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Evgenya Morozenskaya

AFRICA IN THE 2000s: ECONOMIC TRENDS

During the 2000s, economic situation in many African countries was improving significantly compared to previous decades. Relatively high world prices for export commodities, the increase in external aid flows, large-scale debt "forgiveness", and, most importantly, measures taken by a number of countries and aimed at restructuring economic systems contributed to this improvement. In 2003-2007, Africa's economic growth was steady and averaged over 5% a year (5.7% in sub-Saharan Africa), and its position in the global economy strengthened under favourable terms of foreign trade.

In 2008-2009, the main obstacle to growth and development in Africa was the global financial crisis. Its impact on African economies, although somewhat delayed (due to the fact that the largest proportion of population depends on subsistence and semi-subsistence agriculture), manifests itself in several ways:

– firstly, the decrease in the total GDP (in 2009, sub-Saharan Africa's GDP growth did not exceed 2%) implies the actual decline in official development assistance (ODA) received by the continent from Western countries;
– secondly, the export incomes of African countries are falling due to a sharp decrease in demand for minerals and agricultural products which leads to a drop in sales on world commodity markets and lower prices on these commodities;
– thirdly, just like everywhere in the world, some production is being curtailed, which is particularly dangerous for Africa with its limited industrial capacity, because it increases the already huge unemployment and reduces budget revenues by reducing tax revenues;
– fourthly, a massive capital flight from countries with unformed market economies, which is characteristic of financial crises, may deprive Africa, which has no "safety cushion" in the form of significant savings of population and state property, of opportunities for ongoing development. At the same time, the average annual inflow of total financial assets fell sharply (e.g., in sub-Saharan Africa it fell from 42.9 billion dollars in 2002-2007 to -24.9 billion dollars in 2007-2008 and to -5.3 billion dollars in 2008-2009).

Meanwhile, China and other fast-developing economies, which were relatively less affected by the crisis than Western countries, express a growing interest in Africa. With regard to the partnership with the member states of the European Union (EU), the emphasis here is gradually shifting from assistance to trade: the EU insists on a speedy conclusion of bilateral tariff-free agreements with African countries in continuation of the joint declaration on "The Africa-EU strategic partnership", which was adopted by 53 African countries and 27 European countries in Lisbon in 2007. However, removing Africa's import barriers for the EU's products could destroy weak African markets and undermine the base of national budgets, which largely depend on the income from customs duties. Just a few of the least developed countries agree to such conditions while large countries, particularly Nigeria and South Africa, fear direct competition with European economies.

In the context of the growing influence of globalisation, African stock markets, which have a potential for growth, could become an important source of fund raising for the continent. With the aid of foreign capital, stock markets have appeared in some African countries and demonstrated positive development dynamics. For example, in 2002-2007, the average annual inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) to sub-Saharan Africa amounted to 18.0 billion dollars, while portfolio investment amounted to 15.3 billion dollars.

Most of the banks in African countries remain dependent on foreign depositors and serve primarily their own credit needs. Meanwhile, there is some progress in the development of credit and banking system. Besides the largest transnational banks, which are operating on the continent, there have emerged some local banks (e.g., in the RSA) which are capable of setting up a network of foreign affiliates. However, globalisation increases the vulnerability of African economies due to unequal terms of trade in the world commodity markets and changes in foreign trade terms, the increase in control of international banking groups over credit and currency markets in the region, and, most importantly, to an influx of hot money which contributes to strengthening the global financial crisis.

In macroeconomic studies of African economies, the concepts of "economic growth" and "economic development" are often considered an equal, which "dims out" thoroughly the essence of the ongoing processes in these countries. It is well known that economic growth is usually accompanied by the development of market structure, and Africa became no exception in this respect. In recent years, a new structure of national economy, whose trend is following global models, has started to form in the countries of the continent. This fact is confirmed, besides high GDP growth rates, by increased FDI inflows to the continent, especially in mining. In 2005, FDI equalled the official development assistance (30 billion dollars) and in 2007 reached 53 billion dollars.

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* This article was written specially for the Yearbook.
The close relationship between the volume of investment and GDP growth, the existence of which was formulated in the 1930s (the Harrod-Domar economic growth model is widely used to analyse the economic situation in developing countries also), is maintained primarily by the state. The foremost measures of state economic policy (in budget financing, taxation, currency exchange control, combating shadow economy and corruption) are indirect methods of regulation that correspond to the most to the government’s goal of protecting public interests. In Africa, these are, above all, fiscal policy measures that influence not only output level and price level, but also the structure of an economy by changing the terms of taxation and public spending. The main role here is played by tax preferences provided to private entrepreneurs, especially small-scale ones ("tax holidays" – a temporary exemption from several types of taxes), as well as by depreciation preferences.

Most African countries face difficulties in collecting government budget revenues, which provide funding for community development and social services. Public enterprises are unable to perform this task due to a chronic reduction in their capacity and non-efficient use of budgetary allocations. The causes of such a low share of taxes in GDP of African countries are well-known: low per capita income, difficult-to-tax agriculture, military and ethnic conflicts, a low share of highly profitable private enterprises in total production, and a significant predominance of the informal (shadow) economy. In addition, government agencies responsible for purchasing agricultural products typically pay farmers less than market prices, i.e. impose a hidden tax, which is nowhere to be recorded, on manufacturers.

The structure of taxes also prevents an efficient expansion of production and, consequently, of a tax base. For example, customs tariffs are, as a rule, high and excessively differentiated. However, since the protectionist support is often provided to industries with low incentives to increase productivity, it slows down rather than accelerates economic growth.

In most countries of sub-Saharan Africa, the key indirect taxes, especially value-added tax (VAT), are not applied to all sectors of the economy and have many exceptions. Enterprise income taxes are characterised by high maximum rates and a narrow tax base due to the provision of tax benefits to the majority of enterprises. Foreign businesses and multinational companies (MNCs) often pay to the treasury a disproportionately low, when compared to their revenues, VAT. Personal income tax is usually tied to wage rates, which don’t reflect population’s real incomes. Maximum income tax rates are also usually very high, which stimulates tax evasion. Finally, tax and customs officials are inadequately trained and hardly monitored, and their work is poorly paid. This contributes to the spread of corruption and partial concealment of collected taxes and customs duties.

Nevertheless, some countries in sub-Saharan Africa manage to increase tax revenues. However, it is often the result not so much of tax system reforms, but of raising customs tariffs. The latter constrains the inflow of foreign investment and hinders development, which in turn contributes to the further narrowing of the tax base.

The creation of free economic zones (FEZs), above all free trade zones (FTZs) and export processing zones (EPZs), became one of the new directions of economic policy in the countries of the continent. EPZs are now the priority: industrial facilities in these zones employ modern advanced technologies and provide many jobs.

The first FEZs were organised in the most economically developed countries of the continent – South Africa and Egypt. In accordance with the law № 43 of 1974, which regulates the legal status and economic activities of free economic zones, in 1977, the first industrial objects started operations in Egyptian FEZs. The activity of such zones is based on tax benefits and liberalisation of trade. To date 39 industrial FEZs, including seven state-owned FEZs, are registered in 19 governorates of Egypt. Storage of transit cargo and the establishment of manufacturing enterprises with export potential are the main activities in these zones.

In FTZs there exist substantial preferences which facilitate the activity of foreign companies, which specialise, for example, in car assembly, manufacturing and assembly from imported components of electronics and oil and gas equipment, and spinning and weaving industries. Available preferences for foreign businessmen include income tax remission and import duty relief, reduction in electricity tariffs, exemption from foreign exchange regulation, and guarantees of compensation for expropriation.

In the 1990s, a number of sub-Saharan African countries – Mauritius, Madagascar, Mozambique, Botswana, Kenya, Cameroon, Togo, Nigeria and Zimbabwe – also introduced significant changes in investment laws and created EPZs and FTZs. This promising tendency may help the least developed countries access foreign markets and get closer to global processes of globalisation.

The most important tool of state regulation is monetary policy, the tasks of which include price stabilisation and ensuring growth in real output and, consequently, full employment. The current employment situation in African countries indicates the numerical predominance of low-skilled workers, an expanding sphere of informal employment, and the lack of trained entrepreneurs in small– and medium-scale businesses. However, the establishment of specialised services within the framework of state support programmes to aid small entrepreneurs and with state support may have a significant impact on the competitiveness of African enterprises. These services are designed to train local entrepreneurial cadres, provide them with inexpensive services in
the field of developing innovative methods of production management and rational use of raw materials, as well as to orient them towards cooperation with foreign MNCs. This approach is promising for the simple reason that in recent years the demand for export commodities has increasingly depended on their quality rather than on their prices. Thus, Africa is losing its former advantage of cheap labour force and should fight for the recognition of its goods and services as high quality products.

In general, emerging African markets provide a good basis for the incorporation of the continent’s population into market economy, including the part of the population which is engaged in natural economy. However, the prospects for further economic development in these countries depend heavily on how favourable are internal and external economic factors. Only a sound macroeconomic policy can guarantee the optimal use of and interaction with these factors. For example, inflow of foreign investments by itself is insufficient to start the process of industrialisation: it is also necessary to create certain conditions and institutes that can ensure their effective use. A peculiarity of the current situation is that not only government officials but also (and, perhaps, primarily) African entrepreneurs should be taking action and taking main responsibility for implementing reforms.

African economies are characterised by relatively high technological equipment of mining industries in comparison with low technological development of industrial sector as a whole, as well as the inadequacy of the existing transport infrastructure for market structure. In this situation the role of foreign capital in African economies is becoming increasingly ambiguous, since newly established industrial enterprises, on the one hand, expand the industrial base of national economy and, on the other hand, conserve its enclave character, which is not oriented towards entering the world economic system. In addition, despite the growth in foreign direct investment, its share in total financial resources of African countries is low, and these investments are distributed extremely uneven among recipient countries.

Although the majority of African countries are gradually introducing universally accepted international rules on the use of private capital, realising privatisation, and supporting in varying degrees small- and medium-scale businesses, Africa, with its unstable political climate, is still considered by the global business community to be a risky zone for investment. However, the majority of economically developed African countries, primarily in Northern Africa and Southern Africa, have quite favourable prospects for increasing FDI inflow in export manufacturing industries and services sector.

If we consider industrial production to be the key factor of economic development in African countries, the question arises as to which industry (or industries) can play the leading role in economic growth. There are no universal solutions for all the countries of the continent due to the great variety of their natural resources and levels of economic development. For instance, the oil and gas industry (by virtue of the favourable situation prevailing on the world market in 2001-2008 and due to discoveries of new deposits of hydrocarbons in Africa) could become a catalyst for structural change in the economies of some countries. Since more than half of Africa’s population is employed in the agricultural sector, the agro-processing industry could be the leading industry in many countries of the continent. In any case, in order to enter the global economic system it is necessary to reduce production costs and improve the quality of export commodities, liberalise investment climate and trade, create the necessary infrastructure, introduce advanced technologies, train various specialists, comply with certain environmental and health standards, etc.

The ability of African industries to become competitive in the context of intensifying global competition is under question. This competition is acquiring new, more rigid forms due to the acceleration of technological progress and growing barriers to entry of national economies into world markets. Most African countries, despite an easier access to global technological innovations, cannot keep up with this process and make a timely response to changes in modern industries in industrial and agricultural sectors. Therefore, according to UNIDO experts, the “Millennium Development Goals”, which were published in the beginning of the 21st century and concern the issue of overcoming poverty in underdeveloped countries in Africa, can be achieved no earlier than in fifty years.

However, despite the economic and political risks, some transnational corporations (TNCs) are increasing their long-term investment in exploration and extraction of key raw materials on the African continent, because their strategic importance is increasing due to the depletion of non-renewable natural resources of the Earth. According to experts, in the foreseeable future, most FDI assets will continue to be sent to the mineral resources sector.

Since 2005, African countries have actively carried out reforms aimed at attracting investments, including foreign capital, and at developing private entrepreneurship. The reforms concerned improving management of business, strengthening property rights, easing tax burden and access to credit, and reducing the cost of export-import operations. Of the 175 countries ranked according to the extent of their progress in this direction, Ghana took the 9th place, Tanzania – 10th, South Africa – 29th, Mauritius – 32nd, Namibia – 42nd.

At the World Economic Forum on Africa (June 2007, Cape Town, South Africa) it was noted that the economic potential of SANE (South Africa, Algeria, Nigeria and Egypt) is comparable in its perspectives for development with BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and is sufficient for them to become “potential poles of growth for the rest of the continent”. However, the
growth in business activity in African countries is impeded by macroeconomic factors (inflation, complex tax regulations, high interest rates), microeconomic factors (corruption, illegal economic activity, etc.), infrastructural factors (lack of development of energy and transport networks, lack of productive capital, etc.) and labour factors (shortage of skilled labour, shortcomings of labour code)\textsuperscript{12}.

In addition, the food situation, which worsened amid the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, should be mentioned. Politicians disagree on how to solve this problem: the EU insists that African countries must open their markets to European food products, and African countries believe that they will be in a position to cope with food crisis if developed countries help them through investments in agriculture\textsuperscript{13}.

The current fragmentation of Africa into separate exclusive groups of countries which protect the interests of their members raises the question of the role of regional markets in the formation of market economy. This role is ambiguous, since the regional markets, on the one hand, serve as a preparatory stage for the transition to a pan-African market, but, on the other hand, support economic fragmentation. Indeed, the activity of even the most successful among the 14 regional economic groupings currently operating in Africa – SADC, ECOWAS, UEMOA – testifies to their insignificant influence on the formation of a pan-African market.

Meanwhile, the assessment of the situation in the sphere of regional economic integration, which was made in 2007 jointly by experts from the African Development Bank and OECD, is rather optimistic: "Significant progress has been achieved in regional cooperation under the auspices of the African Union and supported by NEPAD\textsuperscript{14}.". In general, we can assume that the joint action of African countries with regard to economic policy might in future create conditions for the development, strengthening and gradual consolidation of regional markets.

\textsuperscript{3} Ibid. P. 46.
\textsuperscript{4} http://www.eurasianhome.org/xml/t/digest.xml?lang=ru&nic=digest&pid=2501
\textsuperscript{7} Proceedings of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation for the parliamentary hearings on the SEZ in the Federation Council of Russia, May 2004.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid. P. XIII.
\textsuperscript{13} "Will Africa survive in the Financial Crisis?" – “agora” // Euronews, 23.11.2008.
Leonid Fituni

AFRICA’S ECONOMY: THE CHALLENGES OF POST-CRISIS DEVELOPMENT. FINANCIAL AND CREDIT SECTOR BEFORE AND AFTER THE CRISIS

Over the last couple of years, many scientific articles and even "express monographs" on the global financial and economic crisis have been published around the world. Most of these publications were predictive. Their authors tried to predict what would happen in a year or two, how would the crisis affect the global economy as a whole and developing countries in particular. Readers were captivated by apocalyptic notes which dominated many predictions. The crisis was characterised as "unprecedented", the "deepest since the Great Depression", and even as a "turning point in the global economy."

However, did the crisis really take place?

Today, after more than two years since its inception, it becomes evident that the dreadfulness of the crisis has often been exaggerated by analysts. Indeed, the depth of the fall of financial indicators is impressive. However, the reduction in the levels of actual production, though obvious and significant, looks much more modest. Moreover, the timely departure from the liberal-market fundamentalism allowed the authorities of the leading world economies to apply quickly the levers of state regulation and seriously mitigate the most acute phase of the crisis and in some places reduce its duration.

Such a rapid transition into a phase of relative stabilisation and, though uncertain, growth by itself reduced the political relevance of the grumble against banks around the world and of the rhetoric, which nearly got intense, about the need to reform the global model of economic relations. The latter was subjected to harsh criticism with the beginning of the crisis. A whole system of intergovernmental negotiations and consultations on the restructuring of the global financial architecture (including the redistribution of votes in the International Monetary Fund and attempts to replace the dollar as the world’s reserve currency), global regulation of financial markets, and even on the introduction of a global tax on certain bank transactions was launched.

At some point, it seemed that the combined efforts of the young growing economies, notably of China, India, Brazil and also Russia, which joined them, would make it all come true. However, no miracle occurred. Moreover, powerful China suddenly appeared much more circumspect and cautious in its actions than analysts from the North and Northwest expected. Having raised its position in the global economy and finance to the level desirable and achievable at this stage, Beijing chose "not to rock the boat further" in vain. The proposals to introduce a new world reserve currency were gradually muffled. Chinese authorities made tough public statements but, in fact, did not ignore Western demands to correct the exchange rate of the yuan in the light of the situation in China’s foreign trade partners.

In short, the crisis, although it has stirred some deep processes of transformation of the global economic model, has clearly not brought the situation to the verge of its actual adjustment.

Prosperity in poverty

Against the backdrop of the above, the results of the impact of the crisis on African economies seem interesting and illustrative. This interest is, above all, due to an ambiguous situation on the continent arising from the vicissitudes of the rampant global economic and financial disaster and from the unique African phenomenon of "prosperity in poverty". Unlike other developing regions – Asia and Latin America – the economies of sub-Saharan Africa had been growing throughout 2008 and in 2009 the region as a whole managed to avoid a large-scale recession, at least in the real sector. I hope to describe this phenomenon in detail in future issues of "Asia and Africa today".

In 2009, the magazine published several articles about the possible consequences of the crisis for African countries, including a large collective forecasting article in the 5th issue, in the writing of which the author of these lines had participated. It is pleasing to know that a number of the assumptions, which were made in these publications and based more on the intuition of Russian Africanists than on the figures (we just did not have them at the moment of our disposal) proved correct. However, it appears that we were inclined to overestimate the heaviness of the consequences of the crisis for Africa.

In this series of articles I would like to offer readers an analysis of what really happened in the economy of the continent and correct some past assumptions, which now seem to be unduly harsh forecasts. But most importantly, for the first time I will use figures to illustrate inadequately covered present economic problems of the continent. The innovativeness, as it is now fashionable to say, of this approach to describing all of the above lies in a clear division of the results (preliminary at the moment) of the crisis in two...
groups: implications for the financial sector and those for the real sector of Africa’s economy. Such a forced dichotomy is a specific feature of the African reality. This objective segmentation of a single economic system is a disadvantage of African economy, but also, as I hope it will be seen in this series, is its salvation in the context of the global crisis.

A forgotten but not forbidden topic

To begin with, it came to my surprise that the question of how the current crisis had influenced the financial sector of African states had for some reason been out of the focus of the attention of both Russian and foreign scientific literature. And yet, logically, this is the area where the impact of the crisis in Africa should have been the most significant. After all, unlike Russian researchers, most of whom write about the systemic global economic crisis, almost the entire rest of the world calls it the global financial crisis, which triggered a recession in many (especially developed) countries. Thus, if it is a financial crisis, it would be logical to expect that in Africa its impact would be most visibly reflected in the monetary, credit, and budget areas. But is this true? World scientific and business press, for some reason, in general avoids this issue.

In our opinion, such a modest attention paid to African finance is due to the fact that its role in the global financial system is still quite modest. It does not actively influence on the world’s financial processes, and therefore is largely uninteresting to the world’s business press. If it is mentioned, it is usually done in one of the two contexts – foreign aid or debt relief.

However, from the standpoint of Africans themselves rather than of an external observer the situation is changing dramatically. For them, the problems of the financial sector are a concentrated expression of the problems of development. The desired leap from the state of backwardness is primarily the issue of financing and implementation of programmes of modernisation of African economies.

Peripheral finance

African finances are considered to be a periphery of the global financial system. Maybe it is true. However, the periphery is an organic and integral part of the global economy and world finance. It is linked to the centre with billions of mutually feeding vessels and indirect influences, sometimes not quite discernible to the naked eye. In this article we will try to answer the questions of how did the global financial crisis affect the financial sector in Africa and what are the possible scenarios of its post-crisis development in the short and medium term.

In order to answer these questions, one should clearly understand the state of the financial sector of the continent before and after the crisis. In addition, one should try to understand how changes occurring inside and outside Africa’s economy could affect the further development of African finance.

As you know, finance, by definition, is economic relations carried out mainly in the form of money being transferred between major economic entities – enterprises, households and government. Financial resources relate to the quantitative characterisation of the financial results of the production process over a certain period.

In addition, when speaking of the states it is necessary to mention the financial system – a whole complex for managing financial relations, including the mechanism of forming funds of both centralised and decentralised functions, government (municipal) financial institutions and financial departments of companies, as well as a system of linkages between them.

With regard to the analysis of economy or national economy the concept of the financial sector is often used. The latter includes the entire set of financial institutions, which operate in this sector, instruments and regulations to ensure the implementation of credit, monetary and payment relations in the economy. It combines banking and non-bank credit institutions, other financial intermediaries, organised and unorganised financial markets.

There are three fundamental characteristics inherent to the financial sector in Africa, both before and after the crisis: weak development of financial institutions, compactness and modest turnover, and increased importance of informal structures and relationships. If one characterises the sector using professional language, one can also talk about the "lack of depth of the financial sector", low efficiency and poor access of the main economic actors to financial services.

From the perspective of macroeconomics, all of the above is easily explained by low incomes of the population (including small and even some medium-sized African entrepreneurs), underdeveloped economy in general and financial relations in particular, and unfavourable economic environment for the development of entrepreneurship and competition.

A small but very profitable banking sector

Financial intermediation (which is what credit institutions are engaged in from the viewpoint of economic theory) in Africa is less developed than in other regions of the world. However, as everywhere in the world, the heart of finance in Africa is the banking sector. Since the mid 1990s, it quantitatively
has grown very rapidly due to a forced, pushed from the outside liberalisation of domestic financial markets. Rating agencies generally note the improvement in the quality of the work of African banks in terms of compliance with international standards and strengthening their financial positions. (See Table 1)

Table 1. The best banks in Africa’s emerging markets in 2010 according to the magazine "Global Finance"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Bank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Arab Banking Corporation Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>B ES Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Standard Chartered Bank Botswana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>Standard Chartered Bank Gambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Ghana Commercial Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>International Commercial Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>Standard Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Standard Chartered Bank Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Barclays Bank of Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>Ecobank Cote d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Wahda Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>Mauritius Commercial Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Attijariwafa Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Millennium Bim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>Standard Bank Namibia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>FirstBank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Banque Commercial du Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Ecobank Senegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Al Salam Bank Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Ecobank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Banque de Tunisie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Stanbic Bank Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>NIB International Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Standard Bank</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Over the past 20 years there have been significant diversification of the banks in terms of ownership and nationality of the controlling stake. Currently, Africa presents a rather mixed picture in this regard (see Table 2).

Table 2. Grouping of African countries according to the type of ownership in the banking sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State ownership prevails</th>
<th>Foreign ownership prevails</th>
<th>Mixed ownership prevails (state-foreign)</th>
<th>National private ownership prevails</th>
<th>Ownership is evenly distributed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>Gabon</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
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<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
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<tr>
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<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
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<td>Madagascar</td>
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<td>Namibia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
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<td>Uganda</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
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</table>

At the same time, domestic private banking capital is still weak almost everywhere. The share of private banks in the total volume of credits provided to citizens of all countries of the continent is most significant in South Africa, Mauritius, Seychelles and Cape Verde.

However, while the number of credit institutions has increased, some modernisation of the banking system has occurred and the share of private
capital has grown, its stability has hardly strengthened. An average African bank is characterised by the following parameters. Average assets in 2008 (calculated based on data from the countries listed in Table 2) amounted to 81 million U.S. dollars (the average for the world outside of Africa is 334 million). Being generally small structures, their operating costs are significantly higher that world average costs. It is estimated that the overheads of African banks are almost 50% higher than of banks outside the continent. At the same time, bank margin (the difference in prices at which banks attract and provide their various services, including interest on borrowing and lending) of African banks is on average 70% larger than in the rest of the world. This partly compensates for their excessive overheads, but the net profit margin of African bankers is also quite large. Though, it is less than in Russia.

Although, as is noted above, African finance is on the periphery of the global financial system, it should be stated that investing in this periphery in the years preceding the financial crisis was very profitable. Even considering the region’s poverty and regular complaints of African financiers about government corruption and administrative oppression, in general, the return on invested capital is here above the world average. Having said that and realising the depth of differences, it is impossible, still again, not to see parallels with Russia’s actuality...

The following observation (supported by the figures in Table 3) characterising the degree of attractiveness of the African financial sector as an object of investment is also noteworthy. Serious statistics does not on average in the world detect any significant difference in the profitability of banking institutions according to their nationality and ownership type. In Africa, however, banking institutions owned by foreigners are more profitable than foreign-owned banks in any other part of the world, on the one hand, and, in addition, more profitable than banks owned by local capital, on the other hand.

The following table shows the level of return on invested capital for the sample of banks that operate simultaneously in Africa and other regions of the world. To make the picture complete, we indicate as profitability is to the value of assets in general and only to the invested capital. (Table 3)

As far as non-depository financial intermediaries such as insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds, etc. are concerned, this segment of the financial sector is much less developed in Africa than the banking one. Moreover, for instance, the level of penetration of insurance services (the ratio of the sum of all insurance premiums to GDP) as compared to colonial times in the former British colonies has even degraded. Today it is below 1 percent in most countries. This is not surprising. Firstly, during their reign the British forcibly propagated insuring in the colonies with the help of tax levers. Secondly, the three main characteristics of modern African economies – low incomes, high inflation and underdevelopment of contractual relationships – are also the main obstacles to the insurance and pension business. To complement this bleak picture, the lack of development of the system regulating insurance and pension markets in Africa and their extremely weak infrastructure should also be mentioned.

Table 3. Comparison of profitability of the banking sector in Africa and beyond (2000–2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Profitability of assets</th>
<th>Return on invested capital</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Profitability of banks in Africa</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign banks in Africa</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Sample&quot; (profitability of foreign banks, which operate both in Africa and elsewhere, in Africa)</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profitability of banks in the rest of the world</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign banks in the rest of the world</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Sample&quot; (profitability of foreign banks, which operate both in Africa and elsewhere, outside Africa)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Due to the deregulation of insurance and pension markets in accordance with the requirements of international financial institutions, there are two systems of pension insurance – public and private– operating on the continent side by side. However, almost everywhere the private business remains at the stage of initial capital accumulation. This leads to onerous contract terms, fraud, non-compliance with contractual obligations, as well as many other irregularities, with which the development of a reliable insurance and pension business is incompatible.

It is extremely difficult to find consolidated quantitative data, especially recent, on the development in this segment, but the Table 4 below gives a general idea of its present state.

Financial markets in Africa with a few exceptions are in their infancy. Organised securities markets exist in less than half the countries of the continent, but only in South Africa did they reach a certain maturity.
Table 4. Portfolio structure of insurance and pension companies in selected African countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type of a financial intermediary</th>
<th>Cash, deposits</th>
<th>Government obligations</th>
<th>Shares</th>
<th>Mortgage / real estate</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>NSIF</td>
<td>41.9%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>PIC</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>NSIF</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>68.8%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>CLI</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>41.5%</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>CLI</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>PPF</td>
<td>81.8%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>NSIF</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>PPF</td>
<td>34.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>NSIF</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>PIC</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>45.0%</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Explanations to the table: NSIF – national social insurance fund (system), PPF – public (state) pension fund, CLI – companies engaged in life insurance, PIC – private general insurance companies.

Pre-crisis stock market capitalisation of South Africa (Johannesburg Stock Exchange) was $600 billion. According to this indicator, it was the fourth largest emerging market in the world (after South Korea, Russia and India, but ahead of Brazil, China and Hong Kong). At the same time, the South African stock market is not sufficiently large to serve as a place of IPOs for major South African companies of the global level. 21 leading South African corporation chose to list their shares on foreign exchanges. Among these corporations are Anglo-American mining corporation, Investec banking group, SAB-Miller brewer, the insurance giant Old Mutual and high-tech company Dimension Data (All of them conducted their IPOs in London).

Prior to the crisis there were 15 stock exchanges in Africa, and several more were at various stages of preparation for the launch of national organised securities markets. Gabon and Cameroon were in this transitional state when exchanges had formally been established, but the listings had not yet been formed. A common problem of African stock exchanges (excluding South Africa) is their small capitalisation even compared with the volumes of national securities markets. Not in a single African state stock exchange capitalisation exceeds 15% of the total capitalisation of the securities market of the country.

Such were the general parameters of the financial sector in African countries on the eve of the crisis. I must say that they generally have changed insignificantly. To a greater degree the crisis has negatively affected some individual financial and economic issues, thus greatly exacerbating them and making it necessary to look for an antidote. These include the issues of budget deficits, risk of recurrence of debt problems and aggravation of debt burden, monetary issues and negative current account balances. At the same time, these difficulties were aggravated by, in general, quite unexpected and rapid exacerbation of the crisis. Many governments, which were obediently following the liberal-market recipes, with displeasure began to notice that the implemented reforms were powerless before the global financial disaster, while their overseas tutors, having faced a difficult financial position, easily abandoned the useless under these circumstances monetarist formulas and spells. At the same time, some proactive measures taken in previous years turned out to be rather useful. We are primarily talking about stabilisation and reserve funds, which IMF experts recommended to establish not only to us but also to African countries.

Stabilisation funds: From Joseph to the "Washington Consensus"

Crises do not scare Africans. During half a century of independence the continent lived without a crisis for just about twelve to fifteen years. Residents have learned to adapt to seemingly hopeless economic situations.

Moreover, Africa, as it is well-known, is the cradle of the first in the history of mankind anti-crisis decisions and financial and economic innovations. According to the extant written sources, it was in Egypt where nearly four thousand years ago Joseph initiated the first in the history of the world stabilisation fund (at the time consisting of grain, in case of a famine). Being an effective manager of the time, he managed to push through the pharaoh's milieu a project for sequestering a part of the crop for state revenue. He also managed to break the resistance of priest and scribe castes that had their own business interests and wanted in fat years to increase production, and therefore insisted on the inclusion of grain from the official government stabilisation fund in the current turnover for the expansion of crops. Joseph introduced a 20 percent tax in kind to effectively guarantee the impossibility of the expansion of real production by ancient Egyptian farmers and creation of
stocks by them. Despite the incessant criticism of his economic policy on the part of opponents, Joseph had ensured the inviolability of stocks during all seven fat years, and seven years later upon the occurrence of the global food crisis (seven lean years) it apparently brought both him and the pharaoh superprofit when they sold the soaring in price real assets to the population. Here is how it is described in the book of Genesis:

"And the famine was over all the face of the earth: And Joseph opened all the storehouses, and sold unto the Egyptians; and the famine waxed sore in the land of Egypt.

And people from all around came to Egypt to buy grain from Joseph because the famine was severe throughout the world."  

The result of that crisis, according to economic logic, should have been the concentration of capital and power in the hands of the centre on behalf of the head of state (pharaoh) and his first minister (Joseph), a significant weakening of the economic position of competing political elites (priests), while maintaining and, possibly, strengthening the position of officials (scribes), without whose mediation business procedures similar to present-day public tenders to sell state stocks would be impossible.  

It is also important to note that the initial prerequisite for the implementation of Ancient Egypt’s anti-crisis programme was the existence in the country of a system of good governance in the form of assistance (special grace) rendered by the pharaoh to economic reforms of Joseph. As shown by the subsequent Egyptian history, the lack of such good governance at the banks of the Nile 430 years later resulted in Egyptian plagues and the subsequent outflow of labour and capital flight from the country.  

Nowadays, the reform of financial systems in Africa took place, as noted above, under the so-called "Washington Consensus", which prevailed unchanged over the global financial horizon until the crisis and under which African countries could count upon external assistance and favourable economic relations only under the condition of the implementation of an economic policy based on the requirements of the liberal market model of development.  

In the field of finance it was necessary for instance to reduce significantly the public sector, tighten fiscal discipline and cut social expenditures of the state, open up domestic markets to foreign capital, adhere strictly to a reasonable currency exchange rate policy.

Modest charm of "fat years" in Africa

Despite the negative attitude towards the recipes of the "Washington consensus", their positive effect is seen in that almost all African countries which followed them managed to reduce public debt in 2002-2007.

The downward trend in public debt during fat years was easily noticeable. The main statistical indicator here is the ratio of debt to GDP. It has been improving since the end of the 1990s. However, an analysis of this indicator in terms of "Africa on the whole" is highly conditional if not totally devoid of practical sense. The fact is that in isolation from the economic context this ratio in itself shows little about whether the country is experiencing difficulties or is doing all right. Bare figures may be similar in countries in diametrically opposite economic conditions.

For example, for the highly developed U.S. this figure at the end of fiscal year 2009 amounted to 83.4% (total debt of the federal and state governments). In 2011, according to the draft budget, it will reach 101% (of GDP), which is not much less than that of Sudan (104.5% in 2009). An absolute world leader in terms of this indicator in 2009 was still another African country – Zimbabwe (304.3%), which is undergoing severe economic difficulties. However, it is followed, albeit far behind, by prosperous Japan (192.1%).  

When analysing situation in African it is not static figures but dynamics that is critical. An analysis of the dynamics shows that the average ratio for sub-Saharan Africa, which was 46% of GDP in 2000, fell to 10 percent in 2008. It should be also noted that the spread between the values of this index for the poorest countries of the continent, burdened by huge debts (there are 29 of those in Africa), and for countries exporting expensive natural resources is very wide. This is due to the fact that oil-exporting countries have managed to reduce the amount of debt thanks to an abundant inflow of petrodollars during the "fat" years preceding the crisis.

In 2000, the ratio of external debt to GDP in Nigeria and Gabon was approximately 60%, but by 2008 it dropped to 1.5% and 14%, respectively. In Angola, the pre-crisis ration was 16.8%. No longer on the advice of Joseph, but upon the recommendation of Western economists, primarily from the IMF, these countries established stabilisation funds. In late 2008, the amount of the reserves of Nigeria’s stabilisation fund reached $18 billion, or 7.5% of GDP. For comparison, the value of Russia’s stabilisation fund at the time of its division on February 1, 2008 amounted to 3,852 billion rubles, or about $154 billion (more than 12% of GDP in 2008). State deposits of oil exporters of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in the regional central bank amounted to 12.5% of their GDP. This, of course, is less than how much major oil and gas exporters (Algeria and Gulf countries) had accumulated, but in 2009 these funds helped dampen the impact of the global financial crisis.

For other African countries the reduction of debt burden (and of the aforementioned indicator as well) is mainly the result of efforts to implement international agreements within the framework of the Multilateral Debt Re-
The Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDRTF) approved in June 2005 at the summit of the Group of Eight in Gleneagles. It was then decided to cancel debts owed to the World Bank, IMF and African Development Bank by 20 least developed African countries, while for further 9 countries this process has not yet been completed.

Attention is drawn to the fact that the ratio of external public debt to GDP has especially increased (as compared with 2007) in the very countries that were considered particularly diligent executors of the recipes of the "Washington consensus" in the years prior to the crisis, namely Botswana, Ghana, Tanzania, and Zambia. Zimbabwe, whose government in February 2009 was taken over by the Western-backed opponent of President Mugabe M.S. Tsvangirai, remains the absolute leader in this regard. During the year of his leadership of the country, the ratio increased by about a third.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>218.20</td>
<td>304.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>105.90</td>
<td>104.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>105.80</td>
<td>79.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>58.50</td>
<td>67.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>75.20</td>
<td>63.80</td>
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<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>63.10</td>
<td>58.30</td>
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<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>50.60</td>
<td>58.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>48.70</td>
<td>54.10</td>
</tr>
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<td>Morocco</td>
<td>67.40</td>
<td>54.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>55.40</td>
<td>53.80</td>
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<td>72</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>31.30</td>
<td>35.70</td>
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<td>34.70</td>
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<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>44.50</td>
<td>31.70</td>
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<td>Zambia</td>
<td>28.10</td>
<td>31.50</td>
</tr>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>22.20</td>
<td>26.10</td>
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<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>19.60</td>
<td>24.80</td>
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<td>Senegal</td>
<td>22.90</td>
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<td>Uganda</td>
<td>20.60</td>
<td>19.30</td>
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<td>Namibia</td>
<td>22.30</td>
<td>19.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>5.40</td>
<td>17.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>14.40</td>
<td>17.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the same time, "fat years" turned out to be the period of the most significant capital flight from Africa. The total illegal export of capital in 2000-2008 amounted to an estimated $437.171 million. This is nearly three and a half times more than the total for the 1990s and two times more than the total for the 1980s. In total, over nearly four decades since the beginning of the 1970s till our time, about $854 billion were illegally exported from Africa. Primarily it was corruption income as well as the proceeds of financial fraud and unpaid taxes.

Thus, the average annual increase in the volume of illegally exported capital over 30 years amounted to approximately 11.9%. These are the most conservative estimates. According to experts, the more likely figure reflecting the real state of affairs is $1.8 trillion. This greatly exceeds the amount of official development assistance (ODA) over the same period. However, even according to conservative estimates, in 1970-2008 the ratio of illegal exports to the inflow of ODA is 2:1.

West and Central Africa are leading at the subregional level. Setting aside unequal initial conditions (some countries were richer and some poorer than others), there are no fundamental differences between French-, English- or Portuguese-speaking Africa in this regard. There is a strong positive correlation between the overall economic potential of the country, its wealth of natural resources and the size of secretly exported capital. Five countries leading in terms of illegally exported funds is both the five largest and most gifted nature of economies in Africa: Nigeria (from 1970 to 2008. – Displayed abroad $ 89.5 billion, Egypt ($ 70.5 billion), Algeria ($ 25.7 billion), Morocco ($ 25 billion) and South Africa ($ 24.9 billion).

There is a strong positive correlation between the overall economic potential of a country, its wealth of natural resources and the volume of secretly exported capital. Five countries leading in terms of illegally exported capital are at the same time the five largest and most endowed by nature economies in Africa: Nigeria ($89.5 billion taken out the country between 1970 and 2008), Egypt ($70.5 billion), Algeria ($25.7 billion), Morocco ($25 billion), and South Africa ($24.9 billion).
What has the crisis done?

When the world economy plunged into the global crisis because of the very "healer" that prescribed the recipe of "financial health", stabilisation funds became a useful reserve, which gave African governments some freedom of financial manoeuvre. Pleasant surprise was, however, fleeting. The feeling that African countries, "undocked" from the global financial market, would become islands of financial stability in a stormy sea of the crisis began quickly to evaporate. For some time the continent continued to implement the same financial policy, as if nothing in the world around them had changed. They spent the accumulated over the previous seven "fat" years reserves without any worries and funded development programmes launched in pursuance of their obligations under the "Washington consensus". Governments were in no hurry to squeeze their expenditures. They continued to generously provide funds for prestigious projects, which testified to the success of their policy of past years.

This was exacerbated by the traditional diseases of the local style of governance and finance – a high degree of subjectivity in making economic decisions, focusing on the doctrinal dogma of financial theory rather than on real needs, and watching the reaction of their "elders" from international financial institutions and "civilised countries with mature markets". Good governance, which had been proven practical back in the time of the political tandem of the pharaoh and Joseph and at the time actively propagated by the "Washington consensus", was everywhere called for by almost all African leaders. However, in fact little has been implemented. If we also add to this a high degree of corruption and low competence of at least some decision makers in the financial sector, we will see a fairly complete picture of the formation of anti-crisis fiscal policies in some African countries during the crisis.

As a result, the "recovering", as until recently it was believed to be, financial sector of the continent began to absorb limited resources of the real economy and worsen overall macroeconomic imbalances. At the end of the first two quarters of 2009 the issue of external liquidity was on the top of the agenda, as if there had not been any seven "fat" financial years prior to 2008.

Aid from international financial institutions and in some cases cash infusions from China and Japan arrived pretty quickly and helped individual countries, which found themselves in the most difficult position, to avoid a balance-of-payments crisis.

The crisis did not strike non-oil exporting countries as hard, but they also suffered some losses. Budgets were balanced on the brink of deficit because in the first half of 2008 there had been a sharp rise in world oil prices and food prices. (See Table 6)

By now, African countries have virtually exhausted their internal resources to control budget deficits. Their access to external financial resources, despite broadcasted statements at various summits, generally remains limited. African intra-regional debt markets are in their infancy. Having used them actively during favourable pre-crisis years has almost dried up their resources. With regard to international capital markets, despite the fact that their accessibility for African countries has improved in recent months, they also should not be counted on. Only a few African countries have sufficiently high credit ratings allowing them to obtain money on these markets on favourable terms. Kenya and Zambia, which intended to launch an initial offering of Eurobonds, had to postpone this venture until better times.

Table 6. Fiscal balance in African countries (excluding grants) as % of GDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subregion</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>-0,1</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>4,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Including</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oil and gas importing countries</td>
<td>-2,0</td>
<td>-3,7</td>
<td>-6,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the same without South Africa</td>
<td>-5,4</td>
<td>-6,6</td>
<td>-8,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oil and gas exporting countries</td>
<td>3,5</td>
<td>6,2</td>
<td>-6,1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By now, African countries have virtually exhausted their internal resources to control budget deficits. Their access to external financial resources, despite broadcasted statements at various summits, generally remains limited. African intra-regional debt markets are in their infancy. Having used them actively during favourable pre-crisis years has almost dried up their resources. With regard to international capital markets, despite the fact that their accessibility for African countries has improved in recent months, they also should not be counted on. Only a few African countries have sufficiently high credit ratings allowing them to obtain money on these markets on favourable terms. Kenya and Zambia, which intended to launch an initial offering of Eurobonds, had to postpone this venture until better times.

Summing up the aforesaid it can be concluded that although the reduction of debt burden in several African countries during pre-crisis years eased the financial problems of 2008-2009, it was not sufficient to avoid budgetary difficulties during the crisis.

In the first half of 2008, oil and food prices skyrocketed and worsened the balance of payments of many countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Oil and gas exporters had been an exception, but in the second half of 2008, when oil prices collapsed, the situation in the latter began to deteriorate faster than in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subregion</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>-0,1</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>4,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Including</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oil and gas importing countries</td>
<td>-2,0</td>
<td>-3,7</td>
<td>-6,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the same without South Africa</td>
<td>-5,4</td>
<td>-6,6</td>
<td>-8,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oil and gas exporting countries</td>
<td>3,5</td>
<td>6,2</td>
<td>-6,1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the former. As a result, in 2009, for the first time in the previous three years, a deficit was recorded in the balance of payments on the current account. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that the trend had shifted to the opposite in a very short time. As a consequence, oil exporters did not have time to take countermeasures. With the exception of South Africa and some other countries deprived of natural reserves of expensive raw materials, the current accounts deficits continue to grow, reflecting the decline in export earnings. Growing deficits on current operations result in the outflow of foreign exchange reserves from the region.

During the past five years, oil and gas exporting countries were the main recipients of foreign currency in Africa. At the time world oil prices plummeted suddenly, the relation between external demands and liabilities of these countries was extremely favourable and it softened the effect of declining revenues from the sale of their main exports to world markets.

By the time the crisis struck them too, foreign exchange reserves had been depleted by about a third. Since then the situation has only been getting worse. Approximately in a dozen African countries the currency situation has become extremely dangerous. So far, foreign exchange reserves exceed the minimum values required by the prudential norms (equivalent to the value of three months of imports of a country) and comply with the standards because of the fall in oil and food prices caused by the crisis.

Conclusion

Back in the time of general euphoria of perestroika and reforms, the author of this article published his opinion that the processes of globalisation so much welcomed at the time carried not only positive but also significant destructive potential. This applies particularly to countries with small or insufficiently balanced economy and heavily dependent on world markets. It is therefore essential when implementing the plan to "enter into the world community" and "integrate" with the world market not to forget about the necessity to develop a system of adequate checks and balances within the national economy, which could offset the negative effects of uncontrollable (or sometimes controlled from the outside) global economic shocks.

The crisis has reaffirmed the importance of diversifying the economic base. It also created the conditions for stimulating the move forward by structural reforms in private sector development, financial sector, labour market and social security systems, as well as by deepening regional integration.

The crisis inflicted considerable (though not as big as originally expected but, apparently, long-term) damage on the economy of Africa, which cannot be minimised without the support of the international community and establishment of a new partnership for Africa's development. Intra-African initiatives in this direction should be complemented by steps taken by developed countries, including measures such as calculated, timely and adequate assistance for development.

It is also important to make sure that when determining anti-crisis measures, their scope, plans for restructuring global economic relations, and establishing a new financial architecture of the world, one would listen to the voices of the Africans themselves, and the continent's problems would be regarded not as something separate but integrated with the general progress of the transformation of global financial systems and international monetary relations.

1 Those wishing to familiarize themselves with the anti-crisis programme of Joseph according to the original source in the Russian translation should refer to the book of Genesis 41:1–57 or, in the original language, to the text of the Torah – the first fifty-seven verses of the book "Miketz".
2 The Bible. The Book of Exodus, chapter 12, verses 35-38.
AFRICA’S GAS IS A SERIOUS BUSINESS

Increase in Its Production May Affect Russia’s Role as the World "Storeroom" of Natural Gas

In the world economic community there continues a discussion of the possibility and feasibility of intensifying international consolidation of the largest exporters of natural gas (NG) along the lines of OPEC. In 2010, only the Gas Exporting Countries’ Forum (GECF), which had been founded in May 2001 by Algeria, Iran and Russia, operated in this industry at the global level. In June 2010, the Forum consisted of 11 states – full participants, and another 3 states – Kazakhstan, the Netherlands and Norway – observers. Among these 14 countries 5 are African (their rank and share of the world's proven reserves of NG are indicated in parentheses): Nigeria (9, 2.8%), Algeria (10, 2.4%), Egypt (16, 1.2%), Libya (22, 0.8%), and Equatorial Guinea – an exporter of liquefied NG (LNG) since 2008. For comparison, the first three places in the world in terms of proven reserves of NG are occupied by Russia (23.7%) along with two Middle Eastern states – Iran (15.8%) and Qatar (13.5%), which to date by far exceed all African countries in terms of this indicator. Sometimes GECF is called a "quasi-cartel", when in fact it is still more like a discussion club. Before Fall 2008, membership in the GECF was not enshrined formally due to the absence of a charter. The Forum had no headquarters, no permanent bodies, and no own staff; it took no concerted steps to regulate the world’s gas markets. However, the fundamental status differences between GECF and OPEC are accompanied with very similar quantitative indicators of their members’ control over global natural resources in their respective industries. It is interesting that the share of 14 (including Kazakhstan, the Netherlands and Norway) Forum’s partners in 2009 accounted for over 65.9% of global proven natural gas reserves and 38.8% of world production of gaseous fuels, while 12 members of OPEC (including Angola as of January 1, 2007) control almost the same share with a slight advantage: in 2009 they controlled 77.2% of global proven oil reserves and 41.2% of the production of liquid fuels.

Table 1 demonstrates the proven gas reserves in 25 countries, which possess the richest stocks of "blue fuel", as well as its commercial production.

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Table 1. The top twenty-five countries in terms of gas reserves at the beginning of 2009 and commercial production of gas in 2008*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Proven reserves Trillion m³</th>
<th>% of the world reserves</th>
<th>Commercial production Billion m³</th>
<th>% of world production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World in total</td>
<td>187.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2987.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Russia</strong></td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>527.5</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iran</strong></td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>131.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Qatar</strong></td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>593.4</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Venezuela</strong></td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Algeria</strong></td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indonesia</strong></td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Egypt</strong></td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>103.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kazakhstan</strong></td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>161.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GECF in total</strong></td>
<td>123.6</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>1158.6</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African participants of GECF</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>184.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African countries in total</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>203.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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* This article was prepared with the support of the Russian Humanitarian Scientific Foundation (RHSF), project number 09–03–00697 a/p.
However, most analysts put not as much emphasis on the organisational structure and natural resource potential of these two groups, but rather on the place which oil and gas occupy in the economic systems – global, sectoral, and regional, as well as in micro- and macroeconomic systems. The difference in natural properties and areas of use for oil and gas is big enough and these properties prevent the conversion of natural gas into a classic commodity, an example of which oil has been since the 1980s.

Suppliers and buyers of gaseous fuel are far more closely connected with each other than their counterparts in the market for liquid fuels. The predominant and most cost-effective deliveries of natural gas by pipelines (in 2008, they accounted for nearly 72.2% of the volume of world trade in the product) are realised almost exclusively on the basis of long-term – usually longer than 15 years – contracts. These types of agreements prevail still over a more “mobile” market for liquefied natural gas (LNG), which is delivered by sea tankers, which accounted for 27.8%5. On the other hand, oil contracts can be concluded for virtually any length of time, which eliminates disputes over pricing issues, which often arise in the natural gas trade.

"Gas OPEC: to be or not to be?"

However, in 2008, GECF actually started to create a new organisation, which focused on harmonisation and consolidation of the efforts of its members, in order to, among other things, facilitate joint discussion and resolution of issues in gas trade. Russia, which is heading the coordination committee under the Council of energy ministers of countries participating in the Forum, so far proposes a relatively soft operational framework for such an organisation. In April 2008, the Russian version of the GECF charter was sent to representatives of the 15 interested states – Algeria, Bolivia, Brunei, Chile, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Qatar, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, UAE, Oman, Trinidad and Tobago, and Equatorial Guinea – and was fully accepted by only 10 of them (the aforementioned except for Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, UAE and Oman).

As cautiously stated the Russian side, the mechanism of the new structure should not resemble OPEC but create a "platform" to help develop a universal formula for the price of gas, promote the use of spot deliveries in the event of gas shortage under long-term contracts, and determine the prospects for building new pipelines. In addition, Russia offered to create the International alliance of non-state independent gas organisations (IANIGO) in order to integrate non-governmental organisations and major companies operating in the gas industry.

According to experts, IANIGO has greater chances of being realised than a "gas OPEC". The prospects for the establishment of a cartel similar to OPEC in the nearest future are highly unlikely, – believes the head of the department for fundamental analysis of financial corporation "Otkrytie" N. Milchakov. Firstly, according to the expert, alliance members would face difficulties conducting a coordinated pricing policy since prices are determined on the basis of long-term contracts with consumers. Secondly, Russia stands out among the other cartel participants because it possesses the largest gas reserves in the world (23.4% of world reserves) and occupies the first place in its production, and many other suppliers are afraid of its competition.

For instance, in late 2007, Gazprom and Algeria’s Sonatrach refused to renew the memorandum of cooperation because it had turned out that they had had fewer common interests than expected. Russia is strong in Europe but it is only beginning to enter the LNG market. However, Qatar, Algeria and other developing countries have already conquered the European and even American LNG markets.

The position of many relatively new gas producers – Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan-, for which the priority is to make a transition to market relations with consumers of their products and with transit countries and, consequently, obtain higher prices for gas, is still unclear.

It would also be difficult to agree on specific issues with potential members of a "gas OPEC". It is not clear how the competing parties are going to determine the feasibility of building new gas pipelines with a view of the fact that the competition of natural gas supply routes intensifies each year. Say, Russia is lobbying the "South Stream" project. Iran, however, may become a resource base for the alternative "Nabucco" project – at least, such a possibility was considered, – noted the director of a department of the independent consulting group "2K Audit – Business consulting” A. Shtock. "Paradoxically, we can say that for Russia the best option is the very idea of a gas cartel rather than its realisation" he said. "Roughly speaking, Moscow is interested in endless negotiations on this subject, but it is not for the fact that they will lead to any practical results."


Commercial production excludes gas burned and/or pumped back into fields.

