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ABSTRACTS

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On the cover page:

Freedom Statue in Lusaka, Zambia

(photo by Dmitri M. Bondarenko)

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PANEL I

Peace, Security and the Actual Transfer of Power Dynamics in African Elections (General Aspects of Elections in Africa)

Convener:

Martin Revayi Rupiya (University of South Africa, Pretoria)
The implications of political power pacts, before or after elections, representing the phenomenon of ‘Beyond the Ballot Box’ on electoral processes

In the local government elections hosted in South Africa during August 2016, the political opposition ranging from the Democratic Alliance (DA), the United Democratic Movement (UDM) the newly established Economic Freedom Front (EFF) found common cause against the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC) during the campaigns, the actual voting and soon after the announcement of the results. The common purpose was to collectively dislodge the ANC from its governance of local government in the cities, towns and rural districts. In order to achieve this, the parties were forced to cobble together and reach previously unforeseen coalitions. This development, in many ways circumvented the spirit and ethos of an election. Similar examples have also been witnessed on the national levels in Germany when Angela Merkel spent over five months since September 2017, negotiating a functioning majority government that has only been achieved in March 2018 with the Social Democrat Party (SDP) that has insisted in the inclusion of pro-worker policies
and submitting the same to its membership before signing up. The attendant delays have had implications on the government and will continue to manifest throughout its lifetime. The same is true in previous election in the United Kingdom when Prime Minister Theresa May misjudged the mood of the country when she called a snap election and has only survived in power by seeking coalition with a relatively small Democratic Union Party from Northern Ireland. The obvious price to pay for the Conservatives in London was to agree to commit a further one billion pounds expenditure in Northern Ireland. In Africa, the current President of Nigeria Buhari, was able to unseat President Goodluck Jonathan only through a broad national coalition of the majority of political parties who were unhappy with the incumbent regime. After coming into office, Buhari appeared to have taken inordinate time towards rewarding his coalition partners resulting in possible revolt until he was forced to move quickly and provide patronage handouts that diffused the tense political situation. The same is true in politically troubled Lesotho, a country that, since the advent of the June 2012 first coalition, has continued to be politically unstable under several coalition arrangements. It is therefore obvious that coalition arrangements that include personal, ideological or group interests that tend to result in stilted outcomes for governments that do not enjoy complete electoral majorities revealing serious limitations of this democratic platform.
However, when these decisions are taken, either before or after the elections, the ballot box is unable to influence the ‘negotiated’ outcome (s). This paper is therefore focused on analyzing the implications of coalition politics in Africa through the discussion on ‘Beyond the Ballot Box’ phenomenon asking the question: to what extent has this compromised the integrity of the processes?
Elections in Africa have been viewed as a panacea for many of the ills that beset African states. Primarily an instrument for the selection of leaders and the legitimation of their rule, elections are now viewed as a cornerstone of democratic governance; a means through which there is broad societal participation in determining governance; an instrument for, and marker of, conflict management; “forums for the discussion of public issues and facilitate the expression of public opinion”; “reinforce stability and legitimacy” and “confirm the worth and dignity of individual citizens as human beings” (Encyclopedia Britannica). Yet, elections have often led to instability and/or violent conflict and do not always express the will of the people or provide for the free expression of public opinion. Many critics also note the lack of ideological differences between competing parties and the lack of capacity and integrity of those responsible for undertaking elections. In some cases – and often where coups have taken place – elections merely become a rubber stamp for a fait accompli. There is a growing trend in Africa where the authenticity/credibility of
elections is increasingly questioned and where violence is an outcome of disputed election results (either because of fraud or losers not accepting outcomes), or violence occurs when those in power refuse to bow out when term limits expire (by extending or eliminating term limits or postponing elections). Atuobi contends that “elections in Africa are periods during which the stability and security of African states hangs in the balance, due to the threat of election related violence” (2008:11). He defines election related violence as “violent action against people, property or the electoral process, intended to influence the electoral process before during or after elections” (2008:11). Election related conflict is evidenced, for example, in Burundi, DRC, Kenya, Madagascar, Gabon, Togo. The African Union has put in place a governance architecture that has a robust election framework (African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance), yet election related conflict continues and its conflict management response mechanisms appear to be challenged in his regard. Many non-state actors have tried to fill the void of conflict prevention in these contexts, innovating around early warning capacity and mediation between disputing parties. There is a need to critically reflect on the nature and function of elections in Africa as a whole, but a more immediate need to examine the violence associated with it and our attempts to manage this. Why (beyond the obvious surface level explanations of fraud and greed) do elections generate
so much violent conflict in Africa? What are our capacities (state, non-state and intergovernmental) to deal with this challenge? How can we strengthen our conflict management systems to respond to election related violence? This paper will critically examine these questions through an evaluation of the attempts to deal with the violence of the elections in Kenya in 2017 and the conflict surrounding the postponement of elections in the DRC.
Managing human security and security of ballot boxes in an
African election context: The impact of the African Charter on
democracy, elections and governance of 2007

Obstacles and challenges to pre-and post-electoral conflicts in
African states during elections highlight and pose the need for
electoral and security dispute resolution capacity building
programmes. In addition, the re-education of the African charter on
democracy, elections and governance, with clear participatory
processes involving electoral communities and the law enforcement
agencies is a necessary condition to mitigate new or resurrected
electoral conflicts in Africa. Recent electoral conflicts in Africa
countries such as Kenya, Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe,
The Gambia and Sierra Leone are contested through the electoral
litigation and in some instance violence become normalised thus the
electorates are victims of the electoral contestation after casting of the
ballot. This paper proposal will explore the principles of managing
human security and security of ballot boxes in an African context as
well as juxtaposed it with the assessment of the African charter on
democracy, elections and governance adopted in 2007 and came into force in 2012. The African Charter on elections has an important aspect where it mandates and instruct African member states to strengthen and institutionalize constitutional civilian control over the armed and security forces to ensure the consolidation of democracy and constitutional order. The argument of the paper will attempt to dissect electoral security and violence principles as applied during elections in various countries in Africa and further contextualise the African Union – panel of the wise analysis of the security threats and perils on African elections. The paper will stress why is it significant to discuss and study electoral security and violence in an African perspective, when, how and where do we assess electoral security situation in our context, how do we scope and assess that electoral environment in the midst of all election actors? The intellectual approach of the paper will also discuss and contextualise the electoral security diagram in relation to the African electoral dispute institutional paradigm with the aim to decolonise the western electoral security systems. In context and intellectually being pragmatic, this paper intends to achieve the following three objectives:

- To cultivate an understanding of the new electoral security architecture in relation to election conflict management,
African charter on democracy, elections and governance and the pillars of Africa’s Agenda 2063 on peace and security;

- To recognise the importance of the electoral studies conducted under the management of democratic elections in Africa (MDEA) offered by the University of South Africa (UNISA) and
- To provide new-grounded theories on the African electoral legal framework and therefore encourage dialogue by all actors on public policy analysis on electoral security

In conclusion, the paper will discuss and engage on the cross-cutting recommendations provided by various election scholars on the neutrality of security forces during elections, the code of conduct for law enforcement agencies, joint security meetings of all actors to discuss issues relating to polling day security and after as well as the national security during the election period.
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An Election Cheat Sheet and what to do about it: The role and functions of Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) in Africa

The paper is inspired by allegations and affirmations of the many ways democratic election in Africa can be manipulated, disrupted, corrupted and securitized by actors who have not bought into the idea of free, fair and genuine democratic elections. Against this background, the research question is asked: What are the most common ways that political actors “cheat” before, during and after elections in Africa and how can it be managed? The aim of the paper is to propose some policy guidelines for EMBs for the development of a strategy to prevent or mitigate “cheating during democratic elections in Africa. The aim will be achieved by presenting examples of specific allegations or confirmed incidents of unprincipled activities during elections in Africa followed by suggesting a strategy on how to deal with it. The presenter will argue that unprincipled actions by some political actors became practice during election campaigns in Africa and that some EMBs have little power to do anything about it. Therefore, Electoral Commissioners as well as election officials should become conscious of the notion of
unprincipled activities. Awareness can be created through formal training and mentorship programs during which officials can be schooled in democratic behavior and how to manage dysfunctions. Furthermore, the formulation of a clear strategy is required. Such a strategy should be founded on a policy framework that promotes democratic elections. Policy guidelines should inform the ultimate end state of credible democratic elections, courses of action to identify and deal with unprincipled or illegal activities, as well as the resources required to implement a successful “anti-cheating strategy”.

The arguments will be presented according to the following outline:

The Principles of Democratic Elections. A brief description of normative principles of the democratic elections as agreed by most proponents.

Diversions of these principles. A list of diversions that occur before, during and after elections will be presented citing examples.

Creating an awareness of unprincipled behavior. Ways of creating awareness through teaching and mentoring of Election Commissioners and Election Officials.

