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PREFACE

The present issue of the African Studies in Russia, 2001 proceeds with the publication of anthologies in the series of yearbooks published by the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Like previous publications the 2001 collection contains articles, reviews, annotations, and other publications of Russian scholars on problems of Africa, which have appeared in print in the year of 2001.

The key goal of Russian publications on African Studies is to introduce the findings of Russian researchers to their foreign colleagues in the field. The matter is that the vast majority of the Russian scholars' studies are being published in Russian only. On considering the difficulties the language barrier can pose for foreign scholars the present issue intends to outline just the general directions of the Russian students of Africa and certain of their findings. To be sure it is impossible to review all the works and all the findings even for one year. So, the editors decided to include only some samples of such works and only some conclusions made by Russian scholars.

The book is opened by a part under the title 'Articles, Papers Presented to Conferences'. Here the reader will find a view of Prof. Alexei Vassiliev on the roots of war hostilities and their impact on the recent African development. Prof. Dmitri Bondarenko discusses the implication of globalisation on Africa versus dialogue of civilisations. Dr. Andrei Pritvorov analyses the importance of natural resources for the development of South Africa and other countries of the region. The article by Dr. Yevgeniya Morozenskaya examines the impact of the shadow economy globalisation on Africa. Prof. Matvei Frenkel deals with the interaction of civilisations within the African context.

The next part – 'Essays' contains extracts from books and some articles published and prepared for publication in 2001. Prof. Rosa Ismagilova investigates the impact of traditional structures and institutions on the inter-ethnic relations and ethno-political situation in Africa and in Russia. Dr. Piotr Kupriyanov discusses the economic relations between Russia and the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Dr. Irina Abramova analyses the interaction of the economic reforms in Egypt and the co-operation of that country with Russia. Dr. Andrei Pegushev addresses the problems of the Kenyan national historiography.

In 2001 a number of conferences, symposiums, round table discussions on Africa have been held in Russia. The majority of them have been organised under the aegis of the Russian Academy of Sciences Academic Council for Problems of the Economic, Socio-Political and Cultural Development of African Countries. The article by Dr. Lubov Prokopenko describes the ac-

tivities of this Council in 2001. The Russian Africanists took part in a number of international conferences on African issues. The proceedings of the Nigerian-Russian conference in Lagos, Nigeria have been outlined by Dr. Igor Bolshov.

The last part of the book contains some book reviews and a list of books and pamphlets published in Russia in 2001. The titles of the listed literature are translated into English to enable the foreign scholars to choose the books and pamphlets in Russian according to their interests and choice.

All the readers of the book are welcome to share their opinions with the authors and editors of the publication. Our address is:

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AFRICA AT WAR

*Alexei Vassiliev**

Wars have spread over a territory in Tropical Africa that is larger than Western Europe. The hostilities have directly involved the Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa), Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia and indirectly Sudan, Zambia, Chad, Central African Republic, Tanzania and Congo (Brazzaville).

After the Cold War, Tropical Africa was temporarily relegated to the backstreets both in world politics and in world economy. Unless the developments that took place there touched the interests of the mighty of this world in the USA and Western Europe, they were no-news to the media. While all papers, magazines and TV channels mourned for beautiful princess Diana, they almost overlooked the massacre of 800 thousand men, women, children and elderly, butchered and chopped into pieces in Rwanda in 1994. They concentrated at Kosovo, grossly exaggerating its humanitarian drama, and created a propaganda screen for the bombardment of tiny Yugoslavia, aimed at overthrowing Milosevic's regime, disliked by the West. At the same time, they virtually ignored the annihilation of hundreds of thousands in the wars waged in Congo (Kinshasa) and Angola, treating them as third-rate events.

Another example: before 1994, when genocide reached its peak in Rwanda, the Western media wrote about the destinies of gorillas in the national parks of Uganda and Rwanda four times more than about the increasing frequency of ethnic clashes in Rwanda and Burundi, involving tens of thousands of casualties. The topic of gorillas became a spicy dish to Philistines owing to the efforts of Diana Fossay, a renowned naturalist, who dedicated her life to the protection of these rare apes and perished in obscure circumstances, becoming the prototype of the heroine of a Hollywood picture. And what a lamenting began when fighters of the Hutu ethnic group in the national park of Uganda slashed to death eight well-off tourists who came to have a look at gorillas! This was really a horrible crime, which deserved the most unconditional denunciation and, if possible, harsh punish-

* **Prof. Vassiliev, Alexei**, Dr. Sci. (Hist.), Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), Director of the Institute for African Studies. RAS. The article 'Africa at War' has been published in *Asia and Africa To-Day* («Азия и Африка сегодня») journal, 2001. Nos 1, 2.

ment. Yet it was a microscopically small part of the all-African tragedy, which is no concern of the Americans and Europeans.

Meanwhile, Africans kill each other by aircraft, tanks, helicopters, artillery, missiles, submachine guns, as well as by arrows and machetes. Even more of them die of starvation and diseases as immediate results of hostilities. Economy is destroyed, fields and roads are choked with jungles, children do not attend schools, while dictators, military commanders and traders in arms and smuggled diamonds luxuriate.

Let me try to make it a little clearer in these notes how, by whom and why the large-scale war is waged in Africa to an extent that is unprecedented since the collapse of the colonial empires.

This is not an easy task. In the kaleidoscope of developments, victims often become butchers, friends and allies turn enemies, winners are defeated, the main players may not appear in Africa at all, and confused information is received from the scene of action in a distorted form.

Although the main hostilities are waged in Congo (Kinshasa), two poles of the developments lie outside its frontiers: one is in Rwanda, to the east of this African giant, and another in Angola, to the southeast of Congo.

After Rwanda attained independence in 1962, a government was formed there that consisted mainly of Hutu, who account for 85 per cent of the population. The militant Tutsi (15 per cent), who dominated the country in the pre-colonial period and formed the bulk of the colonial administration and police, were gradually relegated from power and their elite from wealth. The tension between both ethnic groups strengthened.

In this context it is pertinent to note the features of the interethnic contradictions and clashes in this country and Africa as a whole. The socio-economic and political contradictions, competition for resources, territory and positions in the administration and army acquired the character of interethnic conflicts in Rwanda, as it happened in all African countries.

Both new and archaic ethnic convictions and stereotypes and socio-ethnic psychology became the factors of the development or provocation of conflicts. Competition for power and resources is accompanied by apprehensions concerning one's security, the destiny of one's ethnos and one's self-identification. The traditional ethnic consciousness creates an image of the enemy in quite rigid forms; co-operation, mutual understanding and compromises become unusually difficult. The democratic principles of co-existence of different ethnoses are fixed in many constitutions and legislative acts but ignored in practice. In Rwanda one ethnic group strove to win an exclusive position and benefits to the detriment of the other group, right up to the physical annihilation of the rivals. Each ethnic group claimed to

have special potentials and historical merits, which allegedly entitled it to occupy the topmost positions in the state offices and army, not to mention its share in property. In the setting of confrontation ethnocentrism cultivated fanatic loyalty to one's group, which might amount to the denial of whatsoever rights to the other group.

Demonization of the enemy is well known in the practice of Western media, but here it was much more effective, being multiplied by the traditions. It strengthened group solidarity and fanaticism, justifying whatever atrocities against the adversaries, who were not considered human beings.

In the conflict atmosphere, only cruel extremists became leaders. They were aggressive and inclined for violence; they were ready to solve all problems by force.

The slaughter of the Tutsi began in Rwanda approximately in 1990 and reached its peak in 1994, taking the form of an en masse carnage with the government's connivance. According to objective estimates, genocide unleashed by both parties killed 700 to 800 thousand Tutsi and moderate Hutu.

As early as the beginning of the 1980s Tutsi émigrés in Uganda formed the so-called *Front Patriotique Rwandien*, headed by Paul Kagama. Getting arms and support from the government of Uganda, his detachments returned to Rwanda, seized its capital Kigali, formed the so-called government of national unity and stopped genocide. A million Hutu, both militiamen involved in genocide and peaceful inhabitants, feared of reprisals and fled to neighbour Congo (Kinshasa), then called Zaire. Their fighters began to raid Rwanda. Simultaneously, they confronted the Congolese ethnic Tutsi, called there Banyamulenge, who, naturally, sympathized with their fellow tribesmen across the border and helped them. Mobutu, the corrupt dictator of Zaire, sided with the Hutu against the Tutsi.

This was the beginning of the bloody drama that involved dozens of countries in its maelstrom very soon.

The UN Security Council and the governments of the USA, France and Belgium could prevent genocide in Rwanda in 1994 but did not do so and must be made responsible for their inaction. This was the main conclusion drawn by an independent international commission that investigated massacres in this country under the aegis of the Organization of African Unity and submitted its report to the UN in July 2000. The massacre continued for three months in Rwanda, where a 2.5 thousand men strong contingent of blue helmets was deployed.

The fault of the Security Council was that, getting detailed information about reprisals against innocent people, it did next to nothing to stop the massacre and left the population of Rwanda to the mercy of fate exactly

when they needed aid most badly. The Security Council could timely reinforce the peacekeeping contingent in Rwanda, authorize it to apply force and provide with suitable weapons. It was the US delegation that blocked this urgent decision. It is a 'blame of dishonour' in the history of the American foreign policy, the report noted. Analysts believe that the USA and France knew beforehand about the genocide prepared in Rwanda but adopted a passive stance and made no efforts to prevent it though had real capacities to do so. Belgium's behaviour was not the best possible one, the experts continued. After Hutu fighters shot ten Belgian peacekeepers dead, Brussels withdrew its entire military from the country. Soon thereafter, some 2000 children were killed in a Rwandan school the Belgians were supposed to guard.

According to the experts, the guilty parties must apologize to the Rwandan people. Evaluating the UN's attitude to genocide in Rwanda, Kofi Annan stated: 'On the behalf of the United Nations I admit this failure and express great regret.' It was quite easy to him to make this statement, because then the UN General Secretary was Boutros Boutros Ghali. Thereafter, the US president Bill Clinton, the Belgian government and the Church of England also apologized. The French government and Vatican still deny their fault.

Some 400 Rwandans were sentenced to death for their involvement in the genocide of 1994. Some of them were executed in public. Over 100 thousand people are waiting for trial in overcrowded Rwandan jails.

In the autumn of 1994 the UNO formed an international tribunal to try those who were accused of genocide. It works in Arusha (Tanzania) and has already spent some \$200 million to its activities. This judicial body has already sentenced seven people, including the former prime minister. Over 40 defendants await trial in the local jail. The maximum punishment was life imprisonment.

The situation in Rwanda is anything but stable. After 1994 president Pasteur Bizumungu, a Hutu, ruled it formally. In fact, the devastated country, which had not yet healed its injuries, was governed by young military, mainly Tutsi, led by Paul Kagama, the head of the *Front Patriotique Rwandien*. Formally, he became the president in April 2000. After being elected he claimed in his speech to be the president of all Rwandans, both Tutsi and Hutu. Earlier, he was an officer of the military intelligence service. He was trained in the USA and, being the vice-president, got the master degree in management in Britain by correspondence course. Thus, he is, so to say, not alien to the West.

After the 30-year long exile, almost a million of Tutsi returned to the

country from Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania and Congo. There are quite acute differences between the P. Kagame's group and the local Tutsi, not to mention the Hutu. This is clear from the murder of some eminent politicians.

Do the Hutu themselves support the new president? Their resistance has been suppressed in Rwanda, but their detachments hide themselves in neighbour Congo (Kinshasa) among one million of their fellow tribesmen, who fled the motherland.

Relying on the army, which is quite strong by the African standards, the Rwandan government became an active player in the intra-Congo conflict.

In 2001 raising contradictions between Rwanda and neighbour Uganda, its former close ally, complicated the situation. Mutual charges with aggression grew into border clashes. In October 2001 Uganda accused the Rwandan government of planning an aggression against it and creating military camps for 'elements hostile to the Ugandan government'

* * *

The developments in neighbour Burundi followed almost the same pattern though with less albeit also quite numerous casualties. A civil war continues for seven years there between the Tutsi minority and Hutu majority. Like in Rwanda, the Hutu account for 85 per cent and the Tutsi for 15 per cent of the population. The country witnessed repeated massacres and coups d'état since 1962, when it achieved independence. A peaceful settlement of the seven-year long interethnic conflict is possible only if the Tutsi minority gives up its monopoly of power. This was the statement made by Nelson Mandela. According to the former president of the RSA, who acts as an international mediator between the Tutsi government and Hutu rebels, it is necessary to 'cardinally reshape the political landscape' of Burundi, where administration, economy and army are controlled by the Tutsi.

'The army must consist, at least by half, of the Hutu, the second main ethnos, and voting must rely on the principle "one man, one vote"', Mandela said.

Since the civil war began in Burundi with its population of 6.2 million people in 1993, interethnic clashes claimed over 200 thousand Burundians. At least 1.2 million people became refugees or displaced persons. In the last autumn the authorities created guarded camps to isolate 350 thousand Hutu. This is a humanitarian drama, stemming from deep hatred.

The military situation in Burundi is a stalemate. The army failed to defeat the rebels, who enjoy some support of Hutu peasants. The rebels maintain contacts with Hutu fighters in Rwanda and Congo (Kinshasa), with

supporters of Congolese president Loran Desire Kabila and his son and with all adversaries of Kampala, Kigali and Bujumbura. A delegation of Burundian rebels visited Zimbabwe (this country supported Kabila and then his son in the war against Uganda and Rwanda) to negotiate arms supply. In Congo (Kinshasa) and Tanzania the rebels have bases beyond the local governments' control.

'The army supports the peace processes', said minister of defence Colonel Cyril Ndairukie. 'The war in Burundi is a civil war, in which nobody can be confident of his victory. Therefore, it is necessary to seek lasting peace'.

President of Burundi Pierre Buoya tries to settle the conflict, but he is in a delicate situation: he has to placate both the Hutu armed opposition and Tutsi extremists, who are not inclined to put an end to mono-ethnicity of the army. A split occurred among his Tutsi followers.

In 1993 Pierre Buoya, who became president in 1987, transferred power to legally elect to the presidential post Melchior Ndadaya, a Hutu. He was elected on the basis of the 'one man, one vote' principle, which meant transition of power to the Hutu majority. This initiative ended in a bloody failure. The military killed the president in October 1993. Hutu activists murdered 50 thousand Tutsi; to take revenge, the army massacred 50 thousand Hutu and, finding itself in a political deadlock, returned Pierre Buoya to the presidential chair in 1996.

Now the leaders of the country hold that the immediate introduction of the 'one man, one vote' principle amounts to continuing the war. Therefore, the authorities must create a system of alteration of the Hutu and Tutsi at power and deprive the extremists of both ethnic groups of the active role in politics.

Each party has an idea of its own about who is guilty, who is a war criminal and who committed acts of genocide. Hence the legal and moral deadlock: neither party deems it possible to forgive the 'crime of crimes', i.e., acts of genocide committed by the enemy.

The possibility to achieve peace in Burundi is personified by Nelson Mandela, old wise African, called by media 'the African of the century'. A man with unquestionable authority, he resumed the negotiations began in Arusha by Tanzanian ex-president Julius Nyerere in 1998, which ended in a failure. Then both parties preferred a military solution. President Nyerere, who died soon thereafter, was accused of siding with the Hutu.

Speaking at the Security Council in January 2000, Nelson Mandela said: 'The genuine challenge the Burundians are facing... is to create a form of democracy that ensures existence of a responsible and accountable gov-

ernment and security of those who feel themselves in danger for demographical reasons’.

At the peace negotiations held in Arusha in August 2000 the government of Burundi and opposition parties declared their readiness to cease hostilities. The inclination of most of the participants of the many years long conflict for peace and accord was confirmed by the next summit for the peaceful settlement in Burundi (October 2001) held in Pretoria (South Africa). Then 17 political parties agreed upon the formation of a transitional government and the composition of the cabinet of ministers. The parties overcame differences concerning the composition and numerical strength of the security forces, which were to guard the politicians after their return from exile. In November 2001 president Pierre Buoya, a Tutsi, swore an oath. After governing the country for 18 months, he was to be replaced by Domicienne Ndayizeye, a Hutu, who swore an oath as the vice-president. The new government consisted of representatives of 17 parties that signed the Arusha peace agreement in August 2000. Of 26 ministers, 14 are Hutu.

To prevent various excesses, a peacekeeping contingent of the South African National Defence Forces (SANDF) was sent to Burundi on Nelson Mandela's initiative. Peacekeepers from South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal will observe the implementation of the peace agreement.

It will become clear later if this weakens the tempo of the competition for power in the country. The Pretoria understanding was completely ignored by five large parties of Burundi, which represent the Tutsi minority; they refused to participate in the bodies of the transitional period. Two Hutu opposition groups also ‘responded’ to the peace initiatives: in 2001-2002 the detachments of the *Forces de Liberation Nationale* (FLN) and *Forces pour Protection de Democratie* (FPD) waged hostilities against the government troops, kidnapping and killing dozens of peaceful people. Many Hutu leaders still believe that the key positions in the security agencies are controlled by the Tutsi and are going to continue their struggle.

* * *

The present Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire) became a victim of its wealth (copper, cobalt, zinc, vanadium, uranium, diamonds, gold, valuable species of timber, ivory), size (its territory is as large as Western Europe) and variety of the ethnoses and tribes that form its 45 million strong population and political games of the Western powers.

President Mobutu Sese Seko ruled the country for 32 years as if it was a territory he had seized or occupied. (He is deemed to plunder at least \$5 billion; his entourage seems to have grabbed at least the same amount).

Meanwhile, the economy of the rich country decayed, people died of starvation, the infrastructure went to ruin and the state machinery disintegrated. Getting no salary, soldiers and policemen robbed the population. The revolts stirred up against the dictator in 1979, 1989 and 1992 were drowned in blood. In the years of the Cold War Mobutu was backed by Washington and its allies and clients in Europe, Africa and Asia. The then anticommunist regime not only sold off the national wealth to the USA but also allowed it to use the Zairian territory, in particular, to build a military base in Kamina (west Zaire) in order to supply arms to the UNITA, which combated the Angolan government, friendly to the Soviet Union. International corporations mined Congolese copper, rare metals and diamonds to the amount of \$1.5 billion yearly.

Then, the Cold War became a thing of the past. The Soviet Union disappeared from Africa as the rival of the USA. The appallingly corrupt Mobutu regime, unable to govern the giant country and maintain elementary order and security, needed for TNCs' activity, became a burden to the West.

In 1997 president Mobutu was challenged by guerrilla leader Loran Desire Kabila, and then forgotten by everybody. Earlier he supported the patriotically minded government of Patrice Lumumba and allegedly had some contacts with Che Guevara. He lay low at guerrilla bases in east Congo for almost 30 years, sometimes moving abroad. Now his starlit hour came. The country was so weakened and corrupt and its army so demoralized that the relatively small detachments of the armed opposition began to gain the upper hand.

Kabila's allies were the Tutsi in the province of Kiwu in the east of the country, where they were called Banyamulenge, and the governments of Rwanda and Uganda. It was the east of Zaire whereto the Hutu who were guilty of genocide and hundreds of thousand of their peaceful fellow tribesmen fled from Rwanda. The Hutu armed detachments continued to raid Rwanda, ruled by the Tutsi, and the Banyamulenge of Kiwu. Mobutu was hostile to the Tutsi and at friendly terms with the Hutu. Kabila was supported by regular troops of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. Various political groups of Kiwu united in the *Alliance des Forces Democratiques de Congo* (Zaire), led by Kabila.

The Mobutu regime collapsed within some months. Kabila seized Kinshasa, proclaimed himself the president and renamed Zaire into the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In this setting the USA left its former ally and his gang to the mercy of fate.

As early as the eve of Kabila's victory, representatives of giant corpora-

tions, including the Anglo-American (gold mining), De Biers (diamond mining) and other Belgian, American and South African mining companies, negotiated with Kabila.

Both the Western governments and international corporations were of the opinion that the situation could not be worse than under the Mobutu regime. They wanted stability and peace. Yet renovated Congo was going to face even more terrible ordeals.

Kabila repeatedly assured that he was ready to co-operate with the Western capital. A US mission, led by Bill Richardson, the minister of power, visited Kinshasa. He openly appealed the DRC to demonstrate 'allegiance to economy open to the West, including US investors'. He meant the formation of a super-consortium of American, British, Belgian, Australian and South African corporations for mining copper, uranium, zinc, cobalt, chromium, gold and diamonds.

However, Kabila did not hurry to open the doors of the country to Western corporations. Maybe, he retained the ideals of the remote 1960s, when he was close to Patrice Lumumba. Maybe, his many years long isolation as a guerrilla leader prevented him from evaluating the global balance of forces correctly.

Occupying the presidential chair, he repeatedly denounced imperialism in public, which, naturally, was unpleasant to the West. The government began to speak about the necessity to protect the national wealth from plunder. The relations of Kinshasa with Washington, Paris and Brussels grew cold.

Coming to power with the support of the Tutsi, Kabila turned a blind eye to their reprisals against the Hutu, including peaceful refugees from Rwanda. This also did not make him more popular in the West, which suddenly remembered about the necessity to protect human rights in Congo.

Yet Kabila's alliance with the Tutsi proved flawed. Perhaps, staying in alien Kinshasa, the Tutsi tried to subdue other Congolese, seizing the top-most positions in the administration and army. Then, acting with guerrilla-like resoluteness and, probably, hastiness, Kabila broke with his earlier allies and ... nearly lost power.

He stated on 27 July 1998 that he had decided to deport all foreign (mainly Tutsi) military and civil officials from the country and disband the detachments of the Congolese army manned by persons of a 'non-Congolese origin'. This was a slap in the face for the leaders of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, who had helped him to come to power a year ago. He accused them of the intention 'to restore the mediaeval Tutsi empire, consisting of these three states and the eastern part of the DRC'. 'Unless we rebuff the

aggressor, we shall become the Tutsi's slaves', Kabila said. 'Let the Rwandan refugees (mainly Hutu – *A.V.*) also get out. They are nothing but a source of troubles'.

Some days later, in early August, a rebellion began in the eastern provinces, where Tutsi military opposed the government, and the western ones, where they joined with Mobutu's former supporters, who resented the strengthening of the Banda's position in the army (Kabila belonged to this ethnos). The rebels were supported by Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, which sent their troops to Congo.

Kabila's regime trembled in the balance. But the government of neighbour Angola could not afford losing the valuable ally, which, it hoped, would help Angola in blocking the rear positions of the UNITA, its armed opponent. Angola sent its troops, which smashed the rebels close by Kinshasa and in the western provinces of Congo.

As a result, the situation was as follows in the second half of 1998. The numerical strength of the ill-trained and undisciplined Congolese army was 40-70 thousand. The Angolan troops consisted of 7 thousand disciplined (by the African standards) and well-armed men, accompanied by armoured vehicles and aviation. In addition, the government was supported by the Zimbabwean ground and air forces (7-10 thousand) and Namibian troops (up to 2 thousand). There were also elements from Chad and the Central African Republic, later withdrawn from the country. Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Eritrea, Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville) and Nigeria supported the DRC diplomatically. The rebels had 60 thousand armed fighters, supported by regular troops of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi (10 to 15 thousand from each country).

In mid-1999 (the situation did not change by 2000, when this paper was written) Kinshasa governed just a half of the country (a diagonal strip from the north to the south-east) and isolated centres in the east. The rebels and interventionists controlled a sizable part of the eastern provinces and economically important areas in the centre of the country. Taking into account the Hutu's hostility to the Tutsi, Kabila was favourably disposed towards the actions of their armed detachments against the Tutsi. The Hutu had to become Kabila's allies, but the governments of Rwanda and Burundi used their presence in the DRC to justify their intervention.

In June 1999, the leadership of the DRC approached the International Court in Hague, demanding to recognize Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi aggressors and violators of the UN Charter. The Western powers stated that they 'believe in inviolability of the DRC frontiers'. However, U. Vedrine, the French minister of foreign affairs, said as early as the summer of 1998:

'Inviolability of frontiers does not preclude secession of any areas from Congo, if they want to do so'.

By mid-1999 a dozen of ceasefire agreements were signed, but none of them was observed.

In April 1999, DRC, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia concluded a treaty about joint actions against aggressors and rebels.

The rebel groups occupy almost a half of the Congolese territory. With few exceptions, they control the parts of northern and eastern Congo that border the Central African Republic, Sudan, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and the most part of Lake Tanganyika.

Fierce hostilities are waged in the north-western corner of Congo, around Gemene and to the south of it, across the Congo, to the southwest of Kisangani and northern and southern Kiwu (the east of Congo). Mbuji-Mayi, the main diamond-mining centre of the country, is controlled by the government troops, but rebels are active close to the town.

Different rebel groups tried to organize interaction, but their attempt was a failure. The largest of them are:

* *Mouvement pour Libération de Congo* (MRC), led by Jean-Pierre Bemba, a Congolese businessman. He is supported by Uganda, whose soldiers occupy the whole territory under his control. There are 10 thousand armed fighters in this group.

* *Réunion Congolaise pour la Démocratie* (RCD), the largest part of the rebel group that split into two. Its leader was Emile Ilunga, who headed it for many years. The armed forces of the group consist of 11-15 thousands fighters, commanded by Congolese officers, mostly Banyamulenge. They are supported by Rwanda.

* *Réunion Congolaise pour la Démocratie - Mouvement pour la Libération*, another part of the RCD, led by Erneste Wamba dia Wamba, once prisoner in Mobutu's jail. He has 3,500 fighters. The most part of the territory controlled by this movement is occupied by Ugandan troops.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that there are mutually unrelated groups in Congo, mainly Kabila's allies, including Hutu militiamen. The governments of Rwanda and Uganda claim that Kabila and Mugabe (the president of Zimbabwe), trained thousands of militiamen in their countries. They allegedly fight near the diamond mines in Mbuyi-Mayi and have bases in Kiwu, wherefrom they invade Rwanda. Many Hutu militiamen also penetrated Burundi to help their fellow tribesmen, who fight against the Tutsi-led government. The leadership of Rwanda stated that they would not leave Congo before making it sure that the Hutu militiamen are under reliable control. There are different data about their numerical

strength. Rwanda claims that they number 5 to 25 thousand. Armed detachments of the May-Mayi act in northern and southern Kiwu and other parts of eastern Congo. They support Kabila's government and are allies of the Hutu.

The government of Rwanda does not disclose how much it spends on this war; undoubtedly, it is a huge amount. The government sources report that the situation in north-western Rwanda, the stronghold of Hutu extremists, is relatively calm, because the Rwandan troops are across the frontier in the foreign territory. The Rwandan leaders say that their forces will leave Congo only after inviolability of the frontiers is guaranteed and the Hutu fighters are disarmed. According to most of experts, this is impracticable.

Uganda is often accused of intervening in the developments in Congo (Kinshasa) to satisfy its president Yoweri Museveni's personal ambitions and claims to the role of the regional leader. The West considers Uganda 'one of the most gifted pupils of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank', which granted it the inflow of capitals and relatively rapid rise of its economy. The war in Congo undermines these successes. Many Ugandans doubt if it was suitable at all to get involved in the adventure in Congo.

Uganda was deemed to keep 8 to 10 thousand soldiers in Congo in the second half of 2000, some of whom were deployed in Basankusu, more than a thousand kilometres from the Ugandan frontier.

Many Congolese, including allies of Uganda from among the MCL members, are indignant at the fact that Ugandan military commanders energetically cash in by exporting timber, diamonds, gold and ivory from Congo. This plunder enriches a handful of people; meanwhile, the war is becoming a backbreaking burden to the economy of Uganda. Its leaders claim that it is a must to protect Ugandan frontiers, because antigovernment rebels have found shelter in eastern Congo.

The Ugandan government has to fight against two large rebel groups. One of them is the Allied Democratic Forces, based in eastern Congo. Another is the Lord's Resistance Army, supported by Sudan in its invasions of Uganda from the north. In its turn, Uganda supports the Sudanese People's Liberation Army, consisting of Christians and animists, the inhabitants of the southern part of the country, who combat the Islamist government of Arab Khartoum.

Burundi admitted that it also has soldiers in Congo. Its government claims that it does not support any local group but combats the Hutu militiamen. The government has partly lost control of the southeast of the country, wherefrom thousands of refugees go to neighbour Tanzania because of hostilities.

Tanzania, which preserves internal stability, gave shelter to hundreds of thousands of Hutu, who fled Rwanda and Burundi after the Tutsi's victory in Rwanda in 1994. In addition, there are many Congolese refugees in Tanzania.

Sudan is also involved in the developments in this region. According to the New York Times, it helped Kabila several times, sending its aircrafts in 1999 to bomb rebels in northern Congo. The Sudanese government denies these facts, but Kabila was obviously at friendly terms with the Sudanese government, presumably, following the logic 'my foe's (Uganda's) foe is my friend'. In Sudan itself hostilities, diseases and starvation killed 2 million people since 1983.

The leadership of Namibia is in alliance with the governments of both Angola and the DRC. It permitted Angolans to pursue UNITA rebels in its territory and sent some 2 thousand military (30-50 per cent of the Namibian army) to Congo. The presidents of Namibia and Zimbabwe Sam Nuyoma and Robert Mugabe are at very friendly terms since the time of struggle for independence of their countries. According to the New York Times, it was the Zimbabwean leadership who convinced Namibia to intervene in the Congolese war.

Mugabe's government, which sent 7 to 10 thousand military to Congo to support Kabila, is quite actively denounced by the West for both its policy on white settlers and its participation in suppressing rebels in Congo. It is reported that Zimbabwean generals also cash in on the war by controlling some diamond mines in Congo. However, the military intervention in Congo is unpopular in Zimbabwe and is a heavy burden to its economy. Moreover, the IMF denied aid to Zimbabwe in 1999, claiming that Mugabe had submitted false information about the expenses related to the war in Congo.

On 10 July 1999, an agreement was signed in Lusaka about total cease-fire in the region. It provided for the deployment of observers of the OAU peacekeeping forces in Congo under the UN aegis, withdrawal of all foreign troops from the country within 9 months, disarmament of non-government armed formations, liberation of POWs and hostages and dialogue between the authorities and opposition. However, neither the rebels nor the neighbour states honoured this agreement. In August 2000 the transitional parliament of the Democratic Republic of Congo nullified the Lusaka agreement as obsolete.

The relations between Rwanda and Uganda as allies also were anything but smooth. In the summer of 2000, contradictions between them led to bloody clashes around Kisangani and in the town itself. Hundreds of military and much more peaceful inhabitants were killed. Then both presidents

agreed to disengage their troops. The issue of the conflict seems to be control of the local mineral wealth, destructively exploited by all parties to the conflict.

According to the data of the government of the DRC, which may be, however, exaggerated, within two years of the war 1.7 million people were killed in hostilities or died of starvation and diseases, 1 million were wounded, over 2 million became refugees and 500 thousand transmigrated to neighbour countries. In the eastern provinces, where the fiercest hostilities were waged, they destroyed infrastructure, industry and housing. The losses amounted to \$5 billion. The total damage inflicted on the DRC within three years of hostilities is estimated at \$10 billion.

The socio-economic situation in Congo is horrible. The few state-run hospitals that survived the war are left to the mercy of fate. Only a few of private airlines operate in the giant country. It is difficult to find a phone in Kinshasa itself. Many towns have no telephone lines at all. The condition of impassable roads goes from bad to worse. When the country attained independence, the population of Kinshasa was 400 thousand people, now it has reached 6 million, who live in vast areas of slums. Ten per cent of mothers and children starve.

Meanwhile, the pressure of the public on the Ugandan government and dissatisfaction with its participation in the hostilities in Congo has reached a critical point. It was announced in Kampala that the government began to withdraw the troops from Congo in the summer of 2000.

A sizable part of the guilt for the terrible condition of Congo and other countries of the region lies with the outer world. The European colonialists divided the continent into the colonies whose frontiers had nothing to do with the geographical and ethnic confines. To strengthen their power, they incited some ethnic or confessional groups against other groups. During the Cold War the USSR and USA supported the regimes that were at friendly terms with them, in spite of their repressive character and corruption. For the sake of justice, corruption was much stronger in the states that stood on the American side of the fence than in the countries of the so-called socialist orientation. Mobutu's regime is the most glaring example. As for reprisals, it is difficult to give the palm of supremacy to either party.

Now many people point at the West, holding it responsible for the present critical situation in various regions of the African continent. At least, the Rwandan and Ugandan regimes are oriented towards the USA. Yet Washington did not denounce its allies' intervention in Congo. 'Since president Kabila came to power, we received no aid from the United States, whereas Rwanda and Uganda continued to get it', said Uba Tassinba, the

vice-president of Congo, who is in charge of international cooperation. According to the New York Times, US officials convinced Rwanda and Uganda unofficially to withdraw from Congo but did not insist on this very much, because Uganda is an ally of anti-Khartoum rebels in the south of Sudan, accused by Washington of sheltering anti-American Islamist terrorists.

The situation changed somewhat after L.D. Kabila's death. It was as sudden as his advent to power three and a half years before. In the morning of 16 January 2001, Loran Kabila was murdered in the Palace de Marble (Kinshasa) by his bodyguard.

Was this assassination engineered by conspirators in Kabila's entourage, or an action of the enemies (Uganda, Rwanda, opposition émigrés), or an operation of the Western secret services? There are many versions, but the assassin was murdered immediately after his successful attempt, keeping the secret of the assassination till his death.

The government found a successor very soon in the person of Joseph Kabila, the president's elder son. Together with the father Kabila-junior took part in the struggle against the Mobutu regime. His detachment was among the first to enter Kinshasa during the coup d'état of 1997. After the victory Joseph underwent two months long training in China, where he became Major General. Returning to the motherland, he headed the General Staff.

At the inauguration J. Kabila promised to take measures aimed at ceasing the armed conflict in the DRC. His further statements somewhat cooled the hopes of the population and world community, because they reiterated the statements of his late father: the new leader of Congo urged to withdraw the troops of Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, which supported the rebels, and disarm the opposition groups. The government army's operations against the rebels and refusal of the Ugandan and Rwandan presidents from withdrawing their troops from the DRC were perceived as a sign of a new escalation of the conflict.

Being not inclined to political adventurism and dictatorial manners, the new president of the DRC understood, probably, that a rigid attitude to the opponents within the country and to the neighbour states would not lead to the establishment of peace and accord in the region. In late January 2001 he paid a long series of visits abroad. Meeting the leaders of the European states (including France and Belgium), members of the European Union and other international organizations and the US president Bill Clinton, Kabila not only presented his peaceful settlement programme but also learned the attitudes of the heads of the leading powers and international organizations to the situation in the region.

In February 2001 almost all parties to the conflict met in Lusaka again.

Apart from J. Kabila, the summit was attended by Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe), Sam Nuyoma (Namibia) and ministers of foreign affairs and defence of Angola, Uganda and Rwanda. Another participant of the meeting was Jean-Pierre Bemba, the leader of the MCL. The main result of the meeting was the plan of the disarmament of the armed formations of the parties to the conflict in Congo. In his turn, the president of the DRC agreed to resume inter-Congolese political dialogue. One of the plausible decisions of the summit was a preliminary agreement about ceasefire and deployment of a UN peacekeeping contingent in Congo. In addition, the parties agreed upon a retreat of the troops of all countries involved in the conflict to the positions located 15 km behind the line where they stood, with a prospect of the total withdrawal of the foreign troops from the DRC.

However, J. Kabila's statements about the necessity to settle the conflict as soon as possible were in a sharp contrast with the stance of Paul Kagame, the president of Rwanda. In response to Kinshasa's 'peaceful gesture' he said that his country did not intend to meet Kabila halfway and ignored the Lusaka agreements.

Another obstacles on the way towards peace are dozens of independent rebel groups. They are not going to withdraw from the territories seized from the government and fight with each other when not preoccupied by combating the government forces. Their main objective is to retain the seized territories and use their natural wealth to their own ends. Indeed, the fiercest battles are waged by all parties to the conflict in the areas that are rich in minerals.