** States which are full members of GECF are marked in bold

*** States which are observers at GECF are marked in bold italics

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1 Spot deliveries are deliveries carried out immediately after conclusion of deals and immediate buyers’ payments.
The issue of establishing a gas OPEC was examined in October 2008 in Tehran, where representatives of the three biggest gas powers discussed joint actions on the global gas market but everyone interpreted them differently. Only Iranian Oil Minister Gholam Hossein Nozari spoke of a “gas OPEC” at the press conference held after the talks of Russia, Iran and Qatar: “There is a need for a “gas OPEC” – and there is a consensus about its creation.” Qatari Minister Abdullah bin Hamad Al-Attiyah said that “it is the will of Allah, at the next conference we will confirm the establishment of such an organisation.” But the chairman of Gazprom A. Miller spoke mainly of the “cooperation in the trilateral project” – the creation of the Supreme technical committee of experts and specialists and regular (3-4 times a year) meetings of the “big gas troika”. However, he also considered it necessary to “transform speedily (the Forum of gas-exporting countries – “big gas troika”). However, he also considered it necessary to “transform speedily (the Forum of gas-exporting countries – V.K.) into a permanent organisation that serves to ensure reliable and stable energy supplies around the world.”

The plans for a “gas OPEC” have been discussed for a number of years, having become a sort of scarecrow to gas consuming Western countries. The mentioning of it guarantees interest of the general Western public in the global "gas problem" and fears of gas exporters planning to create a cartel and regulate gas prices. Specialists react by repeatedly explaining that due to the peculiarities of the gas market it is impossible to regulate prices in this area, and all statements about the imminent creation of a "gas OPEC" constitute no more than PR and politics.

There is not and has never been any single gas market in the world. Gas prices in the U.S., Europe and Southeast Asia are very different. As has already been noted, gas contracts are mainly long-term, and supplier and consumer are firmly connected by the "pipe". Russia, Iran and Qatar combined have over 53% of world gas reserves. At the same time, Russia exports gas by pipelines, Qatar exports LNG. Iran is still a net importer of gas. Qatari LNG in Europe could be replaced by Algeria and Libya, which are too closely linked to, respectively, France and Italy to actively support a gas cartel at the moment. Gazprom is unable to redirect its gas from Europe because of existing long-term contracts and lack of ready infrastructure in other areas.

Turkmenistan, which first promises its gas to Europe via the "Nabucco" and then through Gazprom’s gas transportation system, claims its own share of influence.

It is quite likely that the global economic crisis and lower oil prices (on the basis of which the price of gas is calculated) gave an additional impetus to speculation about the possible creation of a "gas OPEC". After A. Miller’s statement that there is a line of creditors knocking at Gazprom’s door, the corporation together with oil companies asked for government aid to restructure foreign loans. The price of even $70 per barrel of oil (and it has repeatedly dropped considerably below the mark) can strongly affect Gazprom: the costs of the company which is not accustomed to economising are too high.

It is known that the price of gas is calculated using special formulas and is based on the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the previous three quarters. Therefore, due to the global economic crisis, a part of which is a drop in oil prices, in 2009-2010 the profits of Gazprom inevitably diminished.

Although there are ways to dramatically Gazprom’s expenditures: for instance, to cancel the construction of the "South Stream" pipeline. However, in mid-2010 the project neared its implementation, while the other project – the "Nord Stream" – entered the active phase of construction.

The example of Algeria demonstrates the difficulties that a number of exporters, which tried to turn the world's natural gas market in a global one by analogy with the oil market, faced a long time ago. That is why natural gas markets to this day have maintained their regional segmentation.

In the 1970s-1980s, Algeria’s energy-exporting strategy was focused primarily on the development of LNG supply. The country also sought to promote geographic diversification of buyers. However, apart from extremely high cost of this strategy, it was also vulnerable to the competition from suppliers of natural gas over pipelines, as well as from producers of alternative energy. In 1981-1983, for example, several attempts of the company Sonatrach to move to a new pricing system with regards to export gas contracts and to boost significantly gas prices led to the loss of large gas importers in the U.S. and Western Europe. The U.S. corporations El Paso Natural Gas (the El Paso group) and Trunkline LNG Company, LLC (TLNG, the Panhandle Energy Companies group ), as well as the British company British Methane, German and Austrian importers refused long-term (20-25 year) preliminary contracts for delivery of Algerian LNG. Germans and Austrians preferred cheaper natural gas coming via pipelines from the then Soviet Union and Norway to Algerian LNG.

Later, since the 1990s and up to the present time, the company Sonatrach has adjusted the national export strategy in favour of a more stable and economical supply of natural gas via pipelines under long-term contracts. As a result, in the 2000s, Algeria exported a predominant – both in terms of volume (calorific value) and monetary value – share of its "blue fuel" via its gas pipeline transportation system (see Table 2).

Thus, long-term contracts and the segmentation of natural gas markets objectively make one of the main goals of pricing policy, for the sake of achieving which OPEC exists in the world oil market, almost unattainable in natural gas market.

The third obstacle is the extremely high capital intensity of LNG. Renowned U.S. economist David Victor, Director of the Programme on Energy
and Sustainable Development at Stanford University, has long come to the conclusion that "... LNG is much more capital intensive than oil." For this reason, according to D. Victor, LNG producers seek to maximise their available production capacity to repay the capital costs and cover operating costs. On the other hand, the corrective activities of OPEC in the oil market, according to the American economist, are based largely on the ability to maintain spare production capacity, which can be increased by reducing oil production in order to raise prices, or, conversely, decreased to increase supply and curb prices.

However, the experts who defend the prospects for closer coordination between exporters of natural gas are correct as well. Theoretically, there are no insurmountable obstacles to this. Yet, to achieve efficiency in gas exports comparable to the effectiveness of oil exporting countries – OPEC members, the corresponding coordination of gas exporting countries should begin at much earlier stages of the production cycle. Cooperation is needed not as much on the stage of exploitation, but on the stage of planning, building and/or expansion of industrial production and export facilities.

In 2006-2007, gas exporters’ positions seemed to start converging and there appeared prospects for transformation of GECF based on similar principles, provided African members, particularly Algeria and Egypt, participate actively. However, until 2008, top government leaders of GECF did not release any specific details about any steps towards economic integration within this association. On the contrary, most government officials made cautious comments on the statements of the former Russian president and current Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, as well as of Iranian and other leaders in favour of increased cooperation of exporters of natural gas. For instance, Chakib Khelil, Algeria’s Minister for Energy and Mines, after talks with his Russian counterpart Viktor Khristenko in Algiers said that it was "... too early and difficult to discuss the creation of a "gas OPEC" because the oil market is different from the natural gas market."

Perhaps the only important function of GECF presently could be facilitating agreements on the routes of future pipelines. However, this function does not require such a large structure: gas exporting countries can agree on how not to lay competing pipeline routes at the regional level.

**Africa vs Russia: who will win?**

In 2007-2008, African participants of GECF were much more concerned with finding priority partners for investment and other forms of sectoral cooperation with Western Europe and the United States at the regional and interregional levels, rather than coordinating common global principles for regulation and joint ventures in gas extraction and transportation.

By 2008, the share of North Africa’s gas supplies in Western and Central Europe almost matched that of Russia, while in Southern Europe the supply of African natural gas occupied a dominant position. African countries were particularly active in taking the lead over Russia as suppliers of gas to European markets in 1996-2000. Russia and Algeria as if exchanged places: in 2000, Russia’s share in the total supply of gas to Europe was 64%, while Algeria’s – about 32%; however, Algeria supplied 65.5% of the increase in deliveries of gas to Europe, while Russia only 21.7%. In 1995-2000, the volume of shipments of LNG increased worldwide from 21 billion cubic meters (bcm) to 34.5 bcm. The geographical origins of imports diversified significantly. Nigeria and Trinidad joined the ranks of traditional exporters on long-term contracts such as Algeria and Libya. In addition, the deliveries of liquefied natural gas on short-term and one-time contracts, which were carried out by the majority of LNG exporting countries that previously had worked only in the Asian market, increased. The possibility of quickly solving peak demand issues by one-time purchases makes LNG an increasingly popular product, and this market – a virgin industry for Russian companies – by all accounts will develop actively. Russia, unfortunately, is gradually losing its monopoly in natural gas markets of Central Europe.

In 1995, the undivided rule of Russian gas in the former socialist countries’ imports was violated only by supplies of LNG from Algeria to the former Yugoslavia (more precisely, to Slovenia) in the amount of 0.4 billion cubic meters. By 2000, Russia’s share in this market declined by 8%. The "outsiders", in addition to Algeria, came to include Norway, which supplied gas to the Czech Republic and Poland, as well as to Germany and France. The latter two countries together with Italy are the biggest buyers of Russian gas. However, Russia’s share in their markets is also decreasing. North Africa’s gas is becoming increasingly important in these countries, as well as throughout the European Mediterranean region. Russia’s share of gas imports of five countries of the region has fallen by more than 5% over five years. Of these, 3% were "taken away" by North African countries and the remaining 2% by LNG exports from Nigeria, Trinidad, the Middle East and Australia.

In 2000, due to the implementation of several LNG and pipeline projects in Algeria, Libya and Egypt, North Africa exported to Europe 60.2 billion cubic meters of gas, of which 27.1 bcm were delivered in liquid form and another 33.1 bcm via pipelines. Algeria keeps the lead in these deliveries. Until 1983, it exported only LNG, the deliveries of which began in 1964. In 1983, the first pipeline "Transmed", which linked Algeria and Italy, came into operation, and in 1996 – the second pipeline, which transported Algerian gas to Spain. The total capacity of two systems is 34 bcm.

The structure of exports of natural gas from Algeria is shown in Table 2.
Three new natural gas pipelines from Africa to Europe are planned to be build. Two of these will transport gas to Spain. Spain is a dynamic market that is growing rapidly, but only recently has Russia begun to take part in this development: agreements on cooperation in gas field were signed during the visit of D. Medvedev to the country in February 2009.

Over the past five years, Italy’s gas consumption has increased significantly and gas imports of this country have doubled. Of the three projects the closest to the realisation is the Western Libyan gas project, which is a joint venture between the Italian company ENI and the Libyan state company National Oil Corporation (NOC). The gas pipeline will link Libya and Sicily, where it will be connected to the ENI-controlled "Transmed" network. The resource base of the project includes the "Wafa" field on land, 550 km from Tripoli, and an offshore field in the area licensed by ENI. Gas will be transported to the gas processing plant (GPP) with the capacity of 10 bcm per year, which is located on the Libyan coast. It is planned that 2 bcm of gas will be consumed inside the country while the remaining 8 bcm will be transported to Sicily via the 540-kilometer underwater pipeline.

The "Medgaz" pipeline is another project that is being implemented by Algeria’s Sonatrach and Spain’s Cepsa. It will become the second transportation route for Algerian gas to Spain (besides LNG). It is expected that BP, Endesa, ENI, Gas de France and TotalFinaElf will join these two companies in this project. This consortium will oversee the entire "production chain" from gas extraction in Algeria till its distribution, as well as electricity generation in Europe. The project is at the stage of techno-economic feasibility study (TEFS); the minimum capacity of the new pipeline is set at 8 bcm per year. The possibility of constructing another gas pipeline – from Algerian fields in the In Salah area to the island of Sardinia and then via the territory of the island of Corsica to Italy – is examined by the Italian electricity company Edison. In case all three projects come to life, the total capacity of gas pipelines from Algeria and Libya to Europe will almost double and will amount to 62 bcm per year.

New LNG projects are being developed in Egypt – a country which until the 21st century did not export gas. Egypt’s natural gas industry is undergoing rapid development. Gas production increased from 18 bcm in 2000 to 58.9 bcm in 2008. Natural gas in general will soon become the primary driving force behind the development of energy sector of Egypt. Foreign companies have been conducting exploration for gas in this country since the 1980s. In subsequent years, news came one after another about the discoveries of large gas reserves in both traditional and new areas of the country. In each of the last two decades – 1988-1997 and 1998-2008 – Egypt’s proven gas reserves first tripled and then grew by almost 2.4 times: BP corporation estimated them at 0.31 trillion cubic meters in 1987, at 0.93 trillion cubic meters in 1997 and at 2.2 trillion cubic meters in 2008. Egyptian experts set probable reserves at more than another 3.4 trillion cubic meters.

The rapid increase in reserves put forward the question of finding exporting solutions. In late 1999, the Egyptian government stated that proven gas reserves were more than sufficient to meet the country’s own needs and foreign companies which extracted natural gas deposits in Egypt should look for opportunities to export abroad. In early 2000, the government went further and announced a moratorium on the signing of new commercial contracts for sale of gas to the Egyptian state-owned Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation (EGPC) for the use within the country.

Four projects to export LNG are currently at various stages of progress. The most detailed project was prepared by the Spanish electric company Union Fenosa, which in July 2000 had signed a contract with EGPC to buy 4

---

Table 2. Exports of natural gas from Algeria*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Delivery method</th>
<th>2004 r.</th>
<th>2005 r.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>units</td>
<td>dollars in millions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Via pipelines</td>
<td>33075</td>
<td>4738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquefied natural gas (LNG)</td>
<td>24003</td>
<td>3755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>57078</td>
<td>8493</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


** Kilo tonnes of oil equivalent.
be merged. A plant with the capacity of 8 bcm per year (two lines of 4 bcm each) will be constructed on the islands of the Nile delta. Most of this gas will be used for power generation on plants of Union Fenosa in Spain. The remaining gas is expected to be sold to other customers in Spain and in other European countries.

BP and ENI signed an agreement with EGPC to build an LNG plant in the port of Damietta. The Egyptian company BG and Italian company Edison developed another project for construction of a gas liquefaction facility. The LNG plant with the capacity of 4 bcm of gas per year will be built near Alexandria; the project cost is estimated at $3 billion. Total exports of LNG from Egypt within these four projects are estimated at 18 bcm per year. However, analysts admit that in the name of reducing competition and maintaining high prices on liquefied gas some of these projects could be merged.

If they unite...

Consolidation of gas complexes of North African countries may go even further. With the emergence of new exporters in Egypt and Libya, every year almost all of the 46 bcm of gas will arrive almost simultaneously at the same market, which will lead to a dramatic intensification of competition in the region. Therefore, it can’t be ruled out that over time North African states – Algeria, Egypt and Libya – may form a kind of informal alliance. The Trans-North Africa pipeline, the idea of which has long been in the air, could become its physical incarnation. Pooling the export potential would allow North Africa to act on the European market as a single supplier of natural gas, with export volumes exceeding those of Norway and the Netherlands and challenging Russia’s gas exporting might. This is the opinion of European gas market analysts.

Moreover, countries of sub-Saharan Africa are entering this market actively. After commissioning of the third production line at the LNG plant in Nigeria, it exports each year an additional 3.7 bcm of gas to Spain and Portugal. The plant will be expanded with the fourth and then fifth lines. Angola, where a plant with the capacity of 5.6 bcm per year is being planned, will also soon join the African club of LNG exporters. Although the implementation of the Nigerian and Angolan projects was delayed, it is still quite possible that after 2010 the volume of gas exports from North and West Africa to Europe could increase by another 65-70 bcm and reach 130-135 bcm per year. Demand on the part of the main southern European importers of natural gas – Italy, Spain and Portugal – by that time is estimated to grow by only about 55 bcm. Therefore, it is assumed that the African gas pipeline will be able to reach out to the Nordic countries.

The plans to transform Africa into a major supplier of gas to Europe have led to a new wave of interest in exploration in the region. Governments of the North African countries, for their part, tend to heat up this interest by creating a more conducive business environment. According to the estimates of the research company Wood McKenzie, at least $33 billion will be invested in oil and gas projects in North Africa over the next decade. The lion’s share of these projects will take place in Algeria. The effectiveness of exploratory drilling in the country during the 2000s was 47% on average. In other words, every second drilled well produces gas – this is a very good indicator. In accordance with existing contracts, thousands more exploratory wells are to be drilled and at least 6 trillion cubic meters of natural gas could be discovered in Algeria.

Licensing rules, which were introduced in 2005 on the initiatives of Algerian Minister for Energy and Mining S. Khalil, improved significantly the investment environment in the country and attracted a large number of foreign companies. With the easing of the political situation in Lebanon and around it, the interest in the oil and gas complex of the country has increased. The Libyan company NOC estimates the volume of necessary investments at $20 billion, of which $6 billion will be invested in exploration for oil and gas and another $6 billion – in the implementation of various gas projects. Half of the total amount of investments will come, as expected, from foreign companies. Despite delays with the modernisation of oil and gas legislation, investment conditions in Libya are sufficiently attractive, as evidenced in the 2000s by the results of competitive tenders for contracts for production sharing, in which over 200 companies took part.

Of particular interest to Western investors is also Egypt’s gas sector. The effectiveness of exploratory drilling for gas in recent years has been close to 80% on average. According to the company BG, this figure reaches a fantastic 100% on its licensed lots. These results give reason to expect major new discoveries. The government seeks to broaden the scope of exploration through new licensing tenders.

Successes of exploration and major export projects in the North African countries, among other things, open up new corporate opportunities: electric utilities companies take leading roles in gas business in North Africa. Since most of North Africa’s gas will be used to generate electricity, electric companies are trying to control the “well-to-bulb” process, gradually replacing the largest oil and gas TNCs in their traditional sphere: exploration, development and transportation of hydrocarbons. In particular, in Algeria, the leading Italian electric utility Edison joined one of pipeline projects, while in Egypt two of the four LNG projects involve electric companies: the aforementioned Edison and the Spanish company Union Fenosa. Edison – a division of Montedison Group – has been doing exploration works in Egypt...
since the mid 1990s. These works led to the discovery of several gas fields. As for the Italy’s Edison, the position of this company in the gas market of the country has so much strengthened in recent years that it now is posing serious competition to ENI. 

However, virtually all projects by gas and electric companies could be revised significantly due to the global economic crisis. These projects are as rule very capital intensive and long-term and hence vulnerable in terms of financing. Crisis processes in the credit and banking system have brought project financing operations almost to a full stop. Besides, in 2009, falling prices for natural gas added to these problems.

The main outcome of these processes is stagnation of the industry. Thus, according to Faisal Al-Suwaidi, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Qatargas, one of the two major Qatari gas companies, the majority of new foreign projects were put on hold for at least two to three years. This fact will inevitably result in a sharp increase in prices in five to six years – in around 2014, when global economic recovery and growth in demand for energy are expected.

However, Qatar could be less affected by the downturn in the gas industry. The country managed to accumulate large currency reserves, which, even amid the global crisis, would enable it to continue its programme of development of production and overseas sales of liquefied natural gas (LNG). During 2009-2012, Qatar planned to more than double its LNG exporting capacity – from 31 to 77 million tons of LNG annually. These ambitious plans are backed by the projections of the relative stability of the U.S. gas market. At the same time, other major gas markets, e.g. the U.K., are saturated.

Unlike Qatar, Algeria did not plan to expand its gas exporting capacity even at the peak of world energy prices. Until 2012, the country decided to limit itself to the commercial strategy of strengthening the position of Sonatrach in the domestic markets of the countries which are importing Algerian gas: France, Italy, Spain and Portugal. Sonatrach in general prefers more long-term and hence vulnerable in terms of financing. Crisis processes in the credit and banking system have brought project financing operations almost to a full stop. Besides, in 2009, falling prices for natural gas added to these problems.

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Thus, some new opportunities have opened up for penetration of Russian gas companies into North African markets. At least until Western energy sector recovers its position in the region. It is true that sooner or later the competition in this region and in this industry will certainly increase. In order
This paper deals with main directions and issues of scientific and technological progress (STP) of the economy of South Africa in the light of the government’s ten-year (2008-2018) plan of transition from an "extraction-based economy to a knowledge-based economy", i.e. from an industrial economy based to a large extent on the exploitation of natural resources to an innovative economy based on scientific progress and high technologies. In South Africa such a transformation is placed among the top national priorities.

The paper will examine the main parameters of the development of scientific and educational potential of South Africa, perspectives for innovative reforms in such cutting-edge areas as biotechnology and nuclear energy, as well as some of the problems associated with establishing and maintaining socio-economic and political environment which would facilitate the aforementioned transformations.

The innovativeness of an economy which advanced to this new level is manifested primarily in an increased ability to transform new knowledge as a product of scientific and educational activities into new products, technological processes and services (by the way, the high share of a service sector product of scientific and educational activities into new products, technological progress (STP) of the economy of South Africa in the light of the global scientific and technological revolution, the next phase of which we are witnessing today.

Innovational priorities or "big challenges" in South Africa include information, bio- and nanotechnology (micro-technologies which aim to control atomic-molecular mechanisms in order to obtain a given structure of materials and substances), medicine and pharmaceuticals, space research, ensuring energy security of the country and a complex of social problems solved on the basis of human development (in addition, there is another direction so far defined only in general terms: "countering global and regional climate changes"). Interdisciplinary convergence of different fields of research is intensifying (bioinformatics, pharmacogenetics, etc.).

It is clear that this is just a shift in focus towards high and science intensive technologies rather than a departure from research and technological support of such "pillars" of the real economy of South Africa as mining and processing of mineral resources, with which the country is so richly endowed.

As the 2002 National Strategy for Research and Development notes, "science and new technologies are critical to the future of South Africa, and the government is aware of its pivotal role in creating a favourable environment for innovation and research, as well as in the formation of human capital necessary for the future knowledge-based economy" [South Africa’s National..., 2002, p. 5].

Global scientific and technical (scientific and technological) potential, or scientific and technical resources of the world economy, is concentrated mainly in a small group of large and developed countries (the USA, leading countries of Western Europe, Japan, Russia; China is catching up with them). These countries carry out entire or almost entire range of research and development (R&D). Smaller developed countries and the so-called key emerging countries (Mexico, India, Brazil, South Africa, the economy of which is on the border between developed and developing countries, etc.) are forced to focus on some of the most important and at the same time manageable directions of scientific and technological progress.

These countries are especially interested in international scientific and technical cooperation. In particular, South Africa actively works together with Brazil and India (the leaders in the Southern Hemisphere) along the lines of South-South cooperation. According to the research-forecast by RAND Corporation, South Africa, together with Brazil and Mexico, belongs to "scientifically developing" countries capable of mastering the majority (9 out of 16) of the most perspective technological systems. (The next African country after South Africa in terms of development of scientific potential –

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* This article was written specially for the Yearbook.
** According to some data, at the beginning of this decade South Africa was a country with a relatively high but declining average level of human development in accordance with the aggregate index that takes into account GDP per capita adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity (13,300 in 2006), as well as education and average life expectancy indices. [Chernetsky, the Global Economy, 2007] The latter one declined sharply in South Africa in the post-apartheid period (from 64 to 43 years) due to the AIDS pandemic.
Egypt – already belongs to the "scientifically lagging" group of countries. India, Russia and China are put by U.S. experts in the group of "scientifically qualified" countries (able to master 12 out of 16 systems). [See: The Global Technology Revolution ... , 2006].

South Africa is also the engine of inter-African scientific and technological cooperation within the framework of NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development), especially in areas such as training of scientific and technical personnel, fighting poverty and infections (HIV, etc.), energy and aerospace research. For example, the African Laser Centre and African Institute of Mathematical Sciences were founded in Cape Town a few years ago and annually conduct, inter alia, summer schools designed primarily for young scientists from neighbouring countries, as well as have begun to establish similar research centres in other countries of the continent.

EU countries are mainly donors and sellers of new technologies to South Africa and use this country with its rich resource base and infrastructure as a testing ground for various kinds of experiments and tests. For example, in recent years the European and Developing Countries Clinical Trials Partnership and International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology, which is headquartered in Italy, have opened their research branches (the only ones in Africa) in South Africa (Cape Town).

South Africa as the country with the most advanced scientific and information infrastructure on the continent hosts many international scientific and practical (those involving senior politicians) conferences. For example, in 2002 the World Summit on Sustainable Development took place in Johannesburg under the auspices of the UN. National programmes for such development were presented. The topics included the threats of global contamination of environment, depletion of non-renewable resources and global warming. At the 2008 International Conference on Biosciences BIO-2008, which was held in South Africa, as well as at the World Nano-Economic Congress and at the 3rd International Conference on Nanosciences and Nanotechnologies, which took place in the country in 2007 and 2009 respectively, achievements of South Africa in these areas were noted.

In the 21st century, the problems of development of scientific and technological capacities, mobilisation of scientific resources acquired, as already noted, even more importance due to the transition to an innovative economy, or an economy based on knowledge (the main resource of the "new" innovative economy) and high technologies. The development of scientific capacity is becoming crucial to economic growth.

Successes of South African science, known for its achievements in such diverse areas as the first human heart transplant operation, production of liquid fuels from coal and even creation of atomic bombs (which were dismantled before the self-liquidation of the apartheid regime in 1994), are facilitated by a significant economic potential and, as already noted, advanced scientific and information infrastructure. Four South African scientists became Nobel Prize winners and scores of them won other prestigious international awards (though many of these scientists later emigrated). In general, indicators of economic and technological development of South Africa (which completed its industrialisation in the 1960s and 1970s) are unparalleled in Africa and are near those of newly industrialised countries and sometimes even surpass them in terms of quality parameters. For example, these are some figures to characterise the information infrastructure of South Africa: in the beginning of 2010, there were 40 million mobile phones in the country of 48 million (i.e., virtually all the adult population owned them), 5.3 million PCs and approximately 10 million Internet users, taking into account the mobile Internet [www.link.wits.ac.za; www.sagoodnews.co.za].

In Africa, South Africa is becoming the largest exporter of information technology (for instance, one of the leading South African mobile companies MTN has conquered half of the extensive cellular phones market in Nigeria).

However, the existing "bottlenecks" – the legacy of internal colonialism, the long-lasting co-existence of a highly developed metropolis and a backward colony within one country – hinder the implementation of ambitious plans for innovational development. As noted by L.A. Demkina, a Russian Africanist, "unpreparedness of the vast majority of the African part of South African society to the full-fledged participation and integration into modern society (economy, politics, social sphere), which is a result of all previous colonial and racist system leads, causes ... a phenomenon which could be described as "slipping" into the state of a developing country. This is reflected in the growth of the so-called informal sector of the economy, rising unemployment and criminalisation of social life accompanying it" [Demkina ..., 2006, p.140].

Recently, however, there have appeared some reasons to believe that in the current decade this trend of "backsersliding" had been stopped. In the context of sustained economic growth, unemployment and crime indicators have declined slightly. The state doesn’t spare means, is completing an "educational programme" (by the middle of this decade, the adult literacy rate exceeded 86%) and moulds an educated and skilled African elite. Nevertheless, the noted negative effects are long-term, and large pockets of poverty, unemployment and crime remain a destabilising factor of South African society. Recent statistics show a continuation of "backsersliding".

The ten-year plan for developing of science and its material and human resource base for 2008-2018 titled "Innovation towards a knowledge-based economy" provides for raising the contribution of scientific and technological progress in economic growth from 10 to 30% and increasing the share of
high technology industries in the country's exports from 30 to 55% [Innovation Towards a Knowledge-based Economy, 2006]. National innovation and space agencies are being created to facilitate the implementation of these plans. They will complement the existing structure of state support for science and scientific councils. One of them – the largest research centre on the continent – is the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR); seven others are engaged in agricultural, medical, humanitarian and other studies.

Scientific, industrial and financial components of the plan which is aimed at accelerating innovational development of the country seem impressive. However, it is still questionable whether South Africa, relying on its economic potential and rich mineral and biological resources, can make a breakthrough in the development of knowledge-intensive industries, including such areas as information technology (a high efficiency computer centre has recently been opened to facilitate R&D in this area given the multiplying complexity of computing, modelling, etc.), bio- and nanotechnology, pharmaceuticals, nuclear, "clean" coal and hydrogen power, and space exploration. For instance, the most ambitious nuclear programme (PBMR reactor) has already failed.

The above-mentioned ten-year plan is aimed at stimulating innovations and R&D in the most promising fields, facilitating their development and directing commercialisation of knowledge in the "right" social mainstream. The current ranking of South Africa (between Brazil and China) according to Knowledge Economy Index (see table) indicates certain prospects for further innovation.

### Knowledge Economy Index*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Rank among 27 countries</th>
<th>Aggregate index</th>
<th>Innovative-ness</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Information Infrastructure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8.81</td>
<td>9.91</td>
<td>8.28</td>
<td>9.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.41</td>
<td>9.78</td>
<td>8.09</td>
<td>8.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.44</td>
<td>7.44</td>
<td>6.78</td>
<td>8.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.26</td>
<td>8.88</td>
<td>7.88</td>
<td>4.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5.77</td>
<td>7.37</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>5.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5.82</td>
<td>8.08</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>5.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5.21</td>
<td>6.54</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>5.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China**</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4.95*</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>4.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India**</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3.97*</td>
<td>8.59</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>2.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>5.31</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>1.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Calculated by the World Bank on a ten-point scale based on approximately two hundred indicators characterising the transition to a "knowledge economy".

**Indices of China and India appear to be somewhat understated due to the use of per capita parameters. It is important to note the innovativeness indices of these countries, which reflect the respective potentials of R&D in these countries.

Source: [The Global Technology Revolution …. 2006, pp. 236-237]

The table shows a huge gap between the innovative leaders and outsiders (the aggregate index of approximately 9 in the U.S. and Japan against approximately 1 in Cameroon) and rather good – above average – indicators for Russia (mainly owing to "old reserves"), Brazil and South Africa.

Investments in science and education and funding for innovation processes, in particular the share of R&D expenditures in GDP, are among the most important parameters that characterise scientific resources of a country and knowledge intensity of an economy. Although there is no direct correlation between levels of development of science and of an economy as a whole and the share of R&D expenditures in GDP, yet in developed countries this correlation is typically much higher than in developing countries.

Appropriations for R&D in South Africa could in the coming years exceed 1% of GDP (0.95% in 2006/2007, 0.93% in 2007/2008, 0.92% in 2008/2009), which will come close to the level attained under apartheid (1.1% of GDP in 1991), when science was seen as one of the strategic factors of the regime’s survival [National Survey of Research ... , 2009]. According to this "science intensity" indicator, South Africa's GDP is nearing modern Russia's GDP (1.28% of GDP), where the situation in science is still far from problem-free (for comparison: in 1990 the Soviet Union spent 3.5% of GDP on science). By 2018, these expenditures in South Africa were scheduled to reach 2% of GDP, i.e. the level of advanced countries (OECD average is 2.3%: from 0.62 in Greece to 2.68 in the U.S. and 3.98% in Sweden) [Innovation Towards ... , 2006, p. 9]. Yet, the failure to attain even the modest 1% in 2009 left little room for optimism. Because of lagging behind in the area of human resources, South Africa spends much more on education (see below).

These are some basic indicators of the development of R&D sphere in the current decade:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D development expenditure (billion rand)</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same as % of GDP</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of people employed in R&amp;D (thousands)</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same in terms of full-time employment</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Including scientists</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of women among scientists</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [South African Survey’s of Research..., 2002/03-2007/08]

In 2003-2007, the total R&D spending was growing at a faster rate (12-13% annually in real terms), but in recent years we have seen a certain decline in real terms. The number of scientists and the share of women among them were also growing, though much slower. The share of black researchers, which receive all-round support, is increasing (from 5% in 1993 to 28% in 2001) [Kahn ..., 2006, p. 11]. However, representatives of the white population so far dominate science quantitatively and, especially, qualitatively due to their scientific and general culture, which cannot be gained just over one generation (they account for about two-thirds of scientists and ninetenths of scientific publications).

The number of scientific publications and patenting activity give some idea of the effectiveness of R&D in South Africa. The number of scientific articles published in the country per year is approximately 7,000 (200,000 in the U.S., 20,000 in China and 16,000 in Russia in 2001), which in 2006 constituted 0.5% of the total number of articles published or the 28-th place in the world. This is not a bad indicator for a country with a relatively small population (48 million, of which 79% are Africans, 9.6 – white, 8.9 – coloured and 2.5 – Indians) and a small contingent of scientists. The number of national patent applications (which were approved) was 4,700 in 2002, (24,100 in Russia, 80,600 in Germany, and 198,300 in the United States); by 2018, this amount could reach (according to the innovation plan) 24,000, i.e. equal the current figure for Russia [Innovation Towards ..., 2006, p.9, 29, 31]. Given the current stagnation in the R&D field, this goal seems unrealistic.

International recognition of South African patents is increasing slowly. For comparison: over the two decades prior to 2004, the number of Indian patents registered every year in the U.S. rose from 10 to 341 (in 2003, China obtained 424 U.S. patents, Russia – 203, Mexico and Argentina – 92 and 70 respectively), while that of South African patents from 96 to just 131 (however, in accordance with the ten-year plan for innovational development of South Africa, this figure could reach 250 by 2018). Nonetheless, these were the only African patents [www.southafrica.info -18.11.2005; Human resources ..., 2008, pp. 146, 147]. Thus, compared with countries similar to South Africa in terms of development, territory and per capita income (Mexico, Argentina) and even Russia, South Africa’s indicators of internationally recognised productivity of the very small group of scientists, engineers inventors do not look too bad.

In total in 2007/08, as shown above, approximately 40 thousand scientists, engineers and supporting staff were employed in South Africa’s R&D, including 31 thousand which were fully-employed. Of these, 19 thousand (15 thousand excluding post-graduate students) were actual scientists, which indicates the ratio of 24 scientists per ten thousand of workers. This is slightly higher than in China, but much lower than in developed countries and Russia [South African Survey of research ..., 2007/2008].

According to 2005 data, 1200 doctoral dissertations were defended each year, of which less than half (561) belonged to the most valuable scientific, engineering and technology category (SET), confirming the necessary qualifications to work as researchers (we can also include 2.9 thousand masters of arts in the same category). By 2018, these figures are planned to grow five-fold (6 thousand theses per year, half of which would belong to SET), for which reason, particularly in universities and university research institutions, 450 new scientific departments would be created (i.e. their number will grow from 60 in 2006 to 500) [Innovation Towards ..., 2006, p. 29, 31]. Recent developments do not support this optimistic prognosis.

The system of higher education and training of qualified personnel is a key part of forming the human aspect of scientific and technical potential, which includes not only educational and qualification level, but also mentality, culture and traditions (A.V. Lunacharsky, the first Soviet minister of culture, is said to have made the following statement: "A real intellectual has three degrees – own, father’s and grandfather’s"). In general, South Africa spends a lot on education: about 20% of budget expenditures, or 5.7% of GDP, in the middle of this decade (4.0% in Brazil and 3.1% in Russia), and these expenditures rise by 8-9% each year, outstripping the growth of GDP [South African Survey of Research ..., 2005/2006]. On the other hand, most of these funds are funnelled to eliminate pockets of illiteracy (about 13% of population is illiterate, almost exclusively Africans, and other few millions are functionally illiterate) and to introduce universal compulsory secondary education.
Intellectual, cultural, social and technological progress has traditionally relied on universities with their atmosphere and traditions of reasonable intellectual freedom (there were 21 universities, including five leading institutions) and complementary technical institutes, or Technikons (15), where the research component was significantly weaker (comparable to technical schools in our country). The oldest (founded in 1829) and still one of the leading universities is the University of Cape Town, in the clinic of which, Groote Schuur, the world’s first heart transplants were carried out in 1967-1968. A few years ago, a reform was implemented, which increased the potential of university science. The two types of institutions were consolidated into large blocks, so it became 23 universities instead of 36, 11 of which remained, as before, “universal” universities with the most versatile training (traditionally the best universities are among them: those of Pretoria, Stellenbosch, Witwatersrand, Johannesburg (based on former Rand Afrikaans), and Cape Town, to which you can now add the University of KwaZulu-Natal) and with strong research bases. These universities and strong and were little affected by the unification process of 2004-2005. Each of these universities has over 100 “high-class” scientists certified by the National Research Foundation and between 500 and 1,000 scientific publications with high international ranking. Combined these universities concentrated 50 to 60% of university science potential in terms of the number of researchers, expenditures, number of scientific publications, etc. [www.hsrcpress.ac.za].

Most attention of “uniters”, supported by appropriate grants, was paid to relatively weak universities, previously designated for Africans (including those located in former Bantustans – currently dissolved state entities on the territories of former African reservations). These were strengthened with small neighbouring “white” universities and Technikons, which were catching up with university standards. The integration with Technikons led to the establishment of 6 technical universities and 6 mixed type universities, which also attach great importance to the development of science (in 2007, the state allocated 7 billion rand, or more than $1 billion, for the modernisation of universities) [Mail & Guardian 15.05.2007].

After overcoming some institutional confusion, such integration may produce scientific and pedagogical results.

By 2018 it is planned to increase the number of graduates for science and high technology sectors of the economy fivefold by expanding primarily training of black students, which will be and already are stimulated by special grants (in 1993, there were only 11% of blacks among graduates of engineering faculties, while in 2004 – over 40%) [Business Day, 28.05.2007].

During the first 12 years of post-apartheid development (1993-2005), there were significant racial and ethnic shifts in the composition of rapidly growing student body. The total number of students in South Africa has doubled, reaching 735 thousand, while the share of whites has fallen from 47 to 25% and Africans’ share has increased from 40 to 61% (the share of Indians and other coloured residents has changed very little: from 13 to 14%). However, the greater proportion of Africans (over half) compared to other racial and ethnic groups (one fourth in case of whites) gets eliminated in the course of study (even though 110 thousand African students received a special state aid for “poor students” in 2005). In 2005, among 120 thousand graduates, there were 66.6 thousand Africans and 38.2 thousand – or one-third – of whites (in case of doctoral degrees, it was Africans who constituted a third). At the same time, only Indians have actually neared whites in terms of education. In the middle of this decade, 61% of white school graduates enrolled in universities, 51% of Indians, 13% of other coloured residents, and only 12% of Africans. 7% of South African students are foreigners – mainly from other African countries, but some are from Europe. Whites still predominate among 36 thousand of lecturers in universities (63% in 2005) [Mail & Guardian 15.05.2007].

The ongoing africanisation of staff is objectively inevitable in modern conditions of the country and has its positive aspects. However, we should note a certain reduction of teaching and professional standards, starting with schools, and also the fact that new college graduates and holders of master’s and doctoral degrees basically just compensate for the losses from emigration. In 1994-2001, 17 thousand, or about half the scientists, technicians and engineers employed in R&D left the country. Since 1994, about a million of South Africans, primarily whites, emigrated, with a few exceptions, to England, the USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand [Problems of development of South Africa ..., 2007, pp. 18, 19].

Being unable to stop this process under conditions of a real democracy, the government sometimes resorts to extraordinary measures. For instance, in order to replace quickly emigrating doctors who do not wish to expand their practice in “black” suburbs which are infested with AIDS and criminal elements, the government successfully hired a group of skilled Cuban doctors, who, however, lacked the knowledge of English language.

* During the period of white minority rule, it was only possible to enroll in a university with a Senior Certificate with endorsement, which confirmed the passing of a full course in a number of subjects such as mathematics and physics, as well as passing examinations in these subjects successfully (Senior Certificate). In 2004, of 40 thousand students taking a math exam, which gives the right to enroll in scientific and technical faculties, half were Africans. On average, 61% of applicants passed the exam, but the figure was only 36% for Africans (at the same time, it indicates a great progress compared with less than 12% in 1999... or maybe lower standards?) [Kahn ..., 2006, p. 144].
Private business, strong and developed, both local and affiliated with leading transnational corporations (the latter accounted for 22% of R&D expenditures of South African businesses in 2006), is increasingly engaged in research and development of new technologies [www.hsrcpress.ac.za]. It is encouraged by generous tax breaks. In total, 52% of companies operating in South Africa invested in R&D in 2004 (a high proportion even by European standards) as compared with 44% in 2000 (the top 20 companies accounted for two thirds of R&D expenditures, while small and medium business accounted for 25%, which is also comparable with the EU’s indicators) [South Africa innovation Survey 2005, p. 20].

In 2005/2006, the private sector financed 44% of R&D expenditures and drew 58% of the total amount, while the state – 38% and 21% respectively (until the end of the 1970s the figures had amounted to more than 50% on each account), universities drew another 20% [National Survey of research ..., 2005/2006, pp. 7, 8]. Just like developed countries, though perhaps not as fast and successful, South Africa is undergoing innovative transformation of the private sector: the restructuring of R&D in corporations, a gradual transition from a closed model of development to an open one. The closed model of research based on the use of internal resources of companies (20% of businesses’ expenditures on R&D in 2004) is increasingly combined with the open model, which is oriented towards outsourcing – employing external sources of innovation-based growth (7.8% of R&D expenditures in the same year. The rest of expenditures falls in other categories, such as cooperation between an affiliate and its parent company) [South African innovation Survey 2005, p. 8], which greatly extends the opportunities for applying new knowledge by engaging other firms, independent research centres, university researchers, and others as R&D partners. On the other hand, it is often cheaper to import rather than to develop own knowledge.

Until recent years, the state’s role in funding science and defining national priorities in this area had been increasing again. Individual corporations and financial and industrial groups are not capable of carrying out an innovative revolution in production which is associated with the creation and application of newest post-industrial technologies, even if we leave aside vital fundamental research (about 20% of R&D expenditures), which does not give direct commercial returns. The newest experience in advanced developing and developed countries shattered liberal illusions about denationalisation and demonstrated convincingly that sustainable development, both socio-economic and scientific and technical, is impossible without an effective state. Strengthening the influence of a state on the course of innovatisation of an economy gives the desired effect given an optimal combination of control measures and incentives and market mechanisms, as well as given a working partnership between governmental, private businesses’ and universi-}

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plants, which suppresses hunger and is known on the pharmaceutical market, which it entered in 2003 after years of testing, as P57. The drug is patented, for example, in the U.S. and the UK, where it will be produced under license, with a portion of license fees and profits from sales (6-8%) being directed at solving social problems of the San people [Nature Biotechnology December 2004 Supplement, p. DC38]. There are many similar examples.

In 2005, the two aforementioned leading universities (of Pretoria and Stellenbosch) created the African Centre for Gene Technologies. Cells that produce substances with desired properties are grown (molecular and cellular engineering) and biosensors for the diagnostics and monitoring of environment are produced. Despite concerns about consequences, the development and introduction of agricultural crops with genetically modified properties (resistant to drought and disease, with improved nutritional properties) continues. The share of area under crops of genetically modified seeds of the largest crop cultures is constantly growing: in the middle of the decade, these crops accounted for 29% of white and 31% of yellow (fodder) corn grown in South Africa, as well as 59% of soybeans and 90% of cotton [T. Cloete ..., 2006, p. 9].

Diagnosticums for diseases and vaccines for livestock and poultry are being created (a number of such vaccines has been created in recent years in the Onderstepoort Veterinary Institute in partnership with the University of Pretoria, and for the first time on the continent a genome – the genome of the pathogenic bacterium Echlichia ruminantium has been deciphered); special bacteria are used to clean up industrial production and environment (the technology for treatment of sewage waters of mining industry was developed at the Rhodes University); precious metals are extracted from dumps of rock (using BACOX technology, which was developed by scientists from the South African Council for Mineral Technology (MINTEK) and which is now used also in Australia and China; the bacterial cocktail extracts gold from gold-bearing rocks) [T. Cloete ..., 2006], etc.

The following table gives some idea of the dynamics and structure of R&D expenditures in the field of biotechnologies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research area</th>
<th>Private business</th>
<th>Universities</th>
<th>Public sector*</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Biochemistry</td>
<td>3,2 4,7</td>
<td>16,5 12,2</td>
<td>3,0 12,7</td>
<td>22,7 30,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genetics and Molecular</td>
<td>5,4 8,1</td>
<td>13,2 14,8</td>
<td>12,5 25,3</td>
<td>31,1 48,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26,2 47,0</td>
<td>65,4 78,7</td>
<td>84,7 33,5</td>
<td>177,5 259,9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Primarily the Councils for Agricultural and Medical Research


Attention should be paid to an almost fivefold increase in spending on research in the field of genetic engineering. With regard to agrobiology, the powerful Council for Agricultural Research (second in budget only to CSIR), which has more than 2.5 thousand staff employed in R&D and dozens of laboratories and experimental farms across the country, "sets the tone". Considering an overall high rate of the development of biotechnology research in the public sector and by private companies, some lag in the university sector, which is undergoing administrative restructuring, should be noted.

It should also be noted that all South African Nobel Prize winners were awarded for discoveries in the fields of medicine and biotechnology and related technologies during the last fifty years: Sydney Brenner in 2002 (work on controlled cell death during organ growth), Aaron Klug in 1982 (studies in macromolecular biology), Alan McCormack in 1979 (inventing CAT scan: computer tomography) and Max Theiler in 1951 (work on yellow fever).

Amongst a series of development programmes and projects that have been introduced and carried on successfully since the initiation of the scientific and technical modernisation in South Africa, we should highlight its nuclear programme, which is studied in detail in a monograph by Russian researcher A. Pritvorov. The monograph deals with the implementation of development projects in Southern Africa. According to Pritvorov, scientific literature pays little attention to Southern Africa because of the specificity of the nuclear theme; South Africa as a nuclear power is little known to a wide range of social scientists, or the country, unfortunately, is not considered worth mentioning when discussing modern problems in energy development [Pritvorov ... 2007, p. 68].

Meanwhile South Africa's nuclear project is a good example for Africa and the world community in terms of peaceful uses of atomic energy and is
very promising for the development of cooperation between countries of Southern Africa and Russia and other countries, including members of the CIS. This became especially obvious due to the looming global energy crisis. It is noteworthy that almost the only scientific and practical result of the IV session of the joint Russia-South Africa intergovernmental commission on trade, economic, scientific and technological cooperation, which was held on 17-19 November 2004 in Pretoria (the author participated in the session as an employee of the Ministry of Natural Resources of Russia), was an agreement to conduct joint research on nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In accordance with the agreement, Russia will supply enriched uranium for South Africa’s nuclear power plant in Koeberg under a contract signed between the Russian foreign trade association Tekhnobsexport and the South African company ESKOM. Our country will also cooperate with South African scientists in the field of theoretical physics and nuclear physics, and South Africa will become a member of the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (an international intergovernmental scientific research organisation) in order to facilitate such cooperation [AfRo, 2004, Issue 6, p. 29].

South Africa plans to increase the share of nuclear power plants in energy production from 6 to 20% by 2020. These plants will mostly be 3rd generation pressurised water reactors, which are widely used in the world, just like the 1800 MW nuclear power plant operating in Koeberg, but they were expected to be supplemented (to cover peak loads and meet the needs of the hydrogen energy industry) with a new type of reactors, PMBR, which will be discussed below [Innovation Towards..., 2006, pp. 20-21].

At the same time, it must be noted that South Africa suddenly found itself in an energy crisis, caused by blatant blunders in the estimation of the necessary generation capacity in the country undergoing significant economic growth (the national grid of the country will need 60 to 90 thousand MW of electricity instead of the projected earlier 55 thousand MW by the end of the next decade) [Innovation Towards..., 2006, p. 18] and by construction delays caused by the lobbying of environmental organisations (two of them, "Koeberg Alert" and "Earthlife Africa", even went to court to stop the development of nuclear energy in the country).

The transition to the development and practical application of nuclear power plants gave strong impetus to the development of advanced technologies in South Africa and to the improvement of quality and safety standards. Approximately 100 local companies supply equipment for the nuclear power plant in Koeberg. In addition, South African scientists have made significant progress in developing the fourth generation reactors with heat-emitting pebbles (Pebble Bed Modular Reactor, PBMR, is a modular pebble bed reactor, which is also high-temperature and helium-cooled). An experimental reactor of this type was to be built in Koeberg (another one has already been built in China in cooperation with South African scientists). Starting with 2016, South Africa plans to begin commercial production of PMBRs – small ones (average capacity of 170 MW vs. 1000 MW of a standard pressurised water reactor), but highly efficient and producing little waste, easy to operate and very safe [Innovation Towards..., 2006, p. 18].

Safety, portability and ease of use could allow South Africa to export the reactors of this type in the future not only to developed countries but also to developing ones that do not possess the knowledge of exploitation of nuclear reactors. PMBR Pty Company, which was to produce the reactor, was a high-tech South African company with a strong of R&D base and 50 PhDs in its staff. It planned in the future to build 30 such reactors in South Africa and export another 75 [www.southafrica.info/ess_info/saglance/scitech/pmbr].

The U.S., where experts predicted a modular revolution in nuclear energy with production of modular nuclear mini-reactors, has in recent years demonstrated considerable interest in this highly efficient and environmentally friendly South African nuclear technology. However, the ambitious and costly (9 billion rands during 10 years) programme for the development of modular reactors after some initial progress encountered serious problems and was suspended in 2010. Practically all of its research and engineering staff emigrated to the USA, Canada, and Australia.

In addition to nuclear energy, the innovative development of the industry was expected to focus on the development of clean technologies for the extraction and processing of coal (for example, an underground coal gasification plant was to be constructed in Majuba), biofuels and the so-called hydrogen energy, in which many environmentalists see salvation from the looming global warming. Currently, much attention in many developed countries is being paid to clean hydrogen, or, as it is also called, hydrogenous energy. Much money is being invested in R&D, but the process of developing new technologies in this area has just begun. South Africa plans to obtain hydrogen from water and biomass using nuclear (high-temperature PMBRs – a German technology which South Africa perfected – are best suited for splitting the molecules of water vapour) and solar energy and to use it extensively, particularly in car engines. Due to the continuing growth in world oil prices, the production of synthetic fuels (liquid and gaseous, the latter possibly being the cheapest material to produce hydrogen) from coal, which is carried out in South Africa by SASOL corporation, became profitable.

In accordance with the ten-year plan of innovation development of the country, it was planned to conquer by 2018 up to a quarter of the world market of hydrogen energy and fuel cells with platinum catalysts (South Africa possesses 87% of the world reserves of platinum and already provides most of platinum catalysts, which are used to filter exhaust gases, for the global automotive industry) [Innovation Towards..., 2006, pp. 20-22]. New techno-
logical challenges are related to the problems of development of automobile engines running on hydrogen cells and to the very process of transferring the transport sector to the use of hydrogen. As other ambitious projects, this one should be treated with caution.

In accordance with the plan to accelerate innovational development of economy, government spending on venture capital funds (stimulating the creation of innovative companies), technology parks and business incubators increased manifold; scientific and experimental base of universities and professional training programmes, including training an increasing number of representatives of the black population (although so far their qualification leaves much to be desired), are being expanded. A significant share of research, both – most importantly – fundamental and applied, is carried out by higher education institutions (in 2004/2005, the figure was 21%, which equals the share of the public sector) [http://www.studysa.co.za].

Also, as already noted, the country spends no less than 20% of the budget on education, and these expenditures increase by 8-9% every year, surpassing GDP growth. Substantial funds are planned to be invested, or are already being invested in the development of bio- and nanotechnologies, aerospace research, energy, and in combating epidemics (primarily the AIDS epidemic, which poses the greatest threat to the nation). It is expected that South Africa will build and launch its own satellites* (Sunspace and Information Systems company, which is based at the University of Stellenbosch and at the CSIR’s satellite communication station, built a mini-satellite, SumbandilaSat, worth 26 million rand, weighing 80 kg and five feet in length , which was designed to travel at the altitude of 500 km and be used primarily for nature and climate monitoring; in 2007, the satellite should have been launched from a Russian submarine near Murmansk, but the launch was unfortunately cancelled by the Russian side. Finally the satellite was launched in 2009 from

* During the apartheid era, South Africa already had a secret missile and space programme, the aim of which was to create missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons and mini-satellites for intelligence purposes: the peak of its development was in the 1980s, when missiles developed with the help of Israel were tested on military test ranges (the Overberg rocket launch site) west of Cape Town (several modifications of RSA-3, which were based on the Israeli Jericho missile and Shavit launch vehicle). Over 50 companies employing up to 1500 people were involved in the programme. The programme has been a busy, up to 1.5 thousand people and over 50 companies. By 1994 the programme was cancelled, and the fate of produced equipment is unknown [www.astronautix.com/ive/rsa3.htm]. The first South African research micro satellite SUNSAT-1, which was built by scientists from the University of Stellenbosch, was launched by American NASA in 1999. The camera design has, in fact, been so successful that Korea bought the technology to use it on board of their KITSAT-3 satellite [www.cellular.co.za/sunsat.htm].
(especially gold and platinum, which are widely used in advanced technologies) retains its importance.