Policy guidelines. Some propositions in the form of guidelines to EMB official that will enable them to formulate a strategy to prevent and manage unprincipled behavior during democratic elections.
Citizen’s discontent, public trust, and political participation in Africa’s new democracies

Does citizen’s discontent affect their trust in political institutions and political participation? What are the factors influencing public trust in institutions of democratic governance in Africa? What is relationship between public trust and political behavior of citizens in Africa? Using data from Afrobarometer surveys, and also some anecdotal evidences on governance, citizen’s perceptions and trust in political institutions, we hypothesize that while Africans prefer democratic rule to any other form of government, dissatisfaction with the performance of African governments in the management of the economy, poor delivery of public goods and problem of official corruption have gradually disposed them towards nostalgia for the past and decline in the condemnation of previous authoritarian regimes. Results of both the Afrobarometer surveys, quantitative data, and anecdotal evidence draw a contrasted picture: a majority of citizens of Africa’s new democracies are proud of their countries’ experimentation with electoral democracy. But many also look backward at social and economic security under the authoritarian
system. They express resentment with the current situation and yearn for a more redistributive system. In many of the new democracies elections have been followed by governmental paralysis, corruption and ethnic warfare. And bribery, pay-offs, nepotism, misappropriation and embezzlement of government funds by politicians and government officials dominate political life. Also desirable democratic outcomes such as accountability, transparency and good governance continue to elude these new democracies as corruption remains one of the biggest challenges. Indeed the continent has continued to experience “pushback” against democracy marked by several reversals notably massive corruption, poor delivery of public goods and incessant social and political conflicts. Because of the weak governance environment, the expected ‘dividend of democracy’ has continued to elude the citizens. The latter now respond with low level of loyalty, trust and support for the political system. As more and more citizens become victims of corruption and are denied public goods as a result of bad governance, many Africa’s democracies are likely to be faced with the problem of political instability.
The "wave of democratisation" and electoral processes in Sub-Saharan Africa

In the late 1990s-early 2000s, a "wave of democratization" swept through the African continent. In nearly all countries of Tropical Africa presidential, parliamentary, gubernatorial, provincial, local and other elections have become a familiar feature of political life, and if observers do not reveal serious violations, the elections are considered valid, and society, whether it gets a new leader or keeps the old, walks along the path of democratization. This does not take into account the fact that in the African context, an election may become a matter of life and death for candidates or their voters, as contenders often resort to extreme methods to protect their electoral interests. In principle, a victory in a democratic election is seen as the main condition for legitimising a ruler, who thus receives the right to do what he promised during the election campaign. In case he implements the declared programme, he is able to confront the opposition confidently, the latter not being able to challenge the policies of the legitimate government legally. This should also help to reduce the level of violence: even if irreconcilable opponents of the
regime do not recognize the rights of the legitimate government to pursue its policy, they will find it difficult to secure mass support for violent actions, because they cannot claim that their struggle is just. Yet democracy does not always create conditions for the consolidation of peace and stability. "Democratisation" in Africa has evoked general enthusiasm, both on the continent and beyond, but the process has turned out to be much more complex and controversial. Often "democratisation" in developing countries produces the effect opposite to what is observed in developed countries, because competitive elections reignite inter-tribal, inter-confessional, and inter-factional contradictions, which languished or were suppressed by authoritarian rulers, sometimes leading to violence. That is, in developed societies democratisation facilitates the strengthening of political stability, while in developing ones it aggravates the already existing preconditions for instability. In developed countries the necessity to implement voter-approved policies does discipline rulers, especially since all their actions are monitored by the media, non-governmental organisations, the opposition, etc. If they are seen to advance their own interests or harm public ones, most likely they will not be re-elected, or will be – but only in the absence of worthy contenders. In Tropical Africa, where the achievements of a leader in the social and economic spheres are of less importance than the effectiveness of the patronage system he has created, it is the scale of
the outreach of this system that will largely determine the outcome of the election. An important factor, which often predetermines the outcome of an election, remains the tribal affiliation of the candidate. This voting principle underlies most of the electoral processes in those African countries where societies are divided into rival factions and common origins remain the most solid base for the formation of political loyalty. In such cases, voters join rival electoral blocs. If a leader enjoys the support of a large and loyal bloc of voters – his fellow tribesmen, the quality of his leadership as a factor for re-election largely loses its significance.
Elections and democracy in Africa: Issues and perspectives

There is a perception in African political leadership that the periodic holding of elections demonstrates the democratic constructs of their polity. This perception is being peddled, primarily, by the regime regulators of the respective African countries. In their view, election is equivalent to democracy. The history of post-colonial is underlined by the struggle for democracy vis-à-vis the policies of the political leadership of African regimes across the continent, irrespective of the holding of the elections. Thus, the electoral process is riddled with anti-democratic practices that expose the hollowness of elections. This paper examines the relationship between elections and democracy in selected African countries. It will identify the explanatory factors hindering the democratic dividend across the African continent. These factors are internally generated as well as external push and pull stimulants. For instance, what role has elections played in the emergence of good governance in Africa? What is the role of non-African powers in the evaluation of elections and democracy in Africa? If we perceive an election as a renewal of the social contract between the citizenry and political leaders, then
both parties have critical roles to play in maintaining order and ensuring that the polity exemplifies good governance. Is it true that a people get the leadership they deserve? The paper shall evaluate the extent to which this is reflected in the selected African countries.
It is generally accepted that the transfer of power from one president to another is best achieved through an election. This Consensus is a widely established panacea to social issues that arise from the complexity of the world, by way of a global community. And further elections are considered the main prerequisite to good governance. Yet this unipolar world view enfolds its own set of problems that compel a careful observation on the premise of Democracy through the lenses of critical analysis. It then follows a cursory review of elections, based on a total of 203 countries, shows 133 countries held free, fair, and open election in 2016, (https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2016). Case in point, in 2015, more than one third (1/3), of the fifty-four (54) countries of Africa, held elections (http://theconversation.com/africas-2015-election-experiences-present-dilemmas-for-2016-polls-53312). As a preliminary result, of these elections in Africa, it can be argued, these countries are making a concerted effort to regaining political integrity and territorial sovereignty. The people, rather the voters, as the strategic resource to
valid elections cannot be overstated since it is the one criterion that confers real legitimacy to every government, comprised of both elected and non-elected officials. From this popular mandate, a government is expected to maintain the social order, with a particular focus on the doctrine of liberty and theory of check and balance; and to stay in power. However, the dichotomy inherent to this order, i.e., new world order, is its covert contempt of universal suffrage. For example, this contradiction is often exhibited from the exit polls that reveal the difficulties voters had to overcome to cast their ballots. Whether by design, and/or inadvertently, elections results are often contested, even in the countries of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Therefore, it is important to note that, in most cases, the challenges, which follow the elections results, lead to social unrest to the extent that the opposition parties always base their grievances on the management of the elections, which they deemed unfair to their candidates. At this phase of this essay, the aim is to search for the evidence of national interest in system dynamic, as a generic model that is most appropriate to projecting, over the years, which African countries will build the capacity to organize the safest and most secured elections. It will be further argued that confidence, in regularly held elections, among the local populations, constitutes one of the core elements of state-led Development. With reference to this argument, this paper will seek to
prove, unfettered voter participation (e.g., no voter identification requirement), before and after an election, is the preeminent indicator of internal changes and foreign policy.
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Social representations and attitudes as a basis for electoral behavior in African countries: the experience of empirical research

This empirical study was conducted in several countries in sub-Saharan Africa: Namibia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Uganda, South Sudan. Despite the differences in the level of economic development, in the nature of the political structure quite comparable results were obtained. A socio-psychological study was carried out, the main purpose of which was to find out the local indigenous population's relations with foreign business partners, determine preferences regarding the type and nature of partnership in the field of business relations between an African country and representatives of international business. To carry out the research tasks, a questionnaire was conducted at the Universities of the above-mentioned countries as well as representatives of the business community. A total of 350 questionnaires. So, there were 5 main points that affect the choice of a business partner and which must be taken into account when building business relations with a potential African partner. The answers to the questions were combined into five groups: group 1 –
"The need for an independent way of development"; group 2 – "The need for innovative technologies"; group 3 – "The need for strategic partnership"; group 4 – "The need for a" donor "and material and financial support"; group 5 – "Striving for Western values and integration into the global economy". As an example, I will present the results of the study in Zimbabwe in two university cities: Harare and Gweru (in the year of the study, the two universities were in the zone of influence of different political forces in the country). These two universities in fact, were on the territories of the opposing sides. Harare - the official capital of Zimbabwe, the capital of Sean, the territory of influence of the President of the country Robert Mugabe and the ruling party ZANU PF. The president proclaimed and implemented the strategy of "Steps to the East" and limiting the impact on the country from the "Anglo-Saxon" world. The city of Bulawayo, near which the University of Gweru is located, is the Ndebele zone, the zone of influence of the country's Prime Minister Morgan Richard Tsvangirai and his party "Movement for Democratic Reforms" (MDC). This is the territory of the opposition, oriented to Western values, receiving financial support from the countries of the West and striving for close interaction with the Western world. The results in these two universities were significantly different. In Harare, preference was given to the establishment of an independent path of development and independence from the West. In Gweru,
respondents preferred an orientation toward "Western values and integration into the world economy". Integration choice is the understanding of the need to find a strategic partner in the long-term. The main idea is that the knowledge of social representations and attitudes of the electorate allows, on the one hand, to predict electoral behavior, and on the other hand, it must determine the program of actions and speeches of the candidate.
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The EU as an observer of elections in Africa:
Aims, methods and consequences (the 2000s)