In April 2002 an agreement was signed in Sun City (South Africa) by the DRC government and representatives of the MCL. The parties agreed to divide power during the transitional period: president Joseph Kabila retained his office and the post of the commander-in-chief, while J.-P. Bemba became the prime minister. Another rebel group, the RCD, refused to sign this agreement, confirming once more that presence of several opposition groups creates additional difficulties in attaining peace. Continuing the DRC government's and the UN peaceful initiatives, all parties to the conflict agreed to withdraw all foreign troops from the DRC. By November Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia, Angola and Namibia withdrew the most part of their troops.

Genuine peace remains a remote prospect in Congo. The territories left by the foreign armies are immediately occupied by local armed detachments, seeking control of mineral resources. The natural wealth of Congo is still plundered by the government and financial circles of Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe. It was not by chance that the special mining battalions of Rwanda remained in the country, continuing mining. The force vacuum that

emerged after the withdrawal of the foreign troops may lead either to peace and stability or to new acts of violence. In October 2002 armed clashes between the RCD detachments and ethnic militia of the Mai-Mai resumed.

* * *

As it was noted above, the situation in Congo (Kinshasa) is directly related to the developments in neighbour Angola. Taking into account the strategic importance and wealth of this country, the scale of the hostilities waged there and long history of Angola's relations with Russia (and earlier with the USSR), let me deal with this country in detail.

When Angola became independent 25 years ago, the government was formed by the *Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola* (MPLA), which was ideologically close to Marxism, had close political and military relations with the Soviet Union and resorted to anti-Western (anti-imperialist) rhetoric. Another serious but weaker organization that opposed Portuguese colonialism was the *Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola* (UNITA), which was pressed back from power.

The Cold War of that period became hot in Angola. The country was invaded by the troops of the racist RSA and Mobutu's Zaire, which sought to overthrow the MPLA government, supported by Cuban troops, armed with Soviet weapons and partly transported by Soviet aircrafts. The Angolans and Cubans rebuffed the South African and Mobutu's offensive. The UNITA, the rival of the MPLA, relied on the USA and the apartheid regime of South Africa. It received weapons and equipment through Zaire (now the DRC) and Namibia, then occupied by the RSA, to the amount of almost \$250 million to combat the legitimate government of Angola; this conflict continued for almost twenty years with occasional intervals.

The situation in the country was rather confusing. The US helped the UNITA. At the same time, US corporations pumped Angolan oil from the wells guarded by Cuban soldiers, and the main source of the government's revenue was the royalty received for oil export.

The UNITA received a progressively increasing income from diamonds, first sold through the secret services of the RSA and then through the worldwide network of diamond smuggling with the assistance of African countries or mediators. This phenomenon will be covered later.

The end of the Cold War spoiled the hands of the participants of the Angolan great game. A settlement was achieved in Namibia with the participation of the USSR, USA and RSA, and the country became independent in 1989. Naturally, Sam Nuyoma, the president of the country and leader of the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO), retained kind

feelings for the government of Angola, which allowed the SWAPO to build bases in its territory, and remained its ally.

The representatives of the MPLA and UNITA began negotiations and agreed to cease hostilities and hold an election in 1992 under the aegis of international observers and the UNO. As a result of the free election, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, the leader of the MPLA, was elected president. The defeated UNITA did not recognize the election results and resumed hostilities. This was the decision of a man who was reluctant to share power with anybody in whatever circumstances or, the more so, to become the second man in the country. His name was Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the UNITA.

After many months long hostilities the parties to the conflict met in Lusaka, the capital of Zambia, in 1994 and again agreed upon national reconciliation and ceasefire (the Lusaka protocol). The UNITA undertook to disarm and cooperate with the government in the peaceful development of the country.

However, transferring several hundreds tons of weapons and equipment, mostly obsolete and out of order, to UN representatives to divert their attention, Savimbi staked on the accelerated armament for a new confrontation with the government. By then the USA, most probably, decided to withdraw its support of the UNITA. The MPLA government threw away its Marxist garments and became Washington's partner. In 1994 the African National Congress came to power in South Africa. This was the end of apartheid.

But the UNITA remained in control of rich diamond mines. They were a tool that opened all doors, frontiers, warehouses and airfields. Savimbi's annual income from them amounted to \$600 million. Within five years, until the war resumed, he got \$3 billion and purchased piles of modern weapons, retaining the rest of his wealth to renew armaments.

His rear supply bases were Mobutu's Zaire and right bank Congo (Brazzaville), ruled by president Pascal Lissouba. This is why the government of Angola helped Loran Kabila to overthrow Mobutu and come to power in 1997.

As it was mentioned above, in August 1998, an armed rebellion against Kabila's government began with the support of Uganda and Rwanda.

At this moment the friends became foes and vice versa: the UNITA leader J. Savimbi, considered an enemy of the Tutsi only because they opposed his ally Mobutu, saw his chance and joined the anti-Kabila coalition. Luanda and Harare reacted immediately by sending their troops to support Kabila. It was mentioned above that the Angolans played the decisive role in defending Kinshasa and smashing the rebels in the western part of the country. President of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe ostensibly was ready to begin an

offensive eastwards. But Jose dos Santos made it clear that his troops were in the DRC only to protect the interests of Angola, as well as to destroy the rear bases of the UNITA and support the Kabila regime in Kinshasa. He was not going to get involved in adventures undertaken thousands of kilometres from his frontiers in the east of the giant country, the more so that the situation within Angola was becoming more and more alarming.

Savimbi decided to stake his all. His maximum programme was to seize the whole of Angola and minimum programme to establish control of the diamond mines he had not yet seized and undermine oil industry, the main source of the Angolan government's revenue.

In December 1998 the UNITA resumed large-scale warfare. The blow delivered by Savimbi's troops was so strong that many observers began to forecast his victory. 60 thousand UNITA fighters were armed with hundreds of tanks, armoured personnel cars, *Uragan* valley fire systems, hard and light artillery, several fighter aircrafts, helicopters, AD systems, anti-tank weapons, modern radio communication systems, not to mention millions of cartridges, hundreds of thousand of shells, dozens of thousand units of small arms, etc.

The war was anything but a guerrilla war. This time the armoured units of the UNITA were used in massed attacks upon Kuito and Huambo. Long-range self-propelled artillery shot at Kuito, Huambo and Malanje. These towns were rounded up. Food shortages made their inhabitants starve.

After the new outburst of hostilities 2 million Angolans left their long occupied places, fearing for their lives. UNITA fighters mined roads, attacked convoys and even brought down aircrafts with humanitarian cargoes. This prevented most of those who needed aid from receiving it.

After the Lusaka protocol was signed in November 1994, the UNO sent blue helmets to observe the disarmament of the military wing of the UNITA. However, the UN observers saw nothing, heard nothing and said nothing. UNITA built airfields for heavy aircrafts in the areas it controlled, and arms and munitions were supplied from Zaire and Zambia by land. At that time some Eastern European countries began to rearm their troops in accordance with the NATO standards and send off excellent modern weapons to Africa.

While UNITA fighters learned to handle new weapons, spare parts for them were supplied on a large scale. This enabled its fighters to repair many units of equipment, first of all, tanks. Thus, when hostilities started, the UNITA disposed the armaments concealed from the UN control, newly purchased weapons and repaired equipment.

Some aircraft came to the UNITA bases directly from the countries where the weapons were manufactured or purchased. It was claimed in a

report submitted to the UN that in August 1997 DC-8 aircrafts with weapons and equipment landed in Andulo eight times, coming from Sofia and Burgas (Bulgaria).

However, the bulk of the equipment and fuel was supplied to the UNITA through the friendly African countries and certain traders in weapons and diamonds.

There were 'wild geese', i.e., mercenaries from some Eastern European countries, in the UNITA ranks. The media mentioned Bulgarians, Ukrainians and Russians.

The UNITA had accounts in banks of many European and African countries, including Switzerland, Cote d'Ivoire, Morocco, Portugal and South Africa.

Lest depend on a single supply channel, the UNITA created parallel chains. Some African governments directly participated in this both for political reasons and in order to stuff their purses. Sometimes supplies were affected despite the counteraction of the African governments, unable to control their frontiers, or runways, or roads in jungles.

After the fall of the racist regime in South Africa, Mobutu's Zaire became the main transshipment base. This is why the fall of the Mobutu regime and the advent of Kabila to power were so painful to the UNITA. However, the African National Congress, when it came to power in South Africa, also was unable to immediately establish control of private traders and organizations that had created this concealed network of profitable business.

After Mobutu's flight in 1997 the UNITA rapidly shifted to Point Noire in Congo (Brazzaville) owing to its friendly relations with Pascal Lissouba, the then president of Congo (Brazzaville), strengthened, probably, by presents in the form of packets with diamonds or cheques to first-class banks. However, as early as October 1997 the armed opposition, supported by the Angolan army, came to power in Brazzaville. Denis Sassou-Ngessou, who already had been the president and was at friendly terms with Luanda, led it; Lissouba, the former president and Savimbi's friend, fled the country.

In 1998, coming to terms with the Tutsi leaders, the UNITA shifted its supply operations to Uganda and Rwanda. At the same time airfields in Burkina Faso began to be used as transshipment bases. The participation of Cote d'Ivoire and Togo in arms smuggling was less active.

In the frontier areas of Zambia, wherefrom it was so easy to transport hardware, fuel and lubricants, the topmost officials, local air companies and international adventurers were involved in smuggling. Savimbi paid them by diamonds and cheques to first-class banks, increasing their 'salary' after losing the rear bases in the DRC and Congo (Brazzaville). When media

learnt this fact, the public protested. Many participants of the dangerous business were murdered to hide all traces; some others were dismissed. Angola and Zambia found themselves on the verge of a war. President F. Chiluba removed the most odious persons from the government.

However, it is claimed that, irrespective of the government's position, arms and fuel were smuggled to Angola via Zambia. The role of the latter particularly strengthened after the government troops drove away the UNITA fighters to the borders with Namibia and Zambia and some UNITA detachments found shelter in Zambia.

By the autumn of 2000 a lot of arms and military equipment for the UNITA accumulated in Burkina Faso and Togo. It was impossible to transport them.

Savimbi's son Sakaita, who broke with him, stated: 'If Savimbi has any friend in Africa, it is Blaise Kampaore, the president of Burkina Faso'. He claimed that the UNITA exported diamonds through Burkina Faso and Kampaore supplied fuel to the UNITA. In August 1999 Savimbi visited Burkina Faso to meet his friend.

As for South Africa, although the ANC government declared friendly relations with the MPLA government, as early as the beginning of 1998 aircrafts with cargoes for the UNITA took off from some runways beyond the government's control. In May 1998 the South African government established its control of them. Two dozen of foreign pilots who took part in illegal flights were evicted from the country. A month later the South African troops installed a radar system in the northern part of the country, making unsanctioned flights much more difficult. However, arms traders found loopholes, and contacts with the UNITA are maintained by smart operators from the racist past of South Africa, i.e., former military and secret service employees, as well as international adventurer traders.

In January 2000 Peter Hane, deputy foreign minister of Britain, specified the names of the persons engaged in smuggling arms and fuel for the UNITA and the air companies they used, which had dozens of aircrafts and regularly changed their names and countries of registration. They acted in Belgium, United Arab Emirates, South Africa, Swaziland, Central African Republic and Canada. It was reported that one of them had some 20 airfreighters. Hane stated on February 17, 2000, that some topmost officials of Zambia, Uganda and Rwanda took part in violating the UN sanctions imposed on the UNITA. Fuel warehouses were built in Gaborone (Botswana), wherefrom fuel was smuggled to the UNITA. In early 2000 a Ukrainian aircraft IL-76, which allegedly supplied fuel to the UNITA from South Africa, was seized in Lusaka.

It was claimed that Bulgaria, Rumania and Ukraine supplied arms to the UNITA.

It was among the main tasks of the UNITA to bypass the oil embargo, since it had a number of tanks, armoured personnel cars, trucks, self-propelling artillery and anti-aircraft guns. Electric generators installed at its warehouses also needed fuel.

Before resuming hostilities the UNITA got fuel from South Africa, Zambia, Togo, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire and the Central African Republic. Most of it was transported by aircraft (expenses were not a problem), but fuel was also supplied by land from Zambia and Namibia, in spite of the position of the government of the latter. This is why a rumour spread in March 1999 that Angola was ready to deliver air blows on the Zambian oil refinery. The attack did not take place. Tension weakened somewhat. Yet by chance or otherwise, that refinery was destroyed in late 1999 by fire. Zambia had to import oil products, and fuel supply to the UNITA deteriorated.

Diamond trade is under Savimbi's personal control. Only three or four UNITA leaders know its genuine scale.

The De Biers, the world monopolist in diamond mining and trade, purchased once a sizable part of diamonds. Despite the UN embargo, UNITA diamonds still are supplied to Belgian and Israeli diamond cutters. It is very difficult to tear up these secret threads. According to the De Biers, even after the introduction of very rigid sanctions the UNITA sold diamonds to the amount of \$250 million in 1998 and to \$100 million in 1999. These amounts may be a half or even less of the genuine figures.

Diamonds are supplied directly to cutters, who make them brilliants. Then it is very difficult to identify the origin of diamonds. Otherwise, they are supplied to traders, who can store them for a long period, or mixed with 'legal' Angolan diamonds of the same quality, or sold through 'free zones'.

One of the sons of the former president of Zaire, Mobutu, was an active participant of this business. The aircrafts of the Air Excellence, co-owned by him, flew from Zaire to UNITA airfields, supplying arms and transporting diamonds. It was believed that specialists from Eastern Europe worked at UNITA mines. Diamonds were directly supplied to Tel Aviv. The diamond mines employed 100 thousand Zairians, which was confirmed by space photography. The workers got their salary in cheap diamonds and exchanged them to food, clothes and medicines at the Zambian border.

One of the largest diamond mines in Kwanza Sul province began to function under the UNITA control in late 1997.

On the insistence of the UNO and according to the mutual agreement of diamond traders, this trade is subject to rigid global limitations: diamonds

can be sold only with a certificate of origin, printed on forms with special anti-forgery protection, manufactured in Britain.

In early 2000 the De Biers published an 'ethical' statement, refusing to purchase 'dirty' diamonds, including those supplied by the UNITA. All its deals would be struck on producing a certificate to the effect that none part of the diamonds had been purchased violating the UN sanctions or supplied from the areas where rebel groups were active. Earlier the De Biers did not purchase UNITA diamonds directly but often did so through mediators.

Now the company has changed its strategy. It purchases less diamonds at free markets, preferring mining it alone, or through joint ventures, or purchasing the precious stones from African governments. In this setting moral and ethic coincide with business interests. Naturally, if the earlier purchased UNITA diamonds were stored in its storerooms, nobody would ever check their origin.

The world community unanimously considers Jonas Savimbi, the UNITA leader, guilty of the war that burst out in Angola. As early as December 1998, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution stating 'the initial cause of the crisis is the non-implementation of the obligations under the peace agreements by the UNITA leadership'. The Euro parliament adopted similar resolutions in December 1998; the UNITA and J. Savimbi personally were held responsible for the hostilities. In January 1999 the South Africa Development Community (SADC), consisting of 14 countries, seconded these decisions. The Organization of African Unity considered declaring J. Savimbi a war criminal.

New and new UN sanctions are imposed to prevent the UNITA from diamond smuggling and arms import. The UNITA bank accounts known to the public were blocked. Yet nobody knew exactly where Savimbi kept his money. The UNITA continued to challenge the UNO.

It was felt that the implementation of the sanctions needed more clarity. In January 1999, Robert Fowler, the vigorous Canadian envoy to the UN, was appointed the chairman of the UN committee for Angolan sanctions. He formed two expert commissions to find how the UNITA violated the sanctions and suggest practical measures. One of them scrutinized the sources of the UNITA incomes, such as illicit diamond trade and financing of fuel supply; the second one concentrated on military issues and mercenaries. The report was submitted to the Security Council on 15 March 2000.

The conclusion was that it was necessary to strengthen the measures aimed at blocking the channels of arms supply to the UNITA and diamond smuggling.

When in December 1998 Jonas Savimbi and his armed to the teeth units

resumed the war, the UNO became a hindrance to them. UNITA fighters brought down several UN planes and began to kill the personnel of the UN charitable mission in Angola. In January 1999 the UNO withdrew its representatives from Angola, because 'there is no peace in this country to maintain'. Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, said, 'The roots of this extremely deplorable state of affairs are well-known to us. They lie in the UNITA's refusal from implementing the basic conditions of the Lusaka protocol, which demand it to demilitarize its forces and let the state administration spread to the whole national territory.'

In March 1999, the UNO formally lowered the flag at its headquarters in Angola, virtually admitting that \$1.5 billion had been spent to its activity and dozens of UN employees had perished for nothing.

Savimbi's adventure did not end in a defeat of the government troops. In the first half of 1999 the war was waged with varying success. The advantage in strength was on the UNITA's side, but it was unable to develop its successes. Shortage of diesel fuel and munitions was its Achilles' heel, because its troops were spread over a territory twice as large as France. The population did not warmly greet the UNITA forces. The government troops fought better than they were expected to.

After the resumption of the hostilities dos Santos, the president of Angola, reshuffled the government, occupying the office of prime minister and appointing generals, tried and tested in battles and his companions-in-arms, to 'power' ministries and key agencies. Then the leadership of the MPLA was transferred to young and energetic functionaries, who were completely loyal to the president.

Oil proceeds and the establishment of partial control of diamond mines helped the government to rearm the troops. It purchased new weapons and military equipment to the amount of almost \$1 billion. 100 thousand military were regularly paid salary; their logistics improved.

In the second half of 1999 the government managed to radically change the situation.

As a result of a large-scale offensive, in September 1999 the government troops occupied the main bases of the UNITA, such as Andulo, Bailundo and Jamba, seizing colossal arsenals of equipment and arms (15 thousand tons in total), including 27 tanks and 40 infantry combat vehicles. Losing Bailundo was particularly painful to the UNITA, since it was considered the spiritual centre of the Ovimbundu, the ethnic basis of the organization.

The counteroffensive of the government troops proved much more successful than many experts anticipated. The UNITA forces were dislodged

from the Central plateau. It was for the first time in the last decade that this area was fully controlled by the government. Retreating hastily, the UNITA fighters left a lot of arms, equipment and hardware.

The UNITA was already unable to wage large-scale hostilities and had resumed the guerrilla warfare, laying ambushes at roads, invading villages and killing peaceful peasants. It seems to have lost its airfields, which were so important for it.

In early 2000, the government troops controlled 92 per cent of 157 districts of Angola, including 11 of 13 districts with diamond mines in Lunda Sul and Lunda Norte provinces. It was assumed that the government might legally export diamonds to the amount of almost \$800 million in 2000.

The government troops' successes did not mean that normal life returned to 92 per cent of the Angolan territory: they controlled many places only in the daytime, and the night belonged to the UNITA.

Savimbi's forces though smashed should not be underestimated. He possessed huge funds, purchasing new weapons, supplied by parachutes, and commanded sympathies of a part of the population. Convoys with humanitarian aid forced to government-controlled areas with great difficulties. UNITA fighters committed outrages even in orphan asylums, seizing food, clothes and blankets, making children hostages and kidnapping priests and state officials. The task of the UNITA was to make Angola uncontrollable and prevent the resumption of normal life in the liberated areas.

The UNITA leaders forced 10-14-years-old boys to join their detachments, made them use drugs and sent to battles or punitive actions, which they committed with especial cruelty. These facts, as well as the enrolment of children by rebels in Sierra Leone, evoked an extremely negative reaction of the international community.

The international environment also has become more favourable to Luanda.

The USA seems to have eliminated Savimbi from the list of its puppets and turned to the cooperation with the legitimate government of Angola, which has given up its Marxist and anti-Western rhetoric. US corporations take part in the production of Angolan oil, exported mainly to the USA. Angolan oil deposits are deemed to be the largest in Africa. Visiting Angola in the spring of 2000, Madeline Albright, the US State Secretary, posed for photo staying on a drilling platform of the Chevron. Visiting Angola, Peter Hane stated on 6 July 2000:

'Savimbi repeatedly violated the peace agreements elaborated by the UN and signed by him. How can we trust his words now? Could he change? Can he pay a contribution to the search for peace? I doubt very much... Attacks

upon convoys with food and blankets for displaced persons, placing mines that wound and mutilate those who work in fields, murders and tortures of unarmed people, all this cannot be activity of a leader who wants to create better Angola for its people. These are actions of a blood-thirsty tyrant, who wants to preserve power at any price.'

However, Hane said that the UNITA might be a part of political agreements in the future.

Since members of the British government seldom say something unpleasant to Washington, it might seem that the West took a clear stand in the case of Savimbi and the UNITA. True, it remains a riddle how the weak and US-oriented governments of Uganda or Rwanda dare to continue violations of the embargo imposed on arms supply to Savimbi in exchange to diamonds. Maybe, a shout from Washington makes less impact on them than an increase in the number of zeroes at their secret accounts in Western banks? Or, maybe, there was no shout at all, but Washington is merely preparing fallback positions?

The war in Angola is an obstacle to normal activity of transnational corporations of the USA, Britain, France, Belgium, Israel, etc., interested in exploiting the exclusive mineral wealth of the country. All they are inclined to support dos Santos.

As early as August 1998, on the eve of the outburst of hostilities, Angolan president dos Santos visited Russia. Then a Russian military delegation, led by defence minister I. Sergeyev, paid a visit to Angola. The military cooperation of Russia and Angola resumed and became active.

The bilateral contacts expanded. Russia actively cooperates with Angola in diamond mining. In 1992 the Almazy Rossii-Sakha (ALROSA), a Russian diamond mining company, began working at the Katoka mine; in 1995 it granted Angola a credit of \$45 million, supplied modern equipment and transport facilities and sent Russian specialists to Angola. The Tekhnopromexport is completing the construction of the Kapanda power station on the Kwanza River. Both countries actively cooperate in agriculture, geodesy, cartography, health care and marketing research.

The Republic of Belarus, Russia's ally, also is Angola's partner. It signed a contract with Angola for supply of armoured vehicles, valley fire systems and munitions.

Russia's return to Angola is not perceived as an action of the Cold War. It has no ideological tint, although Russia's advent to the capacious Angolan market did not delight its real or potential competitors.

By early 2000, five Russian planes with 20 crewmembers were brought down in the UNITA-controlled areas. It was never claimed that any of these

planes carried military cargoes. A part of their crews survived and were captured by the UNITA. Owing to the efforts of the Russian government, international organizations and mediator countries, several pilots were liberated. Yet it is difficult to say how many Russians were killed or captured in Angola: hundreds of Russian pilots and other specialists worked there and in neighbour Congo (Kinshasa) on the basis of individual contracts.

The structure of the Angolan conflict is so sophisticated that some people forget that its nutritive medium is interethnic contradictions. The MPLA has a nation-wide social basis, but its positions are stronger among the Bundu. Many supporters of this organization are so-called *assimilados*, i.e., the Angolans who have adopted the European way of life and Portuguese as their mother tongue.

The UNITA relies on a sizable part of the Owimbundu. Whereas the MPLA is stronger in the littoral areas, the traditional strongholds of the UNITA were in the south and east of Angola. The *Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola* (FNLA) plays a minor role. Earlier it acted mainly in the north, populated by the Congo, and its influence was purely local.

The Portuguese colonialists reinforced contradictions among various groups and ethnoses as early as the 1920s.

Ethnic diversity (there are over twenty large and small ethnoses in the country) is combined with religious one. There are Catholic and Protestant churches and Afro-Christian churches and sects in the country. A part of the population adheres to the traditional beliefs. Many confessions have their own 'prophets', 'apostles' and 'saviours', who sometimes claim a political role.

People in Angola and outside do not lose the hope for a political settlement. An abyss of mistrust and hatred lies between the MPLA and UNITA, but this did not prevent dos Santos, the military triumphant, from promising amnesty to the rebels who would lay down their arms and return to peaceful life.

The government tries to co-operate with the realistically minded activists of the UNITA.

At the parliamentary election of 1992 the UNITA secured 70 seats. Now its deputies have split into three fractions. The Angolan government recognizes one of them, the UNITA Renovada, as the official UNITA and maintains dialogue with it. The second, larger fraction keeps aloof from both Savimbi and the Angolan government. A small group of deputies supports Savimbi. The problem is to identify who is who. Some Savimbi's supporters in Luanda are afraid of disclosing their allegiance, while some his adversaries conceal their stance, fearing that their families may be subject to retri-

sals of his butchers.

In 2000 the government troops' offensive continued. Many topmost UNITA leaders sided with the government, fearing reprisals for their military failures. General Giacinto Bandula, who is of the highest standing among the defectors, said: 'Savimbi would never surrender. He would rather die in a battle. This is his nature. He has already lost self-control.'

Even Savimbi's children defect from their father. One of his 26 children, Sakaita, came to Luanda from Lome (Togo), where he learned, and accused his father of grave crimes. He described Savimbi as 'the worst murderer Angola ever knew' According to Sakaita, his mother was murdered in 1984 at Savimbi's order. Then one of Savimbi's daughters also sided with the government.

Angola is among the richest countries of the world in mineral deposits, such as oil (perhaps, the largest reserves in Africa), diamonds, gold, iron ore, lead, zinc, tantalum, titanium, tungsten, mercury, beryllium, etc. There are huge power reserves in the country. Angola occupies the fourth place in the world in coffee production. Sisal, cotton and palm oil are produced there. However, the Angolan economy collapsed during the civil war and foreign intervention. The 25 years long war killed half a million people. At least three quarters of the population live below the subsistence level, i.e., on the verge of survival. More than a half of the employable population is unemployed. There are 2-3 million refugees and displaced persons in the country. Experts estimate that 200 thousand people die annually of starvation and poverty. Many fertile fields are deserted, because peasants are afraid of being killed by one of millions of mines placed there.

The humanitarian and socio-economic catastrophe caused by the war unleashed by the UNITA is not amenable to an exact evaluation. The war in Angola is among the most chronic and destructive conflicts in Africa. Two generations of the Angolans know nothing but the war. Angola is considered, perhaps, the worst place in the world for children. Every third child dies at age below five years because of the war, poverty and war-induced diseases. The potential mineral depository of south and central Africa lies in ruins.

Yet these were the sufferings the world failed to note. While TV air of the Western media empires was filled by discussions and video clips about refugees from Kosovo, whose troubles finally proved a bluff to a large extent, the public overlooked bloodshed and sufferings in Angola.

In the recent months world media pay more attention to Angola. The public opinion seems to sympathize to an extent with the government and MPLA. Maybe, reports about the Angolans' difficulties have finally touched Western Philistines' hearts. Yet it is more probable that oil requirements

have made the West turn to other fuel sources than the Gulf.

On 22 February 2002, J. Savimbi, the UNITA leader, was killed during a clash between the government troops and a UNITA column in Mosico province together with A. Dembo and S. Capapelo, high-ranking UNITA activists. This event became an impetus to the peaceful settlement, which began in April. The government and UNITA signed a ceasefire agreement and officially announced the end of the civil war. According to this agreement, a part of former guerrillas were liable to demobilization and the rest were enrolled in the army. By June 2002, over 80 thousand ex-guerrillas were kept in camps. The death of Savimbi resulted in the emergence of new opposition leaders. One of them, Paolo 'Gatu', not only signed the peace agreement but also strives to integrate UNITA's legal activity into political life of the country.

* * *

Armed conflicts in Africa are dubbed as 'wars of the weak'. They are often waged without modern high-precision weapons or even without regular armies. Yet within the recent decades five dozen conflicts killed 8 million people and ruined the destinies of much more Africans.

The nutritive medium of such conflicts is poverty: people fight for scanty resources or fabulous fortunes of a handful of people. Poverty has become an epidemic in Africa, like AIDS. The indebtedness of the sub-Saharan countries has increased from \$60 billion in the early 1980s to \$219 billion today. However, dozens of billions 'fly' Africa, being pumped to Western banks. An additional problem is brain drain. About 100 thousand highly skilled Africans work in the USA alone, and few of them are going to go home. Many countries of the continent are in complete collapse.

Wars are waged in Africa because of weakness of its states rather than of their strength. A feature of these wars is their infection-like spread.

The results of these conflicts are devastating: general political and economic instability, starvation, epidemics, refugees (7 million in total). The number of person displaced within their countries is even more. They lost housing, jobs and income sources. Refugees are also a headache of the host countries. They have to allot money from their scarce budgets to at least prevent the refugees from dying of starvation. Refugee camps become foci of epidemics, crime, and illicit arms trade and drug addiction. Armed gangs of refugees clash with the local population. If they are hostile to the regimes of the countries they left, they are subject to military attacks from their motherlands.

Many conflicts are caused by specific local factors and have a centu-

ries-long history. Other ones are the legacy of the colonial past, of the policy of colonial powers, which used interethnic contradictions to strengthen their grip on the colonies and drew frontiers, dissecting ethnic groups, tribes and peoples.

Naturally, the Cold War gave rise to new conflicts. Although the rivalry between the USSR and USA in Africa had a low profile, it aggravated some of the conflicts. The pro-Soviet governments of Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia and the armed opposition groups of these countries, receiving money and weapons from the West, were as if divided by a barricade. After the Cold War the picture became much more intricate because of the emergence of numerous new domestic factors, and the earlier cause-and-effect relations looked distorted and vague. On some occasions the earlier patrons of Africa became hostages of their own political game. The US wanted to get rid of the UNITA, its former client, to establish normal economic relations with Angola, rich in oil and diamonds. However, it should be borne in mind that even former Marxists evoke allergy in Washington. To take Kenya, the negative attitude to it strengthens in the US Congress. This country has not yet been involved in conflicts, but it is notorious for enormous corruption.

With regard to abundance of conflicts, African countries continue to pile arms despite their poverty and backwardness. Tropical Africa is the fifth region of the world in arms import. Given the catastrophically low per capita GNP, it is luxury to spend \$21 or \$14 per capita on armaments.

To avoid conflicts, the OAU members decided to leave the frontiers of the colonial period unchanged. The OAU Charter reads that the organization shall 'protect... sovereignty and territorial integrity' of its members, which should observe these principles. In addition, the Cairo declaration of the OAU reaffirmed in 1964 that 'all member states undertake to respect the frontiers that existed at the moment when they attained independence'. In the course of time, the declaration proved ineffective. United Ethiopia disintegrated, and Eritrea seceded from it. The participants of the conflict in south Sudan did not reckon with state frontiers. Ethiopia and Somalia waged wars. The state frontiers of the DRC (ex-Zaire) are virtually ignored.

The material resources of the African countries are limited. Power and wealth are synonyms there. One who is in power disposes the national wealth without any tangible control. Getting no salary, both opposition fighters and officers and men of national armies often plunder and terrorize the local population. Their slogans may differ. Armed people may cry about democracy, socialism, justice, revolution or national liberation, but their real

purpose is to get access to power and therefore to the national wealth.

Disintegration and even collapse of central organs of government materially influenced the recent intense ethnic and religious conflicts. In such countries as Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, the DRC, the weak state structures, formed after attaining independence, proved merely unable to satisfy the population's such elementary requirements as housing and food from their quite meagre resources. In some African countries government agencies became merely organized gangs, which plunder their peoples under the disguise of government, treating their countries like occupied territories and their economies like trophies. Mobutu's Zaire is a brilliant example.

In this situation people lose their belief in the state's ability to satisfy their basic needs and turn to the more traditional forms of social organization, based on relationship. This results in the competition for the remaining scarce resources and conflicts among ethnic groups.

Some African states face the danger of the total disintegration of the state power institutions; territories and resources are re-divided among ethnic or merely brigand groups. This may be exemplified by the civil wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Somalia. There are almost no fully formed nations in Africa; the real fundament of national cohesion is unsteady. It may be supposed that on some occasions the disintegration of the state and civil wars will not be followed by the reconsolidation of the territories in a united state.

Interethnic conflicts never end in a complete victory of either party. The defeated party always can find new forces, opportunities and protectors to reiterate its claims and apply force.

From the viewpoint of logic and common sense, diplomatic and political settlement is better. From the viewpoint of reality, it does not materialize invariably.

Let us consider some more African conflicts, directly unrelated to the wars in Tropical Africa.

* * *

After the Siad Barre's regime in Somalia was overthrown in 1991, the competition for power never ceased there. The state disintegrated into dozens of areas, controlled by clan-based armed groups.

The first five years of the war (1991-1996) killed 400 thousand Somalis. The northerners managed to protect their independence from the centre in the form of the Republic of Somaliland (former British Somalia), never rec-

ognized by the world community. The war continued thereafter, too, though less intensely.

After delegates of various tribal alliances and political groups that acted on their behalf came to terms at the session of the Provisional Parliament of Somalia in 2000 and elected the president, 58 years old Abdiqasim Salad Hasan (he belonged to Hawiya, one of the main clans of ethnic Somalis), the settlement of this bloody ethno-political conflict became possible.

However, some guerrilla commanders refused to recognize the president. One of those who occupied an uncompromised position was Husein Aidid (F. Aidid's son), who claimed the presidential chair.

President Hasan and the cabinet of ministers never became real central organs of government. They control only a part of Mogadishu, the capital of the country. Leaders of armed groups, most of which are members of the Council for Reconciliation and Restoration of Somalia, govern the rest.

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The interethnic and simultaneously inter-religion conflict in the south of Sudan continues for almost 40 years. It stems from contradictions between the Sudanese Arabs as Muslims, who live in the north, and the Negroid population of the south as Christians or animists. In total the Muslims form over 70 per cent of the population, Christians for over 5 per cent and the adepts of the traditional local religions and cults for 23 per cent. The total population of Sudan is 20 million, of whom 5 million live in the south.

The political leaders of the south insist on its state independence or broad autonomy with administrative and economic reforms for many years. The rebel movement began in three southern provinces of Sudan in the 1950s. Its purpose was to create the independent Republic of Azania, based on these provinces. Some states of Tropical Africa supported the rebels, while several Arab countries sided with the government of Sudan. This factor predetermined internationalization of the conflict to an extent.

Trying to resolve it, representatives of the political forces of the north and south met in Khartoum in the spring of 1965. The special committee formed to study the problems of the south of Sudan and prepare recommendations aimed at ceasing hostilities proved ineffective. The situation continued to aggravate. The government of Congo (Kinshasa) led then by Maurice Tchombe, rendered military aid to the southerners. The 'provisional government of Azania', headed by J. Oduho, was formed in Kampala, the capital of Uganda, in December 1966.

All attempts of settling the conflict failed.

In the early 1980s the People's Liberation Army of Sudan was formed.

Under the command of John Garang it waged large-scale hostilities against the Sudanese government.

In the summer of 1993 negotiations were held in Abuja with Nigerian mediation between the parties to the conflict, again unsuccessfully. The main obstacle to the reconciliation was differences concerning the distribution of authorities between the Khartoum government and local administration, as well as the foreign policy of the future federal state. Garang's readiness to find a compromise and agree for the federation instead of an independent state evoked resistance of some of his followers. The splinter group Nasir insisted on the full secession of the south from Sudan. Hostilities resumed.

The neighbours of Sudan (Egypt, Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya) put a lot of diplomatic efforts to convince president Omar al-Bashir and John Garang to meet in 2001. As a result, the Sudanese government and the leadership of the People's Liberation Army approved the joint plan of Egypt and Libya aimed at the cessation of the years-long civil war and political settlement of the conflict. The agreement provided for a settlement conference, constitutional reforms and a transitional government.

The separatists' attack upon the main oilfields brought all agreements to naught. Probably, control of oil is the separatists' main purpose. The estimates of the proven oil deposits in Sudan vary from 36 million to 160 million tons. The People's Liberation Army stated repeatedly that it considered oilfields legitimate targets of attacks. The rebels argue that the ruling regime uses oil proceeds to escalate hostilities, including air bombing, attacks upon civil targets and deportation of the civil population. In August 2000 the fighters assaulted Heglig, the main oilfield of the country. Subsequently, the rebels repeatedly stated their intention to block oil production and equipment supply for oil companies.

In July 2002 some progress was achieved in the negotiations between the government and the rebels. It was decided to hold a referendum on the self-determination of southern Sudan after a six years long transitional period. The question put at the referendum was not secession but formation of a confederation of the north and south. The next round of negotiations was held in Kenya in September 2002, but it was terminated because of the intensification of hostilities. The PLAS detachments seized Torit, a town in the south of Sudan.

