-absolute» ruler can be compared rather with a commander-in-chief than with a real autocrat.

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**CHANGING POLITICAL SYSTEM IN CONTEMPORARY  
UGANDA: A PHENOMENON OF «NO-PARTY DEMOCRACY»**

Last decennary of the 20th century was marked an event is supposed to be one of the most radical shift in the political history of African countries. Almost all of them from 1989–1990 onward were involved in the processes of political democratization. Social scientists define this new trend usually as «the second liberation» (the first one had occurred in the 1960s from colonial rule) or as «the third wave of efforts to inaugurate democracy in Africa». The new trend of political development consists first of all in a transition from authoritarian type of rule (in some cases one-party rule) that dominated in Africa before to political democracy and with a multi-party system, political and civil liberties, presidential and parliamentary elections, better respect for human rights.

The years of the new democratic evolution has clearly showed it is impossible to import the western model of democratic political system wholly to Africa, especially at once and without any real taking into account African economic, social, ethnic and religious realities as well as local political traditions, values, experiences. It is obviously now there isn't a single unilinear way for all African (and not only African) countries to «real» democracy. These isn't a universal political model of rule as a goal of this way as well.

It is necessary to understand that democracy for Africa isn't a visible self-valuable goal but a political instrument to overcome a backwardness and poverty and to recover. Consequently democratic changes have to be adjusted to a concrete reality and conditions on the place.

Current Uganda's democratic evolution gives a unique example to investigate how a local political elite develops their own model of democracy quite different from both «western» democracy and other African countries ones. Ugandan-style democracy can be called «no-party democracy» after Nelson Kasfir.

Since Yoweri Museveni and headed by him National Resistance Movement (NRM) took power in 1986 Uganda has been progressively developing with a stable government, with a slow but sustainable strides in recovering from the terrible consequences of the long period of dictatorships and civil war, from the lawless and economic chaos.

As for political changes an absolutely new system of government has been created during these 15 years. This system of «movement

democracy» or «indigenous democracy» as the NRM's leaders call it combines elements of both «participatory democracy»(in other words «popular» or «direct» democracy) and «parliamentary democracy». According to this five-tiered system of local government (Local Councils are created on from village to district levels) all adults are members of their village Local Council (LC) and as a result they decide village issues and elect their representatives to work in higher LCs. On the other hand there is a national legislative body Parliament (the last national election took place in 1996).

In Uganda's political system parties may exist but law limits its participation in everyday political activity. For example parties were not permitted to participate in presidential and parliamentary elections in 1996. There are some other very interesting traits of this «no-party democracy» that do it interesting for research.

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#### **«STATE CONCERN» IN ARCTIC POLICY OF MODERN RUSSIA**

In the report it is supposed to consider a situation added up in last years in Russia. It is bound with the influence of oil corporations on the state policy at the federal and regional levels. The crude oil production in arctic and subarctic regions of Russia has rendered not only essential influencing on a mode of life of the native born peoples of the North, but also has essentially influenced on authorities, and its methods. The analysis of processes received a title of «oilism» (concept introduced by Yu. Vella, one of the outstanding figures of motion of the native born peoples of the North), introduces soul interest.» Oilism» not only determines the priorities of authority, but also creates as though situation» authorities without an authority".

Specially brightly» oilism» show itself in the *Hanty-Mansiysky avtonomny okrug* (autonomous district), where I conduct field researches» Oilers» are studied as separate social group (interview and observation). Their perception by the native born peoples is also studied. It is possible to say, what during last ten years a coalescence «of state concern» and concern of the oil capital have taking place. The arctic policy in relation to the native born peoples was transformed to the system of the legislation shadowing first of all the rights of users of natural resources.

At the federal level these processes are more blurred, but they can be observed at the analysis of State Duma elections of 1999, when the fight of users of natural resources for their candidates brightly showed. In some northern districts one could say about victory of this or that company, not about programs of people's candidates.

The exclusive position of oiliers in Russia and their influencing on policy seems more clear comparing them with other users of natural resources for example those who engaged gold or platinum mining on Chukotka and Kamchatka, where for me also was a capability to conduct field researches.

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***SHARIF IN THE TRIBE, SHARIF ON THE THRONE:  
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON RELIGIOUS STATUS AND POWER  
IN PRE-COLONIAL ALAWI MOROCCO***

The descendants of prophet Muhammad (*sharif-s*) have played a significant role on the Moroccan political stage since olden days. Their influence on the evolution of the country particularly increased in the period of sharifian dynasties – the Saadians (1510-1659) and the Alawis (from the 1660s). Findings from historical sources and ethnographic research allow to single out some common and specific features of the religious and political status of *sharif-s* within the tribal and state structure of the Moroccan sultanate.

Arbitration –an important means of intertribal relations control and of blood feud ceasing – always was a trump of sharifian clans in the political struggle. The authority of a *sharif*, based on his peaceful disposition, independence of opinions and wisdom, allowed quarreling parties to make peace under his pressure without any damage to their self-respect. However, the divine beneficent power of a *sharif (baraka)* could be universally recognized and constituted an important element of social practice only if his peacemaking efforts were effective. Such a situation compelled sharifian leaders to have recourse to subtle diplomatic tricks, basing on ambitions of tribal chiefs.

The sharifian *sultan* was perceived in the popular tradition as *primus inter pares* among leaders of provincial religious clans. The interdependency of the monarchy and local sharifian families was caused by both the fact that

the *sultan's* power in Morocco of the 16<sup>th</sup> – 19<sup>th</sup> centuries was introduced through the network of intertribal arbitrators, and the fact that the sharifian sultanate and the institution of arbitration monopolized successfully the expression of collective consciousness of this North-African country population. At the same time, an inversion of meaning of many notions related to the tribal social life can be observed at the level of the Moroccan state. The local self-identification was based on territorial borders, while the affiliation to the Muslim community (*umma*) was determined by faith; the social structure of tribes was quite egalitarian, while the state presupposed an hierarchical order, in which the *sultan* was perceived first of all as a spiritual symbol; the dichotomy between the temporal and spiritual power, between the chief and the *sharif* significant at the local level, lost its relevance at the level of the Alawi sultanate. Here the Commander of the Faithful (*amir al-mu'uminin*) exercised his power and forced his subjects to recognize it combining in his person the phenomena of coercion and divine beneficent power, incompatible at the tribal level.

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#### **THE KYRGYZES: ON THE WAY TO NATION FORMATION**

My paper deals with the process of nation formation in Kyrgyzstan. As the paper deals with ethnicity, I suggest readings the books of scholars who were occupied with the problem of nation and ethnicity, such as books by an outstanding expert in nationalism E. Gellner («Plough, Sword, and Book», «Nations and Nationalism»), Anthony Smith («The Ethnic Origins of Nations»), A. Hiddens («Imagined Communities»), works of S. Abramzon and others.

The paper deals with the process of nation formation in Kyrgyzstan. Independence of Central Asia states, including Kyrgyzstan, is a very amusing case. People of these states, unlike those of Baltic states, Georgia, the Ukraine, did not struggle for their independence. They were just given it (there have been no any kind of expression the will of the people, such as referendum). The Kyrgyzes were not quite ready to accept such independence, and now have quite uncertain perspectives of maintaining their independence. Kyrgyz nationalism is tempered by tribalism, which took much stronger positions after the collapse of the USSR. Loyalties of the Kyrgyzes, like those of other Central Asians, lay first with family, clan, and tribe. A significant part in political life of Central Asian states play what can

be defined as «traditionalism», i.e. the way of life based on customs, traditions and rules of conduct accepted in pre-industrial society. Communists created new states and this process was accompanied by attacks on the traditional power structures, which forced them to adapt new realities. After the disintegration of the USSR we have in Kyrgyzstan victory of tribalism. Under certain circumstances intertribal war for leadership is quite possible in all Central Asian countries, and neighboring Tadjikistan is a case in point. Many Kyrgyz intellectuals argue that tribalism, after gaining independence, became really a national disaster. What are the ways for overcoming tribalism? Is there possible way to national consolidation? In my paper I have attempted to find out possible answers to these questions.

The main objectives of my paper may be outlined as follows:

1. What are ways to formation of national consciousness? The answer can be found in the ethnic origins of the Kyrgyzes.

2. Why tribalism has such hardy roots in Kyrgyzstan? This problem cannot be understood without inquiry to the Kyrgyz tribal system which has been forming for centuries.

3. What are reasons for long-simmering tensions between northern and southern Kyrgyzes? I have investigated historic, ethnic, economic and political reasons for these tensions.

4. Having based on the results of questionings, interviews, surveys, studying of historic, sociological, anthropological and other materials I have made some speculations about future political development of the Kyrgyz Republic. An outstanding expert in nationalism Ernest Gellner called Middle Eastern states “quasi-states”, as they failed to consolidate ethnic groups under one central authority. Kyrgyzstan can also be called a “quasi-state”, as the Kyrgyzes are now just on the way of nation formation. The paper, in my opinion, represents interest for all post-imperial and post-socialist developing countries.

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#### **OVERCOMING HIERARCHY: CONVERSATIONS ON COMMON CONCERNS BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF AMAZONIA AND INVESTIGATORS FROM THE WEST**

Many of the indigenous peoples of Amazonia strongly value a sociality that perpetually works toward the destabilisation of hierarchical

modes of interaction. It has, therefore, been a mistake to view their social life through the lens of a western vision of 'Society', which by definition usually assumes the necessity of institutions of domination and subordination. In his argument against viewing Amazonian peoples and their egalitarian ways through the imagery of evolution, Clastres notes that it is through their highly subtle political philosophies that Amazonian peoples have refused the power of the State, and the institutions of violence and coercion upon which such power is based. Structures of domination have on the whole been alien to many of these people, who can be notably allergic to coercive tactics and the weight of rules and regulations.

This paper will explore more specifically the ways in which the complex social philosophy of the egalitarian Piaroa of the Orinoco Basin is constitutive of daily social practice. To translate their exceedingly rich and many-layered understandings of the relationship between power and equality is not easy. Our own hierarchisation of knowledge has led us to neglect the capacity of others to think as social, moral and political beings to such an extent that we have refused to see their knowledges.

Moreover, unlike us, the Piaroa have not separated ontology and cosmology from matters of morality and social life. To begin to overcome such obstacles to our own comprehension, the suggestion is that in order for us to take seriously indigenous insights, discernments and their link with their own egalitarian practices, we must attempt a conversation with these peoples on political concerns that we might share. For instance central to any moral or political doctrine where the concern is on the side of equality and personal autonomy is the idea of power as 'a problem': power, as a force with coercive, violent, and repressive aspects, is seen as something that must be dealt with, first in theory, and then through action. Who, if anyone, is morally responsible for those powers that allow for humanity's use of the products of the earth, and for their transformation? Through asking such questions, those that appeal to common concerns, a path can be followed that would unfold not only the meaning of indigenous social and moral categories, but also be enlightening of our own. To understand the one entails a deeper understanding of the other.