The European Union pays close attention to the monitoring of electoral campaigns and elections themselves in the African countries. The EU often sends its observers to monitor the African elections, by invitation from the respective African governments. The paper will aim to analyze the role of EU election observation missions (EUEOMs) working in African countries, their aims, methods, and consequences which that process may entail for the EU political relations with this or that African country. This commitment of the EU is in line with its declared aim to promote democratic, liberal, Western values on the African continent. The aim is to introduce the good governance in all African countries, to which the democratic, fair, inclusive and transparent elections are seen as a first step and the necessary precondition. The clauses of political conditionality aimed at promoting good governance are included in almost all economic and political agreements between the EU and African countries. The observation of African elections gives the EU first-hand information about the election process, the possibility to
approve of the election results or to denounce them, to praise or criticize the organization of elections. The EU election observation missions review the whole election cycle, which starts long before the elections themselves, therefore the mission can last up to 6 months. The EU observers produce their report with their evaluation of the whole election cycle, which gives recommendations on how to improve the electoral system of the country, and they monitor whether the government eventually implemented their recommendations, or not. Some governments may see this as affecting its internal political affairs. Sometimes the African governments express their disappointment with the work of the European election observers and with their conclusions, (the example is Kenyan elections in 2017). The EU is also involved in the mediation of the post-electoral conflicts in Africa, such as the one in Kenya (2007-2012). Mediation efforts are used as a tool for conflict prevention and peace building. Actors such as EU special representatives, EU delegations, ESDP missions, are often involved in mediation efforts (high-level mediation meetings, political assistance, and confidence-building measures). The EU also involves in dialogue processes with the participation of African civil society organizations at the grass-roots level. So, the election observation also reinforces other key EU foreign policy objectives, in particular peace-building in Africa. The EU observation of elections may also
be used as the instrument of “legitimization” of the incoming government in the eyes of the Western world, or “international community”. This is the case of Zimbabwe after the resignation of Mugabe. The need for organizing "peaceful, inclusive, transparent, democratic" elections and carrying out political and economic reforms as a condition for expanding partnership with Zimbabwe was stated in the EU Council resolution. The EU is ready to help Zimbabwe restore constructive relations with international financial institutions, based on a clear reform program. The EU plans to send its election observers to Zimbabwe for a preliminary assessment ahead of the country’s harmonised elections, they were invited by the President Mnangagwa in March 2018. Therefore, the EU’s role as an observer of African elections is multilateral, may be evaluated differently and is worth further exploration.
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Economic and religious interplay of interests as a reason for drastic change in Africa's electioneering dynamics  

Africa due to its geostrategic repository of huge natural resources of global interest as well as its growing population and markets have become of huge interest to powerful states of the world. The clash of civilizations in the 21st century, with religion now playing a major factor in the world and foreign policy is also a factor which has caused powerful nations of the world to look towards Africa. These interests have changed electioneering dynamics in Africa and have to a large extent become the denominator and determinant of who comes into power in African states. The paper identifies what these interests and players are, and how the political structure and foreign policy of African states is fast changing not to suit the African peoples but to answer the strategic interests of foreign powerful nation states who have interests in Africa.
Elections in Africa: Prospects and challenges for democracy

This paper seeks to highlight the controversial way elections have been held in some countries, which have led to the loss of confidence with the results, in some cases, the disputed elections has led to civil wars, re-run of the electoral process or the formation of coalitions. Election time on the African continent has therefore brought about anxiety to both the contesting political parties and the electorate. In the battle for political hegemony, pre- and post-electoral violence has become commonplace. But the most susceptible victims of the battle for political supremacy have been the electorate who are swayed left right and centre by completing political parties. The aftermath of most elections has left citizens licking their wounds as they take stock of the brunt of supporting whatever political party of their choice. To avoid outright defeat, most ruling political parties have been able to manipulate both the vote and state security machinery to their advantage. Legislation governing the conduct of free and fair elections has not been of much use either as it has also been manipulated.
This paper explores the vagaries associated with elections on the African continent. The paper utilises available debates to support the argument of cases of flawed electoral processes on the African continent.
Democratic elections and ethnic alliances

Democratic elections in Africa have always been riddled with riots, protests, and killings. The instability that results from the elections is so predictable that, in some cases, people move away from "political centers" cities on the eve of the proclamation of the first tour results. Results that always seem to be to the advantage of power. This scenario is well known to observers. Those in power seem to want to hang on to it, and those in opposition seem to want to get to the power by any means possible. However, the interethnic contractions in this democratic exercise, turned into a battle for power, are often less explored. In most cases, candidates for elections lack serious political agenda. They invest in their ethnic alliances to garner more political power. They all rely on the traditional fidelity of members of their ethnic origin, and affiliated ethnic groups, to win elections and stay in power. In this perspective, questions about the congruence of Western democracy with African societies remain relevant. Is it possible to envisage other forms of elections, in line with the political logics of African societies? Should we simply focus on educating people to democratic exercise? During our presentation, we intend to
expose the place ethnic alliances have in the game of democratic elections in Africa today. We will elaborate on the crossings and tensions between the traditional ethnic logics, and the logic of the nascent democracies.
Elections as an instrument of political succession on the African continent are a post 2000 after the end of the cold war phenomenon. Hitherto, succession had been by military coup d’états, removing incumbents installed and embedded by the one-party-state-system supported by the overarching international system. Following the violent military coup in Sierra Leone of 1987, the then Organization of African Unity criminalized this route banning the ‘unconstitutional’ change of government through force. Soon afterwards, during the 1990s, the surviving super power introduced to Latin America and Africa, the Williamson suggested Washington Consensus that introduced liberal democracy, complete with markets and links to the global economy. The OAU’s successor, the African Union, adopted the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) in 2007 providing the framework towards ‘deepening’ democracy. However, a review of the take up rate of ACDEG by Member-States reveals that only eight countries out of
the 55 have signed, ratified and mainstreamed this protocol within the national electoral systems. The majority has not. In asking the question why there has been this serious reluctance, part of the answer lies in Member-states whose political elite seized power before the 1987 and after decades in power then allows their siblings to succeed them. In cases where the leaders died suddenly, the institutions that they created had sufficient influence to elevate and sustain the sons as the new leaders, creating a complex patronage and personalized power structure as witnessed in Togo after Eyadema on 5 February 2005; in the Democratic Republic of Congo on 16 January 2001 following the assassination of Laurent Desire Kabila and finally, in Gabon, following the death of Omar Bongo in a clinic in Barcelona, Madrid on 8 June 2009. Several decades later, these Sons of Thy Fathers are still in power, able to “win every election” that they have faced. The same is true in the Nguema’s Equatorial Guinea where President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, in power since 1979 is now preparing his son, “Teodorin” to take over. In all the case studies cited, how has it been possible to ‘win elections’ in order to maintain the Republican Dynasties against spirited rioting by citizens on the streets protesting the veracity and legality of the vote? This paper will attempt to isolate the common practices from the three case studies that explain how the Republican Dynasties have managed to survive in the renewal of its legitimacy both at national, sub-regional
and even with international foreign policy partners? Until this phenomenon is better understood through empirical studies and the policy and practice impact is analyzed, the millions of disaffected citizens in Togo, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Gabon continues to pose a mystery as to how the electoral process has been thoroughly compromised by the machinations of the incumbent. Furthermore, in all instances of violent electoral disputes in each of the case study areas, the acquiescence of the sub-region has provided solidarity support towards the incumbent against the voices of the people resulting in the continued existence of the so called “Republican Dynasties”.


PANEL II

Elections in Africa: National and International Aspects

Conveners:

Maciel Morais Santos (Porto University, Portugal)
Vladimir Shubin (Institute for African Studies, Moscow, Russia)
The Egyptian politics and the 1945 elections seen from a minor imperialism – Portuguese diplomacy in Egypt (1940-1945)

This paper exploits the records of the Portuguese diplomacy regarding the Egyptian government in several European capitals. It aims to show the contradictions of a minor colonial power, not flexible in its own decolonisation processes but forced by the circumstances to be especially attentive to every subtle change of the general political environment. The Egyptian revolution of 1952 and the anti-colonial policies followed by the new Egyptian government would become a target for all the old European imperialist powers. But even before, in the aftermath of the II World War, the importance of Egypt in the Arab World and the possible outcomes for Asian and African colonies urged the Portuguese colonial authorities to keep the Egyptian politics under careful vigilance. The general elections of 1945 were a particular significant moment. This paper expects to contribute for comparative view of the standard evolution of imperialist powers regarding the African decolonisation.
The presidential election campaign of 2018 in Egypt

The presidential election campaign in Egypt was officially started on 20 January 2018, when the National Elections Authority (NEA) began to receive applications from candidates who want to run in the polls. The Civil Democratic Movement, which includes small parties: the Constitution Party, the Dignity Party, Socialist Popular Alliance Party, Egyptian Social Democratic Party and the Bread and Freedom Party announced on 30 January 2018 that it would boycott the vote. However, most of the more than 50 Egyptian parties announced their participation in the elections. Candidates must receive endorsements from a minimum of 20 Member of Parliament or 25,000 citizens from at least 15 from 27 governorates of Egypt, with at least 1,000 endorsements from each governorate. These requirements could fulfill two policies. The first of them was incumbent President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and the second was Moussa Mostafa Moussa – the leader of the centrist Ghad Party. Presidential elections held in Egypt between 26 and 28 March 2018, though Egyptians abroad voted from 16 to 18 March 2018. 2 April NEA announced the final results of the elections: Abdel Fattah el-Sisi received 97% of valid votes and has
been re-elected, Moussa Mostafa Moussa received 3% of valid votes. Invalid votes amount to 1.7 million and registered turnout – 41%. These results weren`t unexpected. "The Arab Spring" emphasized the importance of youth policies to ensure national security in North African countries. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi learned a lesson from what happened and put youth issues at the center of domestic politics during first presidential term. The Nation's Future Party, focused on work with youth, which was created in 2014, became the most important tool of the youth policy. It totals about 250 thousand members and has offices in all 27 governorates of Egypt. More than 90% of party members, including heads, are younger than 35 years. They take active part in public life of the country. National youth conferences became an important tool of the new youth policy. President el-Sisi took an active part in their work. Tightening control over the activity of non-governmental organizations became one of the main directions of the youth policy in Egypt. For this purpose, the Law on Associations and Other Foundations Working in the Field of Civil Work No. 70 of 2017, which replaced the previous Law on Non-Governmental Organizations No. 84 of 2002, was adopted. Besides, much attention was paid to the solution of the main economic problems of the Egyptian youth: to a housing problem and youth unemployment. Now in Egypt construction of 24 new cities is carried out, and the total number of the housing units constructed is
1820 thousand in which 7 million people live currently. The Egyptian government achieved special progress in fight against unemployment, which sharply increased during "The Arab Spring". In 2017 according to the Word Bank the general level of unemployment in Egypt decreased to 11.6% from 13.2% in 2013.
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Peculiarity of Algerian campaigns for local elections:
Voting for the Party or for the “Aarch”?