Despite certain rapprochement of the government and separatists' positions, the conflict is far from the settlement. Its participants are not confused by the casualties (within recent 20 years hostilities and diseases killed 1.5 million Sudanese) and dire straits of the population (4.5 million people are

refugees or displaced persons).

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The civil war in Sierra Leone was related from the very onset to the competition for control of the huge diamond resources of the country.

Diamonds from Sierra Leone are among the best diamonds throughout the world. The first diamond deposits were discovered in Sierra Leone, then a British colony, in the 1930s. 20 years later a black market of diamonds already functioned there. After the country attained independence in 1961, that market considerably expanded. In 1960 the official production of diamonds was 2 million carats. Diamond smuggling became the main income source of both anti-government United Revolutionary Front (URF) and the government itself. In 1998 the official export was 8500 carats, but the Belgian Council for Diamond Mining, the largest centre of trade in unprocessed diamonds, recorded import of 777,000 carats from Sierra Leone.

The contest for power that began immediately after the advent of independence continued until 2002, and hostilities were waged for over ten years. In 1961-1990 all successive governments pursued their policy in the interests of the groups in power, without taking care of the citizens' welfare. This was a fertile soil for the radical groups, which were thirsty for power. The political and economic crisis aggravated the confrontation.

The URF emerged as the opposition to the corrupt and antidemocratic regime of Siaka Stevens (1968-1985). After numerous radically minded students were expelled from universities in the 1980s after protest actions, many of them went to Libya and got military training there. Fode Sanko, a former corporal, came to Libya after spending six years in a Sierra Leone jail following an abortive coup d'état of 1971. Returning to Sierra Leone, he became the opposition leader soon. In 1990 Sanko visited Liberia and met Charles Taylor, the leader of the National Patriotic Front. Enlisting his support (it is natural to suppose that Taylor was promised diamonds as a reward for his aid), Sanko hired mercenaries from Burkina Faso and other countries, simultaneously forming detachments from among the population of Sierra Leone.

The URF unleashed the war against the government in March 1991. Sanko's detachments rapidly advanced, seizing town by town.

Defining his actions as people's liberation movement and appealing to combat the corrupt and antidemocratic government, Sanko attracted opponents of the government's policy to his ranks. Mobile and professionally trained rebel detachments seized the eastern areas of the country with rich

diamond deposits. Smuggling diamonds, the heads of the rebels supplied modern weapons to their detachments.

The high professional level of the URF detachments became possible because of the presence of numerous mercenaries. According to the UNO and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, they were from Gambia, Liberia (3 thousand), Togo and Niger (after training in Libya) plus deserters from the government army. Professional military rushed to Sierra Leone from the whole world. They were ready to fight for everybody who pays. Some of them had an experience of hostilities in Chechnya and Yugoslavia. The better-trained rebel detachments not only resisted the government army and ECOMOG (the monitoring group of the Economic Community of the West African States) detachments but also successfully advanced throughout the war. In 1998 and 1999 they seized Freetown, the capital of the country.

Attempts to settle the conflict peacefully resulted only in short lulls. The peace agreement signed in Lome (Togo) in July 1999 by president A.T. Kabba and F. Sanko (the opposition got several seats in the government, and Sanko headed the National Commission for Management of Strategic Resources, National Restoration and Development as the vice-president of the country) was violated a month later. A part of the rebels refused to lay down their arms and seized 40 UN observers as hostages.

Increasing tension in the country made the Security Council adopt the resolution No 1270 (October 22, 1999) on forming the Mission of the United Nations Organization for Sierra Leone and send a six thousand strong contingent to maintain peace in the country and assist the government and opposition in implementing the Lome agreement. This contingent was almost doubled within a year. It was found soon that soldiers from Nigeria, Tanzania, India, Guinea, Jordan and Zambia could not cope with their tasks. Even being authorized to fire, the African peacekeeping contingent acted extremely ineffectively. After more than 500 peacekeepers were seized by the opposition in May 2000, it became clear that a better-trained contingent was needed. The arrest of F. Sanko did not change the situation; General Issa Sesai assumed command of the URF.

Hostage seizures and defeats of the government forces and peacekeepers in local clashes testified that commandos' detachments were needed in the region. Yet the UN's attempt to enlist the Western powers' approval of sending their forces to Sierra Leone was a failure. The Peace Coercion operation, planned by Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, and aimed at liberating the hostages by rapid deployment forces, was disrupted. Great Britain, France and USA declined the UNO's request. The hostages were

liberated owing to the mediation efforts of Liberian president Charles Taylor.

The UNO, USA and Western European powers began to look for a solution. In June 2000, 180 British specialists came to Freetown, led by General D. Huger, to train 1000 Sierra Leonean soldiers in Bengeme military camp. A military training camp, headed by the British, was organized in Ghana, and 40 best officers of the Sierra Leonean army were sent there. The next stage will be the formation of the 8500 men strong national army with the assistance of British specialists. Canada, France, Kenya and the USA also will take part in this programme.

The Security Council resolution No 1306 (July 5, 2000) about the prohibition of the diamond export from Sierra Leone remained on paper. Diamond smuggling still is the main source of the URF's incomes.

Now the UNO has to correct its mistakes. The peacekeepers' main task is to help the government troops in establishing their control in the east of the country, where the main diamond deposits are concentrated. The first steps in this direction have been already taken. First UN peacekeepers were deployed in the Kailahun district, where the deposits are located. A real help is available from 115 Russian peacekeepers with four MI-24 helicopters, sent to Sierra Leone in August 2000.

In the spring of 2001 the slow disarmament process began. Sometimes clashes resumed between the URF detachments and government troops, who tried to dislodge the rebels from the eastern part of the country (Konu and Koidu districts) with rich diamond deposits.

On 12 January 2002, eleven URF commanders solemnly transferred their arms to the UN peacekeeping contingent in Kailahun. They commanded 45 thousand rebels. The civil war completed, but the future of the country remains unclear. In the second half of May 2002, after the presidential (the winner, Ahmed Tejan Kabba, secured 60 per cent of the votes) and parliamentary election (most of the voters preferred the traditional parties, such as PPSL, while the URF got less than 5 per cent of the votes and no seats in the parliament) a new government was formed.

Will peace be lasting? Will the measures of the government, UNO and other international organizations be effective? This is unclear. Too little time has passed after the peace conclusion.

True, some positive results are already visible. The legal diamond export reached \$26 million in 2001, which is 20 times more than in 1999. Detection of new deposits promises Sierra Leone world leadership in the diamond export. Yet some experts are rather pessimists. The situation in Sierra Leone is critical: economy and infrastructure have been totally destroyed; corruption flourishes; former fighters must be trained and employed as soon as

possible; thousands of refugees return to destroyed towns and burnt villages.

The situation in neighbour Liberia also is dangerous. The government is combated by the United Liberians for Reconciliation and Democracy. The country's borders with Sierra Leone and Guinea are transparent, and any conflict has a chance to spread over the whole region, the more so when the stake are the billions of dollars hidden in the Sierra Leone bosom. This is why the 17 thousand strong UN contingent is the only guarantor of peace and stability in this country.

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The armed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea was among the fiercest wars of the last decade: half a million of military took part in it. To consider the roots of the war, we must turn to the 1960s. In 1961 an insurrection against the emperor burst out in Eritrea, which was then a part of Ethiopia. It did not cease when the regime changed. On 24 May 1993, after the Mengistu regime collapsed, Eritrea was proclaimed independent, and in July both presidents signed a cooperation agreement. It provided for concerted actions in the fields of security, defence and foreign policy on the basis of mutual non-intervention into domestic affairs.

Both governments made an obvious mistake, forgetting to specify the state frontiers. Both ports on the Red Sea, Massawa and Aseb, became Eritrean, yielding this country 18 per cent of the budget revenue in the form of duties and fees imposed on Ethiopian goods. Eritrea introduced the currency of its own (nakfa) after using Ethiopian birr for four years. There were many border disputes between two countries. One of the stumbling blocks was Badame, a 400 square kilometres large area lying some 100 miles to the east of Sudan. Since late 1997 border clashes occurred there regularly.

The large-scale conflict began on 6 May 1998, when the Ethiopian police deported a group of Eritrean peasants from Badame. Six days later Eritrea seized four areas of the contested territory. Isayyas Afework, the Eritrean president, rejected the peace plan suggested by the OAU and elaborated with the mediation of Rwanda and the USA. According to this plan, the frontiers would be drawn under international control after the troops of both countries return to the positions they occupied before 6 May 1998.

The genuine war started on 6 February 2000. The offensive of Ethiopia, which had much more tanks and aircraft than Eritrea, radically changed the course of the conflict. After three weeks long bloody campaign, which killed dozens of thousands of people, Ethiopia dislodged the enemy from Badame and occupied a part of Eritrea.

The hostilities stopped on 4 June 2000. On 18 June both states signed

the armistice treaty. They approved the OAU plan, which provided for an immediate ceasefire and creation of a 25 km broad buffer zone along the Eritrea territory under control of UN peacekeeping forces. Ethiopia undertook to return its troops to the positions they occupied before 6 May 1998. On 12 December Ethiopia and Eritrea signed the comprehensive peace agreement in Algiers, forming an international commission for border demarcation. The parties agreed to exchange POWs and return the deported civilians. A UN peacekeeping contingent was to observe the implementation of the agreement.

The fragile peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea is not a guarantee against future confrontations. The border dispute remains unsolved.

The Ethiopian government combats the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the former ally of the regime. The Oromo are the largest ethnoses of the country. After detachments of the Oromo Liberation Army (the military wing of the OLF) attacked the communications that connect Ethiopia with neighbour Djibouti, the authorities subjected the opposition to brutal reprisals. Thousands of Oromo suspected of sympathizing with the OLF were jailed. In addition, the government shifts numerous Tigre and Amhara from the northern part of the country, affected by famine and draught, to the central, southern and south-western parts, populated mainly by the Oromo. Although the Oromo are the largest ethnoses, the present Ethiopian leadership is dominated by the Tigre, who occupy the topmost positions in politics, army and economy.

At the same time, the National Liberation Front of Ogaden (the organization of ethnic Somalis) remains active. It employs mostly terrorist methods of 'political struggle', creating another focus of tension.

Eritrea also faced growth of separatist attitudes of the national minorities. There are two opposition groups in the country, whose purpose is the formation of 'Great Afaria', namely, the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Union and Afar Revolutionary Democratic United Front.

The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea often is described as 'senseless war': to annex a tiny territory, they afforded enormous casualties. More than 120 thousand people were killed within three years of hostilities. The total number of refugees was 950 thousand.

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The government of Senegal combats the separatist rebel *Mouvement de Forces Démocratiques de Kazamans* (MFDK) in the south of the country for almost 20 years. Its leaders demand autonomy for their province. Their ar-

gument is that Kazamans was not colonized by France as a part of Senegal. Disagreeing with this position, the government had to send large contingents of its troops to the province and spend a lot of economic resources to combat the opposition. Up to 1999 the hostilities sometimes strengthened and sometimes weakened. Guinea-Bissau sometimes gave shelter to the rebels and supplied arms to them.

The first step towards the settlement of the conflict was the ceasefire agreement signed in 1999. Now the MFDK does not demand secession of the province from Senegal. However, the radical wing of the movement, which degenerated to terrorist gangs long ago, continued to fight for control of the province, which became a drug-traffickers' centre of West Africa.

Domestic tension and hostilities in Kazamans were among the reasons of the defeat of the former president Abdou Diouf at the presidential election in March 2000. He was succeeded by Abdoulai Wada, the leader of the *Parti Democratique Sénégalaise*. The population of Senegal wanted, first of all, cessation of the many years long domestic conflict.

In 2001 the government and MFDK leaders finally managed to come to terms. Senegalese minister of interior Mamadou Niang and the MFDK leader Diamakoune Senghor signed the peace treaty in Ziginchor. It provided for an immediate ceasefire, mutual refusal from applying force, liberation of hostages and return of refugees and displaced persons to homes. The parties also agreed to shift the MFDK detachments to permanent camps without arms and withdraw a part of the government troops from Kazamans. The agreement also provided for the formation of a commission that would prepare a schedule of the implementation of the treaty.

This successful step towards the reconciliation was partly spoiled by the reaction of the opposition that split from the MFDK and refused to observe the treaty. To confirm their position, the rebels attacked several towns and villages in the southern part of the country, killing mainly peaceful inhabitants.

* * *

In North Africa, the epicentre of conflicts is Algeria, enveloped by a creeping civil war. Throughout the recent decade the country witnessed an acute confrontation between the radical and irreconcilable Islamic fundamentalism and secular authorities, backed mainly by the security structures. The conflict is so deep and multifaceted that we confine ourselves to a schematic description of the developments.

In addition to political motives, the government's serious errors in the socioeconomic sphere were among the reasons of the outburst of Islamic

fundamentalism in Algeria. The economic reforms of the second half of the 1980s, which followed H. Boumedienne's semi-socialist experiments, resulted in mass dismissals at state-run enterprises and growing unemployment. The problem is aggravated by the difficult demographic situation, i.e., high population growth rate though slightly weakened in the recent years. The fall of oil prices in the 1990s further complicated the country's financial condition.

In October 1988 the army suppressed the strike movement and armed detachments of Islamic fundamentalists. The October crisis made president Chadli Bendjedid begin to reform the socioeconomic and political system. A multiparty system was introduced in July 1989.

The *Front Islamique de Salvation* (FIS), formed immediately thereafter, skilfully used the people's dissatisfaction with price rise, inflation and unemployment and launched a propaganda campaign for a return to the 'Islamic values' and introduction of Sharia. The external factors of this Islamic unrest were the Iranian revolution and the Gulf war. All this was conducive to the politicization of Islam and strengthening of political and religious confrontation. The radical Islamists relied on the most vulnerable part of the society, the youth, who form a sizable segment of the society for demographic reasons. Petty traders, educated specialists and a part of the army sympathized with the FIS and helped it.

The parliamentary election of 1991 confirmed instability of the situation and increasing popularity of the FIS. In the first round it secured 187 seats and could further strengthen its position in the second round. However, the military coup d'état prevented their victory and removed Bendjedid from the presidential chair. After the formation of the *Conceil Supreme d'Etat* (CSE), to which the president's prerogatives and authorities were transferred for two years, dissolution of the parliament and appointment of Mohammed Boudiaf as the CSE leader, the conflict between the Islamist radicals and government took the shape of an armed confrontation.

FIS detachments committed a series of terrorist acts. The CSE decided to deprive the FIS of the status of a party and prohibit its activity (March 1992). In response, the Islamite murdered M. Boudiaf. The political dialogue between the authorities and Islamists terminated.

During the transitional period the president was Lamine Zeroual (February 1994), a military, who became an 'elected president' in November 1995. Algeria was on the verge of an economic collapse, but then the economic situation somewhat stabilized.

On 15 April 1999, preterm presidential election ended in the victory of Abdelaziz Bouteflika. However, internal consensus was still a dream: six of

seven candidates withdrew their nomination and after the election urged to nullify its results. The election without an alternative and approval of its results inflamed the country.

Bouteflika appealed for national accord, released several thousand Islamic fighters from jails and proclaimed an amnesty for Islamic rebels (2000). However, the prohibition of the *Armée de Salvation Islamique* (the military wing of the FIS) led to new outbursts of violence.

On 23 November 1999, Abdelkader Hachani, the FIS leader, was murdered. The amnesty led to the disarmament of a part of the FIS, but another fraction of the opposition, *Groupe Islamique Armée*, declared that it would continue the hostilities.

The government faced acute problems in Kabilia, an area with mainly Berber population. Mass antigovernment demonstrations often ended in clashes with the police with dozens of casualties there and in other areas in 2000-2001. The leaders of the Berber movements and parties urged the government to cease the discrimination of the Berbers.

All this ended in the tragic events of April-May 2001. The police attacked a demonstration of the Berber youth, killing 60 and wounding two thousand people. Manifestations and meetings with thousands of participants and resignation of the pro-Berber ministers, belonging to the *Réunion pour Culture et Démocratie*, from the government made the authorities grant concessions, but the tension did not weaken.

The civil war continued in 2001-2002. It is believed that it killed over 100 thousand people within ten years.

Despite repeated compromises between the government and opposition, president A. Bouteflika's peaceful initiatives and the fact that the population is tired of hostilities, there are no reasons to believe that the conflict will be resolved soon.

* * *

The wide variety of the ethnic groups who populate Mali became the reason of conflicts in the 1990s. The struggle for autonomy and against the dictatorial regime of Moussa Traore waged by the Tuareg, a Berber ethnoses, led to a conflict in 1990. Clashes between the separatists and government forces continued after Traore was overthrown (March 1991). When A.U. Konare came to power, Tuareg separatists attacked towns, villages and military garrisons in the north of the country, demanding independence for Azavad, the territory that consists of the Saharan regions of Mali, Niger,

Libya and Burkina Faso. In 1991 and 1992 peace agreements were signed, but the separatists do not hurry to implement their conditions.

After a new peace agreement was signed by the government and *Front Uni de Mouvement de Azavad* in 1994, regular clashes ceased, and 7 thousand Tuareg joined the regular army and received posts in government organizations.

The symbol of the completion of the conflict with the Tuareg was the *La Feu du Paix* in Tombouctou (March 1996): 3 thousand Tuareg fighters from the *Front Uni* burnt their arms.

Local ethno-confessional clashes take place from time to time in Mali.

I would not like to complete the description of African conflicts by pessimistic statements. After all, many African countries are free of wars, and in some others such conflicts died down or were settled. The examples are Namibia and Mozambique. The leaders of some other countries (Tanzania, Togo, Ghana, Benin) managed to avoid interethnic clashes for dozens of years. Maybe, both the African countries and the international community will be able to elaborate mechanisms for preventing or settling such conflicts. This is a necessary condition of the stable and sustained development of the continent.

To substantiate this evaluation, let me refer to an example of the successful (in the meanwhile) settlement of the long and bloody conflict and restoration of civil peace.

* * *

Mozambique of the 1990s is a rare and plausible example of a success achieved in Africa.

Some years after the liberation from the Portuguese colonial domination a civil war burst out in the country. The *Resistencia Nacional do Mozambique* (RNM), led by Afonso Dlakama, combated the Marxistoid government, headed first by Samora Mashel, the leader of the *Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique* (FRELIMO), and his successor Joaquim Chissano. The rebels enjoyed the support of the RSA. In October 1992 the government of Mozambique and the RNM signed a peace agreement, which put an end to the 16 years long civil war. In October 1994 the first multiparty presidential and parliamentary election was held in the country. J. Chissano and the FRELIMO won. The RNM secured some seats in the parliament, and its leader Afonso Dlakama recognized the result of the election, unlike J. Savimbi.

In December 1999 a new election was held with rigid rivalry. Afonso Dlakama got 47.71 per cent votes vs. 52.29 per cent got by the winner, improving his performance by 14 per cent in comparison with 1994. The FRE-

LIMO secured 133 seats in the parliament, and the RNM got 117.

Joachim Cissano, acquainted with Marxism, showed himself as a pragmatist and advocate of market economy. He wears an irreproachable European suit and always is calm and polite. He gave up revolutionary rhetoric for the sake of social peace and attracting foreign investments and succeeded in achieving his goals.

The election of 1999 was held under conditions of considerable economic recovery in Mozambique. After many years of economic disorganization, the annual growth rate reached 5-6 per cent in the first half of the 1990s and above 10 per cent in the second half, evoking envy in other countries of the South African Development Community (SADC). Foreign investors, especially those from the RSA, chose Mozambique to invest their capitals. They hope that all upheavals are in the past and peace and stability will be preserved in the country. True, the reference point of the economic growth is so low that any recovery may demonstrate fair indices. Mozambique is among the poorest countries of the world. Few signs of economic prosperity little affect the common people. The present leadership is concerned with this. And when heavy rains and storm affected Mozambique some months ago, the fragile economic achievements were called into question again.

The GDP of Mozambique doubled within ten years. However, this happened mainly owing to donors' money. In 1986-1996 the country received aid of \$1 billion annually. The debt burden reached \$6 billion, and Mozambique found itself in a debt trap. In July 1999 this amount was reduced by \$3.7 billion on the WB's and IMF's initiative concerning rendering aid to the poorest indebted countries.

In 1994 the African National Congress came to power in the neighbour South Africa with its powerful economy, which opened the way towards the strengthening economic integration between Mozambique and South Africa.

The hindrances to the growth include shortage of skilled personnel, destroyed infrastructure, which was weak before the war, bureaucracy and corruption as its consequence. According to the UNO Development Programme, Mozambique occupies the 169th place among 174 countries in the human development index rating. 70 per cent of the population live in absolute poverty. The adult literacy rate is 45 per cent. The public sector accounts for less than one fifth of the GDP. Ca. 1200 small and medium-size companies were privatized.

After a decade of accelerated economic growth the per capita annual GDP is just slightly above \$200.

Nonetheless, the example of Mozambique, a poor country, deprived of

considerable mineral wealth, shows impressive results in the development of a country that managed to settle its domestic armed conflict and avoided being involved in adventures abroad.

GLOBALIZATION VS. DIALOGUE OF CIVILIZATIONS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR AFRICA

Dmitri Bondarenko*

Globalization vs. Dialogue of Civilizations: The World-System
and Civilizational Approaches to History and the Present

The development of a politically decentralised interpolity network became an effective alternative to the development of a single polity long before the rise of the first empires. Such a historically significant example as the system of Sumerian polities prior to the rise of Akkad seems sufficient for illustrating this postulate. This alternative was already noticed by Wallerstein, the 'founding father' of the world-system approach who viewed it as a dichotomy: *world-economy* – *world-empire*. Note that according to Wallerstein these are considered precisely as alternatives, and not as two stages of social evolution.

However, it does not seem productive to describe this alternative type of integration as a world-economy, as such a designation tends to downplay the political and cultural dimension of such systems. Take for example, the Classical Greek inter-*polis* system. The level of complexity of many Greek *poleis* was rather low even in comparison with a complex chiefdom. However, they were parts of a much larger and much more complex entity constituted by numerous economic, political and cultural links and shared political and cultural norms. The economic links no doubt played some role within this system. But the links of the other types were not less important. Take, e.g. the norm according to which the inter-*polis* wars stopped during the Olympic Games, which guaranteed the secure passage of people, and consequently the circulation of enormous quantities of energy, matter and information within the territory far exceeding the one of an average complex chiefdom. The existence of the inter-*poleis* communication network made it possible, say, for a person born in one *polis* to go to get his education in another *polis* and to establish his school in a third. The existence of this system reduced the destructiveness of inter-*poleis* warfare for a long time. It

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was a basis on which it was possible to undertake important collective actions (which turned out to be essential at the age of the Greek-Persian wars). As a result, the *polis* with a level of complexity lower than the one of the complex chiefdom, turned out to be part of a system whose complexity was quite comparable with that of the state (and not only the early one).

The same can be said about the intersocietal communication network of Medieval Europe (comparing its complexity in this case with an average world-empire). Note that in both cases some parts of the respective systems could be treated as elements of wider world-economies. On the other hand, not all the parts of the communication networks were quite integrated economically.

So, the world-economies were not the only possible type of politically decentralised intersocietal networks. Actually, both cases are of politically decentralised civilization, which for most of human history over the last few millennia, constituted the most effective alternative to the world-empire. Wallerstein suggests that in the age of complex societies only the world-economies and world-empires could be treated as units of social evolution in general. Yet we believe that both politically centralized and decentralized civilizations should also be treated as such. One should stress again the importance of the cultural dimension of such systems. Of course, the exchange of bulk goods was important. But exchange of information was also important. Note that the successful development of science both in Classical Greece and Medieval Europe became only possible through an intensive intersocietal information exchange, whereas the development of science in Europe affected, to a significant extent, the evolution of the Modern World-System.

It is important to stress that the intersocietal communication networks (denoted as 'mini-systems' by Wallerstein) could also appear among much less complex societies than ancient Greeks or medieval Europeans. For example in the aboriginal Australia one comes across a considerable degree of cultural complexity (complex forms of rituals, mythology, arts, and dance compared to the ones of the early agriculturists) at a relatively simple social and political organization of a separate local group. This could largely be explained by the fact that those groups were parts of a much more complex whole: a huge intersocietal communication network that apparently covered most of Australia.

Thus, we are sure that taking into account of the general character and type of particular cultures is essentially important for the understanding of given societies' evolutionary pathways, and believe that this aspect of the problematic might be well examined within the civilizational approach

framework. Furthermore, we will try our best to show that there is no real contradiction between the two respective approaches, *i.e.* the world-system (globalistic) and civilizational (particularistic) ones.

Originally, in the mid-18th century, French (Mirabeau, Montesquieu, Holbach, Condorcet) and Scottish (Ferguson, Millar, Smith) Enlighteners developed the idea of civilization as the highest progressive stage of the essentially unilineal evolutionary process. It did not possess any substantially spatial connotations: though the stage of civilization was considered to be achieved by that time in Europe and its settler colonies only, it was regarded basically possible for other peoples of the world to rise up to this level too. That time the study of civilization took into account predominantly the spiritual dimension of human life; the formation of civilization was regarded as the result of the improvement of human nature, the increase in the morality, the development of civil feelings, and, eventually, of the 'progress'. Out of this the socio-political and economic institutions of the civil society attributed by them to a 'civilized' nation were derived.

From the 18th century on, the priority of the human being, his culture, spirituality has always remained a distinctive feature of the civilizational approach. But the approach as such was becoming more and more diversified. Lucien Febvre wrote in 1930: ... the notion of civilizations of uncivilized tribes has already become usual since long time (Febvre 1991 [1930]: 240). He goes on to maintain that in the second half of the 19th century there happened the ... divergence of the notion of the civilization into two;.. [the supporters of] one of them finally arrived at the conclusion that any group of human beings, notwithstanding the means of its influence, material and intellectual, on the surrounding world, possesses a civilization of its own; [the supporters of] the other (now old) is the concept of the higher civilization, which white nations of Western Europe and North America possess and spread... (Febvre 1991 [1930]: 280–281).

Hence, the spatial approach to this notion, *i.e.* the idea of 'civilizations', consolidated. Thus, this viewpoint did not suppose straight connection between the notion of civilization and a certain stage of development (though the foundations of such an approach also date back to the 18th century, ascending to Vico, Voltaire, and Herder).

But in this context the stress on the spiritual essence of the phenomenon of civilization has become even stronger. It is evident in works of the first 'local civilizations' theories' creators (Rückert and Spengler in Germany, Buckle in Britain, the Slavophiles [Khomyakov, Kireevsky, Aksakov], Chaadayev, and Danilevsky in Russia). They demarcated local civilization

boundaries on the basis of religion, mental characteristics, 'cultural-historical type', etc. of a given large region population. This tradition found its further development in the works by Toynbee and many other civilization approach theorists.

It was already the 20th century when a new trend within the civilizational approach appeared. Its essence is manifested in attempts to combine the global aspect with the local one, *i.e.* to reveal the connection between changes of cultural types and human spirituality at the universal scale, on the one hand, and local civilizations, on the other. Jaspers and Eisenstadt are those who represent this tradition in the most prominent way. Our approach basically stems from this tradition.

At least from the Neolithic revolution era on, cultural distinctions between different areas tended to increase and to dominate the globalizing tendencies till the period of Great geographic discoveries of the early Modern Time. The results achieved on the pathway to globalization in the times of the Neolithic revolution, Hellenism, the Roman Empire, the invasions of Eurasian steppe nomads, the Arabian and Crusaders' conquests, etc. were most often temporal, reversible, and did not touch many parts of the world at all.

From the era of Great geographic discoveries the most important period in the history of all the local civilizations began. Now the intercivilization interactions of various kinds have involved practically the whole universe. The impact of those interactions on absolutely all their participants has increased many times. The immanent smoothing effect of the newly-born capitalism has contributed to the respective processes a lot, too. In the result, changing of the civilization map has been quickened due to absorption of some civilizations by other. Since then new civilizations have appeared only by means of different older civilizations synthesis, and not many such synthetic civilizations have appeared (the Latin American civilization first and foremost).

Thus, the process of globalization could be presented as that of the global civilization formation due to the long-lasting and multidirectional intercivilization interaction. From a definite viewpoint, the whole human history is that of gradual and generally slow up to the Modern Time process of the global civilization's revealing as a common background for particular civilizations' existence. It would be a mistake to present the humankind as a simple sum of separate cultures or even separate civilizations for any period of world history. However, the explication of the global civilization no way means disappearance of particular civilizations. Furthermore, their existence is a pledge of sociocultural variability of the humankind that is necessary for it not less vitally than inner variability is necessary for any particular civili-

zation (the fact, broadly recognized by the civilization approach theorists starting with Danilevsky and Gizaut). This is even more so if one speaks about the macrocivilizational units, that is, about the East and the West. To put it mildly, it is not obvious at all that this division will become irrelevant in the visible future. What might tend to happen is that culture traits that separate different civilizations are supplemented (gradually and often painfully for the people) by new traits, original for another civilization but becoming common for them all. In the meantime, the East and the West are not geographical but sociocultural, macrocivilizational phenomena; their borders changed not once and the present-day borderline had been drawn only by the end of the 17th century.

However, there is an important restriction for this process. Some features of this or that civilization may contradict sharply the imposed ones. And we are coming here to the problem of the globalization limits. It seems unreasonable and even misleading and counterproductive to attempt at solving it from the universalistic viewpoint. As every civilization is distinguished by a unique set of features, a unique complex of cultural characteristics, each of them has globalization limits of its own. The leading role of the Western civilization in the process of globalization is determined not simply historically, but culturally, civilizationally too. This is not by chance that though many non-Western peoples (Arabs, Chinese, Indians, Polynesians) were experienced in navigation, even more peoples implemented into life expansionistic projects, and though economically the East was generally leaving the West behind till the 18th century (as recent research of economic historians has revealed), those were just Europeans who accomplished the Great geographical discoveries, introduced the colonial system and redrew the civilization map of the world.

The point is that the European civilization is practically the only one among those still existing today of which sociocultural dynamism is characteristic throughout its whole history. Dynamism was tightly connected with deeply rooted rationality of thinking, individualism, and other features the enumeration of which is a common place in many studies of the 'European phenomenon'. Dynamism this or that way revealed itself even in the most traditionalized period of European history, that is, in the Middle Ages. Europe realized the advantages of such an evolutionary mode when all its direct or indirect partners in the game for the role of the locomotive of globalization had already exhausted their civilizationally determined potential of dynamism. Just this eventually permitted the West to impose its rules and terms of globalization, to declare its civilizational values 'universal'.

If we now compare, or even better to say contrast *e.g.*, the present-day East Asia and Africa south of the Sahara, we will see how crucially and dramatically the sociocultural (*i.e.* civilizational) possibilities to adapt to the Western rules and values differ from one civilization to another. It should be stressed at this point that we mean not the adaptive potential as such but just the possibilities for adaptation to civilizational features of the concrete civilization, to those features which are now associated with those of the global civilization.

On the one hand, this association is correct: *volens nolens* one should agree that the global civilization is now revealing itself first of all due to the attempts of the West and hence in accordance with its civilizational code and model. On the other hand, the respective association is basically wrong: the global civilization cannot but absorb non-contradictive features of various civilizations. Another aspect of the problem of civilizations' adaptation to globalization is that of their contribution to its still forming complex of features. For example, the civilization of Tropical Africa, as its fortunes from the 15th century on demonstrate seems to be very little adaptable to the features of the Western civilization. However, the African (as well as some other non-Western) cultures' ability to establish non-contradictive relations with the nature (on the level of mental principle, not concrete archaic forms of land use, of course) could be very helpful for the whole global community. Prospects for adaptation and contribution to the still revealing global civilization are crucial for the prospects of peoples and states in terms of their future equal or non-equal position in the reshaping system of international economic and political relations.

So, the global civilization is to become neither purely Western nor purely Eastern. The opportunities for a single civilization's dominance are exhausting now. Though the West is still the main locomotive of the globalization process, some other civilizations, and the East Asian civilization first of all, have already demonstrated their ability not only to adapt but also to contribute to the global civilization's set of features. The synthetic 'third way' will be based on the adaptation to natural environment by means of high technologies at a high level of production what is possible only in the postindustrial world when the role of human conscious activities in history will become even greater than it is today being supplemented by qualitative increase in the sense of social responsibility. This means that the appearance of new principles and forms of human existence in the natural and social milieu accompanied and determined by changes in human mentality, is necessary. The humankind's suicide seems to be the most possible alternative to that 'third way'.

As for the methods of studying globalization, the complete opposition of the world-system and civilizational approaches (rather frequently declared by the supporters of each) is only a seeming one and nothing more. On the contrary, these approaches are mutually complementary.

Implications for Africa: What can Globalization Mean for the Continent?

The problem of the African continent's integration into the so-called "global community" is actively debated by Africanists nowadays. This looks natural and even very much desirable in the difficult socio-political and economic situation that African societies and states enjoy. Their hardships are aggravated by increasing pushing of the African countries to a deep periphery of the world economy and policy.

However, in my opinion, the essence of the processes generally denoted in our days as "globalization" is not understood properly by the majority of both Western and African scholars. In the meantime, the nature of this misunderstanding seems to be different with regards to Western and African colleagues.

For many Western researchers globalization is an event almost entirely (and in any case basically) economic in its nature. For such scholars its essence is in the current transition from "international" to "transnational" system of economic relations, that is, in the establishment of a certain "new economic order". It must be noted that this is really so somehow (and non-understanding and non-recognition of this fact is the basis for many African scholars' mistake, about what it will be said below). However, the Western students tend to believe that voluntary or involuntary inclusion of the whole world (and of Africa as its part too) into the new system of universal economic relations "must" hardly not automatically result in general acceptance of such fundamental Western values as liberal (market) economy and democratic political regime on the national level.

Thus, it looks like two points of crucial importance are ignored at such an approach.

First, globalization (if it ever transforms from a tendency into a fact) will not be able to become a simple universal scale extension of the Western civilization and the values, organically characteristic precisely to it. Globalization was initiated by the West long before the time that is now more and more often called "transitional from modernity to post-modernity". Indeed, from a definite point of view, the whole human history may be regarded as a process of the global civilization's revealing. But the results achieved on this way by the end of the second half of the 15th century (in the times of

Hellenism, Roman late Republic and Empire, the Great migration of peoples, the Arab Khaliphate, the Crusades, etc.) turned out partial and reversible. Only from the time of the Europeans' Great geographical discoveries the respective process has become stable and permanently increasing. However, though "irreversible" globalization was initiated by the West due to specific features of its civilization (dynamism, rationalism and others), the half millennium of its proceeding demonstrate that this process can be effective only if it takes the shape of mutual adaptation and synthesizing of various civilizations' backgrounds, and this imperative has become more and more categorical in the course of time.

Second, the process of globalization by no means implicates disappearance of local civilizations but presupposes the formation of a kind of their "federation", in which some common basic principles obtained in the course of globalization will be combined with not only visual (ethno-cultural) but also with some extend essential (precisely civilizational) diversity of the federation's members. Due to this, it is also senseless (and politically dangerous) to expect general consolidation of the Western economic and political values, at least in their purely Western forms.

On the other hand, as it was argued above, the common African approach to the problems of globalization is based on just non-understanding of how the worldwide economic relations are changing at present. Within that approach, the most significant question can be formulated as follows: "When will the West stop exploiting Africa?" From such a point of view, globalization is not a real process but a sly ideological trick invented by the West for the sake of further unpunished robbery of poor countries as it was in the colonial and neocolonial times of "international" economy.

Probably, globalization is the last chance for Africa to step aside (at least a bit) from the periphery of contemporary world, to integrate into it on the basis, more deserved than before. Unfortunately, this chance is not so great, but at least the very existence of this opportunity is determined by the factors mentioned above. These factors are transference of the world economic processes' center of gravity from the national and international level (as it was during not only the colonial but also neocolonial period) to the transnational, universal level, on the one hand, and the global civilization's inability to reveal itself without synthesizing of different local civilizations' backgrounds, on the other hand.

In terms of this, for example such a popular and actively debated by politicians and scholars idea as that of "African renaissance" declared by the South African President Thabo Mbeki looks ideologically ambivalent and having no predictable result as a doctrine predestined to support persuasion

Globalization vs. Dialogue of Civilizations: Implications for Africa

of state policy. It may lead to crucially different consequences of all kinds depending on the goal of making use of it: for the sake of either isolation from the global community or support of African identity within the framework of the 'federation of civilizations'.

