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# **Between Promise and Peril: African Security in the 21st Century**

**Conference Details**

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# Abstracts

## Session 1. Africa's Security Landscape: Regional and International Outlook

**Professor Hussein Solomon**, University of the Free State

### **Counter-Insurgency in Africa: What is it good for?**

Whilst the number of terrorist incidents are decreasing across in other regions, this is not the case in Africa where its malevolent tentacles is etched deep across the African landscape. From the Sahel in the West to Somalia in the East; from Cabo Delgado in the South to Casablanca in the North, terrorist groups have proliferated. Counter-insurgency operations on the part of governments have largely resulted in failure. Even with the support of foreign troops, trainers and armaments, these military operations have failed. This paper seeks to understand the reasons for this failure and to examine alternatives to military campaigns in an effort to thwart the terrorist threat posed.

**Dr Tatyana Denisova**, Institute for African Studies

### **Insurgencies in West and Central Africa: the economic warfare dimension**

Since the mid-1980s, many African countries have had periods of severe political instability, which resulted in civil wars and conflicts. In the 2000s – 2010s, the number of conflicts decreased significantly, yet there emerged new reasons for their appearance in addition to the usual causes and preconditions such as intertribal, interfaith, and socio-political tensions. These new reasons included competition for access to the development of natural resources and their export, for control over trade and supply chains, over agricultural activities, etc. This was happening amid a crisis of public administration in African countries, the inability or refusal of state institutions to effectively perform their function of providing full-fledged services to the population. Furthermore, shifts in the global economy and the strengthening of the relationship between national and world markets contributed to the emergence of the so-called new wars and created previously unknown material opportunities for African rebels, especially for their leaders. Conflicts also created opportunities for survival/enrichment for various segments of the

population; that is why it is so difficult to seek their settlement: too many individuals and groups are interested in their continuation.

The opportunity for conflicting parties to gain access to local natural resources that could be easily sold on international markets predetermined the start of large-scale illegal mining of diamonds, gold, rare earths, ivory, rubber, etc., which became, if not the main, then a secondary activity of all participants in the conflict, along with actual warfare, but also smuggling, robbery, etc. Stakeholders in these operations included not only rebels, but also foreign mining and trading companies, individual businessmen and intermediaries, representatives of the local political and business elites, officers and soldiers of regular armies, peacekeepers, mercenaries, traditional rulers, and so on. As a result, the goal of the participants in the conflict, primarily the rebels, was often not to suppress the enemy, but to seize and establish control over a certain territory in order to exploit its natural and human resources, i.e. an economy of war was formed, which in some cases, for example, in the Lake Chad basin, has also been called the “economy of terrorism”.

Perhaps, if we are to talk about the countries of West and Central Africa, in the 1990s–2010s the “war economy” developed to the greatest extent in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the DRC, the Central African Republic, and in the Lake Chad basin.

The Liberian wars attracted the attention of the expert community precisely because of the economic motives of the participants in the conflict, primarily the leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) Charles Taylor, who during the years of the First Civil War (1989-1997) engaged in the export of rubber and timber from the territories under his control, the development of iron ore deposits, and the re-export of drugs and other goods, earning up to \$150 million a year.

As in Liberia, during the 1991–2002 war in neighboring Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels also took control of mineral deposits, primarily diamonds, and used the proceeds from their illegal sale to purchase weapons, modern communications equipment and, of course, for enrichment. As for the Central African Republic, throughout the years of the conflict that began in 2012 and continues to this day, armed groups, criminal gangs, corrupt elites and foreign companies have been actively exploiting the country's natural resources. In addition, the militants were engaged in poaching, illegal taxation, extortion, etc.

The Islamist group Boko Haram, which emerged in the early 2000s, in less than two decades turned from a “Nigerian” movement into a regional one, spreading its presence to several countries of West and Central Africa, primarily to the states of the Lake Chad basin. In 2016, Boko Haram split into the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP) and the Society of the People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad, or Boko Haram itself. After the death in May 2021 of the leader of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, some of the militants joined ISWAP, while others split into separate groups. All of these terrorist groups are able not only to maintain their livelihoods, but also to

enrich themselves, relying on available resources. They engage in illegal trade, stealing and selling livestock, control agricultural work and fishing on Lake Chad, and so on.

With governments unable to provide food security and basic services, the inhabitants of the Basin trade everything they need across borders, from weapons and livestock to cigarettes, drugs and food, using old smuggling routes to survive. But even in the conditions of the development of the economy of war, the local population of the Basin loses more than it gains. Border closures and other security measures, such as the establishment of roadblocks in response to Islamist actions, hamper both legal and illegal trade.

The activities of "rebel" groups in the provinces of Ituri, in North and South Kivu and in some other areas have acquired a "sustainable" character. The units of the armed forces stationed in these areas, local authorities, foreign companies and "rebels" are actively involved in the processes of "criminalization" of the economy, against the background of which the transformation of public consciousness, values and attitudes of the inhabitants of peripheral areas takes place.

The phenomenon of cross-border trade in the Congo can be viewed from several perspectives. First, there is trade carried on along the old trade routes that have existed for centuries, and the frontier communities never stopped it, never considered it illegal and never recognized artificially drawn borders, which, moreover, remain transparent.

Secondly, porous borders in themselves not only create an opportunity, but also encourage illegal cross-border trade (smuggling) in goods that are in high demand outside the territory of the state. When crossing Congolese borders, smugglers, who are often also fighters of armed groups, involve border guards, customs officers, government officials and military personnel in their activities. As a result, a smuggling chain is formed, which gets legalized de facto due to the fact that illegal activities are carried out under the control of state bodies and national law enforcement agencies.

Thirdly, illegal cross-border trade in the DRC is part of the state's economic activity and is periodically reflected in financial reports. At the same time, legal and illegal activities are so intertwined that it is almost impossible to determine where the first ends and the second begins.

Thus, the formation of the economy of war is a reaction to the conflict, against the background of which, in the conditions of the destruction of the formal economy, other models of production and interaction emerge, allowing some groups to survive, and others to enrich themselves, which, in turn, leads to further depletion of the state treasury, and to the perpetuation of conflicts.

### **Africa – One Boat But Hundred Helmsmen**

Africa is one of the largest continents with 17,20% of the world population, where the density of population is 45 persons per km<sup>2</sup>. Also, this is an area with six active United Nations (UN) missions of 12 that are active in the world. Since 1960, there have been more than thirty UN peacekeeping missions across Africa, more than in any region. Today, more than seventy-three thousand troops are deployed for UN operations in Africa. It means that around 84% of all UN mission troops are currently in Africa. Those are troops, officers, international civilians, police, UN volunteers, and local civilians.