Elections are the cornerstone of any democratic Process, people are supposed to decide about their representatives at both levels; local and national. In Algeria, the experience with democracy is short; the country knew political openness by late 1980s. The three decades of experiencing participatory democracy were very difficult; Algeria went through a bloody war against Islamic groups which were once heading towards a sharp victory in the 1991 legislative elections. The military has back then stopped the electoral process and thus the Islamic Front of Salvation (FIS) has resorted to violence, consequently, the whole country was in a bloodbath. The next elections (The Presidential Elections of 1995) needed a popular support to show some kind of legitimacy. Amidst all of the atrocities perpetrated by the terrorist groups, Algerians went to the polling centers and voted for Liamine Zeroual in different conditions when compared to previous elections, thus they have acquired and developed a unique campaigning system that is based on loyalty to
the political party sometimes, but most of the time was an allegiance to the “Aarch” system depending on the kind of elections they are having. The coming of Abdelaziz Bouteflika in 1999, along with the restructuring of the political scene, were two important factors for the shaping of the duality “Party/Aarch”. This paper tackles the popular system of allegiance in local elections and its impact on the outcome.
The 2010s in the history of the CAR were especially full of important and ambiguous events. In January 2011, F. Bozizé, who came to power in March 2003 as a result of a military coup, won in the presidential election, having already won 64.37% of the vote in the first round of voting, and the presidential party Kwa Na Kwa received most seats in the highest legislative body of the country (61 out of 105 seats). In March 2013, President F. Bozizé was overthrown, the authorities were captured by rebels under the leadership of M. Djotodia, leader of the insurgent Muslim group "Séléka". A transition period was introduced to prepare the country for presidential, parliamentary and local elections. The Constitution of 2004 was suspended, the parliament and government were dissolved, and the government of the transition period was formed. The temporary legislative body created in April – the National Transitional Council (NPC) – approved the candidacy of M. Djotodia as the interim president of the CAR, and in July adopted the Constitutional Charter of the Transition Period, the basic law of the transition period. By September 2013, the actions of the group "Séléka" get out of control
of its leader. The militants began to terrorize the Christian population. As opposed to the formations of the Muslim group "Séléka", detachments of Christian militia "anti-Balaka" were created, the basis of which were former soldiers and officers of the armed forces. In early January 2014, in the capital of Chad, N'Djamena urgently convened a regional summit of the Economic Community of Central African States on overcoming the crisis in the CAR, in which the Transitional Parliament of the CAR took part, and on January 10, 2014, under the pressure of the summit participants M. Djotodia resigned his presidential powers. There were 24 candidates nominated for the post of interim president of the CAR. The National Transitional Council of the country selected only 8 to participate in the contest for the presidency. On January 20, 2014 The Provisional Parliament elected the mayor of Bangui C. Samba-Panza as temporary president of the country. The main goal of her new mission was the withdrawal of the CAR from the political crisis, the restoration of security in the country, the economic recovery, the return of displaced persons, the disarmament of the detachments "Séléka" and "anti-Balaka", the preparation of elections at all levels. However, the coming to power of C. Samba-Panza, despite the presence of a peacekeeping contingent in the CAR, could not put an end to the violence in the country. At the end of 2015, the situation in the country slightly stabilized. On December 13, 2015, a
A constitutional referendum was held, at which 93% of voters (with a 38% turnout) voted to adopt a new Constitution, in which the prohibition of religious fundamentalism and extremism occupies a special place, which is aimed to overcome the conflict between Christian and Muslim communities. Military coups in the new Constitution are classified as crimes that do not have a statute of limitations. Presidential and parliamentary elections were held on December 30, 2015. Security was provided by 11 thousand UN peacekeepers and French soldiers. 30 candidates fought for the presidency, among them: A.-G. Dologué – former Prime Minister, chairman of the Union for Central African Renewal; F.-A. Touadéra – an independent candidate, former Prime Minister; M. Ziguélé – former Prime Minister, Chairman of the Movement for the Liberation of the Central African People; ex-Foreign Minister A.K. Meckassoua; sons of former presidents: J.-S. Bokassa, S. Patassé-Ngakoutou and D. Kolingba. For 1800 seats in the National Assembly claimed 1800 people. In the second round, the former prime ministers of the CAR, A.-G. Dologué (23.74%) and F.-A. Touadéra (19.05%). The results of the parliamentary elections in connection with numerous violations were annulled by the Constitutional Court. In the second round of presidential elections F.-A. Touadéra won, gaining 62.71% of the votes, A.-G. Dologué received 37.29%.
The two 21st century post-war elections in Liberia have revealed a fractured political party geography. This is all the more remarkable given the country’s de facto one-party state for a century up to 1980 and patterns in nearby countries such as Sierra Leone and Ghana where two consolidated parties vie for power. Indeed, in Liberia in both 2005 and 2011, small parties and independents won seats stretched out across the country, no party dominated the legislature, and none of the larger parties, including the ruling Unity Party, secured a clean sweep of seats in presumed county strongholds. With Africa’s first elected woman head of state – Ellen Johnson Sirleaf – stepping down as president and a partial political vacuum thus appearing at the top, an opposition coalition led by former footballer, George Weah, wrested power from the incumbent party in the 2017 elections. Remarkably, however, political parties continued to splinter. Further, jockeying for coalition partners and examples of
floor-crossing littered the political environment throughout the electoral process, which encompassed legislative and first round presidential polls and, after allegations of fraud and a severe delay, presidential run-off elections. Several questions arise. Does Liberia exhibit post-party political tendencies and why? Is this a new kind of democratic dispensation? And if the Liberian electorate votes not on the basis of party loyalties, what are their actual motivations? This paper investigates Liberia’s 2017 elections from the vantage point of on-the-ground fieldwork, intensive scrutiny of the results and comparison with previous polls. It is hypothesised that instead of loyalty to post-war parties, Liberian voters more often make choices based on local, national or transnational considerations, the latter being particularly significant in Liberia’s case. Forty years ago in ground-breaking work, Peter Ekeh framed his understanding of Nigerian politics on the dialectic between local and national authorities. Although Ekeh did not consider his framework within party politics or with transnationalism as a lens of analysis, it is within the context of the 2017 Liberian elections that we test his thinking.
The problem of political leadership
and electoral process in Côte d'Ivoire

For 10 years - from 2000 till 2010 – the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire experienced an acute military and political crisis, which was overcome due to the intervention of the world community. The situation stabilized after the approval of the country's president A. Ouattara, who came to power after the presidential elections with the support of the world community, especially France. Ivorian society has been still divided into supporters of the current president and those who remain loyal to the ex-head of state L. Gbagbo, who has been currently under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court in Hague. An analysis of the problems of political leadership in Côte d'Ivoire indicates that the next presidential election, scheduled for 2020, can lead to political destabilization in the country. There are facts that give grounds for such conclusions: the presidential elections in Côte d'Ivoire were never in the past discussed a few years before the voting date. The last presidential elections were held in 2015, and A. Ouattara was reelected for the second presidential term (the last possible according to the Constitution). In 2016, he held a referendum
on changing the constitution aimed at strengthening the vertical of power: an increase in the number of new institutions of power - the introduction of the post of vice president, the approval of the Senate and the House of Chiefs. The Chiefs suggested that the amendments to the Constitution would open Ouattara the way to the third mandate". The worsening of the socio-political situation in the country in early 2017, caused by the riots of the military and the strikes of civil servants' unions, forced Ouattara to resign the old and to form a new government. At that time was appointed the vice-president, former prime-minister Daniel Kablan Duncan, who was the closest associate of the president. The former head of the presidential administration Amadou Gon Coulibaly received the post of prime-minister. Guillaume Soro, who aspired to get the post of vice-president, remained speaker of parliament. However, he does not give up his firm intention to fight for the presidency in 2020. It is most likely, in the conditions of traditional ethno-confessional relations existing in the country, that the ambitions of Daniel Kablan Dyuncan and Amadou Gon Kulibali, both loyal to the president, will remain subordinate to the ambitions of their "leader". The non-patrimonial practices that underpin the political system of Côte d'Ivoire may highly likely give Ouattara the opportunity to maintain his post by amending the Constitution, which limits the elected president to two terms of office. However it may not be safe, because the next
presidential elections can become a detonator destabilizing the whole political system of Côte d'Ivoire. It should be taken into account that despite significant positive changes in the economy for the last 5 years, the neoliberal recipes of Ouattara did not benefit the majority of Ivorians. Strong discontent of the population is caused by widespread corruption, the difficulties of daily life, associated with higher prices for housing and electricity. Although the current president does not declare his intention to participate in the election campaign, the country is observing a political struggle between the supporters of Ouattara and G. Soro, who led the insurgent group "New Forces" in the period between 2002 and 2007 and still enjoys great authority among the military of the National Army. Thus, the situation in Côte d'Ivoire is able to evolve according to the “Chinese” scenario, whereby the head of state could continue to hold office as a result of constitutional change, notwithstanding the stated democratic principles.
After the beginning of the democratization process in Africa, people had a lot of confidence in the elections which are supposed to ensure a regular renewal of the political regimes and thus allow a political alternation. Even in cases where there were single party regimes such as Togo, "free and transparent" elections were supposed to allow the "old baobabs" to fall from their positions as heads of state and leaders who reflect the popular will to come to power. However, for the sake of survival or even sustainability, the regimes in place have always known how to organize the elections from which they almost are always winners. Thus, in Togo, the "Gnassingbé" regime has remained in power since 1967 despite the so-called transparent elections held regularly. Faced with this situation, the opposition parties and the population often resorted to the street to contest elections’ results. While in most cases these street protests lead to post-election violence, sometimes they force down regimes in powers to a certain extent or to release at least some of the power. So, can these popular uprisings be an alternative to guarantee political
alternation or are they encroaching on the normal course of democratic processes in Africa? This contribution proposes to analyze the place of the post-election disputes in Togo and their impact on the democratization process of the country.
Cliché of election in Nigeria: To be or not to be