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### MYTH OF MIGRATION IN THE IDEOLOGY OF POWER OF YUCATAN MAYA

On the base of the data of colonial sources it is possible to define three conceptions of the legitimization of power which co-existed in Maya society of Yucatan in the Late Postclassic (1250-1527 AD). Each of them worked on the separate level of political organization, sometimes not correlating with others. In early 16th century every Yucatan» pueblo» represented a community which was built as hierarchy of the lineage groups. The rulers and their kin were autonomous from the community kinship organization. High rulers of the *kuchkabal*» states» which included several dozens of communities and community rulers were members of several» great dynasties» .

First conception legitimized the power of rulers not connected with» great dynasties» and leaders of *kuchteel* (community parts). It was based on the myth describing how the community found its territory in the beginning of the time and re-thought as a migration from mythical native land (usually located on the east) led by patron deity, who gave to the community its name. After his death the power was left in the hands of» the worthiest people» which arrived with the founder.

The power of those rulers who pertained to» great dynasties» was legitimized by the ideologeme of their origin from Mayapan – a capital of the state that united all Yucatan in 14-15 centuries and was destroyed in 1441. The founders of» great dynasties» were proclaimed kinsmen of Mayapan ruler. Two dynasties – Kokom and Xiw, – that pretended to descend from Mayapan, also conserved Mayapan legitimization myth, that was also myth of migration. In the Xiw version the deity-bearer of power is» Mexican captain» K'uk'ulkan–Quetzalcoatl, and the city founder is different person.

Therefore, all the concepts of the legitimization of the power were variants of the myth of migration and conquest of the country in the beginning of the time. In all cases the source of the power is alien/foreign and, thus, sacral. Dominant position of the capital is built into the myth, being legalized by the conquests of the patron deity, whose cult occupied central place in the ideology,» cementing» existing political structure.

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### **NON-STATE EXISTENCE OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES IN THE 6<sup>TH</sup> – 20<sup>TH</sup> CENTURIES**

1. The evolution of Middle-Eastern Christians. Classification: Christian communities without state sovereignty of their own (the Nestorians of Mesopotamia); the communities which lost their sovereignty after the Arab conquest (the Melcites, Copts, Syrian Monophysites, etc.); medieval Christian states in the Afroasian region (Yemen, Nubia, Ethiopia); other groups.

2. Self-organization and the survival mechanism of Eastern Christians. The social role of different clerical structures. The autonomous status of Christians under the Muslim rule and theocratic functions of the ecclesiastic hierarchy inside their religious communities. Hereditary aristocracy within the spiritual elites. The secular Christian quasi-aristocracy and its genesis (bureaucracy, commercial and financial circles, leaders of professional corporations, physicians, etc.). Clans of the Christian nobility and their interrelations with the clergy: rivalry and cooperation. Evolution of their relations during different historical periods. Problems of secular and national movements in the 19th – 20th centuries Middle East.

3. The Eastern Christians' attitude towards "secular infidel" rulers. Non-Chalcedonian churches in the Sasanid Iran and the Arab Khaliphate. Problems of the Melcites loyalty – the choice between the Byzantine Empire and the Khaliphate. The Eastern Christians' position in the time of foreign invasions (the Crusades, the Mongols). The relations between Uniat churches and the Ottoman Empire. The Eastern Christians' attempts to establish states of their own in the 20th century (the Assirians, Maronites).

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### **THE DIMENSIONS OF POWER: EXAMINING POLITICAL STRATEGY IN COMPLEX SOCIETIES**

Archaeologists have long been frustrated at having to analyze complexity through typological frameworks that rely on rigid dimensions

such as Band-Tribe-Chiefdom-State or Egalitarian-Ranked-Stratified, yet few alternatives have been offered. In this paper I suggest that focusing on the strategies used by political leaders to maintain and extend power provides a flexible and analytically robust alternative to typological frameworks. Such a focus examines complexity by charting the changing strategies through which political leaders create bases of power, implement power, and legitimate authority. By considering several of these dimensions of political strategy simultaneously, the rigid categorization of neo-evolutionary typologies is broken down, and a new, more flexible and ultimately more accurate analysis of complexity is made possible.

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### **THE LIAO STATE OF THE CHITANS AS EMPIRE**

The idea of the «empire» was forming parallelly in two great states of the antiquity: Rome and China. But it is not complete because does not take into consideration those peculiarities which were characteristic of other states in a definite historical period. In particular, a model of the empire is well visible on the example of the Liao state of the Chitans (907-1125).

The features of the Chitan empire were as follows:

- the monarchical form of government;
- a variety of economic types (the nomadic of different developmental levels of the Mongolian, Turk and Tungus tribes and the sedentary of the subordinate peoples), languages, cultures (religious [Buddhist, Taoist, Confucianist, shamanistic], Chinese medieval, urban, peasant, subethnic, foreign [Chinese, Pohai, Niichih, etc.]);
- an hierarchy of different «scraps» (peoples, economics, cultures, languages, social groups, etc.);
- the definiteness of the region's boundaries which resulted from the ethno-cultural proximity, political and economic expediency, the proximity or identity of the social development pathways and levels;
- the necessity to resist the cultural and military onslaught from the outside (of the Chinese, nomadic tribes, Tanguts, Uighurs);
- the formation of nationalities as the transitional form on the way from the tribe to the nation;
- the lack of free lands;
- the space of empire was limited by «geographical» obstacles

(mountains, seas, tribes, other empires) as well as by the cultural proximity, economic ties, the metropolis's potential (the human and military resources);

- the formation of a unified legal system;
- the formation of a syncretic philosophy;
- the aspiration for the formation of a common religion;
- the encyclopedic character of the ideas about the surrounding world, the society and the person;
- a common chronology;
- the idea of the literature as «learning about the person» and «conducting of the person»;
- a common vision of history;
- an ideological supervision;
- a specific role of violence;
- the tradition as a regulative factor;
- the recognition of the state's legality by means of references to its antiquity.

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#### **ANCIENT PASTORAL SOCIETIES POLITICAL ORGANIZATION IN THE MIRROR OF THE GREEK *POLIS* AND ROMAN *CIVITAS* DEVELOPMENT**

The ancient pastoral tribes' socio-political history, including their political institutions and power system genesis, depended on different geographical as well as climatic conditions, the speed of their historical development and its unevenness in different areas where the first civilizations of the Old World emerged. Moreover, only the registration of all those factors, results and influences due to which the early civilizational character of the pastoral communities political structure formed, is accessible to our comprehension.

The pastoralists' evolution towards the state formation went on especially intensively in the areas with complex economy (*i.e.*, combining agriculture, crafts and various domestic industries). On the other hand, the rise of political hierarchy first began in the conditions characterized by the polarization of the tribal and the community-private property relations structure. The duality of the factors which initiated the process of state formation was combined with the public division of labor that promoted the

isolation of the community based on the equality of rights principles. Such an isolation was especially characteristic of the period of the first *gentes* and *familiae* institutions, including that of the social structure of the tribal Roman culture splitting into the *patres* and *plebs*, as well as into *ordes*.

Based on the clan and tribal foundations, this system started developing only in cases of overrun by pastoral tribes the agricultural regions or in the course of the sedentarization process. Thus the consequences of the synoecism and the urbanization processes should be taken into account.

Being an alternative form to the State in terms of origins and historical evolution, the Roman *civitas* as well as the Greek *polis* give a clue to the study of the early stages of the power system and political structure development in the tribal society of pastoralists.

Questions for further discussion: 1. Should the Roman *ordes* be considered as the final stage of early pastoral tribal societies' socio-political evolution? 2. Does the opposition of patrons and clients in the Roman *civitas* reflect an identical way of socio-political system genesis as it was in early pastoral tribal societies?

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#### **MECHANISMS OF FORMATION OF HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURES IN SANDERLINGS**

In the process of comparative studies of different species of sanderlings, an attempt was made to differentiate the behavioural mechanisms responsible for the formation of species-specific social structure. Data on life histories and behaviour of 8 species of sanderlings, both in the wild and in testing situations are used in this study. Sanderlings, forming in the wild social structures with elements of in-group hierarchical relations differ from closely related species lacking such stratification by the number of behavioural characteristics:

1. Last year offsprings stay with parents till the next breeding season. Under such conditions their sexual maturation and behavioural patterns connected with this process are suppressed. In captivity, when immigration is impossible, the suppression of reproductive behaviour continues for the whole period of their coexistence with parents;
2. Any avoidance of social contacts (agonistic contacts with dominant animal or territory owner included) is typically absent;
3. When two alien males are

introduced to each other on a neutral territory, more time is spent for agonistic interactions, more time is needed for establishment of asymmetrical relations. The rhythm of agonistic reactions is characterized by relatively low frequency and high amplitude. The changes in the probability of aggression and threat are negatively correlated (unlike in “solitary” species). With time the probability of direct aggression is falling down; 4. When animals are repeatedly introduced to each other the probability of aggression became abruptly decreased and pair bonds in the form of dominance-subordination relations establish. It is concluded that: the key characteristic forming the basis of stable asymmetric in-group relations is the high optimal level of social stimulation. The orientation on such level of stimulation in combination with evolutionary developed resistance towards suppressive influence of social stimulation leads to the special way of realization of contacts with conspecifics following the model of “strong interactions”. Being repeated, such interactions cause the cumulative effect, which in turn leads to the reinforcement and fixation of asymmetry both on the behavioural and the physiological level (suppression of reproduction). The negative correlation of probabilities of aggression and threat, reflects possibly the differentiation of functions and motivational basis of those forms of behaviour in “social” animals. It is possible to suggest that while the direct aggression functions as an instrument of getting rid of the object of aggression, threats ensure the establishment and maintenance of asymmetrical bonds.

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#### **DEGRADATION OF THE WARRIORS’ HIERARCHY: MERCENARY ARMED UNITS**

1. Destination and functioning of the warriors’ hierarchy among other ones, which are making up an identity. The proportion of goals and interests in the interaction of elements of that hierarchy. Its mutual engagement with other main hierarchies. The conditions of its perfecting and degradation.

2. Degradation of a hierarchy – is it an inevitability or the result of a miscalculation? Illustrations of that phenomenon in the past and under modern conditions. Characteristic features of its mutual engagement with other hierarchies in the course of a degradation: the domination of an *interest* as related to the *goal*.

3. The re-establishment of hierarchies on the basis of capital – is it a deviation from the rule or a ‘stage of perfecting’? The historical experience and the experience of the past civilisations to that point. The proportion of positive and negative perceptions of the world in the analysis of the degradation as adapted to the theme.