So, I believe that it is not so much an attempt to shut off from universal integrational processes as from new manifestations of harmfulness of the West but just the policy of reasonable economic and informational openness, of gradual but steady inclusion into these processes could be most profitable for the Third World countries. This is another though also a very important point that no universal receipt of persuading such policy can be prescribed. This is so owe to both intercivilizational and intracivilizational differences that exist in the non-Western world. The same decisions must not be proposed not only for say, Africa and East Asia but also for e.g., Tanzania and Nigeria. To make up decisions adequate to the situation in every particular country is a task of its leaders, the matter of their political wisdom and firmness.

**THE IMPORTANCE OF NATURAL RESOURCES FOR
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA AND BEYOND**

*Andrei Pritvorov**

As is well known, up to 40% of scarce mineral reserves are found in Southern Africa. There is the Witwatersrand (Rand) area in South Africa, whose North-Eastern part (the Gauteng province) is famous for its unique mineral deposits. The mines which are concentrated in a small area are making part of the Great Rift Belt of Africa, rich in minerals, including scarce ones. Some parts of Russia, the United States and, partly, Australia, are comparable to them. The economic histories of South Africa, the United States and, to a certain extent, Russia, are linked by common destiny. As an example, is the 'gold rush', which coincided mainly with the 'happy nineties' of the 19th century. These events were reflected not only in academic literature, but also in fiction. The story of the 'gold rush' in Western Australia was told in a vivid manner by Catharina S.Pritchard in a number of her novels, while Jack London depicted the Klondyke gold-seekers, etc.

The circumstances, which initiated the 'gold rush' were closely connected with the task to provide support for the then 'world money', the pound sterling (£), which from the end of the Napoleonic wars till the beginning of World War I, or for about a century, had been maintained at a fixed level. The pound's gold content was represented thus: £ 4, 4 s, 11 d (four pounds, four shillings, eleven pence) per 1 Troy ounce (31.1 g) of gold¹.

At those times inflation was kept down by trying to increase gold influx to the Bank of England.

In the 1880ies and 1890ies "the biggest English bankers, before all, directors of the Bank of England, namely, William Lidderdale, Herbert Brooks, Hue Smith, Samuel Gladstone, Samuel Marley, Charles de Arbuthnot, Reginald Eden, Lord Alfred C. de Rothschild, as well as the proprietors of the Birmingham Lloyd's Bank, etc. demanded that England's financial system should be supported by means of dramatic increase of the country's gold reserves, by providing high gold content of bank notes. By the mid-90s

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¹ Innes D. *Anglo American and the Rise of Modern South Africa*. L., (Heinemann), 1984. P.72. At present (2002) one Troy ounce costs approximately £ 213 (\$ 305).

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England's position improved, its vaults in the banks started accumulating gold, mined at Witwatersrand deposits in the *Zuid Afrikaanshe Republiek* (sometimes called 'the Transvaal') and in Kalgurli in Western Australia. But the English financial magnates demanded to provide for sustained and powerful gold influx to raise their reserves in England to support the pound. They demanded annexation of the *Zuid Afrikaanshe Republiek* and the Orange Republic².

Gold-bearing fields in Alaska and in Western Australia avoided large-scale conflicts, whereas the Transvaal, the Orange Republic, as well as border areas of Manchuria and Korea became scenes of bloody wars on the threshold of the 19th and 20th centuries, i.e. the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905).

The causes of the Anglo-Boer War were clearly understood by its contemporaries and actors. For example, Lord Kitchener, Chief of Staff, then Supreme Commander of the British Army, according to those who knew him, had a remarkable feature, that is, ill feeling to representatives of the press, which he deemed to be 'the tool of the big business, that provoked the current war'³.

However, the Russian aristocracy's tilt towards financial business was also noticed, which is the sign of its transformation (or degeneration?) from land aristocracy into financial one. In the above mentioned Bank of England there was the Emperor's Family private deposit, which had been formed out of "free arrears of the Chancellor's Office and Estates, transferred there during the 'dark times' from 1869 till 1881". That sum amounted to £ 50 mn, equivalent to 500 mn roubles at that time (that is where a substantial portion of monies gained due to the 1861 <Land> Reform had fallen!). In modern currency that sum is equal approximately to £ 2.5 bn or \$ 3.6 bn, taking into account the fact that 1 Troy ounce of gold at the beginning of 2002 cost £ 213 (\$ 305), or had grown in value fifty-fold during the past 100 years.

At the beginning of the war between England, on the one hand, and the Transvaal and the Orange Republic, on the other, Empress Alexandra Fiodorovna (1866-1918), an English-educated woman and an ardent sympathizer with the British aggression against the Boer Republics, persuaded the Emperor that he should lend that money to Queen Victoria. So he agreed and found himself blocked in helping the Boers. The French were joking on

² Nikitina I.A. Annexation of the Boer Republics by England. Moscow, (Nauka Publishers), 1970. P.21. <In Russian >.

³ Augustus Ye. F. 'Memoirs of an Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) Participant', *The Warsaw Military Magazine*. Warsaw, 1901, No 7. <In Russian >.

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that occasion: *L'Empereur de la Russie voudrait bien venir en aide aux braves Boers, mais le pauvre homme ne sait comment s'y prendre!* ('The Emperor of Russia would like very much to come to help the brave Boers, but he doesn't know how to take up at that!')⁴.

There is a remarkable fact that in Manchuria and in North Korea high-ranking unscrupulous financial swindler courtiers involved the Emperor's Family in adventurous raw-materials prospecting, including gold deposits, by ceding to the sovereign 25% of the shares issued⁵.

At both sides of the Manchuria/Korea border there were at least 5 gold deposits and a silver one. They were located in the vicinity of Unsang, to the north of Tshulangchiang (Turinchang), in lower Tumangan River and in the vicinity of Hungchung⁶.

The Emperor's Family became one of the shareholders of a consolidated venture, as well as of its subsidiaries, namely, 'Count Apraksin's Company for Gold Prospecting' and the 'Society for Prospecting in North-East Siberia', with very wide credentials. The venture which gave impulse to the war, was materially advantageous to the Emperor's Family and to the court circles⁷.

Therefore, the Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 can on due grounds be called one of the first of 'resource wars' that was waged to the least extent for 'forest concessions', due to which, allegedly, the conflict with Japan occurred.

Thence on many 20-century wars were initiated by the struggle for mineral resources; besides gold and diamonds, hydrocarbons became objects of competition. Albert Speer, Minister for Armaments of the Third Reich, stated during his interrogation by prosecutors preparing the Nuremberg Trial, that 'the need for oil was, indisputably, the main cause of war against Russia'⁸.

On the threshold of the 20th -21st centuries oil as fuel has already be-

⁴ Von Waal, V.V., Gen. "Notes dated April-June 1900". Manuscripts Section of the Saltykov-Shchedrin State Public Library. Vol. 127, No 6, book 3. P. 52-55 // "Russia and Africa. Documents and Materials, from the 19th century till 1860". Vol. I, Moscow, the Institute of General History of the RAS, 1999. P.1576-1590. <In Russian >.

⁵ Semamov S.N. The Secret of Admiral Makarov's Death. Moscow, 2000. P.9. <In Russian>.

⁶ Smirnova N.A., Kushnir G.A. (Eds). The Russo-Japanese War. Map (a visual aid). (Head Directory of Logs and Charts), 1979, 1980. <In Russian>.

⁷ Pak Chon He. The Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 and Korea. Moscow (Vost. Lit Publ.), 1997. P.91, 93. <In Russian>.

⁸ Oil and gas of Russia. History and perspectives. Moscow-Geneva, (KRES/AMS Publ.), 1995. P.35-54. <In Russian >.

**Andrei Pritvorov. The Importance of Natural Resources
for the Development of South Africa and beyond**

come obsolete. As is known, the first internal combustion engine was invented by O.S.Kostovich (1851-1916) in 1884, 120 years ago and underwent no changes of principle during that time, undergoing improvements, indeed, due to its parts' 'reshuffling' and 'grinding in'. But, as invention of principle, it is now not only morally obsolete, but even morally antique.

There are new sources of energy and of its transformation and use, high-temperature reactors have been invented, giving basis for further science and technology designs in physical infrastructure, in transportation systems, and, among other spheres, in industry and in the solution of ecological problems. But, evidently, the leading oil companies, before all members of the 'seven sisters' conglomerate, namely, Chevron Oil, BP, Esso, Shell, Total, Agip, Caltex, are not interested in introducing those technologies.

In the modern world these and other transnational corporations (TNC) are not infrequently playing the role of 'state within a state', but, of course, they are not states and that is why it is difficult to control them by their host states, as well as by the UN.

Touching upon the issue of self-reliance, that is, of the Boer Republics' sovereignty over their own resources, Russian volunteer officer, First-Lieutenant Alexei Yefimovich Yedrikhin, who usually signed his essays with the pseudonym Van Dam (which later, in 1907, became his authentic name), in the time of his stay in the Transvaal at the initial stage of the Anglo-Boer War (in May 1900) wrote in 'Novoye Vriemia' ('New Time') newspaper: 'The country since 1877 till 1897 has mined 660,000 pounds of gold' costing 406 250 roubles (10 roubles equated to £ 1 at that time), or £ 40,600. According to very modest estimates made by engineers, those mines (at Johannesburg) will bring gold for 4.5 bn roubles; adding that to the whole of the Rand's yield, we'll obtain a quantity exceeding 11 bn roubles⁹.

Another Russian officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Ye-L.K.Miller, military attaché in Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy at that time, wrote: 'The Government of *Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek* is mining 9 gold deposits at its own expense; during November [1898] it mined gold amounting to the value of £ 216,000. The mint is working at enhanced production rate; in September

⁹ The third article by first lieutenant Yedrikhin. On the Transvaal's Mineral Riches / Letters about the Transvaal. III.// "Novoye Vriemia". May 8/21, 1900, No 86. P. 2-3 // The Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902 after Archive materials and Witnesses' Memoirs (Voropayeva N.G., Vyatkina R.R., Shubin G.V., compilers). Moscow, 2001. P.16. <In Russian >

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gold coins costing £ 60,000 were hammered¹⁰.

The loss by the Boer Republics of sovereignty over their natural resources as a result of the Anglo-Boer War laid foundation for political segregation regime, apartheid and, as a reaction to them, to anti-racist movement, anti-apartheid struggle. Meanwhile the issue of sovereignty over the natural resources was hidden in a shade for a long time.

It is noteworthy that in 2000, 2001 and 2002 the South African parliament and the wide public were lively discussing the Mineral Development Bill. There was a striking feature that the notion of 'the State's sovereignty over all the resources', common of the international legal practice, was perseveringly avoided. The very word is only mentioned in an explication note to the Mineral Development Bill in the sense that in general *the right of the State* to exercise sovereignty is admitted. But the very formula '*the right of the State*' is unusual, because the State's sovereignty by itself is the source of the legal right!

In this case sovereignty over the resources in the land, in the underground (which is very important for South Africa – author's note), in the air, in the shelf, in the economic zone of the adjacent waters, etc. is not proclaimed and there is no reference to the corresponding statement in the Constitution¹¹. There are only notions in sense that the State is the 'custodian' of the resources, whereas they are the 'national asset' and 'belong to the Nation', etc.

South Africa's sovereignty over her natural resources to a great extent rests in the possession of the heirs to British South Africa Company (BSAC), the London and Rhodesian Mining and Land Company (Lonrho). That circumstance strongly influences the ability of the South African State to carry out social and economic transformations in the country, to promote cooperation with other countries on equal basis.

All that is a sad consequence of the fact that the British aggression

¹⁰ Dispatch by Lt.-Col. Miller from Bruxelles about events in the theater of Anglo-Boer. The Transvaal resources // Dispatches by military agent in Bruxelles and the Hague Lt.-Col. of the General Staff Miller. Dispatch No 16 dated January 28 / February 9, 1899 from Bruxelles. P. 12-14 // The Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902 after Archive materials and Witnesses' Memoirs (Voropayeva N.G., Vyatkina R.R., Shubin G.V., compilers). Moscow, 2001. P.92. <In Russian >

¹¹ In the South African Constitution adopted in 1996 there is no statement concerning the State's sovereignty over all the resources. In Chapter II "Bill of Rights", section 25 "Property", pt 5. It is only mentioned, that the State should adopt reasonable laws and other measures within the resources in its possession to provide for equal access to the land on equal basis (see: [http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/constitution/saconst 02.html # 24](http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/constitution/saconst 02.html# 24)).

against the Boer Republics was not beaten off. There is also a lesson to all other nations for the future: by means of latent and open aggression the international financial capital started its world conquest during the 20 century. That is why the events of the initial stage of the 'financial conquest' seem to be so up-to-date ones, especially in Africa.

The influential American weekly of the Schiller Institute, which abides by anti-globalist and anti-liberalist vision of the modern world, is giving account of the events in Africa stating, that nearly the bulk of the world's most important mineral reserves is concentrated in its underground, and is giving the following idea of them in the connection with the world financial crisis: The cleverer among the oligarchs have been preparing for the crash by buying up control over the necessities of life, so that after the crash – after all the paper wealth has evaporated and all the suckers have been mined – they can control what is left of the world. That is the reason for bloody wars along the Great Rift mineral belt in Africa, and the reason for the surge in mergers among industrial companies in the recent years. There are those among the oligarchy who, after all, understand that those who control the raw materials, the strategic minerals, the precious metals, the energy and water supplies, and the means of production of those items, control the destiny of mankind. After the crash, they plan to use their control over those necessities of life to consolidate their control over humanity¹².

No wonder that, while not disposing of sovereignty over its own resources, South Africa could not and, at present, is not sufficiently able to mobilize them to the needs of further progressive technological and social development.

Modern researcher P.Bond in his book *The Change of Élites. From Apartheid to Neo-Liberalism in South Africa* writes that partly the struggle against apartheid should have opened the way to *developmental* liberation.

The way from apartheid to neo-liberalism in South Africa' is not simply a wrong turn of 'élite bargaining', but a turning point on the way before her to ardent social struggle and leading our comrades from one century to another. Such books as that one often end up with a slogan or, not infrequently, an expressive call to action. But when 'A Luta Continua!', the banner of revolutionary nationalism is coming to a contradiction with another 'There is no Alternative!' (The chant of neo-liberalist Sirena) and is interpreted by local cynics into 'Let Looting Continue!', then, of course, there should be an alter-

¹² Hoefle J. Virtual Reality, Real Psychosis // The Executive Intelligence Review. Wash., 24.09.1999. P. 23.

native to both¹³.

One can not but agree to that statement.

¹³ Bond P. *Élite Transition, From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa*. London / Sterling (Virginia) / Pietermaritzburg, [Pluto Press / University of Natal Press], 2000. P.252, 302.

GLOBALIZATION OF SHADOW ECONOMY AND AFRICA

Evgenia Morozenskaya *

The activization of shadow economy takes place in all subsystems of the world economy. Despite quite substantial differences in market economies of highly developed, moderately developed, developing and transitional countries, this process has common historical and economic roots in all of them.

Even if one ignores turns, deviations and backward movements, changes in the social set-up do not invariably lead to the perfection of the economic and social life of the society and individuals. Probably, the phenomenon of informal economy, which exists since the emergence of commodity and money relations and the state, is a kind of the negative reaction of the socioeconomic system to the attempts aimed at its modernization.

Another Challenge to the World Community

Emerging as a reaction to the development of commodity and money relations, informal (shadow) economic activity reflects the general regularities of the historical evolution of socioeconomic systems.

A change occurs in its subjects: small communities are replaced, on the one hand, by progressively individualized producers and, on the other, by organized criminal groups, whose activity acquires an international or even global character. The spheres of this activity change both territorially (as a result of urbanization, shadow economy increasingly shifts to urban localities) and structurally (as the situation at regional, national and world markets changes, shadow economic activity shifts from mining to manufacturing and vice versa). The scale and development level of shadow economic activity depend on the degree of state regulation and development of market relations.

The present situation is totally opposite to the classical market economy. In that epoch, the redistribution of incomes, accelerated development of the military machine and expansion of the social sphere required huge resources; since the latter, by definition, might originate only from the official

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(registered) sector, this sector grew much faster than the total private income. Nowadays, shadow economy grows faster than officially registered companies. The total private income increases more rapidly than the official income¹.

As the world economy globalizes, the shadow economic relations that formed earlier at the national, regional or branch level get a new impetus for territorial expansion, penetration of new spheres of economy and modification within existing shadow structures to adapt themselves to the new conditions of economic activity.

We are witnessing the emergence of new branches of shadow economy, which actively compete with not only official market structures and national government agencies but the regional and world communities of states².

The shadow sectors of world economy that affect interests of many countries include overtly 'black' criminal business (slave, drug and arms trade) and the so-called gray business, not registered by official statistics. World shadow economy is obviously among the global problems of our epoch, because it affects the sphere of the international exchange and renewal of all production factors (goods, services, capital, manpower, management and knowledge).

The fundamental reason of the emergence and development of international economic relations is the difference in economic resources of different countries. On the one hand, they lead to the development of the international division of labour; on the other, to the exchange of resources. In their

¹ *The Underground Economies: Tax Evasion and Informal Distribution*. (Ed. by Feige E.L.) – Cambridge, New York, etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 21-26.

² The latter circumstance is not an 'achievement' of the modern period alone. As early as the 19th century the leading powers of the world united their efforts to eradicate such informal activity as slave trade by seizing the ships that transported slaves from Africa to the New World (Abramova S.Yu. *Afrika: chetyre stoletiya rabotorgovli* (Africa: Four Centuries of Slave Trade). Moscow, Nauka, 1992, pp. 143-220). Regular patrolling of the African coast by warships of Britain, France and the North American United States, began at Britain's initiative, increased the informal slave traders' and ship owners' risk cost many times in comparison with American slave owners, many of whom were simultaneously captains of US patrol ships. This caused a drastic increase in the price of slaves and, as a result, in the number of slave smugglers, whose profit rate reached 1000-2000% (ibid., p. 217, 224). It was estimated that in the recent decades of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, more slaves were smuggled from Africa than in three centuries of legal slave trade.

turn, these processes give rise to parallel shadow economic structures, which strive to capitalize on them, operating in the sphere of the predominant national economic resources.

Smuggling: an Ancient Profession

Smuggling became an inalienable part of international trade, this historically first form of international economic relations. In many countries, it remains a quite profitable sphere of shadow business.

Many countries of the ancient and mediaeval East (especially China) and West, as well as Russia, imposed state monopoly on the production and/or sale of such key consumer goods as salt, alcohol drinks, iron, etc. The state used its monopoly to collect an additional indirect tax from consumers as a component of the price of a commodity. This led to either direct protests (e.g., the 'salt mutiny' in Moscow tsardom) or concealed resistance, mainly in the form of large-scale smuggling, which yielded high profits.

At present, smuggling is the more attractive the wider is the gap between the prices for similar goods in different countries. This gap may be a result of deficit or higher price of a commodity in the importing country, caused by the higher cost of production or high custom dues.

Deficit as an attribute of an economic system based on administrative control has become a thing of the past almost everywhere. High cost of production is characteristic mainly of developed market economy owing to high salaries, not always compensated by applying more productive equipment. At the same time, the most ancient form of smuggling as a method of seizing the state's fiscal proceeds in the form of import dues seems to be a specific feature of the countries with backward market structures and rigid state policy, i.e., the developing countries³.

³ A glaring example is smuggling from Gambia to neighbour Senegal, where high import dues persist as a legacy of the protectionist policy of the 1960s. The highest dues (97%) are imposed on luxuries; the products of foreign enterprises (even if they work in the country itself) that compete with similar products of local producers are subject to dues of 59%. Other rates are: consumer goods – 48%, goods imported for production purposes – 26%, socially important goods (medicines, books, etc.) – 5%.

In this situation smuggling of foreign goods from Gambia, where import dues are much lower, is extremely profitable to both Gambians and the Senegalese who resell smuggled articles. However, the considerable losses of the Senegalese budget make the state keep the dues high, which, in its turn, stimulates smuggling. Even fluctuations of the currency exchange rate cannot break this vicious circle.

Smuggling may be considered the most ancient form of international economic relations as a tool of concealing entrepreneurs' incomes from the taxation. In the course of time, the sphere of activities that may be described as shadow economy permanently expanded. It is difficult now to find a sphere of human activity where incomes are not concealed to evade taxation.

As a rule, it is a result of excess taxation burden, which small- and medium-scale entrepreneurs are unable to bear. This is a brilliant example of incapacity of the state authorities for attracting entrepreneurs to legal economic activity by reasonable legislation, which does not affect their ineptest in continuing economic activity. Notably, the share of the enterprises engaged only in legal economic activity is, as a rule, higher in the countries with well-developed market systems than in those with transitional economy or developing countries. In other words, the volume of shadow economy depends on the character and level of the socioeconomic development of a country.

However, considering other economic crimes than tax evasion, we can see a different picture.

Activities of this kind are criminalized as inflicting losses not only on the budget and other funds but on the society as a whole. This damage may be not only material (e.g., if it is inflicted by the misappropriation of state property) but moral and physical (such as that resulted by trade in drugs, arms, etc.).

True, some states and international organizations, such as the Institute of Economic Development of the World Bank, do not consider such activities a component of shadow economy. Meanwhile, they are the most important sphere of the global shadow economic activity. This is clear from the new list of international criminal activities of 17 items, published recently by the UNO⁴. Most of them are aimed at getting super profits, and only organized criminal groups can commit such crimes. Obviously, such kinds of global shadow activity are next to impossible in the former socialist, developing and underdeveloped countries with their immature market systems.

⁴ In addition to illicit trade in arms and drugs, this includes money laundering, terrorism, theft of art pieces and cultural articles, theft of intellectual property, hackery, environmental crimes, plane hijacking, seizure of land transport, piracy, trade in men, trade in human organs, insurance fraud, false bankruptcy, penetration of legal business by criminal communities, corruption, bribing public figures, party activists and elected officials.

Running from Taxes Faster and Faster

The globalization of shadow economy manifests itself not only in its rapid spread to almost all countries (with the possible exception of the few totalitarian states that apply reprisals to control economy) but in active use of the merger of financial flows.

Owing to differences in taxation rates, the routes of money movement are distorted, and world financial resources are redistributed artificially. The contradiction between the global character of production (realized, first of all, in TNCs' activity) and exchange (this globality is strengthened by the development of 'electronic trade'), on the one hand, and local character of taxation, on the other, stimulates entrepreneurs to strike deals not in the country of origin but in the countries with 'favourable' taxation.

Demand gives rise to supply, and we see 'tax asylums' popping up all over, first of all, offshore zones of financial activity. Legally, this is not shadow activity, since a company is registered officially, is really engaged in production activity and diligently pays taxes. But actually, the situation when production assets of a company are in one country and form a component of its national wealth, while its taxes replenish the budget of another country, where they are much less than in the country of origin, is among the most widespread forms of shadow economic activity. Resorting to this sophisticated method (it is next to impossible to disclose it), those who go to seek job (including illegal) abroad also evade taxes at home. In the developed countries, most of them are highly skilled specialists; most of job seekers from the developing countries are unskilled workers. Going abroad, many of them take advantage of taxation privileges. For instance, in some countries those foreigners who live there less than six months a year are exempted from taxation.

Globalization of economy gives rise to the widespread practice of evading not only direct (income tax, profit tax, property tax, etc.) but indirect taxation (value added tax (VAT), excises, custom dues, etc.). Full elimination of international custom borders or even a reduction in custom dues brings down the taxation level for both producers and consumers of the final product. This is why VAT became the most important source of budget revenue as a result of the taxation reforms carried out in most of the countries or the world in the 1990s. In all countries that collect VAT a trend is observed towards the expansion of the tax basis owing to the emergence of new services which technically cannot be purchased en masse in a neighbour country. Shifting the whole tax burden on consumers by imposing VAT, the state tries to eliminate all loopholes for tax evasion used by both

producers and all other beneficiaries, as well as consumers. This is more characteristic of industrial countries and their most active partners in the developing world, such as the North African countries, which carried out market-oriented taxation reforms⁵.

To simplify the national taxation system and facilitate tax collection in the setting of increased globalization of production, trade and financial activities, many countries expand the application of international accounting and statistical standards and gradually standardize the taxation policy⁶.

The African Informal Sector: a Version of Shadow Economy

Informal sector is an important component of African economy.

Shadow relations develop there in two opposite directions: firstly, the role of the state in shadow economy strengthens; secondly, unofficial self-organization becomes active in the informal sector.

There are different opinions about the essence and forms of informal economy. The study of this phenomenon began in the 1970s, when it was detected in both highly developed and developing countries⁷. By the 1990s, it became clear that the initial evaluation of shadow economy as a special type of economic activity, not registered by official statistics, was too narrow. It did not reflect the scope and multifaceted character of this phenomenon and its economic, historical and sociopsychological aspects.

What are the modern ideas about the characteristic features of shadow (informal) economy?

⁵ *Tax Systems in North Africa and the European Countries*. (Ed. by L. Bernardi, J. Owens). Boston, 1994, p. 55.

⁶ This process almost has not involved the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. All they are characterized by weakness of the taxation levers of state regulation. In 1995 the average share of taxation proceeds in the GDP of 46 countries of sub-Saharan Africa did not exceed 15.7%, although this figure varied from 8-10% (Benin, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tchad, Uganda) to 30.5-38.3% (Lesotho, the Seychelles and Zimbabwe) (calculated from Stotsky L.G., Wolde Mariam Asegedech. *Tax Effort in sub-Saharan Africa*. Washington, IMF, 1997, p. 6).

⁷ Informal economy fell within scholars' view as early as the 1930s (Gutmann P.M. 'The Subterranean Economy' – *Financial Analyst Journal*, N.Y., 1977, Vol. 33, 34, p. 24-27), but it was K. Hart, a British anthropologist, who coined this term on the basis of his study of the urban population incomes in Ghana (Hart K. 'Informal Urban Income and Urban Employment Opportunities in Ghana'. – *Journal of Modern African Studies*. L., 1973, Vol. 11, No 1, pp. 61-90).

V. Radaev treats shadow economy as all kinds of economic relations not reflected in official statistics⁸. They may differ in the degree of legality (legal, extralegal, semi legal and criminal activities), motives of a subject's attitude to accounting (deliberate concealment of deals from the statistical and taxation agencies or simple carelessness in accounting) and degree of coverage by statistical recording.

Many authors attach the primary importance to the social aspect of shadow economy because of its serious and long-term social implications. In addition to purely economic motives of illegal behaviour (the striving to increase the profit or get a super profit), such authors take into account the striving to improve one's social status, strengthen one's power, suppress business and political competitors, etc.⁹.

The criteria of classifying economic activity as informal also changed. Earlier, these criteria were confined to regularity of employees' labour, fixation or non-fixation of their salaries and labour rationalization level. The present criteria number more than a dozen, including entrance barriers, technologies, management, capital, working time, salaries, financial services used by an enterprise, relations with customers, constant costs, use of advertisement, state subsidies, market orientation, etc.¹⁰.

The circle of the persons considered informal sector employees also expanded. K. Hart divided them into two categories, depending on the kind of their incomes, namely, (1) legal informal incomes in the forms of wages in agriculture, manufacturing industry, service sphere and of private transfer payments and (2) illegal informal incomes in the form of payment for illegal services (usurers, smugglers, prostitutes, racketeers, drug traffickers, etc.) and of criminal transfers as a result of theft¹¹.

In the late 1980s, the authors of a study concerning the role of unofficial economy in North African countries identified the following categories of informal sector employees: (1) owners and employees of unregistered enterprises, i.e., illegal employees; (2) permanent or temporary unregistered

⁸ Radaev V. *Shadow Economy in Russia: Changing Contours. – 'Pro et Contra'*, M., 1999, Vol. 4, No 1, pp. 5-21.

⁹ Ryvkina R. 'From Shadow Economy to Shadow Society'. – *Pro et Contra*. M., 1999, Vol. 4, No 1, p. 26.

¹⁰ Fidler P., Webster E. 'The Informal Sectors of West Africa'. – *The Informal Sector and Microfinance Institutions in West Africa* (Ed. By Webster L., Fidler P.). Wash., 1006, p. 6.

¹¹ Hart K. 'Informal Urban Income and Urban Employment Opportunities in Ghana'. – *Journal of Modern African Studies*. L., 1973, Vol. 11, No 1, p. 69.

employees of officially registered enterprises; (3) unregistered craftsmen; (4) persons registered at one enterprise and actually employed at another, informal one; (5) unregistered permanently or temporary working street traders, shoe polishers, etc.; (6) persons engaged in illegal business, criminals and members of criminal communities¹².

Panacea for Backwardness?

By the late 1990s, almost all branches of production and kinds of occupational activity in Africa were involved to a degree in unofficial economy. The report prepared by the UNO on the basis of the papers of a seminar that discussed the development of the African informal sector noted not only the establishment of contacts between the informal and formal sectors but their direct integration¹³. If one remembers, in addition, the wide spectrum of bureaucratic offices at various levels, used as a tool for getting illegal incomes, one will find that in the 1990s the informal sector accounted for much more new jobs than 60-70% (the figure cited in the report).

Owing to the considerable expansion of the informal sector and variety of the interpretations of this concept, in the 1980s and 1990s both researchers and international officials came to consider this sector a kind of panacea for manifest socioeconomic backwardness.

The reason of this paradoxical conclusion (and of the respective recommendations given by international organizations and their experts to African government agencies) in the setting of combating unofficial economic activity at a really global scale is, in our opinion, deliberate or otherwise identification of the informal sector with small- and medium-scale entrepreneur activities, which actually are a basis for sustained economic development. Meanwhile, some studies demonstrated that there is no direct correlation between the size of an enterprise and its allegiance to shadow (informal) activity. On the contrary, a feature of transitional economy is that an enterprise, irrespective of the branch and region, participates in informal operations the more actively the more successful it is in legal business¹⁴. Since many African countries resort to double standards in taxation, the larger and more successful enterprises have to conceal apart of their incomes.

¹² *Tax Systems in North Africa and the European Countries*. (Ed. by L. Bernardi, J. Owens). Boston, 1994, pp. 165-166.

¹³ *Informal Sector Development in Africa*. N.Y., UN, 1996, p. 5.

¹⁴ Simachev Yu. *Shadow Activity of Private Enterprises. – 'Voprosy Statistiki'*, 1997, No 7, pp. 20-24.

At the same time, not all small enterprises are unregistered. The authors, who studied small-scale business in seven countries, including Algeria, Tunisia and Nigeria, found that the overwhelming majority of enterprises with an employment of less than ten are registered. In Algeria almost all small-scale producers and traders have certificates; otherwise, they are liable to a tangible fine¹⁵.

State Ransom

Africa has become a sphere of interaction or, maybe, confrontation of two similar processes, which differ in their nature and final purposes.

On the one hand, the traditional informal sector of African economy expands. We mean the totality of enterprises (kinds of economic activity) unregistered by national or local authorities.

On the other hand, in the 1980s and 1990s, as the globalization process developed, shadow economy spread at the national and regional levels, encompassing groups of countries with similar economic development levels and socioeconomic set-up and connecting them with the world economy as a whole.

Taking place in countries with underdeveloped market economy, these processes cause a substantial change in the role of economic subjects in reproduction. Installing themselves in the activity of modern sector enterprises, as they are appealed to by international experts, including TNC branches and enterprises with foreign capital, as a rule, through the subcontract system, local informal business becomes a participant of two different forms of economic delegalization, namely, traditional and modern.

Moreover, there is a long chain of the participants of the production process, who mediate between the main customer (e.g., a TNC branch), the main producer (a local enterprise of the informal sector), the informal sale organization (e.g., a shop) and the subcontractor. This scheme not only deprives the exchequer of all intermediate payments but strengthens parallel economic structures. The 'rules of the game' that apply to underground economy are such that each of these structures is isolated, being too weak to expand its contacts or develop partnership with other similar structures. In absence of strong mafia groups, which emerge at a higher stage of economic development, these structures cannot unite in a full-fledged and self-sufficient parallel economy.

¹⁵ Morrisson Ch.H. - B.S. Lecomte, K. Dudin. *Micro-Enterprises and the Institutional Framework in Developing Countries*. P., OECD, 1994, p. 1613.

However, this process undoubtedly develops. Its directions, pace and forms are, paradoxically enough, closely related to the official authorities' activities and economic policy.

All kinds of corruption can be found here, from primitive bribery to formally legal and essentially illegal collection of payments to the budget, usually to the local budget.

Most of the African countries face serious difficulties in accumulating financial resources to replenish the budget revenue. State sector enterprises are unable to pay as much as it is necessary to satisfy the financial needs of a country and provide its population with social services.

The only instrument of the state regulation that is able to solve this problem to a degree is taxation. But in this sphere the African countries face the well-known factors of a low share of taxes in the GDP of the poorest countries: low per capita income; predominance of agriculture in the economy, where it is difficult to collect taxes; domination of state ownership in non-agricultural production (in this case, taxes are used, as a rule, to support ineffective state-run enterprises rather than to replenish the budget revenue); small number of sufficiently large private enterprises; political instability, which, on the one hand, deters foreign investors and, on the other, leads to technical difficulties in tax collection; lastly, large informal sector, which, by definition, cannot be a sphere of effective taxation.

These circumstances and the ineffective structure of taxes themselves (e.g., foreign trade dues are characterized by excess and high level of tariff rates) makes government agencies seize a part of producers' income, in essence, illegally.

For instance, the state sale agencies, which are in charge of procurement of agricultural products, pay the farmers less than the market price level, imposing on them a concealed tax, which is not fixed as taxation revenue. The local authorities enjoy especially wide opportunities to enrich themselves by introducing new exceptions in the collection of indirect taxes, first of all, of the VAT. These requisitions often run counter to the tax legislation.

The picture is supplemented by the condition of the taxation and custom services themselves. As a rule, their personnel are ill-trained, ill-paid and weakly controlled by the higher government agencies. Bribery and corruption, including direct concealment of a part of the taxation proceeds, flourish at all levels.

In many African countries the official local taxes drastically increased in the 1980s, when, under the influence of a tremendous economic recession and resulting leap in the budget deficit, some expense items were transferred

to municipal authorities. Meanwhile, local taxes are heterogeneous, and their collection is not regulated and controlled properly. As a result, craftsmen who manufacture same products may be taxed or not, depending on the side of this street where a workshop is located.

The state policy of this kind paves the way towards misuse of official authorities, first of all, for illegal administrative taxation. For instance, Nigerian taxi drivers transfer up to 15% of their incomes to policemen as bribes¹⁶.

In addition, the state itself stimulates many producers to evade taxes by strengthening the tax burden too much or applying double standards. For instance, the enterprises included in the accounting plan pay taxes at much higher rates than others, most of which are outside the modern sector of economy. For instance, in Senegal the bulk of taxes is paid by a relatively small group of the population, namely, those who get salary or own officially registered enterprises.

Taxes are collected from the informal sector by issuing trade certificates, where and when it is possible. The payment for such a certificate is based on a fixed state estimate of profitability of a given kind of enterprise; as a rule, it has nothing to do with the real level of added value. As a result, officially registered enterprises with relative higher profitability find it proper to become informal, which many of them do really. At the first glance, the state must reconsider this fiscal policy, which is so unfavourable for the budget, but double standards are still applied. On the one hand, the state strengthens tax pressure on the functioning enterprises of the formal sector and their employees; on the other, it farms out fiscal functions to the local administration, and the taxes collected from the informal sector do not reach the exchequer. The local authorities often collected fixed amounts from small-scale enterprises, irrespective of their profitability, bringing their owners, who form the backbone of the informal sector, to the verge of bankruptcy, because the local fixed taxes imposed on commodity producers are, as a rule, higher than central taxes.

Thus, the criminalizing government agencies of the African countries stimulate subjects of economy by their policy to 'shift to the shadow', to the informal sector. As a result, the latter grew in the 1990s at an unprecedented scale in almost all developing countries. The UNCTAD noted in its report on the Least Developed States in 1997 that the informal sector accounted for almost whole economic growth, employing huge masses of the population

¹⁶ Berthelemy J.-C., Seck A., Voure'h A. *Growth in Senegal. A Last Opportunity?* P., OECD, 1996, p. 173.

not employed by official enterprises and swallowing up the whole branches of the economy. This process is fraught with deindustrialization and marginalization of whole national economies¹⁷.