As noted in a book recently published of Russian researchers G.V. Shubin and I.I. Maidanov and dedicated to the development of military-industrial complex of South Africa, this country "could become an important producer of most advanced high-tech military equipment, manufactured under license or with the support of Western companies" [G.V. Shubin..., 2008, p. 156] (as had already been the case at the time of apartheid and under different conditions, – Yu.S.). The discussed high-tech military equipment and armaments include helicopters, fighters, attack aircraft, tanks, armoured personnel carriers, missiles and associated electronics and optics.

The restoration and development of a new technological basis for scientific potential of the country was well financed until recent cuts, and the necessary facilities are really being built and equipped. At the same time, combined efforts of the state, academic and business communities do not yield significant, breakthrough results because of the limited human resource base of South African science, lack of a critical mass of highly skilled specialists, ongoing emigration and aging of the remaining scientific and engineering personnel (in 1990, in South Africa 18.2% of authors of scientific publications were older than 50 years, while in the last decade – more than a half) [www.info.gov.za/speeches/ – 10.10.2006]. Suffice it to say that by 2018 the number of researchers (in terms of full employment) will reach, as predicted, only 25 thousand people, which will only by a quarter exceed the present figure, which is clearly not enough to implement the aforementioned ambitious plans [Innovation Towards..., 2006, p.9]. The figures of recent years indicate an at least partial implementation of this plan, but experts note the lowering of academic standards in training for the sake of an increase in its quantitative parameters. The mechanisms responsible for the transferring of the economy to an innovative model of development are criticised for not being sufficiently thought through.

Not much better is the situation with the influx of highly qualified specialists, of who there is deficit in the economy. In 2004, of more than 100 thousand university graduates, only 20 thousand (half of them white, another half – black) were graduates of engineering, law and business (management) faculties [Business Day. 5/28/2007], which are so necessary for innovational activities. However, specialists continue to emigrate, mainly due to growing insecurity of life in South Africa.

Thus, the human resources factor remains the weakest link in the implementation of innovational strategies. Mobilisation of this factor has become a priority.

A successful build-up of scientific and technological capacities, particularly in human resources, in line with the ten-year plan depends also on the climate of political stability in the country and significant reduction in crime rate, which is currently one of the highest in the world. At the moment, political stability is in question because of the recent split in the leadership of the ruling African National Congress, which had been caused by the election of Jacob Zuma (a "dissident", who had previously been ousted from his position of vice-president, and a populist) as its president, which then allowed him to become a president of South Africa in 2009.

It should be noted that Zuma, a charismatic orator, is much more popular among African population than the former president, Thabo Mbeki, who had a reputation of a pro-Western liberal. During the presidency of the latter (1999 – 2008), class boundaries ceased to coincide with racial boundaries. The programme for "Black Economic Empowerment" – giving blacks more economic power – was implemented: the gradual (an example of the economic disaster in neighbouring Zimbabwe so far has kept South Africa from enforcing this policy) transfer of shares, land and leadership positions to representatives of black population. There appeared a lot of black millionaires, "the children of the revolution of 1994", who were reminiscent in their character and habits of the "new Russians" in crimson jackets and with gold chains. They are in fact still closer to racketeers than to the actual members of the production and management process. A ten percent stratum of rich Africans has formed, and the black middle class is emerging. At the same time, however, a systemic solution to the problem of mass poverty, complex transformation of the entire social sphere, which is a prerequisite for successful development of the country (there is no set minimum wage or pension and no accessible general health insurance, which Zuma only promises to introduce in the coming years, etc.), are substituted by a mass (as long as there is enough money) distribution of social grants and sops, to which now about a third of black South Africans are "addicted". As for crime, at the beginning of this decade South Africa held the unenviable first place in the world in terms of the number of deaths caused by firearms per capita. The appropriate treatment of HIV-infected and AIDS patients was greatly delayed (government has long considered AIDS a product of poverty and hindered the purchase of essential drugs, including those that allow the majority of HIV-infected women – and a third of South African women of reproductive age is infected – to have healthy children). Currently almost half a million people die from AIDS each year, and the economy suffers big losses.

However, the preservation and build-up of human capital are aided by the continuing stability of democratic political institutions (the "post-apartheid" elections of 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009 were successful), of civil society (however, we can consider the preponderance of environmentalists from the most influential non-governmental organisations, who inhibit the development of the country’s energy sector, to be one of the costs of democracy and
civil society), as well as the climate of national reconciliation. We should also add respect for civil liberties, relatively transparent and not too corrupt – by African standards – bureaucracy, as well as real independence of the judiciary branch. Unfortunately, the corruption rate tends to increase rather than to decline. We could also again mention a fairly high level of economic development, education and culture.

In general, we can ascertain that South Africa has the means and practical capacity to meet (unlike the vast majority of other countries in the continent), albeit with some delay, its obligations to improve socio-economic and scientific and educational infrastructure. The economic recovery of the last decade, as well as the preparations and holding of the World Cup (2010) in South Africa, which was accompanied by large-scale investments in infrastructure (the construction of a high-speed rail is among the high-tech projects carried out), some increase in employment in infrastructure projects, suggests that in the coming years there will still be reasonable resources to increase knowledge-intensity of the economy and, last but not least, to mitigate social tensions in the country. Further prospects, including the innovational development of the economy, are less obvious due to the aforementioned negative factors. Success of the innovational strategy depends largely on the availability of forward-thinking, dynamic, highly intellectual and moral political leadership. At present this is definitely not the case in South Africa.

In any case, South Africa has already embarked on a post-industrial, innovational path of development. The coming decade will show how stable and successful will it be (also in terms of social consequences: overcoming great inequality, crime, restricting the HIV infection, etc.). Much of course depends not only on internal factors but also on the situation on the global market (the transition from a resource-based economy to a knowledge economy, increasingly virtual and Internet-dependent, poses considerable risks: the colossal scale and turnover of the global financial market, which is increasingly independent from the real economy, and enormous speculative capital, which is wandering freely around the world, may collapse any open-market economy), global geopolitical situation in light of the financial and economic crisis, not to mention insidious natural cataclysms... At the same time, new technologies such as biotechnology and nanotechnology shape new kinds of production and open new horizons for solving development problems.

Other countries of the "global South", especially from the African continent, most of which do not possess even a fraction of South Africa's natural, financial, economic, scientific and intellectual resources, look with hope at South Africa's transition towards an innovative economy ("If even South Africa fails, who could succeed?"). Their future also depends on whether South Africa succeeds or fails on this path of development.

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**FOREIGN CAPITAL IN AFRICA**

The Factor on which Successful "Incorporation" of Economies of the Continent into the Global Economy Depends

The perspectives for capital accumulation and economic growth in the majority of African countries are impeded by the current condition of their productive forces. Mobilisation of foreign exchange, technological and intellectual resources as well as managerial expertise from abroad on a large scale helps these countries to mitigate to certain extent the chronic shortage of investment and imbalances in production and consumption and to smooth over the acuteness of social disparities by improving the situation of their populations in terms of food and employment.

Foreign private capital is one of the key factors which facilitate the inclusion of the continent’s traditional economy in global processes and dynamic modernisation of economy and society. Therefore, African countries are actively competing with countries from other regions of the world in order to obtain foreign investments and are seeking to create a favourable investment climate that would foster incentives for productive investment both by national and foreign investors.

According to World Bank (WB) experts, improving investment climate in developing countries, where 1.2 billion people live on incomes of less than $1 a day, high population growth rates prevail and youth unemployment is twice the average world level, is the main task for their governments. Creating jobs and other opportunities for young people is vital for the successful functioning and development of many African states.

Africans, of course, cherish no illusions that existing problems could be resolved amidst the global financial crisis and recession in the global economy. A reduction in global demand for raw materials and a substantial reduction in export earnings of many countries of the continent may become one of the most serious consequences of this crisis. This would lead to a decrease in national incomes, reduce the inflow of foreign investment, increase debt, and thus adversely affect the level of employment and living standards.

Attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) in order to obtain additional financial resources, technology, and managerial expertise may open up a path for the countries of the continent towards more rapid implementation of structural reforms in economy and creation of competitive industries. Imported capital helps to realise investment opportunities and also creates additional demand for skilled workers, office workers and managers, since foreign investors often assume an obligation to teach and train local staff.

Thus, transnational corporations (TNCs) and foreign companies contribute to the development of the economic potential of host countries by drawing additional material and labour resources into economy. Moreover, in contrast to national capital investments, foreign investments are, as a rule, fully backed in terms of foreign exchange, logistical and organisational aspects.

**Benefits of FDI**

The foreign investments sector can saturate a host economy with new, highly demanded products, stimulate the creation of hi-tech industries (such as the production of computers, electronic components, communication equipment, etc.), promote competition, and introduce and improve free market managerial practices. Attracting FDI in manufacturing which focuses on exports leads to an increase in export earnings of recipient countries. At the same time, foreign companies – exporters – often cooperate with local producers, providing them with access to the global market. As for the TNCs, they undoubtedly profit from producing many kinds of finished products in developing countries which possess a qualified working force and developed physical and financial infrastructure due to the availability of relatively cheap labour force. Objectively, this leads to the inclusion of these states in the transnational assembly line and global goods and services market, as well as to the strengthening of the position of TNCs in these countries.

However, it should be noted that TNCs are not altruistic. In order to compensate for investments they may demand a significant share of revenues and a certain portion of profits. This fact implies that the positive financial influence of FDI is offset to certain extent by a direct withdrawal of a part of national income of host countries, since much of the income earned by foreign investors is repatriated.

In order to finance their investments, foreign companies often turn to the capital market of host countries. Thus, they contribute to higher loan prices by increasing demand for them. This, in turn, limits the opportunities for financing potential national investors. Subsidiaries of U.S. corporations, for example, supply approximately a third of new capital investments in Africa from local lending sources, and another fifth of these investments comes from reinvesting retained earnings. Thus, only about a half of new invest-

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*This article was written specially for the Yearbook.*
ment is funded by a parent company, which is the very net inflow of investment.

Most African governments welcome foreign investors and provide them with significant incentives and guarantees of market rights. This fact illustrates just how beneficial is the cooperation with TNCs for the countries of the region, despite the fact that, in accordance with the laws of capitalist economy, they repatriate a share of their commercial income.

Many factors have an influence on costs, risks and barriers on the path of foreign investment in Africa. There are also some objective factors that are independent from governments. These include the geographical position of a country, size of its domestic market, climatic conditions, and risks of dangerous diseases. At the same time, governments have an opportunity to influence some aspects of investment climate, for example, by guaranteeing property rights and regulating legislature and taxation. Political stability, availability of economic infrastructure, functioning of financial and labour markets and, of course, corruption and crime rates also play an important role. WB experts emphasise the key role of the state in devising a legal regime, in the formation of a favourable climate for investment, and in dealing with the key factors that could adversely affect investment climate. These factors include: political uncertainty (28%), macroeconomic instability (23%), taxes (19%), legal regulation (10%) and corruption (10%).

"Investment image" of the continent

Undeniably, Africa's "investment image" has recently changed in a positive direction, owing primarily to the measures taken to liberalise the legal regulation of FDI. During the past decade, many countries of the continent abolished most restrictions on foreign investment and revised legislation in order to fully include FDI in economic development strategy. According to surveys conducted by UNCTAD, in 2007, 74 policy changes which made investment climate in 58 developed and developing countries around the world more conducive to FDI were recorded (see table). Most of them (74%) were implemented by developing countries, including African ones. In particular, measures to reduce taxes on corporate income were taken (Ghana, Tanzania, Egypt, Algeria, Lesotho, Uganda) and further liberalisation of the regulation of FDI in telecommunications (Botswana, Kenya, Namibia, Ghana, Burundi), banking (Mali, Egypt and Nigeria), and insurance (Swaziland) was conducted. However, in some cases, new restrictions on foreign ownership were introduced or measures to transfer a higher proportion of revenues to the state were taken. Such a trend was observed, for instance, in some mining industries, for example, in Algeria.

By early 2008, the number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) reached 2,608, while the number of double tax avoidance agreements (DTAA) – 2,730; 254 agreements on free trade and economic cooperation, which contained provisions on investment, were concluded. These agreements create conducive climate for foreign investments and, at the same time, promote their effective use for achieving the development goals of host countries.

Legislation in most African countries provides for the same legal regime for domestic and foreign investors. Preferential legal regimes promote investments in priority sectors of national economies. In most countries of the region, the export sector and agribusiness fall in the category of priority. An important aspect of promoting FDI in priority sectors is tax breaks: altered tax rates on corporations and repatriated dividends, tax reductions, and tax exemptions for several years (tax holidays). In order to be entitled to receive tax benefits, foreign investors usually conduct special negotiations.

For example, Egypt offers investors tax holidays of up to 15 years for the implementation of socially significant projects such as building affordable housing. Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire pay special attention to small and medium-sized enterprises; Guinea and Kenya provide special tax reductions for investments in less developed areas of these countries. In Guinea, Ghana,

| Table. Changes in FDI national regulatory regimes (2000–2007) |
|---------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Number of countries that introduced changes in their investment regimes | 2000   | 2001   | 2002   | 2003   | 2004   | 2005   | 2006   |
| Number of changes including creating more conducive climate for FDI | 147    | 193    | 234    | 218    | 234    | 162    | 142    | 74    |
| Number of changes including creating less conducive climate for FDI | 3      | 14     | 12     | 24     | 36     | 41     | 35     | 24    |

and Mali, foreign companies that invest in extraction of local mineral resources get preferences. For example, in Ghana, an income tax on mining companies was reduced from 55 to 35%. In Mali, the mining sector is exempted from taxes on incomes from property and investments, registration fees, value-added taxes and taxes on providing services during the first three accounting periods of their production activities. In Lesotho, foreign companies operating in the manufacturing and agricultural production are subject to a 15% income tax and are exempt from a dividend tax. At the same time, these taxes amount to 35 and 25% respectively for other sectors of the economy.

The general trend is the liberalisation of foreign exchange regulation, although a number of countries in the region retain the right to impose temporary restrictions on trading foreign exchange in the event of an unfavourable balance of payments. Currently, however, these restrictions generally do not affect transfers of income from foreign investments. Many African governments legally guarantee the right of foreign investors to repatriate their capital and profits. In some countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania), the foreign exchange market became free, and any currency operations are no longer subjected to the control of central banks.

**Competitiveness above all**

Despite the positive changes in FDI regulatory regimes, attracting investments to technology-intensive sectors, which can significantly increase employment, skills and competitiveness of local enterprises, remains a challenge for many countries of the continent. This is especially true for the least developed nations in sub-Saharan Africa because of their lack of the necessary innovation capacity, skills and modern infrastructure.

With a sufficiently high degree of confidence, we can assume that the inflow of FDI into the region will gradually increase as the development of high-tech industries and new technologies continues and relatively more developed countries go over to a resource-saving production model. It is very likely that within the next 8-10 years governments in most African states will adapt laws to encourage FDI, remove restrictions on investment activities and facilitate the creation of enterprises wholly owned by foreign companies. These businesses are usually better equipped and able to work more efficiently than local firms. They should also encourage the setting up of joint ventures (JV) between foreign and domestic capital, particularly in the sphere of natural resources development.

Due to the shortage of foreign exchange, which is a characteristic of most African countries, the latter should strive to avoid investing real money when forming joint venture. The share of local companies in the capital of a joint venture may include infrastructure, support services, the fees that foreign partners would have been charged for accessing resources, etc. However, host countries must insist that foreign participants assume the obligation to transfer technologies and expertise in management and marketing.

For many foreign companies, international economic cooperation has become one of the leading strategies for entering new markets, overcoming protectionist barriers, accelerating scientific and technological progress, and facilitating access to sources of raw materials. Joint ventures are appealing to these companies because they receive certain guarantees against nationalisation, obtain, just like national companies, economic preferences, get better access to raw materials and markets, and establish relations with local authorities.

There is also a great variety of contractual, non-equity forms of investment cooperation between African countries and foreign firms. Nowadays, increasing financial potential of most developed of these countries allows them instead of granting concessions to enter into contractual arrangements with TNCs for exploration and mining operations and construction of industrial facilities followed, in some cases, with subsequent management of production and sales by these TNCs. Importing licenses and know-how also gives considerable gains in time and significant cost savings in research and development (R&D).

For their part, managers of international corporations believe the business based on selling technologies and know-how to be no less profitable and even safer (especially in developing countries) than the exploitation of local resources on the basis of ownership. Contractual relationships provide TNCs with unconventional methods of participation in management and profits, which may be even more effective than majority stake ownership. Examples of contractual agreements are production sharing, which is widely spread in the oil industry of African countries, management contracts, which are employed in the gold, diamond, bauxite and uranium mining industries, and engineering agreements for the execution of various works and services associated with the design, construction and startup of social and industrial objects.

**Four characteristics of African economy**

African states vary considerably in size of their domestic markets and pace of economic growth, endowment with natural resources, business development, effectiveness of social and economic infrastructures, and levels of political stability. These objective factors predetermine investment potential of different countries. At the same time, in some of these countries, the prospects for greater FDI inflows in the 2000s increased owing to the devel-
development of important economic processes. The following are the most significant ones:

1. Higher economic growth rates. It was noted at the World Economic Forum (WEF) for Africa, which took place in June 2007 in Cape Town (South Africa), that, since the beginning of the 21st century, economy had been growing by an average of 4.9% per year in 53 countries of the continent; in 2006 the growth had amounted to 6%, and in 2007 it had increased to 6.2%. Economic growth is spurred by external factors: the increase in world commodity prices, debt relief and favourable global economic environment. However, in order to meet the Millennium Development Goals as defined by the UN – halving poverty in Africa by 2015 – its economy must grow at 7% per year. Nonetheless, in a number of oil producers of the continent economy growth rate is already much higher. In Angola, for example, growth rate reached 17.4%, which, according to experts, is not only due to a high level of oil prices on world markets and the increase in its production, but also due to a successful cooperation with such non-traditional partners of African countries as China, India and Latin America.

Taking into account the potential of FDI coming from developing countries and countries with transitional economies, many African governments develop special strategies to attract such investments. In a survey of investment promotion agencies (IPAs), which was carried out by UNCTAD in 2006, over 90% of African respondents indicated that their policies targeted FDI from other developing countries and countries with transitional economies. South Africa led the list of most perspective investors.

2. Regional integration. Market reforms have improved the prospects for regional cooperation among African countries. Governments seek to harmonise investment codes, foreign exchange and customs legislation, which contributes to the conclusion of agreements on regional cooperation and encourages investment from abroad to relatively more capacious regional markets.

3. Privatisation. African countries employ the policy of privatisation to improve business efficiency and to obtain additional funding from local and foreign private sources. According to official reports, they succeed in selling mainly shares of small and medium-sized state owned enterprises. The main state owned objects – mines, airlines, railways, etc. – are difficult to privatise because many of them are unprofitable and constitute a heavy burden for the budget. Countries try to encourage buyers by providing them with various preferences, for example with preferential loans, reductions in customs duties and tax exemptions, which, unfortunately, are associated with losses for the budget.

Privatisation of state owned enterprises, even though it does not directly aim at facilitating the development of local stock markets, leads to their revival. The majority of the 22 active stock exchanges of the continent are national in terms of the list of participants and the scale of operations; stock exchanges of South Africa, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, and Zimbabwe serve regional markets; stock exchanges in Johannesburg and Cairo are international ones. Purposive policies to stimulate development of the securities market (through a reduction in taxes on securities transactions and the liquidation of capital gains and dividend taxes) causes an inflow of foreign portfolio investments, which may become an important source of financing of equity capital of local companies.

4. Restructuring and conversion of external debt. Measures taken by African governments to restructure and convert external debt, which enhance the potential of the secondary debt market, where state debt circulates in the form of promissory notes and bonds, further attract foreign investors. For multinational banks, sale of debt at a discount of 80-90% of the nominal value became another way for getting rid of problematic debts.

According to UNCTAD experts, the perspectives for further increase in FDI inflows to Africa, which in 2005-2007 reached the record for the region levels of 29.5, 45.8 and 53 billion dollars respectively, are associated primarily with the expansion of exploration and exploitation of mineral resources (mainly oil and gas), improved prospects for corporate profits, and more favourable business climate. However, despite this, Africa’s share in global FDI flow remained low – 3%. Besides the development of rich natural resources, telecommunications, light and food industries, and tourism remain the most attractive industries for foreign investors.

What is Africa rich in?

Africa’s resource potential is the largest on the planet.

According to WB estimates, about 70% of the world’s biological resources, which include timber resources and potential for the development of agriculture, fisheries, etc., is concentrated in Africa. 90% of the world reserves of platinum group metals, chromites (80%), phosphates (76%), manganese and cobalt (60%), diamonds (40%), and gold (37%) are located on the continent. The continent has already become an actual raw material base of the world economy, providing 92% of its needs in platinum, 70% – in diamonds, 35% – in manganese, 34% – in cobalt, and 15.5% – in bauxites.

At the beginning of 2006, hydrocarbon reserves of the African continent and its explored offshore areas amounted to about 8% of the global total, and in most countries exploration is far from having been completed.

The strategic importance of the unique natural resources of the region is growing rapidly due to the depletion of non-renewable mineral resources of the planet. It is understandable that long-term investments of TNCs in the ex-
traction of certain minerals and energy resources, in particular from the bottom of the oceans, will continue to grow, despite the considerable economic and political risk\textsuperscript{11}.

FDI can play an important role in the development of export-oriented manufacturing industries of African countries, as has convincingly been demonstrated by the experiences of Egypt and Morocco. These countries take advantage of their achievements in reforming economy and of the availability of trained and relatively cheap labour and proximity to Europe and attract significant investment in electronic, automobile, textile and woodworking industries, as well as in the production of rubber products and construction materials. In particular, in 2006, Egypt invested $8 billion – 80\% of FDI inflow – in various perspective industries and in tourist industry\textsuperscript{12}.

"Paradise" for travellers, "buried treasure" for africans

Tourism deserves special attention of foreign investors. The African continent offers a wealth of tourist attractions, and some types of tourism (e.g., safari tourism) are unique to Africa. Ecotourism may also become one of the leading segments of the travel industry on the continent. This is due, on the one hand, to the ecologisation of social consciousness of the residents of developed countries and their increasing concerns with the destruction of the environment in Africa, and, on the other hand, due to thirst for nature, especially exotic, on the part of population of Western industrial cities and their interest in traditional ways of life. So far Africa accounts for only 2\% of international tourists and for 1\% of income from international tourism. However, the development of this service industry has already become one of the strategic priorities in some countries. Its contribution to the GDPs of Botswana, Lesotho, Ghana, and Zimbabwe is estimated at 4-5\%, of Zambia – at 10\%. The experience of Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Seychelles, Mauritius, Tanzania, Senegal, Uganda, and Kenya, where tourism industry is also developing at a great pace, is instructive.

Undoubtedly, the development of the tourism industry and its transformation into an economically significant and stable source of foreign exchange require huge investments. In most African countries, only a part of the tourism-related demand for goods and services (housing, food, rental cars) can be met by local firms. The remaining part of unsatisfied demand awaits foreign investment. However, the dynamic development of international tourism poses new challenges for African governments, including the need to prevent ecological and cultural degradation of their countries and to involve local population into the process of conservation of unique flora and fauna.

We – Europeans – are still profoundly underestimating the potential role and place of the African continent in the world economic system. It cannot be ruled out that in a few decades the welfare and prosperity of the rest of the world will depend primarily on the development of industry and agriculture in Africa. From this perspective, there is not a more promising destination for foreign investment than various sectors of economy in African states. Leading corporations of Europe, Asia and America, TNCs, as well as business communities and governments of African countries themselves should become aware of this potential and comprehend it.

\textsuperscript{3} Calculated on the basis of the following source: Survey of Current Business. Wash., 1990–2007.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid. P. 36.
GENDER STUDIES IN RUSSIAN AFRICAN STUDIES: MILESTONES, TRENDS AND DIRECTIONS

In the last twenty years, a new to the national humanities subject matter – gender studies -, focusing on socially and culturally marked gender differences, took shape within Russian African studies. However, it should be noted that some sprouts of this research direction had developed many decades before, back at the dawn of the formation of African studies as an independent branch of science in our country. “Women’s theme” was present in yet earlier works of Soviet scientists that devoted their research to peoples of the African continent. This applies particularly to the works of such famous researchers as D.A. Olderogge, I.I. Potekhin, A.S. Orlova, I.A. Svanidze [Kubbel, 1974; Olderogge, 1960; Orlova, 1958; Orlova, 1968; Potekhin, 1958; Potekhin, 1956; Svanidze, 1972, pp. 323-324].

The studies of the women’s place and role in the archaic and modern African society originally developed within the framework of traditional academic disciplines: history, ethnology, cultural studies, sociology, political science and law.

The greatest attention to African women as objects of scientific study was paid when analysing kinship and family and conjugal relations, which served as the cementing foundation of all African societies at different stages of history. This research theme was particularly typical for the representatives of the Leningrad school of ethnologists and philologists, who are still successfully continuing the work begun by D.A. Olderogge, a prominent Africanist and a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. His landmark work “Epigamia” [Olderogge, 1983] contained articles from different years, in which the author set out his ideas on general theoretical and specific issues of social structure of peoples of tropical Africa in the pre-colonial period, including gender relations and relations between generations in the context of kinship system, conjugal customs and legal norms. Among the significant works of his followers, which were written in the same vein, it is necessary to mention the books by Petersburg scientists V.R. Arseniev and V.A. Popov [Arsenieiv, 1997; Popov, 1990], in which, on the example of the Bambari (Mali) and Akan (Ghana) peoples, the role and importance of the kinship system (both female and male lines) in all spheres of life of Africans is demonstrated. Without understanding the specifics of these relations it is often impossible to understand the essence of traditional economic and socio-political relations.

Representatives of the Moscow school of Africanists also successfully supported the idea that the system of kinship and family relations should be viewed as the mainspring of the “mechanism” of all African cultures which set the pace in many spheres of human activity and in social structures ranging from a family to state bodies.

For example, N.B. Kochakova in her monograph “Yoruba city-states”, when considering the pre-colonial history of the Nigerian people and making conclusions about the nature of social and political structures during the transition from a classless society to a class one, indicates a close relation between a power-holding and hierarchical political system and communal and tribal institutions. Although these relations were based on kinship through the male line, women still played an important role in their idile kinship group as wives of chiefs and kings, as priestesses of ancestral cults and as members of secret alliances [Kochakova, 1968, pp. 109, 11, 143, 152].

N.A. Ksenofontova in her book “The people of Zimbabwe” gives a detailed analysis of communal and tribal organisation of the Shona people (Southern Rhodesia, present-day Zimbabwe) from the 10th to the middle of the 20th century. Extensive factual material is used to demonstrate the indissoluble interweaving of different kinds of social and economic relations and dependencies with the structure of family and tribal relations. The author makes a special emphasis on the relations between genders and generations in the context of socialisation, moral, ethical, legal and religious norms, and concludes that this society, as well as other ethnic groups in Africa, is characterised by clear delineation of “female”, “male” and “child” roles, which society imposes on an individual from his early childhood and strictly monitor compliance with these roles throughout his life. The author attempted to explain the complexity of the relation between males and females in both traditional and colonial social systems [Ksenofontova, 1974, pp. 55-93, 137-179].

The topic of intergenerational relations and gender and age-related division of labour was continued and discussed in detail in a monograph by K.P. Kalinovskaya titled “Age groups of peoples of East Africa. Structure and Functions”, which focused on the pastoral Galla and Konso peoples (Ethiopia), Nuer (Sudan), Maasai (Kenya, Tanzania), Jie (Uganda) and Nyakyusa (Tanzania). The author discusses the historical evolution of age-specific systems from the period of primitive communal system to the 20th century, and concludes that these age-related associations, as well as secret societies, initiation schools, men’s and women’s houses, all are the links of one chain with regards to the development of a number of societies and reflect a naturally determined period in their history. In addition, K.P. Kalinovskaya supports those researchers who

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attempted to refute the opinion of most foreign anthropologists that the age-specific system should be regarded exclusively as a male institution. She cites scientists who documented the formation of women's age groups and existence of special houses for women in a number of tribes, and argues that the influence of age-specific system and its norms was not limited to rituals but affected all spheres of human activity and interpersonal communication, i.e. that this institution had a universal character [Kalinovskaya, 1976, pp. 21-22, 129-130].

Kinship system through the female line and the norms of maternal law, which ensured the continuity of royal blood and the legality of power, are the topic of many chapters in a book by E.S. Lvova and A.S. Orlova titled "Pages of history of the great savannah", which describes the customs, traditions and milestones of the pre-colonial history of the states of Kongo (13th to 19th century), Kuba (16th to the early 20th century), Luba (16th to 19th century), Lunda or Mwata Yamvo (16th to the second half of the 19th century). [Orlova, Lvova, 1978, pp. 93-132, 177-259].

Detailed descriptions of rites through which an African woman goes during her life can be found in a textbook by E.S. Lvova titled "Ethnography of Africa", which summarises the findings of a number of domestic and foreign scholars about peoples of sub-Saharan Africa. This fundamental ethnographic review, which is written in a language understandable to the general public, gives a clear picture of the place and role of women in the system of kinship and family and conjugal relations, as well as of their participation in organisation and transfer of power, contribution to the development of national culture and art, formation of spiritual values, religious practices and ideas. The author especially emphasises the importance of the cult of maternal ancestors – patrons [Lvova, 1984, pp. 117-238].

I.E. Sinitsyna, a legal scholar, in her fundamental monographs attempted to get a deeper understanding of the traditional life of an African commune by the means of a detailed analysis of its structure and of the role and functions of each of its members (both men and women) through the lens of customary law. She rightly believed that the issues related to the tradition of customary law are relevant not only to jurisprudence but also to historical and cultural development of peoples. In her work "Custom and customary law in contemporary Africa", the author used an integrated approach and different materials – legal and ethnographic, official documents and codes of customary laws of peoples of Tanzania, Kenya, Cameroon and other countries, writings of historians and notes of travellers – to examine in detail family traditions and the nature of family relations between male and female relatives, individual’s status, women’s status, and the rules of inheritance [Sinitsyna, 1978].

I.E. Sinitsyna continued this research in her next book – "Individual and family in Africa", in which the theme of women's destiny in the context of conjugal relations was further discussed. The author paid special attention to the question of property relations and inheritance rights and exposed the ambiguity, flexibility and variability of the role of women in the legal field of a family commune, which can take the most unexpected forms depending on the interests and needs of members of a small or large family. In particular, it relates to special forms of marriage, for example, a "marriage of a woman with a woman", when a childless widow, who is no longer able to bear children, forms an alliance with another tribeswoman, which gives birth to a child conceived by an outsider, and this child becomes considered to be a child of the widow’s late husband. Thus, an African woman who takes on a conditional function of a husband keeps for herself and for the newborn the property and status of the small family [Sinitsyna, 1989, pp. 82].

Due to the fact that family and conjugal relations and kinship system, in which women occupy a niche, are inextricably woven into the fabric of social relations, almost all of the aforementioned studies include small fragments, in which activities African women are described in the context of historical events. It should be noted that the papers published in the 1950s and 1980s were characterised by the fact that "women's topics" had there no value in themselves, but rather constituted fragmentary information which was subordinated to "male" history [Kochakova, 1986; Kubbel, 1974; Novikov, 1987; Orlova, 1958, Orlova, Lvova, 1978; Fadeev, 1962].

It must be admitted that, nevertheless, some attempts have been made to conduct a full-fledged research, in which the true place and role of African women in history and political system would be studied in all their variety. We are speaking of works by R.M. Smirnova titled "The women’s status in Africa" and by S.I. Shvetsova titled "Tropical Africa. The issue of social emancipation of women."

The monograph of R.M. Smirnova is the first generalising study of lives of African women, specifics of their careers and their social status in the structure of African societies in the Soviet and foreign literature. When describing high status of women in distant historical times, the author provides portraits of prominent figures who headed power structures of many African nations (Amina, a ruler of the Hausa, Ashanti Queens Guebi Saa Ababoi Wankii and Yaa Asantewaa, Bemba and Shona Queens in Zambia and Zimbabwe), led Amazon troops in the medieval states of Dahomey, Ashanti, Monomotapa, headed anti-colonial uprisings, as, for example, did Nzinga Mbande Ngola, the sister of the ruler of Angola. R.M. Smirnova paid special attention to the status of female population in the first decades of the formation of independent states because she believed that African women were destined to play an important role in the development of African countries on the path towards economic and social progress. Besides characterising the role and importance of women in political events, the book devotes consider-
Pogge, who described a custom which prevailed with the Lunda people in the mid 19th century and which was designated as lukokesha in ethno graphic literature. Lukokesha was the title of one of the Mouat-Yamvo sisters, which was symbolically considered to be the mother of all the kings of the country. She was an equal co-ruler and possessed full and unlimited power over life and death of her subjects. She influenced the election of a new king. She had her own palace and a court, extensive estates from which she received taxes, symbols of power (an ivory bracelet – lukano) and numerous slaves. L.E. Kubbel compared this institution with similar phenomena in other nations in various regions of the African continent and concluded that they indicated the importance for many African rulers of matri lineal kinship with regard to inheriting power. He noted that in the majority of cases the name, title, or talisman of female ancestors who had headed a family or a state often became the titulature of royal authority also for male heirs to the throne. In other words, matriarchal and patriarchal norms of customary law coexisted and interweaved.

V.B. Iordansky in his books "Chaos and harmony" and "Animals, people, gods" demonstrated clearly and fully that the relation between males and females in all areas of financial, social and spiritual life is the central issue and foundation of human perception of the world in a traditional African society [Iordansky, 1982; Iordansky, 1991]. The author based the research on his own personal experiences from visiting different parts of Africa and on a large number of scientific works of western and African authors, analysed different types and genres of oral folk traditions (myths, tales, legends, proverbs and sayings), and explored the lesser known philosophical systems of modern inhabitants of the continent, which are deeply rooted in remote antiquity. V.B. Iordansky argued that the theme of gender interaction, their complementarity and contradictions underlay all concepts of time, space, myth, magic, real life and the afterlife, and personality [Iordansky, 1982, pp. 229-300].

However, the author noted that the same circumstances in which different African men and women found themselves did not always lead to identical manifestations of their needs and interests, and views of the world (nature and society) and of their place in it. V.B. Iordansky believed that the reason for this was antagonism between the genders. He further developed these ideas in his article "Opposition of man and woman in African mythology" [Iordansky, 1986].

The ideas put forward by L.E. Kubbel and V.B. Iordansky were confirmed in the works of V.A. Beilis, who studied the evolution of cultural traditions over a long interval of time and reviewed works of both Western and African scholars. He paid particular attention to the dynamics of culture in such areas as rituals, religious systems, fiction, urban life, etc. [Beilis, 1986]. The author stressed that antagonism between man and woman was most noticeable in ritual dimension, and the difference in their social status was most clearly visible...
in that dimension too. V.A. Beilis, when analysing a work of English ethnographer V. Turner titled "Symbol and ritual," especially emphasised Turner’s description of the "change of status" social custom, which was critical to maintaining social stability. In order to relieve tensions in the relations between the genders, at certain times of the year special rituals were conducted, where representatives of the "strong" sex for a while gave up their functions (economic and social), while women took over their roles and authority. At that point the latter played the leading role, while their fathers, brothers, husbands, and elders became their subordinates [Beilis, 1991, pp. 79-80].

The conclusions made by the aforementioned authors highlighted very convincingly the idea that it is necessary to reconstruct "women’s history" not as a subordinate element of "men’s history" but as a self-sufficient objective reality. It became apparent that the approach of "just adding woman", i.e. mechanically including information about her into the common fabric of African studies, is rather inadequate.

In the mid 1980s, several employees of the Institute for African Studies (N.P. Kosmarskaya, N.A. Ksenofontova and I.G. Rybalkina) became convinced of the need to highlight women studies as an independent scientific direction in African studies. In their monographs and articles, which were published in the 1990s, they pursued the idea of the existence of special women’s subjectivity and women’s social experience and did not confine themselves to the study of just women’s lives, but broadened the issue – began to study gender issues, i.e. initiated a comprehensive study of the peculiarities of social development through an in-depth analysis of the relations and interaction of the genders and generations in economic, social, political and spiritual spheres of life [Kosmarskaya, 1983; Kosmarskaya, 1997; Ksenofontova, 1990; Ksenofontova, 1992; Ksenofontova, 1994; Ksenofontova, 1999; Ksenofontova, Rybalkina, 2000; Rybalkina, 1993; Rybalkina, 1994; Rybalkina, 1999; World of African Village, 1997, pp. 140-153].

Around the same time another issue, which is very interesting from scientific perspective and relevant to the daily Russian life, – the fate of Russian women who at different times married African residents and settled in Africa – appeared on the agenda. N.L. Krylova was a pioneer in the development of this problem. She published a monograph titled "Russian women in Africa: problems of adaptation" written based on original sociological material – the results of a survey of a few hundred of our compatriots – wives of Africans who live in Russia and on the African continent [Krylova, 1996].

All the aforementioned research and findings naturally led in 1991 to the creation of an intersectoral group for gender studies in the Institute for African Studies, which is currently headed by N.L. Krylova and N.A. Ksenofontova. One of its goals – to rally like-minded people – is being successfully implemented. The group became a centre to unite experts not only from the Institute but also Russian scientists from other academic institutions (institutes of oriental studies, ethnology and anthropology, governance and law, as well as Kunstkamera), universities (the Moscow State University, Institute of Asian and African Studies, Russian State University for the Humanities, People’s Friendship University of Russia), from Adygea, Yaroslavl, Rostov, as well as African students and postgraduates.

Once every three years discussions are held within a special section for gender and at “roundtables” at Africanists’ conferences, and anyone who is interested in the problem of gender relations on the African continent can participate in these discussions [Africa ..., 2002; Africa on the eve of ..., 1999; Security ..., 2005; Development ..., 2008]. The proceedings of such discussions are documented in the form of collective works.

Since 1999, members of the group began to publish collections and individual monographs as part of a series titled "Gender studies of the Institute for African Studies" under the general editorship of N.A. Ksenofontova.

Not only colleagues from Russia but also specialists from other countries, namely from the U.S., Canada, Europe (UK, Italy, France), India, African countries (Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, South Africa), are invited to take part in such collective researches. By 2008, the group published 10 volumes of the series [Gender and power, 2008; Gender Studies ..., 2000; Gender issues ..., 2003; Grishina, 2007; Krylova, Prozhogina, 2002; Krylova, Prozhogina, 2004; Krylova, Prozhogina, 2007; Ksenofontova, 1999; Man and woman, 2004; Man and woman, 2007].

N.A. Ksenofontova’s monograph titled "African women. Gender aspect of social development", which received a positive evaluation in the scientific press, opens the series. One of the reviews was titled the following way: "Black gender or a new genre of women’s novel" [Veselago, 2000]. Even if we dismiss the journalist’s figurative exaggeration, we still can say that the book marked the beginning of a qualitatively new stage in the coverage of "female" themes in oriental studies discourse. First of all, it was the first time in African studies that the concepts of "gender" and "gender studies" were used. Secondly, the monograph was a comprehensive scientific study of the gender aspect of social relations in traditional African society. It attempted to give an extensive picture of the lives of both sexes in the context of historical events, of their relations within family, social environment, and in the area of spiritual culture and religious rituals.

Other works of the series are written in a similar vein. They are characterised by a departure from narrating purely “women’s stories”, expanding the issue, and striving for stereoscopy in describing reality. These are some topics that comprise gender collections: "The change in the system of values and in status– and role-related functions of men and women at critical junctures of history and culture", "Changing gender awareness and women’s struggle
for equal rights and opportunities”, “Women’s and men’s interests in the context of socio-political and economic change”, “Women in the political system of society and the legal aspect of gender relations”, “Mixed marriages” and the problem of fathers and children”, etc.

N.L. Krylova, as well as such researchers as E.S. Lvova, S.V. Prozhogina, E.B. Demintseva, T.V. Kudryavtseva, and several other authors began with a study of the phenomenon of interracial family and conjugal relations and self-identification of métises, and then expanded their range of research interests to a more global scale and published several books and articles devoted to the analysis of gender relations at the crossroads of cultures [Gender and power, pp. 44-96, 138-160, 317-357; Gender Studies, pp. 92-96, 147-217; Gender Studies, pp. 125-232; Krylova, 2006; Krylova, Prozhogina, 2002; Krylova, Prozhogina, 2004; Krylova, Prozhogina, 2007; Lvova, 1996; Man and woman, 2004, pp. 147-172, 183-250]. The value of these studies was increased by accompanying them with works of our compatriots who many years ago had married Africans and had made successful academic careers on the distant continent (Z. Ogundovole, S. Rubaylo-Kudolo) or who had lived some in interracial families (A. Davis, L. Ivanova, T. Kudryavtseva). By exposing the complexity of gender relations in the context of the collision of different civilisations (African and Russian, African and European) the authors demonstrate that it not only leads to mutual enrichment and interweaving of cultures, but often creates, as S.V. Prozhogina has put it, a deep “dissonance” between them [Man and woman, 2004, pp. 206-250].

Russian experts in the field of African literature (S.V. Prozhogina, N.Yu. Ilyina, A.V. Milto), whose efforts created an independent historical and philosophical direction in gender studies within African studies, analysed the topic most thoroughly.

In recent years, an increasing emphasis is being made on the study of political and legal aspects of the situation of women in family and in society in the context of Muslim culture. A.M. Vasiliev, E.B. Demintseva, S.V. Prozhogina, N.G. Romanova, S.N. Turk, N.Z. Fahrutdinova devoted articles and chapters from their monographs to gender relations and government policies on harmonisation of these relations [Vasiliev, 2008; Gender and power, 2008, pp. 21-43, 123-137, 290-358; Gender studies, 2000, pp. 97-108, 130-146; Demintseva, 2008; Man and woman, 2004, pp. 173-180].

It should be noted that besides the “Gender studies” series in recent years Russian Africanists produced a considerable number of works in which there are fragments devoted to various aspects of the place and role of men and women in various spheres of life and work: in history and politics [Bondarenko, 1995; Emelianov, Myltsev, 1990; Kochakova, 2007; Ksenofontova, Rybalkina, 2000; Lvova, 2002; Early forms of ..., 2000; Symbols ..., 1996; Chernetsov, 1991], in the context of ritual and stereotypical forms of male and female behaviour [Arseniev, 1991; Kalinovskaya, 1989; Lapkina, 2005; Sinit-syna, 1997], and in the area of dealing with the environment [Africa: ecological crisis..., 2001, pp. 17-74, 132-171, 211-220].

In addition to opening new themes and directions, Russian Africanists who deal with gender issues are in constant search of fresh approaches, viewpoints and research methods.

A distinctive feature of many collective works is that they often use comparative materials relating to both Russian and African societies. It turned out that the economic, social and political processes which are currently taking place on the African continent and in Russia are similar in a number of ways because both regions experienced replacement of one socio-economic formation with another. In one case it was the transition from colonial to postcolonial society and in the other – from Soviet to post-Soviet society [Gender and power, 2008, pp. 376-430; Gender issues, 2003, pp. 102-124; Man and woman, 2004, pp. 345-423; Man and woman, 2007, pp. 225-330].

The essential difference between Russian researchers and many Western feminologists lies in the fact that the former actively respond to the needs of time and representatives of African-American culture, who often criticise American and European feminists for the fact that in their practice and during construction of scientific concepts they often ignore social, racial and ethnic differences among women. One of the famous black writers and researchers, who uses the pseudonym bell hooks, notes the injustice and partiality of the fact that all such theories are based solely on middle-class white women [Anthology..., 2000, pp. 236-253].

Russian Africanists such as I.G. Bolshov, N.V. Grishina, N.A. Ksenofontova, N.F. Matveeva, E.S. Lvova, I.G. Rybakina and many others take all of these demands into account in their articles and books when analysing the status of African women belonging to all strata of society ranging from rural and urban poor to the intelligentsia and political elite.

One of the most pressing issues which scientists have faced in recent years is the issue of power relations, which, as they believe, is a universal phenomenon and not only constitutes the core of political system but also underlies all interpersonal relations, including gender. V.V. Bocharov, N.M. Girenko, N.A. Ksenofontova and other Africanists argue convincingly that power in traditional and contemporary African society permeates all social strata and reflects the principle of hierarchy between different social groups and both sexes. The problem of governing is not always associated with violence and coercion. It is, above all, connected with strong-willed dominance, leadership and authority, through which an individual seeks to acquire and express his identity and secure his role in an integral social system [Anthropology..., 2006, pp. 347-359, 377-381, 417-431; Gender and power, 2008; Ksenofontova, 2005; Ksenofontova, 2008 (1); Ksenofontova, 2008 (2)].
By explaining the issue of power through the prism of gender relations, Russian Africanists come to understand the need to consider African realities in the context of world history. This, in turn, implies their strong interest in general theoretical issues of gender science, as reflected in several articles by L.A. Andreeva, M.L. Butovskaya, A.A. Kazankov, N.A. Ksenofontova, O.B. Maksimova [Gender and power, 2008, pp. 9-17; Ksenofontova, 2004; Ksenofontova, 2007; Man and woman, 2007, pp. 9-46, 78-118, 134-143, 225-248, 270-288].

At the end of the last century and in the current years of the new century, Russian Africanists who are interested to various extent in gender issues got an opportunity to obtain and collect their own field material by going on research trips and participating in expeditions to Africa, which greatly enriched the source base of gender studies. Our scientists were able to visit the following countries: Mali (V.R. Arseniev), Nigeria (I.G. Bolshov, N.B. Korchakova), Tanzania (D.M. Bondarenko, M.L. Butovskaya, E.S. Lvova), Tunisia and Morocco (E.B. Demintseva, N.L. Krylova, S.V. Prozhogina, N.G. Romanova), Ethiopia (E.S Lvova), and South Africa (N.V. Grishina). The results of their observations were published in monographs and collections [Grishina, 2007; Interracial and interethnic relations..., 2008, pp. 138-194; Man and woman, 2007, pp. 249-269; Muslims..., 2005, pp. 71-115].

To conclude the review of papers on gender issues published in the field of national African studies over the past 20 years, we can conclude that Russian scientists in their research on this topic have gone through the same stages in the development of gender studies as their foreign counterparts and scientists in related social sciences. Considerable achievements of our experts in this field, which are manifested in a significant number of published works on a variety topics and in well-founded research and conclusions, testify to the fact that gender studies quite naturally received the status of an independent scientific field, which is characterised as a heterogeneous and multi-disciplinary branch of knowledge, which includes virtually the entire spectrum of interaction between men and women both at the level of global society and in private life.

**Bibliography**


Numerous armed conflicts, military coups and civil wars on the African continent in the last decades of the past century and in the beginning of the new 21st century affected with particular strength women and children, which constituted the majority of the victims of such clashes.

To the lot of civilian population, especially women and children, there fall the ordeals of war, primarily associated with the constant threat to their own lives or of death of their loved ones. Tens of thousands of civilians become destitute. Women with children, deprived of their homes, leave in droves their destroyed villages in search of safe havens. They constitute the majority (80%) of all African refugees.

Almost all armed conflicts in Africa were accompanied by serious breaches of human rights and international humanitarian law on the part of both opposition movements and government forces, including mass killings, ethnic cleansing, executions, torture, terror, kidnappings, and all forms of violence against civilians, especially women and children, as well as depriving them of access to humanitarian aid, etc.

African women felt the ruthlessness and cruelty of wars and conflicts on the continent to the greatest degree. Violence (physical and psychological) as a distinguishing feature of all (past and present) armed conflicts on the continent assumed terrible, not amenable to any control or management, proportions. Rape has been a permanent component of all known conflicts and wars in Africa (in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Rwanda, Burundi, DRC, Uganda, Sudan and other countries in the region). Rapes of African women, which were committed by members of warring parties – government soldiers or rebels – and which usually were preceded or accompanied by forced abductions, acquired mass character in warring zones as a regularly used way of attacking women. For instance, rape of women was an essential element of the Hutu campaign of genocide against the Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994 and in subsequent years. Just during the spring of 1994 more than 250 thousand women and other civilian women had been raped.1

Women and girls were widely practiced during the years of intense civil wars (from the 1990s till the early 2000s) in Sierra Leone and Liberia. In the WHO report of 2005 it was stated that 90% of Liberian women had suffered physical and sexual abuse, and 3 out of 4 Liberian women had been raped.2 Numerous cases of rape in the warring zone in east-

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ern DRC were continuously reported by international humanitarian organisations. The actual number of victims far exceeded the official data as many victims concealed the occurrence of rapes out of "shame" and fearing becoming social outcasts. According to experts, such gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law assumed the proportions which allowed assigning them to the category of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Since the beginning of the crisis in Darfur in 2003, tens of thousands of women and girls have been subjected to rape and other extreme forms of sexual violence. Ugandan LRA fighters abduct and rape women living in south-east of the neighbouring Central African Republic.

Refugee young women and girls experience great difficulties. They are at risk of being abducted and raped when leaving their camps for the procurement of fuel, water, etc. Abducted women are sent to rebel military camps, where they are exploited as "wives", sex slaves, forced labour, or servants (carrying heavy loads of water, firewood, military equipment, cooking, laundry, etc.). Violence is the "normal way of life" everywhere in refugee camps. Female refugee (as well as female residents of villages near warring zones) are held hostage by the opposing political forces – government, represented by regular army, and rebel militias. The inhabitants of border camps for displaced persons are attacked by both conflicting parties, which turn these camps into their support bases and govern the lives of refugees – women and children.

Thus, violence, particularly sexual, permeates all actions of the combatants, who use it widely and systematically as an "instrument of war", i.e. as a part of wide and systematic attacks on civilians, which qualifies as a crime against humanity. Killing civilians, mass rape campaigns of women and girls, as well as forcing children to kill and to behave brutally are always aimed at destabilising and terrorising civilian population, transforming war into their usual way of life, spreading ethnic, religious and tribal tensions, and not only continuing but also escalating hostilities. Violence, especially sexual, is to armed opposition groups, which are interested in permanent refugee crisis, chaos, and conflict escalation, a way to demonstrate superiority over the enemy and the best way to crush its resistance.

Endless violence against civilians, primarily women, in conflict situations is used deliberately by one rival group against another as an "instrument" and a way of waging war in order not to just intimidate and draw women to its side, but also to weaken or break family and community bonds (through the isolation of "disgraced" rape victims) with. To undermine the important role of women in family, economy (agriculture, trade, etc.) and their reproductive function meant to weaken the viability and activity of a "foreign" society as a whole.

In areas of protracted conflict, population gets "accustomed" to the endless escalation of violence; violent behaviour is perceived relatively easily as an inevitable component of everyday life. Punishment and bringing all perpetrators of crimes against civilians, primarily women and children, to justice have not become a factor in preventing the escalation of violence. Conflict situations, characterised by rampant impunity, create conditions under which parties, including states, enjoy freedom of action in terms of committing sexual assaults. According to the human rights organisation "Amnesty International", impunity for perpetrators of an increasing number of rape cases committed already after the end of a conflict is still the norm in many African countries.

A weakening or lost authority of the state during the conflict, when there is no law enforcement and the escalation of tensions is allowed, has a further negative effect. High levels of violence aimed against the civilian population across the continent are also due to the militarisation of African society (including minds) during the years of protracted civil wars and conflicts. Massive uncontrolled influx of small arms, their abundance, availability, and widespread use during the years of protracted conflicts, which were generating a market for an even larger import of weapons by the government and opposition political forces, contributed to rampant violence on the continent.