4. Correlation between the hierarchy of power and the warriors’ hierarchy. The influence of superior hierarchies on the decision-making level as a problem of the re-establishment of an identity’s inner balance. The role of the national goal and the tasks of a search for the truth in order to provide for the dynamics of that balance.

5. The contribution of a hierarchy and the warriors’ hierarchy, in particular, to the formation of the culture of an identity. Variants of the warriors’ hierarchy (police, navy, etc.) as structure-forming elements at different stages of an identity’s rise, *i.e.* the formation of a civilisation. Degradation as a particular case.

6. The warriors’ and other hierarchies in the process of “movement for development”(progress). The role of scientific and technological progress in the activation of hierarchies with their help under modern conditions. The importance of a creative (non-linear) dominant motive to secure prosperity of hierarchies and higher identities – nation-states, civilisations.

7. Practical issues linked with the degradation of the warriors’ hierarchy: the mercenaries’ establishment and the criteria of approach to that phenomenon and in setting limits to private guard and other units (the experience of the 20<sup>th</sup> century). Possible ways to settle the problem from the standpoint of the issue raised.

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### **HIERARCHIZATION OF POWER AND TRIUMPH OF THINITIC KINGDOM IN ARCHAIC EGYPT**

Inimitable ecological and demographic preconditions, such as Mediterranean transgression and local concentration of numerous refugees from the Nile Delta in Upper Egypt caused specific geo-political structure of the earliest (Archaic) Egyptian state – the so-called Thinitic kingdom. According to my hypothesis, it represented discrete enclave system initially with two distant centres of crystallization in the regions of Thinis and

Memphis. Interspersed among self-dependent communities, Thinitic kingdom had to struggle a long time for domination over Egypt.

Explosive local growth of population favoured sharp hierarchization of the chiefdom from which Thinitic kingdom had emerged. Already under the First Dynasty various administrative appointments appeared, and their number progressively increased. At the same time, early state administration seems to have gathered round the king: this follows, for instance, from the fact that work of scribes was done by high officials. Besides, archaic hierarchy of power in Egypt was characterized by permanent mutability; furthermore, it is argued to have been bulky and clumsy what could be partly explained by its formation not throughout the country but upon limited territory of a chiefdom dimension.

As proto-state administration was concentrated mainly within enclaves of Thinitic kingdom and failed to cover the whole Egypt, archaic kings and their suite had to sail regularly along the country to fulfil fiscal and ritual tasks. In these trips – the so-called «followings of Horus» kings appeared not only as highest officials, but also as gods establishing the world order.

Deification secured kings on top of the scale of ranks and strengthened the hierarchy of power. The apogee of hierarchization in Ancient Egypt was the hypertrophically developed cult of king.

With all immaturity of the earliest state in Egypt, advance of hierarchization stimulated appearance of written language and allowed Thinitic kings compared to other chiefs to solve more effectively problems of administration of society and economy, in particular, to create irrigation service, to take regular control of the Nile flood levels, to ensure production and storage of foodstuffs, etc. No doubt that among main preconditions of triumph of Thinitic kingdom over the rest of Egyptian chiefdoms on the stage of state formation was its initially highest degree of hierarchization up to deification of a ruler.

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**KINGSHIP AGAINST THE STATE:  
CASTE ORGANISATION AND THE EXEMPLARY CENTRE**

Theories of the emergence of the state tend to postulate a black and white situation: first there was no state, then there was. This supposition is

invariably linked to the materialist thesis that it is the mechanism which makes the state possible – unequal control over resources – which gives rise to social stratification and a complex division of labour. At bottom, the argument of this paper hinges on a clear analytical distinction between inequality and differentiation. It will be suggested that caste organisation, a form of monarchical society under which hundreds of millions of people have lived historically, defies the conventional theory of the state. Where there is caste there is an extremely elaborate system of social division but, correspondingly, such a weak state that it is often impossible to say where the centre is at all. There is a very strong idea of the 'exemplary centre', as Geertz has called it, which is expressed through royal rituals, but there are typically many competing 'kings' none of whom is pre-eminent. Theorists have variously referred to this phenomenon as the 'segmentary' state, and the 'theatre' state, in order to emphasise both its fragmentary nature and its dependence on symbolic, as opposed to material, mechanisms of centralisation. This idea is pushed further here and it is argued that kingship and the state have historically and sociologically quite different functions. As is generally agreed following Weber, the purpose of the state is to provide a monopoly on the legitimate exercise of coercion. The purpose of royal institutions, however, is to overcome kinship divisions by setting in place over-riding symbolic mechanisms of allegiance. But this symbolic opposition of kingship and kinship is not concerned per se with a monopoly on legitimate violence. The preoccupation with being 'kingly' is more concerned with the transcendence of ordinary social divisions than with material superiority and the political and economic division of labour which such superiority gives rise to.

It will be argued that caste – as a form of kingship in its paradigmatic, pre-colonial expression – militates against the formation of the state. Caste organisation brings with it elaborate, but imprecise, social divisions based on symbolic notions of purity and pollution and these divisions are opposed to the more minimalist and clear-cut stratification which one associates with state formation. Examples will be given from a variety of ethnographic sources.

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### **THE ANCIENT MAYA: ATTRIBUTES AND SYMBOLISM OF POWER**

The sources of the research are: the hieroglyphic inscriptions on stelae and in the books of Maya («Popol Vuh», «Chilam Balam»), images on personal articles of the rulers, wall frescos of the Tikal pyramids, the contents of burial places under the temples in Palenque, the objects, lifted up from bottom of the Well of Sacrifices in Chichen-Itza, etc.

A typical representation of the ruler is in the solemn pose on the throne (or performing a ritual dance near it), alone or among his subjects. A figure of divine jaguar stretching out his paw over him in the sign of patronage frequently appears behind his back. The ruler as a victorious warrior is one of the central subjects of the Maya art. The throne could be in the form of jaguar or covered with its skin. Royal clothes were often made of the jaguar's skin, footwear adorned with fur, ritual masks and head-dresses also were in the form of jaguar. In other cases the jaguar appears as the god of rain, reputed as the forefather of the Maya rulers (it results from the agrarian cult), so it has a dualistic meaning in terms of power symbolism.

The ruler had a rod in his hand which later transferred into a scepter with the figure of god-dwarf with one leg much longer than the other, and as a snake which served as a handle («snake strip»). The «water» attributes are represented not only by images of the god of rain and storm as well as of reptiles, but also by sea-products in burial places (spines of sea-urchins). The ruler wore a dress embroidered with geometrical patterns: large square cotton cloak, tied up near the shoulders; loin-clothes with long ends decorated with the feathers of ketsal; they wore bracelets on wrists and ankle-bones, a necklace made of nephritis beads on the chest (nephritis was the symbol of maize, life, death, and blood), sometimes the ruler wore round discs, probably mirrors (the ruler was called «the people's mirror»), or the symbol of the sun god; footwear was sewn around with fur of the jaguar or puma.

The rulers had very long fingernails alike the jaguar's claws. They used the articles made of animal and human (war captives) bones, like flutes and pin-holes covered with hieroglyphs. A bunch of flowers, yellow beads, a white mat, a green turkey, a spotted snail and little white pumpkins were also considered as symbols of power. These traditions were established prior to and in the process of the Maya state formation; the roots of some symbols still have not been definitely revealed.

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### **HIERARCHY AND TASK DIVISION IN ANT WORKING TEAMS \***

It is known that in social animals certain individuals may manipulate activity of other ones and this reflects, to a less or greater extent, hierarchical structure of communities. Such a phenomenon was not revealed in invertebrates yet, although individual hierarchy within ant colonies has been described (Zakharov, 1978; Reznikova, 1979).

There are still very few indications that would enable explorers of social insects to suggest the existence of teams within a colony that assemble for highly coordinated activity in accomplishing a particular task. Our experiments have revealed a sophisticated communicative system in ants based on information transmission from ant-scouts to members of their teams composed of about 10 foragers (Reznikova, Ryabko, 1990, 1996). Data on individual inter-relations within 300 teams of 3 group retrieving ant species are considered. Ants were presented with syrup placed in different mazes. Every scout attracts to the food only the members from its own team. Behavioral patterns of individual identification are based on grooming and food exchange. The prosperity of each team depends completely on learning capabilities of the scout. It has been observed that the number of successful scouts declined with the complication of the task. The constancy of membership was examined by means of alternate isolations of scouts and foragers.

Processes of team shaping were studied by observing ontogenetic trajectories of newly hatched ants. Analogies with teams in vertebrates are considered, in particular, with experiments of Desor et al. (1991) in which social differentiation in rats was described: Lcarrier rats dived and carried food while Lnon-carrier rats attacked the previous one and stole the food. Hierarchical power of scouts in ants are still discussed.

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**PRECIS OF EMOTIONS IN COMMAND.  
A NATURALISTIC STUDY OF INSTITUTIONAL DOMINANCE**

Face-to-face commands were observed in several naturalistic organizational settings in Australia between 1987 and 1992. The aim was to search for dominance behaviors in hierarchies, using the theory and methods of the Austro-German school of ethology deployed in a manner that resembles Erving Goffman's qualitative urban anthropology but without psychologizing and with denser and more explicit behavioral description. I observed types and contents of commands, the techniques used to exact compliance, and resistance behavior in military parades, nightclubs (doormen controlling patrons), theatrical rehearsals, law courts, meetings, and corporate and government bureaucracies. The analytic method was theoretically-guided induction. The main results were as follows. Command are segmented.

Across all settings commands were found to be comprised of four functional parts. (1) Face-to-face directives, including commands, begin with the superordinate gaining the subordinate's attention. (2) This step is followed by the superordinate supplying information specific to the required task, if needed, as well as (3) an indication of when the task should be commenced. (4) Finally, commanders also monitor subordinates' attention, comprehension and performance of the task. Command segments were institutionalized in complex organizations. In small-group settings, command-givers administer all segments. But in complex organizations some segments are administered by specialized individuals or whole departments which attract and hold attention, relay information about duties and schedules, and monitor performance. Dress and architecture also contribute to structuring attention and establishing rank. The same segments were found across all command settings. This suggests that social technologies are constrained by human nature. Affect varies systematically with strength of the control infrastructure. Affective behavior was described based on subjects' facial expression, gaze direction, posture, limb and body movements, conversational tactics, voice characteristics, and verbal behavior. The affective content of commands varied inversely with the strength of institutional dominance techniques, after controlling for the cost of the task to subordinates. As a broad trend the aggression of commands decreases as dominance techniques become more intimidating.

Theoretical points. Social technologies are possible because hunter-gatherer behaviors can be decoupled from their evolved small-group context and recombined into functional complexes. The decoupling is due to population growth and demographic change which transform the social environment. But recombination is due to techniques of social manipulation which build up in cultural traditions. These techniques work by keying into innate behavior systems implicated in the giving and receiving of face-to-face directives observable in hunter-gatherer bands and families everywhere.