UN is not the only organization that is in the field. There are African Union (AU) troops and European Union (EU) troops with different kinds of missions. Since 2003, the AU has mandated a number of peace support operations including the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), as a means to manage conflicts on the continent. In more recent times, the organization has also authorized three operations dealing with non-state armed groups namely the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), Boko Haram and the Sahel Region Jihadists, the Lake Chad Basin Commission Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), and the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) Joint Force.

Also, the EU currently has six civilian missions (Central African Republic, Libya, Mali, Niger, Somalia and "Sahel"), two military operations (IRIN-Libya, ATLANTA-Somalia), and four military missions in Africa (Mali, Mozambique, Central African Republic, Somalia).

Despite close relations with the UN, EU and AU individual African states have already established or explored partnerships with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as on a bilateral level with states such as China, India, Japan, Russia, Turkey, etc. Also, there are countries such as France who have their own missions in some African countries.

Since 2005, NATO has been cooperating with the African Union (AU). The NATO-AU relationship started modestly with AU requests for logistics and airlift support for its mission in Sudan. Since June 2007, NATO has assisted the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by providing airlift support for AU peacekeepers. Building on previous counter-piracy missions conducted by NATO, Ocean Shield is focusing on at-sea counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa. Approved on 17 August 2009 by the North Atlantic Council, this operation is contributing to international efforts to combat piracy in the area.

Whilst some of these peace support missions recorded successes in meeting their mandates, generally, all of them faced or are facing a number of challenges including funding, and logistical inadequacies among others. Generally, peacekeeping missions are considered to have had mixed results in Africa, with a few considered more successful, such as those in the Ivory Coast, Liberia, and Sierra

Leone.

As it is shown there is one boat (Africa), but a hundred helmsmen, and that cannot work properly. Also, it is hard to expect that those nations, who created today's problems in Africa through history and colonial times, can solve those problems that Africa is experiencing today.

At this point is possible to highlight six acute security challenges that Africa is facing: communal identity-based and religious conflicts, insurgencies, terrorism, organized crimes, piracy, and social conflicts. To deal with those problems Africa should do more on prevention, economic development, and development of state institutions and good governance. To deal with this there is a need for financial support, training for civil, police and military personnel, and strengthening military capabilities and civilian capabilities.

This paper should address some clash of interests of different continental, regional, and geopolitical players represented through different organizations or as specific states, and the influence of that clash on Africa`s security. I argue that external influences and external geopolitical interests are key for most of Africa`s countries' stability.

**Mr Yury Vidakas**, Institute for African Studies

### **UN Peacekeeping in Africa – A View from Moscow**

This report reviews the fundamentals of Russia`s approach to United Nations peacekeeping with a focus on the contemporary peacekeeping principles and trends, changes in the Russian peacekeeping policy and Russia`s contribution to the UN former and active peacekeeping missions in the territory of the African continent.

One of the key documents in this context is the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (as amended in November, 2016), that clearly defines international peacekeeping as “an effective tool for settling armed conflicts and facilitating post-crisis nation-building” and once again confirms Russia`s intention to participate in international peacekeeping efforts under the UN leadership and in cooperation with regional and international organizations. This point is of the utmost importance with respect to Africa and particularly the African Peace and Security Architecture.

The report also stresses the Russian consistent position in supporting the efforts of the African states to establish the system of collective security in the continent and mainly through the cooperative great labor of the African Union and other regional organizations.

The present report seeks to trace the dynamics of the activities of the Russian peacekeepers, including such categories as military observers, police advisers, military aviation units as well as the place of Russia in provision of civil aviation services to UN operations. Special attention is given to the training

of military observers and policemen from African states in the Russian military educational and training centers.

Finally, the paper outlines some considerations and ways to enhance the Russian involvement into UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, that in light of our traditionally good relations almost with all the African nations could keep up a positive image of Moscow in Africa in general and on the peacekeeping track in particular.

**Mr Siniša Bundalo**, Independent University of Banja Luka

### **African Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: A French Perspective**

In the early 1960s, France officially left most of its African territories, albeit in the form of direct colonial rule. Previously, official Paris hesitated for a long time to give its territories in Africa full political independence, but, as a kind of substitute, France continued its political, economic, cultural and military control and influence through a series of agreements, almost intact. This was especially true of the former French African possessions, but not only them.

With the acquisition of independence, most of the continent, including the former French Africa, was not able to solve structural problems through emancipation, which was greatly contributed to by chronic institutional deficiencies and frequent armed conflicts, especially internal ones. This was one of the reasons why France set itself up as a kind of "protector" of its former colonies. Although partly considered obligated to help emancipate former possessions, France has sometimes more, sometimes less pragmatically sought to maintain its influence in Africa and for its own belief in the "grandeur" of France and its place in the modern world. For many years, French African politics has been the subject of a kind of hegemony, where, primarily Francophone Africa is nothing but a French backyard.

However, it is necessary to point out here that French ties with Africa are multi-layered and multifaceted. While the Franco-African relationship under the guise of *Franciafrique* is now considered obsolete and inappropriate, and the term itself pejorative, at the same time, through The Francophonie (Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) network, France has built the entire infrastructure that brings together most of its former colonies and other African countries. True, although The Francophonie has for its proclaimed goals the promotion of the French language and cultural and linguistic diversity, the promotion of peace, democracy and human rights, education, scientific research and the promotion of economic cooperation and sustainable development, strikingly omitting any military and defence cooperation, the influence of Paris through a network of cooperation designed in this way should not be overlooked.

The history of French military engagement in Africa from the 1960s to the present day includes



about 90 interventions. These interventions range from defence and assistance agreements to support local authorities to UN-sponsored international peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. Vast African expanses, porous interstate borders, territories with little or no state control along with a handful of intertwined ethnic or religious problems are fertile ground for conflicts that keep Africa bleeding. In this paper, we will try to focus on the problem of terrorism that has shaken many African countries for years. Also, as a characteristic of the struggle of African governments is the use of armed forces in the fight against terrorist groups, we will see what is the role of French military interventionism in that sense. In addition, the global terrorist threat that is shaking Africa with all its might, along with the emergence of traditional and new economic and military actors on the continent, has forced France to redefine its military strategy in this area.