Unlike most of other regions, African economy heavily depends on numerous sociocultural features.

The Western analysts who study the African phenomenon of informal economy have to reconsider the earlier approaches and speak about 'traditional', 'indigenous', 'family economy' rather than about shadow economy in its Western sense^{18,19,20,21}.

Market Is Not Built in a Day

The studies concerning African informal economy highlighted several features. Firstly, it is not a set of kinds of activity with clear-cut boundaries. Secondly, the problem is not presence or absence of whatever kind of regulation but the form of regulation. Instead of the traditional problem of state-market relations, the features of informal regulation come to the forefront with an emphasis either on government agencies or on personal contacts. Lastly, African informal economy is not identical to traditional kinds of activity, because the balance between the formal and informal sectors changes in the course of time; its main issue are the principles of functioning of the shadow sector and its attitude to the state and labour market²².

These conclusions were drawn on the basis of the deplorable results of the reforms carried out on the basis of the IMF and WB structural adjustment programmes in order to involve the African countries' economies in the world market economy rapidly and as fully as possible.

As a result of massed modernization of the African countries, the co-

¹⁷ *The Least Developed Countries*. A UNCTAD Report. N.Y., 1997.

¹⁸ Hart K. 'Market and State after Cold War: the Informal Economy Reconsidered'. – *Contesting Markets* (Ed. by R. Dille). Edinburgh, Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1992.

¹⁹ Roberts B. 'The Informal Sector in Comparative Perspective'. – *Perspectives on the Informal Economy* (Ed. M.E. Smith). Lanham (MD): Univ. Press of America, 1989.

²⁰ Meagher K. 'The Market in the Lived Economy: a Report on the Dynamic of Unofficial and Parallel Market Activities in the Area District Uganda'. Mimeo, Sussex: Institute of Development Studies, 1988.

²¹ Meagher K. Crisis, 'Informalization and the Urban Informal Sector in sub-Saharan Africa' – *Development and Change*, 1995, Vol. 26.

²² *Neformalnaya ekonomika. Rossiya i mir (Informal Economy. Russia and the World)*, Moscow, 1999, p. 317.

called opposite synthesis effect became quite manifest there. This means that, together with the modernization of such economic structures as the state and market, traditionalism strengthens in economy owing to the shift of the centre of gravity in economic development to the sensitization of traditional small-scale entrepreneur activity. The Western advocates of the modernization of African economy provoked a burst of neoarchaic phenomena, caused by the difficulties of the sociopsychological adaptation of the bulk of the population to the requirements of modern market. The sudden change of the forms and priorities of the development upset the balance in the economic system. Evolution of economic policy, as well as the situation at the labour, commodity and financial markets, makes a considerable inverse impact on informal economy.

The change of approaches to the evaluation of the essence of informal economy did not spare the principles of its quantitative analysis. Even J.-M. Cove, the chief economist of the World Bank, opposed the application of official statistical data for the analysis of the economic situation in Africa in the bank's report for 1997, headed *The State in the Changing World*²³. The reason is not only their well-known unreliability but the necessity to reconsider the programmes earlier recommended to developing countries, which provided for maximum curtailment of the state regulation of economy. The bank leadership mean fundamentally different methods of the quantitative evaluation of the so-called real economy as a totality of all kinds of economic activity in a given country. Instead of calculating the production scope, statistical services are suggested to calculate the total amount of the final consumption of goods and services. This approach equalizes, in effect, the formal and informal sectors of economy. Surely, this will favourably influence the results of macroeconomic analysis of each specific situation. At the same time, this approach may have negative economic, social and psychological results. *De facto* legalization of illegal economic activities, which include not only 'innocent', at the first glance, tax evasion but a wide spectrum of antisocial and criminal kinds of business, may considerably accelerate its 'shift to the shadow'. This will not only increase the state budget's losses as a result of tax evasion but may inflict a considerable moral and material harm on the society as a whole.

²³ World Bank. *World Development Report 1997*. 'The State in Changing World'. Oxford. Oxford University Press, 1997.

The State: the Main Motive Force of Economy

According to a sufficiently abstract model of 'real economy', three groups of economic subjects (agents) are equal participants of the market process:

- the state, represented by various institutional agencies and state-run enterprises in material production and the sphere of social services;
- formal (official) economy, i.e., mainly large modern enterprises, where the ownership form is private or mixed, and enterprises of the traditional sector of economy that are registered officially and pay taxes;
- informal (shadow) economy, which consists mainly of the enterprises that are not registered officially and/or evade taxes, mostly small-scale enterprises of traditional economy.

A sizable part of the public sector reflected from the very beginning and, despite all troubles caused by numerous changes in the development strategy, continues to reflect the objective socioeconomic situation in the developing countries, in particular, the poorest of them.

For instance, at independence, in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa the national state was essentially the only subject of economy that was able to mobilize investments, to further more or less active concentration of capital and to regulate the social production as a whole. The economic positions of the state strengthened in the 1960s and 1970s for both such objective reasons as weakness of local capital and lack of foreign investments, combined with a series of subjective reasons.

The most important of the latter was the strong influence of the Soviet model of economic development.

The objective necessity of effective state regulation of economy persisted in these countries also at the subsequent stages of their development. Developing countries are systems with weak feedback; they lack the ability to effectively influence economy. As early as the beginning of the 1970s S.A. Kuzmin, the author of the first Soviet study of systemic analysis of economy of developing countries, noted that weak feedback is not compensated in many developing countries by strong organization of the economic system. To accelerate economic development, either of them must be strengthened. However, the development of feedback in sophisticated economic systems is a prolonged and labour-intensive process, while it is more real to strengthen the organization of the economic system²⁴.

²⁴ Kuzmin A. *Sistemnyi analiz ekonomiki razvivayushchikhsya stran (Systemic Analysis of Economy of Developing Countries)*, Moscow, Nauka, 1972, p. 212.

The Phantom of Stabilization

The massed reorientation of African countries to the market development in the 1980s and 1990s in accordance with the IMF and WB programmes of financial stabilization and structural adjustment of economy did not yield positive results but strongly upset the parallel structural connections in economy that had formed by then. Since the late 1990s a deadlock situation began to mature in both relatively well-off and the poorest African countries.

The pivot of the stabilization programmes was consistent pursuance of the policy aimed at the limitation of the domestic demand in order to reduce import. However, in the setting of immature and structurally unbalanced economy the limitation of demand proved excessive in sub-Saharan Africa, drastically impairing the already weak stimuli for the expansion of production. As a result, the basis of economic growth was undermined at a definite stage of the reforms, i.e., the short-lived advantages of stabilization lay foundations of persistent instability and economic backwardness in the future.

The limited and imperfect regulation functions of the institutional agencies, which existed before the market reforms, were supplemented by weakening of the state control of market subjects' activity. The positive effect of this step exhausted itself quite rapidly under conditions of underdeveloped and, as it was earlier, mostly not accountable to the state informal economy, while the positions of the state, the major owner and equal participant of market activities, were grossly undermined.

All this prompts the African leaders to reconsider the role of the state in economy, strengthening its positions in managing the resources to create favourable conditions for the development of business in the social sphere. Anyway, the state regulation sphere is going to considerably expand again. However, it is unlikely that this will solve the problem of shifting of a sizable part of African economy 'to the shadow'.

AFRICA: INTERACTION OF CIVILIZATIONS

*Matvei Frenkel**

At the end of the 20th century, Africa underwent a series of radical transformations: the archaic institutions of the kin-tribe set-up died out, and the institutions of the modern society emerged. Therefore, Africa is jumping above centuries and formations.

A society that artificially accelerates the development pace gets involved in social upheavals and suffers of political instability, since changes in the social relations and, therefore, in the psychology of the popular masses considerably lags behind the political and economic changes. One can borrow new ideas from outside and import modern equipment, but one cannot import a well-formed national bourgeoisie or working class. The attempts to make the popular masses agree with the changes to which they are not prepared by their natural development end in dictatorship and one-party regimes. Figurally, each African country needs a Peter the Great of its own to find a window through on Europe and force the society from the day before yesterday to the present.

The change of the formations that occurs in Africa has taken the shape of a fierce clash between two forms of economic activity, namely, the commodity-money and subsistence activity, the latter being of the predominantly kin-and-tribe type. The economic upheavals are accompanied by a conflict between the European and African cultures. An original economy emerges in the crucible of these conflicts; new development models are formed to intake the best elements of both cultures.

In this context, a question arises about the role of the interaction among socioeconomic formations in the mankind's development. What happens when societies that are at different development levels and belong to different formations get involved in contact? In particular, what was the result of the contacts between capitalist Europe and Africa, predominantly governed by the kin-and-tribe relationship?

The level of the productive forces is decisive in characterizing a society. Their condition heavily depends on how much a society applies the modern achievements of the mankind in the production and relations of production.

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Therefore, international contacts among the peoples who belong to different formations play a decisive role. These contacts include exchange of information, commodities and achievements in the spheres of production, science and culture, as well as information about the social set-up and society functioning. These processes take place even when one party subdues the other and plunders its wealth on the basis of a winner's right.

The subdued peoples' attitude to the conquerors, as it was formulated by African ideologists, may be reduced to two extremes. One of them is an appeal to the Africans to copy the conquerors' experience in order to become as powerful as them in the course of time. Another is the insistence on the Africans' spiritual superiority over the Europeans. According to the former approach, the newly independent African states become republics of the Westminster type; the extreme forms of the latter result in dictatorial regimes with armed conflicts and ethnic and religious intolerance. The intermediate conceptions combine the features of the extremes.

When the societies that are at different stages of the social development establish a contact, they exchange information; this exchange may be compared with the process described by the law of communicating vessels. The liquids in such vessels reach an equal level; similarly, contacting formations are bound to reach an equal development level.

The achievements in the fields of the productive forces, culture and science are transferred from a more developed society to a less developed one. This is a bilateral process: the more developed society borrows new production methods and cultural achievements from the less developed one (e.g., Europe borrowed the fundamentals of mathematics, compass, gunpowder, wheel and many other things that changed the mankind's life from the East).

As it is in the case of liquids, the information exchange between the formations is the more rapid the wider is the gap between their development levels. Yet if the gap is too wide, the backward party may ruin, being unable to cope with the avalanche of new information. Maybe, this is the reason of the extinction of some peoples of the Russian North and Latin American Indians as a result of contacting with the modern European civilization.

Being similar to the physical process, the contact between formations differs principally from it. Whereas the equal liquid level is a result of its transition from one vessel to another, an interaction between two formations may lead to an upsurge of both. A more backward society enjoys some major privileges: it imbibes the world culture achievements without repeating all stages of the mankind's headway towards them. In other words, traditional societies may achieve the modern level within historically short terms; this may take

decades, but they cannot be compared with centuries and millenia that might be required without borrowing the foreign experience.

Further, unlike liquids, formations never reach an absolutely equal level. The permanent gap in the development levels is the motive force of the mankind's progress. Within a formation, one people may leave other peoples behind to be outdistanced by another nation in the course of time. If the development levels of all formations become almost equal after some centuries, an all-human civilization may arise.

Contacting with capitalist Europe, Africa considerably accelerated the pace of the socioeconomic and political development. The natural process was upset; a leap-like development began: Africa rushed from mainly pre-class formations to the modernity. This impetuous development of the society may result in the emergence of preclass social strata. In Africa, the new elite became such a stratum. It is neither bourgeoisie nor intelligentsia; it is an independent social group, a receptor and propagator of the ideas of the postindustrial society.

Describing the elite, the Western sociologists mean a community characterized by the domination of other people, certain closeness and corporativity (to enter it, one has to overcome some barriers), feeling of superiority as a result of belonging to the chosen stratum and recognition of their superiority by the majority. As a result, the elite establishes standards for the whole society by the character of their actions and way of thinking; their influence or power ensue from the fact that they are recognized as the example to be imitated¹.

Rulers and chiefs played the role of the elite in Africa for centuries. It was after the Europeans came to Africa that a stratum of people who relied on the commodity and money relations and legal standards of the bourgeois society began to form there. This stratum, called the 'new elite', increasingly competed with the traditional elite and gradually became an important force in the African society.

The African new elite differs substantially from the elites of other continents. In the developed bourgeois states it personifies and advocates the interests of the dominant class; in Africa, where the social differentiation of the society is incomplete, the situation is different. In most of its countries, the formation of the classes of the modern society just begins. Therefore, the elite of these countries is not the industrial aristocracy, as it is in a bourgeois

¹ Smythe H.H. and Smythe M.M. *The New Nigerian Elite*, Stanford (California), 1960. P. 8.

society, and not landlords, as it is in Latin America, but mainly bureaucracy and politicians, whose incomes depend almost exclusively on the positions they occupy. There is another striking difference between the new African elite and European and American elites. The Western elites personify their national cultures; the African elite is a transmitter of an alien civilization. They have adopted alien languages, customs, manners and ideas. Naturally, they try to adapt all this to the local conditions. Yet the fact is that their departure point is the Western civilization.

Lastly, the new African elite emerged not as a result of the natural development of the society but as a result of the invasion of an alien force, namely, colonialism, which imposed an alien social set-up, capitalism, and an alien, European culture on Africa.

Borrowing the achievements of the European culture, the new elite got acquainted with such theories of the social development as democracy, socialism and even fascism. Therefore, followers of many ideologies may be found among them. The new elite's ideological preferences may predetermine the choice of the development path by an African country.

The implantation of the commodity and money relations and creation of European schools and political and administrative institutions shook the African society to its very foundation and prepared it to be replaced by a modern society. This process will continue for several centuries, when the traditional and capitalist social systems will coexist and influence each other, until a new modern set-up emerges as a synthesis of new and traditional Africa.

Most of the researchers agree that the indispensable signs of the new elite are their high social positions, 'civilized way of life', i.e., following the European standards instead of the traditional ones, and European education. Whereas the prestige of the traditional elite is based on their 'noble blood' and their position in a tribe, the prestige of the new elite is the prestige of knowledge, based on the European education as a source of power and influence. Thus, they were characterized not by a noble origin but by education and ability to find a place in the emerging colonial society. Therefore, there were more ordinary Africans among them than descendants and relatives of chiefs. Education and skills were the criteria of eligibility to the new African elite.

The above is the basis for the following definition: the new African elite is a social stratum that emerged as a result of the colonial division of the continent as a personification of alien capitalism. Differing even outwardly from the bulk of the population in the way of life, abandoning the traditions and perceiving the European culture, they accomplish an important histori-

cal mission by leading the transition of the African society from the precapitalist to the modern formations.

As noted above, the circle of the values the new elite cherish includes both the European and the traditional cultural achievements. Surely, these values differ in different countries and individuals. Nonetheless, it can be distinguished at the first glance.

It is easy to explain this symbiosis. Being subject to the sophisticated impact of two cultures, the people of the new elite have to combine them in a way. Figuratively, they got power from Europe, but they have to rule Africa. Kenneth Little, an expert in West African history, describes them as a 'social hybrid'. There is a permanent conflict in their minds between the centuries-old traditions of the family, kin and tribe and modern views imbibed while learning abroad. Physically (but not psychologically), they belong to their countries and peoples. In a sense, they are alien in their own countries. They were taught the traditional experience in the childhood; they studied the scientifically predicted development of the society abroad. As a result, it is difficult to them to find a place in the society at present.

The 'civilized' way of life isolates the new elite from the popular masses. It may be asserted that they live in a European manner, combined with elements of the traditional way of life, while the popular masses live in a traditional manner, combined with some elements of modernity. The gap between the people and new elite is easily felt. Suits and ties have become an inalienable attribute of the new elite, who wear them even during strong heat lest be confused with ordinary Africans.

Even within a family, there is a division line between the 'civilized' Africans and the bulk of the population. Misunderstandings and conflicts between educated children and their illiterate parents and relatives are quite common; sometimes they become quite acute and continue for years.

The monogamous family of the new elite is a genuine revolution in the African society. Traditionally, an extended family inhabited a single compound and was engaged in farming on a single land plot; usually, it was subsistence farming. Elite families live separately. Their relatives often visit them but do not live with them permanently. What is the principal matter, a monogamous family relies on the commodity and money relations. Its emergence is a sign of the inevitable victory of private ownership as a mortal blow to the traditional society. Thus, the monogamous family as a product of the commodity and money relations destroys the traditional society to make these relations universal.

The elite tend to create monogamous families with equality of the consorts. Obviously, this trend will spread gradually to other social strata, since

the implantation of the commodity and money relations will inevitably lead to the predominance of the monogamous family.

The new elite understand clearly that education is their main wealth and strive to transfer this wealth to their children at any price.

The old and new elites are related by blood, but the former weaken, and the latter strengthen. Actually, the institution of chiefs is incompatible with capitalism. Practically, a traditional chief cannot become a national leader: his powers are limited territorially to the narrow interests of his tribe. As the representative of a particular tribe, he faces an unfriendly or even hostile attitude of other ethnic groups of his country.

The competition between the new and old elites for the influence on the society is far from the completion. Undoubtedly, the future belongs to the new elite, but this does not mean that they may ignore the chiefs. Actually, they always demonstrate their respect for the chiefs, considered the symbols of the Africans' historical past and guarantors of the unity of the nation on the spot.

The result is a peculiar division of functions: the influence of the traditional elite is stronger in the countryside and that of the new elite in the urban localities. The new elite pursue their policy through the chiefs. It is the latter who collect taxes, organize road construction, etc. In fact, nothing can be done without tribal chiefs in an African country.

Being the youngest social stratum, the new elite try to rely on the chiefs' authority among the people. Without making advances to them, the new elite pursue a policy that ruins this institution. They have no choice: they have to realize the ideas of both the national unity and the all-round development of the commodity and money relations. A success of this policy amounts to the ruin of the institution of chiefs.

In addition, the new elite differ from the people by their faith. Most of them are Christians, while the popular masses are either animists or Muslims. This is the situation in, e.g., Liberia, where a person's confession is a sign of his or her belonging to a definite stratum of the new elite. The clans from which the presidents originated were parishers of the Protestant-Episcopal and Methodist churches. The membership in free-mason lodges was very important. Unless you are a member of the Ancient and Accepted Order of Free Masons or, at least, the less privileged United Brothers of Friendship, you are not eligible for a high position in the administration².

The elder generation of the African leaders is characterized by a stronger adherence to Christianity. Surely, this does not prevent them from

² Fraenkel, M. *Tribe and Class in Monrovia* // London, 1964. P. 161, 192.

criticizing some aspects of the church's activities. The younger leaders' attitude to Christianity is more pragmatic. They advocate the Africanization of the church, limitation of its influence and its use in the state's interests.

The European colonization of Africa made its peoples face many problems. The main of them were as follows: whether it was true that the Africans were biologically unequal to the Europeans and therefore were doomed to be their slaves; how to treat the European colonization; how to overcome Africa's obvious lagging behind bourgeois Europe.

The so-called bourgeois enlighteners were first to try to answer these questions in the mid-19th century. They claimed that the purpose of the continent was to copy the experience of Europe, which left all other regions behind in its development. They considered independence of the colonies a problem of the remote future. They believed that the modernization of Africa would take place owing to 'selfless aid' of the colonial powers and dreamt of a governed evolution process in the continent. They appealed the Africans to give up their traditions and spiritual heritage, replacing them by the European culture. They wanted the Africans to become 'black Europeans'.

At the same time, the 'bourgeois enlighteners' held that all races are equal and lagging of some of them behind others has concrete historical reasons and may be overcome. They advocated the national consolidation of Africans, preservation of some of the African customs and expansion of the Africans' participation in governing colonies and the Christian church. Thus, there were elements of nationalism in their views. The most eminent ideologists of the 'bourgeois enlightenment' were Samuel Croater (1806-1891) and James Horton (1835-1883).

The 'bourgeois enlighteners' were succeeded by 'cultural nationalists', who advocated the preservation of the original African culture. They believed that all races are equal but different and that the Africans will ever differ from the Europeans in their culture and way of life.

The theoreticians of 'cultural nationalism', founded by Edward W. Blyden (1832-1912)³, proclaimed the slogans of 'spiritual decolonization' and 'Africa for the Africans' and formulated the principles of 'original Africa' and 'African individuality'. These principles made the Africans be proud of their spiritual heritage but contained some elements that were fraught with feelings of racial superiority and exclusiveness. The 'cultural nationalists'

³ For details see: Fraenkel M.Yu. *Obshchestvennaya mysl britanskoi Zapadnoi Afriki vo vtoroi polovine XIX v. (Social Thought of British West Africa in the Second Half of the 19th Century)*, Moscow, 1977. P. 42-84, 85-162, 214.

launched a campaign for the revival of African rites, study of the African history and giving up European clothes and names.

An important feature of the forming ideology was its supranational character. The first ideologists of Tropical Africa could not speak on behalf of a country. For instance, Nigeria did not exist in the 19th century. Sierra Leone consisted of Freetown alone; Liberia was confined to the city of Monrovia.

As a result, the motive force of African nationalism at this stage was not loyalty to a definite country but the feeling of belonging to certain race as the basis of the future nation. Owing to the absence of completely formed nations and similarity of the destinies of most of the Negroid peoples (almost all they experienced the distresses of slave trade, colonialism and racial discrimination), the nationalists proclaimed the conception of pan-Africanism, based on the thesis about the common destinies of all Negroid peoples of Africa, the USA and West Indies. In other words, pan-Africanism became the initial stage of African nationalism.

These two trends (either following the European path or adhering to the original development form) determine the ideology of modern Africa. Surely, the theories of Westernists and men of the soil may be called and worded in a different way, but this does not change their essence.

* * *

To sum up, the new elite formed as an antipode to the traditional elite, personified by chiefs and rulers, to serve colonial authorities. They mastered the standards of the bourgeois civilization, including commodity and money relations, embraced Christianity, adopted monogamous family, and became propagandists of these novations in the African society. Thus, it was the new elite that commenced the modernization of the African traditional society.

The factors of the domination of the new elite were incompleteness of the class structure in Tropical Africa and strong impact of Europe and the USA on the social processes that developed there since the 15th century.

The new elite possess a very valuable quality. They easily perceive all novations they deem useful for Africa. Their rapid perception of the modern ideological conceptions is the decisive factor in the competition for Africa's world outlook and choice of the path of its development. The ideas supported by them become a material force after being perceived by the African masses. Therefore, the best method of implanting various ideologies in Africa is to win the African elites' support for them.

The new elite are a transitional social stratum. High salaries, various privileges that ensue from their high social position, corruption and nepo-

tism have become specific forms of the primitive accumulation of capital by them. Getting rich, some of them get involved in business and become an important component of the emerging national bourgeoisie. Its other members who fail to accumulate capital will become the backbone of the African intelligentsia in the classical sense of this term.

The attainment of political independence by the African countries became an important stage of their development. It not only accelerated the social stratification and strengthened the impact of the revolution in science and technology on the continent but resulted in rapid urbanization and unprecedented aggravation of the confrontation between the European and traditional cultures.

Today the Western culture dominates many spheres of the Africans' life. Car horns, bright advertisements of cinema houses, the inhabitants' garments and other attributes of the urban life apparently resemble Europe. Modernity reaches the most godforsaken localities: a sewing machine in an African compound, a transistor radio in a village chief's hands, etc. are the signs of the 21st century. Yet the foggyish phenomena doggedly resist the changes.

The European and African cultures enrich and fertilize each other, which is conducive to their further development. An isolated culture is doomed to decay and perish. However, it would be wrong to believe that one can copy an alien culture. The enlighteners of the 19th century were grossly mistaken while hoping that Africa would become Black Europe in the course of time. Under the powerful impact of the alien civilization, a new but original African culture will emerge as an organic blend of the national achievements and borrowed cultural phenomena.

The independent African states are facing a difficult problem: how can they accelerate the overcoming of their tremendous backwardness? There are reasons to think that the progress of Africa will depend mainly on its successes in transforming the countryside, where 80% of its population live; they are illiterate, have not got rid of the bondage of the communal way of life and depend on the new elite, the only force that is able to guide the restructuring of the countryside, the motive force of the inevitable social changes.

The new elite occupied the leading positions in the national liberation movement as early as the colonial period. Socially, it was an appendage of the alien system. After independence was achieved, this stratum became the dominant force of the society. The contemporary African elite enjoy a strong influence and authority and is characterized by the European way of life and fair education level. It is them who determine the state policy and the destinies of society. The masses consider them the leaders in the spheres of politics, economy, culture, ethics, etc.

The new elite have not yet completed their social development. They have not elaborated all their social attributes, are quite mobile and lack family traditions. As a matter of fact, they are only the first generation of the elite. In the course of time, they will become a community of chosen families and clans.

Although most of the people who belong to the new elite originate from the countryside and their parents are illiterate, an ever widening gap has emerged between them and popular masses: they personify opposite formations. The new elite lack patience to reconvince the people, whom they consider, in the final analysis, a blind and foolish crowd. However, they understand that the implementation of their programmes and achievement of their goals depend on the people and therefore proclaim the slogans the people would support.

Thus, the new elite confront the people and, at the same time, lead them. The people still live within the narrow limits of the traditional institutions and rigidly regulated behaviour rules. The new elite have neither such institutions nor such rules. They elaborate new institutions and rules and impose them on the people. Thence is the duality that characterizes all aspects of their life and activity.

Many African writers and thinkers idealize the 'golden age' of the pre-colonial past, but it is impossible to return it. The new elite's policy is objectively conducive to the erosion of the survivals of the traditional social relations of primitive communism and formation of new relations, which lead to the triumph of modernity in Africa. This is why they are a historically progressive stratum, whose motto was formulated by its best ideologists as follows: 'Down with traditional Africa, down with Black Europe, long live modern Africa!'. The interaction between civilizations paves the way towards this modern Africa.

**THE IMPACT OF TRADITIONAL STRUCTURES AND
INSTITUTIONS ON THE INTERETHNIC RELATIONS
AND ETHNO-POLITICAL SITUATION**

Roza Ismagilova *

The article is based on the results of field studies and observations carried out in 21 African countries, as well as Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and some other CIS countries.

Among the numerous reasons of ethnic contradictions, tension and conflicts (socio-economic, political, ethno-cultural, etc.) a major role belongs to the ethnic stratification and ethnic stereotypes, to such traditional social structures as chiefs' and elders' authority, professional castes, domestic slavery and its survivals, clan hierarchy, etc. They are preserved not only in African countries but in some regions of the Russian Federation and other CIS countries, making a tangible impact on the interethnic relations and political stability.

The structures based on the division of the society into castes still persist. Traditionally, the scions of slaves are considered 'inferior people' up to present; even when such a person occupies a high position in the society, the imprint of his remote ancestors' status lies on him.

Interethnic relations are also complicated by the ethnic hierarchy and ethnic stereotypes. Persisting ethnic prejudices and biases make a negative impact on the relations between peoples, complicating the ethno-political situation everywhere.

Traditional Structures in African Countries

Ethnic hierarchy persists in many African countries. For various reasons, some peoples occupy a higher position, while other ones are on a lower step of the scale of rank. For instance, in Ethiopia the *Amhara* always occupied the topmost position, followed by the *Tigray*, *Oromo*, *Gurage*, etc. The lower steps were occupied by the peoples of the *Ometo* and *Nilotic* groups. For example, the *Yem* (known as the *Jangero* in the past) complained of being treated as second-grade citizens and called 'jangero' which they consider insulting. The lowest rank was occupied by the *Shankella*,

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Bareya, *Agaw* and *Falasha*. It was them in the past (since the 15th century) who were enslaved, and the names 'shankella' and 'bareya' are synonymous to the word 'slave'. They have always been outcasts.

The *Agaw* is a small ethnic group in the north-east of Ethiopia. They retain the features of their traditional culture and speak their mother tongue at home. They are treated as a derelict group.

The *Falasha*, descendants of the Jews, are in same condition¹. They occupy the lowest step of the scale of ranks; according to some researchers, they may be described as 'untouchables'. They are said to be able of sorcery. Some people believe that even the shadow of a *Falasha* has a magic power and is dangerous. Children wear special amulets supposed to protect them from the 'Bud', the magic sorcery ascribed to the *Falasha*.

Ethnic gradation also exists in Senegal. Although the *Wolof* form a majority of its population, the *Lebu* occupy, according to Nguyen Van Chi-Bonnardel², the first place in the hierarchy.

According to official data, there are over 200 ethnic groups in Nigeria. Among them, the *Yoruba*, *Igbo* and *Hausa* are characterized to be the highest in numbers and by the level of development. When presidents from northern Nigeria ruled the country, the *Yoruba* and *Igbo*, who live in the south, complained of the undue privileges granted to the *Hausa* from the north.

Another example: the society of the *Kanuri* in the north-east of Nigeria is clearly divided on the ethnic basis. The highest place in the scale of ranks belongs to the *Kanuri* themselves, Europeans, the *Hausa* and *Shoa Arabs*; the next one is occupied by other Muslim peoples, such as the *Fulbe*, *Yoruba*, *Babur*, *Bolewa*, *Kanembu*, *Mandara* and *Tubu*. Lastly, the lowest category consists of the so-called pagan tribes of Cameroon, as well as the *Tiv* and *Tuaregs*³.

Ethnic prejudices are common in Africa. Some peoples are considered 'aggressive', some others 'enterprising', still some others 'lazy', etc. All this makes a substantial impact on the interethnic relations. O. Klinberg and M. Zavaloni carried out an interesting study of ethnic stereotypes thirty years

¹ Baker J. *Functional Castes in Feudal Ethiopia*. // Paper Presented for the Conference on Ethiopian Feudalism, Addis-Ababa, 1976. P. 16.

² Nguyen Van Chi-Bonnardel R. *L'economie maritime et rurale de Kayar village senegalais*. Dacar, 1967. P. 83, 100.

³ Cohen R. *Social Stratification in Bornu*. // Social Stratification in Africa. New York, 1970. P. 242-244.

ago, which still retains its importance⁴.

In Angola foreign companies prefer to employ the *Ovimbundu*, considered hard-working, unlike the *Ambundu* with their reputation of lazybones.

It is considered in Kenya that the *Luo* are exclusively hard-working and able of leading, the *Kikuyu* are good in enterprise, etc.

In some areas of the Guinean coast and in Angola slave-traders employed some tribes to chase 'alive commodity'. This is still in people's memory, leaving a negative imprint on the interethnic relations. I heard about this in Nigeria, where the *Efik* mediated in slave trade, and in Ghana, where the *Fanti* supplied slaves from remote regions. In Angola the main slave suppliers were the *Lunda*, *Ovimbundu* and *Chokwe*.

Such professional groups as blacksmiths, weavers, wood carvers, etc. are treated disdainfully in many countries. Some researchers hold that they may be described as castes. Ethiopian blacksmiths are an example. They are called *Tum-to* among the *Oromo*, *Teib* among the Amhara and *Nefure* among the Gurage. All these words denote inferior groups, rejected by the society. They cannot marry any girl other than from among their group, or own land, or take part in discussing the affairs of the community.

In 1992, during an expedition to Ethiopia, I studied the role of the traditional social structures in the modern society.

For instance, the *Wolamo* despise the *Dorze* weavers; in the *Sidamo* community the *Adicho* craftsmen complained of their low social status. The *Gurage* are divided into several groups. The most respected part of the society are the *Zera* farmers, who occupy the topmost position in the social hierarchy and look down on such professional castes as the *Nefure* (blacksmiths), *Gize* (painters), *Fuga* (wood carvers), etc. These castes are segregated and kept outside the society. The *Fuga* are subject to the most ruthless discrimination. People are afraid of them, being convinced that they can impair land fertility, affect cattle productivity or even transform milk into blood or urine. Rich or poor, Christians or Muslims, they remain *Fuga* and do not nourish even a slight hope for changing the traditions. When I asked about the reasons of this discrimination, the answer was: this is the tradition, this is God's will.

Many ethnoses retain the hierarchy of clans, which leaves its imprint on the intra-ethnic relations.

My studies in southern and south-eastern Ethiopia demonstrated that some ethnic groups have an internal stratification: they distinguish superior

⁴ Klineberg O., Zavaloni M. *Nationalism and Tribalism among African Students*. Paris, 1969.

and inferior clans, and the fact of belonging to them determines a man's social status. It is possible that the lowest clans of the *Bench (Gimirra)* are descendants of slaves, and this determines their status and is the reason of their discrimination. Higher and lower clans also exist among the *Surma*. According to J. Abbink, such clans as the *Idinit*, *Bandut*, *Kamtut* and *Minja* are the lowest ones; they are segregated from social life⁵.

The existence of clan hierarchy and discrimination of the lowest clans results in a violation of the human rights and intra-ethnic tension. Moreover, in some regions the inter-clan confrontation leads to open clashes. The most striking example is Somalia, where a bloody civil war continues for several years.

It is a unique phenomenon on the global scale: a mono-ethnic country is torn by intra-ethnic conflicts based on rivalry of kins and tribes. The Somali ethnos consists of several tribes, such as the *Digil*, *Rahanwein*, *Hawiya*, *Darod*, *Isaa*, *Isak*, *Dir (Benadir)*, etc. Some authors denote them as clan-families. The tribes consist of hierarchical clans, divided into sub-clans, sub-sub-clans and *Diyas*, the smallest and the most stable units, consisting of blood relatives. Let me give an example to demonstrate the intricacy of this division. General Mohamed Farah Hassan 'Aidid', one of the main actors in the Somali politics of the recent years, is from among the *Saad*, a subgroup of the *Habr Gidir* group, which is a part of the *Herab* clan of the *Hawiya* tribe. Some authors mention an even smaller subunit of the *Said*, the *Rer-Jalaf*⁶. The competition for power involves clans and sub-clans rather than tribes.

Slavery as a category of the social and ethnic stratification was known in many African regions. Its survivals still persist. The scions of slaves experience the impact of the survivals of the remote past even today. For instance, in Ethiopia, as it was noted above, the *Shankella* were slaves in the past. Although many of them mixed with the surrounding population through inter-ethnic marriages for centuries, their slave status was remembered, according to R. Pankhurst, by seven consecutive generations⁷. The condition of the *Bareya*, who live near the Sudanese border, is the same.

Slavery coexists with the ethnic stratification among the *Azande* in

⁵ Abbink, J. *The Me'en as Historical Transformation of the Surma. Preliminary Notes on Society and Culture*. // Proceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Ethiopian Studies. 26-29 August 1986. M., 1988. P. 14.

⁶ *Africa Confidential* 1995. Vol. 36. No 1, No 13.

⁷ Pankhurst, R. *The History of Bareya and Other Ethiopian Slaves from Borderland of the Sudan* // Paper Submitted to the Conference on Ethiopian Feudalism. Addis-Ababa. 1976. P. 41.

Congo, the *Bachama* in northern Nigeria, the *Gwoza* and *Banana* in central Nigeria, the *Wolof* in Senegal, the *Ida* in Zambia, etc⁸.

There are two *Touareg* groups in Niger, 'white' with lighter skin and 'black', the descendants of the slaves seized in a distant past from the Negroid tribes of the Southern Sahara. They are still treated as slaves. They have lost the mother tongues of the ancestors; they speak *Tamashek*, wear traditional Tuareg clothes and do not differ from the Tuareg in their everyday life. Yet they still experience discrimination.

The stereotypes that emerged in the extreme antiquity were transferred from one generation to another; even when a man occupies a high position in the society, in the administration system including, people remember that his remote ancestors were slaves. The tradition treats slaves' descendants as second-grade people.

The traditions are so strong that in some countries (the both states of Congo, Angola, Ethiopia, etc.) the people of lower castes who have penetrated the topmost echelons of the party and state machinery enjoy no real power; they are merely ignored.

The contempt of the *Masai* in Kenya (this also attributes to other shepherd peoples) for land tillers is expressed in an extremely insulting formulation: 'He roots the earth like a Bantu'.

The ethnic self-consciousness is a reality that cannot be ignored. Moreover, the revival of nationalism leads to a fast growth of this self-consciousness. It manifests itself, depending on the situation, in various forms, from the striving to observe the rites and traditions of one's people to demands for an independent state for this people.