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### **PROPERTY RIGHTS IN TRANSITION: FROM STATE BUREAUCRACY AND CORRUPTION TO THE RULE OF LAW**

The paper investigates the issues of state bureaucracy and corruption in the context of transition, drawing on numerous examples from the Caucasus region and Armenia in particular. It focuses on establishing the rule of law and its importance strengthening property rights in the post-communist space. Analyzing the current economic situation, the paper shows that the various existing problems can basically be traced back to one main cause, the lack of respect for individual liberty and property rights.

It points to the fact that some components which are essential for a market economy are either non-existent or inefficient. These include the legal structure (civil code, contract law, and other economic laws), bankruptcy laws, regulation of competition, and tax and customs service. Weak and non-transparent institutions leave space for distortion of the «rules of the game» and weaken competition, the main engine of economic growth in the market. The weakness of the state in the enforcement of property rights, rising distrust toward the state and the legal system, abuse of authority by state officials, corruption, and mafia activities hinder the entry of domestic and foreign businesses into the market.

The existence of a significant shadow economy in the region testifies to a still weak institutional capacity in the economy, and significant reinforcement is needed in regulating property rights, enforcing contracts,

maintaining law, and controlling official acts of corruption and abuses of power.

The problems identified include the presence of an active black market in the transportation and labor sectors and the insufficient protection of intellectual property rights, as well as political instability in the region, including the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and civil unrest in Georgia.

Analyzing the factors that prevent the rule of law from operating, *i.e.* the judicial system being influenced by the political system and underestimation of the rule of law by the state officials, who either do not know its value or do not think it is important enough to implement if it conflicts with the present way of doing things, the paper draws a parallel with other countries in transition, building on experience of other CEE/CIS countries that are trying to replace central planning with a market system.

The paper gives emphasis to the role of the state in the age of globalization. It points out the need for a more active involvement in international and regional programs. Indicating the potential of the workforce as a comparative advantage, it shows that, however, the managerial capabilities necessary for modern technologies and businesses must be improved to meet international standards. Analyzing the situation of the Caucasus countries since independence, the paper draws attention to theoretical concerns, *i.e.* the implications for sovereignty; ensuring regional security; and promoting inter-country cooperation, including economic.

In summary, the paper analyzes the role of the state in bringing the level of protection of private property in the Caucasus and CIS at large to global standards, as an aspect of establishing due respect for property rights and human rights in general.

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#### **MUSLIM *SUFI* ORDERS IN TROPICAL AFRICA – A VERSION OF BECOMING CIVIL SOCIETY**

The Muslim spiritual (*sufi*) orders (*tariqas*, brotherhoods) demonstrate one of the most expressive examples of complicated non-state societies, particularly in Tropical Africa. Islamization became possible there thanks to spiritual religious structures, adopted to the local socio-cultural and economic conditions. Uniting Muslims on the basis of spiritual and mystical

relationships (the devotion to a certain method of personal cognition of Allah and claims for the brotherhood and its members being God-chosen ones), the *tariqas* compensated the disintegration of traditional social ties by new social structures that were consolidated on the spiritually-religious and morally-psychological backgrounds, *i.e.* moral, juridical, material mutual help and support, mutual respect and emotional warmth.

The internal discipline and obedience of ordinary *talibes* to their spiritual teachers, *sheikhs* attach significance to the orders. The adepts must submit to the *sheikhs (marabouts)* as to the holders of specific religious knowledge and bearers of piety. The consolidation reached due to these features distinguishes the *tariqas*, especially those that came into being on the African socio-cultural soil. An unquestioned submission of the orders' adepts to their *marabouts* turns the socio-confessional association into a potential instrument in the political struggle. Secular politicians and statesmen have to apply to the *sheikhs* for support, thus giving them an opportunity to use their independence from the state for pressing on the bureaucratic institutions of authority for resolving problems of their own and those common to the whole brotherhood.

The role of the orders especially increased in colonial and postcolonial periods when they adopted additional integrative functions in African societies. The orders formed the basis for the struggle against the European conquerors. Then a part of the *tariqas* gradually turned into socio-economic associations of coreligionists, and their leaders became managers of social and enterprise corporations. Thus the background of spiritual leaders' power was (and still is) strengthening; the community structure, autonomous from the state bureaucracy was (and is) forming.

A socio-confessional sect marked by the most strengthened and effectively governed orders (like the Mouridiya *tariqa* in Senegal) possesses all the functions, typical for the state (excluding defense), from the mobilizational function to the fiscal and legal ones. These corporate amalgamations become effective foundations for economic enterprises, as well as for international business. The *mourids'* capitals go to Europe, North America and Russia and it consolidates its success thanks to the reproduction of the *mourid* communities' pattern. *Mouridiya* and other *sufi tariqas* in Senegal, and in lesser extent those in Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea and some other countries demonstrate an experience of politogenesis in a society, born on the basis of a religious doctrine.

At the same time, the *mourids* do not obey blindly, they exercise strictly only the principal precepts of the founder's brotherhood, particularly those concerning the obligation to work honestly, and they follow the spiritual exhortations of their leaders. But in other respects the adherents of

an order are free to choose their destiny, including the political preferences. These facts give scholars some grounds for arriving at the conclusion that an analog to the civil society is formed on the traditional basis as well as for arguing that modernization based on the Muslim spiritual religious structures is possible.

A system of government in the *tariqas* is founded upon the recognition of the spiritual authority and supernatural possibilities (the charisma) of *marabouts* to impact on the society and nature. There is the most pious Muslim at the height of the scale of ranks; he possesses the charisma by the right of succession or if he proved his unsurpassed qualities of misgauge. His positions are also strengthened by the concentration of the threads of economic, social, and political control over the spiritual and religious community in his arms. And perhaps an order works more effectively than a modern state in the present day Tropical Africa.

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**THE RELIGIOUS PROTO-STATE CONTRASTING WITH  
SECULAR STATE FORMATION IN THE ANDES:  
WARI AND TIWANACU, A.D. 400-1400**

For the first time, we are in a position to talk about alternative complex societies equivalent in scale to states, both in quantity (complexity and efficiency) and quality, as stated in the preamble to the International Conference on Hierarchy and Power in the History of Civilizations (Center for Civilization and Regional Studies). We shall present the parallel development of two societies in the Andes from c. A.D. 400-1400, in which one (Wari, alt. Huari) evolved into a secular state from a complex theocratic chiefdom and the other (Tiwanacu, alt. Tiahuanaco) developed and maintained an expanding elastic religious proto-state, which we liken to the Himalayan proto-states of Bhutan, Nepal, or Tibet over the millennial sequence.

The recognition of the Tibetan type macro-theocracy was announced for the first time in a previous paper; and we now simply elaborate on the diagnostics (negative and positive) that characterize these “proto-states” and suggest why their internal dynamics are much more flexible than the secular state.

Fundamentally, the yardsticks we use are settlement pattern and iconography. The religious state contains at all times more than 50% of public buildings in religious structures (temples, monasteries, shrines). The iconography is heavily monopolized by hieratic symbols. The secular state has better than 50% of public buildings in administrative structures, elite residences and storage, and military accoutrements. Iconography is both less hieratic and more eclectic. There is a dimension of what Ruth Benedict calls the overall pattern of a culture which can be extrapolated from both diagnostics that make, let's say, the overall expression of the Himalayan art (in our case Tiwanacu) more Apollonian (using Benedict's term) than say Chinese art (in our case Wari; more Dionysian) despite much iconographic sharing.

The presentation of the sequences will necessarily be restricted to schematic representations; first of the Wari sequence and then Tiwanacu. As will be seen, the Wari sequence is broken up by warring states and behetrias (chiefdoms) over the millenium and a half while Tiwanacu represents a kind of evanescent period of peace with expansion and flowering followed by contraction and withering.

The text stresses the lack of infrastructure which characterizes religious society and has been responsible for critiqueing its technological backwardness; the rhythm of change is what we focus on, and we try to show how secularism and technology propel the economic machine towards ecological exhaustion while the religious dynamic permits greater fluidity in the sharing of resources.

The fact that the oral tradition substantiates a more or less theocratic proto-state background is obvious in Huarochiri myths, where Inka hegemony was anecdotal. As Steward and Faron noted in their survey of South American cultures, two types of chiefdoms emerged in protohistoric South America; one known theocratic example, the Kogi people, have preserved their structure after 400 years of attrition. This culture is the only known example of an aboriginal religious theocracy undiluted in form and content by Christianity through Colonial times and into the present. They are known archeologically as the Tairona prehispanic proto-state, which had ruins not insignificant when compared with Tiwanacu, although their domain was smaller.

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**POST-COMMUNISM, POWER, IDIOM:  
THE SHORTCOMINGS OF DEMOCRACY**

From the outside, the post-communist systems are generally taken to be reasonably similar to the well-established democracies of the West. They hold regular and fair elections, they have constitutions, parliaments, governments, separation of powers, independent judiciaries and multi-party systems, as well as market economies. The reality of the distribution and exercise of power, as shown by the idioms of power, are something else, however. In sum, these systems – and this includes the five states scheduled for early accession to the EU and thus the ones deemed to closest to meeting Copenhagen criteria – observe the forms of democracy, but not necessarily the practice. These shortcomings are made manifest in the language and in the underlying structures of politics. Crucially, the legitimation and exercise of power show many of the features inherited from communism, the weakness or absence of any radical break with that tradition and the rise and reproduction of new traditions that have become self-reproducing. In this respect, post-communism is a *sui generis* self-reproducing system.

Its principal features are:

1. The legitimation of power customarily takes place through the establishment of a monopoly or near-monopoly plausibility structure that is sustained by a corresponding intellectual idiom, accepted universally by society and the political elite as (unconsciously) hegemonic.
2. The aim of this exercise of power to a monopoly intellectual idiom is the establishment and maintenance of coherence.
3. Reality-defining agencies operate by seeking to eliminate ambiguity (monologic situations) and by ensuring that one intellectual idiom, with its own unchallenged discourse, has hegemonic domination over the political field. It must be accepted as exemplary and binding.
4. Under post-communism, these features of democracy are not matched. Rather, political activity is characterised by a deep level ontological divide which finds articulation in party politics, as different reality-defining agencies compete to make their version exemplary and binding.
5. The outcome is a far greater polarisation than is found in Western democratic systems.
6. The explanation for this state of affairs, which signifies that post-communism is indeed a *sui generis* system, combining aspects of democratic

and non-democratic practice, lies in a number of interlocking factors. First, historically, the collapse of communism came under conditions in which it was impossible to prepare alternatives, condense a democratic cultural idiom around which all the elites could cohere. Above all, no dominant counter-elite could emerge as an authoritative reality-defining agency. Several did so.