The idea of election in many African countries is a process that has depicted itself through various phases and developments. Most African countries had to face the fact of electoral processes which has not been favourable to the state and people at large. The 21st century have seen how various African countries have struggled through various forms of electoral processes, yet with little progress or fruit towards development of the nation state. Nigeria as a nation is not foreign to this. Starting from its creation from colonial times down to its independence and post-independence stage, Nigeria could be seen as wallowing in the shadows of a true electoral process. This paper tends to analyse through a systematic historical process, the various stages and development in the electoral process of Nigeria, the struggle for power, the influence of western powers in the political processes of the Nigerian state and the various indices of the so called ´corruption´ and ´cling to power´ which most nations believe to bedevil the African continent at large.
The geopolitics of ‘zoning principle’ in Nigeria’s electoral process

The first military coup in the political history of modern Africa took place in Egypt in 1952. At the turn of the 1980s, the continent had witnessed at least seventeen military coups and, by the 1990s, the phenomenon of military coup and its intertwined problematic of military dictatorship had swept across the entire Africa. Some of the military coups instigated counter-reactions that eventually led to civil wars in a number of countries in post-colonial Africa. The direct consequence of this development was the militarization of African politics through which different levels of horrendous despotisms were unleashed on the ruled in the continent. As the 21st century gradually appeared on the horizon, civil society organizations and the enlightened public in the continent were constantly engaged with the military regimes in their respective countries in the struggle for an alternative political system – democratic governance. Similarly, within the period, the advanced countries of the Northern hemisphere embarked on a network of enlightenment campaigns in favour of democratic governance. Thus, the tides of the new era clearly preferred democratic governance to military dictatorship. These
developments paved the way for the waves of democratization that began to sweep across Africa on the eve of the 21st century. In Nigeria, the long struggle for democracy came with a variety of political lexicons that ostensibly enriched the country’s political vocabulary. In the main, the political lexicons were originated and conceptualized to etch the contours of the country’s democratic processes and institutions. The ‘zoning principle’ was one of such political lexicons that were conceptualized to shape the workings of Nigeria’s democratic system and electoral process. Paradoxically, the zoning principle, which was intended to address the specific problems of marginalization and politics of exclusion in Nigeria’s democratic system, has arguably exacerbated the infelicities of the country’s democratic consolidation and electoral politics. This paper, therefore, interrogates and contextualizes the geopolitics of the ‘zoning principle’ in a pluralistic democratic order and its implications for Nigeria’s electoral process.
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Electoral violence in Nigeria in the wake of globalisation:
A rethinking order

Elections involve a set of activities leading to the selection of one or more persons out of many to serve in positions of authority in a State. However, election’s Result in Nigerian come in two separate columns. One records the votes cast at polling stations; the other the number of people killed during election. Electoral violence in Nigerian and in did Sub-Sahara Africa has been a reoccurring decimal and comparatively the bane to successful democracy and democratisation. Embedded in the premise of political globalization and the core tenets of globalization being witnessed worldwide, do we considered electoral violence in Nigeria as a negative product of political globalization or probably inability to pursue globalization to its ultimate end. Scholars could argue that Nigeria has not historically and by its current manifestations of incessant electoral violence; significantly being positively influenced by the political globalization. Political scientists have argued that free, fair and credible elections provide the basis for the emergence of democratic, accountable and legitimate governments with the capacity to initiate
and implement clearly articulated development programmes. Be that as it may and without doubt this study empirically examines the causes of electoral violence in Nigeria and the implicit role of the stakeholders. This is a qualitative study with over reliance on interview with the stakeholders in an election and archival document complimentarily. Again, the article concludes free, fair and Credible elections are, therefore, sine qua non for democratic governance, political stability and national development.
Nigeria has now conducted two consecutive elections widely adjudged to meet international standards of credibility: the 2011 and 2015 general elections. The second of these elections also led to the peaceful transfer of Presidential power from an incumbent to the candidate of an opposition party. But then as argued by Beetham (1994, p.160), “establishing democratic electoral arrangements is one thing, sustaining them over time without reversal is quite another”. Experts on consolidation of democracy recognize sequence of electoral cycles (e.g. Lindberg, 2006), electoral turnover (Moehler and Lindberg, 2009) and alternation of power (Lodge, 2013) as important elements in consolidation of democracy. Also following Huntington’s democracy consolidation test of “two turnovers” (1993), it can therefore be said that Nigeria’s 2015 general elections has set the country well on its way to democratic consolidation. However, it cannot be taken for granted that there is a linear path that leads from two successful elections to democratic consolidation.
Certainly, the process is reversible as can be seen in the number of countries in the continent – reversals after transitions particularly to one party dominant state. Indeed, Nigeria may well be moving into its most vulnerable phase of democratic consolidation whereby the next general elections, the 2019 general elections may be even more acrimonious and hateful if the current trends and happenings in the country are taken into account, even to voting and post voting. This paper problematizes the frameworks for understanding “successful” elections from the 2011 and 2015 elections. It explores reasons why the 2011 and 2015 elections were acclaimed as successful by examining the factors that contributed to the “exceptionalism” of the 2011-2015 electoral cycle of Nigeria. Its core point of departure is that elections are not events but involves a range of processes embodied in and by an electoral cycle. It will particularly focus on the role of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), and stakeholders such as CSOs and development partners. The paper is based on an interdisciplinary research that draws on political science, sociology, anthropology and history. It aims to provide rich analysis in understanding “successful” elections within an electoral governance framework and how this deepens our understanding of the possibilities and constraints on democratization and consolidation of democracy in Africa. This study hopes to answer the key question: how was the 2011-2015 electoral cycle, and the 2011 and 2015
general elections different? How was the EMB able to deliver elections acclaimed as credible in 2011 and 2015 in such a highly fractious and volatile Nigerian electoral environment? How do the different categories of actors involved in electoral governance conceive of successful elections?
From corporatism to contentious politics:
Analyzing elections in the context of dual transitions
in Nigeria and emerging (African) countries

The fundamental logic that should belie processes of socio-economic transformation within nation-states still remain an area of huge debate in policy and academic circles in spite of pretentions about an absolute hegemony of neo-liberalism and triumph of the market doctrine. Lately, this debate has centred on developing countries involved in implementing Bretton Woods-inspired reforms, with their stylized economic models that emphasize greater openness to the market, usually at immense social costs and distemper. The challenge appears to be greater in those countries undertaking (concurrently) substantial political and economic reforms in form of institutionalizing democratic governance and market-led economic growth. What has become customary in such countries is massive resentment and opposition towards authorities by subaltern groups led by the working class and their organizations, mainly as a result of deprivations associated with such policies. The emerging pattern appears to be that of recourse to forms of authoritarianism by ruling
elites and governments of many developing countries in order to push through these reforms - regardless of their actual performance on the ground. It has been argued that outside of established democracies of Western Europe, radical market-oriented growth strategies have been pursued more often by authoritarian than democratic governments. The harsh measures associated with these policies, particularly for workers and the poor, has frequently resulted in tensions between organized labour and the state - even in climes that have had a long history of close labour-state relations or corporatism. The strain in relations between labour and the state (government) that usually characterizes countries involved in dual transitions is often considerable, often resulting in attempts to curtail labour rights in a manner that indicates the existence of procedural democracy. For it would seem clearly illogical that an upsurge in attacks on labour rights should occur under a civilian-democratic administration. But the explanation for this lies in the very character of this dual transition, especially the desperate economic principles that belie it. It has been argued that the implementation of neoliberal economic policies is implicitly (and explicitly) associated with attempts to control or repress labour (Baskin, 2000; Suarez, 2001). The outcome of this process is regularly the enthronement of contentious politics – even in countries with long standing tradition of cooperation between the labour movement and the state. Nigeria fits this portrait, as do
several emerging and/or developing countries in Africa. This paper attempts an examination of these issues using Nigeria as a case study with strong reference to cross-national experiences. It focuses on three important analytical issues (i) the nature and history of political engagement within these societies; (ii) the pattern of political exchange in the context of dual transitions; and (iii) the implication of these developments for elections and democracy in Nigeria and Africa.
Peculiarities of the electoral system of Sao Tome and Principe

1. Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe (DRSTP) is a unitary semi-presidential representative democratic state, whereby the President is head of state and the Prime Minister is head of government, and of a multi-party system. The President and the Government exercise executive power. Legislative power is vested in both the government and the National Assembly. The Judiciary is independent of the executive and the legislature. 1990 Constitution provides the citizens of DRSTP with basic human rights, including the right to vote. This right is realized by participation of the citizens of the country in the elections for choosing their representatives to the power structures.