The spreading practice of sexual violence and mass rape has led to serious social consequences. The lives of raped women are forever marked by a social stigma. Raped women and girls who have given birth to a child of the enemy are a "disgrace" of their family, community, and they have no chance to remarry, have children, and return to their native villages and to their old lives. Rejected by their families and communities, they found themselves in the position of outcasts with no hope to get help and support from their community. The increase in violence in many spheres of life (especially inside families) became a new social problem in many African countries in post-conflict situations (Sierra Leone, Liberia, Mozambique, DRC, etc.). Domestic violence thrives even more than during conflicts.

The practice of violence and rape during armed conflicts entails catastrophic physical, moral and psychological consequences for female population. It represents a serious threat to the health of women, being one of the reasons for the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, AIDS and HIV. Conflicts set a fertile ground for the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the spread of which clearly intensifies under the influence of war and violence.

Many women who have witnessed the massacres, atrocities and killings of their relatives, friends, children, and who themselves became the victims of moral and physical abuse and sexual violence, suffer from permanent traumatic stress disorder that can destroy their personalities. Their physical suffering is complemented with moral suffering and mental disorders – helplessness, fatigue, apathy, anxiety, depression, and insomnia. Suicide is not uncommon among these rejected women.
Under the pressure of appeals and demands of the international community in the person of international humanitarian organisations and the UN to take necessary measures against sexual abuses by all conflicting parties, African governments are beginning to (often with the assistance of local civil society) to take responsibility for the implementation of international humanitarian law, take steps to bring the perpetrators to justice, prevent and end discrimination and violence against women (as was enshrined in the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights in 2003).

Women are not just victims, although it is true in most cases, but in some cases they are active and direct participants in armed conflicts being part of army, rebel forces, support groups or support staff. In most cases, the participation of women in recent armed conflicts was not voluntary; rebels abducted (or forcibly recruited) representatives of local female population not only to provide sexual services or take care of housekeeping in military camps, but also to use them directly as combatants in battle. Only a few women and girls in occupied zones joined rebel movements voluntarily. For instance, support and assistance to opposition forces was rendered when women not just concealed, fed and did all the washing for militiants, but also acted as spies, informants, messengers, and nurses.

These “volunteers” were often youthful women from occupied poor rural areas who were willing to escape from the drudgery of everyday reality, where unemployment, poverty, hunger, lack of means and no prospects in life were pushing them for direct and voluntary participation in conflicts. To no lesser extent was it due to their desire to save their own lives or the lives of loved ones or the desire to avenge the deaths of loved ones.

Women, like men, have participated in acts of violence against enemy’s civilian population, including its female part. In Rwanda, for example, the cases are known where they were accomplices and perpetrators of crimes per se during the campaign of genocide of the Hutus against the Tutsis in 1994. Some women, who had been abducted, captured by insurgents, or forcibly recruited, in their desperate situation became real criminals and rapists. Such women had a hard time both in army and after the onset of peace. The majority of women with combat experience had mental health problems and difficulties adapting to civilian life and reintegrating into society.

Protracted civil wars and armed conflicts on the continent, despite their most negative impact on women’s position, led to a seemingly unexpected impetus towards positive changes in gender relations. The traditional role of African women in family, household and society as a whole is changing.

In the absence of their husbands and male relatives and, consequently, with the weakening of their power and everyday control, many women become more independent economically and socially. There are now a lot of families headed by women, wives (often widows) of the men who went into the army and went missing, were captured or displaced. For example, in Rwanda in 1994 after three months of genocide 34% of households were headed by women, 60% of whom were widows. The change in intra-family division of responsibilities led to a higher marital status of women and to the widening of the range of roles they played during armed conflict. Women began to work in previously closed to them “non-household” areas that were traditionally considered masculine. Due to the increasing role of women in solving important family matters (marriage, divorce, etc.) and strengthening of their independence with regard to family’s material interests, they naturally realised own key role in ensuring its survival and themselves as individuals deserving equal rights with men, which was a prelude to a greater autonomy in social and eventually political life that had once been the monopoly of men.

The increasing involvement of African women in peacekeeping activities, campaigns to protect peace and security, and searching for a peaceful settlement of the bloody civil confrontation is the evidence of their increased public role during conflicts and wars. Numerous women’s organisations, associations, and unions, whose primary concern was the promotion of peace, emerged in the conflict zones of the region (in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, etc).

Wars and conflicts became a catalyst for the women’s movement for their rights. Various social organisations of African women, which struggled for gender equality, the elimination of violence and all forms of discrimination against women, greater access not only to education, but also to participation in political decision making, became more active. The increase in the number of women occupying government positions and serving in national parliaments or even in security and defence agencies in several African countries has already become a reality.

Armed conflicts to no lesser extent negatively affect children, who experience the horrors of war. They can easily become its victims being the most vulnerable category of civilians. Tens of thousands of African children are killed in fighting or are wounded or maimed after stepping on a land mine. Millions of children in conflict zones became homeless, forcibly displaced, and refugees, who had no contact with their parents and family.

Sexual violence against children, who in most cases in the absence of their parents fend for themselves, which is closely linked with the practice of abducting children (mostly in camps for displaced persons and refugees, but also in villages, schools, etc.), has become widespread in the setting of total chaos and insanity of war. In conflict zones, children (and women) were (and still are) subjected to various forms of violence and exploitation, extreme brutality, sexual assault and rape by all warring parties in violation of international humanitarian law.

During armed conflicts, girls became increasingly often the main objects of abductions and forced recruitment and were then sold into sexual
slavery or as concubines. This practice was widespread in Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Uganda and the DRC. In times of armed conflict, girls faced and still face physical (including sexual) and mental abuse, hard work in family, in camps for displaced persons and on rebel bases, worsening health, particularly of reproductive system and associated with early pregnancy in case of rape and child birth. HIV/AIDS also pose a great risk.

A phenomenon of child soldiers became a true disaster. An unprecedented number of children in African conflict zones are systematically and widely used in combat both by rebels and pro-government armed units. According to the estimates of the human rights organisation "Human rights watch", nearly a third of all child soldiers in the world are in Africa, and the largest in size in Africa army of child soldiers operated until recently in the DRC. In some of conflicting countries, children constituted the bulk of combatants despite the fact that the practice of abduction and forced recruitment or conscription on a "voluntary basis" of persons under 18 years of age for direct participation in armed struggle is a direct violation of international humanitarian law and international conventions on the rights of children. In Angola and Mozambique, child soldiers, who had previously been abducted during raids on villages and separated from their families, actively fought throughout the long years of civil war. In the DRC, all parties to the conflict used abducted child soldiers and impeded actively international humanitarian organisations from upholding children’s rights and withdrawing them from war. In the east of the country, children accounted for up to 40% of the personnel of some armed groups. Child soldiers participated in military operations not only in their countries, but also in neighbouring states. In the West African subregion, for example, child soldiers from Liberia were recruited for participation in armed conflict in Cote d'Ivoire.

After the end of conflicts, which in many cases did not mean the achievement of genuine peace, the release and demobilisation of thousands of child soldiers did not lead to cessation of violence, cruelty to children, their forced or voluntary recruitment into armed opposition groups or army. Faced with dismal conditions in transit camps for the "returnees", lack of social and other assistance, including humanitarian one, difficulties of post-war life – everyday challenges, extreme poverty, unemployment, hopelessness, cruel treatment, etc., children – former soldiers – tried to re-enlist in the armed forces and go to war. Poor socio-economic situation and the failures of reintegration into society pushed children – former soldiers – to participate in new conflicts and fight for money, as the war became the sole means of survival for thousands of young underage people.

War experience seriously affected the physical and moral state of children who were in armed groups and did not know another life apart from robbery, raids and violence. The younger generation in Sierra Leone and Liberia actually grew up during the civil wars that lasted over 15 and 10 years respectively. Child soldiers – the witnesses of the horrors of war crimes and "heroes" of violence, cannot easily escape their past and still remain the most vulnerable members of society, who suffer from serious mental post-stress disorders. These children are difficult to integrate into civilian life and to get them to study and work.

It is important to note that local communities in former conflict zones (for example, in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Southern Sudan) participated in the process of social reintegration of demobilised children, which had been exposed in their early, immature years to severe forms of violence. Community structures, large families and especially women, committees of elders, and religious societies play a significant role in ensuring the protection of war-affected children, providing them by the means of traditional community mechanisms of support and assistance with schooling, professional training, and in preventing their re-recruitment into armed force. It is obvious that the effective implementation of government programmes for the rehabilitation of the direct participants in armed conflict and the involvement of former military youth in post-conflict reconstruction and development of their countries linked to the extension granted to her by the State of employment opportunities, vocational training, access to education, health care, as well as poverty reduction, while a significant increase in sustainable investment in these areas.

It is obvious that the effective implementation of government programmes for the rehabilitation of the immediate participants of armed conflicts and the involvement of former military youth in post-conflict reconstruction and development of their countries linked to the expansion by the state of employment opportunities, professional training, access to general education, health care, as well as poverty reduction, and coupled with a significant increase in sustainable investment in these areas.

African governments have the primary responsibility for solving problems of safeguarding and protecting children’s rights in their countries, as required by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (signed in 1989, came into force in 1990) and by the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (came into force in 1999). However, countries in the region, which are emerging from conflict, cannot do without the support and assistance from the international community in the person of, first of all, the UN and its subsidiaries (in particular UNICEF and OHCHR), international humanitarian and human rights organisations, whose efforts since the outbreaks of conflicts had been directed at protecting and improving the situation of children affected by war in Africa.
At present time there is a decline in political and military conflicts, civil wars on the continent owing to the efforts of African and international community to settle disputes and differences peacefully, disarm rebel forces, and restore stability. However, there are still many socio-political and economic reasons that could lead to new or exacerbate old conflicts and contradictions in different parts of the region and give rise to political instability, social violence and tension. Unavoidable new conflicts will serve as a breeding ground for the resumption of destruction, mass killings, violence and rape against civilian population of women and children. The African Union declared year 2010 to be the "Year of Peace and Security" in Africa in order to finally resolve and settle armed conflicts, which to a varying degree of intensity are continuing in several African countries. It is necessary to find new peaceful and political means and ways to overcome conflicts and differences, including those between neighbouring countries, which lead to exodus of citizens and rampant violence against women and children. Such means and ways could include the extension of the processes of democratisation, development of democratic institutions, elimination of all forms of discrimination against women (and children), increasingly active involvement of women in socio-political and economic life of their countries and the continent as a whole. The need to strengthen international mechanisms to protect the most vulnerable groups of African society and strengthen intra-African and international cooperation in humanitarian assistance to and support of women and children – victims of civil and military conflicts – is apparent.

The story about Tanzania cannot do without a mention of Zanzibar, what is quite logical – the island is a part of the country. However, for me and, as far as I believe, for my expedition colleagues a narrative about the island is a separate story, in which an emphasis should be put on the special role of the island and its inhabitants in the life of the country. So what is special about this region of the country? Why am I trying to stress the singularity of the island and separate it from the mainland? The reason for this is not just the geographic location and history of the island, but also the results of our research, which are different from the results obtained on the mainland.

During the expedition to the island, its participants managed to visit Zanzibar Town (or City, as local population calls it) – the capital of the island, once the capital of the sultanate, as well as a small Muslim village of Paje on Zanzibar’s eastern coast, where the project ‘s participants conducted a series of interviews and surveys of the population. This article is based on the results of this study, which focuses on the current state of interethnic relations in Tanzania.

The dissimilarity between Zanzibar and the mainland part of the country strikes one’s eyes already on the way to the island. A voyage by ferry from Dar es Salaam takes just an hour and a half, and although my colleagues and I knew about the role of Arab culture in the history of this region, we did not expect the island to be in such sharp contrast with the mainland. The appearance of Dar es Salaam is determined by German-style colonial buildings and modern hotels which are being constructed along the waterfront, while in Zanzibar we saw before us an Arab city, or rather an Arab port, the architecture of which shows not only the influence of Eastern civilization, but also of the colonial legacy.

During the disembarkation from the ferry, foreigners are reminded about the customs: after filling in a small declaration you get a visa in your passport – an immigration stamp of the port of Zanzibar. This is a reminder that you now are not quite in Tanzania and that Zanzibar is certainly a part of it, but also the results of our research, which are different from the results obtained on the mainland.

The need to strengthen international mechanisms to protect the most vulnerable groups of African society and strengthen intra-African and international cooperation in humanitarian assistance to and support of women and children – victims of civil and military conflicts – is apparent.


\[6\] www.HRW.org.
From the first steps on the island we dived into smells unusual for Africa – a mixture of spices and incense, a smell which I had not encountered on the mainland. As you move farther from the port and immerse in urban crowd, you see a distinctive image of not only the city's architecture, but also of its inhabitants. There are mostly Africans on the streets, but their facial features are different from those that we are accustomed to seeing on the continent. Dark skin (often lighter than skin of representatives of tribes living on the mainland), almond-shaped eyes and facial features, which give up their mixed origins, – knowing the history of the island, we can confidently identify the admixture of Arab blood in many of the inhabitants of the old city we encounter on our way.

Narrow streets, small shops, workshops, coffee shops – it is easy to get lost during the first couple of hours, but then it appears that the city is quite small and intimate, and there are plenty of guides. A local twenty-year-old lad joins us on one of the streets. First we wave him off thinking that he is one of the sellers of souvenirs for tourists, of which there is no end on these streets. However, he persistently follows us asking us who we are and where we are coming from. He introduces himself as a student who makes some money working as a guide. We, in turn, also get interested in him – he is the first local resident with whom we can talk.

We get to know his name – Suleiman, and that his father was born in Dar es Salaam. "My mother was born in Zanzibar. She is from the Manyema tribe. My dad is a Nyamwezi. My family is doing business". In the course of our conversation we are trying to get his answers to our research questions: what is his attitude towards Arabs, Indians, and Europeans.

"In Zanzibar, there is a mix of Arabs, Indians, and Swahili. All of us here are mixed. My friend calls himself an Arab, but he is also mixed with Swahili." During the conversation with the young man we are trying to understand whom he calls "the Arabs" and who he considers himself to be:

"The Arabs in Zanzibar are those who have Arab ancestors by descent mixed with us, Swahili," – he replies. Thus, mentioning in the beginning of the conversation the tribal affiliation of his parents, he resumes saying that all of them are Swahili. This is an interesting fact which the expedition participated encountered during the first conversation and which recurred in the course of all conversations.

It is necessary to note that we conducted interviews not with experts in any way connected with issues related to our research topic but with the people whom we met on the streets of the city or in villages: tour guides and museum staff, church officials and hotel workers, salesmen, taxi drivers – so these interviews illustrate, above all, the opinion of "ordinary people", i.e. people not related professionally to our topic. For many people that we encountered the term "Swahili" stood for those Africans who had arrived from the mainland. For instance, a young man who worked at the hotel told us that his wife was "Swahili" and he brought her from the mainland. However, later we learned that she had lived not far from Arusha and her ancestors had come from a local tribe.

The interviews and conversations with local residents not only allowed us to get answers to our questions but also pointed at a special identity of the residents of the island and the relations among its inhabitants. When we continued the interview with our first respondent we found out the following: "I think they (the Arabs – E.D.) are good people, but sometimes they are bad. Sometimes they help poor people. But they make money on the poor because the poor work for them, and they live better than we do. They have nice cars, houses, which we don’t have.

The Indians are not friendly. They are generally different from the Swahili and Arabs. Indians run many shops here, so we have to communicate with them. They always underpay their workers and force them to work much.

Europeans come here to work and study. They like to communicate with us. They like the peoples who live here and their traditions. They are very friendly with the residents of Zanzibar (the respondent confuses European Tanzanians and tourists with visitors who work temporarily on the island – researchers and travel agents. In Zanzibar, there are many tourists with whom he communicates and whom he approaches in the streets to guide them through the city, for which Europeans pay him. Here he most likely describes the tourists – E.D.).

We will come back later to the discussion of the inhabitants of the island. I would like to note the fact that in Tanzania there are several so-called "tourist zones", which include Zanzibar. Even in comparison to Dar es Salaam and the Kilimanjaro region, this part of the country is a kind of a tourist Mecca (above all, Zanzibar City and the eastern coast with a developed tourist infrastructure). For the residents of Zanzibar, Europeans are, above all, tourists or those involved in tourism industry, as opposed to, for example, Dar es Salaam, where local people discuss Europeans that come to the country to work (many South Africans are working in Tanzania) in large corporations or to do business, or representatives of one of European Diasporas (e.g. Greek).

The fact that this part of the country is becoming increasingly attractive for tourists is further proven by the number of souvenir shops that sell not only traditional island spices or other native Zanzibar souvenirs, but also all those objects of folk art that can be found throughout the country: Makonde statuettes, famous Tingatinga paintings, moreover, Maasai, which belong to probably the most tourist-oriented tribe in Africa, filled the promenade so popular among tourists for an evening out. They purposely come to the is-
of which is traditionally considered to have taken place in the 12
states (to which we may also add Pate, Lamu, and Mombasa), the golden age
their temporary residence: they did not bring families with them, took African
contributed to this mixing. "The first Arab settlers considered East Africa to be
influence to the islands of Mafia, Zanzibar, and Pemba, on which the Zenj
from Shiraz. The migrants settled on the island of Kilwa and expanded their
swahili. "It seems that by the beginning of the era East Africa’s coast was
Bantu-speaking peoples. The development of their trade relations with the East contributed to strengthening the mutual influence of cul-
tures. Increasingly often immigrants from Arab East settled in East Africa,
took local wives, became included in the socio-economic and political life of
African societies and changed it." – note scientists.

For instance, in the 9th – 10th century, along the eastern coast of Africa
several city-states emerged due to the trade contacts between Arabs and Af-
ricans, primarily immigrants from Arabia and the Persian Gulf area. Accord-
ing to historians, in the 10th century an important event was the migration
from Shiraz. The migrants settled on the island of Kilwa and expanded their
influence to the islands of Mafia, Zanzibar, and Pemba, on which the Zenj
state was founded. The culture of Swahili began to form in these very city-
states (to which we may also add Pate, Lamu, and Mombasa), the golden age
of which is traditionally considered to have taken place in the 12th – 15th
century.

Swahili language and culture evolved from the mixing of Arab culture with
that of the Bantu peoples. The fact that Arab merchants coming to the island
were mostly unmarried and, after settling on this new land, married local girls
contributed to this mixing. "The first Arab settlers considered East Africa to be
their temporary residence: they did not bring families with them, took African
women as wives and concubines, and did not seek to introduce their culture
and norms of social life into the local community. Therefore, the earliest Arab
settlements on the coast and islands are characterised to a greater extent by a
mixture of Arab and African cultures, rather than social and cultural divi-
sions." Besides Arabs, Persians, Indians, and representatives of various tribes,
which were brought by Arabs as slaves from interior regions of Africa, also
participated in the ethnogenesis of Swahili.

In the 18th century, Zanzibar gradually became the key trade centre of the
coast. At this time, the island was swept over with a new wave of newcomers –
this time it was Omani Arabs. In 1841, in order to further develop the trade
area of the Indian Ocean, to facilitate slave trade, as well as to more effec-
tively control East Coast cities, Omani sultan Seyyid Said moved his capital
to the island of Zanzibar. It was at this time that Omani Arabs appeared on
the island, and their attitude towards this migration was different from their
predecessors.

Omani Arabs originally represented the elite of society: they governed
the sultanate and held most wealth in their hands. They came to the island to
settle down there: to export local products, develop the land, establish new
spice plantations, and, finally, to live there and have a status which is defined
and separate from the rest of the population. They came to new lands, unlike
their predecessors – the Arabs who stood at the origins of Swahili civiliza-
tion, with their families, brought with them their customs and social system
( unlike their predecessors). The "new" Arabs formed mainly the landed arist-
ocracy, which for a long time was exclusive elite. Significant revenues pro-
vided young people from these families with the opportunity not only to do
business, but also to receive education, which paved their way to supreme
administrative authority. The influence of these families in vital areas of the
economy and civil administration was so great that they were making a huge
impact on the entire social and political structure of East Africa’s society.
"During the colonial period, the British administration, which perceived Zan-
zibar as an Arab state, promoted Arabs to administrative positions." It
is worth noting that not all Omani Arabs were rich land owners and
merchants close to the sultan. Zanzibar government invited to the island
small merchants also, as well as not so rich Omanis wishing to buy small
parcels of land. Despite their seemingly rather low social status, Omani Ar-
abs emphasised their singularity in relation to the rest of the population and
preserve their cultural identity. Thus, they emphasised their belonging not
only to their ethnicity, but also to the elite.

"By the 20th century ... the not so well-to-do layer of Arabs consisted of
several groups. One group included the descendants of the earliest settlers,
who had suffered an economic collapse, particularly due to the prohibition
of the slave trade. Another group was represented mainly by relatively recent
immigrants from Oman and other Arab countries. These immigrants were
different not only due to their short stay in East Africa, but also to their attitude towards the regions as a place to improve their financial situation... The Arab population was mainly engaged in commerce... in addition, a significant number of Arabs worked as drivers, butchers, etc.”

On top of that, in Zanzibar a kind of commercial elite was formed by another group of foreigners – Indians, whose mass migration and the formation of diaspora had begun with the establishment of the Omani sultanate on the island. It should be noted that trade relations between India and Africa existed for centuries. When we say "Indians" we mean people from different regions of India, mainly from Western and Northern India. Some of them were Shia Muslims (e.g. Khoja and Bohra), and a significant portion of migrants, who were predominantly Catholics, came from the Indian province of Goa.

The following fact is also interesting: it is known that "... the original form of economic activity of Indian settlers in East Africa was trade, (and this fact – E.D.) defined to a large extent the caste of immigrants arriving in Africa: for example, Bania, Bhatti, Khoja, Bohra, and others." 12

"Their knowledge of the Bombay market, where East Africa exported most of its products, made Indians essential in an era of flourishing trade in Zanzibar. They were a kind of middlemen, dealing with financial aspects of caravan business and exports to Europe.” 13

During the colonial period, the authorities penetrated East Africa’s market with the help of Indians. The British let them not only into the financial sector, but also into the administrative one, albeit limited their influence in government.

Despite their long presence in East Africa, Indians, which in 1948 numbered 6% of the population of Zanzibar, have maintained their ethnic and religious identity, in spite of the fact that many of them were already the second and even third generation living on the island. As scientists believe, Indians openly express their cultural difference from the rest of the people living next to them, and even those who were born and raised on the island spoke the language of their ancestors: "They stayed outside Zanzibar society.” 14

The indigenous population of Zanzibar includes Shirazi, although it is historically and sociologically difficult to determine who they are and where did they come from. That term is used today to describe indigenous population of the islands of Pemba (Pemba tribe) and Zanzibar (the old name of the island is Unguja; Hadimu and Tumbatu tribes). There is a myth about the origin of this people relating them to the Persian Shirazi.

According to A. Prins, 15 there are certain problems when defining Shirazi. "They have never identified themselves with the Persians, although they are aware of the existence of Shiraz as a kind of a homeland distant in time and space...There are some families...which believe that they belong to some “invisible entity”, which partly determines their origin...” 16 The scientist notes that there are whole villages whose leaders call themselves Shirazi and their inhabitants, even if the belong to local tribes, identify themselves with Shirazi as well. According to him, Shirazi is more of a social rather than ethnic commonality, although it is difficult to state this unequivocally. Prins stresses that many farmers and fishermen attributed themselves to Shirazi, thus distinguishing themselves both from Africans and Arabs.

However, the main concern of its bearers remains, as before, the separation of themselves from Africans – immigrants from the mainland. Scientists argue that "since 1930, the meaning of this concept has broadened and now distinguishes all African peoples trying to contrast themselves with African workers – immigrants from the mainland. The same group includes freed slaves, who preferred to be called Shirazi, rather than Swahili. In fact, the Shirazi possess the same characteristics as the Swahili, but they never use this term to refer to themselves.” 17

Shirazi coexisted with Arabs and have never been their slaves. However, Arabs dominated this relationship, not only politically and economically but also culturally. Not for nothing "to be educated" in Swahili is pronounced the same as "to be an Arab" (ustaarabu). Shirazi emphasised that they were the first inhabitants of the island, unlike Arabs and Africans – people from the mainland. Before Zanzibar’s independence, Shirazi were engaged in agriculture and fishing, and this island nation is obliged to them for the world famous carnations – one of the main export products.

Speaking of Zanzibar, it is impossible not to mention the so-called continental Africans. This term stands for all the Africans who came to the island from the mainland. "In 1948, they accounted for roughly a quarter of the population of the island of Zanzibar and for one-eighth of the population of the island of Pemba. These Africans came from different regions of eastern and central Africa, and the census of 1948 stated that 78% of them had been born on the islands.” 18 In general, Africans represented the most vulnerable layers of population: they or their ancestors came to the island in search of work and were ready for any work, even if it was low-paid. For the most part they were hired seasonally to harvest or on an hourly basis to work in the city. Africans took up even the jobs that Shirazi considered “slavish” and rejected.

Among the local population they were perceived as "outsiders" and often a priori considered Christians. However, their social status was often not too different from the status of Shirazi.

Thus in Zanzibar there was not only social but also ethnic hierarchy before the revolution. Omanis, who immigrated to the island over a century
and occupied key positions in the administration, belonged to the elite. Even the establishment of British protectorate in 1890 kept the situation as favourable for the Arab elite as it was earlier: the British took into consideration the power that Arabs had in Zanzibar and reinforced it by appointing them to positions in the administration and legislative assembly. Until 1950, the Britons were convinced that only such a policy could promote stability in the region.

"Even though the Sultan no longer had real political power, he played an important role of a representative and an adviser to the government. In 1926, a legislative council was created, which was composed of eight members appointed by the sultan with the consent of the British Governor, which represented primarily the interests of the Arab oligarchy... Only some time later there was a racial reform of the council, which was approved by the administration: 3 seats were granted to Arabs, 2 – to Indians, 2 – to Africans, and one – to a European. A conflict erupted because of these two "African" seats since they were regularly occupied by Shirazi rather than by Africans from the mainland."\(^{19}\)

As history shows, throughout various periods of times, the ethnic question has always been one of the key issues in Zanzibar. It is not surprising that, after having received an approval from British authorities for the establishment of ethnic associations, Arabs and Indians were the first to create such organisations: the Arab Association (1901) and the Indian Association (1914). As expected, these organisations defended the interests of the Arab elite, merchants, and bankers from India and Pakistan. In 1934, the African Association was established, whose members were immigrants from the continent, and, finally, in 1934, the Shirazi Association was founded. Even if the main purpose of these organisations was the opposition to colonial regime, they still acted in the interests of their own group.

Even the Zanzibar National Party, which was created later to represent mainly the interests of the Arab elite, declared "its political purpose at the time to expand voting rights of local population... on the basis of the principle of "one man – one vote" and secure this right for the "real" people of Zanzibar." When declaring this, Arab aristocrat Saif Hamad initially excluded from this group the Indians, who posed a danger to the bourgeoisie and financial elite, and immigrants from the continent, who were able to organise a revolution... His idea was to create an Arab society... which included the Shirazi, who would follow Arab leaders..."\(^{20}\)

A few years later, in 1957, the Afro-Shirazi Party, which represented the interests of both mainland Africans and local black population, entered the political arena and became a kind of opposition to the Zanzibar National Party. Until the revolution of 1964, the island was divided into two camps – ethno-political blocs: the Zanzibar National Party united the Arabs and some Tumbatu and Pemba Shirazi, with some support of Muslim Indians, while the Afro-Shirazi Party had in its ranks Hadimu Shirazi and mainland Africans, as well as some Hindu Indians, and had the backing of the mainland Tanganyika African National Union.

"On 12 January 1964, the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council (ZRC), in which the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) played the main role, seized power in Zanzibar as a result of an armed uprising... The overthrow of the sultan and the elimination of Arab domination, under the cover of which, according to the historian O.I. Teterin, "the British strengthened their domination on the island of Zanzibar and the adjacent Pemba and Tumbatu islands, was contrary to the agreement previously achieved in London, which provided for the independence of the islands under the condition of keeping power on the island in the hands of the Sultan, and was a consequence of a mass uprising of the black population... The rebels seized Arabs, took them to beaches, and there executed. About 5 thousand Arabs were killed... Many Indians and Pakistanis... fled the island..."\(^{21}\)

The 1964 revolution completely changed the life in Zanzibar. Though a part of Tanzania, Zanzibar still remains a kind of a detached part of the country. The results of our expedition, which aimed at studying interethnic relations in Tanzania, confirm this.

The research results confirm that the ethnic composition of the local population of Zanzibar is still divided into four groups: the Arabs, Shirazi, Indians and mainland Africans. I would not include the so-called "Europeans" in this group because, unlike the mainland, where representatives of various diasporas (Greeks, Italians) reside permanently, in Zanzibar they are mostly newcomers – businessmen and tourist agents.

"...They (the Arabs – E.D.), for the most part, came from Oman, but possibly they came here long ago, before the Revolution. They have been here for a long time, but are called Arabs. They joined hands with the Swahili and intermarried here. However, the specific thing is that they came from the Arabian Peninsula very long ago. They are still here, they married here, (raised) sons, but they believed that they were the Arabs," says a respondent (an African born on the mainland, who lived in Zanzibar for thirty years). Indeed, both in Zanzibar and Pemba many Arabs during several generations took local Africans as wives or even as husbands.

An interesting observation was made by my colleagues on the island of Pemba: a respondent, who presented herself as an "Arab", drew attention to some differences between them: there are "white" and "black" Arabs. "White" ones are those who have pure male line (there were no local men in the family). "Black" are those where husbands were local.\(^{23}\) Some respondents simply referred to themselves as "Arabs" without giving further explanations.
Nowadays, not all "Arabs" can tell who they are and where from. The usual response of local Arabs: "My ancestors came from Oman." According to the observation of expedition participants, many of them know neither when their ancestors immigrated nor family history. Aisha, the mother of a landlady on the eastern shore of the island, is an Arab whose ancestors "came from Arabia", but she does not know either when they arrived or the Arabic language.24 This is quite typical of present-day Arabs – residents of Zanzibar, most of which come not from the Arab elite, which once ruled the island, but from merchants and craftsmen.

Many respondents in interviews and conversations reiterate that they all live together. "...The island is very small! We have to live together ... On the mainland, they have districts where they live (on their own), only Indians. In Dar es Salaam there are entire Indian streets, where only Indians may walk. We have no such Indian places here. All places are visited by the Indians, Africans, and Arabs" – were some of the opinions. "People from the mainland have long being coming to the island, like my parents from Malawi. They were people of different nations, different peoples. Thus, when they stay on the island, no one can say "this is my island" because everyone came from elsewhere. Therefore, we live in a state of friendship."25

From the interviews conducted on the island it can be concluded that, indeed, after such a lasting residence near each other the ethnic groups have found a way to coexist. Most of the Arabs we met belonged to the business elite of the society, and Indians, as before, were engaged mainly in commerce. In Zanzibar City we met quite a lot of "mainland Africans" who had moved to the island after the revolution, or their children. We managed to talk to Shirazi in a village on the eastern shore of the island.

Out of all the conversations a conclusion can be made: on the island there still remains a kind of ethnic hierarchy, a kind of business hierarchy. Each ethnic group has an unofficial but fixed area of occupation. "...The Arabs are Muslims. We do not say much else about Arabs... We do not have a special relationship (with the Indians – E.D.), they are present both in Zanzibar and on the mainland, most of them are businessmen. – What are the main differences between the Indians and the Africans? – They are white while we are black. – Are there any differences between the Arabs and the Afro-Tanzanians? – Yes, they also differ in the way of life, they are engaged in business. Most Africans are engaged in agriculture."26

The main problem for the residents of Zanzibar is not so much interethnic relations on the island, but also their relations with the mainland. If you come to Zanzibar, then I will tell you that I am a Zanzibarian. In general, there are a lot of questions about the independence of Zanzibar. Zanzibar wants independence. – Do you? – You came from Dar es Salaam. You have seen it – a big city with large buildings, nice roads, and houses. They have money, good money. The government gives us very little. Everything stays there. It’s not right.”

This is not an isolated opinion. In private conversations, the independence of Zanzibar was mentioned many times, and the main argument of its supporters was poor funding provided to the island from the state budget, in contrast to the mainland. However, we cannot argue that this is a general opinion of the population: we cannot give an objective analysis due to a non-representative sample. There were other opinions: "I think that the leaders of Zanzibar and the mainland should be ... (thinking). OK. Here is the island, here is the mainland. However, we have a common president. – What about the President of Zanzibar? – Yes. We have a president of Tanzania. Here, in Zanzibar, we have our own president. But, as I mentioned, in Tanzania (that is – the mainland and Zanzibar parts) there is only one. – Do you think that a tendency to unite parts or to develop separately will prevail? – We will develop our country... There is a separate president here, and there should be (to be) a president for the whole of Tanzania."27

Having established certain relations between the ethnic groups, based primarily on the allocation of economic roles, the primary concern for the residents of Zanzibar becomes the island’s relations with the mainland and the question of the island’s independence. However, looking into the past of the island, we are left to wonder whether the problem of interethnic relations reappears in the context of the struggle for independence and the redistribution of political and economic roles in the islands.

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1 Interview T 20, 03/05/05.
2 The conversation was not recorded on tape. The author and other expedition members made individual records of the results of interviews.
3 An interesting fact is that the Maasai, even during the slave trade, hardly ever imported to the island as a "commodity". The Maasai – proud warriors – almost immediately died in captivity, as a tour guide told us at the museum of the slave trade.
4 Arabs, al Arab (original name), is a group of peoples, a meta-ethnic commonality... It belongs mainly to the Indo-Mediterranean race of the large Europoid race ... For more details see: Peoples of the world. Historical and ethnographic handbook. // Arabs. Moscow, "Soviet encyclopaedia", 1988. Pp. 64-66.
5 Swahili (original name, literally "coastal people" from Arabic "sahil" – “coast"), an ethnicity of the Bantu group in East Africa... Swahili speak the Swahili language (Kiswahili) ... Descendants of the aboriginal population of the coastal strip and (immigrating here since the first centuries B.C.), Indians, Arabs, Persians, as well as representatives of various tribes which were imported by Arabs as slaves from internal regions of Africa, mixed and took part in the ethnogenesis of the Swahili). For
ASHANTI: ETHNOS, SUB-ETHNOS OR SUPER-ETHNOS?

(On the issue of levels of ethnic self-consciousness)  

The modern age, on the one hand, is characterised by increased regionalisation and ethnicisation, revival and development of ethnic cultures, but, on the other hand, by the processes of globalisation (including the processes at the level of continents such as Africa and South America). Almost everywhere, this leads to different processes of ethnic transformation and the so-called "explosion of ethnicity" (nationalism, tribalism, ethno-chauvinism, separatism, irredentism and other forms of politicising ethnicity), which highlights the problem of ethnic self-consciousness.

Ethnic self-consciousness implies ethnic identity and awareness of ethnic differences (ethnic frontiers). Ethnic identity, or ethnicity, is the component of ethnic consciousness which reflects an individual’s view of himself as a representative of a certain (own) ethnic group, i.e. ethnic identification and inter-ethnic differentiation. At the same time, ethnic identity (or self-identity) is a direct determination by an individual of his ethnicity and attachment to a specific ethnic group (based on the "we – they" contraposition) and is associated primarily with linguistic identity.

As we know, language is the key characteristic of an ethnic group. Language and ethnicity are generally interdependent, and an ethnonym usually coincides with a linguonym. In fact, linguistic unity is one of the conditions for the formation of an ethnos; connection between an ethnos and a language is natural and stable, so it is quite natural that genetic (genealogical) linguistic classifications are widely used for the classification of ethnoses.

In other words, belonging to a linguistic community is the basis of ethnocultural identity, although there are many ethnic groups in the world that have changed their language. Thus a change of language does not always lead to a loss of ethnic identity and disappearance of a particular ethnic group (or, in other words, the characteristic of language as the leading ethnic determinant may lose some importance, and other components of ethnic culture may come to the forefront, namely confession, ethnic-specific worldview, ethno-axiomatic systems (ethnic values), including, probably, ethnic mentality and historical memory, i.e. myths about common ancestors and native land, etc.).

Vladimir Popov

This article was written specially for the Yearbook.
Turning to facts, the Ashanti is considered to be the largest nation of the Akan group. Currently they number no less than 4 million, while the total number of all Akans is close to 15 million, of whom about 10 million live in Ghana (over half the population of this country; other major nationalities besides the Ashanti include the Fanti (about 2 million), Akyem (700 thousand), Akwapim and Gonja (500 thousand each), more than 4 million live in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire (a third of population, mainly the Agni and Baoule); there are also Akans in Togo (the Tchokossi, which number 50 thousand) and in the towns of Liberia, Sierra-Leone and Nigeria. The main integrative factor for the Akans is language: they all use very similar, often mutually understandable idioms that constitute a cluster (i.e., they, just like many linguistic communities in Africa, consider it important to distinguish language – dialect – subdialect), which was traditionally included in the Kwa subgroup of the Guinean language group of West Africa according to the classification by D.A. Olderogge or in the Kwa family of Niger-Congo branch of the Niger-Kordofan macro-family according to the classification by J. Greenberg.

According to the degree of linguistic proximity the Akans are usually divided into two groups: the Western group (Agni, Baoule, Nzima, Ahanta, Anufo, Tchokossi, Afema, Cherepon (Kyerepon), Abron, etc.) and the Eastern one, consisting of two sub-groups or dialect bundles: Fanti (Mfantse) and Twi (Chwee). Twi-speaking peoples include the Ashanti, Akyem, Akwapim, Akwamu, Kwawu, Kswatu (Kwahu), etc.

Modern linguistic studies have significantly changed our understanding of the relationship between Kwa languages. The Eastern Kwa (Yoruba, Igbo, Idoma, Bini, Nupe) are now regarded as a western subfamily of the Benue-Congo family of the Niger-Kordofan macro-family; the Ijo group received the status of a special language family. The former Akan subgroup was called the Volta – Comoé and incorporated these three groups: Guan (Guang, Gonja), Ono (Abure and Metyibo languages) and Tano, consisting of Bia and Akan subgroups, which generally correspond to the former eastern and western Akan language groups. Thus, modern linguistics uses "Akan" to refer only to the eastern groups of the Fanti and Twi dialects (the so-called "proper Akan").

The most recent research in the field of Kwa language classification has led to the distribution of Akan languages according to the following taxonomic levels: Nyo super-branch – Yi (Potou-Tano) branch – Volta-Comoé (Tano) sub-branch – groups:
- Western Tano: Abure, Betibe (Metyibo, or Eotile)
- Central Tano:
  1. Bia
- Agni-Baoule

Agni: Ndenye (Indenie), Anufo, or Brussa (including Tchokossi), Betye, Dyabe, Sefwi (Sehwi), Moro (Moronou)
Baoule: Baoule, Nguwou, Woure, Bona, Abe
Nzima – Ahanta
Nzima, Afema (Sanvi), Aowin, Pepisa
Ahanta, Evalue, Wasaw

2. Akan (Chwee – Fante)

Twi
Twi Kasa (Akwapim), Akyem
Acante (Ashanti), Denkyira, Adanci Adansi
Akwapmu, Assin, Assenie-Twifo
Abron, Kwawu

Fante: Fante (Mfantse), Agona
- Guan (Gonja)
  northern: Gonja (Ngbanyato), Nwawu, Nkhumuru, Krachi, Anyanga, Nkonya, Nkami
  southern: Cherepon, Late (Larte), Anum (Boso), Awudu
  eastern: Bazantche, Tchumbuli.

So what are Akan languages and who are the Akans? What is the relation between these two concepts? In another words, what is the relation between linguistic and ethnical classification?

The origin of the term "Akan" is still unclear. Different transcriptions of "Akan" are often found in documents of European forts in West Africa and in the writings of travellers and merchants in the 16th-17th century as the name of a group of people inhabiting the interior of the Gold Coast, whose representatives often came to European forts to sell gold. It was believed that they came from Akan, but, at the same time, some authors called Akan a country, while others called it a city, and still others called it a tribe, but the majority called it a political entity (state or chiefdom). Attempts to juxtapose Akan with more recent political organisms that existed in pre-colonial period in the forest zone of the Gold Coast were not successful. Akan disappeared from the writings of Europeans in the 17th – 18th century, but at the end of the 19th century missionaries and colonial officials used Akan as a collective name for a group of related ethnicities and languages.

The etymology of the term "Akan" has not been established, although there exists an interpretation by J.G. Christaller: Akan, or rather Okanni (plural – Akanfo), is "a man who speaks the Akan or Twi language…a nice, refined, well-mannered man", i.e. Akan is the best, first among others (other nations?). This definition is confirmed by the phrase that Ashanti and Akyem use in situations when then need to defend their personal honour or distinguish themselves from outlanders and emphasise their belonging to aboriginal population: "look, I am an Okanni". It is possible that the concept of
Okanni/Akanfo strengthened among Twi-speaking peoples during the period of slave trade in response to increasing numbers of slaves and their descendants.

The use of the term "Twi" is also not characterised by monosemanticity. In the narrow sense the term is used as a second name of the Akwapim language / dialect, in its most common sense – as a designation for the group of dialects which includes Akwapim, Ashanti (Asante) and Akyem, which is reflected in the latest linguistic classification, and in its widest sense – for the nomination of all languages of the eastern sub-group of Akan languages or Akan (Twi-Fante) subgroup, i.e. usually it comes down to considering Akwapim, Asante, Akyem, and Fante as the dialects of Twi. In addition, in Ghana there is a tendency to apply the word "Twi" as a synonym for "Akan" to refer to all Akan languages (in the traditional interpretation) or Volta-Comoé (Tano) languages, which are common in Ghana.

Let us consider Ashanti and other Akans in terms of ethnicity. To begin with, Akan languages do not have a special word to describe the concept of ethnic unity. The "oman", which was a word for chiefdom or any other ethno-political community (EPC), was used for that. Compound words consisting of the name of an oman and "fo" (people) served as ethnonyms. For example: Asantefo, Akyemfo, Akwapimfo, etc. Practically without an exception, Akan ethnonyms are derived from Akan politonyms and match the names of political entities, which, in turn, are mostly toponyms and often coincide with the name of a capital.

Thus, some Akan ethnic communities formed exclusively within the frames of EPC. The Ashanti were probably formed in the middle of the 18th to early 19th century as a result of consolidation and assimilation of various Akan groups within the Ashanti Confederation (circa 1700 – 1896). There are several theories about the etymology of the ethnonym and politonym "Asante". The most convincing theory interprets the word "Asante" as "united for a war (wars)", i.e. a "military alliance" ("osa" means "war", "inte" means "for the sake of, due to", and the prefix "a" is the indicator of the plural). Initially Asante referred only to the "proper Ashanti", i.e. the residents of the five chiefdoms (Amanto), which established the Ashanti Confederation to fight against Denkyira oman. Thus, Asante emerged as a socio-political term and acquired an ethnic tinge only towards the end of the 18th century.

It should be noted that in various collective and encyclopaedic works the ethno-cultural and socio-political specifics of the Ashanti are passed for all Akan, i.e. all Akans are reduced to Ashanti. This approach is justified, as a rule, by the statement that the "culture and religion of the Ashanti are the most typical of all the Akans." However, the Ashanti culture has been preserved in a more original form, probably because the Ashanti fell under the direct influence of Europeans later than most of the other Akans – at the end of 19th century, while the Akans of the coastal regions had been experiencing this influence since the 15th century.

If we consider ethnos to be a self-conscious cultural and linguistic unity, it is obvious that the Ashanti and Fanti did not exist as ethnoses until the beginning of the 19th century, i.e. Asantefo and Fantefo were just the populations of corresponding political bodies, or nominal ethnic groups. In other words, until the pre-colonial period the Akans were a single ethnos or linguocultural unity, which was characterised by the so-called ethno-linguistic continuity, when the differences between neighboring communities are very subtle, but are clearly visible between the extreme components of an ethnos. In case of the Akans, the most contrasting are coastal and savannah Akans, while the highest homogeneity characterises Akans of the forest zone.

Ethnogenetic processes of the Akans now seem to have developed as follows. In the 12th–14th century, certain proto-Akans had moved from Tekyi-man (a savannah zone in modern Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire) to the forest zone and to the coast of the Gulf of Guinea and became, along with the completely unknown aborigines, the primary substrate for the formation of the Akan linguocultural unity. During the 14th – 18th century, numerous micro-migrations took place, or, according to V.P. Alekseev, the modus of resettlement dominated (in the form of pulsation and budding of certain social groups), conjugated with the modus of ethnic (ethno-linguistic) continuity. This led to the emergence of the Akan area (centred in the forest area of the Gold Coast), which has up till now remained virtually unchanged in its contours, i.e. the modus of autochthony has dominated over the past 200 years.

The modus of resettlement is reflected, inter alia, in the fact that where the genealogy of the ruling clans of the Akan EPCs begins with the arrival of the clan of first settlers, the founders of which associate themselves with other regions and EPCs.

From the middle of the 18th century and for about a century, the formation of separate Akan ethnoses took place within the frames of EPCs, i.e. complementarity of ethno-genetic and socio-political processes occurred, where a single Akan ethnos, which had existed in the form of numerous EPCs, broke down as a result of the divergence of these EPCs into a number of new ethnic commonalities. This process may be called the potestarian-political modus.

Observable blurring of ethnic frontiers may be explained by the remaining linguocultural continuity of the substrate, as well as by the fact that Akan omans represented demosocial organisms (according to Yu.I. Semenov), because they were not limited by the borders of the occupied territory, but rather by the area where the people constituting oman resided, and where be-
longing to a specific oman was regulated by the norms of social kinship. Thus, if we take oman to be the totality of people organised on the principles of kinship, then new Akan ethnoses integrated on the basis of the idea of commonality of origins.

As is well-known, in early political societies the leading role in the integration of members of a social organism belongs to potestarian-political institutions, and they prevail clearly over economic relations. In other words, potestarian-political structure and, above all, a unified system of power and control facilitate the strengthening of the internal integrity of a society because it provides for intensive contacts and information connections. Consequently, it performs ethno-stabilising functions, creating certain pretexts for ethnical consolidation. Akan data confirm these generalisations.

Ethno-evolutionary processes within the frames of different EPCs led to the emergence of differences in the cultural and household spheres of population’s activities in these EPCs and to the gradual formation of a separate ethnic self-consciousness. In particular, it clearly manifested itself in the fact that in the middle of the 19th century Ashanti and other forest Akans of the Gold Coast refused to teach their children Akwapim pronunciation which, according to European missionaries, was to be considered as standard for all Twi-speaking Akans.

The shifts in the nature of ethnic self-consciousness also took place: besides the notions of commonality of the origin and genetic kinship, there appeared the awareness of unity (closeness) of language and culture. In addition, there emerged a hierarchy of self-consciousness consisting of at least three main levels of ethnicity: all-Akan (i.e. Akan ethnics acquired the traits of meta-ethnical commonality), regional (sub-meta-ethnical commonalities, coinciding with the division of the Akans into ecological zones / savannah, forest, coastal / and language subgroups, i.e. Twi-speaking, Anyi-speaking, etc.), and the lowest level, paired with a specific (or concrete) EPC, since the awareness of own ethno-cultural commonality was seen primarily as an expression of unity and homogeneity of potestarian-political commonality as reflected in the ethnonymics, which continued to coincide with politonymics, and in the denotation of the concept of "ethnos" with the word "oman".

At the same time, it is not clear whether there existed a term with which the Akans referred to themselves despite the presence of all-Akan self-consciousness, since there existed a notion of the common origins, and there even existed a term to describe outsiders in terms of ethnicity: apotofo (from "apoto" – dirty, muddy).

It is difficult to formulate the characteristics that distinguish, for example, Ashanti from Fanti and other Akan ethnoses. There are many more features that unite rather than separate them. The most obvious differences are related to language and speech behaviour. They are also distinguished by some characteristics of their economic-cultural type, the specific details of sacred rituals and attributive-symbolic spheres, but the key difference lies in self-consciousness, which, one way or the other, goes back to the political isolation within EPCs, which is especially noticeable in the case of the Ashanti: the Ashanti Confederation and its attributes became the main ethnic symbols and ethno-specific parameters.

In addition, the ethnic culture of the Akwapim and Gyaman was influenced by the ethno-heterogeneity of the population of Akwapim and Gyaman, while the Akans of savannah (especially Abron) experienced some influence of the Arab-Muslim culture.

During the colonial period, especially after the restoration of the Ashanti Confederation, Fanti Confederation and other Akan EPCs, ethno-transformational processes intensified, in particular the differentiation of major ethnic groups increased and is currently accompanied with the tendency to call own ethnic commonality using one ethnonym "Akan" and call own language "Twi". Thus, besides the pan-Akan processes, the trend towards consolidation in at least two major Akan ethnic communities of modern Ghana – Ashanti and Fanti – has strengthened.

Thus, the Akans are characterised by a complex multilevel structure of language (language – dialect – subdialect) and ethnocultural (super-ethnos – ethnos – sub-ethnos) identities, while the largest Akan ethnic groups objectively became powerful ethno-linguistic centres of attraction, whilst at the same time each of them consists of multiple sub-groups (from 3-4 to 20 and more) – of the so-called tribes, ethnic groups, sub-ethnoses, etc. For example, the Ashanti include Denkyira, Adansi, Twifo, Assin, Kwawu, the Agni – Ndenye (Indenie), Anufo, Tchokossi, Betye, Dyabe, Sefwi, Morofo, etc., the Akyem – Abuakwa, Bosome, Kotoku, etc. In other words, any Akan ethnos, including the Ashanti, acts at the same time as an ethnicos, super-ethnos and sub-ethnos (if the Akans are considered to be an ethnos). Accordingly, there is a hierarchy of ethnic self-consciousness, where ethnofor synchronously identifies itself with all three levels of ethnic commonalities.

The hierarchy of identities creates the conditions for the construction of ethnicity, which often leads to the ethnicisation of politics and becomes the means to achieve group interests (a kind of an ideology for the elites to mobilise "their" ethnic commonality, as was the case with the Ashanti and Ewe in Ghana (formation of ethnic parties), with Baoule in Côte d'Ivoire (the ethnicos of President F. Houphouet-Boigny), with Bakongo and Ovimbundu in Angola (the ethnic-based political movements FNLA and UNITA respectively), Igbo in Nigeria (separatism in Biafra and the civil war), etc.).

One of the pressing practical problems of the majority of modern African states is the actualisation of the factors and mechanisms serving to preserve and strengthen or change and abandon ethno-linguistic identity of their popu-
ADAPTATION OF AFRICANS IN MOSCOW: DISTINCTIVE FEATURES AND PROBLEMS

Introduction

Currently immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa constitute a tiny minority of the immigrants living in Russia. It is also clear that neither in terms of their number nor their importance — their influence on Russian society — will they ever be able to stand on a par with the migrants from former Soviet republics and even from some other countries, for example, from China. However, the influx of Africans to Russia is growing. Reliable statistics on their number do not exist, but at the moment it can be estimated in the tens of thousands. Still few in numbers, Africans have already become noticeable in the ethno-cultural landscape of the largest cities of Russia. Consequently, this research is timely.

The topicality of our work is due to yet another, broader factor: large-scale international, especially “trans-cultural”, “trans-civilisational” migrations are one of the most important processes determining the overall framework and direction of contemporary global transformations. The tremendous interest in migration issues, which researchers of various specialties have demonstrated in recent years, is an ample testament to this. It is obvious that without taking into consideration migrations to Russia any general study of migration processes in the contemporary world would certainly be incomplete, moreover, very few publications until this day have dealt with the topic of Africans in post-Soviet Russia.