Traditional Structures in the Subjects of the Russian Federation

Patriarchal family and kin relations retain their enormous importance in the life of not only the indigenous population of Caucasia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan but in many non-Russian subjects of the Russian Federation, such as Chechnya, Adygeya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Buryatia, Tuva, etc. They form the social background and basis of modern political and social life and make a strong impact on the inter- and intra-ethnic relations.

The local societies of the indigenous peoples were also mostly traditionalist by their basic social foundations in the Soviet period. The Soviet totalitarian political system coexisted with the local traditions of authoritar-

⁸ *Social Stratification in Africa*. New York, 1970. P. 10, 49.

ian rule, ethnosocial hierarchy and clan psychology.

Therefore, it is not a surprise that the quite numerous strata of intelligentsia and officials formed in the years of the Soviet power is closely related to the traditionalist society by its origin, combining the clan psychology, based on the traditional social structures, with that of the builders of socialism and national state. It was these groups who became the carriers of the ethno-nationalist ideas of building sovereign states on the eve of the disintegration of the USSR.

Although the Soviet power existed for more than 70 years, the ethnic culture (the rites and traditions followed in everyday life) survived in many regions. A special role belonged to Islam in Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Northern Caucasia and Azerbaijan. It penetrated all aspects of the indigenous population's life and was a strong consolidation factor. The earlier division of the society into kins, tribes and traditional estates was preserved (often illegally).

Clans played and play an important part in the political life of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Caucasia and some other regions. Rival clans and ethno-territorial and professional groups formed the Soviet bureaucratic bourgeoisie, the 'new class', which always strives to preserve their hegemony and privileges.

The competition among the clans of the Soviet bureaucratic bourgeoisie for power, privileges and public offices often acquired extreme forms. The topmost Soviet leadership was aware of this. It was this competition that underlay many clashes and riots that took place in the last years of the USSR and continue nowadays (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, some regions of Caucasia, etc.). It was these clans and groups who provoked many ethnic conflicts.

The strengthening inter-group (inter-ethnic) competition for resources and control of government agencies, unemployment, housing shortage, etc. caused ethnic tension, which led to fierce conflicts.

New ethnic stereotypes emerge in Russia, especially in Moscow. For various reasons, some Caucasian ethnoses (first of all, the Azerbaijanis and Chechens) have monopolized almost all markets in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other cities. They not only charge high prices for their goods but oust the Russians, Moldavians, Ukrainians, etc. from the markets. All this causes tension and often ends in showdowns. In addition, there are various mafia groups in Moscow, consisting of Georgians and other Caucasians. As a result, people treat them quite negatively. The term 'persons of Caucasian nationality' was coined officially. In the everyday life they are often referred to as 'cockroaches' (most of the Caucasians are sporting moustache). Unfortu-

nately, these feelings, evoked by tiny groups of traders and brigands, may spread to the ethnic groups as a whole in the course of time. This negative phenomenon gradually becomes a negative stereotype.

In the recent years the world community pays an increasing attention to the developments in Chechnya, one of the subjects of the Russian Federation. The war that continued there for several years killed thousands of people, including peaceful citizens, and led to an economic collapse and, which is most important in our case, to an aggravation of anti-Russian attitudes. The consequences of the war, including those in the fields of social psychology and interethnic relations, will be felt for many years.

It is extremely important to an analyst of the developments in Chechnya to understand the historical and cultural aspects of the conflict, which, although, did not determine the course of events.

Chechnya consists of southern upland Large Chechnya on the right bank of the Argun and Aksai and low Small Chechnya on the left bank of the Argun. Before the 16th century the Chechens lived mainly in the mountains and were divided into the territorial groups of the *Michik* (on the banks of the Myachik), *Kachkadyk* (on the north-eastern hillside of the Kachkalyk range), *Aukh* (in the upper streams of the Yaryksu, Yamansu and Aktash) and *Ichkeris* (in the central part of upland Chechnya). This division is preserved at present.

The main social unit of the Chechens remains *teip* (kin). There are over 135 *teips* in Chechnya⁹. Each of them consists of 10-15 home estates, called *nekye* (certain) or *gar*. Teip is a group of blood relatives on the father's line. The tradition requires each Chechen to know the names of at least twelve his direct ancestors in the male line. Teips are united in *tukhums*. The teip structure not only survived up to present but plays an important role in the socio-political life of the country and in everyday life. The fighter squads and their leaders often belong to different teips, and the competition for power among them is essentially of an inter-clan character.

The life of the Chechen society is still regulated by the norms of *Adat*, many of which formed under conditions of the domination of the kin and tribal relations. *Adat* is the fundamental law of the Chechens' life. Each man, family and territorial community observe its rules in all fields, such as religious beliefs, rites, traditions (including those related to blood feud, sworn brotherhood, etc.) and relations with the outer world.

⁹ *Chechentsy. Istoriya i sovremennost' (The Chechens: History and the Present)*. M., 1996. P. 189.

Some Russian authors describe the Chechens' social system as 'mountain democracy'¹⁰. Its main feature is a well-elaborated structure of *khels* (councils). The lowest of them is *tsiina khel* (family council), followed by *verasi khel* (patronymic council) and *teip khel*, which always was and is a subethnic unit rather than a unit based on blood relation.

Inter-teip relations were regulated by the *mehk khel* alias *meh-kan khel*, the country council.

During the tragic developments of 1994 the *mehk khel* was formed in Chechnya side by side with the modern government structures (parliament, president, constitutional court and government).

The traditional way of life formed for centuries, and many its features are projected to the future. Undoubtedly, peoples differ in the norms of customary law, but I do not deem it correct to absolutize the Chechens' love for freedom or ascribe a specific mentality or national character to them.

The tradition of hospitality exists among many Caucasian peoples, including the Chechens. A guest is the dearest man to a Caucasian.

Relations with the neighbours occupy an enormous place in various peoples' life. 'A neighbour is dearer than a brother', reads a Chechen proverb. One more proverb: 'Unless people eat together at least once in three days, they may become enemies'.

Another old tradition is blood feud, which applies not only to an individual but to the whole teip.

The deportation of 1944 played an important role in the development of ethnic identity of the Chechens and other exiled peoples (the Ingush, Ossetes, Kalmuck, etc.). It strengthened the ethnic feeling and helped them to survive and preserve their ethnic culture. Initially it was a protest against the existing political system, but thereafter the strengthened ethnic self-consciousness took the form of the whole people's striving to regain the humiliated dignity. The historical past is reconstructed to this end, because an appeal to the past is helpful in finding legal arguments for a programme. Moreover, an appeal to emotions is conducive for the mobilization of ethnicity of ordinary members of the society. This is the origin of the myth about the exceptional ancientness of the, e.g., Chechen people.

Some scholars believe that the Hurrite-Urartu languages, spoken in Transcaucasia and northern Mesopotamia in the second and first millennium B.C., were kindred with the contemporary Vainakh languages, Chechen and

¹⁰ Chesnov Ya. *Mountain Democracy*. // Aziya i Afrika Segodnya. 1995. No. 8. P. 7.

Ingush¹¹. This enabled Jokhar Dudaev to claim that, being the most ancient people of Caucasia, the Chechens are entitled for the role of the all-Caucasian leader.

One may agree with the authors who believe that a common version about the past is a resource for the cohesion of an ethnic group and an argument used to formulate an ethnic's claims¹². Historical memory or rather the mobilized past becomes a powerful factor of consolidation. The memory about the deportation is alive among the Chechens and other peoples, and the elder generation permanently reminds the youth of this horrible tragedy.

Thus, preservation of such traditional social structures and institutions as teips, elders' authority, ancient traditions and appeal to historical memory (both the remote past and the tragedy of the people deported by Stalin) among the Chechens not only facilitates their consolidation and strengthens their ethnic self-consciousness but serve as a permanent source of the negative attitude to Russia and the Russians. In this setting it seems rather difficult to preserve Chechnya as a part of the Russian Federation.

Traditional social structures play a notable role in the interethnic relations among the Abkhazians, Adyghe, the peoples of Dagestan, etc. They preserve the division into kins and patronymies. The role of mutual assistance within a kin remains no less important than it was. After decades of the Soviet power people still remember to which estate their ancestors belonged.

Such forms of community self-government as *khase* (people's assembly), council of elders and norms of customary law (or Sharia, the Muslim law), including the institution of mediatory court¹³, played a great role in the Adyghe's life in the past. A part of them survived, as well as tradition, in the Soviet period. As peoples' striving to revive the traditional culture strengthens, they demonstrate an enhanced interest in the ancient forms of the social organization of the society.

The Adyghe applied Adat, customary law, calling it *Adyghe Khabze* (Adyghe law). Different tribes applied it in different manners. The bulk of the norms are of a pre-Islamic origin. Adat was applied to resolve conflicts

¹¹ Pliev, R. *Khranitel' tain - yazyk (Language, the Custodian of Secrets)*. M., 1996.

¹² Tishkov, V. *Ocherki teorii i politiki etnichnosti v Rossii (Essays on the Theory and Policy of Ethnicity in Russia)*. M., 1997. P. 414-415.

¹³ Babich, I. *Adygs' Traditional Institutions: Past and Present // Indetichnost' i konflikt v postsovetskikh gosudarstvakh (Identity and Conflict in Post-Soviet States)*. M., 1997. P. 43-44.

between neighbours and family quarrels, to punish thieves, to settle problems of succession, etc. Such serious crimes as murder, wounding, rape were punished on the basis of the law of revenge. Bloody feud for a crime might continue for decades or even centuries. It was allowed only among the people of same estate.

The mediator courts played a major role in resolving the problems related to blood feud, which was widespread among the Adyghe. The mediators solved the conflicts caused by theft, failure to repay a debt, property division and clashes that ended in an injury or murder. This weakened tension within the community and helped to restore normal relations between the families that were at odds.

In the first decade of the Soviet power the mediator courts, which applied customary law, coexisted with Soviet courts in Northern Caucasia. The authorities pursued the policy of gradual elimination of the traditional legal and other social institutions.

As a result, mediatory court does not exist among the Adyghe as a legal institution, but 'traditional mediation' plays definite role in their life as a social institution.

People approach mediators in such situations as conflicts, including those of a criminal character (brawls, body injuries, murders, accidents, girl abduction, rape, etc.) among the Adyghe, similar conflicts between Adyghe and Russians, intervillage land conflicts and interethnic conflicts. The local and republican authorities of Adygheya, Karachai-Circassia and Kabarda-Balkaria put efforts to revive such traditional social institutions as people's assembly (khase) and council of elders. For instance, the Adygheyan government issued a decree that replaced village Soviets by khase, which are in charge of settling conflicts within the villages and between them.

The public and political organizations created in the 1990s play a great role in reviving the traditional culture of the Adyghe and other Caucasian peoples. Their names are the Kotekhabl Forum and Peace League. They mediate in interethnic and other conflicts.

Unfortunately, the Russian federal authorities that solve the problem of Northern Caucasia, Tuva and other non-Russian regions overlook the specific features of their peoples and their mentality, relying on the methods of conflict settlement deemed to be common to all mankind; these methods not only are ineffective there but result in a stalemate. Therefore, it was not by chance that president Yeltsin met the Northern Caucasian elders in early March 1998.

The federal authorities' ignorance of the ancient tradition of bride abduction and its erroneous criminalization barely led to a serious complication of

relations with Ingushetia in February 1999. To the law and order bodies' credit, this problem was solved in a manner acceptable to either party.

The striving of many peoples of the Russian Federation to preserve or revive the traditional social structures and institutions is a good reason to consider the local and federal authorities' attitude to them. Are they compatible with the sociopolitical setup of Russia?

In my opinion, the traditional social institutions must be widely used both in Russia and in Afro-Asian countries. They are closer to the people than any others; they are an inalienable part of the centuries-old legacy of an ethnos.

Conclusion

Although the African countries and subjects of the Russian Federation considered in this paper notably differ in the socioeconomic, political and cultural characteristics, they share many features in the sphere of traditional sociocultural values and institutions. These institutions are still strong in Africa. In the former Soviet Union all peoples preserved (to different extents) their ethnic cultures and traditional institutions despite seven decades of the Soviet power.

To consider the reason of this phenomenon, despite multifarious external impacts and interaction with other cultures, the ethnic culture, which includes, in addition to language and traditions, such social institutions as the traditional rulers' authority, clan system, etc. are relatively autonomous, and their traditional forms are quite stable. These features enable it to perform the ethnic function of the disintegration or integration.

We are witnessing a considerable strengthening of the ethnic identity and the trend towards preserving ethnic specificity.

In many African states and areas of Russia ethnonationalism acquires increasingly aggressive forms. In its turn, renaissance of nationalism leads to further growth of ethnic self-consciousness.

Ethnic self-consciousness and traditional culture (languages, religions, traditions, traditional authorities, norms of customary law, etc.) are realities, and government bodies must study them carefully and pay attention to them.

Analyzing the sophisticated ethno-political situation in both African countries and regions of the CIS, one must take into account the role of traditional institutions and structures. Conflicts and contradictions occur in a traditionalist society, where the interests of estates, clans and regions play an enormous role, where an individual has to reckon with these interests in accordance with the tradition, where the cult of the elders determines the behaviour of the younger members of a community and blood feud is spread to the whole clan.

Roza Ismagilova. The Impact of Traditional Structures and Institutions on the Interethnic Relations and Ethno-Political Situation

My observations show that in many African countries the opinion of a 'rain-maker' is often more important than that of a party or trade union functionary. The formula 'the ancestors may not approve your actions' (the ancestors' spirits are meant) makes a magic impact not only in backward rural areas but even among the university elite.

Durability of the traditional structures is explained by the fact that they are based on the cultural, moral and social values, traditions, traditional beliefs and cults inherited from the past. All this not only helps them survive but enables them to adapt themselves to the new conditions. Just one example. Traditional rulers (kings, sultans, chiefs, elders, etc.) continue to play a tangible role in modern societies, and not only in backward rural areas. It is well-known that the attempts of some African governments to eliminate traditional chiefs' authority or merely ignore them were a failure. Now we see a continuous strengthening of the governments' respect for the institution of chiefs. Houses of chiefs were formed in the parliaments of Nigeria, Ghana, the Republic of South Africa, Zambia, etc. Surely, the traditional power structures, such as the institution of chiefs in many African countries or the teip and elder system in Chechnya, cannot become the basis of organizing modern society. However, such traditional systems may supplement the existing state and legal systems and play a major role in the peaceful solution of many conflicts. Authority of the traditional leaders is much stronger among the masses than that of elected government bodies.

At the same time the traditional structures and institutions are often used by elite groups as a tool of generating and inspiring conflicts, including ethnic ones.

Only the policy of respecting peoples and their traditional cultures, including social institutions, traditions and beliefs, as the fundamental principle of ethnic policy can lead to a gradual weakening of interethnic tension and improvement in the ethno-political situation.

POWER IN THE CONTEXT OF THE POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA

Nikolai Kosukhin *

Political activity is the production of political relations, institutions, values and orientations, forms of the communications and information, related to the protection of the interests of definite socio-political forces, national-ethnic communities, organizations and individuals in the course of organization or transformation of the society using political power.

Among the institutions that regulate the public life, the decisive role belongs to the political and state power.

Political power and state power are similar but not identical. Political power is wider than state power; it is realized not only through the state mechanisms but through the activity of parties and public organizations, through political standards and ideas.

According to K.R. Popper, a social philosopher, the history of political power is nothing but the history of international crimes and mass murders¹.

However, the historical experience shows that power may be both negative and positive. Power cannot be reduced to violence. It is multidimensional, omnipresent and all-embracing.

Power is the primary condition of realizing the law; it regulates group conflicts and ensures communication within the state. It relies on the commonly accepted or legally fixed values and principles, which determine and regulate the place, role and functions of both an individual and socio-political relations.

According to Russian researchers, the effectiveness of power is determined by implementing a programme that is: (a) based on a fundamental conception of the society and theory of the social process in question; (b) an adequate reflection of the reality, the laws and trends of changes in it and real political opportunities; (c) proceeding from an idea of the political process in question as a system that is capable of developing and adequately interacting with economic, cultural, legal and other processes; (d) aimed at a purpose that corresponds to the society's capacities; (e) capable of realizing its possibilities;

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¹ Popper, K.R. *Otkrytoe obshchestvo i ego vragi (Open Society and Its Enemies)*. Vol. 1. Moscow, 1992. P. 312.

(f) able to critically evaluate the results of the programme implementation².

Political power is realized by state authorities, which represent, as a rule, the interests of the economy, policy and ideology of the dominant class. In the developing countries of Africa, political power is, as a rule, not conditioned socially; it takes the shape of the traditional ethnic and religious relations. The political sphere of these countries is quite specific. The social foundations of power are a bloc of heterogeneous forces with the political elite in the leading role. In addition to the state, ruling parties, public organizations and traditional institutions perform the power functions. Initially, power priority belonged to the ruling parties; as a result, a kind of 'parties-states' emerged in Africa. One of the founders of this theory and practice was A.S. Toure, the president of Guinea.

The functioning of the political power and its interaction with the society are, according to V.G. Khoros and M.A. Cheshkov, determined by:

the starting situation, which ensues from both earlier history and the circumstances of the emergence of the existing political power (an economic crisis, an armed conflict, a national movement, etc.);

external impacts, interaction of geopolitical forces, as well as the degree of involvement of a country in world economy;

the composition of a political elite, its homogeneity and immediate social reliance;

relations between the elite and masses (vertical mobility or self-regulation), which define the opportunities of the political mobilization and involvement of various population groups in development processes;

the main government agencies and institutions and their ability to find a feedback, including the relations between the central and local administration;

the role of a national leader and his entourage in elaborating and realizing an effective economic and social strategy;

political and social mobilization of the masses, using the national traditions, without which a 'development ideology' is impossible;

the degree, character and mechanism of achieving a social consensus³.

Naturally, the above characteristics do not exhaust the real processes of the political relations in the developing countries.

Notably, the power mechanisms, underlied by social interests, determine the direction and realization of political processes and their shaping as

² *Tekhnologiya vlasti (filosofsko-politicheskii analiz) (Technology of Power: Philosophical-Political Analysis)*. Moscow, 1995.

³ *Avtoritarizm i demokratiya v razvivayushchikhsya stranakh (Authoritarianism and Democracy in Developing Countries)*. Moscow, 1996. P. 16, 17.

definite political structures.

In the setting of the disagreement of political and ethnic interests, strengthening of centrifugal trends and antagonism between the centre and periphery, the only acceptable method of establishing civil accord is forming a government of national unity.

The political process manifests itself in the activity of social communities, political and public organizations and groups and individuals, aimed at achieving certain goals. This process expresses the dynamics of the functioning of a political system, which reflects the character and participation of various sociopolitical forces, individuals and groups in the public and political life and their attitude to the powers that be and their political course.

The content, character and features of the political process are decisively predetermined by the type of the society, the level of its economic and cultural development, the social nature of the state power and balance and competition of various sociopolitical forces. The natural and cultural-ethnic diversity of the African world and originality of the ethnogenesis and historical destinies of its peoples predetermined the specific features of the social development of the African countries to a great extent.

The foreign authors who analyze the political situation in the 'non-Western' world widely use the estimates formulated by L.U. Pie, a US political scientist, in the *Non-Western Political Process*⁴:

there are no hard and fast lines between politics and social and personal relations in non-Western societies;

political parties are inclined to claim reflecting the world outlook and the way of life;

political process is considerably influenced by cliques;

the character of political orientations presupposes that the leadership of political groupings enjoy considerable freedom in determining the strategy and tactics;

the opposition parties and elites that strive for power often act as revolutionary movements;

the political process develops under conditions of the disunion of its participants, resulted by the lack of a common communicative system in the society;

non-Western societies are characterized by the lack of consensus concerning the legitimate purposes and means of political activity;

the intensity and wideness of political discussions are weakly related to the political decision-making;

⁴ Cited from: *Polis*, 1994. No. 3. P. 13.

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the political process is characterized by a high degree of combination and mutual substitution of roles;

the role of overtly organized interest groups, which play predetermined roles, is insignificant in the political process;

the national leadership have to appeal to different strata of the public;

the lack of structuring in the political process in the non-Western societies makes the leaders be more certain in the foreign than in the domestic policy;

emotional and symbolical aspects relegate the search for a solution of the topical and general problems to the background;

charismatic leaders play a too great role;

political 'brokers' play no substantial role in the political process.

These theses not only give an idea of the character of political processes but indicate the features of the government agencies in African countries.

The above characteristics of the political processes in the developing countries deserve keen attention. At the same time, the trend of the recent years towards globalization means that the most important political decisions are made by the leading capitalist centres and their currency and financial agencies⁵.

John and Jean Komaroff (the USA) write that the movement towards democracy is conditioned by the Western, first of all, American aid. According to them, under conditions of globalization democracy becomes processual rather than intensional and an electoral process rather than a social movement round the world. Democratization is accompanied everywhere by a weakening of government as a reflection of the crisis of the national state. The peoples get the state power when the state itself loses its importance and the centre of the political decision-making shifts from the state to the international institutions, to the corporative world, mass media and social movements, to the sphere of civil society⁶.

When the UNO held the millenium summit in September 1999, the leaders of the G-8 declared their resolution to halve the number of those who get less than a dollar daily, suffer of famine and have no access to quality potable water by 2015. Notably, the indebtedness of the African countries alone to the West is \$ 315 bln.

⁵ Vassiliev A.M. *Africa: a Stepchild of Globalization: Report at the 8th Conference of Africanists*. Moscow, 28-29 September 1999. Moscow, 1999.

⁶ Comaroff J.L., Comaroff J. 'Postcolonial Politics and Discourses of Democracy in Southern Africa and Anthropological Reflection on African Political Modernities'. *Journal of Anthropological Research*. Albuquerque, 1997. V. 53. No. 2. P. 126.

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Africa entered the 21st century with a backward economy and permanent political instability. In this setting, the mobilization of the resources of the majority of the population, strict discipline and state control play an important role. Hence, the state must be powerful.

The World Bank's (WB) report *Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?* notes that indiscriminate liberalization and hasty withdrawal of the state from economic life do not invariably yield good results. The document mentions the limitations of the narrow-minded market approach and necessity of a strong and effective state. The report emphasizes the necessity of making the state institutions really reflect the hopes and aspirations of the African peoples. It suggests the representation of various ethnic groups, including minorities, transfer of some authorities from the centre to local government agencies, which must function effectively, establish superiority of the law and enhance the effectiveness of the state machinery.

The report emphasizes that the state can do a lot in this field. Firstly, private entrepreneurs need clear-cut and stable legislative standards. Secondly, the state should actively participate in major infrastructural projects, such as railway and highway construction, building of power transmission lines and ensurance of telecommunications. As a rule, they require huge expenses, do not pay for themselves at once and are of little interest to private investors. Meanwhile the rapid development of agriculture, which implies an improvement in the welfare of most of Africans, is impossible without the infrastructure development.

Thirdly, the state can play a major role in enhancing labour productivity and competitiveness at the world market; otherwise, Africa will miss the 21st century. This requires an improvement in the education and health care systems⁷.

The economic strategy of the IMF and WB concerning the role of the state was corrected after the financial and economic crisis of 1997 in Asia. The WB report headed *The State in the Changing World* noted the importance of strengthening the state's effectiveness, since it is the centre of the socioeconomic development and a partner, catalyst and supporter of private business⁸. In the 1980s the IMF and WB rigidly connected their aid with the withdrawal of the state from economic activity. As a result, many African

⁷ Kompas. No. 1. 2001. P. 60.

⁸ World Bank. *Report on World Development in 1997. The State in the Changing World*. Washington, 1997. The report was analyzed in detail by Yu.N. Cherkasov in his article *State Mechanisms of the Management of Market-oriented Economy in Afrika: novye tendentsii v ekonomicheskoi politike (Africa: New Trends in Economic Policy)*. Moscow, 2000.

countries experienced a crisis of statehood and the authorities' competence⁹.

The report admits that given the giddy changes in markets, civil societies and global forces, the state experiences a pressure that makes it become more effective; but it does not adapt itself to the rapidly changing world, too slowly to stand the pace of the changes. Many reforms are carried out inertially, because they require a fundamental rethinking about the role of various institutions and interaction between citizens and authorities¹⁰.

These conclusions apply to a considerable extent to the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, where backward economy, lack of a civil society and traditional structures cannot resist the destructive influence of the global financial flows. Yu.N. Cherkasov, a Russian Africanist, noted: 'The exploiter class, which consists of economic and political elites of the West, becomes an impersonal system, a direct and ominous embodiment of the Its Majesty financial capital'¹¹.

A feature of exercising political power is the cult of the state, the sensation of the honour of being close to it and its power. This is one of the most ancient Oriental traditions.

The confronting forces strive to seize state and political structures not only to develop the society in the direction they like but to derive direct economic advantages through the power machinery. The power of bureaucracy is identified with both political and economic power. As a result, the state machinery is hypertrophically inflated in African countries. The predominant type of the institutionalization of the state power in Africa remains the authoritarian bureaucratic type, based on the dominance of the executive bodies in the state system and their identification with the persons of the rulers¹².

R.E. Sevortyan distinguished two types of the state, namely, bureaucratic and pluralist; the latter is characteristic of democratic regimes. A bureaucratic state is based on the territorial, administrative or national centralization. The African version of the bureaucratic state is based on administrative centralism and patrimonialism, which amounts to subjective-personal and clientelle relations¹³.

⁹ Cherkasov Yu.N. Op. cit. P. 17.

¹⁰ Ibid. P. 18.

¹¹ Ibid. P. 74.

¹² *Zarubezhnyi Vostok i sovremennost (The Foreign East and the Modern Epoch)*. Vol. 1. Moscow, 1980. P. 297.

¹³ Sevortyan, R.E. *Gosudarstvo i vlast v sovremennom mire. Teoriya. Politika. Realnost (State and Power in the Contemporary World: Theory, Politics, Reality)*. Moscow, 1997. P. 173.

Firstly, patrimonial relations manifest themselves in the personalization of the leadership, when the authority of an individual is not only a derivative of his position but is sacrificed by the tradition, by his belonging to a group, ethnos or confession. Secondly, patrimonial relations include the symbiosis of the traditional relations and modern elements of constitutionalism, standards and various ideological orientations. Thirdly, patrimonial relations presuppose personal loyalty to a leader. This type of the patronage-clientelle relations is widespread in the political culture of Africa. Lastly, patrimonialism implies personal domination and control of state services and use of their opportunities to personal ends. This is a way towards widespread corruption and outflow of the state's money to the bureaucrats' pockets.

R.E. Sevortyan noted: 'This is a political order that exceeds the framework of ethics, jurisprudence and constitutionalism, when even criminality and mafia-like relations, sanctified without the public's knowledge by patronage-clientelle attitudes and motivations, acquire the right to exist'¹⁴.

Relying on his experience acquired in Cameroon, P. Geschire, a Dutch Africanist, noted omnipresence of the state and a high degree of its penetration of the African society, the heavy pressure of authoritarianism and bureaucratism, felt even in remote villages. The colonial structures, imposed on Africans from outside, rapidly Africanized after the attainment of independence, and the modern state institutions have got saturated with the traditional ideas of power and authority¹⁵.

The state is the main and leading link of the political system; it determines the character and direction of social transformations. The problem of the state's role in the political life of developing countries was studied quite profoundly in Russia¹⁶.

Some authors noted the features of government agencies in developing

¹⁴ Ibid. P. 173, 174.

¹⁵ Cited from: Kochakova, N.B. *Ranee gosudarstvo i Afrika (analiticheskii obzor publikatsii Mezhdunarodnogo issledovatel'skogo proekta 'Ranee gosudarstvo') (Early State and Africa: Analytical Review of the Early State International Research Project)*. Moscow, 1999. P. 62.

¹⁶ See, e.g.: *Obshchestvo i gosudarstvo v Tropicheskoi Afrike (Society and State in Sub-Saharan Africa)*. Moscow, 1980; *Konstitutsionnoe pravo razvivayushchikhsya stran. Obshchestvo, vlast, lichnost (Constitutional Law of Developing Countries: Society, Power, Individual)*. Moscow, 1990; Chirkin, V.E. *Gosudarstvennaya vlast v razvivayushchikhsya stranakh (State Power in Developing Countries)*. Moscow, 1990; Entin, L.M. *Politicheskie sistemy razvivayushchikhsya stran. Gosudarstvo i politicheskie sistemy v stranakh Azii i Afriki (Political Systems of Developing Countries: The State and Political Systems in the Asian and African Countries)*. Moscow, 1978.

countries, such as the creation of mixed party-state structures and conception of supremacy of the ruling party. Such party was considered an instrument of political domination of the ruling class and state power, exercised by a special machinery¹⁷. Another feature of the state power in developing countries is its multiclass character. As a result, it becomes relatively independent.

At the same time, the state power was often exercised in the form of military rule with the army as its only institution. Such state power used to be personified in a leader with enormous authorities, often in an ugly form of a kind of cult of personality. The examples are the activities of such lifetime presidents as Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire, Bourguiba in Tunisia, Banda in Malawi, etc.

Political power is a sophisticated system of social relations in the African countries. The power mechanisms and the methods of exercising it are characterized by a combination of old and new elements; the latter were implanted in the traditional system of the political relations based on the ethnic, religious, clan and other nonclass relations. As a result, the power is characterized by hybridity and eclecticism, which make it unstable and contradictory. This is a result of the inherited backward social structures, lack of democratic traditions, economic underdevelopment and dependence on the West. On the other hand, this is a result of the incomplete postcolonial development and serious negative consequences of the modernization of economic and social structures. Discussing this point, some Russian authors [omission] They mean religious, tribal and regional associations and customary law norms¹⁸.

Analyzing the political process in West African countries, L.V. Geveling concluded that a quite specific method of organizing power formed there; this method integrates some principles and institutions of the traditional and modern forms of democracy and authoritarianism and elements of archaic rule. He conventionally denoted this method of power organization as Afrocracy¹⁹. Continuing this way of reasoning, N.B. Kochakova noted that the traditional power is essentially local and confined to a definite ethnos; therefore, it is ethnically limited in all respects. It is subordinate to the

¹⁷ Chirkin, V.E. *Op. cit.* P. 221.

¹⁸ *Sovremennaya Afrika: itogi i perspektivy razvitiya. Evolyutsia politicheskikh struktur (Contemporary Africa: Development Results and Prospects: Evolution of Political Structures)*. Moscow, 1990. P. 9.

¹⁹ *Mekhanizmy politicheskoi vlasti v stranakh Zapadnoi Afriki (Mechanisms of Political Power in West African Countries)*. Moscow, 1991. P. 14.

modern state, even if its representatives occupy important positions in the central authorities²⁰.

The activization of Islam in the late 1970s and early 1980s led to a strengthening of the role of the Muslim spiritual orders in the political life of many Sub-Saharan countries. For instance, the Western political and local socioconfessional institutions intertwined in the political system of Senegal. A.V. Savateev noted dualism of the political system of the power mechanism, which creates a balanced sociopolitical situation. Moreover, the economic strength and consolidation of the Muslim orders and the population's support for them enable them to pursue an independent policy and strengthen their presence in the central institutions of political power in Senegal.

After African countries attained independence, a new system of political power began to form there, which consisted of two hypostases. The first of them was the formal and legal aspect, i.e., adoption of the constitution and formation of the administrative and legal institutions of local government agencies. The legal model copied some essential elements of the power mechanism of the former mother states, as well as the USA and USSR. It was an attempt to borrow the political institutions and parties that did not correspond to the socioeconomic and political climate or political culture of African societies.

The fabric of the formal power mechanism includes the real mechanism of the political government, represented by the civil and/or military elite. Foreign authors characterize the elite as a special 'political class', whose main sign is not ownership of means of production but power.

The methods of real political leadership include personal union, personal contacts, political corruption, patronage-clientelle relations and ethnoreligious community²¹. Real power yields considerable economic resources. Capitalist ownership merges with political power, personified by bureaucratic bourgeoisie. I.V. Sledzevskii noted that in Nigeria 'political and administrative power was used as the means of and, simultaneously, a shelter for backstage manoeuvres of the governing elite and state management, aimed at redistributing budget allocations in their favour by concluding profitable contracts with foreign companies and strengthening their political and personal influence in the topmost echelons of power²².

The features of the social structure of the African society made the army a sociopolitical institution that claims to protect the whole society's

²⁰ *Ibid.* P. 26-27.

²¹ *Nigeriya. Vlast i politika (Nigeria: Power and Politics)*. Moscow, 1988. P. 239.

²² *Ibid.* P. 30.

interests.

The army command dominated the government agencies in many countries, especially in the first years of independence. Military rule reflects not only economic difficulties and ethnic contradictions but the competition for power among ethnopolitical groups.

To sum up, the postcolonial development of the African countries was characterized by direct borrowing of the Western state and political structures, which led to the destruction of the traditional government institutions. The social development models were eclectic and unstable, and lack of democratic traditions and economic dependence on the former mother states hampered the modernization of economic and political life.

Political issues were considerably aggravated by universal poverty, interethnic contradiction, unstable situation and permanent menace of military coups.

In this setting, facing the challenge of territorial disintegration and competition for power among various groups of the elite, almost all ruling regimes relied on the one-party system as a tool of their authoritarian rule. In the late 1980s, this was the situation in 38 of 45 Sub-Saharan states.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, against the background of the global democratization, positive changes took place in most of the African countries in the political, legislative and other spheres. These changes occurred in countries with different ideological orientations and socioeconomic policies. The most important result of the democratic transformations was the establishment of multiparty regimes.

The problem of the political modernization of government agencies attracted keen attention of Russian Africanists²³. They believed optimistically that these changes would be helpful to the economic development of these countries, the more so that the statements made by many European political leaders testified to their interest in implanting the Western models of democracy in Africa. As a rule, the West considered such democratic transforma-

²³ See, e.g., *Avtoritarizm i demokratiya v razvivayushchikhsya stranakh: Protess demokratizatsii v afrikanskikh stranakh: tendentsii 90-kh godov (Authoritarianism and Democracy in the Developing Countries: The Democratization Process in African Countries: The Trends of the 1990s). Pts. 1-2.* Moscow, 1993; *Tropicheskaya Afrika: ot avtoritarizma k politicheskomu plyuralizmu? (Sub-Saharan Africa: From Authoritarianism towards Political Pluralism?)* Moscow, 1996; *Afrika: mnogovariantnost razvitiya (Africa: Multiple Versions of Development)*. Moscow, 1997; Komar, Yu.I. *Demokratizatsiya v Afrike: 1980-1990 gg. (Democratization in Africa: 1980-1990)*. Moscow, 1997.

tions as introducing the multiparty system, protection of human rights, freedom of media and democratic election a precondition for economic aid to African countries.

Notably, the transition to democracy is not limited to a mere change of the political regime, proclamation of the citizens' rights and freedoms and multiparty system. Democracy is a political system that makes it possible to replace officials and enables the majority to influence decision-making. E.E. Osaghae, the professor of political sciences of the Transkey University (RSA), holds that the success of democratic transformations in Africa should not be reduced to overthrowing nondemocratic rulers and introducing such democratic institutions as the multiparty system, bill of rights and free election. The survival of democracy depends, as it did before, on what it gives to the people, on how it can improve their welfare and literacy, protect their life and property, improve health care, provide them with jobs, food, security and potable water, develop the rural areas, ensure political stability and save them from the horrors of wars and violent conflicts²⁴.

Political modernization of Africa takes place when there are no socio-economic, political and culturo-psychological premises for establishing democracy in most of the African countries. A question arises: how much do the European democracy models correspond to the African realities? They do not seem suitable for the societies with a strong influence of the traditional institutions and ideas, religious, ethnic and psychological factors.

Political changes in Africa are accompanied by the strengthening of the patronage-clientelle relations and ethno-religious movements and emergence of 'ethnic democracy' rather than expansion of the social basis of these changes. We witness a crisis of the postcolonial state, which is often unable to control the situation in its own territory or to prevent the emergence of parallel centres of influence and power.

The sphere of power relations is the sphere of a kind of symbiosis of some principles and institutions of traditional power and new, pro-bourgeois forms of democracy or autocracy, as well as elements of archaic rule. The statehood that emerges on this basis combines the modern and archaic patrimonial features. The sociopolitical structures of such society include a strong component of ethnic and clan relations.