2. The president of the republic is elected to a five-year term by direct universal suffrage and a secret ballot and may hold up to two consecutive terms. Candidates are chosen at their party’s national conference (or individuals may run independently). A presidential candidate must obtain an outright majority of the popular vote in either a first or second round of voting in order to be elected president. The National Assembly has 55 members, elected for a fore-
year term in seven multi-member constituencies by proportional representation.

3. The electoral processes are organized and carried out by the election commission, which is formed according to the constitutional acts 11/90 and 11/92. It consists of the Chairman and the Secretary, approved by the National Assembly, and the representatives of the parliamentary political parties. The election commission is an independent entity.

4. Observation for electoral processes is usually carried out by the representatives of the international organizations, as well as accredited on the islands diplomatic missions on the invitation of the election commission. As for the citizens of the country only representatives of the political parties can take part in the processes.

6. The latest elections were held in July and August of 2016. There were two rounds. They were presidential elections. The observers from Africa Union marked that the voting took place in a peaceful way without any case of violence. There were three candidates who stood for the post of president. The winner was Evaristo Carvalho, the representative of the political party Independent Democratic Action (ADI). He won 50.1% of the votes.
Elections in São Tomé and Príncipe: From redemptive democracy to authoritarian restoration?

In 1990, São Tomé and Príncipe was among the first African countries to adopt representative democracy as a political system. At the time, this step was understood as the return of the country to its Europeanized cultural matrix and, cumulatively, the elections were seen as a genuine instrument of the definition of a collective will. For almost three decades, the few cases of contestation of electoral results never resulted in conflicts or institutional blockades. If it is true that the state has gradually lost both political and ethical authority and economic, cultural, and social effectiveness, but the head organs of state have conducted themselves within the limits of the laws that determined their legitimacy and constitution. However, for decades the elections have been reflecting not the preference for ideological or programmatic platforms, but rather for the most powerful potential party chief. This power, associated with its presumed wealth, is measured by the bath - a word used among the Sao Tomeans to designate the purchase of consciences or the purchase of vows. In an indulgent view, bath may have seemed a resource with which parties
reinforced, through goods and resources donated to voters, the social base of support. From this point of view, the bath was more a propagandistic resource, which added to the programmatic proposals. But, in parallel with the creation of one-man parties, bath has become the primary resource of the electoral contest. As all parties have emptied themselves in terms of political action, bath - and, above all, the promise of power and wealth of the elect big man - has become the criterion of partisan adherence or, more precisely, personal fidelity to the chief. Gradually, the fulanisation of the party dispute, which reduced the parties to one-man groups, and the population's adherence to the big man reduced the election to a choice of a big man. In these circumstances, state elections and organs can become an instrument of one-man power and, perhaps, of an authoritarian restoration.
Madagascar 2018 presidential elections: Towards a new crisis?

1. The President of the Republic is elected in Madagascar by universal direct suffrage for a mandate of five years renewable one sole time. In accordance with Constitution, the first round of the presidential elections should be held between 25 November and 25 December 2018. President Hery Rajaonarimampianina will contest the 2018 elections for a second term. It is possible that M. Ravalomanana and A.Rajoelina will also enter the race. There are concerns that H. Rajaonarimampianina may prevent them from contesting, which some fear may result in protests from their supporters. The history of violent political confrontations in the country proves they could result in civic unrest.

2. Since gaining independence from France in 1960, Madagascar has experienced recurrent crises in 1972, 1991, 1996, 2002 and 2009, including coups, violent unrest and disputed elections. The most recent coup in 2009 (when opposition leader, Andry Rajoelina, forced Marc Ravalomanana to resign as president), led to five years of political deadlock, international condemnation and economic sanctions.
3. H. Rajaonarimampianina's election as president in 2013 brought fresh hope following years of political instability in Madagascar. The elections were a major step forward, but they did nothing to resolve the underlying causes and impact of the 2009 coup. President H. Rajaonarimampianina has failed to ensure political stability as well as to put the country back on the path to development, resulting in very low rates of popularity. Just 18 months into his presidency, the country's National Assembly voted to impeach him for failing to deliver on his election pledges. Although the bid failed, both H. Rajaonarimampianina's supporters and opponents continue to remain at loggerheads. Although democratically elected institutions are in place, weak governance at all levels remains a key challenge and the risk of relapse into a major political crisis remains high.

4. President H. Rajaonarimampianina faces immense challenges: establishing an inclusive government he can work with (he appointed 3 different Prime Ministers in 4 years) to reform the political system and culture; building institutional integrity; fostering national reconciliation; averting political misuse of the security services by addressing realistic professional demands; resuscitating development and service delivery; addressing a public health crisis (both in terms of food security and disease outbreaks); and restoring government control in the south, which is rife with bandits and weapons. Unless there is a fundamental transformation that addresses Madagascar’s
structural challenges, the current period will be little more than the calm before the next inevitable storm.

5. The challenge facing the upcoming elections in Madagascar does not center on whether M.Ravalomanana and A.Rajoelina can participate, but rather how to construct a process that will mitigate violent confrontations. Interventions by regional and national leaders should focus on developing some ground rules for contestation, avenues for negotiation between the political camps, monitoring to identify and respond to issues of growing tension, and developing processes to sanction those that resort to violence.
Presidential elections in the context of political processes in Kenya (The winner takes all)

The Supreme court of Kenya declared null and void the results of the August presidential election, during which the candidate for the highest state post Kikuyu U. Kenyatta received a majority of votes. However, the attempts of his main opponent Luo R. Odinga to achieve elimination of violations detected during the first election campaign before the second round of voting failed. As a result, Odinga urged his supporters to boycott the repeated elections. Crowds of demonstrators with slogans "no reforms, no elections" took to the street, risking getting shot by police. The socio-political situation in the country, which was already tense on the eve of August 8, when, according to polls, the chance of U. Kenyatta And R. Odinga were almost equal, worsened again. Against the backdrop of continuing protests, the situation in the country has clearly shown signs of a political crisis. At the same time, it differed from the post-election events of 2008, the beginning of which also received protests of those who disagreed with the results of the elections, which were pacified from the position of force. However, the clashes of protesters
with the representatives of the apparatus of repression resulted, not without the participation of the instigators, of the bloody inter-ethnic clashes which shocked the international community with its brutality. This time, there were virtually no ethnically motivated incidents of violence. The protest movement 2017, the spokesman of which was R. Odinga, brought together representatives of almost all ethnic groups are dissatisfied with their marginalized position in terms of dominance in the social hierarchy, multi-ethnic Kenya, came from only two ethnic groups – the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin. This system is characterized by ethnic divisions, where belonging to a particular ethnic group is a bonus in moving up the social ladder and Vice versa, rooted in the past of an independent Kenya. It has developed in the years of authoritarian rule of the first President of independent Kenya Kikuyu Jomo Kenyatta and Vice-President Kalenjin Daniel Arap Moi. Having replaced Kenyatta in 1978, he held the highest public office for almost 25 years and then, having remained one of the most influential figures in Kenyan politics, to a large extent contributed to the further strengthening in key areas of public life of the country duopoly Kikuyu-Kalenjin. Its personification are Moi confidants, the incumbent President U. Kenyatta and his running-mate Kalenjin V. Ruto. Protest against the situation of ethnic outsiders in the densely populated Western and coastal areas of Kenya contributed to the growth of separatist sentiments, which
R. Odinga in the competition for the votes has on board. The population of those areas boycotted the vote unanimously. Thus, it demonstrated its preference for the candidacy of R. Odinga for the presidency, guided by deeply rooted in the public mind postulate "winner gets everything". This conviction, fueled by the unresolved problems of unemployment, poverty and land distribution, was practically unaffected by the adoption in 2010 of the new Constitution, which sought to balance the positions of different ethnic groups in the Kenyan political landscape. It is characteristic that during the discussion of the draft Constitution R. Odinga did not object to the abolition of the post of Prime Minister, created just for him in the coalition government formed after the events of 2008. It was dissolved in 2013 before the next presidential election, demonstrating its failure and inadmissibility under the current political development in Kenya, limiting the powers of the President for candidates for this post.
Ethnicization of politics in Kenyan 2017 elections

Kenya is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country and, as it is often claimed, its modern politics is fueled by the rivalry between main ethnic groups – Kikuju, Kalenjin, Luo and Luhya. The existence of presidential system in Kenya, with the long periods of presidential campaigning, constitutes a potential factor which may enhance or even provoke ethnic clashes. In 1992, shortly after the multiparty system was installed in Kenya, a new constraint was imposed on presidential elections by the Constitution, namely, the centripetal requirement for the territorial distribution of votes. It means that the winning candidate must obtain at least 25% of votes in at least half of the counties (then regions). The aim of the law was to allow to choose in the future a “pan-ethnic” president, who would be capable of leading the country with support of all ethnic groups. The second period, when additional legislative solutions were introduced in order to reduce the importance of the ethnic factor in politics, took place after the post-election crisis in 2007. The most important changes (adopted in the 2010 Constitution) included, among others, devolution of the administrative system (47 counties replaced hitherto
eight provinces), as well as creation of County Assemblies with the newly built institution of County Governors. Both, the so-called centripetalism and devolution, were implemented with hope to diminish the significance of the ethnicity in Kenyan politics, especially during elections. The aim of this talk is to analyze the results of the 2017 Kenyan elections, taking into consideration the changes introduced earlier to the law – centripetalism and devolution. I will investigate the presidential results from individual counties. I will also conduct comparative analysis of these results with the results from the previous presidential elections. Additionally, I will analyze the results from the county-level elections in 2017. The aim of this analysis will be to answer, whether in 2017 the same “voting ethnicization” pattern was present, as it happened in the past. My attempt in the talk is to show that although several reforms were undertaken in Kenya in order to eliminate “ethnicization” of voting, the election results show, that ethnicity identification still plays key role in Kenyan political landscape. Citizens, when they cast their ballot paper, identify themselves with politicians from main parties, based on their ethnic provenience. At the same time, the analysis of career of top not the most purposeful factor for politicians, when they take their pragmatic, political decisions.
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Implementation of a new constitution and attempts to destabilize the socio-political situation in Kenya