Therefore, France, along with some other Western countries, in addition to the "traditional" role of strengthening close regimes or preventing phenomena such as a serious terrorist threat, is implementing various forms of military cooperation in order to strengthen the capacity of local counter-terrorism forces. The unpreparedness and poor equipment of the local military forces lead the authorities to seek help from outside, but with the appearance of new actors on the world stage, the hitherto inviolable position of Western countries, including France, has been called into question. The mere rethinking of French military doctrine in general, and thus in Africa, is part of a broader re-examination of its role in the modern world. It seems that the basic question that French foreign and defence policy makers are asking today is whether France's affiliation, role and obligations in major international organizations, and its full, re-integration into NATO and the European framework for a common defence policy limit its sovereignty and autonomy of action. In short, is France still a great power?

France's main strategic axis spans the Atlantic Ocean across the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, with its main stronghold in Djibouti. This whole axis includes a whole series of permanent military installations from West Africa to its territories in the Indian Ocean. In addition to the constant military presence, the current missions of France in the Sahel area should be added here, as part of the fight against jihadist terror. It is worth emphasizing here that, as far as Africa is concerned, its Mediterranean coasts, then the coasts that cover West Africa and the wide belt from the Red Sea to the north of Madagascar are "areas of interest for national security" of France.

However, French military engagements in Africa are not without controversy. They derive primarily from the colonial and postcolonial heritage as well as Paris' attitude towards the new states in the first decades of their independence. Faced with loud opposition from some governments, the public and intellectuals to its military presence, or the role of its armed forces, France is trying to change its negative perception of its actions in Africa, either diplomatically or informatively.

The review of the overall and thus the military presence of France in Africa was accelerated by some external factors, such as the rapprochement of certain African countries (or their leaders) with

China and Russia. From a French and Western perspective in general, any Chinese or Russian influence, the former economically and the latter militarily, does nothing to contribute to the development and stability of the African continent. France is trying to replace the policy of paternalism with the policy of partnership, promoting the democratization of countries, especially the French-speaking area, which from the perspective of Paris is contrary to the intentions of other, new external actors. In this regard, France is trying to promote its military presence to the points of support and instruments of cooperation that would accordingly serve the security needs of the continent. Military interventions in recent years have only strengthened France's intention to seriously redefine its permanent military presence on the continent in order to adequately respond to the emerging challenges.

Without a previous permanent military presence, France would not have been able to respond quickly to the Sahel crisis. Since one of the basic goals of the French military doctrine is autonomous action, France, by redefining the outdated goals of its White Paper from previous years, strives to adequately respond to all security challenges, whether classic military or hybrid or cyber security threats.

**Dr Sergey Kostelyanets**, Institute for African Studies

### **Private Military Companies and African Security**

Agenda 2063, adopted by the African Union in 2013, pays much attention to achieving security of the continent. In this connection, I deem it important to consider the ever-increasing role of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in military-political conflicts and also international peacekeeping. Over the past few decades, Africa has seen a marked increase in the use of private military and security companies during conflicts. Among the main reasons for this phenomenon is the inability of fragile states, weakened by wars and internal disagreements, to ensure the safety of their citizens, as well as the fear of rulers for their own lives.

Until 1989, private military and security firms were involved in only a few conflicts in Africa. In the 1990s, they played important roles in Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Congo, Angola, Sudan, and Zambia. At present, hundreds of local, foreign and multinational PMSCs partake in most conflicts in Africa. American, British, Australian, Israeli, Turkish, Canadian and other PMSCs export their services to the DRC, CAR, Somalia, Libya, Mozambique, Sudan, South Sudan and many other African countries. In the past few years, the world media has paid greatest attention to the activities of Russian PMSCs in Africa, especially in Sudan, Libya, CAR, Mozambique and Mali. Meanwhile, there have also appeared more and more Chinese military companies on the continent.

Most PMSCs operate like any other firm: they have corporate structures, websites and official registration; many of them are part of large industrial holdings. The services they provide are varied and

include armed combat support, consulting on military construction, equipment, tactics and strategy, deployment assistance, weapon training, communications, general security and intelligence, prison management, etc. More recently, PMSCs have been actively used by international organizations, including the UN, in peacekeeping missions.

It is not uncommon for governments in conflict-affected countries to use PMSCs in circumvention of international norms, sanctions, and embargoes. In addition, the growing demand for legitimate private security companies has led to an increase in demand for the services of individual independent mercenaries, who often disregard legitimate concerns of their clients, and this is what often gives private military and security companies organizations a bad reputation.

Governments may hire PMSCs to change the balance of military power between themselves and rivals, for example between the army and the rebels. Often, PMSCs are involved in direct engagement. Typically, however, they focus on providing and analyzing intelligence for governments and commercial clients, participating in post-conflict reconstruction, guarding humanitarian missions and facilitating development assistance. Such a wide range of functions is due to the fact that over the past decades, PMSCs have transformed from small and specialized enterprises into large military service providers. Today, PMSCs are able provide almost any service to government agencies, including in the area of law enforcement. It should be noted, however, that PMSCs undermine the state's monopoly on violence and increase the risk that power will increasingly be challenged by violent methods.

An important trend has been the transformation of illegal armed groups into PMSCs, which gives the former rebels and their supporters the opportunity to carry weapons legally. Many PMSCs are run by former warlords who otherwise would have been disarmed. In addition, the inability of an African government to exercise full control over the national territory may allow PMSCs to create quasi-state structures in remote areas.

Thus, the use of PMSCs is not problem-free . But the main problem is that they operate in a “gray zone” of legality and are difficult to control, let alone be held accountable for violence. However, violence may be as widespread in those areas where only regular government forces are deployed.

At the same time, the use of PMSCs can open up great opportunities for governments – both African and foreign. For example, there are tasks which are better to delegate to PMSCs. In particular, there are operations so dangerous or controversial that a government would not want to deploy its own citizens. It is one thing to have national armies staffed exclusively by citizens who serve their duty to protect the nation, and quite another – to send such forces on missions that have little or nothing to do with national defense. Just like France, which has often used foreigners (the Foreign Legion) to carry out peacekeeping tasks, other states are increasingly coming to the conclusion that their military deployment in a particular conflict zone is not related to ensuring their own security, and therefore they can make a financial contribution but not send their citizens to hot spots. In fact, most developed countries have long

been reducing their troop commitments to UN operations in Africa. Thus, Western states fulfill their obligations as members of the UN without contributing anything but money or, occasionally, logistical support.