M. Owusu, an African researcher, thinks that the main prospect of the development of democracy in Africa may be a combination of the traditional government forms and Western democratic institutions in a united viable

²⁴ Osaghae E.E. *The Study of Political Traditions // Review of African Political Economy*. Sheffield, 1995. No. 64. P. 188.

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system. He asserts that there are such parallel political power structures in Africa as clan leaders, traditional chiefs, old and new religious groups and ethnic, racial and regional associations.

They compete with the state by various methods as centres of control, regulation and distribution of economic resources. Since they influence their adherents stronger than the state, they make a direct impact on the character, forms and pace of the democratic evolution. Therefore, the prospects of the sustained democratization of Africa depend on the African governments' ability to come to terms with these influential social forces on a mutually acceptable and practicable mechanism of the division of authorities and responsibilities and a just distribution of material resources²⁵.

At the same time, the opposition has not become an organized political force, relying on definite social strata, in sub-Saharan Africa. Essentially, different factions of the elite compete for power. In this setting, the multi-party system resulted in the institutionalization of the opposition on the basis of ethnic, regional or confessional interests.

Democratic changes in African countries entail numerous difficulties; obviously, this process will be prolonged and anything but easy. The democratization of the society is more important than that of the political regime. It implies political participation and redistribution of the wealth rather than mere recasting of the political institutions. Democratization is an intricate and prolonged process of socialization and conviction²⁶ In the final score, it

²⁵ Owusu M. *Domesticating Democracy: Culture, Civil Society and Constitutionalism in Africa // Comparative Studies in Sociology and History*. Cambridge (N.Y.). 1997. Vol. 39. No. 1. P. 147-148.

²⁶ *Politicheskaya nauka: novye napravleniya (Political Science: New Trends)*. Moscow, 1999. P. 351.

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reflects the search for alternative development models. On some occasions, it leads not to the replacement of authoritarianism by democracy but to an opposite transformation. According to S. Huntington, a US political scientist, the world experience testifies that the principle of democratization is two steps forward and one step backward. In our opinion, some African countries follow the principle of one step forward and two steps backward.

THE SICK AFRICAN GIANT

*Alexei Vassiliev**

Olusegun Obasanjo has completed the term of his presidential authorities, as it is provided for by the Nigerian constitution. Now he has to ensure his victory at the next election. The president faces challenges that are almost as strong as at the beginning of his rule.

The former general, a military leader who voluntarily devolved power to civilians in 1979 and was imprisoned when dictator Sani Abacha ruled the country, Obasanjo hardly could have a better record to head the most populated country of Africa (120 million) in 1999. After 20 years when civil and military regimes, usually incompetent and corrupt, ruled Nigeria, his advent to power was welcomed with a strong feeling of good will and satisfaction at home and abroad. His personal qualities, such as unyieldingness in achieving his goals, deep knowledge of the army and society of Nigeria, loyalty to the country and democratic ideals, ability to reckon with the interests and features of ethnic and confessional groups, made him the most suitable leader, whose mission was to stop the degradation of the country.

He managed to prevent the disintegration of Nigeria, curb the rapacious top brass of the army, allow freedom to press and TV, cancel obviously underhanded contracts for oil production on the shelf and for installation of radars in airports and telecommunication network. He returned almost a billion dollars misappropriated by the Abacha clan to the exchequer. He managed to regain the confidence of international financial organizations and restructure foreign debts. The international authority of Nigeria strengthened, and an active foreign policy was pursued in all directions, including the expansion of cooperation with Russia.

Nigeria has regained one of the central roles in the international relations in Africa, at least, in the Sub-Saharan region. Investments began to flow to the country, mainly to the oil and gas industry. The Nigerian soldiers are the backbone of the peacekeeping forces in Sierra Leone, torn by the war. Relations with the neighbours improved considerably: Nigeria managed to come to terms with Sao Tome and Principe and Equatorial Guinea concerning the division of the continental shelf, thus opening opportunities for unhampered exploitation of the oil deposits discovered there.

There was an element of luck in Obasanjo's successes: the oil prices doubled during his rule. This amounted to an increase in the revenue of the largest African oil producer.

Then, why is he now facing the mounting public cynicism, disappointment and animosity? Unfortunately, people expected a miracle from Obasanjo, but he is not a wizard. Neither he, nor his government can, as if with a wave of a magic wand, overcome the deep and multifaceted crisis, caused by deep-rooted corruption, inefficiency of the bureaucracy, economic decay, deep interregional and ethno-confessional contradictions and foul play of corrupt politicians.

The Gravest Legacy

When Obasanjo voluntarily transferred power to civilians in 1979, the per capita annual income was ca. \$700. In this respect Nigeria occupied the sixth place in sub-Saharan Africa, following Gabon, South Africa, Cote d'Ivoire, Mauritius and Botswana. The average annual economic growth rate was 7.5 per cent (ranked fourth in the region). When the country became independent in 1960, agriculture accounted for two thirds of the GDP and in 1979 only for 22 per cent. By the late 1970s oil production and industry increased their share in the GDP from 11 to 45 per cent.

When Obasanjo headed the state for the second time in 1999, the per capita income was close to \$260 (prices of 1997). The country occupied the 119th place in the world in this respect; the former sixth richest country of sub-Saharan Africa became the eleventh poorest one. This fall might be not so much notable to the absolute majority of the population, because the earlier fair indices by no means reflected the real state of affairs. The ruling elite at that time also siphoned off and concealed abroad a sizable part of the oil proceeds.

There were many illusions and still more disappointments. In 1980 the Nigerian government published a plan of socio-economic development, based on the anticipated oil prices of \$40 per barrel. However, the prices proved three or even four times lower. But it was not the only reason. After Shehu Shagari's civil government was overthrown, four military dictators changed in Lagos: General Buhari (1984-1985), General Babangida (1985-1993), General Abacha (1993-1998) and General Abubakar's transitional regime (1998-1999). No foreign capital was invested in Nigeria in the 1990s, with the exception of the oil sector. Both the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) withdrew their support. The structural adjustment programme, imposed by the WB and IMF in the mid-1980s, had woefully failed.

* Prof. Vassiliev, Alexei (see footnote at page 7)

In 1998 Nigeria was the last of the 20 African countries in competitiveness. The evaluation was based on the taxation system, political stability, crime rate, corruption level, power production and distribution, condition of water supply, communications, roads, railway and port facilities and access to Internet. Nigeria was the last among these countries in the number of telephone lines per 1000 people. It was among the three countries with the worst air communication, condition of ports and transportation cost. Among 174 countries of the world Nigeria is the 142nd in the human development index rating (HDI).

There are striking differences among the states within Nigeria, maybe, the sharpest in the world. Bendel is the best Nigerian state in the HDI, which is five times as high as that in Borno.

Adult literacy is lower in Nigeria than in such poor countries as Tanzania, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia. In 1980 the school attendance rate was higher than the average index for developing countries; now it is much lower. A half of the population has no access to quality potable water and medical aid.

Almost 20 per cent of the Nigerian children die at age below five. A half of the five years old children are underdeveloped because of regular malnutrition. The average life expectancy is 50 years and shows a downward trend, because more and more Nigerians die of the AIDS. True, the situation is not as tragic as in the south of the continent. It is considered that 5.4 per cent of the population are HIV-infected. In some states this level reaches 20 per cent or more.

If the annual economic growth rate is 5 per cent, the country can reach the life standards of the late 1970s not earlier than 2010.

The economic development of Nigeria is subject to three serious limitations, which neutralize the effect of the oil price rise: the abominable condition of the infrastructure, particularly (but not only) in the oil sector, weak investment capacities of the public sector and foreign investors' reluctance to invest in any business but oil.

The government has set the task of reaching the economic growth by 10 per cent, but it does not seem practicable. In 2000 the GDP rose by 3.8 per cent owing to an upward leap of the oil prices and a comparatively good harvest. Optimists forecast an economic growth by 4.5-5 per cent in 2001 as a result of an increase in oil production from deep-sea fields; the budget revenue will increase, although, according to the earlier agreements, the investors first make up for their expenses and then their incomes are divided between them and the government. 'The level of their expenses

needs to be calculated', said Obasanjo and had cancelled one and a half dozen of contracts for oil concessions on the shelf.

Industrial development remains among the government's priorities, because to pin hopes on the oil sector alone amounts to a too strong dependence on the price fluctuation. However, in the recent 20 years the African giant became a victim of the deindustrialization. Nigeria still remains the most industrialized country of sub-Saharan Africa, next to South Africa. Yet its per capita production is merely negligible. Industry (without oil) accounts for just 7 per cent of the GDP (11 per cent in the early 1980s). This is very low level even by the African standards. The production capacities are used just by a third owing to shortage of power and fuel, high prices of spares and obsolete equipment.

Nigeria hopes that the share of industry in the GDP will reach 15 per cent by 2010, which seems too optimistic.

To create competitive economy, it is necessary to restructure the economic and social systems of the national development and the population's mentality and find a Nigerian solution of the Nigerian problems, unlike the abortive 'structural adjustment'.

Oil and gas are the basis of the Nigerian economy, but...

It is anticipated that the explored oil deposits will increase from 22 to 40 billion barrels (6 billion tons) and oil production to 4 billion barrels daily (200 million tons annually) by 2010 vs. the present level of 2 billion. This will happen if the shelf deposits are developed; it will be a pleasure to oil companies to shift thereto from the politically explosive Niger Delta. After several dozen of years of their activity, this area was recognized the environmentally worst delta in the world; the local population cannot earn their daily bread by fishery and agriculture, which results in epidemics and starvation. The area that yields 90 per cent of Nigeria's oil proceeds is among the poorest areas in the country. The local ethnoses actively oppose both the oil companies and the government. They blew up oil pipelines and wells. Oil production decreased by 400 thousand barrels daily. Sani Abacha deployed troops in the Delta to smash the opposition and prevent new outrages. The problem was perpetuated but not solved.

Kilometres long queues at filling stations, where petrol is either in short supply or absent at all, are a usual picture in Nigeria. When somebody tries to jump the queue, this results in fist brawls. But you can buy a canister of petrol of unknown quality in a side street, paying two or three times more than at a filling station.

Petrol crisis is not a new phenomenon in the largest oil producer of Africa. However, in the recent months the country faced the most acute petrol deficit in its history. When oil prices were low, it could import comparatively cheap petrol. Yet as the world oil prices increased, this became more and more expensive.

The petrol import went down. Queues became longer. A sizable part of economy was paralysed.

Now the government spends \$1 billion annually to subsidise the Nigerian National Oil Corporation. The capacity of its oil refineries is 445 thousand barrels daily (22 million tons annually). This is more by a third than the country needs. Although formally hundreds of million dollars were invested in the refineries, they can work only at 30 per cent of their capacity. The trade mafia, connected with topmost government officials, earns by the 'repair' of the refineries, fuel import and black-marketing of subsidised petrol. Officials receive commissions for contracts for petrol import and are interested in malfunctioning of the refineries.

According to the *Oil and Gas Monthly*, within 9 months Nigeria imports petrol, mazut and diesel fuel to the amount of \$600 million. Spending a half of this, it can make two of four refineries work at full capacity. Those who get rich owing to their idling do everything to prevent this. Obasanjo's measures aimed at the sanitation of economy are doggedly resisted.

Liberals and advocates of market economy suggest total deregulation of the fuel market to make petrol available at any price. Then all goods and services will become more expensive. It easy to foresee the resulting social explosions. The government tries to solve the problem gradually but to no avail. The discussions about the deregulation continue, the public opinion is split and misled. The petrol and diesel fuel deficit continues.

In the nights the Niger Delta is covered by dirty-yellow gleams of petroleum gas flare. It is a depressing picture. Oil-well gas is burnt, because the country lacks capacities and technical means to use it. This is a classical example of the wasteful exploitation of resources. The population of Nigeria is the same as or a little more than that of Pakistan, but it burns more gas than Pakistan consumes, 2 billion cubic feet (56 million cubic meters) daily. This is a quarter of gas burnt in the world in vain.

The Nigerian gas deposits are estimated at 115 trillion cubic feet (3.3 trillion cubic meters), the world eighth largest deposits. But it is just an estimate: no gas prospecting was carried out in Nigeria. The country produces a thousand cubic feet of gas per each barrel of oil, of which 90 per cent are burnt in flares. The government intends to put an end to this waste by 2008. It imposes heavy fines for gas burning, which replenish the ex-

chequer by \$100 million annually. A Chevron subsidiary began to produce liquefied gas, partly supplied to the Nigerian market, since 1997. Yet the works aimed at an increase in the capacities were suspended, because the Nigerian National Oil Corporation, the partner of Chevron, lacked money to participate in the enterprise.

The Nigerian National Oil Corporation with the participation of Shell, Total-Fina-Elf and Agip created one more consortium for the petroleum gas liquefaction. It has built a new plant in Bonni Island and purchased 6 tankers to transport its product. The first two projects produce 5.8 million tons of liquefied gas annually, and the third project was to be completed in 2002. The consortium plans to increase the annual production to 8.7 million tons and order 8 tankers more. The Bonni plant became the largest investment project in sub-Saharan Africa. Liquefied gas will be exported to Europe.

The consortium created by the Exxon-Mobil, Chevron, Texaco and Conaco of the USA also intends to invest in the gas industry.

Power Production: Nigerians' Dismal Humour

Nigerians humorously decipher NEPA (National Electric Power Authority) as No Electric Power at All. Maybe, this agency is the first in the world in the number of employees per one produced kilowatt. Its employment is 40 thousand, and its capacity is 2,500 megawatt, a half of the country's minimum requirement.

Some plants and elite families purchased generators of their own. This increases the cost of power production. Yet, most of the population manages to eke out with the solar and lunar light.

Obasanjo popularity partly depends on the solution of this problem.

The president told *The Financial Times*, 'The things proved much worse in the country than I supposed while looking at the developments from the side. People ask whether I would nominate myself to presidency, knowing how bad was the situation. Certainly, I would, though I would take some steps in a different manner at the very beginning of the path. For instance, it concerns the NEPA, our power corporation. Assuming the higher office, I dismissed its director and the second level of the leadership, hoping that it would be enough. But we really did not know how deep was our demoralization...'

The government intends to increase the power production capacity to 4,000 megawatts. In 2001, the state allocated \$500 million to the repair, maintenance and development of power stations and power networks. But the too high employment and all-penetrating corruption make any operation of repair, restoration and maintenance next to impossible. Without purging the NEPA from its corrupt leadership at all levels, it is useless to invest in it.

The government thinks intensely about the possible choices: to privatize a part of the distribution system? To build new power stations? To transfer management to foreigners?

One of the methods of attracting foreign oil companies to the construction of thermoelectric power stations is obliging them to use the gas they burn in vain now. The Agip (Italy) has signed a contract for building a steam plant in Abuja with a capacity of 550 megawatts. The Exxon-Mobil is going to follow this example. Yet it is impossible to improve the power situation within a short term.

Is Privatization a Panacea?

The Nigerian state controls the oil industry, mining, banks, telecommunications, power and steel production, etc., in total 40 per cent of the GDP. From taxes and oil proceeds, \$3 billion are spent to subsidies and privileges for state-run enterprises. Foreign investors and IMF and WB experts claim that privatization is the only method of saving the economy. If four oil refineries are privatized, the petrol deficit will end. The government considers privatization of the Nigerian Airways, telecommunications, fertilizer plants and hotels.

The Nigerian society is merely bombarded with the information and misinformation about the privatization. Yet the Nigerians' 'culture of sceptics' and cynicism appears in full mistrust of statements and promises by officials, including foreign ones. Moreover, both protagonists and antagonists of privatization understand that the purely economic effect of even successful privatization will be achieved at the expense of the bulk of the population.

Western authors hold that the state-run enterprises as the institutional foundation of the patronage-clientele relations and corruption must be transferred to the private capital. After the advent of independence they created a stratum of people who parasitized on this system. It is a fact, often ignored, that the patronage-clientele relations were among of the pillars of social stability in most of the Nigerian ethnoses for centuries, and such traditional institutions could not be eliminated by a mere change in the legislation or ownership form.

It was argued in 2000 that unless the privatization is carried out in 2001, it would be postponed because of the forthcoming election of 2003. The state hurried to do anything, being pressed by the IMF and WB. The task was set to privatize the NITEL (Nigerian Telecommunications) and its subsidiary MTEL (Mobile Telephones) for \$2 billion (although the amount of investment was \$8 billion). The only successful auction was carried out for the GSM telephone network, for whose license the Exchequer got \$285 mil-

lion, the largest amount in sub-Saharan Africa. What was very important, the main investors were Nigerian entrepreneurs, including bankers, industrialists, oil traders and even governors of at least two of 36 states.

In total, it is planned to privatize 41 enterprises. However, little was done by mid-2002. One of the reasons was that the WB, under whose aegis the privatization was to be carried out, spends many months to elaborate its principles and sends expensive experts to study the problem. It allocated \$100 million for the Nigerian privatization programme, which are successfully squandered by its experts.

It is expected that the tastiest morsels of the state-owned property will be transferred to Nigerians themselves at such low prices that the privatization will lose all its logic.

It was not by chance that the president's economic adviser Philip Asiodu advocated a cautious approach to the privatization. 'It is important to carry it out correctly. We do not want a Russian-style privatization.' The foreigners who offer higher prices or better technical maintenance and technical maintenance are merely pressed back from auctions. This was the destiny of the national petrochemical company, sold to a powerful Nigerian businessman with lots of pull among the administration, while the more advantageous offer of a South African company was rejected.

The state property privatization is the key demand of the IMF. Its other conditionality include the distribution of the state's expenses to the education, health care and economic infrastructure, particularly transport and water supply, price deregulation, liberalization of trade and currency exchange and strengthening of the state institutions in order to increase transparency of their activity and curtail corruption. The recommendations seem excellent, but the author fails to note that it's easy to say than done.

If the state's expenses are distributed before corruption is eliminated, this amounts to the legalization of the misappropriation of the state's property, sold for a song; combined with the prices deregulation, this is a guarantee of price rise and inflation, resulting in social disturbances in an embittered and impoverished country. The import liberalization will ruin agriculture and finish off the dying industry. Therefore, Obasanjo and his advisers are so cautious to the IMF's demands though trying to implement some of them (the naira, the national currency, was devalued).

The Debtor's Prison

Nigeria finally became a global debtor in the period of Shehu Shagari, a civilian president, in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The country began to receive huge loans and found itself in a debt trap. Nigeria's debts are esti-

mated at \$28-38 billion, of which \$8.5 billion were received really, and the rest (70-80 per cent) were interest and fines.

Akin Arikawe, the general director of the Nigerian Administration for Debt Obligations, explains that the most part of the debts was borrowed in the early 1980s, when the interest rate on inter-bank loans (libor) was 3 per cent. The combination of the collapse of the oil prices in the mid-1980s, an increase in the libor to 13 per cent in 1989 and corruption of the civil and military regimes resulted in Nigeria's insolvency.

Three attempts were made to solve the problem by restructuring the debts. The IMF was not ready to do so. Therefore, the unpaid interest permanently increased. The final agreement was reached in late 2000. The commercial debts were restructured for 18 years with a three years long moratorium. The debts related to the official aid were restructured for 20 years with a moratorium of ten years. All this meant that Nigeria had to pay 'only' about \$2.2 billion annually within the next five years, after which the paid amount will increase.

Nigerian leaders state that the country has already paid much more than it had borrowed. Moreover, it spent billions of dollars on the participation in the ECOMOG peacekeeping forces, e.g., in Sierra Leone. Therefore, it is entitled for a special approach, the same as is applied in Poland or Egypt. In Mr. Asiodu's opinion, the West must write off 80 per cent of the debt. But Nigeria does not meet the criteria applied by the IMF and WB to writing off debts of the poorest countries, although some Western experts agree with Asiodu.

A cup of Manioc Daily

The government has not yet decided what to do of agriculture. To continue subsidizing the fertilizer production, contrary to the IMF's recommendations? To give credits to small farms? To build roads? There is a labour shortage in agriculture, because, despite the horrible life conditions in towns, a part of the rural population continues to migrate thereto.

Both Western experts and Nigerians themselves believe that agriculture has not been affected by a large-scale crisis yet, but it is round the corner. 90 per cent of food is produced at small farms (up to three hectares) by hoes. They need cheap fertilizers, credits and roads. But the government cannot afford this even theoretically, not to mention corruption. The naira devaluation benefited farmers, but if the government cancels the import duties under the IMF's pressure, agriculture will collapse.

Agricultural export has drastically decreased in the recent 20-30 years. Once Nigeria was among the leader producers of groundnuts and palm oil.

Now it lags behind the countries of South-East Asia, e.g., Malaysia, in the both total and per hectare palm oil production. The production and export of cocoa also decreased. Its yield (4 metric centner per hectare) is one third of that in Ghana. True, the experts from the agricultural institute in Ibadan, who improve the grade of cocoa, tea, coffee, cashew and cola, claim to have grown a hybrid sort of cocoa with a 20 times higher yield than today. But this requires a different kind of agronomy and, again, investments.

There are ideal conditions for rubber-bearing plants in Nigeria, but the rubber production is one tenth of the potential. The cotton and groundnuts export has almost ceased.

The total volume of the food consumption is just a little higher than 15 years ago, although the production of corn, manioc and yam has increased, as well as the livestock of cattle and sheep. Yet the population grew more rapidly than the agricultural production, and the food import is insignificant. Very simple: people have begun to eat less. The official statistical data show that a half of the Nigerians get less than 30 cents daily. Their daily ration consists of a cup of manioc, i.e., starch, and most of them cannot even dream of proteins.

Corruption Yesterday...

Nigerian dictator General Sani Abacha died in 1998: allegedly his heart could not stand a stormy night with Indian prostitutes, which he spent after consuming a lot of Viagra (a preparation that strengthens sexuality). But even remembering him, Nigerians feel loathing. He added a shameful page to the history of the country as a cruel and ruthless thief, who killed his opponents without hesitation. He hanged Ken Saro-Viva, a renowned fighter for the human rights and poet, and eight his comrades from among the Ogoni, who live in the Delta. He ordered to record the execution on videotape and viewed the record with a great pleasure. He was going to execute jailed General Obasanjo but did not dare to do so, being flooded with international protests.

During his rule it was impossible to do anything without bribes, from getting a simple certificate at a government office to striking a large-scale deal. Sani Abacha set a record of plundering one's country, \$4 billion within five years, joining the company of Suharto's clan of Indonesia (\$40 billion in 30 years), Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (\$5 billion in 30 years) and Marcos of the Philippines (\$4 billion). When, according to the Transparency International, Nigeria replaced Cameroon as the most corrupt country in the world, Nigerians joked bitterly that Abacha had bribed the Cameroon for introducing a kind of order in the country, which enabled him to win the

world corruption championship. The other most corrupt countries next to Nigeria were Pakistan, Kenya and Cameroon. The least corrupt country was New Zealand, followed by Denmark and Sweden. South Africa occupied the 20th place of 50.

Yet one can also make a list of the most corrupt transnational corporations. The legislation of almost all countries criminalizes bribe taking and bribe giving, as well as receiving of stolen articles. In our case, the bribe givers were mainly transnational corporations, the bribe takers were Nigerian officials, beginning with the head of the executive authorities, and the receivers were Western banks and other financial institutions. But this is another song.

According to Jack Blan, a US expert in banking fraud, government corruption and money laundering, many of those who plundered Nigeria may be found among the richest people of Britain. He also considers that Abacha stole \$4 billion, but in total, since the attainment of independence, ca. \$40 billion were illegally transferred abroad from Nigeria. Some people estimate this amount at \$90 billion. Blan proposed to treat the money plundered in the countries of the South similarly to drug dealers' money, because this alone can put an end to the global corruption. (Let us note a degree of naivety in this reasoning: despite all obstacles, at average 100 billion drug-dollars are laundered in the West every year.). The countries plundered by their rulers are usually very poor. When the rulers go, the obligations to repay the loans they receive and misappropriate remain with the indebted states. According to Blan, restructuring of economies is a means of extorting money from the poorest population in order to repay the debts made by the richest persons of the country.

A Nigerian political scientist wrote, 'In Nigeria corruption is not a part of the government's activity but the purpose of this activity'.

Abacha and his clan made their fortunes in everything. They merely plundered the Central Bank; they took bribes from foreign companies for oil concessions and from building companies, especially those that built Abuja, the new capital.

One of Abacha's 'partners' in construction was the Chagouri family from Lebanon. Chagouri's elder son Gilbert made friendship with Abacha as early as the 1970s. When Abacha seized power, the Chagouri & Chagouri seized most of the building businesses in the capital. In addition, it was allowed to purchase a part of Nigerian oil.

The Abacha clan is deemed to have stolen \$2 billion allocated for the reconstruction and repair of four oil refineries. Their productivity decreased three times, and this was the very reason of the fuel shortage.

The Abacha group behaved like a gang that seized a foreign country. Economy became the occupants' trophy. The more Nigeria fell down the more its rulers enriched themselves.

Unlike Mobutu, who bought palaces and villas in Europe, Abacha did not demonstrate his wealth in public. He tried to hide the stolen wealth reliably not only in Europe but in the countries of the Gulf and South-East Asia, as well as in Brazil. A very conspicuous fact is that one of Abacha's partners was the Glencore of Switzerland, controlled by a certain Mark Rich, who fled the USA after being charged with fraud. But it was Rich whom Clinton, who visited Nigeria twice during his term, amnestied literally in the last hours of his presidency.

Many Nigerians note that the Obasanjo administration concentrated at finding Sani Abacha's and his clan's money. Other former military dictators are seldom disturbed: their numerous supporters still occupy high positions and enjoy a strong influence. As long as they are alive, it is next to impossible to fight against everybody.

Enrico Monfrini, a Geneva advocate, is in charge of Abacha's money. He managed to return first ca. \$600 million and then some hundreds of millions more. Monfrini gets information and assistance from such countries as Switzerland, Luxemburg and Liechtenstein, but Britain refuses to cooperate with him, although it was learnt that Abacha and his clan transferred \$1.3 billion to London. The latter took no measures to freeze these accounts, claiming that the Nigerian formulation of the charge against Muhammad Abacha, the son of the late dictator, is incorrect legally. It is considered that the government and the Abacha family are bargaining: the corrupt family is allegedly ready to return some amounts to the government in exchange to the cessation of the legal prosecution of the family.

In spite of the corrupt nature of Abacha's regime, the Western states supported him de facto. Only Nigeria's membership in the Commonwealth was suspended. The Shell, Chevron, Mobil and other oil giants, which earned huge profits in Nigeria, opposed in a concerted manner all actions of the international community that could hamper their activity. Moreover, Abacha suited them as a leader who brutally suppressed the workers' movement, one of the most developed and strongest in Africa, and rebel ethnoses in the Niger Delta. Britain, France and Italy secretly cooperated with Nigeria, considering it the centre of the pro-Western stability in West Africa. But the main ally of the regime was the USA, the importer of almost a half of 100 million tons of oil produced by Nigeria annually.

Corruption Today and Tomorrow

‘It is obvious now that there is corruption in the country. And it is a rule of life at the level of states’, stated Obasanjo. ‘I cannot tell you that corruption has been eliminated totally, but a minister would tell you three or four years ago: ‘Sit at the table. What is this? OK. Either five per cent are mine or no deal with you’. Nobody dare to tell so today. Thus, we have gained a success at the level of ministers and permanent secretaries. We would like to eradicate corruption deeper, among directors and deputy directors of departments, up to the level of messengers... But we claim that if there are dishonesty and corruption, they are just islets, which will disappear sooner or later in the face of the dominant force we represent.’

The president of a country that faces such profound and sophisticated problems cannot speak in a different manner. Without optimism and belief in the future he cannot claim the role of a leader, even if the real situation is worse than he admits in public.

Obasanjo's administration has reached a definite level of transparency in the government's activity, including the contracts it concludes. It was for the first time in the history of the country the National Nigerian Oil Corporation published some data about its activity.

The government formed an ‘Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC)’, which was empowered with wide authorities for investigations and prevention of corruption. Mustafa Akanbi, once the chairman of the Constitutional Court, who won a reputation of an extremely honest man, heads the commission.

However, Obasanjo's and his supporters' drive against the horrible evil has not yet yielded the desired results. In the last year the Transparency International, an anticorruption organization, nominated Nigeria again as the most corrupt country in the world. Receiving government orders, all companies have to raise prices to have a reserve for kickbacks, high commissions and contributions to the so-called ‘party funds’. It is believed that companies bribe members of the parliament to make them adopt the laws and amendments they need. People are convinced that there is even less transparency at the level of states or local authorities.

A foreign businessman described the situation in Nigeria as follows: ‘Direct theft from the exchequer, as it took place during the military rule, may have been stopped, but it becomes more difficult to do business in many respects: you have to get approval at much more levels and apply much more sophisticated methods to solve your problem.’ Morineke Raire, a Nigerian journalist, wrote, ‘Corruption has become an institution of the

Nigerian life, and an attempt to dismiss any corrupt Nigerian amounts to an attempt to create a situation when you cannot find anybody suitable for public service.’

Akanbi, the head of the anticorruption commission, said, ‘When people are used to steal, it is difficult to change them overnight.’ He investigates the cases of 40 big corrupt officials at the state level, but he has taken sight at birds flying much higher.

In addition, a special commission considers the contracts concluded by the previous government. There is a pile of papers on its tables. Swindle lies on the surface, but, with regard for the type of the overthrown regime, the commission barely scratches the surface.

Government officials received huge commissions for their signatures on documents directly, or through their relatives, or through figureheads. They got used to ‘work’ this way. It is very difficult to destroy this mentality and these habits.

Kolade, the head of the contract commission, said, ‘Morality and the way of doing business are distorted in our society. When I was a child and lived in a village, women brought bundles of firewood to the road and left them unwatched. Everybody knew its price. Somebody took a bundle, leaving money instead. No passer-by would touch money or bundles, unless he wanted to buy them. It was an idealist time.’

Maybe, he exaggerated; maybe, this never happened, but a dream of such a time exists in the imagination of some Nigerians.

According to Kolade, the changes must begin at the top. ‘As a whole, people react to the leaders' behaviour; thus, if the leaders are bad, the people behave accordingly.’ The Nigerians have already got used to anticorruption rhetoric that brings little real changes, and this gives rise to mass cynicism.

Obasanjo noted soon after the election, ‘Some problems can be solved within days, weeks or months, some others require years. Let us not deceive ourselves’.

The process of the degeneration of Nigeria into the so-called ‘corruption culture’ was sophisticated. Corruption is multifaceted in Nigeria. One of its manifestations is nepotism, when people are employed not on the basis of their professional competence but for being the employer's ethnos- or clan-fellows. Many state offices are merely bought. As a result, many gifted professionals find themselves not essential to the society. This strengthens the feeling of hopelessness, immorality, passiveness and cynicism in the society. In this setting the social movement vector is directed towards the self-destruction.

An example of corruption was the construction of a steel plant in Ajakuta. According to various estimates, the state laid out \$5 billion to \$8 billion on the construction, but the plant never started production. At least one or two billions more were needed to complete the project, begun in the cooperation with the Soviet Union. But many building works were reserved for Nigerians just because the Soviet Union was the least corrupt country in the world then, and it was impossible to line one's pocket by cooperating with it. The plants built with the USSR's cooperation in Helwan, Iskenderun, Isfahan, Bhilai and Bokaro required much less expenses and successfully manufacture steel.

There is another manifestation of corruption: holders of unfeigned medical diplomas open dozens of illegal hospitals, where incompetent bilkers 'manage' patients, actually plundering them and ruining their health.

After the election of 1999 the Nigerian Senate pronounced impeachment twice, charging its president, the third person in the state according to the constitution, with corruption. The speaker of the lower house of the parliament had to resign, when he was found to hold a forged university diploma.

The first president of the Senate was dismissed for concealing his criminal record. The next one proved to have taken part in a deal that enabled his friends and relatives to get government orders to the amounts of hundreds of millions of dollars. He paid himself \$200 thousand as a Christmas bonus and overdrew the estimate of \$245 thousand allocated for the construction of his office the sum exceeding the estimate one and half times. Moreover, he purchased 32 luxurious cars at the state's expense. This was too much even by the Nigerian standards.

Obasanjo's anticorruption campaign yields some fruits though not much. 'All of us know that when the military ruled the country, armoured cars carried millions of dollars in cash from the Central bank to Sani Abacha's residence, and nobody asked questions', said Etundo Johnson, a Lagos banker. 'Now people ask questions, and the authorities have to answer them. It is an undoubted victory of democracy'.

Crescent vs. Cross

After Obasanjo became the president, clashes between the Christians and Muslims resumed in Nigeria. Gangs of Muslim adolescents attack people from among other ethnic and religious groups in the northern states, especially in Kano, a town dominated by the Muslim Hausa. Christians are ousted therefrom. In the Niger Delta, rich in oil, armed clashes burst out

between the Itsekiri, Urhobo and Ijaw. A weeklong hostilities, caused by disputes concerning the distribution of the government subsidies and oil proceeds, killed several hundreds of people there in 1999. In Sagamu, a town in the southwest of the country, the Yoruba chopped almost 60 Hausa. In reply, 60 Yoruba were murdered in Kano. The chanting crowd decapitated five people and burnt two Yoruba drivers alive.

Rumours are spread in Nigeria that the interethnic and inter-confessional clashes are instigated by the generals and officers dismissed by Obasanjo. Although Obasanjo, a Yoruba Christian, won the presidential election with the support of a part of the northern elite, his victory gave rise to contradictions between the northerners (Hausa-Fulani), who traditionally occupy high posts in the Nigerian armed forces, and the southern ethnoses.

In February 2000 the country witnessed Christian-Muslim clashes in Kaduna. According to independent observers, some 400 people were killed on both sides. The intervention of the army, reinforced by units from central Nigeria and Lagos, arrested the outburst of violence, which could lead to a small-scale civil war. The Christians began to migrate to the south (mainly to Lagos), southwest and east. Mortal interethnic clashes also took place in Lagos.

Zamfara, a northern state, was first to introduce Sharia as the dominant legal system in December 1999. Eleven states with a Muslim majority followed it.

In accordance with Sharia, alcohol, adultery, premarital love affairs and female football are prohibited in the north. Gender segregation was introduced in schools and public transport. In Zamfara a man was punished by hundred lashes for his affair with a married lady and another was flogged for consuming alcohol in public.

Sharia has become the banner of the northern political elite, who uses religion to realize their political ambitions. In response some groups of the Yoruba, Christians and Muslims, demanded self-determination, and an autonomist movement gained momentum in the Niger Delta.

Understanding that the relations between the centre and regions must change, Obasanjo did not take sides in the question of Sharia, although its introduction contradicted the Nigerian secular constitution.

Nigeria was created by the British colonial authorities in the early 20th century, when lord Lugard united the northern Muslim and southern Christian protectorates. In 1946 three regional councils were set up: in the North (Hausa-Fulani), East (mainly Igbo) and West (mainly Yoruba). These are the largest ethnoses in the country. In total, there are 250 small and medium-

size ethnoses. To avoid clashes, the authorities gradually fragmented the country into small states, which number 36 at present.

Muslims predominate in 18 northern states. Twelve of them have introduced Sharia *de jure* and one (Kano) *de facto*. Both the governor and the Emir of Kano, the second most populated city of Nigeria, opposed the introduction of Sharia a long time, because there are almost a million Christians in the state, including Yoruba and Igbo. But the pressure of religious groups and Muslim Ulemas made them retreat: the governor was afraid of being impeached by the legislative assembly of the state.

If Sharia is introduced in the rigid form, this may result in an exodus of hundreds of thousands, and the economy of the state will collapse. The Christians are afraid of becoming second-grade citizens in the northern states. The legislative assembly of Kano has already introduced Sharia, and it is applied *de facto*. The governor did not support this decision but did not veto it. True, with regard for the Nigerian traditions of cynicism and sceptics, it may be assumed that, despite the Sharia legislation, sale of alcohol, hazardous games and prostitution continue in private.