In 2010 the new Kenyan constitution was accepted on a national referendum: 8 former provinces were divided into 47 constituencies, each with the right to select a governor and a local parliament. Elections in March 2013 became the first conducted in accordance with the new law. While in some counts the disappointment is prevailing with the devolution, in others people see some advantages of it. In 2011 Kenya sent a peacekeeping military contingent in war-torn Somalia. The international movement of mujahedeen, Al-Shabab being only one of its representatives, immediately voiced that they would spread war in Kenya. During 2012-2013 several well trained and equipped terroristic groups penetrated Kenya but were destroyed by Kenyan security forces and failed to disrupt the 2013 elections. The mujahedeen succeeded only in three major attacks: Westgate (September 2013), Mpeketoni (Summer 2014), Garissa (April 2015). The night raid of a mujahedeen’s group on the military base situated on the border with Somalia in June 2015 was totally repelled and after that Kenya has not seen large-scale terroristic attacks. The main
terrorists’ aim in that period was to cause polarization in the Kenyan society, especially between coastal people and settlers from upcountry and between Muslims and Christians. But mujahedeen’s movement has failed to disrupt social relations in Kenya and to stop the implementation of the new constitution. The ethno-political essence of public protests after the 2017 general elections was far from the agenda propagated by terrorists.
The electoral process in Zambia:
A quarter of a century of political pluralism

Twenty-five years have passed since Zambia became involved in the process of political liberalization of the 1990s common for most countries in Africa. The political parties of the country, despite their fragmentation, have great experience of electoral struggle. Since 1991 when political pluralism was proclaimed, eight democratic elections have already been held: in 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2015 and 2016. The electoral process was periodically complicated with acute interparty conflicts, outbreaks of violence in some regions, separatism in Barotseland (Western Province). Nevertheless, all elections ended with a peaceful power transfer which has become a tradition in Zambia. The power passed peacefully not only from one president to another within one party, but also during a radical change of government after two victories of the opposition (in 1991 and 2011). With the exception of the first multi-party elections in 1991 when only Kenneth Kaunda and Frederick Chiluba were rivals, all the other elections were competitions of several candidates: 5 in 1996, 11 in 2001, 5 in 2006, 4 in 2008, 10 in 2011, 11 in 2015, 9 in 2016. The
national electoral system has been improved and modernized (automation) by new technologies. Death of the country’s acting president that took place twice in the last decade (Levy Mwanawasa in 2008, and Michael Sata in 2014) tested the entire electoral process for stability and maturity. The electoral system in Zambia, like in many other countries south of the Sahara, is permeated with contradictions. In fact, this institution that is designed to identify and register the will of the majority of society tends to fix the will of its minority. Practice shows that during the electoral campaigns and elections in 1991 and in the 2000s the society went through surges of political activity – indicators of the formation of civic consciousness. Nevertheless participation in presidential and parliamentary elections has not been very active. Voter turnout in the presidential elections declined steadily (in 2001 it was 68.55%, in 2011 53.65%, in 2015 32.36%) which shows the political apathy of a large portion of the electorate. However voter turnout in the presidential election in 2016 increased to 56.45%, while victory was achieved with a slight margin of voices. This, together with a low voter turnout, gives the opposition an excuse to blame the government for falsifying election results and to challenge them in court. After coming to power in 1991 the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) party headed by F. Chiluba showed signs of interethnic tensions. In poly-ethnic Zambia where more than 70 ethnic groups live, the new leadership has
abandoned the principle of regional and ethnic balance which used to maintain ethno-political stability during the years of the one-party system under President K. Kaunda. The manipulation with the ethnic factor in the 1996 elections (an amendment to the constitution prohibiting Zambians whose fathers and/or grandfathers were not Zambian-born to run for presidency) also caused discontent with the authorities. Nevertheless the majority of the ethnic conflicts of the past 25 years have a common background – unsolved socio-economic problems. One of the main issues in the political process is: will the tradition of peaceful democratic transfer of power be preserved? Zambia gives an affirmative answer to this question.
The purpose of this paper is to present and analyze the electoral campaigns of the two main parties that competed for the 1992 Angolan elections: the MPLA (Popular Liberation Movement of Angola) and the UNITA (National Union for Total Independence of Angola). Different aspects help to understand the campaign strategies adopted, such as the novelty of the election, the prolonged civil war that preceded it (1975-1991), and the violations of both parties to certain items of the peace agreement in force. The paper begins with the moment of political distension inaugurated with the multiparty process and the attempt to build an alternative path to the two main Angolan parties, which would not materialize. The analysis of the international journals that accompanied both the peace process and the first movements of political parties tended to value two criteria that were favorable to the UNITA: the calculation of ethnic basis and the wearing down of 16 years of power by the MPLA. The ethnic component was based on the country's few statistical data, according to which the Ovimbundo population, based in the south-central
provinces of the country, reached about 35% of the Angolan population, being the largest ethnolinguistic group in the country. According to these data and the fragile argument for a perfect marriage between ethnic identity and vote, UNITA would have a significant electoral advantage by recruiting a majority of the votes of that ethnic group. On the idea of deterioration of the MPLA's governance experience, this was fueled by the allegations of corruption, but, above all, by the results of the elections in other African countries. Comparisons with other African electoral contexts were due to the lack of national parameters, since they were the first multiparty elections in the country. It also contributed to this analysis a certain "pasteurization" regarding the speeches proposed by the two main political parties. The old belligerents became convinced Democrats and lovers of the "liberation" of the economy. The polarization of the elections will be analyzed taking into account the videos of the electoral campaigns of the MPLA and the UNITA, as well as some of the public presentations of these two political forces. Finally, an analysis will be made of the final results of the 1992 presidential elections, taking into account, not always jointly, three aspects such as the main factors responsible for the victories of José Eduardo dos Santos in the presidential elections and of the MPLA in the legislative elections: the ethnic factor, the privileged use of the
MPLA's administrative machinery and state propaganda, and the innumerable mistakes made by Jonas Savimbi and his party.
Angola’s general elections of 2017

The 2017 general elections were the fourth since Angola’s independence in 1975 and the second to be conducted following the revised Constitution of 2010. Under the new basic low the President and the Vice-President of the Republic are indirectly elected through the party that wins a majority of seats in Parliament. The ruling party MPLA received 61% of the vote, giving it a parliament majority of 150 out of 220 seats and ensuring that the head of its list would become the President of the country. This time the MPLA list was first headed by the Deputy Chairman of the party João Lourenço. He replaced Jose Eduardo dos Santos, MPLA’s Chairman, who had Angola for 38 years. The 2017 elections were a peaceful transition of power in Angola. International observers called the election process fair, well-managed. It was organized in an environment characterized by political tolerance, freedom of speech, movement, association and assembly. It was a strong sign of increasing stability in Angola after a twenty-seven-year civil war, marked an important step towards consolidation of democracy in the country. The new President of Angola, the candidate of the MPLA, will likely maintain many of the
former governments’ main policies. At the same time, a change in leadership often signals for transformation and challenges. A new stage in Angola’s modern history is opened.
Moçambique está se preparando para eleições universais de 2019

então acabou de abandonar o RENAMO. Apesar de pouca idade do partido, seus candidatos obtiveram nas eleições universais, realizadas no mesmo ano, 3,93% de votos e 8 bancos parlamentares; para o líder do MDM votaram 8,59% dos eleitores. Ao lado de queda dos indicativos eleitorais da RENAMO e crescente influência do MDM testemunham aperto gradual de regime político em Moçambique. Este processo associa-se também com o descobrimento do gás no país e a ameaça de penetração de grupos terroristas islâmicos. Próximas eleições universais em Moçambique realizar-se-ão em 2019. Mas já em 2018 em algumas regiões do país, terão lugar eleições autárquicas. Muito provavelmente, as mesmas serão ensaio geral, antes das principais eleições. E já agora, os principais atores têm começado a se preparar para elas, removendo com paciência cartão de forte, mas escondendo ainda seus principais trunfos.
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Elections of Robert Mugabe:
It doesn't matter who votes, what matters is who counts the votes

This paper analyzes the Zimbabwean electoral process in the Mugabe period. Robert Mugabe ruled Zimbabwe from 1980 to 2017. There were ten elections in the country for 37 years of his political leadership. Despite a lot of serious economic and political failures, Mugabe officially never lost the votes. This fact can be explained both by electoral frauds and skilful state propaganda. Mugabe's key electoral base were senior citizens and peasants in underdeveloped regions of Zimbabwe. Mugabe managed to attract votes of the crowd by various manipulations and populist practices such as construction of the 'enemy' image and the fast-track land reform. In contrast, urban residents and young people often supporting opposition used to be repressed and deprived of the right to vote. Notably, that 'flirting' with the electorate was one of the causes of the forced Mugabe's resignation in late 2017.
Election in Zimbabwe: Free and fair?