7. Second, the cognitive model of party politics was heavily influenced by the experience of the communist «party», which was nothing of the kind, of course by Western criteria, but for inexperienced elites and societies the model of an all-embracing, thought-world creating political body was very attractive, as a source of language, security, identity, and as a form of knowledge.

8. Each of these agencies is marked by a claim to a monopoly or near monopoly of the «truth» and a claim to possess the «truth»; this claim then creates a mindset in which opponents can be demonised as enemies. It follows that legitimacy is based on an underlying acceptance of a fixed epistemology.

9. To complicate matters, power has a twofold legitimation and the two modes are contradictory, with different languages of legitimation. The two are (1) popular legitimation by elections (popular sovereignty) and (2) ideological legitimation by «truth claim». Broadly these are universalist-liberal vs. particularist-national, but they are marked by elements of the other, against which they seek to define themselves.

10. Furthermore, while power is attained by consent, through elections, the exercise of power is generally ideological, potentially or actually coercive or corrupt, and weak in terms of democratic values, like self-limitation, transparency, accountability, moderation, compromise.

11. Once power is gained through elections, politics and policies are determined largely by ideological criteria, as defined by the dominant idiom. This makes opposition and constructive criticism virtually impossible, logically and practically. A monopoly claim to «the truth» cannot be seen as anything other than heresy. In this sense, the post-communist mindset is heavily marked by the legacy of communism. But whereas communism could deal with dissent by coercion, post-communism does so by overreaction, polarisation, hysterical language (like accusations of «lies» and «manipulation»).

12. Thus post-communist politics, obliged by its adopted democratic ideals to find compromise, tries to find this by relying on pseudo-consociationalism, tacit agreements, but without the language and concepts on which to base compromise.

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### **THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE INDUS CIVILIZATION: THE FIRST STATE OF INDIA**

The grand phenomenon of the Indus civilization, covering a vast region from the Himalayan foothills to Baluchistan, and from Oxus to Daimabad (inM) has been known and studied for over eighty years. As far as its political organization is concerned, though the exercising strict control, has been generally envisaged by the archaeologists, few details have been filled up to create a semblance of power structure.

In this paper, the author has tried to reconstruct the structure of the central authority from the Rigveda, with her new approach to the ancient sanskrit anthology of poems dated to 1500 b.c. (available in print) which considers it to be a source of information for the Indus civilization with the *asuras* emerging as it self identified with that element of population which is identified as the Harappans by the archaeologists.

With an ideology based in ecology, the state of the *asuras* as reflected in the Rigveda was sun-focussed. each member of the council of ministers was sun representing a phase of the sun during the day and performed a suitable function in the organization. Varuna was supreme ruler and was called emperor, king, etc identified with the bright sunny sky in the ideology.

The state was characterised by a supreme ruler assisted by another of slightly lower status. the componential institutions identifiable in the structure are law and justice, agriculture, revenue and redistribution, defense and intelligence, public works and communications, irrigation arts and crafts, trade and contracts, health and welfare.

The state exercised its authority through laws and had a system of punishments and awards. It was the first political attempt at unification at social, political, and cultural level of the Indian subcontinent and its populations, and hence its significance.

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**STATE AND SOCIETY:  
POST-SOVIET AND POST-COLONIAL EXPERIENCES**

The aim of the paper is to provide a conceptual framework for analyzing political institutions (the state) in Russia and post-colonial societies. The role of the state and its relationship to a society have been a subject of intensive research both in Russian studies and in Post-Colonial studies. Unfortunately, these two academic traditions have not engaged into meaningful dialog or discussion so far, although this discussion might be very fruitful and might lead to new perspectives in comparative studies of bureaucracy.

The dominant concept of bureaucracy is the one developed by Weber and «Weberian» school in European and American sociology. Both soviet/Russian and post-colonial bureaucracies are seen as deviations from this «classical» modern/Western type. But these two «deviations» are usually described in different terms. When talking about Russia, the researchers prefer to talk about «paternalism» and «patrimonial dominance» (which is very different from «bureaucratic dominance», according to Weber). In a sense, the state is presented as «caring too much» about its subject, which is seen as a Soviet legacy (or the legacy of totalitarian state). When talking about post-colonial societies, the usual terms are «predatory state» or «weak state», which imply that a state cares too little about its' citizens. In one case we have a situation where a state is too active, and in other case we have a situation where a state is not active enough. At the same time, in both cases a state has to perform essentially the same function – at least economically – to secure the well-being of citizens in a globalized and open economy, which creates a situation of extreme dependency/competition between the West and the rest. Under such conditions, one would expect to find more similarities between the Russian state and the states in post-colonial societies than the academic traditions mentioned above present. So, I would like to outline a research agenda which would allow comparing empirically Russian state to post-colonial states to see what are the similarities (and differences) between them.

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**UNTIL THE END OF THE WORLD:  
DEBATES ABOUT THE FUTURE AT A CENTURY'S END**

Much has been written in political anthropology on the topic of naturalization and consequences of power, as well as on the conjunction between power and knowledge. The process of subjectivisation, however, is two-fold. While a considerable part of it is carried out through assimilation of the dominant relations of power (Althusser's interpellation of subject by ideology), constitution of subject has a second side: that of naturalization of the subject's powerlessness. Both of these processes contribute to the acceptance of the status quo, but the mechanism by which this acceptance is achieved is substantially different. Naturalization of power occurs, according to Foucault, through full assimilation of the dominant ways of classification, regulation and power distribution, i.e. through complete absorption of the ways of knowing and meaning-making which prevail in the society. Naturalization of powerlessness, on the contrary, is achieved through circumscription of the desire for knowledge and active engagement, and withdrawal into apathy and misrecognition. It is these two processes acting together that constitute the basis of the power/knowledge regimes in societies in general and in each of their constituents in particular.

In this paper, I explore the phenomenon of naturalization of powerlessness in the everyday discourse of the powerless in Russia. The analysis focuses on the ways in which the imagery of the millenium has been incorporated into everyday discourse of Russians before the advent of the year 2000. I argue that denial of the potential dangers of the transition and avoidance of knowledge about them can be interpreted as an adaptive device on behalf of the ordinary people, developed as a way of naturalizing and domesticating the uncertainty and uncontrollability of their circumstances. Contrasting with this mode of orientation, the ways of talking about the advent of the millenium in the United States exemplify the discourse power and discipline, with its fixation on surveillance and normalization, and a desire to foresee and control all possible outcomes. Analysis of this forecasting debate is not interpreted here as an evidence of the fundamental difference of the communities in question, but rather as an illustration of two mutually complementary coexisting discourses, each of which contributes its own way to the maintenance of the dominant social order and perpetuation of the relations of power.

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### **THE HERITAGE OF THE TURKUT KAGHANATE IN THE HISTORY OF EASTERN EUROPE**

A period of domination of military confederation led by Hunnish Shan-yu Attila evidenced the end of Roman provincial culture on the Northern Black Sea coast. The formation of «the barbarian kingdoms» of Teodorich and Chlodvig in the Western Europe was synchronized with the withdraw of the Huns to the Dnieper basin. Bulgarian tribes (the Saraghurs, the Onoghurs and the Uroghs) were forced out by the Savirs, which, in their turn were supplanted by the Avars from the east. The Saraghur tribe headed new confederation (the Acatzirs, the Onoghurs etc.), the replaced the Hunnish one, but disappeared after the campaign in the Transcaucasian region, that, probably, was connected with the invasion of the Savirs. But in 565 the Avars perssed by the Turkut kaghanate army appeared in the Central Europe and establish their power, penetrating into Thuringia and Hungarian steppe.

The epoch of the Turkut kaghanate on the Northern Black Sea coast was ended together with the fall of the Turkut dynasties in the Central Asia. Western Turkut dynasty Ashina was accepted by the Khazars, and the Eastern dynasty – Dulo – was accepted by the Bulgars. For a short time (634–642 AD) this portion of the steppe was dominated by Great Bulgaria – a polity headed by the Bulgarian ruler Kubrat. The Bulgarian-Khazar cofrontation in the Eastern Europe terminated after his death by the Khazar victory (679).

Insufficiency of current chronological scales, its separation from the historical events prevents the proper identification of the archaeological complexes (associations of artifacts) with adequate historical processes. We suggest that «Pastyrskaya culture» of the Dnieper Basin correlates with the existence of Great Bulgaria (634-643 AD). Its final phase corresponds to the period around 679 AD, when the son of Kubrat Asparukh led a part of the Bulgars to Danube, and his brothers Batbay and Kotrag («Silver Bulgars» and «Black Bulgars») stayed in the original territory.

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### **POLITICAL CULTURE: POST-COLONIAL AFRICA AND POST-SOCIALIST EUROPE COMPARED**

The paper attempts to compare political culture on both continents with special emphasis on the role of colonial and socialist/communist legacies respectively. Parallels and differences are systematically discussed against the alien model of democracy which in both cases was imported from the West (western Europe and northern America). The paper pleads for better understanding of specificities and explains why slavish copying of western models is neither possible nor desirable.

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### **HIERARCHY AND POWER AMONG THE MONGOLS**

My paper deals with the distribution of power among the Mongols in three spheres: temporal, military and sacral. The division of the Mongolian *ulus* into two *Wings* (*ji'ür*) or *Hands* (*qar*) was first mentioned in 1206. There is no concrete data concerning this event in *The Secret History of the Mongols*. As for the war leadership among the Mongols, Boorcu was at the head of the *Right Wing's* military group (*tumen* = 10000), Mukali headed the *tumen* of the *Left Wing* and Naya was appointed the commander of the *Center* (*Yeke qol*). The latter was formed by Cinggis-qan from various *tumens*. Two military groups were recruited from the people of the *Right* and *Left Wings* respectively which included the population spatially distributed correspondingly in the "right" and "left" parts of the Mongolian *ulus*, each having the temporal ruler of its own. This war leadership was of an explicit character.

The distribution of temporal power in the Mongolian *ulus* can be revealed through the implicit data. *Cinggis-qan* connected himself with the *Center*: "§ 226. *Let the Great Center (Yeke Qol) be behind me enforcing the tumen of Kesikten*". The *Center (Yeke Qol)* being always connected with nomadic headquarters of the leader, was not obligatory situated in the clan territory (§§ 195, 208). As for the *Wings*, we can just suppose that they were

headed by Juci (*right*) and Tului (*left*). Juci and Tului were named by Cinggis-qan his *elder son* (§ 210) and the *Father's other wing* (*öröle ji'ür*, § 212) respectively. Other sons were not mentioned at all. Simultaneously, the central position of Tului (*tüblen sa'utuqai*, § 213) was marked here. The Center (*tüb*) was always of special importance being connected with the clan fire/hearth preserved by the Junior (*otcigin*) of the clan.