This study of African migrants in Moscow consists of two interconnected parts. On the one hand, we studied the ways in which Africans adapted to life in the Russian capital’s metropolitan area, difficulties that they faced there, results they achieved, etc. On the other hand, we considered how “indigenous Russians” perceived these Africans and whether they accepted or rejected them based on the prevailing opinion about immigrants from Africa and, especially, on the stereotypical image of the latter in their minds. This aspect is important by itself but is also directly relevant to the problem of adaptation of migrants: the more loyal is a host society towards them, the more successful is their inclusion in this society. The main methods of our work included formalised interviews, questionnaires with subsequent statistical processing.
of results, and observation, which was participant whenever possible. The result was a study of more than 150 migrants from various African countries and of a comparable number of "indigenous Russians". In addition, we referred to more than 100 formalised interviews done in the course of other research projects in several countries of Africa and with Africans living in Russia.

**African Moscow**

At the end of the Soviet era, almost all Africans living in this country were students of universities and colleges, i.e. they were not permanent residents and were dispersed, thanks to a centralised system of distribution of foreign students, fairly evenly over numerous Soviet educational centres, except for those in Siberia and in the Far East. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the situation has changed radically. Today, the vast majority of "Russian Africans" are concentrated in several large cities, first of all in the capital. Compared with Soviet times, the number of students from Africa has decreased significantly, primarily due to cuts in government quotas for free education in this country. At the same time, lifting the Iron Curtain has led to an influx of migrants of another kind. Some of them are refugees from "hot spots", to which category many countries of the Dark Continent either belonged in the recent past or still belong, while others are economic migrants.

After arriving in Moscow, most of them do manage to raise their standard of living compared with the lower one that they had at home. Nevertheless, many Africans initially consider Russia as a transit point on the way to the West. One of our respondents, Cameroonian, who has lived in Moscow for over a decade, says the following (and the truth of his words is confirmed by many of our respondents): "About 90 percent [of African migrants in Russia] are of the kind: those who come here and then look for a way to go farther" (Interview SS 1-3, 2007). Of course, not all migrants have an official permission to live and work in Russia. As a rule, they lack sufficient education and knowledge of the Russian language, have little idea about the Russian way of life, climate, very limited financial resources, little hope for any assistance from the embassy and other official missions of their home country, few or no friends among the "indigenous Russians", etc. Bringing a family to Russia to some extent smooths out psychological problems of migrants, but makes their financial problems even more acute. As a result, it is often very difficult for them to adapt to life in Russia. Many of these migrants say that they hope one day to return home or move to more affluent countries of Western Europe or North America, but some of them admit frankly that often this belief is just a psychological trick which they play on themselves: dreams of returning home or a sweet life in another country in the future help them cope with the difficulties here and now.

An impression appears that distribution of advertisement leaflets and flyers in subway stations is becoming a very popular and typical kind of work, a "privilege", for African migrants, just like selling cheap souvenirs in Paris. As a rule, migrants are not engaged in such work, but rather "indigenous Russians" from the poor strata of society, mostly students and pensioners. Africans seem to be the only migrants who are widely involved in this sphere of activity. Also Africans can often be seen selling cheap clothes, shoes, household items, etc. on numerous "merchandise" markets, where they work side by side with Russians, Ukrainians, migrants from the Caucasus, East Asia, and other countries and regions (whereas food markets are dominated by sellers from the Caucasus and Central Asia). You can also come across some students among the Africans which are distributing advertisements and trading in the markets, even though Russian law forbids them to work. Africans often complain that finding a better job is difficult even for those who have a good command of Russian language and reside in Russia legally: "When I was looking for a job, I called and said: 'Hello, I want to work in your company.' Then I was asked whether I was a Russian, and then they replied to me by saying: 'Sorry, we hire only Russians'" (Questionnaire 4, 2007).

During the first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was easier for foreigners to obtain Russian visas than it is now. Sometimes it led to peculiar situations. For example, until 2002, the inflow of transit migrants from Angola to Russia was very intensive. Until that year, when the civil war in Angola ended, the UN provided the holders of Angolan passports with refugee status and helped them to emigrate. For this reason, some citizens of the neighbouring DRC (Zaire until 1997) illegally acquired Angolan passports and travelled to Russia. According to our information, in 2002, Moscow was home to about 150 supostos Angolanos ("pseudo-Angolans") from the DRC; few dozen of them still live in Moscow or Moscow region.

Another group of Russian Africans, a smaller one but easily distinguishable, is made up of people of a completely different kind. Almost all of them are graduates of Soviet and Russian universities which have received Russian citizenship (most often through marriage), has been living in Russia for about 20 years, are fluent in the Russian language, know the Russian way of life, receive support from Russian members of their families, are respected in their homeland, whose best friends are "indigenous Russians", they are welcomed as guests to Moscow embassies of their home countries and have no intention to leave Russia. For the most part they are businessmen, journalists, university professors, doctors, or engaged in show business. However, while these people are relatively well-off, there aren't many of them who are rich
forms a kind of an extra-territorial unit within the host society and for maintaining own cultural identity, and which, due to the dis-`cord and agenda for the majority of contemporary border crossings... is too limiting an analytical concept to capture the multiplicity of vectors and agendas associated with the majority of contemporary border crossings. In this article, a Diaspora is understood as a networked community, which provides migrants with a means for more successful adaptation in a host society and for maintaining own cultural identity, and which, due to numerous and various visible and invisible relations between its members, forms a kind of an extra-territorial unit within the host society, status in statu – a state within a state.

An analysis of the collected data allows us to argue (although tentatively) that the formation of an African Diaspora in Russia is very slow, and many migrants from the Dark Continent are not included in it at all, because their social networks are limited to a narrow circle of personal acquaintances. Nevertheless, some attempts have been made to consolidate enough to provide support not to individuals but to the African migrants as a community (even more so to all migrants to Russia). Even those who have such an opportunity prefer to strengthen their position in Russian society in a different way – by establishing links with their Russian colleagues. In particular, since 2001, a group of African businessmen living in Russia has been publishing (on glossy paper with many colour illustrations) bilingual (English – Russian) journal My Africa, which was designed to serve as a “bridge between the Russian and African business communities”. The website of the journal contains pages not only in Russian and English but also in French, is very informative, and is updated regularly. In late 2007, the journal publisher, a Cameroonian, C. Tchoudja, announced the launch of an association, Cameroonian Business Community in Russia.

As a rule, Africans from this category are generally positive about the changes in the country in the post-Soviet period, in particular, about the dis-`cordance of the Iron Curtain, emergence of a multi-party system, ideological pluralism, civil liberties and market economy, and revival of religious life. They also note that the post-Soviet Russia has managed to maintain such a positive feature of its historical predecessor as the status of a great cultural, scientific and intellectual power. At the same time, some informants express regret over the fact that the post-Soviet Russia has rejected some of the ideals of the previous era, for example the principle of social equality.2

Thus, during the post-Soviet period, the social composition of the “Rus-`sian Africans” changed dramatically and became heterogeneous, while the geography of Africans living in Russia narrowed down to a few major cities in the country.

One of the key issues of our research is the formation of an African Diaspora in Russia. So far a Diaspora is often seen as a simple totality of people of a common origin living outside their home country. We, however, agree with A. Ong that “...the old meaning of diaspora – of being scattered or in dispersion... is too limiting an analytical concept to capture the multiplicity of vectors and agendas associated with the majority of contemporary border crossings.” In this article, a Diaspora is understood as a networked community, which provides migrants with a means for more successful adaptation in a host society and for maintaining own cultural identity, and which, due to numerous and various visible and invisible relations between its members, forms a kind of an extra-territorial unit within the host society, status in statu – a state within a state.

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trust each other. This was due to the ethno-religious and socio-political situation in Nigeria. Even abroad it is difficult [for us, Nigerians] to perceive ourselves as a united nation from the same country and with the same goals” (Interview 9, 2007). In any case, such voluntary associations, official or unofficial, with formalised norms of functioning or informal, help to integrate their members into a new socio-cultural environment.

Churches and mosques are another type of institutions around which many Africans gather, although not all of them go to church or mosque regularly. The latter refers primarily to the socially and financially well-off Africans, i.e. to those who do not need moral or practical assistance that a religious institution can provide too much. Orthodox Christians (Ethiopians), just like Muslims, can go to the same churches or mosques as “indigenous Russians” of corresponding faith and try to establish informal relationships with them. At the same time, in Moscow there are several Roman Catholic, Lutheran, and Anglican churches, as well as quite a few places of religious assembly of “new” Protestant congregations, including African ones (established and headed by preachers-Africans), which operate in Russia too. The social base of their congregations is mixed and includes, among others, a lot of people that are not well adapted to Russian life in all respects. Our study shows that the role played by these churches in the integration of Africans in the Russian socio-cultural environment is dual. On the one hand, these churches do help Africans by providing moral and practical support to migrants, giving them a sense of security and stability, and creating an atmosphere in which they can express and reproduce values of their native cultures and preserve their cultural identity. On the other hand, belonging to these institutions erects additional barriers to the integration of migrants into a host environment and contributes to their isolation from Russian society because these churches have no roots in Russian culture and are perceived by the overwhelming majority of “indigenous Russians” as totally alien. Not by accident, they are often referred to as “foreign churches”, also in the mass media.

Finally, in Moscow there are several night clubs, cafes, bars and restaurants which Africans, especially young ones, chose for their meetings. Of course, these institutions can be more or less respectable. Their typical regulars are African students and migrants with a modest but stable and, at least, “more or less” legal income, while some establishments serve as gathering places for Africans living on the edge or beyond the law.

It is important to determine the level at which the Africans who arrived in Russia, in particular, in Moscow, from all over the Dark Continent are seeking to unite themselves. Our analysis shows that although it is common for them to have as their friends people from different countries in Africa, the main level of consolidation is the level of a country of origin rather than ethnic or regional (within a country or the continent) commonality or anything else. As far as the pan-African sentiment is concerned, it may be present as a kind of virtual basis for distinguishing between “us” and “them” within “white” culture. Almost all of our respondents note they are ready to help absolutely any African. However, as a rule, this sentiment does not lead to the emergence of a stable non-formal or formal groups, clubs and societies, which would bring together people from different countries. In particular, this is typical for the situations when Africans speak different European languages in their home countries. These conclusions seem equally true for both social categories of “Russian Africans.” An exception is the case when ethnic groups which are in a state of conflict in the homeland are forced to coexist. Then the representatives of conflicting ethnic groups resort to the tactics of more or less strict mutual avoidance, even during their emigration in Moscow (we heard this from, for example, immigrants from Ethiopia: Interview SS 1-13, 2008).

The foregoing applies also to African students which are official temporary migrants. In particular, there are many organisations of students from Nigeria and Cameroon (the Association of Nigerian Students on the Programme of Russian Federal Grants, Union of Nigerian Students of the Russian Peoples’ Friendship University, Association of Cameroonian students in Moscow, Association of Cameroonian Students in Russia, etc.). It happens that for some members of these associations ethnic origin is very important, but, according to a leader of one of the Cameroonian student organisations, “we immediately try to stop them... We say to them: ‘There, at home, you can part, but we came here, and here we are united!’” (Interview SS 1-9, 2008). It is significant that the pan-African Association of African Students of the Russian Peoples’ Friendship University is a federation of country associations of students. It should be noted that the association was founded relatively recently – in 1995, while the first national unions of African students had formed immediately after the founding of the university in 1960. As members of the association openly acknowledge, only the difficulties of the 1990s in Africa and in Russia, which made life much more difficult for foreign students, forced national student unions of the Peoples’ Friendship University to unite.

Thus, there is currently no reason to believe that in Russia, particularly in Moscow, a unified “African Diaspora” is emerging. What we can observe among Moscow’s Africans is a rather weak tendency for some internally heterogeneous communities of countrymen to evolve into national Diasporas with a vague sense of pan-African unity, which is capable of manifesting itself most clearly in cases of common danger, for example, necessity to resist racist attacks. Nigerians have advanced the most on this path; Cameroonian and Ethiopians are probably following them.
Moscow and black Muscovites

Certainly it is objectively difficult to expect that Africans will unite on the pan-continental level because they do not represent one ethnic group or even a country of origin. However, from the outside they are perceived, and probably will always be perceived, as "Africans", i.e. as one community. Paradoxically, this perception of the majority of "indigenous Russians" can to some extent promote the strengthening of ties between Africans coming from different ethnic groups and even countries. The way Africans try to provide for their survival and even to adapt to Russia is one side of the coin, its other side is how they are perceived and accepted by those around them. The majority of African migrants consider themselves as "partly adapted" to the new realities. Nonetheless, of course, it is no coincidence that the migrants who consider themselves "well adapted" to life in Moscow more often believe that "indigenous Russians" attitude toward them is "positive" or "tolerant". The majority of those migrants who believe that "indigenous Russians" perceive them negatively usually recognise themselves as "poorly adapted".7

One of the main objectives of our research is to identify the images of Africa and Africans in the minds of "indigenous Russians" based on a provision that images of other cultures have a decisive impact on attitudes toward those coming from there. In particular, the images of Africa and Africans have a direct and largely decisive influence on shaping public opinion about immigrants and on actual relations with them. The civil society and the government with its policies in legal, economic, cultural, educational, informational, and other areas should play the role of intermediaries and regulators of the relations between racial majority and immigrant communities.

Russia (as well as other post-socialist countries) doesn’t have such a long, varied and contradictory experience of interaction with Africans as Western countries – the experience that has been embodied in strong involvement of Diaspora communities in the development of at least the basic principles of relations between immigrants and a host society and of government immigration policies. The “closure” of society in the relatively recent Soviet times and the difficulties of post-socialist reforms have even further complicated the contemporary situation. The national media have also played a negative role. Before the second half of the 1980s the image of Africans which they conveyed was consistently positive (that of nations fighting against world imperialism and neo-colonialism), but beginning with perestroika Africans were presented as symbols of hopeless savagery and backwardness. It was openly stated that the communist regime had thrown money away on assisting African states instead of developing a relationship with the “civilised world” (i.e. the West) and raising the living standards of its citizens.8 As a result, currently "Russia does not know Africa or pretends not to know it, because the image of Africa in Russia is the following: a poor continent, where people live primitively in the woods, eat coconuts and bananas, and where everyone is infected with AIDS," as a Beninese, who spent 13 years in our country – from the late 1980s to the early 2000s, told us (Interview R03, 2006). Now this perception of Africa and its inhabitants, once introduced, and, unfortunately, still supported by many media, is still alive in the minds of many Russians. For example, it was clearly manifested in the hundreds of comments which appeared in the Internet in response to the statement of President Dmitry Medvedev that Russia would help African countries, which he made at the summit of the Group of Eight in June 2008.

Another very common mental model of perceiving Africa and Africans is the attitude toward them as curious exotics. (Not by accident, in recent years, Africa has become very popular with rich Russian tourists). For those whose minds are dominated by this model, Africa is associated with heat, bananas, hippos, etc. There is no aggressiveness in this model, but it reflects the fact that people are not willing to accept the presence of Africans in the streets of Russian cities as a daily reality. Presently, this overly simplistic and one-sided image of Africa and Africans is actively exploited by domestic producers of advertisements, soap operas and serials.9

The collected evidence also clearly indicates that young Russians, even their most educated and informed part – capital’s students, have very little knowledge about Africa – its culture, ethnography, history, geography... "The lack of information leads to the impoverishment and distortion of the image" of Africa and Africans.10 Most of our African interlocutors see the causes of racist acts committed by some young Russians in the paucity of accurate information about the continent and its peoples. At the same time, it is worth noting that, more recently, exhibitions of African art and photo exhibitions devoted to Africa have become a fairly frequent phenomenon of cultural life in Moscow, and many young people visit such events. Of course, it is mostly young people who fill concert halls when African musical groups perform (some arrive from Africa, like Benin’s Gangbe Brass Band in May 2007, and some are created by "Russian Africans", like Sun Music, Djembe Africa and several other groups). However, only 36% of the students surveyed were able to name at least five sub-Saharan African countries, and 26% could not name a single one. Sometimes, during interviews it became clear that a respondent was puzzled with the very phrase “sub-Saharan Africa”. In response to a request to list prominent Africans, some students mentioned African-American jazz musicians, Pele, Naomi Campbell and other famous people related to Africa only by skin colour, while 57% could not recall a single name at all. Of the Africans, Nelson Mandela and Patrice Lumumba were mentioned most often, but only in 14% and 11% of the ques-
tionnaires respectively. Only 48% of respondents knew that it is European languages rather than African ones that are official in most countries of the continent.

As in any modern society, in Russia there are racists, "active" or "passive" ("implicit"). In Russian society there is a widespread belief, which we regard as wrong, that racists did not exist in the Soviet Union and that there they appeared in the troubled 1990s deus ex machina – out of nowhere. However, nothing can come out of nothing, and, at least when the faith in communist ideology began to fade away – in the 1970s – 1980s – there were already some people (albeit, perhaps, they were less numerous than today) which, despite the official propaganda of "proletarian internationalism", did not like racially "different" people, particularly Africans. It is important also to understand another point: these people did not have an opportunity to act and even to express their views openly. Soviet authorities were still able to suppress anything that was not consistent with the official ideology – both good and bad. In any case, currently, thanks to the media, the whole world, including Africa, is well aware of the violent manifestations of racism, which from time to time take place in various Russian cities. In particular, the awareness of such manifestations keeps some Africans from going to our country to study, and, in general, such facts cause enormous damage to Russia's image in Africa and around the world.

A successful Nigerian who lives in Moscow conveys a very typical idea, which many of our interviews with Africans conducted both in Russia and Africa contain: "Unfortunately, recent news reports focus mainly on the killings and attacks on blacks in Russian streets. Accordingly, the attitude [towards Russia and Russians] is also changing" (Interview R07, 2007). As a result, an educated young man, whom we interviewed in Tanzania, declared bluntly: "The Russians are indeed racists, like the Nazis" (Interview with T14, 2007). Equally frank and harsh in their comments were some of our informants in Benin: "The majority of Russians are racists", "I have a negative image of Russia: there exists racism" (Interview B27, 2008; B06, 2008).

Social and political upheavals have always generated growing interest in "other ways", and Russian society – one of the most turbulent in the world at the turn of the 20th and 21st century – has demonstrated this interest in many forms, including very painful ones. Nevertheless, in our opinion, which is supported by the collected evidence, the percentage of racists (at least, active ones, factually or potentially) in Russian society is not greater than that in many other societies. Our own research forces us to agree with the statement of Elena V. Haritonova that "in general, 'Moscow' Africans are regarded without constant negative connotation and do not have the status of 'enemy' in the mass consciousness of Muscovites." However, if this is true then why racists are so visible in today's Russia?

This problem, as it seems to us, has two dimensions. The first one is the attitude toward the racists in society. There are far fewer citizens, compared with the West, who, not being racists themselves, would be willing to speak out against racists, to declare openly and loudly that they do not accept racism, and that Russian society is not racist. This reflects the lack of maturity of civil society in the country – of society in which (at least, ideally) every citizen feels personally involved in everything that happens and does not shift the responsibility for the state of affairs and events onto the government. Another reflection of the same fact is the very small number of voluntary independent public groups or unions which aim at supporting migrants and promoting the principles of tolerance in Russian society. Official organisations, supposedly public, but in fact created and managed by state bodies, which flourished during the Soviet period (the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with the Countries of Asia and Africa, Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship with Foreign Countries), even if they do still exist in one form or another, under old or new names, do not assist migrants as actively and effectively as before, according to migrants themselves.

The second dimension of the problem is the struggle of state with racial (and ethnic, religious) extremism. Although the suppression of extremism has not so long ago been proclaimed an important national goal, the legal framework for the solution of the problem has been strengthened, and some high-profile criminal cases have been brought to court, lenient verdicts and public, sometimes even legal activity of a significant number of right-wing organisations (e.g., the Movement Against Illegal Immigration) indicate that problems in this area remain.

Migration policies are far from being well defined and, hence, efficient. This happens in particular due to the fact that discussions about Russia's demand for migrants and about the priority for the reception of representatives of various ethno-cultural, professional, and educational groups still continue in society and in various government circles. Opinions range from the assertions that only ethnic Russians from former Soviet republics should be allowed to immigrate to proposals to open doors to everyone wide. Undoubtedly, "... Russia still lacks a strategic vision of migration as a positive phenomenon." At the same time, in Russia the trend typical of migrant-receiving countries is more and more pronounced: jobs which require unskilled labour but are necessary to the state and society do not attract "indigenous Russians", including the Muscovites. They already are rarely seen among the street and office cleaners and construction workers. However, among them you can meet Africans, although they are certainly not numerous enough to fill those niches to the same extent that natives of Central Asia and other regions of far and near abroad do.
Mobilising immigrants – both legal and illegal – is profitable to employers too: they can pay them less, sometimes much less, than "indigenous Russians", and they are incomparably more helpless socially and legally. This gives rise to corruption, which further blurs the already weak barriers designed to discourage illegal immigration. At the same time, due to certain official regulations and prejudice of some employers, it is difficult for migrants, especially for those from outside the former Soviet Union, to get a legal, well-paid and respected in society job. It is worth mentioning frequent cases of large- or small-scale abuse of migrants by police, as well as the fact that state programmes for social adaptation of migrants and educational programmes aimed at promoting tolerance in society are still in their infancy.

Conclusion

Thus, we can ascertain that the community of African migrants in Russia in general and in Moscow in particular is expanding; moreover, there exist clear preconditions for the further intensification of this process. However, to date the adaptation of Africans to Russian society is facing difficulties due to Africans’ frequent unpreparedness to adapt, on the one hand, and insufficient readiness on part of Russian society and the state to accept them, on the other.

This problem, which lies at the intersection of national and global agenda, is too complex and multifaceted for us to take the liberty to offer an exhaustive list of measures to address it. Globally, such a direct contact of "post-socialism" and "post-colonialism" further reveals the complex and contradictory nature of globalisation and raises new questions about its possible forms and consequences. At the same time, some of our ideas on how global trends can be partially corrected at the national – Russian – level should be ensuing from the above: improving the legal and educational spheres, etc. Taking a broader look at the issue, we can say that the "warmth" and mutual fruitfulness of the meeting between "post-socialism" and "post-colonialism" ultimately depend, in case of Russia, on the perspectives of civil society and democratic state in our country.

Therefore, in the conclusion of our paper we will avoid any advice and guidance to whomsoever, but give the reader an opportunity to listen to one more "voice from the ethnographic field" and comprehend it. It is the voice of a Ghanaian journalist who had been living in Moscow since the Soviet era and, like all "Russian Africans", had to face and deal with the aforementioned problems in his daily life. "The country's history has gone in another direction after the collapse of the Soviet Union. ... Just as it took the United States nearly 200 years to build their democracy, Russia too will need time to achieve a high level of democracy which will ensure civil rights and fundamental freedoms. One of my important personal impressions about Russia is that it is a country of contrasts. However, for us, black people, it has become extremely uncomfortable for living and studying due to the growth of nationalism and racism. We live in full and constant fear. Many of us now think badly about this vast and powerful country because of our marginalisation and acute racial discrimination. Sadness or fear must give way to universal sympathy" (Interview R01, 2006).


FROM THE ZULUS TO THE KAZAKHS.
NINETEENTH CENTURY CONTACTS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND SOUTH AFRICA

Could there be any connection between the Zulus and the Kazakhs as early as the 19th century? Between remote parts of Russia and South Africa? According to some archival documents, people from these two countries did know something about one another and had started to form mutual images of one another even in that epoch. And this led to contacts – direct or indirect. The available evidence is fragmentary, often contradictory and sometimes difficult to interpret. But it is there.

A Pondo Chief Seeks Assistance of the Russian Tsar

Lo msebenzi undogamele, ndicela izandla ke ngoko ezihlobeni ukuba zind-incidise.
(Alone this work is beyond my physical strength and so I feel I must ask for help and assistance from friends).
Xhosa proverb.

We found this letter, written in English, in Moscow, in the State Archive of the Russian Federation. It was handwritten – the handwriting is odd.

It was addressed to a "czar" – Alexander III at the time – and was posted to St. Petersburg from South Africa, specifically from Esihlonyane in Pondo-land, on 10 November 1886. It must be one of the most unusual documents in the history of Russian international relations.

We cite it fully and try to maintain the features of grammar and spelling of the original letter. All geographical places and names are reproduced as spelled in the original.

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To the Czar
St. Petersburg
Russia

Esihlon yane
Pondoland
10 Nov. 1886

Sir

I again write to you, I wish to explain our present position As a Nation. We are independent Nation subject to no other power up to the present Self Independent. The Pondo Nation now ask to be protected by you. The English Government wants to take Away our Country. They have recently taken forcibly a portion of our country occupied by the AmaXebisi and have Annexed it since we wrote to you on the 25th (Oct.? – A.D., I.F.). Our Country is taken away from us without any just Cause. And we have not fought with the Colonial Govt. We are quite unaware of our Crime to the English Govt. Things which have been forcibly taken from us are 1st the Country occupied by the Xebisis.

2nd Port St. Jones River Mouth they have taken it, saying they will purchase it with Money. So said they. They made an offer to buy the country occupied by the Xebisis from us for Cash. As I said have made an offer for the two ports they have taken these two ports and still make an offer to buy them for Cash. We refuse to accept their offer. After the letter we sent to you the Country occupied by the AmaXebisi is, we hear, Annexed on the 25th Oct last they have taken our ground without our being fighting with them and without any just reason The only thing is their imposition on us. As we are not strong. As them, the Pondos Are not Armed As the Colonial Govt. We are independent Nation subject to no other power up to the present Self Independent. The Pondo Nation now ask to be protected by you. The English Government wants to take Away our Country. They have recently taken forcibly a portion of our country occupied by the AmaXebisi and have Annexed it since we wrote to you on the 25th (Oct.? – A.D., I.F.). Our Country is taken away from us without any just Cause. And we have not fought with the Colonial Govt. We are quite unaware of our Crime to the English Govt. Things which have been forcibly taken from us are 1st the Country occupied by the Xebisis.

3rd Port Mt. Nolangenii they have occupied, saying they will purchase it for Money. So said they. They made an offer to buy the country occupied by the Xebisis from us for Cash. As I said have made an offer for the two ports they have taken these two ports and still make an offer to buy them for Cash. We refuse to accept their offer. After the letter we sent to you the Country occupied by the AmaXebisi is, we hear, Annexed on the 25th Oct last they have taken our ground without our being fighting with them and without any just reason The only thing is their imposition on us. As we are not strong. As them, the Pondos Are not Armed As the Colonial Govt. We are quite unaware of our Crime to the English Govt. Things which have been forcibly taken from us are 1st the Country occupied by the Xebisis.

4th Port Mt. Zolongeni they have occupied, saying they will purchase it for Money. So said they. They made an offer to buy the country occupied by the Xebisis from us for Cash. As I said have made an offer for the two ports they have taken these two ports and still make an offer to buy them for Cash. We refuse to accept their offer. After the letter we sent to you the Country occupied by the AmaXebisi is, we hear, Annexed on the 25th Oct last they have taken our ground without our being fighting with them and without any just reason The only thing is their imposition on us. As we are not strong. As them, the Pondos Are not Armed As the Colonial Govt. We are quite unaware of our Crime to the English Govt. Things which have been forcibly taken from us are 1st the Country occupied by the Xebisis.

5th Port Mt. Ezulwini they have occupied, saying they will purchase it for Money. So said they. They made an offer to buy the country occupied by the Xebisis from us for Cash. As I said have made an offer for the two ports they have taken these two ports and still make an offer to buy them for Cash. We refuse to accept their offer. After the letter we sent to you the Country occupied by the AmaXebisi is, we hear, Annexed on the 25th Oct last they have taken our ground without our being fighting with them and without any just reason The only thing is their imposition on us. As we are not strong. As them, the Pondos Are not Armed As the Colonial Govt. We are quite unaware of our Crime to the English Govt. Things which have been forcibly taken from us are 1st the Country occupied by the Xebisis.

I have the honor to be

Your Most Obedient Servant
Umhlango J.S. Faku
For Paramount Chief Umqikela
Chief Councillor and Prime Minister W

P.S. do not listen the English Govt. what might they say. They might say perhaps the Pondo Country belongs to them. They might say this to delude you as you are no aware of the facts, that it is false. The boundary of the Pondo Country Commences from Umtata river Mouth and up along the Umtata river and through Gungululu to Shawbury Mission Station, and go down to Ngxaroli and through Ishungwana and to the Umzimvubu River and Run along the Stream to the junction of the Imvenyne stream and along the Intsuwa Mountain and to Celintcungu Mountains to Nolangenii Mountains through Engele Mountains. Another thing they have armed their subjects to come and fight us. As we have no friend to assist us we don’t want to be un-der the protection of the English Govt. We shall await your valuable assistance. The English Govt is treating us most shamefully. The population of the Pondo Nation is about 200,000. Our country is very rich in Copper, Gold, Coal, etc. and all kinds of Minerals. It is for this reason they want to take away our Country forcibly against our Consent. Should you kindly agree to protect us. We would Allow you to Open all Mines in the Country.

I have the honor to be

Sir

Your most obedient Servant
Umhlango J.S. Faku
for Paramount Chief Umqikela
Chief Councillor and Prime Minister

How did Faku get the idea of sending a letter to the Russian Tsar? What did he know about Russia? It is obvious from the letter that he did not know much – not even the tsar’s name. And yet he asked for his help. And this was not even his first letter.

Most likely, the origin of this letter was the rumour about the Russians that spread among the Xhosa, one of the biggest ethnic groups in South Africa (of which the Pondo were a part), in the wake of the Crimean War. In 1857 the Xhosa heard that somewhere in the north some “Russians” were fighting against the British, just like the Xhosa did, and that these Russians were willing to come to the Xhosas’ aid. These rumours were sparked by the news that General George Cathcart had been killed in one of the battles against the Russians during the Crimean War. In 1852-53, Cathcart had been governor of the British Cape Colony, and he was one of the most hated ones by the Xhosa. The renowned South African writer Zakes Mda wrote in his novel The Heart of Redness: “We all remember how the news of the death of Cathcart spread like wildfire, with universal jubilation and impromptu celebrations. People for the first time heard about the Russians. And while the British insisted that the Russians are as white as themselves, the AmaXhosa knew that it was a lie. The Russians were black. They were the spirits of the AmaXhosa soldiers who had died in various wars against the British colonisers...”

But Faku wrote his letter at the end of 1886 – three decades after these events. At that time, he could have gleaned information about Russia from many other sources. Among the Xhosa there were already a number of graduates of missionary schools – those who read missionary magazines, and even wrote articles for them. Faku himself was a correspondent of Imvo Zabatsundu, the first Xhosa newspaper. He wrote to the paper’s editor, John Tengo Jabavu, and sent him materials for the paper. Knowledge
of the English language was spreading, and with it the ability to learn what was going on in the world. Many Xhosa went to work on farms and mines in the Cape Colony and Natal. They saw a lot there. They could have even met real, rather than fictional Russians – sailors who visited Cape Town and Simon’s Town. A well educated person like Faku could have visited the Cape Town Museum of Curiosities and Natural History, which exhibited Russian arms and uniforms, Russian coins and even such a mysterious – for South Africans – object as cast-iron oven shutters. Faku could have also received information about Russia from European traders living in Pondoland.

Whatever the sources of his information, it could only confirm and reinforce the impression of the thirty-year-old rumour: the Russians were enemies of the British, they were fighting against them, and sometimes won. Hence, it is to them that one should turn for help.

One can easily imagine the astonishment of St. Petersburg officials when they received the letter. Hardly any of them had heard about the Pondo. Certainly none knew where Pondoland was and what its relations with the British and the Boers were.

Had this letter arrived just a few years later, at least in 1890, the letter would, perhaps, have received more attention. It was in 1890 that the first Russian engineers were sent to the Transvaal to study mining there, in order for it to be applied in the Urals and in Siberia. This reflected a growing interest in South African affairs on the part of Russia. But in 1886 the letter could have remained unnoticed. If somebody did pay attention to it and did report the matter to higher-ranking officials, we did not find any trace of such developments. If any thought was given to ways of using the letter against Russia’s arch-rival – England, we did not find any follow-up, nor a response either to this letter, or the previous one, which was mentioned in our document.

A Distant Echo of Wars of the British against the Zulus and the Boers

The wars between the Russians and the British did not go unnoticed in South Africa. In Russia, the wars of the British against the Zulus and the Boers that took place in the late 1870s – early 1880s, did not go unnoticed either. The first of these wars occurred in 1879, the second one, in 1880–1881. Both began with defeats of the British. In January 1879, the Zulus wiped out one of the British columns that invaded their country in the battle of Isandlwana. In 1880, the Boers defeated a British detachment in the battle of Majuba.

Both defeats caused such a shock in Britain that it resulted in the collapse of Disraeli’s government. Their echoes were heard in Europe too.

The French, too, were in a state of shock, although not because of the defeats of the British. They were appalled by the death of the son of Napoleon III at the hands of the Zulus. They used to call him “The Imperial Prince”, and Bonapartists dreamed of seeing him on the throne. He travelled to South Africa in search of military glory and joined one of the British detachments. Both Empress Eugenie, his mother and widow of Napoleon III, and Queen Victoria blessed him in this endeavour. However, a Zulu assegai put an end to the Napoleonic dynasty.

The Russian Embassy in London monitored these developments with close attention. Ambassador Count Shuvalov reported to Chancellor Gorchakov on 22 January (3 February) 1879: “For three years the British Government has been experiencing serious difficulties in South Africa. The 1877 annexation of the Transvaal did not improve the situation.” With regard to the Anglo-Zulu war that was unfolding at the time Shuvalov wrote: “The outcome of the struggle leaves no doubt. The Zulus will be defeated, but victory will require blood and money... At the end of this campaign the conquered lands will be annexed and immediately placed under British control.”

Having learnt of the battle of Isandlwana, the ambassador described the reaction of the British public and government to it in a report dated 31 January/12 February 1879. He concluded that “defeats suffered by the British troops caused deep embarrassment”.

While diplomatic correspondence focused mostly on England, its reaction to the war, and its soaring military expenditures, the Russian public became interested in Britain’s opponents, the Zulus. After the battle of Isandlwana several Russian newspapers and magazines published descriptions of Zulus’ everyday life, their military organisation and military skills.

By that time Russian readers already knew something of the Zulus. For instance, in 1828, a Moscow magazine, Vestnik Evropy, founded by Karamzin, published the following news: "From the Cape of Good Hope we are notified that as of August 3 the army of King Shaka was advancing against the Kaffirs between the Umtala River and the Washi River. Colonel Somerset moved to the Kasi River (Kaisikamma) to defend the border and to assist the Kaffirs. In 1873 in St. Petersburg, a collection of tales of the Zulus and the Khoikhoi, who were called Hottentots at the time, was published. However, the first detailed description of the Zulus appeared only after 1879.

An extensive essay titled Cetewayo, the King of the Zulus, and his Possessions was published in the largest Russian magazine Niva immediately after Isandlwana. Cetshwayo, one of Shaka’s successors, entered the Russian language as Cetewayo. The article stated: "As an intelligent and sagacious ruler, he was always careful with his neighbour, whose might he understood well." The neighbour is England, which by then owned not only the Cape
Colony, but also an outpost, Natal, located right in the middle of Zulu territory. The article also stated that Cetshwayo did not provoke the war, and that the British started it. There was a photograph with the caption: "Cetshwayo, the King of the Zulus, victorious against the British." 21

A few months later the same magazine informed its readers that: "the Courageous chief Cetewayo, who many times valiantly repelled the British, has been captured... It now remains to bring him to Europe as an animal and for small newspapers to begin to mock his habits and eccentricities..." 22

Three weeks later it stated: "The Kingdom of the Zulus has been destroyed and, as we have mentioned, the war is over. But did it contribute much to the glory of British arms and of Beaconsfield’s policy? Unlikely. From the very beginning of the war in South Africa, there have been loud voices among the British themselves condemning the unjust invasion of Cetewayo’s possessions. 23

Similar information and assessments appeared in the Golos newspaper 24 and in some other Russian newspapers and magazines.

With regard to the victory of the Boers at Majuba and the subsequent Anglo-Transvaal negotiations, the Russian mission in London reported to St. Petersburg (18 February (2 March) and 14/26 March 1881) that "the annexation of the Transvaal was illegal and the consequence of a fraud" and that the demands of the Boers were "just". Russia’s ruling circles were still furious about Britain’s uncompromisingly anti-Russian position during the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78. Despite his, the embassy noted in its report that: "Making broad concessions to the Boers, Mr. Gladstone acted wisely and fairly."

There is no doubt that the reason for the attention which the Russian authorities, press and public paid to these events, as well as their reaction to them was the result of their hostile and suspicious attitude towards the British. The two greatest empires, the Russian and the British, could not live together in peace, especially after the Crimean War. During the 1870s and 1880s, Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Central Asia peaked. Russian anglophobes greeted the difficulties that Britain faced in South Africa with joy, if not with malice. A lot was written in Russia about Britain’s troubles in this distant land, inadvertently introducing the Russians to Britain’s opponents there. The picture was, of course, distorted by political expediency, but it still reflected the realities of South Africa and informed readers about the events that were unfolding there.

Cape Town Greets the Son of the Russian Tsar

Of all visits by Russians to the Cape Colony in the 1870s, one, the visit by the 22-year-old Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich attracted the greatest attention, both in Russia and in the Cape. The reason was not so much that fact that he was the son of Emperor Alexander II (he was Alexander’s third son, and therefore was not considered as heir apparent to the throne) but rather by a romantic story that followed him. It was said that the Grand Duke had either married, or was about to enter in a morganatic marriage with a girl who was not considered his match. Her name was Sasha Zhukovskaya. She was a maid of honour of Empress Maria Nikolaevna, Alexander’s wife, and, alas, a daughter of just a poet – Russia’s famous poet Zhukovsky. Alexander II sent his son on a voyage around the world for two or three years to let him think the matter over. The Grand Duke was followed by gossip everywhere he went, and in the Cape the gossip was fuelled by rumours that a mysterious Russian princess, rich but long out of favour, came to the Cape shortly before the royal visit and even went to see the diamond mines. 25

Alexei arrived in Cape Town on 3 June 1872. The Cape Argus solemnly reported: "the long-awaited Russian imperial squadron with Grand Duke Alexei on board arrived in Table Bay". 26 Vice Admiral Posiet commanded the squadron. Twenty years earlier Posiet visited the Cape together with the writer Goncharov on board the frigate Pallada. Together, Posiet and Goncharov made a trip to the interior of the country, stayed in Cape Town and even visited prisons and met their inhabitants.

The Grand Duke was met with due pomp: the Cape parliament allocated special funds for his reception and even adopted a welcoming resolution. 27 He stayed in the colony for three weeks, and Cape newspapers were full of reports about the way he passed his time: a formal reception at the Government House, the success of a ball in his honour, his trips around the colony, a banquet on board the frigate Svetlana, his purchase of the best ostrich feathers, a "magnificent gift" from the Russian Empress that he gave to Lady Berkeley, wife of the Cape Governor-General, and another gift, of a malachite necklace, to one of the eminent ladies of Cape Town, this time from himself. 28

The Grand Duke attracted the attention of the Cape public once again two years later on the way back from his voyage, coming from the East, this time as commander of the frigate Svetlana. 29 By that time his sister, the Grand Duchess Maria, had married Prince Alfred, the second son of Queen Victoria, and had become the Princess of Edinburgh. This was, of course, an important theme of high-society gossip, and who could better describe the new princess than her brother?

Both visits attracted the attention of the Cape public to Russia. The main impression was that of the luxury and pomposity that surrounded the life of the royal family.

And what about the Duke? Was he cured of love?

Love affairs or morganatic marriages of the royal family were not openly discussed at that time. Even after Grand Duke’s death there was little reliable
information about this affair. General Alexander Mosolov, Chief of Staff of the Ministry of the Imperial Court, wrote in his memoirs: "Alexei Alexandrovich as a very young man was infatuated by the maid of honour Zhukovskaya, and, according to some rumours, married her secretly and had a son with her, who received the title Count Belevsky. However, according to the more recent opinions of members of the imperial family, the rumours about the marriage of Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich were false. He did not marry the maid of honour Zhukovskaya. She did not live long." According to other sources, Zhukovskaya died only in 1893, and was even married to Dr. von Woermann.

The Grand Duke was not out of favour for long. In January 1881 he was appointed member of the State Council. Alexander III, upon ascending to the throne in March 1881 after the assassination of Alexander II, forgave his beloved brother Alexei completely. In July the same year, Alexei Alexandrovich was appointed to head the Navy and the Naval Department. In January 1882, the Cape Town authorities received his commendation for the hospitality extended to the Russian warship Kreiser. He signed the commendation already as the General Admiral of the Russian Navy. He had just turned 31 at the time.

Alexei Alexandrovich held this high position during the reign of his brother, Alexander III, and his nephew, Nicholas II. His naval career was propped up not only by his title, but also by that voyage around the world. The Duke, however, showed no talent in naval affairs. S. Yu. Witte wrote of him: "A man who never had any ideas of his own about statecraft and had no serious ideas in general. He was more inclined to lead a private comfortable life than the life of a statesman." In addition, he was "always under the influence of a particular lady with whom he lived at the time." Years later, during the Anglo-Boer War, when Alexei Alexandrovich was appointed Naval Minister, a publisher of the best informed Russian newspaper wrote: "The Naval Minister lives in Petergof with his mistress and does nothing. As long as the Grand Duke is General Admiral, we shall not have any navy. Great Dukes do nothing, while ministers do everything "not to disturb the Great Dukes". Theft is colossal." Of course, no one would have dared to publish such sentiments, so this entry remained only in the publisher’s diary. In the same year, 1900, the publisher foresaw the destruction of the Russian navy by the Japanese. "The Emperor hates the Japanese...", – he wrote. "Our navy is bad... The Japanese have a wonderful navy, and they can destroy us." This in fact happened just a few years later during the Russo-Japanese War.

Alexei Alexandrovich’s visits to Cape Town were doubtless recalled in 1904, when a huge Russian armada was sailing past the coast of South Africa to the Far East to fight the Japanese. After all, he was one of those who sent thousands of Russian marines to their certain death. After the defeat of the Russian navy, he retired and, like many Russian aristocrats, left his luxurious palace in gloomy St. Petersburg and went to live out his days in cheerful Paris. However, he kept the rank of admiral until his death.

Fifteen years after Alexei Alexandrovich another Great Duke, Alexander Mikhailovich, visited the city. He was married to Xenia Alexandrovna, the beloved sister of Nicholas II, and was influential in the Russian government, especially in naval affairs. In 1900, he was appointed Chairman of the Council of Merchant Shipping, and in 1909 was promoted to vice admiral. Just like his elder relative, he gained experience in maritime affairs during his trip round the world, which he made as a young officer on board the corvette Rynida. During this trip, in 1887, he visited the Cape of Good Hope. Many years later, in his old age, he shared some of his memories of the Cape. He wrote of the hardships of labourers on Boer farms, the arrogance of the British and the luxury of the clubs of British officers. He also recorded the words of Cecil Rhodes which were often repeated in Cape society. These were about the need to "think imperialistically."

An Artist’s Sketches

The Russian reader got the idea of how South Africa and its inhabitants looked from the drawings which were made by those who visited this far-off land and which were then published in Russia. Alexei Vladimirovich Vysheslavtsov (1831-1888), a Russian artist, was the most renowned author of sketches of South African life. He stayed in South Africa for about three months – from mid-March to mid-June 1858. Upon his return, he published a book with three pictures of South African life as separate insets. He did not explain what was in the pictures but it was clear enough.

One presented different types of inhabitants of the Cape Colony. A fisherman, a sailor, a fishmonger, Cape Malays, a Khoi woman with a child on her back – at the time she would be called a Hottentot. All were in European dresses, although some were in rags and barefoot. The second picture depicted the Africans. They were drawn walking along a road near Cape Town at the foot of Table Mountain. One drags a bag, the other, obviously feeble, is leaning on a pikestaff. The third sketch depicted a Cape beach. Vysheslavtsov did not draw the rich white public. They were obviously the same as everywhere and therefore of no interest to him.

In his book Vysheslavtsov spoke of South Africa not as of a white outpost of civilization on the edge of the African continent, but as of a Babylonian mixture of peoples. "It seems like all the nations of the world have sent a sample of their nationality to Cape Town", he wrote. "There is an amazing diversity of colours in the streets; here – red Malay turbans, there crowds of
Kaffirs, strong people with dark copper faces, a Mozambican, a *pur-sang* Negro, a Hindu in his picturesque white coat, draped easily and gracefully. In addition, there are the British in all sorts of hats, for example in gray felt helmets with a sort of a fan, similar to white quilted samovars, or in a straw hat with a veil. Amidst Kaffirs, Negroes, British and Malays there are, occasionally, skippers and captains from merchant ships, soldiers in red uniform, and, finally, we, the inhabitants of Orel, Tambov, Tver..."\(^{36}\)

**A Zulu Hero in Kazakh Folklore**

In 1978, Apollon Davidson received a letter from Alma-Ata from Professor A. Derbisalin, a specialist in the history of the Kazakh literature.\(^{37}\) Professor Derbisalin wrote that in the late 19\(^{th}\) century the Kazakh bard Akylbai Kunanbaev had created an oral poetic song, "A Zulu". Derbisalin asked what sources could the bard have used for his poem.

The fact that such a song existed is amazing. In the nineteenth century, on the far outskirts of the Russian Empire beyond the Caspian Sea, in the Kazakh language – a folklore poem about a Zulu!

Professor Derbisalin suggested that the idea of the poem could have been adopted from a book or books in Russian because the Kazakhs had no written literature at the time. However, Russian 19\(^{th}\) century literature does not contain much information about the Zulus either. We have already mentioned that in 1873 a book of translations of Zulu folklore was published in St. Petersburg\(^{38}\), and after the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 the Zulus were often mentioned in the press. But hardly any of these publications could have reached not just Kazakhstan but, moreover, the storyteller, Akylbai!

Could it be that a Zulu visited Russia or even Kazakhstan? Oddly enough, such a possibility cannot be completely ruled out. The evidence for this is the story of a Zulu named Mnqoka – if, of course, it had some real life basis. According to its author, L.D. Turner, who published it in the *Journal of Negro History*, a group of Zulus came from South Africa to the Sudan to help the Mahdists fight the British. In this they did not succeed, but they crossed the entire continent and came to Egypt. Then Mnqoka came to Germany, travelled to America, changed many professions, studied several languages and even published articles in American magazines.\(^{39}\) But so far no information about the Zulus visiting Kazakhstan or Russia at that time has been found.

We asked A. Derbisalin to send us the text of the poem. It was recorded and published in 1924 in the Kazakh magazine *Sana*, which has long become a bibliographical rarity. From the text of the poem, it became clear what its source was. The poem is a paraphrase of Rider Haggard's novel *King Solomon's Mines*, first published in 1885 and soon translated into Russian. The difference between the poem and the novel is that the Kazakh author turned the Zulu into the main hero – thus the title of the song.

What caused Akylbai’s interest in the plot of the novel? The author died in 1904, so we can only guess. Possibly he saw a parallel between the Zulus and the Kazakhs: both fought against colonialism and both suffered defeat.

Illiterate Pondos and Xhosas heard about the Russians, while illiterate Kazakhs heard about the Zulus... This is perhaps the most surprising fact in the history of early contacts between Russia and South Africa and of Russians’ and South Africans’ views of one another.

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1. Pondo (AmaPondo) – a Xhosa-speaking people of South Africa. By the treaty of 1844, the British recognised that the Pondo territory extended from the Drakensberg Mountains to the coast of the Indian Ocean between the Umtata and Umzimkulu rivers. After the death, in 1867, of Faku, the most famous and powerful chief of the Pondo, they split, and the territory west of the Mzimvubu River fell under the rule of the "usurper" Ndamase, while the territory east of the river remained under the rule of the legitimate heir of Faku, Mgikela, who signed the letter that is reproduced here. (For more details about these events, see Davenport T.R. South Africa. *A Modern History*, London, 1991, Pp. 126-128).

2. State Archives of the Russian Federation, fund 677, inventory 1, file 475, lists 1-2.

3. We are grateful to Professor Christopher Saunders of the University of Cape Town, who helped us to decipher the text of the letter.

4. AmaXebisi – a Xhosa–speaking group, closely related to the Pondo. They inhabit a small territory between the Mtmvuna and Mzimvubu rivers to the north of the Pondo (see footnote 1). Their northern border is the modern town of Kokstad. The Pondo believed that by their 1844 treaty with the British this territory was under their sovereignty. It was occupied by the British in 1886.

5. Port St Johns – a harbour at the river mouth of the Mzimvubu River. British ships began to call on this port since the mid 19\(^{th}\) century. In 1878, the governor of the Cape Colony, Sir Henry Frere, declared Mgikela deposed and "bought" Port St Johns from Ndamase’s son (see footnote 1). In response, Mgikela levied tribute on transit through his territory and with the assistance of local white merchants built a new harbour, Port Grosvenor, to create competition to Port St Johns. In 1885, Frere declared the entire coast of Pondoland a British protectorate.

6. Mhlangaso (Umhlangaso) J.S. Faku – secretary of Mgikela, the supreme adviser and the Prime Minister of Pondoland, who was obviously a very well educated and far-sighted politician. The idea of levying tribute on transit caravans from the Cape Colony and of building Port Grosvenor (see footnote 5) was his, just like, apparently, the initiative to send letters to the Russian Tsar.


8. The meaning of this letter in the text is unclear.

9. The name is not clear.

10. According to the text. Both the number of the Pondo and the mineral wealth of their country were greatly exaggerated.

SYNOPSIS

Nikolay Kosukhin

CONTEMPORARY AFRICA:
METAMORPHOSES OF POLITICAL POWER

(Executive editor – Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) A.M. Vasiliev;
Institute for African Studies of the RAS – Eastern Literature, Moscow, 2009, 494 p.)

The collective monograph offers an analysis of the features of the functioning and development of political power in Africa at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries. It studies the political role of Islam, the prospects for democratisation of North African societies, the system of power relations in the countries of Tropical Africa, including the key issues of the conflict and crisis development of political mechanisms, as well as the tendencies of establishing transitional forms of power structures, the establishment of a federal political system (the experience of Nigeria), the evolution of party political systems, and the problem of African identity. The pressing issues of forming national relations and main directions of national policy in South Africa are also discussed in the monograph.

The monograph consists of three parts, which have the following titles: The part one is titled "North Africa: Power, Islam, Political Game". The first part covers the following topics: the politicisation of Islam, the Tunisian model: "democracy without Islamists", the Algerian model: "from civil war to guided democracy", the Moroccan model: "monarchy and Islam in a multi-party system", the Egyptian model: "democratisation in the context of the state of emergency".

The second part titled "Tropical Africa: power, crises, geopolitical institutions" is dedicated to the conflict and crisis development of power relations, parliamentarism as a form of political modernisation, evolution of party political systems, establishment of the Nigerian political system, Islamic factor in politics, issues of African identity and nationalism, formation of transitional forms of power organisation, and socio-political preconditions for the collapse of autocratic despotism. The third part titled "South Africa: power, dismantling of the apartheid, new political guidelines" is devoted to national policy and national relations in South Africa after 1994.
In the end conclusions of this research are made and results are briefly summarised.