It can be assumed that the use of mercenaries and PMSCs during conflicts and civil wars is a temporary, transitional phenomenon and a tool for state building, but the whole world is currently developing in the direction when military force ceases to be the prerogative of the state and when PMSCs begin to play their legitimate role in the military-political processes. However, state control over them remains necessary. In any case, the use of PSMCs in peacekeeping operations has become a fact that cannot be reversed.

## **Session 2. Africa's New Perils: Beyond Conventional Warfare Threats**

**Professor Vladimir Shubin**, Institute for African Studies

### **The Fallacy of Hybrid War**

Speaking at the meeting of the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy in Moscow on May 14, 2022, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said: “The external circumstances have not just changed radically; they are changing ever more profoundly and extensively though not becoming more elevated, unfortunately, with each passing day. And our country is changing along with them. It is drawing its conclusions. The choice we have taken is made easier by the fact that the “collective West” has declared a total hybrid war against us. It is hard to forecast how long this will last. But it is clear that its consequences will be felt by everyone without exception”.<sup>1</sup>

This was not the first time when Minister used the term “hybrid war”. Addressing the meeting of the same Council on November 22, 2014, Lavrov said: “It has become fashionable to argue that Russia is waging a kind of “hybrid war” in Crimea and in Ukraine. It is an interesting term, but I would apply it above all to the United States and its war strategy – it is truly a hybrid war aimed not so much at defeating the enemy militarily as at changing the regimes in the states that pursue a policy Washington does not like.”<sup>2</sup>

The term is not just interesting, but catchy, it is usually recognized that it was proposed by Dr Frank Hoffman, an American academic relatively recently in his monograph *Conflict in the 21st Century*:

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<sup>1</sup> [https://mid.ru/en/foreign\\_policy/news/1813377/](https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1813377/)

<sup>2</sup> Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's remarks at the XXII Assembly of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy | Russian Mission (russiaeu.ru)

*The Rise of Hybrid Wars*.<sup>3</sup> However, he himself admits that “credit for the first use of the term can be given to Robert G. Walker”, but his Master’s thesis on *The U.S. Marine Corps and Special Operations*”, where he described Marine Expeditionary Unit as “a hybrid force for Hybrid Wars”, submitted in 1998, remained unpublished.<sup>4</sup>

One circumstance is noticeable: Walker submitted his thesis in Naval Post Graduate School, while Hoffman’s 43 years in the U.S. defense establishment includes 30 years with the U.S. Marines, and later he was the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and worked on the *National Defense Strategy*.<sup>5</sup>

As to the Russian military experts the team that included Yuri Baluevsky, General of the Army and former Chief of General Staff pit the “hybrid war” on the fourth stage of the “escalation ladder” of armed conflicts and wars, lower than “local conventional war”<sup>6</sup>

However, the term “invented” relatively recently was so catchy that it went far beyond the action of the US Marines and even various multiple types of modern warfare both in the chronological and operational senses.

Some historians believe that it can be used to describe conflicts even as early as in some centuries B.C., not to say about American Revolution or Napoleonic wars.<sup>7</sup> In the operational sense the term is applied in various meanings. It is too often used as derogatory when describing actions or intentions of the opponent.

The use (or, rather, misuse) of the term is boundless, for example bloodless and voluntary entry of Tuva in the USSR in 1944 is described as a “Soviet precursor to Russia’s hybrid warfare”.<sup>8</sup> During the migration crises in the European Union Philip Breedlove, four-star general who then headed U.S. European Command, and was Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO Allied Command Operations, claimed in the US Senate that Russia was directing the influx of refugees to destabilize Europe, and Finnish Defence Minister Jussi Niinistö followed him by suggesting that Russian planned the arrival of as many as 1 million migrants over the Finnish-Russian border. Then when Belarus refused to stop migrants from crossing its borders with Latvia and Lithuania in 2021 after the EU introduced new sanctions against it, the country was accused of conducting hybrid warfare.<sup>9</sup>

All these examples (and many more can be added) show that the term “hybrid war” can be used and has been used even when combat actions are completely absent. Hence the jeopardy of using the

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<sup>3</sup> Hoffman, Frank (2007). *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*. Arlington, Virginia: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, p.9.

<sup>5</sup> <https://inss.ndu.edu/Media/Biographies/Article-View/Article/571462/hoffman-francis-g/>

<sup>6</sup> Кокошин А.А., Балуевский Ю.Н., Есин В.И., Шляхтуров А.В. Вопросы эскалации и деэскалации кризисных ситуаций, вооруженных конфликтов и войн. (Kokoshin A.A., Baluevsky U.N, Yesin V.I. Shlyahtorov A.V. “Questions of escalation and desescalation of crisis situations, armed conflicts and wars.” М.: ЛЕНАНД, 2021. С. 60-61.

<sup>7</sup> A peculiar detail: Western historians write about Spanish guerrillas co-operation with British Army but forget about Soviet partisans.

<sup>8</sup> <https://neweasterneurope.eu/2020/03/20/dreaming-of-tannu-tuva%E2%82%AC%91-soviet-precursors-to-russias-hybrid-warfare/>

<sup>9</sup> "Baltic, Polish PMs condemn 'hybrid attack' by Belarus". *Lrt.lt*. 23 August 2021.

term, because it creates a dangerous impression that a real war is something normal and acceptable.

**Dr Predrag Obrenovic and Dr Dragana Popovic**, Independent University of Banja Luka

### **Hybrid War – Contemporary Conflict of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century**

The development of human civilisation so far, in addition to scientific, technical, technological and cultural achievements, has also been characterised by one very negative feature, and that is, as some theorists of society call it, eternal conflict between good and evil. However, can it be perceived only as a conflict between good and evil? Historical facts speak differently, in the course of the development of the human civilization conflicts have been manifested primarily as those taking place within certain social groups, between different social groups, or eventually turning into conflicts between nation-states.

Contemporary social sciences and practices investigate and define several types of conflict. From the point of view of this paper, the most significant type of conflict is the one which is led by use of force i.e. by use of arms and weapons of war.

In the course of history, the term “war” has changed its definitions from initially being defined as an armed conflict between different nation-states to its more contemporary definitions pertaining to other social activities in relation to which it has been expressed by use of syntagms such as: cold war, special war, total war, multidimensional war, unlimited war, hybrid war, etc.