The Senior of the clan being the possessor of the clan charisma had the supreme authority/power (temporal function) and performed socially important (*i.e.*, sacral) rituals. The *Right Wing* was headed by the *elder sons* and the *Left Wing* – by the *younger*. It was the Senior (*Right Wing*) who performed the inthronization rites: Cagatai for Ugedei, Batu for Munke. In my opinion, the nomads divided the territory and people into the *Wings* because of the necessity to distribute the ownership between the royal sons. The fact that the clan territory which was the sacral center of the community belonged to the *Left Wing* is remarkable either.

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#### **HIERARCHIZATION AND DE-HIERARCHIZATION OF THE SOCIUM AS THE PHENOMENA OF THE CULTURE GENESIS**

The hierarchy of the phenomena and meanings of the culture is one of the most important manifestations of the culture genesis as a movement from the syncretistic unity «I–Other» to the division and nivelation of this fundamental opposition of the human existence. In the system of the culture social and psychological hierarchies are transformed into the semantic-semiotic chains, which connect opposite points of the sensual continuum of the culture along its main directions: immanent-transcendental, sacral-profane and discrete-continuous. At the same time complete and ordered cultural hierarchies are combined with unordered, dehierarchicized syncretistic formations, which are more simple and clear from the point of the perception and experiencing of the opposition «I–Other». If the dehierarchization of the society obtains a systemic character, it changes the systemic quality of the culture, revitalizing archaic syncretistic totality and blocking the division of the autonomous meanings, phenomena and spheres of the culture. The stability of various types of civilizations and of civilizational process as a whole is in a great degree defined by the combination of principle of

hierarchy and principle of syncretism and the cultural pattern of their reproduction.

Cultural chaos arises when existing hierarchies do not ensure proper stability of the hierarchized and dehierarchized parts of the culture. As a result the rise the phenomena of the destruction and inversion of the meanings, spontaneous perception of the reality, and self-identification with the cultural chaos can be observed.

At the same time cultural chaos activates the role of the fundamental cultural opposition «I–Other». Due to this opposition the chaos obtains characteristics of forming cultural order. This new stage of the culture genesis is directed to the ordering (organization) of the social system. In this the character of the activity of the subject of the culture, his basic values, the choice of the direction of the world ordering have very important place. In this context the human activity transforms the cultural chaos into the process of self-organization. Depending on the value's orientation of the historical subject of the culture binary oppositions of the culture can be mediated by various images and structures of the power. They can be distinguished according to the models (strategies) of world ordering and proportions of the principles of hierarchy and syncretism, hierarchical and non-hierarchical organization of the power.

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#### **EXAMINING POWER: TOWARD A MULTICONTEXTUAL RESEARCH DESIGN**

New approaches to the study of complex societies in the past have emphasized that the construction of power must be seen in terms other than simple paradigms of hierarchy. One of the recurring themes in these approaches is that we must see power as manifested in different social contexts, rather than an abstraction applied to the whole of a culture. In turning to this view of past power, we must change the foci of many of our archaeological research designs, from those that focus exclusively on a single context, to ones that are long-term and focus on an aggregation of synchronous contexts in the past.

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**ILLEGALITY AND THE CONSTITUTION OF SPACE IN  
COLONIAL AND POST-COLONIAL HONG KONG**

Squatter settlements represent the imposition of state-defined categories on space in circumstances in which the power to eradicate illegal uses is either insufficient, or is not mobilized. Elsewhere, I have developed a typology of basic reasons why illegal practices persist (Smart 1999). In this paper, I apply this model to understanding changing regimes of regulation of illegal settlements in Hong Kong between 1945 and 1999. Decolonization, occurring as it did only in 1997 and unusually in a territory that had attained First World levels of income and development, allows an examination of how distinct forms of governance influence the control (or lack of it) over irregular housing. I conducted field research under both regimes, from 1982-85 for my doctoral dissertation and for a shorter period during 1999. The 1984 agreement between Britain and the People's Republic of China to return Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty facilitated a level of control over illegal housing, and illegal migration, that had not been available previously. As a result, controls over new squatting have been largely effective since 1984, although over 200,000 squatters still exist. The absence of legal markets for such housing results in distorted «markets» that rely on the self-regulatory actions of residents, but are strongly influenced by the regulatory context. Toleration has been characteristic of the governmental stance towards squatter settlements throughout the postwar period, but the nature of this toleration has changed over the years, and influences the nature of the social organization found within the squatter areas.

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**COUNCILS, CONFEDERATIONS AND COMMONWEALTHS:  
PERSISTENT HORIZONTAL PARITY VS EMERGENT VERTICAL  
HIERARCHIZATION**

Despite the temporal, geographic, and structural ubiquity of the governing structures of councils, confederations and commonwealths, anthropologists, as well as other social scientists, have paid relatively little attention to them. Yet, under various linguistic labels, they appear from earliest recorded history (and before if you include oral history and myth), are found globally, and appear at all levels of organizational complexity—i.e., from small bands of egalitarian foragers to tyrannical empires, from republican city-states to modern international and transnational organizations, e.g., the UN and the EU respectively (here, I utilize Friberg and Hettne's distinction that 'international is a function of national interests [whereas]...transnational...is a transcendence of the national'). This is not to say that such structures have not been noted; the literature of various disciplines is rife with data on them. Rather, they have been taken too much for granted and interesting questions about them have not been raised.

This paper will argue that, firstly, all three represent similar attempts to coordinate sociocultural units, sometimes for very limited and specific reasons (at least initially), other times over a broad range of activities and institutions. Secondly, such structures are marked by an explicit emphasis on parity among participating members, especially as such parity—note, 'parity' not 'equality'—is achieved in the decision-making process. The latter leads to attempts to ensure that actions are not initiated until members have reached consensus.

However, relative, say, to majority rule or top-down unitary command, consensus—not quite the same as 'unanimity'—is usually cumbersome and time consuming; frequently, it can only be attained by compromises that not only satisfy few if any but often result in decisions that are incapable of addressing the problem they're supposed to resolve. Why then have such structures persisted, no less popular today among supposedly sophisticated political bricoleurs (again, see the UN and EU) than they were among tribal peoples or peasant villagers?

The paper will suggest that their utility lies in the recognition that such horizontal and collaborative structures are techniques of resisting an alternative process—vertical hierarchization and a non-egalitarian

concentration of power that results in increasing powerlessness and vulnerability of those who, initially, coordinated their efforts as a collaborative venture. Thus, the growth of governing complexity is not a simple unilinear 'march to hierarchy,' but is marked by attempts to restrain or renounce structures of vertical power in favor of horizontal consensualism and parity.

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**BRUISED BY AUTHORITIES  
(TOWARDS AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF FEAR AND DESIRE)**

My contribution is focussed on my own early childhood experiences of power inculturation, dating back to the period of the 1960s and taking place in a mining town of South-Western Siberia. I have purposefully chosen the genre of auto-ethnography as a form of narration freer from immediate power relations than the mainstream anthropological methods such as participant observation.

I intend to discuss several cases of my 'upbringing' and 'training' from nursery and kindergarten to junior school and reflect on my traumatic experiences and ensuing strategies to cope with the power of adults. I will specifically look at my tactics of escape from power relations, dwelling more on the subjective side (emotions of fear and desires), than on objective positive and negative sanctions.

*Fred Spier*  
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**THE STRUCTURE OF BIG HISTORY:  
FROM THE BIG BANG UNTIL TODAY**

In 1993 at the University of Amsterdam, the sociologist Johan Goudsblom and I started organizing an interdisciplinary course in 'Big History'. That is: an overview of all known history from the beginning of the Universe until life on Earth today. In this optional choice module for students from all departments, twenty-five experts, including astronomers, physicists, biochemists, a geologist, a biologist, a climatologist, an archaeologist,

historians and social scientists explain modern versions of history, spanning the entire range from the Big Bang to the present day.

Our curriculum has been modelled on the course 'An Introduction to World History' set up by the Australian historian David Christian at Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia. We adapted his approach with the aid of our emerging sociological structuring principles, while the revision of the contents benefited from comments by contributing lecturers.

Structuring the course inevitably meant devising a structure for Big History itself. In my book: *The Structure of Big History: from the Big Bang until Today*, I advance one single, all-encompassing, theoretical framework for Big History. We think we live in one single, undivided Universe, within one single Solar System, on one single planet, as one humankind, which, like all other living species, has descended from one single life-form. In order to grasp this unity adequately, we need a type of unified knowledge that is not split along the fault lines of academic specializations, which developed as part of our social history.

I think the time is ripe for such an effort. In almost all branches of academic thought, the historical approach is gaining ground. We now have to devise an overarching scheme unifying all these historical approaches. I am not the only one who perceives such a need. The US world historian William H. McNeill, while commenting on our project, formulated it as follows: «the meeting of hard and soft sciences is much needed. It elevates history to the Queen of the Sciences: an interesting reversal from its status as a would-be science in the 19th century».

*Nikolai Ssorin-Chaikov*  
(Max-Planck-Institute,  
Halle, Germany)

### **ETHNOGRAPHY AND REPORTING IN STALINIST SIBERIA**

This paper discusses uses of ethnographic authority in politics of collectivisation among Siberian aborigines. In this paper, I focus on one ethnographic interview with Evenki 'foster-child labourer', which conducted in the early 1930s and used as to denounce his adopted parent as an indigenous 'kulak'. In looking at such a case, I examine the early Soviet relationships of power which underscored the construction of indigenous voice as well as of the Soviet understanding of 'law' as a social science practice.

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### **HITTITE KING AND ASSEMBLY: OLIGARCHY, MONARCHY, ELECTIVE MONARCHY?**

The Hittite kingdom existed in Anatolia during five centuries in the end of the Late Bronze age. From the very beginning of the Hittite history (so-called Old Hittite Kingdom) we have some royal inscriptions. In these texts (first of all «Testament of Hattusili I» and «Proclamation of Telepinu») a term *panku-* appears. Obviously it was an important Hittite institution. Etymologically this word can be derived from *pangur-* («clan», «kin»). But from the context it is clear that it was an organization that united all Hittite highest officials and served as a main opponent to the king. After «Testament of Hattusili I» *panku* possibly could elect new king or had strong influence on the legitimization of the king's power. Structure, responsibility and evolution of this institution are still main problems of the Hittite political history.