The monograph was written by a team of Russian scientists specialising in the study of power relations in African countries. The introduction ("Political power in non-Western modernity") and conclusion ("The contours of transforming power") of the book were prepared by L.V. Geveling. Sections of the first part "The politicisation of Islam – the brainchild of the twentieth century.", "Tunisian model: democracy without Islamists" and "limited pluralism", and "Egyptian model: democratisation in the context of the state of emergency" were written by M.F. Vidyasova; "Algerian model: from civil war to the "guided democracy" and "Moroccan model: the monarchy and Islam in a multi-party system" – by V.V. Orlov. The part two of the monograph was prepared by the following authors: L.V. Geveling ("Conflict and crisis development of power relations" and "Establishment of the system of transitional forms of power organisation"), I.M. Sadovskaya ("Parliamentarism as a form of political modernisation"), B.G. Petruk ("Establishment of a federal political system (the experience of Nigeria)"), N.D. Kosukhin ("Evolution of party political systems"), Yu.N. Vinokurov ("Socio-political preconditions for the collapse of autocratic despotism (the experience of Zaïre)", A.D. Savateev ("Islamic factor in politics: Sharia and Tariqahs"), N.I. Vysotskaya ("The problem of African identity" and "Nationalism in the political field of African countries"). The third part was written by A.B. Davids-
on and I.I. Filatova.

In the monograph it is noted that the entry of African countries into the third millennium was accompanied by the process of political changes, the pace, scope and depth of which were almost the most significant in the world. The restructuring of the power mechanism for regulating society, which led to changes in political structures and public institutions, occurred, on the one hand, due to the transformation of "social context" (changes in ethno-confessional and social-class structures, in economy and in other "outer" areas). In other words, the transformations of power were largely determined by environmental impulses, the importance of which was usually emphasised by the adherents of the conceptu-
alist approach. On the other hand, the political changes in Africa in no small part were caused by the violation of a consensus in the depths of government institutions, as well as by the imbalances and (or) permanent failures of political mechanisms responsible for maintaining stability in society. The internal restructuring of political institutions could either comply with the progressive development of African societies or serve as a serious obstacle. "Insider" factors in the political structure of African states were seen as crucial predominantly by the supporters of the institu-
tionalist approach.

Areas and levels of political changes in contemporary Africa are impressively diverse. Specifically, sociological studies of power systems show that over the past quarter century the countries of the continent underwent the most significant changes in the area of political values and norms. These changes affected political interaction of Africans and markedly transformed the institutional forms of communication and organisational and managerial contacts.

The authors of the monograph focused on the problem of power as one of the central areas of research policy, which, in turn, serves as a prerequisite for studying social, economic, legal and other institutions. Therefore, incomplete and unclear understanding of power structure and its operational principles noticeably of power distorts both the scientific understanding of the functioning of political systems in Africa and the view of the social develop-
oment of the continent as a whole.

The monograph convincingly demonstrates that the need for analysis of power relations is due to the uniqueness of a number of phenomena and processes in the political reality of contemporary Africa. Africa’s experience (positive and negative) in establishing systems of power relations can be regarded as an essential piece of a political mosaic on a planetary scale. The development of this theme continues the tradition of Soviet and Russian schools of African and Arabic studies in the field of studying various types and forms of power in African countries, as well as maintains the respective positions of national researchers in the world science. In terms of practice the analysis of the metamorphoses of political power in Africa is important and timely at the beginning of the 21st century in view of unfolding reconstruction of political, economic and other ties between Russia and African nations.

The African reality is a unique object of study for politogenesis, as well as main varieties of power. Researchers possess extremely valuable material on coercive (pre-state) systems of power (potestas), extensive information on state and public authority and, finally, information on supranational forms of organisation and governance. Construction of an African multi-dimensional model of power involves a comprehensive analysis of the structure and le-gitimacy of authority, review of major developments and trends in carrying out decision-making functions, as well as the study of bearers of power, its subject and object of ruling. Political life in Africa may well serve as a study of the three principal projections of power and influence – "symbolic power", "structural power" and "instrumental power".

Certainly it is impossible to review all scientific and fundamental, as well as scientific and empirical problems of the functioning and development of "African authority", to define its substance and to give comprehensive spatial and temporal characteristics in a single paper. Therefore the authors of the
monograph set a relatively narrow chronological framework for the research, which covered the last quarter of the 20th century and the first years of the 21st century. Geographically, the study focused mainly on the countries of North and Sub-Saharan Africa, although some aspects of managing social processes were studied based on the data from Southern Africa.

The range of issues under study was also subjected to severe limitations. It included only the key and most urgent problems of state and public authority in Africa. As the core themes of forming the system of power relations the following issues were selected: the peculiarities of regulating social communication during transition period, the emergence of transitional forms of power organisation, and the instability and fragility of the political life of African countries and the specificity of their conflict and crisis development. The study of "African power" took into account the results of the evolution of political systems, the results of state and party building, the influence of ethnic and confessional situation, as well as the impact of irrational factors. The study of power interaction of people to some extent was focused on the peculiarities of political behaviour, as well as the specifics of national elites and the relationship between the rulers and their subjects, and the competition of the "principle of strength" with the "principle of law." The authors touched upon the latest trends of "reterritorialisation" and the formation of "legal spatiality".

Many of the processes and trends of the development of "African power" can be studied within the framework of political science and its sub-disciplines – political science of development, political science of transition, etc. However, the complex nature of the "problem of power" in Africa also suggests utilisation of methods and tools of other social sciences. These include political sociology (the descriptive, but above all the normative approach), micro– and macrosociology, political philosophy, history, state and law theory, organisation theory and governance theory. At the same time, the cooperation of middle level theories with the information generated within the framework of country and regional studies is critical for creating "new knowledge" about power in Africa.

The study of "African power" should help to further overcome the Eurocentric approach to analysing the political problems of non-Western modernity. Certainly, a direct contradistinction, much less attempt of a "head-on collision" of African tradition and Western modernity long turned to a scientific atavism. Already developed – for example, by L. Pye – sets of distinguishing features of "non-Western political process" mark the contours of state and public authority that exists outside of the western and perhaps even Eurocentric world. Here it is appropriate to recall such properties of the political space of non-Western modernity as incomplete dissection of political, social and personal relationships, a large number of political clans and cliques, an impressive number of political leaders of the charismatic type, freedom of political leadership in defining development strategies that verges on arbitrary rule, markedly different political sympathies and preferences of different generations. The intensity of the emotional component of public policy, weak influence of public opinion and national discussions on political decision-making, insufficient ideologisation of political parties that prefer to fight not for the chosen goal and system of beliefs, but for a certain lifestyle (in a broad interpretation of this concept) should also be mentioned.

Even the most complete list of "non-Western" features of political power cannot "close the topic" because it is not tantamount to a full-fledged power model. Hypothetically "African power" operates and develops in a specific semantic space, where notions of good and evil, progress and regression, effective and ineffective do not always coincide with the perceptions that are characteristic of "European thinking". A comprehensive scientific assessment of the phenomena and processes associated with the implementation of state and public authority in Africa is an independent and complex problem whose solution lies primarily in the theory of interaction between civilizations.

The multidimensionality of the problem of power and the necessity to find non-trivial approaches to its analysis make it advisable to conduct network and interdisciplinary research. At the same time, its sections play the role of "projects", and do not constitute an anthology – a collection of loosely related to each other articles. The importance of author's interpretations and initially controversial nature of issues necessitated the expansion of polemical basis and utilisation of methods of discourse and dialogue of various scientific schools and areas.

One of the approaches to the analysis of political process is a systematic study and modelling of power relations. In terms of theory modelling governing processes facilitates the development of a new class of scientific problems (both in political science and in African studies). In perspective, a comprehensive analysis of power could highlight the most significant, in terms of social progress, threats, the source of which is actually or potentially African countries, as well as contribute to the creation of a global classification or typology of organisational forms of government and to further development of the theory of political transition. We could not but agree with the authors of the monograph that in terms of scientific and applied aspects the study of African political models should lead, first of all, to the creation of new algorithms for governing and managing society in conflict, crisis and emergency situations, and, secondly, to preserving, updating or complete restructuring of political institutions in aggressive social environment.

In this context, much attention in the monograph is drawn to the politicalisation of Islam.
In the last third of the 20th century and in the beginning of the 21st century in the Arab countries of North Africa, including Egypt and the Maghreb, we could see either the entrance of Islam to the forefront of politics, or its retreat into the depths, “backstage”, towards the sphere of moral and spiritual values. In domestic and foreign Oriental studies the importance of Islamic teachings as a political umbrella that gathers under its canopy social strata and groups swaying toward traditionalism and brought out of the usual circle of contacts, tasks and expectations by modernisation was repeatedly stressed.

The so-called Islamic revival, which at the turn of the 1960s to the 1970s still had a circumscribed character and gained momentum by the end of the 20th century, certainly made a noticeable but contradictory impact on the evolution of political systems in the region. However, this process kept a slow pace and has pendulum rather than forward momentum, which gives an impression of stagnation, if not retrogression. In fact, one-party regimes that existed in Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria, are gone; these countries held alternative presidential elections, but none of the current heads of state is ready to give up his power or transfer it to another person on a free competitive basis.

When considering the problem of democratic transformation in South Africa, researchers conclude that there an illiberal democracy has developed, which has all the formal trappings of democratic government – a constitution, elections, separation of powers, etc., but which doesn’t possess a liberal political culture that would allow these institutions to work in full force. "Illiberal democracy" secures the power of undemocratic government through democratic means. Nevertheless, in South Africa, despite the distinct tendency to centralise government and gain control over the legislative and judicial powers, this process is far from over: an active opposition operates in the Parliament and neither the press nor courts are entirely dependent on the executive power; there is also a civil society, which rarely acts the way this government wants.

The history of South Africa is centuries of racial segregation, racial discrimination and ethnic cleavages. It also has another legacy: decades of anti-racist activities of the SACP and the unity of all forces struggling against apartheid both in exile and inside the country. True, the struggle against racism, nationalism and ethnicity doesn’t clean the consciousnesses of those who are fighting against these evils. The pressure of the historical experience could not but lead to an explosion of racial and ethnic emotions, and they, as is well-known, do not contribute to the development of democracy or to a rational approach to solving socio-economic problems.

Thus, political practice and scientific and empirical studies indicate that in the context of post-colonial Africa the types and forms of political power as well as the key processes of establishing power relations significantly (sometimes fundamentally) differ from their European, American and even Asian counterparts. An analysis of the dynamics and transformation of power demonstrates that its functioning and development is subject to the laws of other times, other (as compared, for example, with the Western world) rhythms and cycles. On the outside this peculiarity of power in Africa can be expressed in the phenomenon of “frozen political reality” or, alternatively, in kaleidoscopic and unexplainable flashing events with political meaning.

Power, as it develops in its own system of coordinates, became a concentration of many paradoxical phenomena. For example, while modernising their political systems, some African countries suddenly and in the most mysterious way found themselves far behind the rest of the continent. When strengthening central authority, governments often managed to only weaken it. The processes of democratisation in the second half of the 20th century often paved the way for autocracy. Possessing rich foreign experience in forming political systems (a phenomenon that some researchers call the "advantage of backwardness"), African states, in essence, became laboratories for conducting "experiments" of establishing the reign of chaos and almost destroying the civilizational foundations of society. At the same time, the duality of social, political and state power, as well as the "equalisation of rights" of power and powerlessness became perhaps the main paradoxes of the political development in Africa.

In conclusion, the authors make the following conclusions: the very concept of political power in African society does not easily fit into the Procrustean bed of scientific definitions and categorisation and analysis systems already established in domestic and foreign political science. The specificity of genesis, rate and extent of socialisation, and other qualitative and quantitative characteristics of political power in African societies often defy describing them using such "European-oriented" concepts as the "levels of delegation of power", "pluralism" and "convergence", "diffusion" and "dispersion".

In recent decades the development of political systems in Africa was marked by a conflict interaction of the different trends in designing the political organisation of society and by a "competition" between different ways of governing – (neo)traditional, "Western", quasi-socialist etc. The archaisation of Africa’s social reality, a new round of tensions between the actors of political games, and even – as some researchers assert – a rollback into the 20th century were among the consequences of Africa’s integration into the global system of political relations. As a result, on the African continent there emerged very original models of political power and bizarre systems of state and legal organisation, and there formed a rather complex configuration of political space, in some areas of which power relations acquired previously unknown unique shapes.

The multidirectionality of the formation of power left a definite imprint on the processes of developing objectives and main directions of the devel-
The development of society (political leadership), as well as on the implementation of strategic guidelines (governance). Due to a large extent to the systemic uncertainty of power relations, political leadership in Africa is characterised by low efficiency of decision implementation, unpredictability, unrealistic plans and programmes of national development. Volitional principles, as a rule, took precedence over legal, and the relations of domination and subordination ousted the principles of constructive influence, governance and control. With regard to governance, it was often devoid of scientific basis and focussed on power or rigid administrative practices.

Political power in Africa can be likened to an "organism", which is responsive to all the major changes in social life (not just in the countries of the continent). Therefore, anomic, terrorism, corruption, and other social viruses affect mainly power, which as a result weakens significantly or even perishes. Internal links in such a power system get broken and it no longer "knows" how and in what direction it should develop further. The disorientation of power-organism under certain circumstances may be replaced by "dispersion" of its elements in favour of various control centres.

It is possible that political power, as its concentrates and centralises, could turn into a primitively constructed "mechanism", the operation of which would be carried out in the interest of a small ruling group and would virtually ignore the interests of society. This would lead to a desocialisation of power, which would become a powerful instrument for various abuses carried out under the pretext of "national specificity".

Power models differ markedly at different stages of development of political systems and in different historical periods of development of African countries. Political "matter" obtains special properties during a transitional period when society lives by fundamentally different rules and regulations. It is important to take into account this factor of transitivity when analysing the problems of political leadership and governance, because this particular phase is characterised by alternativity and multiversion of development, as well as the coexistence of several multidirectional and often latent social processes.

On the one hand, the "transitional age" of political power in Africa is fraught with a number of "surprises" of social development, which in principle are inherent in the phenomenon of transition. These include a new surge of disorientation of political forces, the lability of the ruling elites, the chaos in the field of public governance, the instability of domestic and foreign policy, and a high probability of emergence of other destructive phenomena in public life.

On the other hand, several features of "African government" indicate just the opposite. It is likely that the vector of socio-political development of African countries will focus on the positive transformation of power. The world's leading powers, international organisations, and big business are in general interested in the stabilisation of political life, which until recently threatened to spiral in Africa out of anyone's control. That is why external factors at the beginning of the 21st century contribute mainly to conflict resolution and crisis management on the continent. Even to a greater extent, the trends of positive transformation are determined by the influence of internal factors. It is hard not to notice that state and public relations in Africa mature every year and become more stable. In part, this trend is manifested in the elimination of odious dictatorial regimes, the overall restructuring of political institutions, and in an effort to establish a system of qualified management of social and economic processes. Partly this trend is proven by the commitment of African leaders to the continental and sub-regional integration, the reduction of the zone of wars ("the territory of blood and tears"), which raged on the continent for many decades, as well as by a marked decline of political tensions in inter-African relations. As a result, the collective efforts of African States in peacekeeping substantially intensified and Africa's own crisis management capacity was built. Finally, the prospects of transformation of power are bright because Africans plan (while designing new mechanisms of political leadership and governance) to use the legacy of diverse African cultures, Africa's own experience in democratic development, as well as individual elements of the models of power established outside the continent.

An analysis of the future of African politics, on the one hand, should allow putting forecasts, scenarios and various hypothetical constructs of power and administration developed by national experts into broad scientific operation. On the other hand, the futurological aspect of the study will obviously help find answers to many important questions. What are the "pros and cons" of the experience in political development of the continent? Is Africa a model of "passing world" and planetary instability? Towards which political "lighthouses" are African societies drifting? What should representatives of non-African civilizations expect from Africa?
Africa: Problems of Formation of Civil Society

Nailya Fakhrutdinova

The monograph prepared by staff of the Centre for Sociological and Political Sciences Studies of the Institute for African Studies examines the origins and background of civil society (CS) in Africa, analyses the difficulties of forming its elements under complex economic, socio-political and cultural conditions of democratisation. The authors of this comprehensive study believe that the characteristics of CS are not immanent only in modern Western civilization: they can mature (with some specificity) also in other socio-cultural environments, e.g. in Africa, forming non-Western versions of civil society.

The monograph consists of 9 chapters:

I. Civil society: formation conditions and basic characteristics (N.D. Kosukhin, Dr.Sc. (Hist.)). II. Prerequisites for the formation of civil society in Africa (I.G. Bolshov, Ph.D. (Econ.), Yu.V. Potemkin, Dr.Sc. (Econ.)). III. Political pluralism in the context of the formation of civil society (N.D. Kosukhin, Dr.Sc. (Hist.)). IV. Socio-political atmosphere of civil society formation (L.Ya. Prokopenko, Ph.D. (Hist.)). V. Tropical Africa: political culture and the problems of civil society formation (N.I. Vysotskaya, Ph.D. (Hist.)). VI. Non-governmental organisations and civil society (O.B. Gromova, Ph.D. (Hist.)). VII. Gender aspects of civil society formation (N.V. Grishina, Ph.D. (Hist.) and I.G. Rybalkina, Ph.D. (Hist.)). VIII. State and civil society organisations: confrontation or partnership? (L.M. Sadovskaya, Ph.D. (Hist.)). IX. Features of the civil society in Arab countries of Africa (N.Z. Fakhrutdinova).

The introduction and conclusion of the monograph were written by Yu.V. Potemkin, Dr.Sc. (Econ.).

The first chapter is devoted to a general review of the genesis of the concept of CS itself and its "interpretation" in the context of African countries. N.D. Kosukhin examines various interpretations of civil society, noting that the idea of CS goes back to Aristotle, and at each stage of the historical evolution of mankind it acquired a new meaning and new features. However, the author stresses that a significant number of domestic and foreign political analysts have a consensus regarding the basic characteristics of CS, which in his opinion opens up an opportunity to give a fuller definition of it: CS is a system of non-state social relations and institutions, which is formed on the basis of the principles of individual freedom, legal equality of citizens, their initiatives and self-organisation and attains the peak development in democratic states. By this definition, the structure of CS includes autonomous activity of citizens, activity of organisations and associations they form, as well as relationships established between these actors.

Referring to the problems of CS formation in African countries, N.D. Kosukhin characterises these societies as proto-civil, in which the remnants of traditional relations and ethno-religious linkages are strong. The author stresses that the emergence of CS in Africa is associated with the process of political modernisation, which provides for the establishment of multiparty systems, electoral institutions, and the activities of public and non-governmental organisations.

In the second chapter I.G. Bolshov and Yu.V. Potemkin specify, firstly, the origins and peculiarities of forming African civil organisations, characterise the role of different social groups in this process, in particular of the middle class, and, secondly, analyse the reasons for the weakness of small and medium entrepreneurship, which is potentially the most important social base for CS.

The authors stress the fact that a modern state and CS are the products of a culture that is closely associated with the processes of urbanisation. Representatives of African middle class are mainly urban dwellers. The concept of CS is associated exclusively with the urban "civilization". In characterising civil society organisations (CSOs), the authors note the unevenness of their development on the continent. The greatest progress, with the exception of North Africa, was made in Nigeria, Uganda, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Some increase in the activity of CSOs was observed in Cameroon, Senegal, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Almost all of these countries have significant resource and economic potential. Another feature of the development of CSOs in Africa is the support of the activities of CSOs by "transformed" ruling regimes and cooperation with them. According to the authors, external financial and other support weakens CSOs. The main donor of African CSOs is the United States.

In the context of the prerequisites for the formation of CSOs in countries such as sub-Saharan ones, the authors identify, among others, two main lines of social progress. The first one – socioeconomic – suggests poverty reduction and improving living standards. One of its aspects is the development of economic entrepreneurship, particularly small and medium business, and concomitant increase in employment. A prerequisite for such development is mobilisation and effective use of resources, as well as active participation of government institutions.

Such participation forms the second – socio-political – line of progress: strengthening the state's role in promoting economic, financial and other ser-
vices that are necessary for the functioning of production; and organising an institutional framework to fit the needs of socio-political progress, including strengthening civic and democratic tendencies in society.

The subject of the third chapter is a detailed assessment of the importance of political pluralism in the context of CS as well as the features of forming multiparty systems in African countries. N.D. Kosukhin provides a detailed analysis of the modern theory of political pluralism, while noting its importance to African societies that are characterised by a variety of ethnicities, cultures, languages, religions, social and age groups, etc.

Multiparty system in African countries facilitates political activism, the formation and expression of interests of various ethnic groups, especially, especially during election campaigns and national referendums. In this case, parties become an instrument of political will of citizens, a factor influencing the outcome of popular elections. According to the author, harmonisation of interests within main directions of socio-political and economic activities should become the key function of political forces within the framework of CS. N.D. Kosukhin thinks that the stability of African countries and solution of their socio-economic problems depends on whether multi-party system will become a key element of CS.

L.Ya. Prokopenko in the fourth chapter examines various elements of the socio-political atmosphere in which the formation of CS occurs, including the nature of the interaction of political elites and lower classes of society, the dialectic of competitive relations of ruling and opposition elites, and the influence of these relations on civil society organisations. The author stresses the importance of media and ICT (information and communication technology) in the development of political system and CSOs. They produce and disseminate information (norms, values, etc.), acquisition of which is necessary for real and informed participation of citizens in public life and society. With the expansion of the Internet on the continent, political leaders and elites in general are becoming more vulnerable. L.Ya. Prokopenko believes that neither ruling nor opposition political elites in most African countries are prepared to support the formation of CS.

In the fifth chapter N.I. Vysotskaya analyses a complex of problems of African political culture in the context of the formation of CS. The author shows that the features of political culture, along with other factors related to the nature of socio-economic development under colonialism and post-colonialism, impede the overcoming of many dividing lines that exist in social structures, thus hampering the formation of civil society. N.I. Vysotskaya emphasises that the overriding feature of the political culture in sub-Saharan Africa is its integration with traditional perceptions (about government, society, leadership), which explains the prevalence of specific, irrational – from the viewpoint of Western political scientists – political motivations inherent in the majority of political actors of the continent. Unlike Western countries where political culture is dominated by individual or individually realised group interests, in sub-Saharan Africa there dominates communal, clan, tribal, and ethnic solidarity based on shared, traditionally entrenched, customs and symbols. According to N.I. Vysotskaya, the dependence on community orders and commitments to "own" ethnic group inhibits the establishment of intergovernmental organisations of corporate type, which would help the middle class to defend their specific interests. The author stresses that in a traditional political culture the rallying basis acts within a clan, tribe or ethnic community, which in the context of tribal and ethnic tensions prevents the emergence of a broader civil solidarity for the formation of CS. However, N.I. Vysotskaya observes that the absence of civil society does not mean the absence of non-governmental organisations of various types that operate in the majority of sub-Saharan countries. However, the percentage of "organic" NGOs is insignificant and implanted NGOs or the NGOs that imitate foreign models form the majority.

The sixth chapter contains a comprehensive analysis of the genesis, nature and importance of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as an important element of CS. These organisations are considered in terms of their role in socio-economic development, contribution to promotion of democratic reforms, social and human rights functions, as well as their "coexistence" with African traditions. In this regard, O.B. Gromova emphasises that the essence and nature of NGOs as institutions or models of Western origin are changing under the specific conditions of Africa’s developing countries. Considerable difficulties in most African countries – economicbackwardness, permanent political instability, refugees, growing poverty, underemployment and unemployment, environmental threats, discrimination of women and children, etc. – led to a shift in the focus of NGOs towards solving practical problems and easing socio-economic difficulties of ordinary masses of Africans, especially in rural areas. The author observes that the human rights aspect of NGOs’ activity is less visible and called-for, despite the efforts of Western and international NGOs to orient Africans to a greater extent towards protection of human rights and control over the degree of transparency and efficiency of local authorities, and is sometimes perceived by local people as imposition of guidelines and programmes alien to traditional values and irrelevant to Africa’s current needs.

In the seventh chapter N.V. Grishina and I.G. Rybalkina claim the impossibility of the formation of CS in Africa without gradual elimination of hitherto clearly visible socio-economic and legal inequality between the sexes. Some changes in this area are taking place, but they are clearly insufficient, especially given the continued feminisation of poverty. The authors believe that a state policy on women should be the key prerequisite for the formation of civil society and an essential element of an overall so-
cial policy. Such policy should take into account the interests of women as a significant socio-demographic group, raise their legal and social status, and regulate their relationship with society. Mitigation of asymmetry, levelling the social roles of men and women, improvement and democratisation of the women’s movement appear as a necessary part of the formation of civil society.

The eighth chapter is devoted to one of the key aspects of the process of political democratisation: the relationship between state and civil society organisations. L.M. Sadovskaya raises the question: what is happening in this area, confrontation or partnership? Analysing in detail the ambiguity of the real situation in this matter, she finds that each side understands inadmissibility of a confrontational nature of the relationship. The preservation and strengthening of democratic tendencies requires partnerships between state institutions and CS. L.M. Sadovskaya notes the importance of strengthening ties between CS and state mass media, which should positively affect the functioning of the state itself. At the same time, the formation of CS is impossible without developing mass media. Public opinion is becoming a force to be reckoned with because of mass media. Based on the proceedings of international and pan-African forums and analysing the assessments made by African leaders, L.M. Sadovskaya stresses that the partnership between state and civil society, which entails state support of NGOs involved in solving social issues that contribute to moral, cultural and intellectual development of population, could contribute to strengthening a climate of trust in African authorities and to the formation of CS.

The ninth chapter is devoted to the specifics of the formation of CS in the Arab countries of Africa. N.Z. Fakhrutdinova reveals the historical background of the development of identity and national characteristics of Arab political culture, as well as various manifestations of the growth of popular civicism in the modern period. Particular attention is paid to the role of Islam in the region, which the author calls a kind of national idea and the foundation of political culture of citizens. Islam for the Arabs is not just a religion but a symbol of their former power. The author stresses that individualism, which is the basis of CS in Western countries, is to certain extent alien to the Arabs. They recognise themselves as part of the two major communities: the general Arab culture and history, on the one hand, and the huge Muslim Ummah – on the other. Communal is more important for an Arab than personal, and Sharia is based on the idea of obligations imposed on a person rather than his rights. Therefore, the NGOs created in the Arab world are dominated by the organisations that advocate for greater humanity in the socio-economic sphere and for helping the poorest strata of population, etc.

Noting that modernisation in the Arab world is inevitable, the author defines it as the formation of modern welfare economics and CS, as well as the enrichment of Islamic states with achievements of the global civilization while preserving their national identity.

* * *

The analysis of several aspects of the formation of CS in Africa, which is carried out by the authors of the monograph, demonstrates the ambiguity, complexity and contradictions of the process of civicising, which became, nonetheless, an integral part of some movement in the direction of democracy. This movement is officially recognised, proclaimed, encouraged and at the same time faces serious, closely interrelated economic, political and socio-cultural barriers. The absence of a developed market economy with a well-organised system of self-development, an extremely low standard of living of the majority of population, isolation and economic weakness of the African middle class, low overall maturity of the general population, the dominance of traditional political culture, permanent inter-ethnic conflict, corruption of ruling groups, etc. – are the main drags on the formation of CS, the removal of which requires great efforts and a lot of time. Such great efforts should not be undertaken just by Africans but also by the international community which is interested in economic and social "rehabilitation" of the continent and its withdrawal from the current state of marginality.

However, despite the obstacles in the process of civicising African societies, it remains the fact that a variety of different associations exists and often acts vigorously. These range from informal local networks that represent, in essence, an African variety of CS grassroots to voluntary structured organisations such as trade unions, women’s, youth’s, religious, ethnic, corporate, environmental and human rights, etc.

In the context of weakening, if not fully nullifying the "developmental" function of a state in Africa, NGOs became regarded as a channel to promote socio-economic development and a tool for promoting democracy in "backward" societies.

The authors argue that the movement in this direction is a very lengthy process. They are asking themselves a question: Is it possible at all? In Africa and elsewhere many are sceptical of the assessment of the future. However, there are optimists who do not consider the obstacles that stand in the way of socio-economic progress, which is associated with the development of civil society, as insurmountable. It is not present yet in most African countries. Nevertheless, there are multiple, varied, vibrant and growing shoots of civicising. These shoots are the source of optimism about the civic future of African societies.
AFRICAN MIGRATION: THE EXPERIENCE OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

The changes in the global demographic picture are swift by historical standards and confront most countries with the problem of mass migration. Demographically "aging" countries of the North face the burning issue of "compensating" for natural population decline with the inflow of people from southern regions that have relatively "excessive" population growth. Russia, which occupies one of the leading positions in the world in terms of physical "volume" of migration, still doesn’t have a developed and implemented articulate migration policy. Meanwhile, the processes of depopulation have been taking place in a large number of Russian regions for many decades and have led to both an absolute decline in population and to the growing deficit of economically active population. Both have serious economic, social and political repercussions. Therefore the issue became one of the key obstacles to the country’s overall development and directly affects the image of Russia in the modern world.

The purpose of this study is to examine the experience of the EU in the field of migration policy and to apply the best practices to create a rational migration policy of Russia. The cooperation of Russia with Western countries on migration issues could become one of the key steps on the road towards Russia’s adjustment to the new global world and the formation of the country’s positive image.

The study for the first time in domestic science aims to provide a comprehensive study of migration from the South and the East to the North and the West, as well as Africa’s role in these processes. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of economic and other activities of immigrants, the impact of migrants’ remittances on the balance of payments of donor and recipient countries, the issues of preservation of cultural and civilizational identity of a host society, the regulation of labour and reduction of illegal migration and associated criminal and shadow economy.

The objective of the study determined the nature of employed methods. The study is based on modern methods of comparative research and systems analysis of Russian and European migration policies towards migrants from the South and the East. In preparing this article, a series of interviews with African migrants, as well as with scientists, civil servants and experts on migration issues was conducted in Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Tanzania, Benin, South Africa, Germany, France, Spain, Italy and Malta.

According to studies of socio-economic benefits of immigration, the majority of Russian and foreign scientists concluded that in terms of macroeconomics immigration brings benefits to a host country, because the total gain in productivity exceeds the earnings of immigrants. Immigration is conducive to a more efficient use of resources – not only labour, but also financial. However, in the controversy surrounding migration not the gains in efficiency are emphasised, but migration’s redistributive aspect. Most authors also stress the fact that the formation of a common labour market in the EU and the former Soviet Union proceeds at a slow pace, as this market’s subject is people with their specific perceptions of changes in economy and social life. Therefore, in the coming years the EU and Russia will need to better manage the combined labour potential of the North and the South through its redistribution from the countries with relatively abundant human resources to the countries experiencing depopulation. In this regard, the relevance of new research in the field of migration from the South to the North will not decrease, but, on the contrary, will increase further.

Based on modern methods of comparative studies and theoretical generalisation of the author’s findings of 1996-2008, including the results of field research in Germany, Italy, Spain, Great Britain, Morocco, Tunisia, Benin and Malta, interviews with several Russian and foreign experts, immigrant surveys, and materials from research centres, government agencies and other organisations in Russia and abroad, the author defined the specific role of Russia, Africa and the EU in migration from the South to the North. The basic causes of migration to Russia and other EU countries are identified.

The intensification of migration flows from the South to the North is primarily associated with the aging of population in developed countries. Demographically “aging” countries of the North face the burning issue of "compensating" for natural population decline with the inflow of people from southern regions that have relatively "excessive" population growth. The processes of depopulation of a large number of European countries and Russian regions have been taking place for many decades and have led to both an absolute decline in population and to the growing deficit of economically active population. Both have serious economic, social and political repercussions.

Population shortfall in the North, including in Russia, doesn’t of course mean inviting everyone to migrate to a new place indiscriminately. In recent years, host countries have increased selectivity in terms of professional skills and qualifications of immigrants. Priority is given firstly to specialists capable of working in high-tech industries, and secondly to specialists in industries of middle technological level that lack sufficiently skilled manpower. The first kind of selection is more typical of Western Europe and the U.S., the second one – of Russia. In the latter case, specific mechanisms for
the mobilisation of labour resources, their territorial distribution and rational utilisation have not been yet sufficiently developed.

However, the main cause of labour migration from the South to the North continues to be the income inequality of developed and developing countries. In 1975 the average per capita income in high-income countries was 41 times higher than in low-income countries, but presently this gap is equal to 66. Therefore, many Africans consider emigration to be the only way to improve their living conditions and the living conditions of their families.

On the other hand, entrepreneurs from developed countries are also interested in using immigrant labour. This is due, primarily, to the desire to reduce production costs (particularly labour costs) as well as to the necessity to mobilise manpower during periods of production growth and to a shortfall of workers in industrial sectors with harsh or adverse working conditions. In the era of economic globalisation the reduction of production costs is essential to competition in domestic and foreign markets.

Another reason for the intensification of migration flows in African countries is the backward structure of employment in some states of the continent. More than half of the working population of Africa is engaged in small-scale low-productivity agriculture, which is facing competition from the modern and state-subsidised agricultural sector of developed countries. Millions of rural families in Africa go bankrupt each year and join the ranks of domestic (village – city), regional and international migrants.

The unstable political and military situation in many African countries also increases the scope of both internal and external migration.

The author of the article provides a classification of migrants by major categories, types, ethnic and social composition, destinations, age, gender, education and qualification criteria.

Modern emigration from Africa is made up of very inhomogeneous flows, which fact clearly determines the differentiation of their socio-economic impact on host societies. Some of these flows are initiated by a host country, and then they are subject to regulation, but a substantial proportion of immigrants is accepted on humanitarian grounds or arrives illegally, without being subjected to selection or control.

In the structure of migration, there are four main categories: economic migrants, reuniting family members, refugees and illegal migrants; the ratio between these categories varies in individual countries. Because of the relatively low proportion of migrants who are motivated by better employment opportunities, the volume and structure of immigration do not always correspond to the basic economic needs of a host society. Its impact on the level of economic activity and on the ratio of working and non-working population is twofold.

In terms of national composition of immigrants, groups that are ethnically distant from core populations of receiving countries tend to dominate. Ethnical differences are often accompanied not only by other types of demographic behaviour of migrants (e.g. large families), but also by considerable difficulties in the adaptation of migrants to their new environment.

The latter circumstance leads, on the one hand, to extra spending by host countries, and, on the other hand, to the active use of traditional and alternative ways of living by migrants, which facilitates wide dissemination of types of economic activities based on ethnic solidarity (ethnic economy). A “black labour” market also forms in host countries, which acts as a mechanism for using illegal labour migration in order to increase profits through using cheap labour.

Although the level of education and professional qualifications of immigrants, as well as of indigenous populations, has an obvious tendency to increase, in general it is usually lower than that of local residents, and the professional and qualification composition of immigrants is more polarised.

In recent years, besides quantitative changes, there took place significant qualitative changes in migration movements from the South to the North.

First of all, noteworthy is the increase in the proportion of young people, women and children in migration flows. For example, the proportion of youth (persons under 25 years) in the total number of African migrants exceeds 25%, while the proportion of women exceeds 30%, which suggests the feminisation of migration.

The length of stay of migrants in countries of employment has also increased: it is now 10 years in the EU and more than 20 years in Germany.

There is also a growing migration of scientists and highly skilled workers. The “brain drain” from African countries annually exceeds 200,000 people. The total annual costs of this process are close to 50-60 billion dollars.

Migration with an aim to obtain professional education and training is also increasing. Such training is organised by the EU member states in order to penetrate EU markets with the help of cadres trained by them.

The scale of individual migration of professionals and businessmen is also increasing. A new category of business immigrants – investors from North African countries (mostly Libyans, Tunisians and Egyptians) – has emerged.

The article examined the overall economic impact of migration from Africa and demonstrated it effect on wages, welfare, labour market, production volumes, taxes and government spending in donor countries and recipient countries.

The assessments of the impact of immigration on economic growth are ambiguous. Most studies indicate that the impact of immigration on growth is positive. For example, in the EU an increase in the level of net migration
by 1% leads to an increase in growth rates by 0.1%. A population increase of 1% owing to immigration can lead to an increase in GDP by 1.15%. While creating added value in host countries, the immigrants also are consuming goods and services. The resulting ripple effect ultimately contributes to economic growth. Some immigrants invest in own businesses, which makes a positive impact on the economy.

Average wages in host countries are decreasing due to the influx of migrants. As a result, the penetration of labour markets by a large number of unskilled workers and their employment in those sectors, in which national work forces prefer not to work, maintain low wages (especially in case of employing illegal migrants).

Immigration levels affect the volume of tax revenues and public expenditures. Tax revenues grow at the expense of qualified professionals, as they have higher incomes and do not require public spending on their education. However, the majority of unskilled workers need government support, which increases public spending in recipient countries. On the other hand, the status of illegal immigrants keeps them from using social security benefits and welfare payments, so government spending on them is insignificant.

Migration affects the labour markets of labour exporting countries. Under adverse economic circumstances and when unemployment in African countries grows labour migration can to a certain extent solve the problem of employment and reduce social tensions in society.

Re-emigration of workers who received high qualifications abroad can contribute to GDP growth in a donor country. Studies conducted by the International Labour organisation in labour exporting countries suggest that immigrants are more ready for new activities and take an active part in the development of new forms of economy. In some North African countries, for example, returning migrants have managed to grow new crops and to introduce new production methods. Labour shortages caused by emigration can stimulate positive technological changes, including better use of manpower and other resources.

At the same time, the “brain drain” has negative consequences for a donor country, which not only loses its scientific potential, but also has to replace emigrants by making additional investment in education and training.

The book theoretically justifies a special "Russian" model of migration policy and analyses its main features. For the first time in Russian scientific literature the impact of migration on the formation of budget and on the expansion of shadow and criminal economy in donor and recipient countries is demonstrated. Particular attention is paid to studying the causes, nature and consequences of illegal migration. A methodology for the analysis of cross-border remittances is developed and their ambiguous role in the Russian and world economies is revealed.

At present the share of the African continent in the total amount of official remittances is relatively small and amounts to 15%, while the share of sub-Saharan Africa is only 5%. The main recipients of remittances are countries such as Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Nigeria, Sudan, Uganda, Lesotho, Senegal and Mauritius. Remittances constitute a significant part of GDP in many countries. In particular this applies to Lesotho (23%), Cape Verde (13.5%), Burkina Faso (6%) and Benin (4.5%). The African continent on the whole received about 42 billion money transfers in 2009. Given the fact that the banking system in African countries is not sufficiently developed, much of these remittances are received through unofficial channels. The preference given to unofficial money transfers is also due to the high cost of official transfers, which sometimes is 10-15% of the total amount of a remittance. According to the World Bank experts, the amount of unofficial remittances to African countries is 2-3 times the amount of funds transferred through official channels. In a country such as Uganda, for example, the share of official remittances is only 20% of all funds sent into the country by emigrants. In many African countries remittances play a significant role in social life. For millions of poor African families remittances make up nearly half of all cash income that they spend on improving housing conditions, on consumer goods, as well as on investments in setting up their own, primarily construction, businesses, as well as education and health.

As for Russia, in recent years our country has taken on a role of a "world's assistant" in overcoming poverty and underdevelopment: citizens of the CIS annually send home from Russia about 10 billion dollars, which helps to keep social stability in these countries. The main flows of transfers go to the Ukraine, Armenia, Tajikistan and Moldova. In the latter the share of remittances in GDP is 35%. At the same time more than 70% of migrants' earnings are spent on consumer goods, primarily on food and clothing, and only insignificant amounts are spent on education, medical treatment, or are invested or saved.

The book summarises the EU's experience in the area of migration and analyses the reasons that force the EU to revise immigration policies toward their tightening. It is demonstrated that at present the policy of containing immigration from Southern regions is under the influence of not only ambiguous demographic but also ambiguous economic factors. It is concluded that under current conditions the reduction in demand for medium skilled labour is accompanied by increasing demand for both highly educated and skilled professionals in the advanced sector of economy and for low-skilled labour in the expanding services sector. All of this maintains and even increases the demand for compliant and unassuming immigrant labour, the employment of which increases the competitiveness of host countries. The study identifies the "inappropriateness" of unilateral restrictive immigration
policies of European states in general and of Russia in particular. It is con-
cluded that the "associative" relations of the Maghreb with the EU and the
desire of the EU to turn Tunisia, Algeria, Libya and Morocco into a "safety
cushion" for Western Europe against migration flows from Africa lead to
straining relations between the countries of North Africa and sub-Saharan
Africa. As a result, there is a discrepancy between the "pro-European" immi-
gration policy of the Maghreb’s political elites and its "pro-African" assess-
ment by liberal-minded Arab scholars. Their approach does not take into ac-
count the interests of host countries of the EU, but is based on the postulates
about the unacceptability of hindering free movement of labour in a globalis-
ning world and on the moral and historical legitimacy of migration from poor
to rich countries, as well as on the primacy of pan-African interests. A simi-
lar contradiction between authorities and independent experts in the field of
migration in terms of approaches and assessments of this phenomenon can be
found in Russia, which makes this study particularly relevant. The book
analyses the main features of the identity crisis of immigrants and native
population and the possibility of overcoming this crisis on the basis of public
policy on integration. It is concluded that the global financial crisis that
erupted in the autumn of 2008 and transformed into an economic crisis dra-
matically changed the situation on the global labour market. It is not ruled
out that the crisis could lead to a significant relative and even absolute reduc-
tion in international migration and to changes in the structure and direction
of migration flows in the upcoming few years, thus affecting the socio-
economic situation in Africa, the EU and Russia. The realistic assessment of
contemporary migration processes between the South and the North, which is
presented in this book, makes it possible to predict the results of the upcom-
ing expansion in the reception of immigrants, so that the structure of immi-
gration is the most adequate to the needs of the economy and society as a
whole.

The book may be of particular interest to Russian and African govern-
ment agencies, whose functions include carrying out general management of
a variety of practical aspects of migration policy.

RUSSIAN-AFRICAN RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT
OF GLOBALISATION

(Executive editors: T.L. Deych, E.N. Korendyasov. Authors: V.K. Vigand,
T.L. Deych, L.P. Kalinina, E.N. Korendyasov, O.S. Kulkova,
V.V. Lopatov. Moscow, 2009, 146 p.)

The monograph consists of 3 chapters, an introduction and a conclusion.
The Introduction states that globalisation leaves an increasingly signifi-
cant imprint on Russian-African relations. It presents not just threats (espe-
cially for weak economies), but also a constructive resource. Now Africa is
more of an object rather than a subject of globalisation and is largely unable
to exploit the positive potential of this phenomenon. Russia’s adaptation to
the globalising world is also painful and contradictory. While the levels of
Russia’s and Africa’s participation in the global economic system are sub-
stantially different and sometimes incommensurable, globalisation exerts an
increasing influence on their cooperation, forming new areas of interdepend-
ence and mutual interest. The authors of this paper see their task in identifi-
ing the level of the impact of globalisation on the formation of national inter-
ests and incentives for cooperation between Russia and Africa.

The first chapter of the monograph deals with "Main trends in devel-
opment of Russia and Africa in the beginning of the 21st century in the
context of globalisation." The first section of the chapter titled "Contradic-
tory results of Russian market reforms and the integration of Russia
into the world economy" notes that Russia had to pay a high price for mar-
ket reforms of the 1990s and for achieving certain political and economic
stability in the early 2000s. Only over the last five to six years Russia has
made a noticeable turn in a positive direction. However, these observable
positive changes still do not have a sound foundation. During these reforms
the industrial sector of the economy found itself even deeper in crisis. The
technological backwardness of Russia’s economy is due to a diminishing
role of science and poor application of scientific achievements in business.
Low per capita incomes remain a serious problem; a deepening demographic
crisis is a further threat to the future of Russia.

Although the Russian economy has overcome a number of important
stages of structural transformation, progressive processes are developing
slowly and inconsistently. The global economic crisis that erupted in 2008
has confirmed the instability of the economic development of Russia and re-
vealed the defectiveness of its integration into the global economy.
The geographical structure of Russia’s foreign economic relations demonstrates a clear Eurocentric focus: developing countries are on the periphery of its foreign trade. Meanwhile, African countries are of interest for Russia as an important source of resources for the mining industry, for satisfying Russia’s demand for scarce mineral raw materials, as well as for facilitating the strengthening of Russia’s position on global commodity markets.

The growing internationalisation of the global economy has significantly accelerated the modernisation of Russia’s economic potential in the direction of increasing country’s competitiveness and strengthening its positions on global markets, in particular, on energy and other natural resources markets.

The strongest among Russian companies are oil and gas corporations. Gazprom is the biggest company worldwide in terms of proven natural gas reserves, production levels, length of main gas pipelines, and the volume of gas exports. The company Lukoil, which incorporates about 300 organisations in 30 countries worldwide, has closely approached the status of a global transnational corporation. A group of powerful Russian companies has formed in ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy. United company RUSAL (Russian Aluminium) is becoming the largest player in the global aluminium market. Norilsk Nickel, which occupies the 376th place among the 500 largest companies in the world, seeks to acquire assets in South Africa and to interact with South African companies.

The development of the Russian economy is entering a new phase characterised by capacity building, which enhances its ability to compete on equal terms in world markets. Russia’s role as a global player on the strategically important world markets is increasing. Much will depend on whether the Russian economy development strategy in the coming decades is consistent with the main trends in the internationalisation of the global economic system.

The second section of the chapter titled “Enhancing the role of developing countries in the world economy in the 21st century” discusses the economic aspect of the transformations that marked the last decade of the 20th century and the essence of which was the successful growth of developing countries.

In the first decade of the 21st century, the Asian region was the fastest-growing region in terms of economics; under the influence of rapidly developing China and India, the region of East and South Asia became a new growth pole of the global economy due to the record levels of private capital inflows, foreign direct investment (FDI), and high external demand coupled with active internal demand.

In the new millennium in Africa started the most significant period of sustained economic growth in most of the continent’s countries over the entire period of independence. The economic growth in the region was stimulated, above all, by sustained global demand for raw materials and was aided by domestic demand, the successful implementation of measures to ensure macroeconomic stability, and carrying out structural reforms. Notable progress was made in Latin American economies.

The share of exports of the developing world in international trade has almost doubled since 1970 and the first decade of the 21st century exceeded 30%, while the share of imports reached 29%. As a result of growing industrial production in developing countries, the composition of their exports has changed. However, the developing world continues to play the role of the largest supplier of commodities to the world market.

Positive developments in the economies of developing countries in recent decades have increased their role in the movement of foreign direct and portfolio investments. The role of developing countries as exporters of capital is growing, and the process of forming stock markets has accelerated (in Brazil, Mexico, India, and China). The positions of developing countries in the WTO have also strengthened; their fight for tariff exemptions proves that there exists a broad field for cooperation between Russia and these countries within this prestigious organisation.

The last two sections of the chapter are dealing with the issue of globalisation’s impact on Africa’s development and analysis of adaptation processes on the continent.

Globalisation increased the involvement of African countries in global economic processes of production and created favourable conditions for improving the efficiency of African economies. However, globalisation, which developed spontaneously and according to the neo-liberal model, came under the control of TNCs of developed countries and became a subject of their interests. Consequently, the technological and economic gap between the rich and the poor and between successfully developing and lagging countries has widened. Africa’s dependence on world markets, which are under the control of TNCs, has increased.

Russian scientists put forward proposals for the development and implementation of a global anti-crisis programme for Africa, which would focus the efforts and resources of the international community on the earliest possible escape of Africa from its deep civilizational crisis. The topic of research suggests an analysis of measures to be carried out in Africa in order for African countries to be able to better adapt to new conditions of globalisation. Two specific measures can be identified: increasing the share of exports in GDP and the inflow of foreign investment.

Africa can be characterised as a region that is lagging behind other regions of the developing world, which can be confirmed by the statistics of past years, but forecasts suggest a slight shift in a positive direction.
With regard to the success of the adaptation to globalisation in the African region, the author of the section believes that it can be statistically evaluated with the ratio of exports (their value) to GDP, which determines the size of an export quota. The author concludes that the demand for raw resources of an African country is more important for this country’s adaptation than the full-fledged development of its national economy.

Based on the analysis of the measures taken in selected countries of North Africa (Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan) and Sub-Saharan Africa (Ghana, Nigeria, Ethiopia, South Africa, Mali), the section makes a conclusion on the level of achieved success in the adaptation of a country to globalisation. At the same time, the factors which facilitate or impede this kind of adaptation are evaluated.

On the whole, it is mainly oil-exporting countries that successfully adapt to globalisation and only South Africa stands out for its high-tech exports. It is hard not to notice the very low level of export quotas, but today it is the process of adaptation that remains the driving force behind the preservation of Africa’s position in the global market.

Export quotas, the rate of GDP growth, and foreign direct investment are not the only indicators and, moreover, not exhaustive ones of the capacity of African countries to adapt to the conditions of the globalising economy. At the same time, countries of the continent are expanding their presence in global information and communication networks, in global production processes, and increasing their role in international trade and economic organisations.

The second chapter titled “Political interaction between Russia and African countries in the era of globalisation” states that Russia’s qualitatively new position in the international arena puts into practice the issue of enhancing its relations with African partners, in particular, in order to bring together the sides’ positions on global issues of our time, cooperate in the international arena in addressing these issues, coordinate joint efforts in building a new world order, and increase the ability of the international community to give an adequate response to the challenges of globalisation.

A course towards development of mutually beneficial partnership with Africa allows for leveraging the African factor in the promotion of Russia’s interests in the international arena and solving our country’s own political and economic problems. Russia seeks to achieve cooperation with African countries in confronting new challenges and threats that undermine international stability in the 21st century, as well as in strengthening international law and the UN’s central role in international relations. At the same time, Russia is actively participating in concerted international efforts to promote Africa's development, which also enhances the status of our country as a responsible member of the world community, its credibility on the continent and in the international arena in general.

In the last decade, Russia’s interest in reviving relations with African countries, which had been partially lost as a result of the collapse of the USSR, has returned and raised a ready response in Africa. African countries proceed from the fact that Russia remains one of the most influential players in the system of international relations and try to gain its support for solving problems of their interest.

The first section of the chapter covers bilateral and multilateral contacts between Russia and African countries. The collapse of the Soviet Union had a negative impact on the state of Russian-African relations, which resulted in the reduction of political, economic, scientific and cultural relations. The intensity of diplomatic exchanges began to increase significantly only in the late 1990s. A kind of a “breakthrough” in Russia’s foreign policy towards Africa occurred due to the visits to the continent by Russian President Vladimir Putin, who visited Egypt in 2005, Algeria, Morocco and South Africa in 2006, and Libya in 2008, and by new Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev, who visited Egypt, Nigeria, Angola, and Namibia in 2009. The intensity of Russian-African political consultations on pressing issues of international politics has increased; the interaction between representatives of the Russian Foreign Ministry and African countries in the UN and in international forums, as well as inter-parliamentary exchanges, has intensified.

Steps are being taken to develop relations with African regional and subregional organisations: the African Union (AU), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and others.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union the level of scientific and cultural ties between Russia and African countries has declined. A notable revival in this area of cooperation has been observed only since the second half of the 1990s. Presently Roszarubezhcentr’s offices operate in several African countries, and the practice of signing two- and three-year agreements on cultural cooperation has been resumed. In 1996, the practice of granting government scholarships to African students and graduate students was resumed, and African citizens also began to be accepted for studies on a commercial basis. However, the number of Africans receiving education in Russia has dropped dramatically since the Soviet period. A new form of cooperation is the creation of joint educational institutions in Africa. Alumni associations of Russian universities play an active role in the expansion of Russian-African cultural ties. Scientific cooperation includes joint organisation of conferences in Russia and African countries, as well as scientific exchange.

One of the sections of the second chapter deals with the interaction between Russia and African countries in the UN. The Peacebuilding Com-
mission and the Human Rights Council were established, the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was endorsed, and the decision to revitalise the UN General Assembly was adopted with the active cooperation of Russia and African countries. Russia and African countries occupy similar positions on the issue of reforming the UN.