In theory, the period after the end of the Cold War has been marked by the emergence of various unconventional forms of warfare such as asymmetry, terrorism, cyber attacks, and similar. The speed at which new forms of warfare are developing have imposed the need for the continuous monitoring, improvement and adjustment of the protection means and defense systems.

Global security changes, i.e. the emergence of new phenomena, challenges and risks in the sphere of individual, national and global security have been the main incentives for the significant scientific and professional advancements, improvements and discoveries in the field of threat studies. In such a continuously changing and increasingly challenging environment, states, alliances and other entities in the sphere of international relations and security are faced with an extremely complex security situation at the global level, characterized by uncertainty, rapid change and unpredictability of threats. For these reasons various processes of the adaptation of the security and defence “architecture” at the global and national levels had to be initiated.

In recent times, the term "hybrid war" has been increasingly used in almost all the areas of social life. It has been used by almost everyone, from various experts, ministers, prime ministers, presidents, all the way to the “ordinary” people using this term while chatting with their friends. In other words, the use of the term "hybrid war" has had its peak in the last few years, whereas the term itself has appeared at the

beginning of the 21st century. Large portion of authors believe that it does not mean anything new compared to other similar terms, claiming that it is not so much of a new term, and that the principles and strategies of the "hybrid war" have been studied and used before and in relation to previous conflicts. For these reasons, even though the term "hybrid war" have been used for more than two decades, we do not have an officially accepted definition of the term as yet.

The term "hybrid warfare" first appeared as such in 2007 as a part of the military terminology of the "US Department of the Navy". According to that concept, the notion of hybrid warfare is derived from the historical analyses and references related to intentional military interfering and "blurring" of warfare (Hofman, 2014). Subsequently, the term has been incorporated in the military doctrine of the United States Armed Forces, and today it is used by leading military theorists to describe the evolving character of wars.

According to Hoffman, a hybrid actor is any opponent who simultaneously uses conventional and unconventional tactics within the same battlefield, as well as terrorist and criminal actions in order to achieve their own political goals (Hoffman, 2014).

With an aim of a better understanding of the term "hybrid war", in addition to the analysis of the views of Western theorists, the paper will also consider the views of scientists and experts from the East. First of all, when we talk about the attitudes towards this term and the ways in which it has been perceived by scholars from the East, it is necessary to mention and consider the stance of the general Valerij Vasiljevic Gerasimov, who has held an extremely important and responsible position of Head of the Russian Military Headquarters since 2002. On February 26, 2013, his article was published in a Russian military journal entitled "The value of science is in its power of prediction" in which he stated the following: "New challenges require rethinking the forms and methods of conducting combat operations" (Gerasimov, 2013). In this article, Gerasimov presents his views and opinions on the contexts of warfare and strategies of military operations in the recent past, present and future. Based on his positions as expressed in the article, general Gerasimov's aim was to analyse the actions of actors who endanger security, that is, who are perceived as a threat to Russia's security and survival. However, his interpretation and analysis of the new security threats to Russia, have not been accepted as such by Western scholars and experts, instead they are being used, according to certain Western analysts, as a paradigm through which the hybrid Russian politics and warfare are being seen and interpreted.

Based on observing the possibility of conducting hybrid warfare within the strategic framework, it can be confirmed that this type of warfare is not a new form of warfare, but that due to the technical and technological achievements of the modern world it has changed significantly, almost beyond recognition, and also due to its wider application. Globalisation and the complexity of the geostrategic environment resulting from technological progress have enabled the hybrid adversary to apply the sophisticated forms of asymmetry, with the aim of conditioning the decision-making process of the other side (unclear

responsibility – making it very difficult to see and identify the main actors and reveal their real goals). In contemporary conflicts this effect is further intensified by various public and media pressures.

Based on all the above, the aim of this paper is to point out to and clarify the notion of “hybrid war” – how this notion has developed in the course of history, as well as as to point out to the contemporary understandings of this term, in both Western and Eastern theory and practice. The paper also analyses the positive and the negative characteristics of hybrid wars, which, as theory proposes, should or should not be conducted in conflicts between states, as well as between state and non-state actors.

**Mr Oleg Shulga**, Institute for African Studies

### **Hybrid War vs. Hybrid Warfare: Reality and Applicability for Africa**

The author examines the terms “hybrid warfare” and “hybrid war” introduced in 2005 by a group of American military theorists (F. Hoffman) into the military lexicon and the essence of the concepts they describe.

Initially, the term characterized the dominant at the present stage type of hostilities, representing a combination of "classical (regular)" and "non-classical (irregular)" actions, carried out by open and hidden, state and non-state actors using any - including terrorist, criminal and immoral-methods that as a result bring the achievement of the set military goal. The novelty of the phenomenon lies in the fact that non-state forces and non-classical methods have moved from the category of auxiliary to the category of those of equal value that can bring victory once used.

Further use of the terms extended their application to the characterization of not only of military actions as of events of a higher level – modern wars and strategic campaigns, in which not only state and non-state actors, but also military and non-military measures are seen as equivalent, initial components of the "hybrid" (economic, psychological, informational, cybernetic) measures of influence.

Vivid examples of modern “hybrid” wars are the campaigns of the US and its allies against the legitimate government of Syria, the actions of Saudi Arabia in Yemen, and the “proxy” war currently being waged by the US and its allies against Russia in Ukraine.

On the African continent, an example was the "hybrid" war of the Western coalition against Libya in 2011. The United States first conducted a "non-military" propaganda campaign to demonize the Gaddafi regime, created and launched a "non-classical component" in the form of an armed opposition, used "classic" air strikes on government facilities and received the desired "hybrid" product - the overthrow of the regime, ten years of controlled chaos and conservation of one of the world's sources of oil.



Is it possible to repeat the "hybrid war" or at least "hybrid warfare" on the African continent? Yes, it's possible.

At the current stage of the rapid turn of the West towards Africa with a predatory goal to compensate the lost Russian oil and other raw materials, the objects of the "hybrid war" from the collective West can be countries that, in the current stand-off between Russia and the United States, refused to quickly defect to the American side and continue an independent policy of cooperation with Russia, such as Algeria, Egypt, etc. The latter has now become the target of US accusations of "violating human rights" - a standard prelude to forthcoming hostile actions.