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(Tbilisi State University, Georgia)

*George Tarkhan-Mouravi*  
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### **LEGITIMACY AND IDEOLOGIC FORGERY IN CAUCASIAN CONFLICT**

Language and geographic descent, ethnogenetic theories and myths play considerable role in the Caucasus. Claim for exclusive rights for a specific territory is often linked to the claim to have 'autochthonous' status, whereas only 'guest' status is attributed to others, generally based on arbitrary use of historical facts. When some political claims are easier to substantiate with historic facts, opposing party may find it difficult to support its own claims through historical material of the same period. Legitimacy of argumentation based on the difference between autochthonous and immigrant peoples will be rejected, and other arguments applied. In both types of legitimisation, history is manipulated for political reasons, while the impact

of such historical arguments on public consciousness is strong conflictogenous factor. Symbolic acts and statements, national myths and conspiracy theories have inflated all conflicts in the region, being mostly developed and propagandized by intellectuals of nationalist breed. It is astonishing to see how sophisticated linguistic theories or interpretations of art history may shift to the domain of public discussion and become issues causing mutual hostility and violence. Equally, all parties in the conflict pragmatic, or rather cynical, approach to universal democratic norms and international law, appealing to and applying those norms and provisions which they find useful and ignoring others. Human rights rhetoric may serve as a disguise for extreme nationalism. Double standard is a norm when moral norms do not preclude intellectual falsification. Soviet heritage – including the Stalinist ideological tradition concerning nationality question played paramount role in forming the confrontational rhetoric in ethnic conflicts. Although itself rhetoric is not creating conflict, being rather an instrument of xenophobic propaganda, it plays important role in hindering the resolution of existing tensions, which become strongly linked to wording and different interpretation of terms. There is long going tradition of ideological falsification, deliberate creation and exploitation of myths, enemy images and traditions, especially highly developed during Soviet time, when special institutions worked on designing such ideological constructs. So, in Georgia of 1970s, came to life first fake anti-corruption campaigns, based on extreme political hypocrisy, and accompanied by developing new «socialist» festivities (Tbilisoba), bizarre ceremonies («buduoba» –socialist-atheist version of baptism), and abominable plague of monumental art. Today we attend the campaign of ascribing labels of terrorists to whole nations, or coining racial labels such as «Caucasians», based on the same tradition of ideological forgery. The study raises a critical subject in exploring the nature of political beliefs, norms and preferences among Georgia's population as revealed through political behaviour and in public discourse in situations of conflict, of how para-scientific argumentation or theories influence mass beliefs and contribute to such process. It is intended to describe some elements of existing political culture as factors and preconditions of conflicts and political conduct in crisis. In particular, the process of creation of new beliefs and stereotypes as related to legitimacy issue, and especially in the situation of ethno-territorial conflicts, is analysed.

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**RECIPROCATION AT DONATIONS TO GODS UNDER THE  
PALLAVAS, THE 7<sup>TH</sup> – 9<sup>TH</sup> CENTURIES AD  
(A STUDY OF INSCRIPTIONS)**

Reciprocation was a remarkable phenomenon of the medieval Southern Indian society. The interchange of services also played an important part in the creation of the structure of interaction of an agricultural community (and an association of communities), a minor ruler and the Pallava authority in the relation to a Hindu temple. The construction of temples was widely spread in this period under the king's patronage.

The Hindu temple was an important factor in the socio-cultural integration process. It represented a synthesis of local traditions, beliefs and cults, their inclusion into a more complex and universal mythological model.

In this research we were interested in the understanding of the mechanism, which did often make the integration and existence of the temple in the self-sufficient and autonomous communal structure successful.

The analysis of the temple epigraphy of the Pallava time evidenced a change of the contents of records. Panegyric and memorial inscriptions were displaced by records of different communities about their consent to take at their disposal those or other donations to a god (temple). Having received, for example, the whole amount of donated gold, they agreed to supply a particular interest of the capital in money or in kind (rice, oil, etc), and in some cases to pay a certain fine to a king if the discontinuity of the charity is caused. Formally, a temple neither spent its gold, nor drew any income from its usage, except a specified interest from the community. For the donor it was something like a "permanent donation", as the implementation of the purposes of donation had a stable source of financing.

This mechanism gave the community additional resources and the particular immunities recognized by the Pallava authority and minor rulers. For the Pallavas the temples represented the network serving as a support of their authority, explorer of direct political and ritual influence.

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## **PANCAPITALISM AND HEGEMONY**

The rise of Pancapitalism as the triumphant order of our own era poses several intriguing questions for the future of human civilization. How have the patterns of hegemony changed in history? What are the unique features of power and hierarchy in the new regime? Where is Pancapitalism taking us in the 21st century? This essay reviews the evolution of hegemony from its agrarian, to industrial, and informatic imperialism. It argues that power and hierarchy have shifted from control of land to capital and knowledge. However, the new Pancapital regime threatens to create a neo-feudal world order in which gated communities of the rich are chordened off from the gated community of the poor in a system that resembles a global apartheid. Apart from its costs in continued violence and human suffering, the new regime is highly vulnerable to technological and political sabotage. It cannot therefore last for long unless it is transformed into a more humane system of governance and civilization. Covariation between power asymmetry and other social characters in macaque societies Bernard Thierry (Laboratoire d'Ethologie des Primates, CNRS & Universite Louis Pasteur, Strasbourg, France).

In some non-human primates, individuals manage competition by respecting strict rules of submission and dominance. In other species, individuals regulate conflicts by retaliating and reconciling frequently. A logical question to ask is whether patterns of conflict management and power asymmetry are interconnected characters within social organizations or if they evolve separately. The behavioral diversity found among macaque species is reviewed to answer this question. In spite of the occurrence of intraspecific variation, it is shown that patterns of aggression, reconciliation, dominance, kinship, socialization and temperament evolve as sets of covariant characters. Macaques are ranged along a four-grade scale rating species according to their patterns of conflict management. The scale correlates with the phylogeny of macaques, pointing out at the action of evolutionary constraints. It provides an operational framework that generates testable predictions. The consistency of the scale is assessed with regard to the socioecological models proposed to explain the evolution of despotic and egalitarian styles of dominance in macaques.

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CNRS & Université Louis Pasteur,  
Strasbourg, France)

### **COVARIATION BETWEEN POWER ASYMMETRY AND OTHER SOCIAL CHARACTERS IN MACAQUE SOCIETIES**

In some non-human primates, individuals manage competition by respecting strict rules of submission and dominance. In other species, individuals regulate conflicts by retaliating and reconciling frequently. A logical question to ask is whether patterns of conflict management and power asymmetry are interconnected characters within social organizations or if they evolve separately. The behavioral diversity found among macaque species is reviewed to answer this question. In spite of the occurrence of intraspecific variation, it is shown that patterns of aggression, reconciliation, dominance, kinship, socialization and temperament evolve as sets of covariant characters. Macaques are ranged along a four-grade scale rating species according to their patterns of conflict management. The scale correlates with the phylogeny of macaques, pointing out at the action of evolutionary constraints. It provides an operational framework that generates testable predictions. The consistency of the scale is assessed with regard to the socioecological models proposed to explain the evolution of despotic and egalitarian styles of dominance in macaques.

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### **ELITOLOGY AND NOMADISTICS: POINTS OF CONTACT**

The classic elitology that has formed during the 20<sup>th</sup> century, rarely used medieval materials and concentrated its attention mainly on modern times. Nevertheless, the characteristics and features of the highest social strata being worked out by this branch of the political science, can be relevant to the study of hierarchies and power relations of the Past, including the nomadic world. Evidently, the ruling elites of nomadic political formations can be considered in accordance with the general elitist indices. It is worth pointing out such indices as power, wealth, ideology, cohesion, corporate self-consciousness, etc. It is also possible to define various resources of

elite's dominance in the steppe – economical, social, symbolic, and cultural. Analyzing the structure of the nomadic elite, one should bear in mind that in those societies there were the elite proper (the ruling clans), the counter-elite (oppositional clans and political aristocratic alignments), and the circum-elite surrounding (not noble functionaries, officials, generals, the pagan and Muslim clergy). In the time of formation of any khanate or qaghanate the elite usually underwent an identical transformation. A closed group became firmly established at power, its leaders got charismatic power and formed the meritocratic elite of a new "state". In one or two generations their descendants safeguarded the founders' charisma while the power became not charismatic, but traditional owing to those people belonging to the governing clan. The joining this elite was theoretically possible only through the ruling clan membership and at the same time practically through a marriage with its female representative, the strengthening of the counter-elite's influence or virtual usurpation (see numerous examples of commoners co-ruling with lawful monarchs). Meanwhile, the authoritative prerogatives of the ruling clan were not disputed by anyone. Belonging to the elite was determined by the degree of closeness or the strength of the kin ties with this clan.

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#### **MASS MEDIA IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE: CREATION OF «VIRTUAL POLICY»**

In an epoch of domination of modern mass communications the difference between the original perception of a person and the views he learns from other people or through mass media is obliterated. Nowadays people hardly understand this, acquiring much of information indirectly and coordinating it with own notions in such a manner that all this becomes compressed in something being indivisible, and as a result the influence of mass media also could not be realized.

People used to combine their own perceptions with vision of «mass media's eyes», as though they are their own thoughts and impressions. It is a «legal» way of influence and formulation of public opinion by mass media. But public opinion as «articulated declaration of desires of constituted social groups» in Russia influences insignificantly on decision making by authority. On account of this the public opinion in Russia is used as the «sign of itself».

Mass media exploits the concept of «public opinion» for support of a political struggle and speaks in the name of it.

Mass media shows to authorities already fabricated public opinion. And sometimes there is an impression, that this opinion has been created by an order of the authority, which tends to represent itself as the arbiter in political conflicts. On the other hand, the financial, industrial and other corporate groups use a fabricated «public opinion» for its presentation to this arbiter (for example, President).

In its turn, the society is influenced by means of «public opinion» of mass media and as a result political parties, political scenarios in conformity with this fabricated public opinion are created. Thus, the process of interaction of two subjects of the information sphere: mass media and society becomes virtual. Mass media broadcasts the flow of symbols and facts, and society produces the flow of needs, interests and desires.

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#### **GOVERNMENT OF THE TURKISTAN REGION NATIVE POPULATION IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE**

Before its annexation by Russia the indigenes of the Turkistan general-governorship (*general-gubernatorstvo*) did not have a unified administrative system. The nomads were divided into tribes, tribes into divisions, and the latter ones into subdivisions. The sedentary inhabitants were divided into *aksakhalships*. Hereditary leaders, named the *manaps*, *sultans* or *senior beys* headed tribal groups of the nomads. The ordinary *beys* (also hereditary), governors of tribal divisions, were their subordinates. Subdivisions were ruled by the *tugachies*. Only in cases of emergency, the *doyens* could elect other tribal leaders and *beys* which were then approved by the *khan's* representatives – the *beks*. Only the *tugachies* held non-hereditary offices and almost always were elected by the elders. The settled inhabitants enjoyed the political system of another kind. Every settlement or block (a division of a large settlement) was managed by the *aksakhals*, elected by people and affirmed by the *beks*.