The chapter titled "Russia and Peacemaking in Africa" states that Russia is directly involved in international efforts towards a political settlement of crises and conflicts in Africa. Peacemaking is Russia's way of demonstrating its national interests and capabilities and one of the most tangible means of increasing its authority and strengthening its political influence on the continent. A representative of the Russian Federation was a member of the UN Security Council's missions to Africa. Russia cooperates with African countries in the training of African peacekeepers. Russian military and law enforcement officers are participating in all UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. However, Russia occupies the 40th place in the number of peacekeepers engaged in peacekeeping operations under UN auspices, and its share in the budget for peacekeeping operations (1.4%) does not fit our country's role in the modern world.

The last section of the chapter examines cooperation between Russia and African countries in combating modern threats and challenges. African countries support Russia's proposal to establish a global system of counteraction to modern challenges and threats and take part in its formation. An important component of Russian-African relations is our country's participation in international efforts to combat poverty in Africa. As a member of the "Big Eight", Russia is involved in implementing the Action Plan for Africa and other agreements reached at the summits of the Group of Eight. Russia cooperates with the World Bank within the framework of the "debt-for-development" programme, participates in the financing of the IMF programme to help the poorest countries suffering from external shocks. Russia has fulfilled its obligations for contributions to the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. African countries also receive targeted humanitarian aid.

The problem of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has taken on special urgency due to the persistent attempts by some countries to become members of the "nuclear club". Russia and African countries support the implementation of the programme for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, although there are some differences in their positions. However, African countries have a marked influence on the debate on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation and make a real impact on decision-making, which makes it necessary for Russia to liaise with the African group, in particular in the UN, and to work for a consensus in the interests of both parties.

Public awareness of the dangers of extremism and terrorism has led to intensified international cooperation to combat these phenomena. Russia became the first nuclear state to ratify the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Along with the U.S., Russia is a co-chair of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. African nations are getting actively involved in the fight against terrorism. Their efforts often focus along the same lines as Russian. For example, African countries supported the UN Security Council resolution 1373, which provides for specific steps in the fight against terrorism, although many of the provisions of the resolution could be interpreted as interference in their internal affairs. The struggle against terrorism is important for the African continent. Trans-border Islamic extremism finds fertile soil in the Sahara, Somalia, Ethiopia, Tanzania (Zanzibar), and Nigeria. In 2002, the meeting of African Union member states in Algeria was dedicated to the fight against terrorism. The establishment in Algeria in 2003 of the African centre for combating terrorism was among the outcomes of the meeting.

All base documents, bilateral and multilateral, signed by Russia and African countries at the highest level, include the obligations of the parties to counter international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Russia has also special agreements on cooperation in this field with some African countries. In addition, Russia and African countries forge cooperation in the fight against corruption: the Russian Federation participates in international anti-corruption cooperation. Russia also cooperates in combating weapons and drugs trafficking. Of particular importance is cooperation in extradition and legal assistance in criminal matters.

Russia, a significant portion of its population being Muslims, seeks to find an answer to the challenges of Islamic fundamentalism, which threatens the internal security of the country and its citizens. On this basis, it carries out active cooperation with the Islamic world, interacting with such influential Islamic organisations as the Organisation of Islamic Conference and the League of Arab States, many members of which are African countries. Russia searches for new common interests with the Islamic world and heightens the level of bilateral and multilateral relations. This approach is seen as a real opportunity to successfully address many problems of interaction between civilizations, including the fight against the terrorist threat.

The fourth chapter deals with the "Impact of Globalisation Processes on the Evolution of Russian-African Trade and Economic Relations". The first section of the chapter refers to the restructuring of Russian-African economic cooperation. Since the mid-1990s there has been a new period in Russian-African relations, which is characterised by the increasing activity of the Russian state and private business. Economic feasibility and stable relations became the main criteria in the trade and economic ties. Economic re-
lations have nearly being put on a market basis, while new contractual and legal background, financial and economic levers and tools promoting mutually beneficial cooperation are being created.

The chapter also examines current trends and priorities of Russian-African economic relations: a) Evolution of foreign trade; the growth rates of the latter have increased significantly, although its volume has remained low. The trade with Africa suffers from imbalances; tariff and customs policies of the partners continue to exert significant influence on the dynamics of foreign trade.

b) Cooperation in developing energy resources and other minerals. The most ambitious activities of Russian capital are concentrated in the energy sector (oil, gas, uranium), as well as in mining and processing of solid minerals (bauxite, manganese, diamonds). Russia is actively involved in the process of internationalisation of its mineral business on the basis of the "long-term government programme of the study of the subsoil and renewal of the mineral resource base (2005-2010 and until 2020)." Mining companies demonstrate the greatest activity in this area. Due to the growing role of energy, the oil and gas complex occupies the key place in investment cooperation between Russian companies and foreign partners. African market of high-efficiency oil and gas projects is characterised by fierce competition for the right to participate in their implementation. Russian oil companies have to fight against the leading multinationals and, in addition to Western oil companies that have rich experience of relations with African countries, against Chinese and Indian companies, which are increasingly active on the continent. However, the scale of investment activity of Russian companies suggests that over the next few years Africa's raw materials will become one of the most attractive areas for the capitalisation of Russian financial resources.

The last section of the chapter covers the state strategy of development of Russian-African relations in the field of international economic relations. The section notes that at the present stage of Russian-African relations, the state's regulating, organising and stimulating role in foreign economic activities acquires special significance. The lack of effective and diverse state support for businesses is one of the main reasons for the slowness of the development of African markets. Creation and implementation of conceptual approaches to economic and trade relations are the crucial conditions for their dynamic development. The concept of developing relations with Africa should become an effective incentive for intensifying trade and economic cooperation and a binding reference point for the practical activities of public authorities and business structures. In the development of a foreign economic strategy on Africa it is expedient to identify clearly the priority African partners with whom the Russian government intends and is able to cooperate successfully on a lasting basis.

The Conclusion states that globalisation becomes a driving factor in the development of Russian-African relations. The growing integration of Russia and Africa into the global economy, the impact of scientific and technological progress and the deepening of international division of labour create new opportunities for the formation of areas of mutual interest and partnership. The underestimation of the potential for the development of comprehensive relations with the African continent is fraught with negative consequences to the strengthening of the international position and prestige of Russia, improvement of the efficiency of its foreign trade complex, and expansion of its influence in world markets. The most important condition for the successful realisation of this potential is increasing governments’ influence, the implementation of an active economic diplomacy, and creating, in partnership with the business community, effective mechanisms for providing credit, finance, advertising, and marketing support and for stimulating Russian exporters and investors.

The impact of globalisation on Russian-African relations is ambiguous and contradictory. However, globalisation has undoubtedly accelerated the formation of new principles, frameworks and incentives for the development of Russian-African cooperation, which correspond to the defining trends of socio-political and economic evolution of Russia and Africa, progressive changes in the global economy, and international economic relations.
THREE CENTURIES OF DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

(Institute for African Studies of the RAS, executive editor A.B. Letnev, Dr.Sc. (Hist), 2008, 180 p.)

Valentina Gribanova

The monograph describes the history of education in South Africa over the period of more than three hundred years (from the end of the 17th century till the beginning of the 21st century). The paths of development of South African education over the past 300 years were determined by the processes and phenomena that the region experienced during this period of its historical development. Each national system of education is unique. Formation of education in any sovereign state cannot be understood without a deep knowledge of its inhabitants and of this state’s history. By the beginning of the 21st century in the process of formation South Africa’s education system absorbed many models, starting with traditional African education. But in general, education in South Africa is based, of course, on the European education system, which, in turn, has been influenced here by many factors. One factor is the existence of a large number of missionary schools – later to become public schools – under the control of the Dutch Reformed Church, where education was imbued with religious spirit. Another factor is an opposite model of secular education based on the British education system. Such political developments as the conflict of the Boers and the British in the second half of the 19th century to the early 20th century, the advance of segregation against non-white population, revolutionary transformations of political systems and social relations that occurred after 1994, as well as factors such as mixed composition of the population, the confrontation of different racial and ethnic groups all made an impact on the development of education.

For the first time in national African Studies the author set and carried out the task of studying such a complex and multifaceted phenomenon as the development of the education system throughout the existence of the South African state.

The first chapter covers the establishment of the European education system in South Africa. In the beginning of the chapter the attention is paid to the traditional education methods of Africans – the indigenous inhabitants of this territory. The main task of traditional education is to prepare future members of the community and to maintain their ways of life, social structure, and the values of their tribes unchanged. Of course, the main components for the formation of an education system after the arrival of Europeans in this region were the ideas and norms of European education, for white, coloured and African children equally. However, traditional upbringing long coexisted with the missionary schools, and eventually became one of the sources for the development of an education system as a whole. The monograph analyses the role of traditional education in the lives of Africans and its importance for maintaining the stability of the tribal way of life.

With the arrival of Europeans in South Africa (1652) education began to take new forms. The peculiarity of education from the end of the 17th century to the first half of the 18th century was its religious character. The main task of education in this period was the preparation of the future congregation. The Dutch Reformed Church, which dominated Southern Africa, exercised strict control over education. In the early centuries of European colonisation education developed very slowly. There were very few schools that were opened with the assistance of the Dutch East India Company, which ruled the region. The Boers’ children were taught by retired employees of the company, who travelled across the country from farm to farm and taught reading and writing. Schools that provided quality education were present only in larger cities such as Cape Town, Stellenbosch and Paarl, but there too the religious component of education was very significant.

Paradoxically, at the first stage of the development of the European education system in South Africa and coloured people who converted to Christianity received much better education. This fact was connected with the activities of missionary stations. In Southern Africa, there was present the widest range of missionary societies of Europe and America. From the end of the 17th century to the early 18th century the religious society "Moravian Brethren" established several missions in South Africa. This event marked the beginning of missionary penetration into the region. Most influential in the 19th century were the London Missionary Society and the Central Missionary Society.

Missionaries implanted on African soil a new culture, economic and social relations and tried to destroy the traditional worldview of Africans. In the process of modernisation of traditional societies in South Africa, the missionaries did a considerable job, the most important aspects of which were training Africans in missionary schools and the creation of writing in indigenous languages. The missionaries made a contribution to the struggle for the rights of Africans and to the struggle for the abolition of slavery. In 1834, when slavery in the British colonies was abolished, most of the missionaries withdrew from politics and became engaged exclusively with educational activities. The authorities often supported such educators. The process of educating the "colonial elite" started. The children of chiefs and elders loyal to the authorities were drawn in education especially persistently.

It should be noted that this played an important role. Education at missionary schools influenced the formation of the interest of Africans in politics and affected their future professional activities.
The second chapter examines the formation of public education system both in the British Cape Colony and Natal as well as in the Boer Republics – the Transvaal and Orange Free State.

In the second half of the 19th century, the state took the education of the white population into its own hands. In 1839, the government issued a memorandum of establishment of the Department of Education of the Cape Colony, which became an important milestone in the process of legalisation of education system. Schools were divided into two groups: "principal" schools in big cities (which provided both primary and secondary education) and "second class" schools which provided only primary education. All schools were fully subsidised by the state. In 1854, there was developed a system of state subsidies for missionary, private and farmers’ schools. This so-called safeguards system was legalised by the Education Act of 1858. In order to train teachers the "Normal College" was founded in 1878, which received government support. Another important step was the adoption of the Higher Education Act in 1874. In the second half of the 19th century, colleges of higher education were organised in Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Grahamstown, and Stellenbosch. In 1873, the University of the Cape (of Good Hope) was founded, which gained the right to confer academic degrees.

The third chapter deals with the formation and development of a unified education system after the proclaiming of the South African Union in 1910, which became the result, inter alia, of the victory of the British in the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902.

A unified system of education of the new state was formed. In the first half of the 20th century, the education of white children in South Africa was mandatory. In 1922 a law was passed to regulate issues of professional education, particularly in the field of construction, electrical mechanics, printing, trade, tailoring, etc. It set the age of professional education at 15 to 26. A pupil could begin to learn a craft after the completion of compulsory schooling in the city. In 1873, the University of the Cape (of Good Hope) was founded, which gained the right to confer academic degrees.

The Education Act for the white population was adopted in 1967. It established a 12-year period of differentiated education, i.e. a choice of subjects at secondary school. Education from 6 to 16 years of age until the completion of junior secondary school was mandatory. The initial 6-year school consisted of 3-year preparatory (junior) school and 3-year principal school. The education of white children was conducted in English, while the education of Afrikaners was usually conducted in their native language throughout primary school.

In secondary school education was given in English or Afrikaans, and the time allotted to study the language selected as the medium of instruction was greatly reduced. The vast majority of those African children that reached secondary school restricted themselves to junior secondary school. There were very few senior secondary schools for the Bantu. Only 3-4% of all students managed to graduate.

In 1964, legislation came into force on education of people of colour, and, in 1965, of the Indians. Primary and secondary school education were declared generally accessible and free from 7 to 16 years of age. The education of coloured population was usually conducted in either English or Afrikaans, while the education of Indian children was offered in their native language.

The Education Act for the white population was adopted in 1967. It established a 12-year period of differentiated education, i.e. a choice of subjects at secondary school. Education from 6-7 to 16 years of age until the completion of junior secondary school was mandatory. The initial 6-year school consisted of 3-year preparatory (junior) school and 3-year principal school. The education of white children was conducted in English, while the education of Afrikaners was usually done in Afrikaans.

Secondary school lasted 6 years and consisted of junior high school (3 years) and senior high school (another 3 years). The first year of secondary school was a transitional year from primary school to a new form of education based on subjects. Students began to concentrate on specific subjects in their second year and further concentrated in the third year. In the majority of senior secondary schools the differentiation of education further deepened. The struggle of pupils and students against discrimination. The fourth chapter of the monograph covers these issues, as well as reforms in education, which were implemented in line with the general reform of apartheid in the late 1970s – early 1980s.

After the adoption in 1953 of the Bantu Education Act and till the changes of 1994 the process of education was strictly based on racial divisions: the children of white, coloured, Indians and Africans studied in different schools with different programs and textbooks. The level and nature of the education of Europeans and non-Europeans and the material conditions in schools were different. According to the law of 1953, Africans received 13 years of education divided into primary and secondary schools. In turn, primary school was divided into lower, covering the first 4 years of education, and higher, consisting of 4 more years. Secondary school consisted of junior secondary school (three years of education) and senior secondary school (two years). In 1976, the total educational time was reduced to 12 years at the expense of primary education, and the attendance of lower primary school (from 7 to 11 years of age) became compulsory. The education of Africans was conducted in their native language throughout primary school.

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student chose one of the seven areas of study: agriculture, art, business, general education, homemaking, humanities, engineering or natural science. The system of differentiated education, in full compliance with the law of 1967, began to operate in the schools for coloured students in 1972 and in Indian schools in 1973. In 1979, almost all white students, 30% of Indian students, 17.4% of coloured students and 14.6% of African students were attending secondary schools.

In the field of professional education the law of 1958 was the key piece of legislation, which was amended in 1959 and 1961. Education of Africans was provided in technical schools and professional schools. The status of the former was higher and their number was smaller. There were also established schools for the professional education of coloured and Indian students. Education in technical colleges was free for whites and the quality of such education was high. High professional schools for whites were specialised in technical training, home crafts, or business.

Higher education, including bachelor’s and master’s degrees, was offered in universities. Access for non-Europeans to the universities for whites had been prohibited since 1959. According to a special law, there were separate schools for them. By the early 1980s there were 18 universities, 10 of which were intended only for Europeans, one for coloured population and one for Indians, and five for Africans. A special role in higher education was played by the transnational University of South Africa in Pretoria (founded in 1873), which provided higher education for correspondence and external students (about 56,000 students in 1983). Higher education institutions, which, however, did not offer a bachelor’s degree, included eight polytechnics institutes, where students were segregated.

In the late 1970s, there was started a reform of the system of apartheid. Among other reforms of the late 1970s to the early 1980s there took place an education reform. Without abandoning the very principle of segregation in education, in the 1970s, the government took measures to improve and expand secondary and higher education. During this period, for each 100,000 Africans there were no longer 50 (as in the 1960s) but 250 secondary school graduates. In 1976-1979, the government accepted a significant number of African students to universities for whites. Africans began to be taught the most sought-after professions including engineering. Two new universities were opened for Africans: medical one in Pretoria and “Vista” in the Witwatersrand. The number of professional and technical schools continued to increase. In late 1982, a programme to transform a number of existing schools for Africans into technical and commercial schools was adopted.

The parliamentary elections of 1989 brought the victory to F. de Klerk, who succeeded P. Botha as president. He began implementing democratic reforms, including the departure from segregation in education, and, particularly, the establishment of “open” schools. In the end of 1990, a law on the restructuring of public schools for whites according to three models was enacted. The government reduced the funding of private schools (models A and C), paying only the salaries of teachers. These schools managed the issue of admission of students themselves. The schools that were organised according to the model B remained fully funded by the state. These state-financed schools had to start accepting children of different racial groups.

At the end of the 20th century the history of South Africa experienced another sharp turn. The system of apartheid and the segregation in education were abolished after the first universal, democratic elections of 1994. A new, non-racial system of education was established. It immediately experienced the burden of the uneven development of society during the era of apartheid. The last, fifth chapter of the monograph covers these issues.

The modern education system is defined by the law of 1996. In line with the new principles of a democratic state, everyone is entitled to free basic education, equal access to higher education, and decent conditions of learning. Parents may choose the form of education that is appropriate for their children, obtain the necessary counselling, and participate in the management of educational institutions. Students have the right to study in the language of their choice (when it is feasible) and if possible in educational institutions formed on the basis of their culture, language or religion, and without race-based discrimination. Instead of the old categories of schools there have been introduced two new categories: schools of a public category (formerly community, farmers’, miners’, state, fully or partially subsidised schools) and schools of an independent category (formerly partly or completely independent). Teachers of public schools are appointed by provincial education departments on the recommendation of or after consultation with local authorities. Public schools have the status of legal entities, governed and financed by the government. Compulsory education covers children from seven to fifteen years or until their transition to the ninth grade. All public schools receive equal funding and should accept all children regardless of race or religion.

In 1997, an official plan for the transition of primary and secondary schools to the new curricula was published. The phased introduction of the 12-year basic education began in 1998.

Compulsory schooling, as before, is divided into primary and secondary schools. In lower primary school a child studies for three years, from the first to the third grade. He focuses on reading, writing, numeracy and the development of languages – of his main one, native, and of a second one, additional. Secondary school education is also divided into junior and senior schools. In junior secondary school, which corresponds to the sevenths till ninth grade, most of its subjects are compul-
sory, but educational materials can be presented on a differentiated basis according to the wishes of the majority of parents. In the eighth grade students may choose two subjects in addition to those which they already have. After the completion of senior high school (the tenth to twelfth grades, which are not compulsory) students take an exam in at least six subjects; the results of examinations are distributed according to three levels of evaluation: the highest, standard and lowest. After passing these exams graduates receive a senior certificate – a document that allows an applicant to go to college.

Higher education is declared one of the pillars of national development in South Africa. The “Education White Paper 3” was published in 1997. The Higher Education Act provided a legal framework for reforms in higher education, which have been implemented into practice since 1998. The law allowed the existence of private universities under the condition of their compulsory registration in the ministry.

Universities remain the most prestigious place to obtain higher education. Universities of South Africa are autonomous institutions, the management of which lies entirely in the hands of their boards. The ministry is the regulatory authority, particularly in the area of subsidies and tuition fees, which must conform to established norms. For admission to the university it is required to have a certificate of completed secondary education (senior certificate) with grades that allow continuing education at a university. University may establish special requirements for admission into some special subjects. Enrolment in higher education is conducted without examinations and is based on applicants’ competition. As students progress in their education, universities confer on them bachelor’s, master’s, Ph.D., and honorary degrees. Most universities offer instruction in English, and a few universities – in Afrikaans.

The plan of reorganising higher education had been adopted in June 2002 and was implemented by 2007. The programme provided for the closure of 36 existing universities, technical schools and colleges over a 5-year period, for the creation on their basis of 23 institutions of higher education, and, at the same time, for the increase in the number of students by 200,000. Currently, there are three main types of higher education institutions: classical, complex and technological universities.

Despite the fact that the ANC has occupied the governing position and has consistently pursued a policy aimed at improving the lives of the black majority, it is necessary to note that significant improvements in the field of education have not yet occurred. Certainly, over the years much has been done to eliminate the effects of racial segregation in education – a sphere which had been especially affected by apartheid. The improved access of Africans to education can be considered an unconditional accomplishment of the ANC’s rule. As a result, the percentage of illiterate citizens of South Africa has decreased, and an increasing number of Africans continue their studies in higher education institutions. Well equipped, exemplary schools that provide quality education appeared in traditionally disadvantaged provinces, the former Bantustans.

However, in the beginning of the 21st century, just as in the 1990s, the main tasks for the government include: tightening requirements for teacher training and the level of knowledge of school and university graduates, returning the prestige of fundamental sciences, maintaining strict discipline in schools, and controlling the distribution of funds allocated to education. Still the main causes of the unsatisfactory situation in the education sector include: the lack of funds needed to provide a huge number of former African schools with modern buildings, equipment, and new textbooks, inadequate teacher qualification, lack of discipline and proper teaching culture in many African schools. The question of discipline remains very painful. Outbreaks of violence in schools are frequent. Violence in schools is one of the aspects of an extremely painful problem of the contemporary South Africa – the growth of crime.

The situation in higher education also is not changing radically. As before, the number of white students wishing to continue their education far exceeds the number of Africans. Almost 50% of white secondary school graduates go to college, whereas among African graduates this figure is only 12%. This is despite the fact that Africans outnumber whites 5 times over.

In conclusion, the author notes that modern African education has a number of sources, understanding of which is critical for the analysis of the challenges facing it at the beginning of the 21st century. These sources, above all, include the European education system, which had been forming since the second half of the 19th century, traditional African education, and, of course, the enormous contribution to African education made by missionaries. The effectiveness of education in the 21st century will depend on the extent to which the positive elements of all three sources will be taken into account.

The monograph may be of interest both to specialists in African history and the history and contemporary issues of development of education in foreign countries. The monograph’s materials can also be used in educational process for the preparation of relevant courses.
The book studies the features of the functioning and development of insurance and reinsurance market in Africa. The evolution of credit and capital markets in African countries, including the key issues in the evaluation of investment and credit risks, as well as trends in the penetration of Russian businesses into African markets, is studied. The urgent issue of Russian insurance companies providing support for Russian business in Africa is examined.

The book consists of three chapters, which have the following titles. The first chapter is called "Insurance as a necessary condition for foreign economic activity." The contents of the first chapter cover the following topics: the nature and function of insurance in foreign trade activities, peculiarities of reinsurance services in the global economy, and factors in establishing insurance and reinsurance markets in Africa.

The second chapter titled "Status and trends of development of investment risks in Africa" explains the classification and manifestations of investment risks, methods of evaluating investment and credit risks, and the evolution of credit and capital markets in Africa.

The third chapter titled "Practical aspects of insuring foreign economic risks in African countries" deals with the issues of developing African insurance market, underwriting and claims settlement in Africa, the insurance of investments in Africa and the possible participation of Russian business.

The processes of economic globalisation have fundamentally changed the structure and importance of global economic relations, deepened and transformed the international division of labour. The share of services and high-tech goods in world trade is constantly increasing, while the share of raw materials and agricultural products is falling. These processes affect Africa to the least degree. Most of the economies of the continent remain largely agrarian and are characterised by single-industry specialisation in their foreign economic relations with little of manufacturing industry and almost completely lacking knowledge-intensive industries.

Africa occupies a very weak position on the global credit and capital market. The growth of direct foreign investment in African countries lags significantly behind such flows to countries in Asia and Latin America. The shortage of domestic and foreign investment determines exceedingly slow renewal of fixed assets in industry and insufficient commissioning of new capacities, which in turn reduces the export potential, reduces foreign exchange earnings, thus preventing the development of infrastructure and, as a result, mobilisation of new investments. A sort of "vicious circle" is formed, the way out of which only few countries of the continent succeed in finding. Coupled with general economic factors, another very significant obstacle to foreign investment are the risks, the impact of which cannot be compensated even by profitability, which in Africa exceeds the average for developing countries.

Hence the well-known tendency of not only foreign but also domestic investments from many African countries to "escape" to regions that are more attractive for them.

While commercial risks can be calculated and reduced to acceptable levels by an investor himself, non-commercial risks – above all, political – cannot be anticipated, much less prevented by an entrepreneur. The relevance of the problem of insurance of investment risk in Africa is proven by numerous attempts to create special public and private organisations at national and international level. Unfortunately, Russian entrepreneurs and investors in Africa have no insurance coverage, even remotely reminiscent of that held by their American and Western European competitors. The lack of insurance leads to the fact that short-term speculative investments are regarded safer than long-term real investments, although only the latter gives an investor a strategic advantage in the struggle for markets for products and capital investment.

The author notes that there is only one way, namely the use of insurance instruments, to solve the problem of optimal reduction of Russia’s investment risks in Africa. The book shows convincingly that Russian insurance and reinsurance market is already in a sufficiently mature state both financially and methodologically to begin this work on the African continent. Mobilisation of private Russian insurance business in Africa would contribute to solving numerous internal problems of Russian insurance and reinsurance sectors, as well as to promoting Russian industrial products in prospective markets, increasing Russia’s export and investment potential, increasing foreign exchange earnings, assets and capitalisation, as well as generating additional tax revenues to Russia’s budget. At the same time, services provided neither by private insurance companies insuring investment risks, nor by state export credit agencies, which operate on fundamentally different principles, but pursue the same objective of promoting foreign investors and exporters, should be ignored.

The author of the book focuses on prerequisites for inflow and outflow of capital from the region. It is noted that although the average return on investment in African countries is four times higher than in the U.S. and
Europe, it hardly stimulates the influx of full-fledged investments from abroad. Significant investment risks can be identified as the main cause of this phenomenon. A significant portion of foreign investment in Africa are of "bad" quality due to their speculative nature and because they are invested in government securities with an excessively high rate of return ("financial pyramids") or state property objects privatised at understated prices. Privatisation in most countries of sub-Saharan Africa has been carried out for the benefit of foreign speculative capital, but not for the benefit of local population, as evidenced by statistical data and expert estimates.

D.B. Sukhorukov in his research draws attention to the fact that the capital market in East Africa has a distinct national flavour and is controlled to a large extent by immigrants from countries of South Asia. The differences between European and Asian (primarily Chinese) investors in their attitude towards investment risk in Africa are noticeable: if the former invest, as a rule, only in the complete absence of risk, the latter invest sometimes many times over notwithstanding such risks.

National capital often operates in form of primitive loan and savings banks, credit cooperatives and moneylenders, who control, according to some reports, more than half of all cash flow in the informal sector of economy. In order to mobilise the "weak link" – the internal financial resources of the continent – there is being implemented the NEPAD long-term programme of development, under the auspices of which many investment projects are carried out in the region. However, the NEPAD embodies a big political risk, because many African governments pay only lip service to the important role of local private sector, but the programme is focused primarily on private capital.

Stressing diversity and mutual complementarity of risk assessment methods, the author proposes to use for this purpose instruments of sociological analysis. The task of a researcher is to determine what motivates usually the degree of rationality in the actions of the executive and legislative authorities of that country. Moreover, the sociological approach assumes that rationality may be different in different countries and different political systems.

African capital market is characterised by "ebb and flow" of short-term investments due to global market fluctuations. Africa depends strongly on the global economic cycle and the situation on the leading stock exchanges around the world.

Capital being invested in Africa is often of short-term speculative nature and uses the continent’s stock market for transit or is invested in objects of state property privatised at inadequately low prices. This can be considered a direct consequence of increased investment risks and is not consistent with the goals of economic development of the continent.

The average rate of return on investment in African countries is significantly higher than in other regions. Nevertheless, foreign capital does not rush to most African countries because of the risk of its total or partial loss as a result of political or economic upheaval.

Domestic savings are not the primary source of investments in Africa.

The largest portion of foreign investment comes to Africa as official development assistance, rather than foreign direct investment, which narrows the insurance scope for government agencies and commercial insurers which insure investment risk.

According to D.B. Sukhorukov, many African countries receiving official development assistance are actually net exporters of capital. However, it is likely that the situation will change: developed countries focus increasingly on purpose funding and tied loans, which somewhat restricts capital flight from Africa.

The principal quantity of short- and medium-term investments is funnelled to those countries of Africa, which have already created all the conditions to minimise business risk. These countries include Nigeria, where there exists a well-developed infrastructure for oil production. However, long-term investments of good quality, including portfolio investments, flow to countries with minimal political risks, an indicator of which is a relatively developed stock market. These countries include, in particular, South Africa, Egypt and Algeria.

In describing the opportunities and prospects for foreign economic relations of Russia with the countries of Africa, the author of the book puts them in direct relation with the development of insurance in this region. On the one hand, it seems necessary to strengthen Russia’s presence on the continent manifold in the person of domestic insurance and reinsurance companies and brokers. On the other hand, African insurance market could find internal resources for its development.

The protection of material interests of Russian business in Africa objectively requires the presence and participation of Russian brokers, insurance and reinsurance companies, which have not yet taken an active interest in the African market and are giving way to their foreign competitors.

The paper draws attention to the fact that before proceeding with the development of an investment risk insurance market in Africa, Russian insurance companies should have a clear idea about the statistics of losses. In Africa, the following risks are realised most often: risks associated with the inability to repatriate capital and dividends (for example, the Taiwanese company TWN Steel Industrial Limited in Zimbabwe), nationalisation or expropriation of factors of production (for example, of land resources in Zimbabwe, Mozambique and South Africa), expropriation of finished products (for example, the burning of the entire run of the Standard newspaper in
Kenya), imposition of new taxes (for example, the tax on attracting foreign labour force in Uganda), and non-convertibility of currencies.

As the experience of export credit agencies demonstrates, investment risk insurance is often unprofitable. However, achieving optimal financial results is possible; in order to do so it is necessary to select objects of insurance based not on political expediency (as most government agencies do), but on their profitability.

When working with investment risks in Africa, Russian insurers should diversify their risk portfolios. In this case, diversification involves not just expanding the number of countries, but "diluting" portfolios with the countries such as South Africa, Botswana, Egypt or Tunisia that carry the least risk on the African continent.

African insurance market also has a long way to go before local insurers can insure foreign investments. In order to do this insurers need to increase their equity (through mergers and acquisitions, pool formation, or closer cooperation with F.A.I.R.), improve the quality of staff training and scientific and methodological base for the calculation of insurance rates, raise the level of information technology (through the establishment of educational centres such as the Chartered Insurance Institutes in Nigeria and Malawi). In addition, it is necessary to strengthen marketing efforts, stop the mindless copying of European insurance products and begin to focus on the needs of local markets, primarily in the sector of agricultural insurance, for which there exists a great demand. A big problem of insurance markets in many countries of the continent is the weakness of insurance regulators, the duty of which is to protect shareholders and policyholders from the consequences of insolvency or bankruptcy of insurance companies, as well as to adjust tariff policies, the inflow of capital in the insurance industry, stop unfair competition, and to monitor the levels of legality of various insurance schemes.

This research allowed D.B. Sukhorukov not only to identify the problems of Russia’s investment risks in Africa, but also to find ways to address them.

The author formulated the definition of investment risk which takes into account previous knowledge gained by other researchers in this field.

He identified the root cause of investment risks facing investors and lenders in African countries, namely: the instability of social structures, widening gap between the richest and the poor, and pauperisation and marginalisation of African society. Until major shifts towards the improvement of social structures take place, investment risks in Africa will remain higher than in other regions of the world.

The book by D.B. Sukhorukov presents a new approach to assessing investment risks (such as South Africa, Botswana, Egypt or Tunisia) that carry the least risk on the African continent.

The book offers an alternative calculation of a minimum risk premium using the following formula:

\[ MRP = \left( \sum LC + \sum INL \right) / \sum FDI. \]

where \( MRP \) is the minimum risk premium, \( \sum LC \) is the total losses claimed on investment insurance in a given country over a five-year period, \( \sum INL \) is the total incurred but not reported losses in a given country over a five-year period (this includes any form of violation of investors’ rights), \( \sum FDI \) is the total foreign direct investment in a given country over the same five year period. The use of the aforementioned formula demands much knowledge on the part of an underwriter, but its advantage is the increased accuracy of the result.

The author formulated and substantiated the thesis that Russian insurance companies and insurance brokers should become an outpost of Russian large and medium businesses in Africa, anticipating their arrival and creating in Africa an adequate business environment in terms of risk management. Typically, an opposite viewpoint, according to which international insurance companies, as well as multinational banks, follow in the footsteps of transnational corporations and come only to those countries where the latter are already present and in need of banking and insurance services, prevails in business literature.

The book puts forward a suggestion that Russian insurers should join their efforts in a pool for the insurance and reinsurance of investment risks of Russian companies not only in Africa but also in Asia and Latin America.
The participation in this pool of predominantly non-state commercial insurers is very important for investors because in this case any decisions on offering insurance would not be made based on state interests but would focus on profitability, which would significantly expand the range of investment projects eligible to apply for insurance coverage, and at the same time would prevent insuring investments in notoriously unprofitable enterprises.

The pool requires an open to all participants and regularly updated database containing detailed information about the events of political and economic life of African countries that could affect investment risks.

In parallel with the establishment of the pool it is advisable to continue improving the system of government guarantees for exports, taking into account the experience and disadvantages of GOSINKOR, which was granting export guarantees in the 1990s, Roseximbank CJSC, which performs these functions at present, as well as of the world’s leading export agencies.

The author developed a proposal on guarantees for insuring political risks in Africa: foreign assets of African countries, not only in Russia but also in other countries, could serve as such guarantees. In case of the realisation of political risks and loss of investment, ECA could bring an action in a local court in order to seize the property of a country receiving investments. In this regard, a constantly updated database of such objects should be compiled.

The application of proposals and ideas presented in this book would not only facilitate the development of economic relations between the Russian Federation and African countries, but would also make quite a significant contribution to the economic development of the Russian state, and in particular its insurance and reinsurance markets.

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The book by T.L. Deych, Ph.D., deals with China’s Africa policy. It examines Africa’s role in 21st century China’s global international strategy and analyses the effects of this strategy for African countries.

The book consists of five chapters, an introduction, a conclusion, and a bibliography.

**The introduction** states that the era of globalisation has been marked by the emergence of “new actors” in Africa. China, the key “Asian tiger”, boasts especially impressive successes in Africa. Relations with Africa are an integral part of China’s strategy of a new world order, creating a multipolar world, and South-South cooperation. However, one cannot ignore the economic background in China’s interests in Africa. The desire to acquire sources of raw materials and to find investment opportunities and markets for its booming industry is the main motive of China’s policy in Africa in the 21st century.

**The chapter I is titled “China in the modern global economy”**.

The first section – "The rise of China: components of the phenomenon" – analyses the factors that have led to China’s unprecedented economic growth. China’s development is the result of the transformations which were initiated in December 1978 at the 3rd plenum of the 11th CPC Central Committee. China's growth has been achieved using both internal resources and massive foreign investment. The policy of attracting foreign capital owes much of its success to the Chinese Diaspora, which occupies powerful economic and financial positions in many countries. China’s transformation has led to significant positive changes in its economy and social status of the population. China’s economic growth rates greatly exceed world average. At the same time, the development is impeded by such factors as the backwardness of agriculture, gaps in levels of development and growth dynamics of individual sectors of the economy, regional disparities, and sharp social stratification.

The second section – "The open-door policy and "going abroad strategy" – is devoted to an important component of China’s reforms – the creation of an "open" economy. Special Economic Zones (SEZ) have spearheaded the reforms due to measures to attract investment and advanced technologies. The country’s openness to the outside world also implied investing abroad, moving production facilities overseas, establishing Chinese multina-
The task was to draw the country in the global market, ensure broad access of its products to foreign markets; an emphasis was made on importing of advanced technologies and know-how. A step towards the creation of an open economy, along with attracting investment and joining international financial institutions (the World Bank and International Monetary Fund), was the restoration of China's WTO membership.

A section on China’s participation in global integration processes concludes the chapter. During the last decade, China made a breakthrough in developing ties with the global economic community, including through joining existing integration blocks. Considering regional trade and economic structures to be impediments to the spread of protectionism in relation to third countries, China holds great hopes for APEC. While intensifying activities of Asian integration blocks, it does not exclude the possibility of a unified Asian economic space to be created on the basis of a merger of the economic union of SCO with the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area, which would strengthen the leading position of China in the Asia Pacific region.

The topic of the Chapter II is "China in the international relations of the 21st century". The chapter provides an analysis of the contemporary foreign policy agenda of Beijing. Over the last decade, China was guided by the development strategy, the main motto of which was a peaceful revival. China's foreign policy was reflected in the White Paper, which was published in December 2005. The strategy was based on the necessity of China's economic growth, the continuation of reforms in the country, and the expansion of ties with the outside world, including active participation in international affairs, on the one hand, and quite pragmatic relations with the major powers, on the other hand.

The second section of the chapter is devoted to China's relations with leading Western states, as well as with Russia. While emphasising its commitment to a multipolar world, China avoids tensions with Washington, on which the growth of China’s economy and the solution of the Taiwan problem largely depend, as well as uses extensively technical and technological achievements of Europe for the development of its economy, giving priority to relations with Germany, France and the U.K. The factor that largely determines the political processes in South-East Asia is the struggle between China and Japan for dominance in the Asia-Pacific region. A special role is attached to Sino-Russian relations. Currently Russia and China have no ideological contradictions; their positions on international problems are close or coincide. The two countries maintain active diplomatic relations and develop trade and economic relations, although the potential of bilateral trade is not used to the fullest.

The third section examines the role the countries of the "South" play in Beijing's foreign policy priorities. Relations with developing countries are a part of China’s strategy on South-South cooperation, which seeks to prove that China, despite its rapid economic growth, belongs to the group of developing countries and that its claims for leadership in this group are valid. The main China’s competitor in the group of developing countries is India. Interest in resources leads to a collision of the two growing economies in the world market, but China and India try to act as a united front in the matters of international politics. China is expanding its economic ties with the countries of Middle East. An important focus of Beijing’s foreign policy in the 21st century is Latin America – not just a source of raw materials and a target market, but also one of the few areas where China can act as a "senior partner".

The theme of the third chapter is China’s Africa policy. The chapter includes five sections. The first section contains an analysis of the basic principles of China’s policy towards the continent. In the 21st century Africa has occupied one of the leading positions in Beijing's foreign policy strategy, which is based on a conception adapted to the needs of developing countries. A proof of how important African countries are to China is the paper "China’s Africa policy", which was published on 12 January 2006. The ideological doctrine of Beijing still includes the thesis that developing countries “share destiny and objectives”. At the same time the thesis on non-interference in the internal politics of partner countries plays an important role in the doctrine. Beijing does not make its relations with African countries conditional on their political course or adherence to democratic norms, etc. In bilateral relations, only the “one China” principle remains firm.

The second section of the chapter is devoted to Beijing’s diplomacy in Africa. The last decade has seen sharp strengthening of Beijing’s presence in Africa, including bilateral visits, regular political dialogue at the level of foreign ministers, as well as party, military, women’s, youth and parliamentary contacts. All Chinese leaders repeatedly visited Africa. For example, President Hu Jintao visited Africa in 2001, 2004, 2006 and 2007. African heads of state are also often invited to China. A growing number of countries have taken China’s side in competition with Taiwan: in 2007, 48 African countries had relations with China. Active diplomatic exchanges, including at the highest level, which are accompanied by assistance packages, and the possibility of measures of a political nature, which in Africa is regarded as evidence of China’s attention, help Beijing to gain allies in order to continue its rapid growth and strengthen its international positions.

The third section discusses the cultural and scientific ties between the PRC and African countries. China has bilateral agreements on cultural cooperation with most African countries and carries out active cultural ex-
change. In Beijing there is the Chinese-African Friendship Association; associations of friendship exist in a number of African countries. An increasing number of African students study at Chinese universities; "Confucius Institutes", where students can study China’s history, culture, language, are being opened up in African countries in order to facilitate the creation of China-oriented African elite.

The fourth section deals with the cooperation between China and African countries in the UN and African regional organisations. As a rule, China supports proposals of African countries in the UN. This applies, in particular, to the UN reform, peacekeeping issues, debt relief, fair trade, and the fight against poverty. For their part, African countries voice their solidarity with China on most international policy issues. The African Group at the United Nations played a crucial role in the fact that Western efforts to condemn China for human rights violations were not successful. A large number of African countries recognised China as a market economy, which facilitated its entry in the WTO. China maintains active contacts with the African Union. The Chinese leadership has expressed support for the NEPAD programme and the readiness to contribute to its objectives of African countries economic development. China attaches great importance to such regional organisations as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), etc. The PRC also has a cooperation agreement with the African Development Bank.

The final section of the third chapter discusses China’s participation in resolving African conflicts and in peacekeeping on the continent. China seeks to play an active role in resolving Africa’s security problems by participating in conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. In recent years China has intensified its participation in international peacekeeping operations, seeing it as a way of increasing its credibility in the UN and in the developing world. China ranks 12 on the list of countries participating in UN peacekeeping activities, and ranks 1 among the five permanent members of the Security Council. Most of Chinese peacekeepers – 1273 people – are deployed in Africa’s "hot spots". This factor, as well as humanitarian aid to affected regions and mediation activities of Beijing, which in some cases (e.g. Darfur conflict) occupies a "special" position, different from the western one, in assessing controversial issues, is positively perceived on the continent.

The fourth chapter – "China economic penetration in Africa" – is devoted to the rapidly developing economic ties between China and African countries.

The first section of the chapter characterises the economic model offered by China to the continent. China owes its strong positions in Africa’s economy in no small part to its development model, elements of which it recommends for use in African countries. The rate of China transformation from an underdeveloped country to one of the world’s leading economies prompts many countries of the continent to consider the Chinese economic model as an example to follow. The fundamental doctrine of China’s economic cooperation with Africa is the "South-South" formula, which provides for expanding trade between developing countries, cooperation in the development of intermediate technologies, and mutual technical assistance. At the turn of the century, fighting poverty came to occupy an important place in Chinese conceptions of economic development in Africa. An optimistic view on the economic situation in Africa and good prospects of African countries are conducive to China’s policy. Proposed to the Africans as an alternative to the Western model the Chinese development model, which states that "stability is more important than democracy", is one of the three "pillars" of China’s policy in Africa, along with the objectives to provide China with raw materials and to find markets for Chinese goods and services.

The second section of the chapter contains an analysis of China’s economic assistance to Africa, its traditional and new forms. The last decade has witnessed a steady growth of Chinese investment in Africa, including loans, credits, investments, and grants. Presently, ideological criteria for granting aid have given the way to economic interest. The proof of China’s desire to adjust its economic ties with Africa by actively developing new forms of cooperation was the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). At each of the three meetings of the Forum (2000, 2003 and 2006.) programmes of cooperation in various fields for the next three years were promulgated. The Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank) of China is responsible for the distribution of government financial assistance. China seeks to control the disbursement of its loans in the field, with an emphasis on socio-economic development projects. In total, countries of the continent have been assisted in implementing over 900 projects in industry, energy sector and infrastructure. At the same time, China still pays attention to "goodwill" objects (stadiums, government buildings, schools, hospitals). China considers the development of agriculture to be a priority area of economic cooperation with Africa. The healthcare sector is also an important object of Chinese assistance.

China’s "trade boom" in Africa is the theme of the third section of the chapter. During the last decade, Sino-African trade experienced rapid growth rate. The PRC leadership and the Ministry of Commerce undertake measures to enhance trade and economic cooperation with African countries. Among these measures are the opening of the China-Africa Chamber of Commerce in Beijing in 2005, and the establishment of 11 centres in Africa which facilitate investment and trade, trade delegations exchanges, and mutual participation in trade fairs. In some African countries there are Chinese permanent
trade missions and stock exchanges with the participation of local and Chinese businessmen. China undertakes measures to improve its exports structure and the quality and range of export products. It opens its market to African goods, services and investments. A concrete step was the elimination of tariffs on 440 categories of products imported from 28 least developed African countries.

Main Chinese import from Africa is mineral resources, primarily oil. Key China’s trading partners are resource-rich countries. In 2005, these were South Africa and Angola, which were far ahead of other African countries in terms of the volume of trade with China. Trade and economic cooperation provides China with a privileged access to African raw materials, especially energy resources, and provides Africa with access to financial and technical assistance which is not burdened with conditions imposed by Western donors. At the same time, there is a problem that Africans pay attention to: cheap Chinese exports undermine local industries in many countries, which leads to plant closures and rising unemployment.

The fourth section deals with the issue of Chinese investment in African economies. Investment cooperation between China and countries of the continent is booming and is playing an increasingly important role in Sino-African economic relations. Encouraging investors to invest in African economies is a declared priority of China’s policy towards the continent. The programme which was adopted at the first meeting of China-Africa Cooperation Forum in 2000 in Beijing provided for such measures as investment protection and guarantees, double taxation avoidance, preferences for investors within the framework of national legislation, management experience exchange, establishment of joint and private Chinese enterprises in Africa, including small– and medium-sized, and preferences for joint ventures as a key factor for the development of the partnership. A Fund “China-Africa”, the goal of which was to cover the risks of Chinese enterprises investing abroad was established. The financial policy of the Chinese government includes the provision of insurance for external loans and credits and the establishment of international marketing funds for small– and medium-sized enterprises. In late 2006, according to the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, the total amount of accumulated Chinese FDI in Africa amounted to $6.6 billion. According to UNCTAD, in 2006, China had bilateral agreements on investment cooperation with 20 African countries. In addition, according to the Export-Import Bank of China, in 2007, China had agreements on mutual protection of investments with 28 African countries, and double taxation avoidance agreements with 8 African countries. At the time, over 800 Chinese companies (including 100 state-owned) operating in 49 African countries had invested in Africa. China’s growing interest in resources determines the interest of Chinese investors in the extraction and processing of energy and mineral resources. The spheres of investment co-operation also include civil construction and infrastructure. In recent years, Chinese investment has been increasingly funnelled into the sphere of high technologies, particularly in telecommunications. In recent years, a growing number of Chinese entrepreneurs have begun to pay attention to the African continent. Currently, Chinese companies can be found in almost all corners of Africa. The success of China’s investment policy in Africa is due to several factors. One of them is the ability to integrate public and private initiatives; at the same time, both public and private companies are relying on state support, which stimulates their activities. A critical factor of the success is the willingness of Chinese companies to take risks and work in war– and conflict-torn countries, as well as their willingness to operate in countries that are the subjects of Western sanctions, positioning themselves as an alternative partner of “rock states”. The effectiveness of Chinese business is also based on the fact that it focuses on certain sectors of an economy. In particular, China is becoming a major player in the sphere of African infrastructure. Nevertheless, several features of China’s investment policy in Africa have been criticised. For example, Africans are dissatisfied with the fact that China employs its own labour force even in cases where African workers are abundant and can learn new skills easily.

The final section of the chapter examines China’s oil strategy in Africa. This strategy is based on the increasing demand of China’s economy for energy: China is the 2nd largest oil consumer in the world. In 2006 it became the 3rd largest oil importer after the United States and Japan. African oil accounts for 28% of total Chinese oil imports. The largest supplies come from the countries to which Western companies do not have access, or access is restricted for political reasons, as well as from the countries which are relatively new oil producers and by virtue of this are offering more attractive conditions. The list of China’s trading partners includes mainly oil-producing countries. The key supplier is Angola. Sudan is the second largest African supplier of oil to China. In recent years, China has developed relations with Nigeria – the largest oil producer in Africa and the 11th oil power in the world. External activities of oil companies are encouraged by a broad set of instruments. The leaders on African oil front are the three large-scale Chinese oil companies – China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which is the largest investor in Sudan’s oil industry, and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). Loans, credit lines, development assistance, arms sales, and diplomatic support are the tools helping China to gain privileged access to oil sources. Another fact which is conducive to China’s oil strategy is the ability to find niches in countries in which, for whatever reason, Western companies do not work, in particular, Sudan. Beijing’s willingness to invest in adjacent
sctors of economy and to assist governments of oil-producing countries with construction of necessary public facilities such as schools, hospitals, railways and highways also helps to win oil-producing countries’ favour. Finally, Chinese companies use the tactic of entering the oil sector gradually, initially acquiring small stakes in companies of oil-producing countries. However, the main factor of Chinese oil companies’ success is the leading role of the state, which supports and encourages their investment activities in Africa. Booming China’s interest in African hydrocarbons is worrying other oil-importing countries, which accuse China of monopolising the African oil resources.

The last, fifth chapter of the monograph contains an analysis of the relationship between China and several African countries which in recent years have become its leading partners on the continent. The first section of the chapter is titled "Oil producers – in the focus of attention".

The most desirable partners of China, the economy of which is heavily dependent on imports of energy resources, are African oil-producing countries, above all Angola, Nigeria and Sudan, the relations with which have significantly developed in recent years. Angola is the largest African supplier of oil to China; Beijing’s oil strategy in Africa puts the most emphasis on this country. The motives of China, which seeks to take the leading role in Angola’s economy, are not limited to its interest in energy resources. Beijing is satisfied with the level of political stability in the country, which has increased, particularly after the death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in February 2006. It is difficult to deny China’s growing influence and the significance of its positions in Angola. Sudan is another key partner of China in Africa. China is the largest consumer of Sudanese oil and the biggest investor in the country’s economy. The vacuum that formed here after the U.S. imposed sanctions forced Western companies out gave an impetus for China’s involvement and opened new opportunities for Chinese investors. Sudan is the third largest trading partner of China in sub-Saharan Africa, accounting for 13% of China’s trade with the region. China, in turn, is the largest trade partner of Sudan. While satisfying its own energy needs, China at the same time does a lot of good for the Sudanese economy. Of the 15 foreign companies operating in Sudan, 13 are Chinese. China participates in the implementation of projects in various sectors of the Sudanese economy. One can not underestimate the influence of China on the economic development of Sudan, on its position in the international relations system, as well as on prospects for a peaceful resolution of the Darfur conflict in Sudan.

In recent years, China has actively developed its relations with Nigeria. In addition to Beijing’s interest in Nigerian oil, it is also desirable for China to strengthen political co-operation with Nigeria, which is one of the leading countries in Africa, plays an important role in African and world affairs, and is one of the founders of the African Union and NEPAD. Nigeria has authority and influence in the continent and in the world; it is an extremely important supplier of the oil to the West countries. This explains Beijing’s efforts to strengthen its positions in this country in face of tough competition.

The next section of the chapter deals with China’s relations with Zimbabwe. These relations deserve attention because they are an object of constant criticism in the West. At the same time, the cooperation between China and Zimbabwe serves as the evidence of Beijing’s desire and ability "to fill the vacuum" to benefit not only itself but also the country that is the object of its attention. Zimbabwe is not an oil producer, but it has the second largest world reserves of platinum, as well as deposits of more than 40 other minerals, including uranium, gold, silver and copper. Thus, Beijing’s interest in developing contacts with Harare also has an economic dimension. In recent years, the two countries have intensified diplomatic exchanges. With China’s help, the country has put into operation some objects. China ranks second after South Africa – Zimbabwe’s main trading partner – as an exporter to this country. For Zimbabwe, the cooperation with China is, undoubtedly, a way out of the rather complex economic situation. In view of this, the country’s leadership seeks to persuade Beijing of its friendly feelings and strongly emphasises its interest in closer rapprochement with China and its willingness to support it politically at all levels. The University of Harare students study Chinese language. Nine thousand Chinese people live and work in Zimbabwe. For China, the cooperation with Zimbabwe is an opportunity to gain an ally in competition with the West; for the government and business elite of Zimbabwe it is a way to help to restore the economy and to establish themselves in the eyes of the world community, demonstrating that the charge of democratic norms and human rights violation cannot prevent them from finding influential partners and friends.