The paper will be devoted to the forthcoming general election in Zimbabwe that has to take place not later than in July 2018. It will try to assess the preparation and conduct of this election, the degree of its freedom and fairness. It is well now that the history of the general election in Zimbabwe is rather contentious, especially in the 21st century. The accusation of fraud and rigging followed the elections held in 2000, 2002, 2005, 2008 and to a less degree in 2013, when a landslide victory of the ZANU-PF could not be convincingly rejected. Moreover, the political developments in Zimbabwe in the last five years were extremely controversial: on one hand the opposition suffered several splits and attempts to form a “grand alliance” so far failed, but, on the other hand the ruling party experienced acute crises that culminated in a forced removal of Robert Mugabe from power after the 37 year rule. Hence the importance of a deep and objective analysis of the impending election.
Zimbabwean election in a changing new world order

Since the end of the global ideological struggle between the United States and the former Soviet Union, elections have become more frequent and more regular in Zimbabwe and Africa as a whole. However, elections alone have not assured democracy in Zimbabwe and free and fair elections have become one of its greatest challenges. The upcoming democratic elections in Zimbabwe will draw significant international attention. It will be the first presidential and parliamentary elections without former President Robert Mugabe on the ballot. The elections will serve as the first major test of the new leader, Emerson Mnangagwa who became president in November 2017 following events that ended Mugabe’s 37-year rule of authoritarianism and repression. Although numerous parties have registered to compete in the 2018 elections, the two most likely parties to qualify are the ZANU-PF led by President Mnangagwa, and the main opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by Nelson Chamisa following the death of the party’s longtime leader Morgan Tsvangirai. Elections since 2000 have been condemned by international observers as not free and fair. Mugabe
utilized the state’s scarce resources to tamper with the election process. He disregarded the constitution, removed constraints on his power and utilized tactics to harass and suppress the MDC opposition. As such, elections were constantly largely disputed and marred by electoral irregularities, fraud, and violence, resulting in decreased electoral legitimacy and disconnect giving rise to what some authors have described as “illegitimate democracy.” The 2018 elections will be a major test of Mnangagwa’s promise to strengthen the country’s democracy and attract badly needed foreign direct investment to its ailing economy. An apparent pragmatist, Mnangagwa seeks a middle ground to win the trust and confidence of the citizens by respecting the right of the people to a free and fair election, and, on the other hand, pursuing a policy of appeasement and continuity with the military establishment. This paper contends that despite Zimbabwe’s huge challenges, the country has massive potential as well, with Mnangagwa, a pragmatist in power or the opposition MDC, and with a free and fair elections and a re-engagement with the international community, there is real opportunity to bring about positive change and hope to Zimbabweans after 37 years of hopelessness. A change in leadership in Zimbabwe will result in improved governance. Zimbabwe needs a visionary leader and strong institutions that will facilitate political and economic recovery. Zimbabwe will begin to be a democracy when its
citizens can freely choose their representatives through credible, free and fair elections. Nevertheless, some lingering questions persist. How will President Trump’s claim that the US 2016 election was tainted by massive voter fraud and rigging influence elections and events in Zimbabwe in a changing “New World order?” What are the implications of Mnangagwa actions in sending a delegation headed by the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission chairperson Priscilla Chigumbu and his special advisor Christopher Mutsvangwa, a contesting party, to “observe” the recent Russian 2018 elections?
The exceptional case of South Africa which not only held its first successful democratic elections in 1994, but also abolished an entire political system requires to be given a special focus in the study of the history of political psychology dimension of South African foreign policy. South Africa Act passed by the British Parliament in 1909 combined the self-governing British colonies of the Natal, Cape, Transvaal and the Orange Free State into the Union of South Africa. The Act, which served as the Union's constitution until 1961, created a parliamentary government along the lines of the Westminster model, consisted of a directly elected House of Assembly and an indirectly elected Senate. However, the permission was largely restricted to White men. The Orange Free State (formerly the Orange River Colony) and the Transvaal denied all Blacks the right to vote. In Natal, nearly all Blacks were not allowed to vote. In the Cape Province, an important number of Black and Coloured men were allowed to vote under a "color-blind" permission based on property requirements. However, only white men could be elected to
Parliament. However, during the 1970s, the Apartheid government of South Africa granted Homelands/Bantustans independence, and allowed elections in the Bantustans. Black South Africans were offered collaborator candidates who were chosen by the white South African government. The elections in the Bantustans/homelands stopped in the late 1980s. Since 1994, elections in South Africa are held for National and Provincial legislatures. The multiracial elections followed a five year cycle, with National and Provincial elections held concurrently. All the elections are conducted by the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa, an independent body established by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Although research on elections and political psychology approaches in the processes of foreign policy creation and implementation in Africa has significantly advanced in the past twenty five years, and much more is known about the conditions, the institutional framework and the historical settings of electoral and political psychological methods from most studies it is apparent that a careful contextualization of electoral and psychological phenomena is needed in order to make sense of their meaning and importance. As elections are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a democratisation process to be successful, it is crucial that other factors in the political culture of African countries are taken into consideration as well (as is also the case in studies on elections in the US, Europe, Russia or
Concrete traits in local political traditions impact on the success and durability of elections: cultural notions of authority and accountability, levels of economic development, the extent of ‘neopatrimonial’ networks, civil liberties, gender relations, and religious values regarding the political process and community representation. The role of political leaders in different historical periods provides an opportunity to identify the structures of shaping and regulating the democratic and institutional context of elections which is also highly relevant.
People in African countries express low levels of trust to the results of the elections. As Afrobarometer interviews with 1,200 – 2,400 people in 36 countries showed, the lowest levels of trust was expressed in countries with closely contested elections in 2016, including Gabon (25%), São Tomé and Príncipe (31%), and Ghana (37%). Two thirds of Africans rate their most recent election as “completely free and fair” (41%) or “free and fair, but with minor problems” (24%). But substantial proportions of the population are skeptical about the quality of their elections. Half of Africans say that elections do not work well as mechanisms to ensure that people’s views are represented (50%) or that voters are able to remove non-performing leaders from office (51%). Countries with the highest levels of dissatisfaction include Gabon, Morocco, Sudan, Nigeria, Swaziland, and Madagascar. In 2016, there were examples of unrest in Kenya, where opposition called for electoral commission reforms have sparked demonstrations and a violent reaction from security forces; in the Republic of the Congo, where election malpractices led to violent protests; such cases occurred in Ghana. Gabon where after
President Ali Bongo claimed a widely disputed reelection opposition leader Jean Ping lost by less than 6,000 votes, has seen post electoral protests and unrest and bloody clashes. 38% of Africans believe that votes are only sometimes or never counted. Several countries with a history of election–related violence express low levels of confidence in the vote count, including Kenya (26%), Zimbabwe (22%), and Nigeria (6%). Countries with the highest levels of dissatisfaction with the representation and accountability performance of elections include Gabon, Morocco, Sudan, Nigeria, Swaziland, Madagascar. Methods for swaying voters may include threats, actual violence. Bribery is commonplace in some countries. People consider also, that if election processes could be improved by counting votes digitally, issues with corruption may remain. The important question is interference of external forces into electoral processes. There are many cases of support candidates and parties by the West countries. As for China, the fundamental Chinese foreign policy principle is non-interference in internal affairs of other states. Some critics assert that China turns a blind-eye on dictators on the continent. But the Chinese position in question of elections and political systems in African countries is supported by Africans. They make a choice Chinese model instead of Washington Consensus. The model championed by the West places a premium on human rights and democracy, while Chinese model is more concerned with political
stability and economic growth. Most Africans also believe that food, health, and good sanitation are more important than the right to vote. They also consider strong economic and political leadership is essential for growth and stability. Paradoxically, the fastest way to build a strong middle class in Africa would be to move toward the hierarchy of principles that China’s model promotes. Neither the Washington Consensus nor the Beijing Model has all the answers. But, as for example Rwanda has demonstrated, if strong leadership can improve lives and deliver public goods, perhaps liberal democracy should be a long-term priority.
As a self-proclaimed “Global Leader” the United States have made one of the pillars of its foreign policy “the assertion, advancement, support and defense of democracy” throughout the world. This aim invariably figures in all Washington’s program documents pertaining to Africa. A major component of these efforts is assistance to holding of regular, free and fair elections. The selection of arguments cited to justify such activities has been done skillfully. In each specific case it is emphasized that the United States do not side with any competing party, stand “above the battle”, work for the perfection of electoral process, defend the rights of opposition and rank and file votes, render material and technical help to national electoral committees. Sounds irreproachable. And what is the real situation. The acquaintance with the US practical activities in this field allows to conclude that Washington has one-sidedly awarded itself a role of a judge and supervisor of developments related to elections in the sovereign countries of Africa, tries to control the ways they are prepared and conducted. These activities signify interference into the internal affairs of African states, reach after one of the most sensitive
spheres of their inner life. The scale and forms of such interference differ-subject to tasks the USA try to resolve in this or that country on the national, regional or global levels. However, everywhere it serves as an instrument of penetration and strengthening of the US influence, accustoms the African partners to the US political presence in their countries. The US right to perform this role is presented as something indisputable. Those doubting are branded as opponents of democracy. The report will review the US positions and activities connected with elections in Africa during the years of B. Obama and D. Trump presidencies. It will be shown how their policy was implemented on the continental level and in regard to several countries – Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda.
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