**Dr Zdravko Todorovic**, Independent University of Banja Luka

### **Geopolitical Context of Contemporary World Developments in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century – A Review of Africa**

In the first decades of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the post-Cold War period, the scientific community and lay people have a clear geopolitical context of contemporary world trends, especially in-depth analysis of economic and energy trends, which are manifested both globally and nationally. The need to provide energy in sufficient quantities and quality, necessary for the current economic conditions, then food and water resources, is what determines the future of the 21<sup>st</sup> century in which we live, and probably beyond.

In that sense, energy security is a part of national security, it represents the protection of the state and the population from external and internal dangers, but also threats related to the functioning of the energy sector. Energy security is an integral part of national security, which refers to the protection of the state and society from potential forms of threats in the energy sphere.

The doctrine of the "Great Reset" backed by the World Economic Forum and its proponents of this process represents the reanimation of globalism as the ideological framework of postmodern capitalism. At the same time, a distinction should be made between globalization and globalism. While globalization represents a complex social process of increasing interdependence of human societies around the world, globalism represents a doctrinal position of advocating one world under all-encompassing unification. Globalism is different from internationalism. Globalism is a means of creating a world state and abolishing nation-states as they have existed so far. Globalism advocates such economic, political and cultural changes in modern states, which lead to their fragmentation, while internationalism advocates international activities that strengthen nation states and build new institutions capable of resisting globalist processes in the world. Globalists advocate for a unipolar, and internationalists for a multipolar world.

The world capitalist system after 600 years, in the 70s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, was caught by the

irreversible process of its historical resignation, trapped by a deep structural crisis spatially limited wars, epidemics, economic crises. At the time of the corona, the world is transformed into a planetary concentration camp, into a totally controlled and manipulative space filled with fear.

The function of this new world is to temporarily, if possible, temporarily, if not redirect the vectors of history, then slow down the historical resignation of the world capitalist system and create a global illusion of a world return to zero on the ruins of the deconstructed erased era point of history. To preserve the core of the power of the previous pyramidal world social-class structure (and its reproduction) with the power of totalitarian control, manipulation, the power of systemically managed fear and thus prepare humanity for the next configuration of the world order in which the ruling pyramidal social-class structure will be not only preserved. renewed, but also radicalized in its intention to establish corporate - technological fascism, posthumanist digital dictatorship and neo - feudal order.

The essence of geopolitical reorganization in the world in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is the continuous energy crisis, which will mark the fourth technological revolution on a global level, but also affect the regional and world positioning of individual countries and regions, such as the Balkans or Africa. In other words, Europe and the world are threatened with energy poverty decades in advance, especially if the countries subject to international relations do not respond properly and in a timely manner to the energy and geopolitical challenges that are set before them.

Looking at a geographical map of the world with mapped sources of oil and natural gas, it should be noted that these energy resources are not evenly distributed in the world. The largest quantities of oil are exploited in 20 countries, which account for 96.9 percent of world production (93 percent of the world's proven oil reserves are located in these countries). When other natural gas is taken into account, these 20 countries account for 77.2 percent of production, and when it comes to confirmed natural gas reserves, 90.97 percent of reserves are located in them.

When analyzing confirmed oil reserves, the conclusions look somewhat different. Venezuela has the largest oil reserves, followed by the "Gulf countries", Canada, Russia, Libya and Nigeria (African continent). If we look at the distribution of oil sources by region, we come to the conclusion that there are seven oil zones: North American, South American - Caribbean, equatorial - African, Middle Eastern, Central Asian, Arctic and Siberian. The equatorial-African zone is located in the equatorial region on the "black continent", south of the Sahara, with sources in Nigeria, Ghana, Angola, Gabon, as well as in other countries that are smaller producers. North of the Sahara in the North African belt, the wider "western arm" of the Middle East zone, which includes all Gulf countries, stretches from Algeria, through Libya, Egypt and Sudan, to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Iraq and Iranian sites in the zone of the Persian Gulf.

In the next two decades, 99 percent of the world's oil will be exploited in the seven listed oil zones. This is the main reason for the need of the most important geopolitical forces to be present in these

regions, to expand their political initiatives and economic interests and, if necessary, to intervene militarily. When the natural gas reserves of certain countries are analyzed, the market share of the USA, Australia, Norway, Malaysia, Great Britain will decrease, while the market share of Russia, Iran and Qatar will increase. Comparing these data with oil zones, it follows that the importance of the Middle East, Central Asia and Siberia zones will grow, the North American zone will decrease, while the importance of the Arctic, South American - Caribbean and equatorial - African zones will remain the same.

A comprehensive hybrid war is being waged widely in the listed zones of oil and gas exploitation sources and the ways of delivering energy to their markets, especially in the Middle East zone, which includes North Africa, and then the African continent (Sahel).

The process of dividing the world into opposing blocs, which is accelerating the war in Ukraine, is taking place on the global chessboard. In fact, the world is not divided into two camps as it seems at first glance. It is a conflict between the West and the majority of the world, to which it imposes its own discriminatory rules on all other participants in the trade and political process, while changing those rules at its own discretion. The policy of double standards is being replaced by unilateral actions, and in European countries this is justified by democracy, while the rest of the world is not given any explanations other than sanctions.

The idea of a liberal international order consolidated by economic globalization and the Internet, governed by liberal democracies and free market capitalism, seems to have failed. There has been a dramatic change in the very nature of power and in the ways it changes and moves. The world, including the African continent, is in an era that came after the post-Cold War, a time without a formal war, but certainly no peace. The formation of a new global geopolitical and geoeconomic balance is in progress, in which Russia and China have a key role, as well as other Eurasian powers, so the processes on the African continent will largely depend on the positioning of these processes.

**Dr Eben Coetzee**, University of the Free State

### **The Spectre of Nuclear Terror in Africa: Another Look**

How real is the threat of nuclear terror in Africa, today and for the foreseeable future? In a 2009 working group discussion report of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, a panel of experts concluded that the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat in Africa could best be classified as “latent”. In considering the *nuclear* threat, the report underscored the necessity of understanding Africa’s security environment and carefully watching future developments and trends as several factors could heighten the threat of nuclear terror. Subsequent reports and publications have noted that the nuclear terror threat in

Africa has increased significantly. Various trends and challenges on the continent coalesce in accounting for renewed fears about nuclear terror in Africa: increased interest in and reliance on nuclear energy among African states, thus increasing the nuclear footprint on the continent; the increase in terrorism and, concomitantly, the rise of Islamist extremism and Jihadism; the increase of transnational organised crime, thus opening up the possibility of the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology and material; and concerns over lax safety and security measures at (future) nuclear power stations. Importantly, these trends and challenges must be framed against the backdrop of the question of interest and motive among terror groups in going nuclear as well as consideration of the feasibility of various paths to the bomb, globally and in Africa.