Finally, the theme of the last section of the last chapter is the cooperation between China and South Africa – China’s main partner on the continent. Acknowledging the importance of South Africa as a key supplier of raw materials and, at the same time, appreciating its role on the continent and in the world as a whole, China pays special attention to this country. Vigorous diplomatic exchange, rapidly growing trade, investment cooperation, and, finally, fruitful cultural and scientific ties – all of this suggests that South Africa has become the leading partner of China in Africa. In recent years, both formal and informal contacts between the countries have been increasing. For example, in 2007, South Africa was the only African country to cooperate with China in the sphere of security. A Chinese language centre operates at South Africa’s University of Stellenbosch. In its statements Beijing expresses solidarity with South Africa international position, the una-
nimity of opinion with this country on many political issues. South Africa accounts for 28% of Chinese trade with Africa. In turn, China is the second largest Asian trading partner of South Africa. Investment cooperation is developing rapidly. In 2008, China’s investment in South Africa three times exceeded the volume of South Africa’s investment in China, in particular owing to the acquisition by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) of a 20% stake in South Africa’s Standard Bank. The obstacles to investment cooperation include red tape and South Africa’s high rate of crime. China’s interest in South Africa’s resources and the prospects for the cooperation with a state that has a political weight on the continent and in the world is a guarantee that China-South Africa cooperation will strengthen.

The conclusion states that the era of globalisation was marked by the rapid growth of China’s economy and, consequently, by a significant intensification of external political and economic activities of the country. An important component of China’s foreign strategy is the “return” to Africa. The defining factor in these relations is China’s economic interest in African natural resources, which are necessary for the rapidly growing Chinese economy. However, economic relations are not the only factor determining China’s interest in Africa. The PRC needs international support from African states, which enables it to establish itself in the status of the leader and spokesman of the developing countries. China is becoming a key factor in the politics of most African countries. Unprecedented diplomatic exchange, growing economic assistance, unencumbered by political conditions, debt relief, trade and investment boom, protecting the interests of African countries in international organisations have made China an attractive alternative to the West for the Africans. The “return” of China to Africa in the 21st century is of special interest to Russia, which has to build relations with African countries on a new basis; it could certainly find useful the experience of China, which is successfully gaining ground on the continent.

All academic schools and research areas have their main forums which, just like a general inspection, gather the maximum number of participants. The conference of Africanists of Russia serves as such a forum for African Studies. The conference has international status and takes place regularly – every three years. It is the most popular meeting for the followers of this humanitarian science. For instance, the latest conference, the XI International Conference, which took place on 22-24 May 2008 and was entitled "Development of Africa: Possibilities and Constraints", attracted the record number of participants: 320 scientists, post-graduate and graduate students who explore the continent’s problems and the lives of its peoples. There were nearly 90 foreign guests from 32 countries of Africa, Europe, North America and Asia among the participants of the conference.

Hardly any issues were not discussed at 18 panels and four round tables. In the concept of "development" the organisers of the conference included not only economic agenda, but to no lesser extent they included socio-cultural and political transformations, changes in the system of international relations, improving education, deepening ties between people of different countries, ethnicities, religions, etc. These quantitative and qualitative changes can only be associated with development if they are organically adapted by African socio-cultural environment, and local communities, in their turn, adapt to technological, economic and political innovations, while retaining its Africanness.

Broadened participation of youth, not only post-graduate students, but also second- and third-year undergraduate students, was a distinctive feature of this conference. With rare exceptions, virtually every panel had reports from the students of the Institute of Asian and African Studies of the Moscow State University, St. Petersburg and Yaroslavl Universities, Russian State Humanitarian University and other educational institutions of Russia and the two capitals. This fact gives a hope for the continuation of continuity in this humanitarian science.

The opening ceremony of the conference, which was held at the Institute for African Studies, was attended by all heads of African diplomatic mis-
The forum of Africanists began with a brief introduction by the Director of the Institute for African Studies, Corresponding Member of the RAS, Professor A.M. Vasiliev, who is also the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for the Relations with African Leaders. He read the messages sent to the Conference by other academic and educational institutions and practical organisations. Then the Dean of the African Diplomatic Corps, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Sierra Leone to Russia, Ms. Melrose Bayo Kai-Banya greeted the attending scientists. Director of the Department of Africa A.M. Makarenko gave a speech on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia.

Director of the Institute A.M. Vasiliev made a keynote speech titled "Africa: is there light at the end of the tunnel?" He noted positive shifts in the lives of peoples of the continent: overall GDP grew up to 6%, exports of goods and services in 2007 increased by 15.2, and imports – by 13.2%; there appeared a tendency for strengthening peace and security, and the African Union plays an increasingly prominent role in this regard; African states even more tend to combine their efforts when solving a number of major political, military and economic problems; the level of managerial efficiency has increased; the threat of hunger has somewhat retreated. However, these are just fragile trends, which in order to consolidate require huge amounts of money, changes in the structure of economic relations of the continent with the outside world, the fight against corruption, which also remains one of the main problems of the continent. Illegal capital outflows continue to undermine the efforts to combat poverty. The problems caused by human habitat destruction and climate degradation are worsening. The available huge hydropower resources are used only to a fraction – 0.7% – of their potential. There are not enough medical personnel, resources, and medicaments to treat African diseases and AIDS, the spread of which has not stopped yet.

Nevertheless, the speaker concluded, the situation on the continent is currently better than it was 6, 8 and 15 years ago. The way forward became visible.

The plenary session of the conference was concluded with a brief statement by the executive secretary of the organising committee, scientific secretary of the Scientific Council of the RAS for the problems of economic, social, political and cultural development of Africa, Professor A.D. Savateev, Dr.Sc. (History). He congratulated the audience with the opening of the forum and reminded everyone of the agenda, meeting places for each panel, conference breaks and the closing plenary session. The discussion of perspective development and its obstacles was scheduled for panels and round tables. The panels and round tables worked for almost two full days: they started after the lunch on May 22, then worked the entire day of May 23 and finished only in the first half of May 24.

The state of peace is the key condition without which development is nothing more than a speculative subject. Therefore it is no accident that the panel entitled "Peace and Security" (moderated by V.G. Shubin, Dr.Sc (History)) was designated to take place first, also in the book of abstracts. Speakers from South Africa, Russia, and Spain mainly touched upon two topics: the activities of continent-wide and regional entities in Africa to promote peace and conflict resolution. In particular, the speakers summed up the first five years of the existence of the African Union, discussed the formation of a strategic culture in Africa and the activities of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security established within the Southern African Development Community (SADC), analysed the conflict in Somalia and the related problem of safety of navigation in the Horn of Africa and the reasons for the resumption of the civil war in Angola in 1990 and the measures to overcome its consequences.

The second panel entitled "The economy of development and the development of economy" (moderated by E.V. Morozenskaya, Ph.D. (Economy)) included over 20 presentations. Active discussions covered the following key topics: oil, gas and the economic development of Africa (the issue of the so-called "resource curse" was also discussed extensively during these debates); social capital and human capital in Africa; general theory and applied aspects of growth and development in Africa (participants discussed the differences in methodology for measuring economic growth and the correlation between the concepts of growth and development, new developments in the field of external financing for African countries, the nature of water resources depletion; the prospects for developing industrial infrastructure and enhancing the role of rail networks in the economy, the opportunities for improving the effectiveness of regional economic groupings). The advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Angola, author of a book on the role of oil in modern politics E. Beni and Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Zimbabwe to Russia P. Mphoko added to the acuteness of the debates in this panel.

The panel "Political modernisation and the problems of social development" (moderated by Yu.V. Potemkin, Dr.Sc. (Economics)) focused on the most urgent issues of the social and political development of the continent. Participants discussed the interim results of the implementation of the socio-political programme of the African Union, concepts of new public management, the impact of political elites on the formation of state policy at the beginning of the XXI century. The participants of this panel paid careful attention to the following issues: the impact of political culture on democratic process, the problems of civil society in African countries, the role of...
human rights organisations, the role of Islam in the development of political situation in a number of African regions. Interpretations of the role of political parties in the life of African countries sparked heated debates.

In general, the panel contributed to the clarification of a number of aspects of the current socio-political situation on the continent.

The panel "States of Tropical Africa: overcoming obstacles in socio-economic and political development" (moderated by Yu.N. Vinokurov, Dr. Sc. (History)) consisted of 14 reports and was attended by 22 specialists as well as beginning Africanists. Besides the staff of the Institute for African Studies there were scientists from other academic and educational institutes of Russia, their counterparts from South Africa, Norway, Mali, as well as representatives of practical organisations: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Embassies of the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Moscow, the UN Mission to Cote-d'Ivoire. Their attention was focused on discussing a wide range of issues of economic and socio-political nature, the main of which were: realisation of national plans, problems of mitigating the crisis in industry and agriculture, the establishment of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa, settlement of conflicts and restoring peace in regions and individual countries, integration processes in sub-Saharan Africa and on the continent as a whole, political culture and identity in the political life of the region as factors of the development of the peoples of Africa, the demographic components of social and political development.

The panel "Political decisionism and challenges of nation-building in Africa" (moderated by Dr. E. Kofmel (Switzerland)), building on the ideas of Carl Schmitt, concentrated on investigating the nature and significance of political decisionism in African history and modernity. Speakers – including researchers from Sweden, Hungary, Morocco, Nigeria, Algeria, and Spain – also tried to clarify the correlation of political decisionism with the concept and practice of nation-building and socio-economic development on the continent. The issues discussed in the panel and its reports included the roots and manifestations of "African decisionism", relationships between decisionism and democracy on the continent and, in addition, the role of Russia and China, Botswana, Kenya, Namibia, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, South Africa served as examples for speakers.

The two-day panel "Social and cultural borderlands as a phenomenon of African, Russian and global transformations" (moderated by I.V. Sledzevsky, Dr. Sc. (History)) included 21 reports and their discussion. The theme of contemporary global and civilizational transit was the focus of the panel. The reports on this subject demonstrated a departure from the linear patterns of transit and focused on new, non-linear, poorly predictable and insufficiently explored threshold states of the global and civilizational borderland. Particular attention was paid to such phenomena as a manifestation of the borderland in the traditions of Russian civilization, increasingly uncertain contemporary global development, the possibility of transition from the "nation-states" model of the world order to a corporate state model, growing risks of a global civilizational catastrophe, the substitution of formal social institutes with anthropocentric institutes, the new role of diasporas in global geopolitics. The following new phenomena of African and Russian transformations were also analysed: the current trends in interfaith relations in the areas of Muslim-Christian borderlands (Ethiopia, Tanzania, the North Caucasus, the Volga region), the changing balance of syncretic and proselytic Islam in Africa, Islamic options for Africa’s development, vigorous inclusion of Arab and Muslim diasporas in political processes in Europe, the possibilities for an African transnational area to emerge in Europe.

A third of the reports were devoted to the analysis of global threats and risks arising at the current moment on the continent in the light of modern civilizational processes.

The panel "Africa in international relations and Russian-African cooperation" (moderated by M.L. Vishnevskiy, Dr.Sc. (History) and E.N. Korendyasov, Ph.D. (Economics)) was attended by more than 20 people. The participants looked at various aspects of international cooperation on the continent. An analysis of legal parties led to the conclusion that it is necessary to consolidate the efforts of the international community to address contemporary threats and challenges and to build a just world order. The increasing international interest in Africa, primarily in its mineral resources, as well as the growing activity of the so-called "emerging powers" which enter into fierce competition with the "old players" was noted. The participants reaffirmed the usefulness and the need to strengthen Russian-African cooperation, which has great potential for strengthening Russia's position on the continent and for the development of domestic economy on the basis of innovation.

The panel "Traditions and modernity: the role of traditional institutes in Africa’s development" (moderated by R.N. Ismagilova, Dr.Sc. (History)) was attended by scientists from France, Italy, Nigeria and Russia. Most of the reports were based on the results of field studies of the reporters. Most of the presentations were devoted to characterisation of the role of traditional authorities in the contemporary political, economic and cultural life of African countries. The participants considered traditional institutes in connection with the implementation of the NEPAD programme and examined the importance of traditional religions. It was concluded that traditional methods of solving and preventing ethnic conflicts in African societies are of enormous importance and need to be incorporated into modern socio-political systems.

The participants of this panel came to the conclusion that traditional institutions and structures that make up the core of African culture still continue to play an important role in various areas and affect the processes of social...
adaptation to modern economic and social conditions. In light of this, scientists believe, it is strange that such an important document as the NEPAD programme does not mention the internal prerequisites for development that are rooted in the peculiarities of traditional culture. However, without understanding the role of traditional institutions we can hardly expect much success in implementing these plans.

The tenth panel, "Literature, literacy, education in Africa" (moderated by N.A. Dobronravin, Dr.Sc. (Philology)), included 13 reports. Of interest is the geography of presentations and submitted papers: Russia, Italy, Kenya, Namibia, Britain, Germany/Belgium, USA/Japan, Nigeria/UK, and Senegal/Norway. A significant number of the participants acted in two capacities, representing both their native countries and their universities, or even two countries.

The reports covered traditional themes (African literature and study of folklore). In particular, the participants examined literature in European languages, Arabic, Swahili, and Hausa and Manding folklore. Several interesting reports were devoted to educational systems in Africa and prospects for their development. There were also reports on the application of Internet technologies in education in Africa and on the problems of literature and the identity of the African Diaspora in Europe, North America and Brazil.

The eleventh panel, "History of Africa: the vicissitudes of development in the past and present" (moderated by A.B. Letnev, Dr.Sc. (History)), chronologically embraced three centuries: XVIII-XX. The speakers and panellists of the panel focused their discussion on the following thematic blocks: 1) the peculiarities of the dynamics of Africa's development as an integral part of the colonial world in the early modern and late modern eras; 2) the colonisers and decolonisers of the continent and the tools they used to influence the evolution of African societies and the worldview of Africans; 3) the lessons of half a century of independent existence of the African continent; 4) the place of the founding fathers of the new Africa in the historical memory of their fellow citizens; 5) Russians and Africans: understanding the experience of intercultural interaction in historical perspective.

The main focus of the twelfth panel entitled "Development of Africa: opportunities and obstacles in the context of gender" (moderated by N.L. Krylova, Dr.Sc. (History) and N.A. Ksenofontova, Ph.D. (History)) was a study of the existing gender composition and gender attitudes prevailing in the studied societies and areas of human relations. Two main clusters of issues were identified:

1. A description of the gender context of culture, a detailed study of the discourses that reproduce the gender order in the historical and contemporary perspectives, and the analysis of literary texts;

2. Setting dispositions that determine the social status of women (both the "norms" and "deviations" in these statuses), a detailed description and a scientific analysis of the status of women.

One of the key objectives of the panel was to produce academically reasoned deconstruction, demythicisation and demystification of the foundations of patriarchal policies.

The panel studied socially determined gender relations based on the examples of specific groups and examined the mechanisms for reproducing gender relations and the factors that cause their transformation through the female subculture as well as socio-cultural stereotypes related to these issues.

The thirteenth panel, "Africa and the world: mutual perception of cultures, human relations and public policy" (moderated by D.M. Bondarenko, Dr.Sc. (History)), included 16 reports by scientists from scientific and educational centres of eight countries. The presentations reflected the diversity of the theme "Africa and the world", which is due to the existence of both regional (Africa and Eastern Europe, Africa and the West, Africa and the East, as well as intra-African relationships) and topical (analysis in terms of levels and types of relations between Africa and the world: mental, interpersonal and state levels) approaches. The participation by representatives of different scientific disciplines (social anthropology, philology, psychology, history and sociology) enriched the analysis and allowed to examine the discussed questions within different methodological contexts.

A comparison of different scientific approaches, which was demonstrated by experts in different areas of knowledge, served as a useful model for undergraduate, graduate and post-graduate students which were particularly numerous in this panel. The students themselves made a significant portion of the reports presented during the two-day panel.

The fourteenth panel, "Africanist's toolkit: source study and historiography of Africa" (moderated by Apollon B. Davidson, Dr.Sc. (History)), included ten reports. The main objective of the panel was to identify new trends in African source study which emerged in recent years throughout the world including Russia. The panellists came to the conclusion that a source can be and should be any document, because it is able to characterise one or another aspect of its time or even more. In modern social science the Internet also became a source, and two reports were devoted to the use of the Internet in this capacity.

The fifteenth panel "Southern Africa: potential for growth and integration, overcoming obstacles to development" (moderated by Yu.S. Skubko, Ph.D. (Economics)) attracted more than 30 scientists and public or political figures from South Africa, Russia, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Portugal, Italy, Spain, and the UK as well as representatives from the World Wildlife Fund and the embassies of Namibia and Zimbabwe. The discussion mainly fo-
cused on three major themes: 1) socio-political and economic problems in South Africa, Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe; 2) questions of history of the region; 3) domestic and foreign policy issues and global challenges facing Southern Africa.

The reports on economic and social problems presented within the first theme aroused a lively discussion. Within the second theme of the greatest interest were the stories related to the history of armed conflicts in Southern Africa and the war in Iraq. The third part of the panel was notable for the discussion that raged around the foreign political and economic issues related to the integration processes (with the participation of South Africa) in the region and in the developing world as a whole.

The sixteenth panel "The Middle East and North Africa: the regressive and progressive trends and patterns of economic and social development" (moderated by A.S. Tkachenko, Ph.D. (Economics)) was attended by the Arabists of the Institute of Oriental Studies, Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as by researchers from India, the United Arab Emirates, and Russian practical organisations. Nine reports were presented in this panel.

The main focus of these reports was put on the influence of reforms on addressing the most pressing economic problems of the Middle East and North Africa, economical use of fuel and raw materials – the key resources for development, and the role of the ethno-confessional factor in modern political life. The participants of the panel discussed the issues related to the realisation of the initiative of "the Group of Eight" for partnering with countries of the region and providing assistance in the implementation of economic and social reforms.

The linguistic panel titled "Development and functioning of African languages in the context of national and cultural construction" (chaired by the Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of the Institute of Linguistics of the Russian Academy of Sciences V.A. Vinogradov) was organised in view of current issues, which were grouped as follows: 1) general theory and typology based on African linguistic evidence; 2) socio-cultural processes in Africa and the Lexicon, 3) phonetic and grammatical problems in synchrony and diachrony.

The reports dealt with many of specific languages and language families of Africa. Beginning Africanists were among the reporters and participants and contributed to the panel no less actively than experts with extensive experience. A particularly positive omen of this conference was a considerable influx of young researchers – linguists from St. Petersburg and Moscow. Their reports were typically built on new original materials, including those obtained during their field studies in Africa.

Participants of three round tables, which focused on the complex problems of the African continent that accumulate global issues of human and social survival in modern conditions, significantly contributed to the work of the conference.

The round table on African geography and ecology titled "Environment and man: a symbiosis or mutual destruction?" (moderated by V.I. Gusarov, Dr.Sc. (Geography)) included 11 reports by Russian participants. These reports examined continental, regional, country and problematic aspects of African geography and ecology. Analysing them from different angles, the reporters came to general conclusions that can be reduced to the fact that the environmental and resource potential of the continent is rapidly depleting and no longer renewing. The process of relationships between nature and man in Africa is fundamentally disrupted and there is a permanent socio-ecological crisis.

Summing up the signs and clear evidence of worsening environmental situation in contemporary Africa, the panellists came to the conclusion that this crisis develops simultaneously in three major areas: 1) environmental degradation, including desertification; 2) depletion of water resources; 3) the rapid expansion of AIDS and some other epidemic diseases. In addition it was concluded that the governments of most African countries are not able to cope with the deteriorating situation and count on international assistance only.

The round table «Challenges of globalisation and Africa» (moderated by Professor L.L. Fituni, Dr.Sc. (Economics)) was attended by 11 people, including researchers from Germany and Angola. The debate concentrated on the fundamental changes occurring in the socio-economic life of African countries under the influence of globalisation processes. Three groups of questions drew the most attention: 1) the changing role of the African continent as a source of natural and labour resources for the global economy; 2) the problem of international terrorism in connection with Africa; 3) the expansion of some elements of "Islamic economy" on the continent. During the debate the participants put forward some new hypotheses of a theoretical nature concerning the assessment of resource dependence, the proportions and assessment of the impact of TNCs on economic and social development of Africa.

Members of another round table entitled "Revival of the historical forms of social life through the prism of the interaction of Africa with the West and the East" (moderated by V.R. Arseniev, Ph.D. (History)) heard three of the five planned reports. The panellists discussed main points and reached to a consensus in assessing the results of the independent existence of African states after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the USSR. In their view, during this period these countries became almost completely economically and
politically dependent on the West and on the new East – namely China – which is entering the competition. Under such circumstances, according to the panelists, the transformation of former colonial empires and their cultural and linguistic spaces into consolidated and affiliated unions of former colonies could create an alternative to Western globalisation. It would also lay the foundation for maintaining the integration of Africa into the global civilizational process, with ampler room for manoeuvre than a direct interaction with TNCs or other culturally, historically and linguistically alien actors of world politics.

The programme of the closing plenary session was brief, but sufficiently capacious. Director of the Centre of African Studies of the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences Professor Apollon B. Davidson, Dr.Sc. (History) made a scientific report. He outlined the main stages of development of Russian-Soviet African Studies since Tsarist Russia and till the 1960s and described their key features. The speaker reminded the audience of the forgotten and unknown names of Russian scientists, who had begun the study of the continent in the 19th century and who had travelled thousands of miles through the hot areas of Eastern and Central Africa.

The speech by Deputy Chairman of the National Assembly of Mali Abdraman Silla became a distinctive statement on behalf of Africans who had become certified specialists in the Soviet Union. He appealed to scientists with the words of sincere gratitude for the assistance rendered by the Soviet Union and Russia to peoples of the continent in their struggle for independence, construction of new states, development of industry and personnel training. The ardent speech of the high-ranking guest, who earned his Ph.D. at Peoples’ Friendship University during the Soviet period, was so emotional, sublime and at the same time convincing that normally reserved scientific audience responded with enthusiastic applause.

Secretary of the Organising Committee A.D. Savateev, Dr.Sc. (History), summed up the scientific results of the conference. He outlined the main trends, issues and conclusions that had been made by the participants, and noted certain weaknesses of African Studies in Russia. In particular, the subject areas of the reports presented at the conference reaffirmed the urgent need to strengthen and, more precisely, to re-establish research in the field of law. The international aspect of African Studies does not correspond, in his view, to the contemporary level and volume of objectives. The study of economic problems should be broader and more diverse. Nevertheless, in general we can speak of the increasing number of researchers and of a growing interest in the society and national humanitarian science towards African Studies.

This was the concluding statement of the conference.
entist, his curiosity and scientific meticulousness strike one’s imagination. Undoubtedly, the diary of I.I. Potekhin, which is kept in the library of the Institute for African Studies, is a precious grain of his creative heritage and still has a great scientific, applied scientific and methodological significance.

A.B. Letnev’s (IAS) report was titled "I.I. Potekhin and the key objectives of studying African history". He noted that I.I. Potekhin had developed a programme to study African history and participated in its implementation at the turn of the 1950s -1960s. The programme was based on two postulates. The first postulate dictated the need of rediscovering the truth about the past of the peoples of Africa, discrediting the myth that the African peoples don’t have a history, and liberating the continent's history of falsifications. The second postulate suggested conducting research on individual countries and peoples starting from ancient times. In his list of priority areas of scientific research, I.I. Potekhin stressed the need for simultaneous work on five major themes: the ethnogenesis of the peoples of Africa, the history of great migrations on the continent, the history of slave trade, the features of African feudalism, the history of Africa’s anti-colonial struggle. Considerable attention was given to foreign research foundations, and a special emphasis was placed on interdisciplinarity and all-inclusiveness of historical research. In defiance of sceptics and opponents of the programme it was implemented in line with the postulates identified by I.I. Potekhin. Potekhin’s long-term programme for African history studies withstood the test of time.


P.I. Kupriyanov’s (IAS) report was entitled "I.I. Potekhin and study of the agrarian question in Africa". In 1933 I.I. Potekhin published the article "Farm workers in the Union of South Africa"; in 1939 he defended his thesis "The history of agrarian relations in South Africa". Subsequently, a number of his works spurred debate among Africanists. These works included the article "On feudalism of Ashanti" (1960), "Agrarian relations in African countries" (1962). At the initiative of I.I. Potekhin and under his direct supervision the monograph "The agrarian question and the peasantry in Tropical Africa" (1964) was written and still remains, according to the speaker, the best fundamental work on these issues on the African continent.

R.N. Ismagilova (IAS) devoted her report to the study of African ethnic issues in the USSR prior to 1960. Many of these issues remain unresolved to this day and continue to exert considerable influence on modern ethno-political situation on the continent. Soviet scientists D.A. Olderogge and I.I. Potekhin made a great contribution to the study of these problems in Africa. Not only did they commence the research on these complex issues, but they also created a new area of African studies and trained a significant number of pupils and followers. One of the important works in this area was I.I. Potekhin’s monograph "Formation of a national commonality of South African Bantu" (1955). The most significant work in Soviet and foreign African studies of 1940s-1950s was the volume "The peoples of Africa" from the series "Peoples of the World" published by the Institute of Ethnography of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Despite the fact that this book was published in 1954, it still has not lost its significance both for the wealth of factual material and also for formulating a number of important issues, including in the area of ethno-social development.

N.V. Gromova (The Institute of Asian and African Studies of the Moscow State University) noted that although the teaching and learning of the Gyzzy, Amharic and Coptic languages had begun in pre-revolutionary Russia, national African linguistics had emerged in the 1930s. At the time D.A. Olderogge, who had studied Swahili and Hausa at the seminars of German professor D. Westermann, began to teach these languages in Leningrad. In 1934 the first Africanist sub-faculty of the LSU opened its doors. Besides D.A. Olderogge, there were also N.V. Yushmanov, I.L. Snegirev, T.L. Tyutryumova and others who were engaged in African philology in Leningrad. In Moscow first Africanists began to study African languages in 1932: a group of linguists (G.K. Danilov, P.S. Kuznetsov) and historians (A.Z. Zusmanovich, I.I. Potekhin and others) started to learn Swahili. Future first president of Kenya Jomo Kenyatta, who was studying in Moscow at the time, became their informant.

In January 1934, the linguistic department of the African office of the Academic Research Association for the Study of National and Colonial Problems initiated the first-ever national African Studies Conference on African languages. In addition to 11 linguistic reports there were also 3 historical reports including a report by I.I. Potekhin "The anti-imperialist movement in African countries". It was decided to publish the collection "Africa, its peoples and languages". However, this decision was not implemented because G.K. Danilov was dismissed in early 1935 on charges of Trotskyite propaganda. Head of the African cabinet A.Z. Zusmanovich and soon after him I.I. Potekhin were also fired. G.K. Danilov was executed by shooting in 1937 and the Moscow branch of African philology ceased to exist. Fortunately, the wave of repressions did not affect Leningrad’s African-
historical memory and historical imagination, i.e. to the stereotypes (models) the "black race" is related not to historical cognition or political (national) identification. According to him, the peculiar Afrocentrism's glorification of Africa as a specific form of civilizational consciousness (civilizational self-formation of an independent Africa.

Studies.".

I.I. Potekhin on education of young Africans in the Soviet Union.

I.A. Sledzevsky (IAS) devoted his report to the evolution of Afrocentrism in the 1980s and 1990s both in African countries and among the African Diaspora in Europe and the black population of the USA. This upsurge (against the background of falling interest in scientific African studies in the leading countries of the West) became the basis of African national identification of the African and of African civilizational consciousness of a cultural and racial type. Consequently, Afrocentrism evolved from original, purely identity constructions (Negritude, a civilizational unity of the African world, the kinship of African culture and ancient civilizations) to a global cultural and communicative structure. At the same time, the speaker noted, globalisation opens up new opportunities for the revival of Eurocentrism. This sharply expands and complicates the area of formation of an African (civilizational) historical consciousness. The area may become a field for dialogue between different civilizational images of world history or a field for division and mutual exclusion of the African and European cultural worlds.

A.N. Moseyko (IAS) addressed the problem of forming the theory of "Negritude", the founders of which were Leopold Senghor, Martiniquians Aimé Césaire and René Ménil and Guyanese Leon Damas. This theory asserted the unity of all Negroid peoples and the commonality of Negro culture. Genetically, it was associated with the movement of "Harlem Renaissance" that emerged in the 1920s in the U.S. From this movement the theory adopted the idea of the "return to Africa", rejection of Western values and introduction of the specifically African values. "Negritude" as a concept grew out of the progressive movement for the rehabilitation of the spiritual values of African peoples, and out of the assertion of the dignity of the Negroid race. In this sense, it became an element of the ideology of national liberation movement and played a positive role in the struggle of African peoples for independence. The tragedy of the situation faced by African intellectuals – supporters of Negritude – has roots in their marginality. In fact, while proving the exceptionality of a Negro-African man and his natural being, they abandoned this being and became "almost" Europeans. While living in Europe or in Africa and imitating European lifestyle, they felt like strangers everywhere.

I.T. Katagoshchina (IAS) reported on "The role of African intelligentsia in the national liberation movement" and noted that intelligentsia had quickly raised its voice in defence of the rights of indigenous population and founded...
itself in the role of an ideologist and organiser of the liberation movement. Pan-Africanism became one of its banners at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Its most striking representatives were E. Blyden, W. Du Bois, and D. Padmore. Since the 1930s the focus of anti-colonial ideology has shifted from common problems to the problems of each specific country. The 1940s and 1950s were a period of development of African nationalism within individual colonies and of interests to establish and develop local societies. African intellectuals led national liberation movements to their victories in the ways that were dictated by specific conditions in different countries.

Ethiopian scientist Kasae Negusie reported on the war crimes of Italian fascists in Ethiopia and on the issue of restitution. In 1935-1941 Ethiopia lost its access to the sea, suffered heavy human, economic and environmental losses and lost many works of art, religious and historically significant objects, and priceless archives. However, the issue of restitution remains open.

Liberian historian W. Frederick highlighted some peculiarities of his country’s emergence. The emergence of an independent African republic in the first half of the 19th century – in the heyday of the theory of blacks’ inferiority – based on progressive democratic principles is surprising. A number of wise statesmen emerged from the ranks of the founders of Liberia, who had used to be disenfranchised slaves. Liberia was conceived as a country created to accommodate the newly emancipated African Americans. But in the 1820-30s it became clear that the plans for their resettlement could not be realised on a significant scale, because they did not want to depart, and the U.S. government did not want to spend public resources on this project. Yet the migrants achieved the proclamation of the republic of Liberia in 1847.

G.M. Sidorova (IAS) made the report "The participation of Africans in the World War II", in which she noted that Africans had contributed to the victory over Nazi Germany. Tens of thousands of Africans fought and thousands passed through Nazi prisoner and concentration camps. The military path of Africans veterans and their military awards and fates did not yield to the value of European soldiers. At the same time, these circumstances contributed to the awakening of political and national consciousness of Africans and influenced the determination of their own position in the war. Testaments by African soldiers demonstrate that colonial authorities did not care neither about the morale of African soldiers nor about their material well-being. Moreover, the legitimate demands of Africans to equate their rights with the rights of European soldiers caused only irritation of the military command. The facts of heroic acts of African soldiers manifested during the war are undeniable and deserve a special attention and more careful study of documentary sources.

Yu.N. Vinokurov (IAS) in his paper "The Political Evolution of the Belgian Congo during the World War II" noted that the Congolese society of those years was actively affected by external factors, because the colony, previously closed, became open to the world. The occupation of Belgium by Germany was perceived in the Congo as the collapse of the metropolitan oppressor. The Governor-General told the Congolese at the time that their country remained the only unoccupied territory of the Belgian empire that had the Belgian national flag hovering over it, and that it was their duty to help the Allies defeat fascism. More than 22 thousand of Congolese (soldiers, porters, nurses) participated in military operations outside the Congo, alongside with their fellow Africans, Asians, and Europeans. U.S. and British military units were present in the Congo. All this could not but broaden the horizons of the Congolese people and influence their world outlook.

However, emerging Congolese pride was accompanied with the increasing exploitation of people, who responded with mass protests: army riots, city strikes, and desertion of peasants from forced "public works". Existing and newly created Afro-Christian sects experienced a revival, especially in rural areas, and were calling on their followers "to suppress the Europeans and take power into their own hands". The "evolve" – an educated stratum of the society – began to demand access to the management of their colony. They claimed that they were no longer aborigines, but a "new social class" – a kind of "bourgeoisie". At the end of the war the first socio-political sections and politicised ethno-cultural associations came into existence.

It was during the war that anti-colonial sentiment gained momentum in the Belgian Congo. In May 1945, a demonstration of war veterans was held in Leopoldville, whose participants expressed dissatisfaction with their situation. It was well known that the Treasury had not paid their allowances amounting to $4 billion Belgian francs (750 million if converting to 2008 Euros). Significantly, the Belgian colony, in which the anti-colonial protest in the interwar period had not gone beyond a few local peasant revolts, gained its independence just 15 years after the war.

A.Yu Dyabin (IAS) reviewed the origins of ethnic conflicts that had become a part of the contemporary crisis in the Great Lakes region (GLR). They have largely arisen in the 1930-1950s. The conflict in the RVO was composed of three ethnic conflicts: one between Rwandan Hutu and Tutsi, another one between Hema and Lendu in Ituri district of the Eastern Province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and lastly the contradictions associated with the Congolese Tutsi Banyamulenge Diaspora, which lives in the provinces of North and South Kivu.

The formation of the first two conflicts was associated with the activities of the Belgian administration. Colonial rule also indirectly influenced the problem of the Banyamulenge. Despite the fact that the lesser in numbers
Tutsis dominated the region since the 16th century, their relationship with the Hutu remained relatively peaceful. At the end of 19th century Belgians consolidated the privileged position of the Tutsi, incorporating them in the colonial system, which led to a sharp deterioration in relations between these ethnic groups. It were the actions of the colonialists that laid the foundation of inter-ethnic intolerance and led to the genocide of 1994 in Rwanda.

A similar scenario unfolded in Ituri. The Hema and Lendu relatively peacefully coexisted and even practiced inter-marriages. Belgian administration patronised Hema. The resulting income inequality worsened relations between the two peoples. Hema obtained access to education and positions in post-colonial state bodies, their officials in every possible way promoted their fellow tribesmen and increasingly overshadowing Lendu. The protest led to a blood bath which broke out in the Ituri district in an atmosphere of inaction of the central Congolese government, but with the active intervention from the outside.

The ethnic strife between Rwandan Hutu and Tutsi, practically instigated by the colonialists, had a negative impact on the problem of Tutsi Banyamulenge. In 1994, the Hutu fled Rwanda and escaped to the Congolese provinces of North and South Kivu, creating many refugee camps there. Repatriation of the refugees to their homeland was very slow. Under the circumstances Hutu extremists turned their hatred against the Congolese Tutsi Banyamulenge and started systematic attacks on them and even killings, which provoked the Banyamulenge to begin armed struggle and a full-scale "Congolese" war.

Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences V.G. Solodovnikov (IAS) described the contribution of the USSR to the elimination of colonialism and apartheid in Africa. After the World War II the USSR consistently supported the longing of colonial peoples for independence, provided material assistance to national liberation movements, and supplied them with weapons. In 1960 at the 15th session of the UN General Assembly, the Soviet delegation submitted a draft Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 89 delegations voted in favour of this project. The Soviet Union advocated the creation of the UN Committee on Decolonisation (Committee of the 24), UN Special Committee against Apartheid, UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and UN Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.

M.L. Vishnevskiy (IAS) in his report "U.S. policy towards Africa" stressed that in the late 1950s the ruling circles of the USA realised the need to prevent revolutionising of liberated Africa and the spread of socialist ideas. Administration of John F. Kennedy developed a "policy of the new frontiers", which meant an attempt to develop relations with Africa outside the framework of the Cold War and within the framework of capitalist evolution of underdeveloped countries controlled by the West. However, the concept of the "new frontiers" did not meet the expectations of its authors because of the desire of African leaders for greater autonomy. In the early 1960s American propaganda in Africa acquired a tinge of "paternalism", which is presently transforming into the notion of the U.S. leadership on the continent on the basis of "common destiny and interests."

L.V. Ponomarenko (Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia) made a presentation on the activities of the first Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Patrice Emery Lumumba. T.M. Gavristova (Yaroslavl University) devoted her report to the analysis of works of sculptor and art theorist El Anatsui, one of the most famous representatives of African avant-garde. He was born in Ghana in 1944, and has lived in Nigeria since 1975. His works were included in the collections of many museums and exhibited at the Venice Biennale. The meaning of his work, as he sees it, is to encourage the world to reconsider the attitude towards Africa and its rapidly developing art which is seeking ways to integrate into the international art community.

When summarising the Readings, Yu.N. Vinokurov said that the conference went by with interested participation of Russian and African scholars — historians, economists, ethnographers, political scientists, philosophers, philologists. Therefore, its multifaceted nature, which began to show in previous years, is continuing to consolidate and goes well with its memoir component which is highly desirable for this type of scientific conferences. It is also worthy to note the thematic diversity and creative energy of the reports presented at the Readings.
"IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL CRISIS ON AFRICA AND THE IMPACT OF CRISIS PROCESSES IN AFRICA ON THE COUNTRIES OF THE NORTH",
PROCEEDINGS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

The first international conference to be held jointly by the Institute for African Studies and the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation (RLF) (Germany) took place on June 16, 2009. The event was attended by representatives from Africa, Europe, CIS, as well as Russian scientists. During the conference colleagues shared their views on one of the most pressing issues of today – the interaction of crisis processes in the global economy. Scientists from Russia (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Yaroslavl) and well-known in the scientific world academics from South Africa, Nigeria, Zambia, Germany, Sweden, the CIS (Kazakhstan) expressed their views on the subject. Experts spoke about the peculiarities of the crisis in their countries and intensification of social contradictions in these new historical conditions.

The Rosa Luxemburg Foundation provided substantial financial and organisational support to the Institute for African Studies in holding the conference, for which the IAS expressed its sincere gratitude. A few words should be said about the RLF. The Foundation was established in Germany in 1990 as an organisation of political education, a discussion forum for critical thinking and political alternatives, as well as a research centre of progressive social development. In 1992 the RLF was recognised by the Party of Democratic Socialism, now the Left Party/DIE LINKE. At present the RLF is one of the six largest public funds of Germany and serves as a platform for critical analysis of the current state of society, as well as is engaged in research in the field of political science and economics. In Russia the RLF branch operates since 2003 under the leadership of Mr. Peter Linke. Its structure includes: the Academy for Political Education, Institute for the Analysis of Social Development, Centre for International Dialogue and Cooperation, educational department, archives and libraries. Besides Russia, the RLF has branches in Poland, Belgium, South Africa, Brazil, Mexico, Vietnam, Israel and Palestine.

Scientists from Russia (IAS) – Prof. L.L. Fituni – and from South Africa – Dr. Cheri Hendricks – acted in the capacity of leading moderators. The following topics were suggested for discussions: Africa in the world crisis: the end of economic growth and socio-political stability?; Complex nature of the crisis, including food and climatic aspects; Domestic and foreign policies of African countries during the crisis; Implications of the crisis for different regions of Africa; Measures taken by international associations and organisations to overcome the crisis: their impact on Africa; Policy of leading world powers towards Africa during the crisis: trends and implications; Africa and the world in crisis: the increasing interdependence of the global South and North; Present model of development of the continent and the prospects for its change: does the crisis give an added impetus for this? These discussions were attended by economists, historians and political scientists, who gave detailed analysis of the processes occurring in the African continent due to the global crisis.

The conference started with the welcoming remarks made by the Director of the Institute for African Studies Professor A.M. Vasiliev, Ambassador of Algeria S. Chergui and Head of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation Mr. P. Linke. Professor A.M. Vasiliev gave an objective description of the modern development of African countries and the impact of the crisis on individual countries. At the same time the head of the Institute suggested that the Millennium Development Goals for Africa set by the UN for the period till 2015 would not be achieved. He noted that high population growth in African countries and falling GDP would inevitably lead to social explosions. According to him, socio-economic and political implications of the impact would be so considerable that overcoming the crisis would take a long time. Mankind is facing a crisis of unprecedented scale, and its low point is yet to be seen, although there are optimistic forecasts. The whole structure of society and international relations could change. But, according to the professor, efforts to overcome the crisis, including on the African continent, must be applied by all the members of the international community in a coordinated manner.

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Algeria in Russia Mr. Smail Chergui also welcomed the Conference. He described the forum as extremely timely and convened at the critical moment of the international financial and economic crisis. The head of the diplomatic mission stressed that the conference was an integral part of mobilisation, through which Africa should minimise the impact of the crisis on African people. Mr. S. Chergui gave a detailed analysis of the impact of the crisis on African countries. In his opinion, the financial crisis hit the African continent “with a bang” in the first quarter of 2009 – a year after the crisis had erupted in the U.S. and six months after it had spread to Europe and Asia. Such delay could be explained by the modest integration of Africa into the global financial and economic system. According to the Ambassador, the crisis would lead to an increase in the number of people living on less than a dollar per day to 150 million. This figure represents a significant threat to the political, economic and social stability of the continent. African countries are mobilising efforts to prevent the crisis, at both national and international levels. African Gov-
Governments are carrying out anti-crisis measures, including the establishment of mechanisms to monitor the crisis, budget cuts, aid to exporters, reduction in interest rates wherever possible, and promoting consumer credit and the expansion of public investment in order to sustain economic activity, increase tax base at the expense of informal sector, etc.

At the continental level, national policies are supported by collective efforts. These efforts are supported by the African Union and African Development Bank. In this respect, an international conference for ministers of economics was held and the Committee of Ministers and African Central Bank were created in Tunis in November 2008 in order to manage the crisis. In February 2009, the Addis Ababa Declaration on the International Financial Crisis was adopted, and, in June 2009, in Cairo a conference was held devoted to the crisis. The Algerian Ambassador noted that a reform of the financial international crisis must take into account the needs of African countries and employ a multilateral approach. In conclusion, Mr. S. Chergui expressed the hope that through collective efforts Africa would achieve its goal of overcoming the crisis.

The representatives of Germany Mr. P. Linke and Mr. A. Hofmann agreed with their colleagues and noted that the impact of the crisis on Africa would be catastrophic. In particular, A. Hofmann noted that if the price of oil rose, the price of food would rise too. When you consider the fact that Africa produces little food and depends in this respect on imports, many African countries would face imminent famine. According to Mr. Hofmann, this crisis would wipe off all achievements of African countries. Therefore we should not sit on our hands, but we should analyse the situation and seek an alternative path of development.

Deputy Director of the Institute for African Studies Dr. I.O. Abramova opened the scientific and analytical part of the conference which followed the welcoming speeches with the report titled "Africa in the world of crisis: catastrophe or new opportunities?" The author attempted to assess and forecast possible changes in the pace and nature of the development of African economies. An emphasis was placed on the following points. By the beginning of the crisis Africa had certain material and social savings, due to which it could hold out over the next 1–2 years. Most analysts agree that Africa is not sufficiently closely integrated into the global economic structure, especially in the financial system, to suffer the full implications of its collapse. Perhaps to a greater extent the crisis would affect some of the larger and more developed countries, including South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, etc. The bulk of the continent's population that lives in villages would not feel changes in its position because of the crisis, not just because it is not included in the international market, but also because it practically lives in semi-subsistence economy.

Several scientists, including African, believe that in terms of distant future the world crisis could bring a number of positive changes for some African countries in the context of the transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world economic model. Since the beginning of the crisis and collapse of the financial markets of developed countries many African countries have fostered their trade relations with non-Western countries, primarily with China, India, Brazil, and the countries of the Middle East. According to some foreign analysts, Africa has a chance to gain some investment advantages because the global financial crisis has increased the risks of investing in Western countries.

At the same time, Dr. I.O. Abramova noted, the negative impact of the crisis on the African continent would likely prevail. The rate of growth of African economies in general would decrease. However, experts disagree on the magnitude of this decrease and its speed. Industrial production in Africa is quite vulnerable and any fluctuations in both global and domestic markets may lead to its destabilisation or even, as it happened in the first half of the 1990s, to de-industrialisation, which could further aggravate the "disconnect" of the continent from the globalisation process. In the context of falling world prices on main African export commodities foreign exchange earnings of African countries will decrease, devaluations will continue, a significant increase in their cumulative external debt, both public and private, will occur, terms of attracting foreign borrowing will worsen, inflation will increase. In 2009, Africa's economic growth rate will fall below the population growth rate (2.5% for Africa as a whole). This will lead to the rise of unemployment and the increase in flows of illegal migrants and refugees away from the continent and towards more successful, according to Africans' perception, countries. Probability of armed conflicts, including regional, will increase, and Europe and the U.S. will not be able to stay away. It might be more rational to invest in conflict prevention at an earlier stage to avoid significant losses in the future.

The speaker believed that Russia's interests in Africa during the crisis would remain unchanged. The growing activity and popularity of Russia on the international arena will lead to the growth of opposition to its national foreign policy interests on part of the West. Accordingly, the need for support of Russia from friendly countries will grow. Expansion of partnership with Africa in commodity markets is essential for the consolidation of Russia's role as an influential global player in unfolding struggle for control over natural, especially hydrocarbon, resources.

The second keynote speaker, Dr. Rose Shayo of the University of Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), could not attend the conference, but sent her report on Africa's response to the financial global crisis, and it was read at the conference. Dr. R. Shayo noted that financial and economic crisis in general would not have a major impact on Africa because it was not sufficiently integrated...
into the global economy. An important addition by Dr. R. Shayo was the idea that Africa was underrepresented in global economic structures such as the IMF, WB, “The Group of Twenty”.

Mr. V.N. Fedotov, Deputy Director of the African Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, stressed the importance of the fact that an academic institution such as the Institute for African Studies, which focused on such important current topics as peacekeeping, the relations of Africa with the main political and economic players of the modern world, now turned to the theme of the crisis. According to Mr. V.N. Fedotov, a crisis is a systemic and long-lasting concept. It should be studied by political scientists and scholars. The impact of the crisis on Africa is of multi-vector nature, and it has many drawbacks, but there could also be advantages, including intensifying intra-African integration processes and fostering desire to rely on the region’s own resources rather than hope for foreign aid. It is important to emphasise the demographic issue. As is well known, Africa’s population is growing rapidly. Economic slowdown, not to mention stagnation, in Africa means the worsening of socio-economic environment. Population growth in the context of the crisis is Africa’s peculiar characteristic and presents a very serious threat for the outside world, and above all, for Europe. And Europe takes it quite seriously. It also means a growing threat of migration trends.

The outside world, in turn, does not ignore the problems of Africa. They are discussed at meetings of the Group of Eight and in the framework of all economic associations of the world. The key thing is to avoid reducing aid and to promote Africa’s own economies and social infrastructure. Russia is providing all possible assistance to Africa through international structures and the Ministry of Emergency Situations. This includes assistance in crisis situations. Previously Russia’s aid amounted to hundreds of thousands of dollars, but now each delivery costs millions of dollars. It means that Russia understands the role and importance of issues of international development. Mr. V.N. Fedotov wished the Institute for African Studies to continue the tradition of discussing topical issues of our time at other conferences and in other formats.

Dr. Ali Varizu from Nigeria made a report in which he formulated the idea that the current crisis is a continuation of another African crisis that swept the continent after gaining independence in 1960. Dr. A. Varizu noted that the problems of development and recovery has been confronting the post-colonial Africa for a long time. However, all these processes slowed down because the IMF and other international organisations made their adjustments, deflecting Africa from the direction towards addressing these problems. These structural adjustments were based on the principle of economic decentralisation. It aggravated the crisis of socio-political development in 2008, when the talk of the global crisis began. In the 1980s, the globalisation talk began, but nowadays Africa is at a historic crossroads where global capitalism is being revealed. The Washington Consensus, with its support of neoliberalism, also complicated the situation in African countries. According to Dr. A. Varizu, the key topic of the present is a crisis of capitalism and a structural collapse of global economic governance. He mentioned the book “Global capitalism. Social crisis management in the era of globalisation” which presents strong arguments that in the foreseeable future capitalism will face a very serious crisis. Getting back to the theme of African resources, raised by speaker Dr. I.O. Abramova, Dr. A. Varizu reported that there are countries such as Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, and Botswana, where leadership skillfully manages the resources. There are also extreme situations where there are no such reserves. In connection with the global crisis, in his opinion, other crises that had hit Africa should also be discussed: widespread corruption, social degradation, religious and ethnic hatred. The speaker noted very low quality of policy and weakness of political institutions. In this context, according to the scientist, we can predict where the crisis will hit most powerfully. Dr. A. Varizu agreed with previous speakers that African economies are poorly integrated into the global economy and depend on the outside world. He also supported the opinion that the development goals for Africa outlined in the Millennium Development Goals were unlikely to be achieved by 2015.

Professor Krishna Kamini (Zambia) suggested that Africans should take care of themselves and rely less on the help from the West. Perhaps, she noted, Africans should be taught to work and some countries should undergo a so-called green revolution like in India. Africans should be taught not only to consume but also to produce, she said. Kamina K. Kamini highlighted the problems of training African personnel as well as issues related to the “brain” drain from Africa. This led to a lively scientific discussion of scientists who came to believe that in the context of the crisis this is a natural process which is also observed in Russia.

Dr. Cheri Hendricks (South Africa), the moderator of the second part of the conference, summarising the first part of the meeting, spoke about what was happening in her country during the crisis. Not so long ago the South African Finance Minister announced that the international crisis would not affect the economy of South Africa. However, as the speaker noted, just two weeks before the conference the first recession in 17 years was observed in South Africa. Was it not that the effect of the crisis? The rate of economic growth fell down noticeably and unemployment was growing. As already mentioned, this is a systemic crisis and a reform of the Bretton Woods system.

The conference included the presentations by Dr. G.M. Sidorova on the crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dr. T.L. Deych on China's
policy in Africa, and Dr. M.L. Vishnevskiy on U.S. policy towards Africa during the crisis. Dr. S.G. Azerbaev from Kazakhstan reported on his Gov-
ernment’s activities aimed at country’s survival during the crisis, Dr. O.S. Kulkova shared her ideas about British policy towards Africa, T.V. Gavris-
tova from Yaroslavl shared her opinions about the spiritual crisis of iden-
tity. A discussion of the root causes and ways out of the crisis took place be-
tween the presentations of Mr. A. Bigsten (Sweden) and Dr. A. Varizu (Nigeriа). In this regard, participants made an important conclusion about the
need for a holistic approach to the crisis based on its systematisation and
characteristics. Many experts agreed that the crisis requires a new approach
to the development model of the world and confirms the need to reorganise
global financial and economic structures.

Prof. L.L. Fituni, the moderator of the first session, summed up the con-
fERENCE proceedings. In particular he noted that while the global economy is
in crisis, the seminar indicated that our Russian social science is gradually
recovering. The first session was devoted to the issues of crisis systematisa-
tion and identification of the key characteristics of the crisis and speakers
elaborated on the crisis processes in Africa. In the course of the discussions it
become clear that not everyone agreed with the so-called technocratic ap-
PROACH to the analysis of the situation (presentations by Drs. I.O. Abramova,
S. Chergui, and R. Shayo). The scientists have different views on these is-
ues, but this actually is the very basis of a scientific debate. The pre-
sent global crisis is the restructuring and acceleration in the whole world, as
Prof. L.L. Fituni noted. The reorganisation of political relations began on
September 11, 2001. In the framework of the global crisis we face, in fact,
the elimination of the ballast of old industries in developed economies and
redistribution of economic power on a qualitatively new basis.

The international forum demonstrated the interest of scientists in such
meetings that define weak points of modern society and form new conceptual
approaches to solving its problems, which is especially important given the
global economic crisis.
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Germany’s Trade and Economic Relations with African Countries at the End of the 20th – Beginning of the 21st Century.