In populous settlements, besides the *aksakhals*, there were the *raeses* (assigned by the *beks*) who exercised the police and religious power. The *serkhers* and *ziakhetches*, assigned by the *beks* as well, collected taxes. The *arik-aksakhals* supervised the distribution of water.

Right after the conquest, the Russian authorities, taken up by the solution of their political problems, could not pay proper attention to the organization of internal affairs. As a matter of fact, The Temporary Statute for Governing of Turkistan Province 1865 included conventional administrative bodies within a new ruling structure, by not making thus any principal changes.

The first attempt to legalize a new local administration took place in 1867, when the tribal division of the nomads was substituted by an imposed two-stage merely administrative system (the *volost*, divided into the *auls*). The settled population kept the former single-stage division into the *aksakhalships*. There was an order of selection of the local officials, who were approved by the Russian authority.

As a matter of fact, the projects of new Statutes for Turkistan, which followed in 1871, 1873, 1881, 1883, 1884 and were not approved by the central authority, were to assign Turkistan indigenes the rights of the Russian natives of the applicable condition, *i.e.* the rights of the agricultural estate with some exceptions for the benefit of preservation of folk customs. For the urban population it was supposed to assign the rights of the urban estate. It should be mentioned that in the project of 1883 the establishment of the same two-stage administrative system (the *volost*, divided into the *aksakhalships*) for the settled population was proposed. These innovations received the legislative confirmation in The Statute for Governing of Turkistan Region 1886.

Thus, the spread of a new administrative system in the Turkistan general-governorship was accompanied by an anxiety about a gradual approach of new possession to the general imperial orders. In order to avoid confrontation between the new authorities and the local population the Russian authorities first kept the local management at the lowest level practically without any changes. Later, trying to consider the specific features of different groups of the population, different administrative systems for the nomadic and settled peoples were introduced. The tendency to acknowledge the distinctions between different groups of indigenes and to establish their correspondence to these or those estates of the population of the Empire became the key point of all the legislative acts on the Turkistan general-governorship.

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**HALF-CAST AND UNDERPRIVILEGED COMMUNITIES IN A  
SEMI-NOMADIC SOCIETY: THE EMEKS/JEMEKS AMONG THE  
NOGAI-TATARS OF THE ASTRAKHAN REGION IN THE  
17<sup>TH</sup> – 19<sup>TH</sup> CENTURIES**

The *Emeks/Jemeks/Yameks* (turc. *em, jem*: “food”, “proviand”) represented an underprivileged community among the suburban Nogai-Tatars (the Edisans or Jetisans) who escaped from the Kalmyks and found a shelter in the environs of Astrakhan at the beginning of the 17<sup>th</sup> century.

The *Emeks* permanently lived in 3 or 4 peculiar villages and were bound to supply the semi-nomadic horde with grain and other food.

They were ascertained to be descendants of captives of strange origins, e.g. the Chechens (the Tauli clan in the village of Jemene or Emene), from the Circassians (the Jari clan in the village of Kulakau) as well as the Kalmyks, Kazan and Cgimean Tatars, and even Kuban Nogais who lost their cattle and fled to the Volga region.

This social phenomenon looks typical for the Nomad sedentarization process, particularly for the Turkic peoples in different areas of the world. For example, the Yamaks among the nomadic Turkish (the Yuryuks) of the 15<sup>th</sup> – 17<sup>th</sup> centuries Balkans paid off sheep to be released from the Mounted Army, and as a result they were not held in respect.

In 1801 when all the Edisans/Jetisans near Astrakhan became settled, the *Emeks/Jemeks* lost their peculiar status. And the tsarist government released them from the dominion of former princes (*moursas*) and best warriors (*batyrs, aga's*) as common “state peasants” of the Russian Empire through the “revisions” of the population of 1811-1835.

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**POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE IROQUOIS  
AS A PATH OF STATELESS DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIETY**

The process of politogenesis is that of the change and development of a society's political structure and the formation of a new type of power and

government structures. It does not result invariably in the creation of a kind of statehood. The stateless path of the social development is also possible, at least, in the case of postprimitive societies. The Iroquois, namely, the political confederation that went down to history as the Iroquois League demonstrate an example of such a development.

The independence of each tribe was unlimited, and there was no common chief to lead the whole tribal alliance. The supreme ruling body was the League Council, which combined undivided legislative, executive and judicial power and managed practically all common affairs of the League. Each of the five tribes delegated sachems (civil chiefs) to the League Council, which were elected on kin and tribal councils. All the community members participated in the elections that favoured meritocracy.

Almost no contradictions are traced within the Iroquois society, among its strata. There were no dependent groups; there was no single person who concentrated power in his hands even relatively, as it happens, e.g., under the chieftom system; there was no bureaucratic management machinery personified by various officials, without which a state system cannot function. Apart from adopting individual prisoners, whole tribes were adopted. Subdued ethnic groups were incorporated into one of five tribes and were quickly assimilated. The League did not introduce direct government in an overwhelming majority of the territories they conquered but controlled them by sending military expeditions thereto regularly. I believe that it would be proper to speak about use of the territories rather than about government.

Having a sufficiently developed social and especially political organization, which enabled the alliance of five (later on six) Iroquois tribes to occupy the dominant position in the north-eastern part of the New World, perhaps, for more than two hundred years, the League showed no obvious signs of social stratification and property differentiation in its structure. It was characterized by a complicated and efficient system of organization of the society, which functioned, however, without any bureaucratic government institutions, retaining its egalitarian traditions and having no pronounced hierarchy, whereas the very notion of state, even in its primordial form, presupposes a hierarchy. Thus, the functions of the state, e.g. large-scale organized military activities were assumed by a nonstate system of political organization.

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### NOTES ON FOUCAULT AND FASCISM

A number of historians have pointed out what they perceive as a significant problem with the work of Michel Foucault. Laura Engelstein's comments in the pages of the *American Historical Review* might be taken as exemplary: she faults Foucault for paying attention only to the minor tyrannies while ignoring altogether the major ones. The implication is that there is a moral problem lurking within Foucault's oeuvre: why did he decline to write about the catastrophes of the 20th century, if not because of a profound anxiety about the relativist nature of his own position?

In my paper I am going to explore the question this dichotomy between major and minor tyrannies. I will argue that Engelstein's view is a misreading of Foucault's relationship to intellectual work (a point made by Rudy Koshar in a thoughtful comment on Engelstein's article), and that it elides the more important question of how the major tyrannies are compounds of minor ones, that human catastrophes are aggregates of disciplinary practices. The need is to see the major and minor tyrannies as residing in the same space of politics. Indeed we might consider that the moral problem resides with Engelstein's position: the misleading aspect of this critique is that it implies we keep a look out for other lurking major tyrannies, while living in a mode of toleration of all the minor ones.

I will suggest how we might describe the animation of the «major» tyrannies of Nazism and Stalinism by the «minor» ones of discipline. This requires that we pay attention to those writers who have extended Foucault's descriptions of forms of government. The question relevant for the study of major tyrannies is, how was it possible for multiple forms of governmental power to be activated and articulated solely within idioms of discipline? Explanations that privilege the consolidation of an evil ideology within an oppressive state bureaucracy that was able to take over public and private space, assume the normality of liberal capitalist democratic societies. More in the spirit of Foucault we might try not to assume any kind of normalcy to the process of modern governance; we might look instead to that place that Foucault problematizes in his work, the body as subjectivity. I will draw from the philosopher Eugene Gendlin who has pointed out that human understandings are always felt by the body, that we live by means of what he calls felt-meanings. I will argue that tyranny is a narrowing and constricting of governmental technologies, and that it represents a short circuiting of the body's place in the process of felt-meanings. I will contextualize my

discussion by referring to anthropological literature that sees the body as the key site of social reproduction.

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#### **THE TITLE *QALGA* AND THE CONTINUITY OF AUTHORITY IN THE DZHUCHID STATES (XVI<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY)**

The origin of the title *qalga* attracted the attention of researchers for a long time (Vel'yaminiv-Zernov 1864, Smirnov 1887, Matuz 1970, Grigor'ev 1985, Abrahamowicz 1986 etc). The title is ancient Turkic-Mongolian one and ascends, probably, to the time of formation of the Mongolian empire. This post existed in the states formed after disintegration of the Golden Horde.

*Qalga* was the younger brother and successor of ruling khan (or *biy*, i.e. prince, in Nogay Horde). However, V.D. Smirnov has paid attention, that, for example, in Crimea, khan frequently inherited not by *qalga*, but son of khan's other brother or nephew. It has allowed the scientist to doubt of an antiquity of the title both precise fixing of functions and purpose of the post.

According to Evliya Çelebi (1666) in Crimea *qalga*-sultan ruled over the eastern (right) part of the peninsula, whereas the *nureddin*-sultan over the western (left) one. The same situation we can observe in Nogay Horde in XVI cent. There are two mentions of existing the title of *qalga*-sultan in Astrakhan Khanate (1540s).

The study of inheritance of the throne in Post-Golden Horde States allows to come to a conclusion, that the changes of authority inheritance was almost always connected to intervention of external forces. In all cases, when the loyalist *qalga*-sultan was alive to the moment of death of khan, he as a rule occupied the throne. The institute of successor in Post-Golden Horde States, which takes the beginning in the Mongolian epoch, was the guaranty of preservation of continuity of authority, and its concentration within the framework of one dynasty.

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### **SUBORDINATION IN ANTS: SOCIO-ETHOLOGICAL ASPECTS**

Eusociality in insects is known to be determined, at the socium level, by the evolution of two spheres of functioning, viz., reproduction and supply. The sphere of reproduction includes the reproductive adults and the brood, while the supply sphere the socialized workers.

The ants are characterized by a complete division of these two spheres as well as by the involvement of two vectors of individual domination, one for the females and the other for the workers. In the so-called solitary insects, an integrated behavioral reaction of each individual is observed, whereas in the eusocial insects this is only revealed at the level either of a group of individuals or of the entire socium. Within a socium, conventional behavioral motivations become of paramount importance. The reaction of an individual is determined by its social role as well as its rank within the functional group involved.

The ants are also characterized by a functional group hierarchy. For example, a forager is always a dominant in relation to any worker operating inside the anthill. The real hierarchic structure of the workers is socially determined, this solving the problem of completing the socium's functional organization. Thereby the formation of a functional series always takes place from above. The loss of an individual dominant results in a shift along the entire functional series. This occurs both under territorial interactions between the individuals and at a transformation of functional series in the anthill.

The transition of an individual worker from one functional group into another or its rank elevation is realized through a drastic increase both in its overall behavioral activity and the frequency of contacts with individuals of higher rank. The vacancies are filled in as the result of a "contest" between several workers. Differentiation of individuals into various levels of social behavioral activity serves as the main ethological mechanism of display of all forms of worker subordination in ants.