**Dr Eldar Salakhedinov**, Institute for African Studies

### **Peaceful Atom for Africa? Geopolitics, Information Warfare and Energy Security**

Africa is no stranger to acute energy shortages, which cost the continent up to 4% of GDP annually. It has a significant negative impact on sustainable development, economic growth, jobs, and investment in the continent. Average per capita consumption in Sub-Saharan Africa, excluding South Africa, is 65% below the average for developing economies.<sup>10</sup> Given increasing population and expanded industrialization in Africa it is expected that corresponding electricity demand will continue to rise in the decades to come.

It is expected that energy consumption in Africa will at least double by 2030, offering huge potential for new energy sources. The rapid rise in prices for fossil fuels, which today serves as the main source for energy generation, is forcing African governments to look for alternative sources. However, the quest for new generating sources is hindered by lack of technical know-how, an unstable political situation and significant corruption. The situation is aggravated by fierce internal strife in terms of absence of consensus among leadership and stakeholders regarding what type of power stations are needed and who should build them.

One of the most effective solutions of acute energy deficit in Africa could be nuclear energy. To date, nuclear power has no serious competition, especially if consideration is given to large countries with populations of tens of millions of people. It could be argued that nuclear energy is clean and safe, carbon-free and can provide stable electricity prices for many decades. However, nuclear energy business comes with its own risks and challenges. In general, opponents of nuclear energy point to a possible danger for nature and society associated with the extraction and utilisation of nuclear materials. Recognizing the validity of these concerns, it is worth noting that modern mining methods allow avoiding any off-site

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<sup>10</sup> Africa Energy Outlook 2019. P.15

pollution.<sup>11</sup> As far as the disposal and utilization is concerned, some African countries have uranium mining and South Africa has the Vaalputs Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility.

Recently, several African countries have demonstrated their interest to develop nuclear energy technologies. In Africa, possession of nuclear energy technologies is seen as not only a solution to the current energy deficit but also as bestowing prestige on governments that own it. This interest attracted strategic attention from global players in nuclear energy such as Russia, France, China, South Korea, USA and Japan.

For Russia, which is trying to restore its former positions in Africa, one of the priority areas of cooperation is the energy sector. The Russian state-owned corporation Rosatom as a leading nuclear energy company tries to expand its technologies across the continent. This is apparent considering the various deals Rosatom entered into with different African countries such as South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Zambia, Ghana to mention but a few.

One can argue that Russia is trying to increase its influence in Africa through promoting nuclear energy solutions. Contestation over the African nuclear market is not only economic but is also geopolitical. It is speculated that the country that builds a new NPPs will obtain considerable influence over the country for the next 50–100 years. No wonder, Russian nuclear projects in Africa have experienced strong opposition from other global players.

Since the start of military actions in Ukraine in February 2022, the geopolitical contestation for political influence in Africa has increased. Notably, unlike some other regions, half of African states did not support the UN General Assembly resolution of 3 March, condemning Russia's invasion to Ukraine, Eritrea voted against, while twenty-six African governments abstained or were absent. In the similar vein, presidents of many African countries commented rather in a conciliatory manner on the situation in Ukraine. For example, the South African president Cyril Ramaphosa has resisted calls to condemn Russia and even blamed the US and NATO for not heeding warnings from Moscow about its eastward expansion.

To counter Russian influence in Africa, the US has taken several steps, including the Countering Malign Russian Activities in Africa Act, which passed the House of Representatives on 27 April by a significant bipartisan (419-9) majority. The act is expected to be passed by the Senate and become law soon. It would direct the US Secretary of State 'to develop and submit to Congress a strategy and implementation plan outlining United States efforts to counter the malign influence and activities of the Russian Federation and its proxies in Africa'<sup>12</sup>. Similar steps, though not yet formalized into law, have been taken by EU leaders.

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<sup>11</sup> World Nuclear Association (2017) Environmental Aspects of Uranium Mining. URL: <http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/mining-of-uranium/environmental-aspects-of-uranium-mining.aspx>

<sup>12</sup> H.R.7311 - Countering Malign Russian Activities in Africa Act. URL: <https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/7311/text>

Although, most of African countries have not joined the sanctions against Russia, Russian projects in the continent have come under severe pressure. According to Al Jazeera, in March 2022, the Egyptian government unofficially put on hold the project of NPP construction in El Dabaa due to anti-Russia's sanctions, the disconnection of Russian banks from the SWIFT system, and the rapid depreciation of the ruble. Nevertheless, Egyptian leadership officially expressed confidence that the NPP project would be continued. However, difficulties still exist, the Western sanctions, among other things, will affect the ability of Rosatom to purchase the components for the construction of NPP. At best, it will only affect the price, at worst, the company will lose ability to buy necessary components.

However, it is unlikely that direct sanctions against the Russian nuclear industry will be introduced any time soon. The CIS countries together with Africa produce over 70% of uranium, while Russia controls about 35% of the world market for enriched uranium. NPPs in the US and EU are critically dependent on enriched uranium supplies from Russia and Kazakhstan. No wonder, Rosatom was withdrawn from all the sanction packages in both the US and the EU.

Western countries will try to overcome this dependence, and nuclear energy projects have already received a second wind in Europe. The "new cold war" will increase competition in the global nuclear energy market, which may also contribute to the development of new peaceful nuclear technologies in Africa.

### **Session 3. Addressing Sources of Insecurity in Africa: Promise and Pitfalls**

**Mr Gerrie Swart**, Acuity Africa Advisory

#### **A Responsibility to Deflect? A Critical Assessment of the African Union's Norm Against Unconstitutional Changes of Government**

Conflict prevention is at the core of the PSC's mandate. As confirmed during its July 2021 meeting, the council is supported by the continental early warning system in ensuring timely response to conflicts. However, its track record in 2021, as in previous years, has demonstrated a failure to act on early warning information in several countries, in favour of a fire-fighting role.

In particular Handy and Djilo pose a critically-important question:

With some member states' commitment to shared values at an all-time low, can the AU manage and prevent conflict?

Several incidents highlight the challenges facing the African Union (AU) Commission as its recently reformed structures are put to work. These difficulties test the AU's capacity to keep up with the

changing nature of security and governance in Africa.

Overall as incidents in Chad, Somalia and Mozambique recently (2021) illustrated, the AU faces problems in supporting peace and security.

One is a lack of consistency in applying AU norms and principles. A second is the uneven implementation of PSC decisions by member states. A third problem is the growing reluctance of member states and RECs to accept external intervention in internal crises - including from the AU. Without a clear definition of subsidiarity, this is often seen as the RECs bypassing the AU.

The AU's inconsistent response to the slew of unconstitutional changes of government has been particularly damaging. Often heralded as a major achievement of its twenty-year history, the AU's established norm against coups took a significant hit when its Peace and Security Council (PSC) decided to maintain Chad's membership after the military took power in April 2021, following the sudden death of the long-time president. Although it swiftly suspended Guinea and Mali following military takeovers in September 2021 and May 2021, the Council was deeply divided in trying to articulate a response to the October coup in Khartoum. Some faith in the AU's willingness to uphold this key principle was restored, however, when, after intense deliberations, the PSC decided to suspend Sudan. Most recently, on 24 January 2022, Burkina Faso's military ousted President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, a move which the AU Commission chair swiftly condemned. The country was then suspended by the PSC on 31 January.

A particularly worrying trend has been the continuation and surge in Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCGs). This paper will examine the AU's seemingly lacklustre performance vis-à-vis Unconstitutional Changes of Government, despite the much-vaunted norm that has been adopted to stem the tide of this scourge.

**Dr Albert Schoeman**, University of the Free State

### **Hybrid Political Orders: A Post-Western Alternative to State-Building in Fragile States or a Hopeless Fantasy? The Case of Somaliland**

Since the collapse of communism in the late 1980s, a "third wave of democratisation" has swept across the globe, encouraging many developing countries (particularly in Africa) to embrace liberal democratic, free market principles. However, several states appeared unable to sustain democratic governments and economic growth during the 1990s. This resulted in the rise and prominence of the fragile state discourse, which characterised these states as soft, weak, failed, or collapsing in accordance with the degree to which they failed to meet the Weberian criteria for statehood. This Western, state-centric approach has further been reflected in the efforts of governments, non-governmental organisations, and donor agencies to promote peace and state-building as a remedy to state failure. The

chapter argues that the state-centric approach exemplified by Weber's definition of the state and embraced by fragile state discourse and Western state-building efforts has failed to provide an objective, counter-hegemonic, and emancipatory perspective on states labelled as weak, failed, or collapsed. Rather than that, the study will focus on hybrid political orders as a complementary perspective that takes a post-Western state-building approach more suited to comprehending the realities of fragile states while also acknowledging the role of traditional authorities in the hybrid state-building process. Current international relations theory, with a particular emphasis on statehood, the fragile state perspective, and state-building, is accused of being exclusive and catering to a small minority at the expense of most of the world's population. Rather than exaggerating the politics of public bodies, political science and international relations theory should place a greater emphasis on people or politics at the grassroots level. The chapter will attempt to provide a post-Western revisionist and alternative perspective on current Western state-building practises by emphasising the role of hybrid political orders in Somaliland. As a region within Somalia, the independence of Somaliland has not yet been recognised by the international community, yet it has succeeded in functioning as a state that has managed to create relative peace and stability within its territory, amidst the violence, instability, and turmoil in surrounding Somalia.

**Dr Jude Cocodia**, University of the Free State

#### **The International Media and Security in Africa: Doctored Reportage and Dire Outcomes**

Watching and listening to international media streams, there is the assumption that what we hear is true, and these drive our convictions and beliefs. If this happens all over the world, as indeed it does, then the power of the global media is massive. When this force is put at the service of the parochial interests of states, rather than the facts as they really are, what happens? Is any damage done, when, after all, it is just news? Does the end justify the subversion of facts? Drawing on the instability in South-Central Somalia, this study examines the role of the international media in the demonization of the Islamic Courts Union, the radicalisation of its youth wing – al-Shabaab, and the stalemate/insecurity from a conflict that has dragged on for over thirty years. Adopting case study for the research design and process tracing for its analysis, this paper concludes that it is up to the local and international public to wake up to the politics of the global media and so challenge their hold on shaping national and regional trajectories based on falsehood.



### **State Fragility and Impediments to Countering Islamist Violent Extremism: The Case in Kenya**

This study is an examination of the relationship between state fragility and impediments to countering Islamist violent extremism (CIVE) in Kenya. The relationship between state fragility and barriers to CIVE is the case. Kenya is the context. State fragility is a phenomenon, a conceptual framework, an analytical instrument, and a theoretical perspective, explaining varied development and security challenges, including Islamist violent extremism (IVE) (an ideology and movement) and its most predominant manifestation, Islamist terrorism. State fragility also explains impediments to CIVE and CT, ineffective and counter-productive CIVE and CT, and consequently the failure of CIVE and CT. Incorrectly often only linked with state weakness; a capacity deficit, state fragility is accurately defined by both underperformance and improper performance at the macro, meso, and micro levels of the state.

State fragility has intrinsic debilitating and conflict-generating properties that include endemic insecurity, weak institutions and poor governance, unequal economic development, widespread corruption and rent-seeking, and abusive structures of governance and authority, including state terrorism and little regard for the rule of law. These properties have causal capacity and tendency, driving IVE and generating impediments to CIVE. These causal links are evidenced in sub-Saharan Africa where state fragility is most entrenched and prevalent, including in existing fragile contexts like Nigeria, Somalia, Mali, Kenya, and Mozambique. The fragile context in Kenya demonstrates that added to the limited utility of force that is inherent to CIVE as a response to IVE, state fragility also generates particularly intractable impediments to CIVE, rendering CIVE ineffective and counter-productive, and hence the failure of CIVE.

**Mr Ruben Pretorius**, University of the Free State

### **The Neo-Patrimonial Factor in Sub-Saharan Security**

The subcontinent of sub-Saharan Africa is fully entrenched in a period of democratic backsliding. Neo-patrimonialism, with its extensive patron-client networks as a form of political domination, serves as a catalyst for this process of autocratization due to its inhibition of democratic consolidation. To African political elites, this provides the ideal circumstances for political moves, especially in resource rich countries where the mineral wealth serves as the government's main income stream in light of an impoverished tax base. Consequently, this shapes a very dangerous prognosis for African security, one that is already marred with pessimistic undertones in international development circles.

## Presenter bios

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