Why are the Sharia norms so attractive? First of all, this is a form of protest. Many ordinary Nigerian Muslims are suggested that the return to the Islamic norms is the only solution in a country where civil rule, democracy, military rule and the constitution were and are a total failure and the society is dominated by corruption and lawlessness. Most of the people barely know that Muslim Pakistan and almost completely Muslim Indonesia are among the most corrupt countries in the world. But when people protest against growing crime, violence, armed loots and arsons and open and shameless plunder of state funds, they pin their hopes on the renaissance of morality in conformity with the Islamic canons.

However, many people described the introduction of Sharia as a ticking time bomb, which may blow up Nigeria. This may be an exaggeration. However, the tension between the North and the rest of the country is exacerbating. Many governors promised Obasanjo that the application of Sharia will be limited, but, firstly, they cannot control the situation and, secondly, they understand that their future, i.e., re-election, depends on the support of Muslim activists and Ulemas.

Armed Wizards

The erosion of the public's confidence in the police and courts gave rise to a new phenomenon, based on the traditional institutions.

Chinenye Okponpu is the leader of the Vigilantes group in Onitsha. He claims that his ability to exercise justice is based on his connections with

otherworldly forces and demonstrates dummies of a hawk and two turtles, a statue of a man with the head pinked by a knife, roughly carved of wood, and other magical and ritual articles. Using them, he allegedly can trace armed robbers and protect people from evil intentions and violence.

Okponpu claims that bullets shot upon him inflict no harm on him. 'Just try', he says to me, offering a charged pistol. Naturally, I declined this honour.

The Vigilantes, known also as the Bakassi Boys, demonstrate the disintegration and feebleness of the police and other agencies in charge of ensuring the functioning of the state machinery and protecting people from robbery. When injustice is done, people resort to the traditional, sometimes extreme forms of social organization. In the southwestern and eastern regions they approach fighter groups, formed on the basis of a kind of 'secret societies' with a mystic-magical tint.

The Bokassi Boys act in Anambra state; their centre is Onitsha, a town that has become a giant market of imported goods. Located on the eastern bank of the Niger, it always was a centre of trade in agricultural products. Now you can buy everything there, from compact disks and tape cassettes to shoes and statues of Jesus and Our Lady. Most of the population are the Igbo, defeated in an internecine war in the 1960s. It is estimated that there are 100 thousand traders in Onitsha. It is they who are subject to robbery. The governor of the state said that he had to hire the Bokassi Boys to resist armed robbers, who work in racket. Once they murdered 40 passengers of a bus to intimidate the others.

According to Okponpu, his group is armed only with daggers and has no rifles or sub-machine-guns. Seizing a robber, he transfers him to the authorities together with his arms. 'Then, why do your security have rifles and sub-machine-guns?' 'We have seized them from armed robbers.'

The supreme protector of the Vigilantes is Ike Komo Onyekaonwu, the local traditional chief. He is convinced that God sent these young people to help the population of the state. But he reports that 'these boys' kill brigands almost every day, and it is impossible to count the number of their victims. However, it is a fact that armed robbery has become less frequent in Onitsha after the Bokassi Boys appeared there. The local people say that the Vigilantes kill only robbers and do not trouble traders; unlike the police, they do not extort bribes nor work in racket.

This is how forces accountable to nobody grow from the bosom of the traditional society. They apply the law of jungle, but there is no other law there, because the state structures are feeble.

The local governor uses the Bokassi Boys as a kind of his personal militia, which will help him win the new election. His photos where he stands

in an embrace with the leaders of the Vigilantes may be seen round the state. No official would tell you how much the Bokassi Boys are paid.

People apprehend that organizations of this kind will brutally revenge the Muslims who murdered Christians in the north of Nigeria and this will lead to unpredictable consequences.

The Thorny Path towards the New Election

Existing for 41 years as an independent state, Nigeria knew periods of rises and crises, peaceful labour and 30 months long internecine war. Civilians ruled the country for 15 years, including over three years of Obasanjo's present term, and the military for 29 years. Several constitutions were adopted, four republics were proclaimed, a dozen of 'successful' and abortive coups d'etat happened. Acute regional, clan, class, ethnic and religious contradictions, tore off the vast country, formed artificially by the British a century ago.

Traditionally, the modern history of Nigeria was the history of the confrontation between the civilian political elite and the army, which became an independent and influential political and social force. The military, most of whom were from the north, combated the centripetal trends and advocated the preservation and strengthening of the national unity. I think their positive role was limited to this. It should be borne in mind that oil and gas deposits, the main wealth of the country, lie close to the coast, and isolated from the South (or rather the East and West), the North would be doomed to poverty.

Combining flexibility and firmness, the Obasanjo regime was able to react though slowly to the challenges and dangers. Some 150 generals and senior officers were dismissed in batches from the army and police under the pretext of their depolitization. The commander-in-chief of the armed forces and renewed general corps are beginning such long-term enterprises as the curtailment of the army, aimed at making it modern, compact, well-trained and well-armed. Obasanjo controls the armed forces, in particular, through defence minister Danjuma, his old supporter and author of many reformist ideas.

To solve several social and economic problems, the president often had to act bypassing the National Assembly, which either sabotages or pigeon-holes his proposals. This makes an impression of an authoritarian style of leadership and comes in for fire of criticism of liberal media and MPs. Irritated by the invectives of the opposition, Obasanjo refrains, nevertheless, from political reprisals.

Pius Anyim, the new president of the Senate, is Obasanjo's ally and rival at the same time. He is among the leaders of the People's Democratic Party, which nominated Obasanjo to presidentship. But the party itself is a combination of political bosses, businessmen and military that opposed Abacha. They have egoistic interests of their own, which do not invariably coincide with Obasanjo's course.

Maybe, this is why the sombre mood and impatience strengthen in Nigeria. Obasanjo is accused of surrendering to the politicians of the 'old guard', identified with the earlier abortive attempts to establish a civilian regime. His striving to put an end to corruption contradicts the egoistic interests of the groups and clans who helped him come to power but are interested objectively in chaos and decay of the country, which enable them to line their pockets.

The growing oil proceeds enabled the country and all states to considerably increase their budgets and revenues within the recent two years. Yet queues at filling stations have become even longer; crime is growing, although less people die in political and ethno-confessional clashes in the recent months.

The problems of the disintegrating infrastructure are so formidable and other bottlenecks are so numerous in the economy that it will take many years to put things in order and achieve economic growth. Unemployment has not dissolved, and more and more disappointed and embittered youth appear at the labour market.

Let me quote the evaluation made by the Catholic bishops who once raised their voices against the military regime and helped Obasanjo become the president.

'We see now that many members of the political class at the federal, state and local levels do not think and take care of the population's needs or even basic needs but spend time and money with the only purpose of being re-elected two years later. We observe again that the government at various levels spends so scarce resources on the projects that do not improve the people's life directly'.

All Obasanjo's supporters understand that the closer is the election the more difficult it is to carry out unpopular reforms and make the Nigerians swallow a bitter pill. The authorities willy-nilly take populist measures with a short-term positive effect for the population.

'Democracy is not only a value by itself. It is also what I call the dividend of democracy: an improvement in the quality of people's life', said Obasanjo. 'They have a right to desire this, since it is for its sake that the leadership exists. I must have a right to say, "Yes, I do something to im-

Alexei Vassiliev.
The Sick African Giant

prove water supply, I do something to improve power supply, to repair roads". Surely, one cannot do everything within a short period.' This is realism of a wise and experienced politician. But his path is difficult and thorny.

...Africa, Africans and their concerns seem so infinitely far from Russia. Different sun, a different civilization, a different level of the social, economic, political and cultural development. Yet... It is not out of place for us to look at ourselves in the African mirror sometimes. Maybe, we shall see painfully familiar features in it; maybe, knowledge about others will help us understand ourselves better.

**RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC COOPERATION
WITH THE COUNTRIES OF TROPICAL AFRICA**

*Pyotr Kupriyanov**

The economic cooperation between Russia (the USSR) and most of the countries of Tropical Africa (TA) began to develop actively in the 1960s, after they attained political independence. By early 1981 agreements on the economic and technological cooperation were concluded with 34 African countries, including 29 countries of Tropical Africa¹.

Developing the economic and technological cooperation with the countries of Tropical Africa, our state carefully took into account their specific features, caused by their considerable retardation in the economic and social development and the financial difficulties that ensued from the underdevelopment of economy and small population, engaged in subsistence or semisubsistence farming. Most of the countries of this most underdeveloped part of the African continent could not afford even the local expenses of the projects built with foreign cooperation. At the request of some governments the Soviet Union granted them so-called commodity credits: Soviet organizations supplied various commodities thereto to be sold by national companies at the local market; the proceeds were used to finance the local expenses of the projects under construction.

In addition, there were no national construction organizations and companies in some countries of this region that would be capable of realizing the projects provided for in the agreements on the economic cooperation with the USSR. For instance, at the request of the governments of Guinea, Mali and Ethiopia Soviet construction organizations were set up there to build the projects on the keyturn basis, i.e., building them without attracting the local personnel. Apart from this, some enterprises built in TA with the Soviet cooperation lacked skilled engineers, technicians and managers. Our specialists helped these countries not only in mastering new technological processes but in the organization of the functioning of the enterprises and personnel training in order to enable the local employees to ensure normal performance of the projects.

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¹ Postroeno pri ekonomicheskom i tekhnicheskom uchastii Sovetskogo Soyuza (Built with the Economic and Technical Participation of the Soviet Union). M., 1982, p. 222.

By late 1973 some 130 projects were under construction with the Soviet aid in the region, including 42 in industry and power production, 15 in geological prospecting, 19 in agriculture, 9 in transport and communications and 39 in the spheres of education, culture and health care. Thus, the cooperation encompassed the main branches of the national economy of the TA countries, but the main sphere of this cooperation was material production. About 50% of the total amount of the Soviet credits were meant for industry and power production, 12% for geological prospecting, 11 for agriculture and 6% for transport and communications. The rest was spent on education, culture, health care, etc.². This policy enabled the new independent countries of TA to create a basis for the development of their national economies.

In the early 1990s the economic and scientific-technological cooperation between our country and the TA states was grossly upset by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which led to the collapse of the decades old Soviet-African trade.

In the first years thereafter the Russian government agencies obviously tended to give priority to the cooperation with such leading powers as the USA, EU and Japan, underestimating the contacts with the Third World. The number and employment of the Russian embassies in TA were curtailed; trade and other representations were closed down.

This policy resulted in a radical decrease in the volume of the Russian-African trade and economic cooperation, totally ceased in the case of some countries of TA. On the eve of the disintegration of the USSR its trade turnover with African countries was \$ 2.7 bln; by 1994 it went down to \$ 0.74 bln. In 2001 the amount of the Russian-African trade was just 60% of that in 1990³. The limited circle of Russia's African trade partners narrowed further. The most important of them were the countries of North Africa, Guinea and Nigeria.

The euphoria concerning the technoeconomic and trade cooperation with the industrial countries ended very soon. The Russian novice entrepreneurs faced the realities of the European, US and Japanese markets. Firstly, nobody was eager there to welcome them with open arms, as they had naively expected, in the setting of rigid competition. Secondly, the bulk of the Russian products proved totally incompetent at the Western markets. Thirdly, we became competitors rather than partners of TA in the export of some items.

² Narody Azii i Afriki. 1973, No 5, p. 134.

³ Vneshnyaya Torgovlya Rossii. 2000, No 3, p. 41; Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'. 2000, No 5, p. 60; Kompas. 2002, No 19, p. 110.

In the second half of the 1990s, especially after the default of 1998, it became obvious that the orientation towards the economic and technological cooperation with the West did not yield the desired results, and our agencies in charge of foreign trade sought to restore their forfeited positions in the Third World, including TA. However, the West and China tried to fill the vacuum as soon as possible, and their efforts were a success. They pay keen attention to Africa.

At the same time, 36 countries of Tropical Africa with a population of 450 mln are of an unquestionable interest to Russia as a region where it can expand its foreign trade. It accounts for 36% of the GDP and 43% of the foreign trade turnover of whole Africa, as well as for a sizable part of the African deposits of some minerals (48% of oil, 40% of manganese, over 90% of bauxites, etc.)⁴.

Tropical Africa is a major source of raw materials. Mineral and fuel supplies therefrom enable the countries of the EU to satisfy a substantial share of their need for these strategically important articles.

The world market, including Russia, cannot do without such products from the countries of this region as strategic raw materials (niobium, tantalum, manganese, cobalt, bauxites, etc.) and agricultural products (cocoa beans, coffee, palm and peanut oil, vanilla, cloves, tropical and subtropical fruits, valuable species of timber, resin, etc.).

In the near future the countries of Tropical Africa or most of them will become not only raw material suppliers but a permanently growing capacious market for industrial products from developed countries.

Russia and the TA countries have a lot of opportunities to develop mutually advantageous business cooperation. However, these opportunities are realized only partly.

At present Russia's economic cooperation with both TA and most of other developing countries undergoes a difficult period of recession owing to the transition to the new forms of cooperation, namely, mutually advantageous commercial contracts instead of credit supplies.

Many objective factors hamper the development of the bilateral cooperation. They are caused, as it was noted above, by the considerable retardation of the economic and social development of these countries (almost a half of their population spends less than a dollar daily) and their geographical remoteness from Russia, which increases the cost of transportation.

⁴ Tropicheskaya Afrika: strukturnye sdvigi v khozyaistve. 90-e gody (Tropical Africa: Structural Changes in Economy in the 1990s). M., 1999, p. 7.

Russian entrepreneurs are not prepared to invest in projects with a return in the remote future. In addition, they are ill-informed about the local situation. It is important to grasp that our entrepreneurs who start a project in TA must work on the spot, which they are very reluctant to do.

Other obstacles to an increase in the trade turnover between Russia and TA are single-crop farming and involvement of mediators in commercial deals. This impairs effectiveness of trade operations. Other factors are Russian businessmen's poor knowledge of the markets of the region and insufficient advertisement of their capacity in Russia and of Russian goods in TA.

One more hindrance to the development of the bilateral economic cooperation is corruption at all levels. Notably, according to the report prepared by the Transparency International, led by O. Obasanjo, the president of Nigeria, in 2000 the dozen of the most corrupt countries of the world included five African countries⁵.

These are only few of the difficulties that prevent Russia and TA from expanding their cooperation.

In our opinion, the cooperation between Russia and TA may develop most successfully in the following fields.

Russian organization must take part in the development of geological prospecting, mining, fishery, construction of granaries and refrigerating facilities and training of skilled personnel. Certain experience has been accumulated and some successes have been achieved in these spheres.

An important form of Russia's cooperation with these countries is the creation of small or medium-size JVs for the production of fertilizers, agricultural equipment, construction materials, glass and plastic articles of local materials and processing of tropical agricultural products to be supplied to Russia and other CIS countries, such as instant coffee, babyfood, tinned oranges, grapefruits, anannases, mango, papaya, etc. and juices of these fruits, as well as starch and other products made of cassava.

It is quite promising to Russian organizations to take part in irrigation projects. Many countries of this region need to expand irrigated areas by building large- and small-scale irrigation facilities.

There is much room for the cooperation in oil and gas industry. Russian organizations can help in the development of new oil and gas fields and in the construction of power plants that burn natural gas, as well as oil and gas pipelines. Notably, the Russian specialists have a lot of experience of the construction of such facilities in subtropical regions. For instance, in the late

⁵ Pul's Planety, September 15, 2000.

1970s and early 1980s they built two more than 900 km long oil pipelines in Nigeria. Working in adverse climatic conditions in a marshland near the coast of the Gulf of Guinea, they built this pipeline with five pumping stations and a total annual capacity of 11.2 mln tons within a short period and at a high technological level⁶.

Other promising spheres for the cooperation are joint exploration and use of the space and solar and thermal power. As the general director of the Soyuzkarta-Impex noted, the new Russian technologies, particularly in the field of space, enabled specialists of not only Russia but other countries to solve many problems, such as environment protection, making and renewing topographical maps and prospecting for water, oil and gas⁷.

We deem it proper to set up joint trade and purchase companies and a joint bank or financial company.

Despite the financial, economic and political difficulties faced by both parties, the bilateral cooperation in trade and economy is restored in various spheres on the basis of mutual advantage, mainly by expanding private business. At present Russia has signed trade agreements with 43 African countries, including those in TA.

The Russo-African technoeconomic cooperation is becoming stable and multifarious. In 2001 the first step was taken in the field of the interbank cooperation. The Russian interregional AKB Forte-Bank and the Nigerian Hallmark Bank established direct partnership as a basis for providing all kinds of financial services, including various forms of financing of the export-import operations performed by Russian producers and guaranties for trade deals. Since 1996 the Russian government resumed state scholarship allocation for students from the African countries.

The exchange of high-ranking state and business delegations, trade and industrial exhibitions between Russia and TA countries, creation of federal and regional organizations for Russo-African trade and meetings of Russian and African businessmen have become quite frequent. In June 1997 the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences initiated the 1st congress of Russian and East African entrepreneurs, held in Nairobi. A month later a Kenyan trade delegation visited Moscow and Samara.

In February 1999 the Medic Africa exhibition was held, to which a dozen of plants of Ekaterinburg and other cities sent diagnostic equipment.

⁶ Afrika v sovremennom mire i rossiisko-afrikanskie otnosheniya (Africa in the Modern World and the Russo-African Relations). M., 2001, p. 212.

⁷ Pul's Planety, September 11, 2000.

In June 2001 three dozens of Russian companies took part in the international trade and industrial exhibition held in Ndola (Zambia). Most of the Russian exhibits were pieces of mining equipment and machines. Such exhibitions are held every year in Zambia. Unfortunately, their Russian participants failed to find a local project to invest in it.

The Uralimpex Co. coordinates the efforts of the enterprises of Ural and other Russian regions aimed at expanding the export of Russian goods and services to Asia, Africa and the Middle East. In 2000 it organized a travel of African ambassadors, including those of Zambia and Tanzania, to Chelyabinsk, where they got an idea of the capacities of Russian industry. They expressed their countries' interest in developing mutually advantageous cooperation with Ural. It is planned to found the Russian Trade-House in Lusaka as a permanent exhibition and business centre⁸.

It would be useful to our trade and industrial corporations to establish contacts with African regional organizations, such as the Economic Community of West African Countries (ECOWAC) with 16 member states. It realizes the programmes of trade and custom liberalization, creation of free trade zones and development of the regional infrastructure. The ECOWAC plans to introduce common currency by 2004⁹.

Notably, many participants of the Russian Entrepreneurs in Africa business forum, held at the Institute for African Studies in late March 2002, noted that it corresponds to Russia's interests to further expand political, trade, economic, scientific, technological, cultural and other contacts with Africa, including the countries of TA. It would be better to do so as soon and actively as possible in order to use the available opportunities, which are shrinking rapidly because of the strengthening competition and appearance of new rivals at the African markets. Despite riskiness of investments, such factors as abundance of manpower and rich natural resources of TA are a guarantee of a very high profitability, provided that commodity exchanges are permanent and economic cooperation is based on long-term planning.

It is necessary to restore and expand the intergovernment contacts, including those between the topmost officials, and to perfect the mechanisms of bilateral consultations. It is urgent to renew and improve the contractual and legal basis of the trade, economic and technological cooperation between the RF and Tropical African countries and apply it in practice, as well as to improve the activity of the intergovernment commissions for trade, economic, scientific and technological cooperation.

⁸ Ibid., June 28, 2001.

⁹ Kompas. 2002, No 19, p. 53.

An important sphere of the investment cooperation with the Sub-Saharan countries is the promotion and mutual protection of investments¹⁰.

Some positive changes have taken place in the restoration and expansion of Russia's technoeconomic cooperation with the TA countries. Business structures become increasingly active in the region. Fair prospects for the comprehensive cooperation have opened after Nigerian president Olusegona Obasanjo (March 5-7, 2001), Gabonese president Omar Bongo (April 23-26, 2001) and Guinean president Lansana Konte (July 26-28, 2001) visited our country.

As a result of President Putin's and other topmost statesmen's and businessmen's meetings with the African guests, the parties reached understanding on several important projects. For instance, Russia and Nigeria agreed to increase their trade turnover ten times within the next five years; it will reach \$ 500 mln annually. An understanding was reached on a question of crucial importance, namely, the completion of the too protracted construction of the Ajaokuta metallurgical plant. In addition, our country is ready to take part in launching several space vehicles in order to control environment and explore land in Nigeria¹¹.

The communique of Russia and Gabon emphasized the necessity of joint measures aimed at facilitating the development of trade and economic cooperation, including direct contacts between the provinces of Gabon and subjects of the Russian Federation. Gabon would like to purchase Russian fertilizers and aviation and agricultural equipment. It also was ready to set up a technical centre in the country for maintenance of Russian planes¹².

The main topics of the negotiation between President Putin and Guinean president Konte was the development and strengthening of the bilateral economic cooperation. They discussed the steps towards the expansion of cooperation in bauxite mining, road construction, geological prospecting and air transportation. Gabon agreed to lease concession of Dian-Dian bauxite field to the Russkii Alyuminii for 25 years¹³.

The results of all Russo-African negotiations confirmed the striving of the African countries to actively cooperate with our country in all spheres.

These and other summits will be, undoubtedly, helpful for the restoration and further expansion of Russia's cooperation with the countries of Tropical Africa in all spheres. The state's aid is badly needed to solve this

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 12-14.

¹¹ Pul's Planety, March 7, 2001.

¹² Ibid., April 26, 2001.

¹³ Ibid., July 30, 2001.

problem. At the same time, the development pace and character of the Russo-African economic relations will depend to a great extent on the pace of the revival of the Russian economy.

**EGYPT: ECONOMIC REFORMS AND
CO-OPERATION WITH RUSSIA**

*Irina Abramova**

Egypt is among the most dynamically developing states of the Middle East and Africa. In the 1980s and particularly 1990s, it pursued the Infitah (open doors) policy, aimed at overcoming ineffectiveness of the then economic system and perfection of market mechanisms. A special importance was attached to the comprehensive support of the private sector, which was going to play the key role in the formation of Egyptian export, and to the creation of a favourable investment climate for foreign partners. Before the reforms, the public sector accounted for 70% of the industrial products (98% in mining, 68% in manufacturing industry and 100% in power production). 80% of the total investment in economy were allocated to the public sector¹.

The legal base of Infitah included guarantees against the seizure, nationalization and confiscation of foreign private assets and the right to transfer profits abroad and repatriate the capital. The economic liberalization mechanisms included the creation of free zones, where the national trade legislation did not apply. Foreign capital rushed mainly to oil prospecting and production, power production, machine building and petrochemical industry.

In the 1970s and early 1980s, the accent was on the investments in the tertiary sector of economy, i.e., nonproductive infrastructure and services, including tourism. Retaining its domination in national economy, the public sector remained in control of the most profitable spheres of economy, including mining, power production and manufacturing of the main industrial goods. Foreign investors preferred the state-run enterprises, which were prepared to cooperate technologically and organizationally with foreign entities better than private companies. Actually, oil production was the only industry that attracted foreign investors. Oil replaced cotton as the main export article, accounting for 68% of total export in 1985².

In spite of some improvements in the economic situation and moderate

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¹ Knyazev, A.G. *Egipet posle Nasera 1970-1981 (Egypt after Nasser, 1970-1981)*. Moscow: Nauka, 1986, p. 81.

² *Arabskaya Respublika Egipet. Spravochnik (The Arab Republic of Egypt. Directory)*. Moscow: Nauka, 1991, p. 190.

activization of the private sector, the initial period of the economic liberalization was characterized by the faults of the so-called consumption Infitah. Private entrepreneurs were particularly active not in production but in mediation; export was not diversified; the main sources of the export proceeds were oil export, operation of the Suez canal, money orders from Egyptian emigrants and tourism. The import of luxuries increased.

President Mubarak had to solve the difficult problem of the transition from the consumer to productive Infitah in the setting of the economic crisis of the late 1980s, caused mainly by the fall of oil and gas prices. Another challenge was achieving balanced development of the public and private sectors in the complicated political and socioeconomic situation that prevailed in the country.

The Path of Structural Reforms

Since May 1991 Egypt began carrying out market-oriented economic reforms according to a programme approved by the IMF. It provided for the measures aimed at financial stabilization, liquidation of loss-making companies and privatization of the public sector enterprises. At the first stage of the market-oriented transformations, the main direction of the state policy was the economic stabilization and curtailment of the budget deficit. As a result, the share of the state's expenditure in the GDP reduced from 43.5% in 1988/1989 to 34% in 1992/1993, while the share of revenue rose from 26-28% to 30%.

Administrative control of process was lifted from most of industrial goods, except medicines. The domestic oil price reached 80% of the world level in 1992, electric power rates increased, food subsidies were reduced, except those for bread³. The annual inflation rate went down from 20-22% in the 1980s to 6-7% in 1995. The market quotation of the Egyptian pound was introduced in 1991⁴.

Profitability of deposits in the national currency was increased to limit the capital flight from the country and normalize the financial situation.

At the same time, most of the capacities of the monetarist measures aimed at an economic stabilization were exhausted, and Egypt faced the necessity to start structural reforms, first of all, privatization of industrial enterprises.

³ Saad Eddin, Ibrahim. *Egypt, Islam and Democracy. Twelve Critical Essays*. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1996, p. 148-149.

⁴ IMF. *International Financial Statistics*, July 1996, p. 232.

By late 1997, 53 state-run enterprises were privatized; in 1998 the state sold its shares in 119 companies. Most of the auctioned objects were large hotels, restaurants, land plots, insurance companies and mixed commerce banks⁵.

In January 2001 the government declared privatization of 49 more state-run companies, including five large trade-houses and cement plants⁶. Thus, the initial privatization plan was implemented by 50%, the most profitable companies were auctioned, and bank indebtedness of the rest objects considerably increased.

Carrying out market reforms, Egypt achieved certain successes. The annual rate of the increase in the GDP in the constant prices was 5-5.5% in 1995-2000, and the budget deficit went down to 1% of the GDP. The inflation rate did not exceed 3.7% in 1999⁷.

By 2000, the share of the private sector in the GDP reached 70%, and it accounted for over 65% of the total investments⁸.

The relative financial and economic stability and restructuring of Egyptian economy create a sufficiently favourable climate for an investment inflow. Between 1991 and 1999, the investment volume considerably increased: roundly 5 thousands private projects with a total cost of 100 bln pounds (\$ 30 bln) are under realization. The share of foreign capital in the investments was 50%⁹.

The improved situation at the currency market enabled Egypt to start financial reforms. Control was lifted from the interest rates in banks, fixed charges for many services were cancelled, as well as credit ceiling. The government began to introduce indirect currency control. The interest rate for short-term deposits was raised to 10% and for bank loans to 14%.

In 1996, privatization of banking began. The government decided to privatize the state's share in 23 mixed banks. This strengthened the competition in banking; the indices of the development and economic activity of commercial banks increased several times.

There were 35 mixed banks, 22 branches of foreign banks and 4 state-run banks in Egypt in 1999. The total amount of the deposits was 207 bln pounds, of which 120 bln were in the state-run banks.

⁵ IMF. *Egypt beyond Stabilization, toward a Dynamic Market Economy*. Washington, D.C. May 1998, p. 57-59.

⁶ www.uk.sis.gov.eg/online.

⁷ www/cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/goes/eg/html.

⁸ www.uk.sis.gov.eg/online.

⁹ Al-Ahram. Cairo, January 9, 2000.

An important achievement of the stabilization policy was convertability of the Egyptian pound. Stability of the exchange rate and positive level of the real interest rates caused a capital inflow, which enabled the government to maintain the exchange rate at the level of 3.4 pounds to \$ 1 for a long period.

Stabilization of the financial system led to an increase in foreign currency reserves, which reached \$ 20 bln in 1999¹⁰. An important component of the financial reform was a change in the government's approach to state-run enterprises. It strove to increase their profitability, at the same time cancelling subsidies for their products. These enterprises were granted management autonomy; their privileges in receiving bank loans were cancelled. All this led to the equalization of state-run and private banks (the private sector accounts for a half of bank credits).

Bank privatization begins from small banks. The government took measures to protect creditors, debtors, shareholders and depositors from the state's interference and bankers' misuse, strengthening the Central Bank's control, making it independent from government agencies, perfecting the credit system and creating obstacles to the formation of bank monopolies. Ownership rights are transferred from the state to private entities under the state's control.

An important stage of the financial liberalization was the law about the sale of state-run banks' shares to private entities, adopted in June 1998. Initially, it was planned only to attract the private sector to owning a part of the assets of these banks, buying it at the stock exchange and through other channels. The liberalization makes banks look for new investment objects, because earlier the bulk of bank assets was invested in the public sector. The planned privatization of the National Bank, Misr Bank, Bank of Cairo and Bank of Alexandria will, as the government expects, improve their management, increase effectivity of their activity and ensure a strong inflow of foreign and domestic investments to banking. This privatization will be carried out under the control of the Central Bank (with regard for the recommendations of international experts) in order to prevent an infringement of the national interests as a result of the purchase of most of the shares by foreign investors. The law stipulates that physical and legal persons cannot own more than 10% of the declared capital of a bank without the Central Bank's consent. The Egyptian and other Arab investors will be preferred to foreigners in selling banks' shares.

¹⁰ www/cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook.

In the 1990s the Egyptian private sector strengthened its activity, creating a basis for the expanded cooperation with foreign companies, including those from Russia. President Mubarak's balanced approach, based on the geographical and structural diversification of foreign policy and trade, creates a possibility to strengthen the Russian-Egyptian economic cooperation in both public and private sectors.

Activization of Business Co-operation

Once Russia and Egypt were active economic partners. Up to the late 1980s, Egypt was among the most important partners of the USSR in the developing world. The main items of the Soviet export to Egypt were machines, equipment, timber, cellulose, plywood, cardboard, paper, chemical fertilizers, coal, cast iron, frozen fish, etc. The bulk of Russian import consisted of cotton, cotton yarn, cloths, natural essential oils, perfumery, cosmetics, citrus fruits, garments, household chemicals and furniture.

Trade was based on the trade turnover protocols concluded by the governments and barter deals on supplies of our machines and equipment in exchange to Egyptian consumer goods and raw materials for their manufacturing. By the late 1980s, the total turnover of the Russian-Egyptian trade reached \$ 1 bln¹¹.

The recent decade witnessed a recession in the Russian-Egyptian business cooperation, caused mainly by the difficulties of the transitional period and transformation of economic systems in both countries. In the late 1980s and early 1990s the amount of the bilateral trade went down three times. The participation of Russian companies in the erection of economic projects in Egypt drastically decreased.

However, there are prerequisites for a revival of the Russian-Egyptian trade and economic cooperation, both in the sphere of the public sector and between private entities. The latter is considered a priority in Egypt. Visiting Moscow in September 1997, President Mubarak said: 'In the economic cooperation with Russia we will stake on the private sector, on the development of cooperation with non-state-run enterprises'¹².

The present economic situation in Russia and Egypt, the privatization results, the possibility to realize large-scale investment projects with the participation of foreign capital, the financial capacities of Russia and Egypt, their current investment legislation and banking policy make business opera-

¹¹ *BIKI*, No 89 (7979), August 3, 1999, p. 4-5.

¹² *Ibidem*.

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tions of Egyptian private companies in Russia and of Russian entities in Egypt quite promising.

The contractual and legal basis regarding non-state-run commercial structures pays a special role in the bilateral trade.

Before 1992, the trade between the USSR and Egypt was regulated by the trade and payment agreements signed on June 23, 1962. They provided for mutual granting of the most favoured nation regime in trade and navigation. The payments were effected in British pounds on the clearing basis.

After the disintegration of the USSR, the development of the Russian-Egyptian trade required a new contractual and legal basis. The negotiation held in Cairo resulted in the agreement on the trade and economic, scientific and technological cooperation signed on May 14, 1992; it provided for mutual payments in hard currency. On November 5, 1993, the agreement was supplemented by a special protocol about mutual granting of the most favoured nation regime and the use of national currencies in bilateral trade in addition to hard currency.

On November 9, 1994, a new agreement on the economic and technological cooperation was signed by Russia and Egypt with a list of the branches and projects in industry, power production and irrigation where the parties intended to cooperate. In addition, the Russian vice-prime-minister signed an agreement about the mutual settlement of debts with Egypt in Cairo in 1994.

The first meeting of the joint Russian-Egyptian commission for trade and economic, scientific and technological cooperation was held in Moscow on September 18 to 22, 1997. Soon thereafter, President Mubarak visited Russia and signed a series of agreements about scientific and technological cooperation, mutual encouragement and protection of investments, cooperation in the sphere of marine transport and avoidance of dual taxation. He also signed a treaty about the preferential custom dues, reduced from 50% to 25% of the value. Another agreement dealt with export guarantees.

In 1998 Russia and Egypt negotiated opening of a direct shipping line with ships of the 'river-sea' type, which made it possible to carry cargoes to the ports on the Volga, the Don and the Caspian. The Egytrans Co. and the administration of Nizhegorodskaya oblast of Russia took part in the negotiation.

A considerable progress was achieved in 1998 in the negotiation between the Ingosstrakh, a Russian insurance company, and the Egyptian Company for Export Credit Guarantees, which signed an agreement about the guarantees against commercial risks in foreign trade. In early 1999 Russia transferred a draft long-term programme of trade, economic, industrial,

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scientific and technological cooperation to Egypt. In March 2000 the Egyptian-Russian council for business cooperation was set up. It is led by Ahmed Diqa, an Egyptian entrepreneur.

In 1991-1993 the amount of our trade with Egypt drastically decreased, owing to the disintegration of the USSR. Most of the Black Sea ports remained in Ukraine, which led to an increase in the cost of transportation of the exported and imported goods and risk of damaging or losing the cargoes. Another reason was the payment in hard currency, whose resources are quite limited in the state-run companies of both countries.

The situation began to somewhat improve in 2000. The total amount of the Russian export reached the precrisis level.

Table 1

Trade turnover between Russia and Egypt (\$ mln)

	1993	1996	1997	1998
Turnover	313.6	422.5	470.8	415.8
Export	169.9	387.7	438.8	399.2
Import	143.7	34.8	32.0	16.6

The increase in the Russian export to Egypt after 1993 was accompanied by some changes in its structure; its main feature was a high share of machines and equipment (33.4% in 1993), including aviation equipment (helicopters produced in Kazan and navigation and radio location equipment).

Egypt is interested in purchasing Tu-204-120 aircrafts with RV-211-535 engines supplied by the Rolls-Roys of Britain and avionics supplied from the USA. This deal is financed by I. Kamel, a renowned Egyptian entrepreneur. There is a good demand in Egypt for VAZ cars, Ural and KAMAZ lorries, road construction machines and Ural motorcycles. In 1999 Russia supplied machines and equipment to Egypt to the amount of \$ 150 mln.

Russia's share in the supplies of semi-finished goods of iron and steel to Egypt is 55%, in plywood supply 43%, in newsprint 56%, in timber 20% and in polymeres 15%¹³.

The Egyptian government considers the amount of Egyptian export to Russia impermissibly low. Egypt's share in the total import to Russia is just 0.05%¹⁴.

¹³ www.polpred.com/afrika/egypt.

¹⁴ www.uk.sis.gov.eg/online.

Russian companies import Egyptian consumer goods, including food. Oranges account for 20% of this import (\$ 6.9 mln in 1997). Our shops trade in Egyptian rice, onions, garlic, spaghetti, ready-made soups and broths, cascade tea, razor blades, perfumery, cosmetics, furniture, clothes and knitted garments.

In September 1998 the Egyptian Week was held in Moscow with the participation of major Egyptian exporters, who earlier did not supply their goods to Russia, such as the Bella Donna (knitted garments), Nounou Bros (cotton cloths and garments) and Nefertiti Cosmetics (creams, shampoos, lotions). They demonstrated garments, furniture, perfumery, cosmetics, medicines and food articles. In 1998 Egyptian businessmen (the Mamso, an exporter of agricultural goods to the CIS countries) took part in the Nizhni Novgorod fair.

The Egyptian Federation of Industries hopes to increase supplies of fruit juices, tomatoes, dry and fresh fruits, flowers, car tyres, cigarettes, cotton and leather articles, yarn and quilts to Russia. A quite promising field of trade is the supply of Egyptian medicines: in the recent 15 years Egypt achieved major successes in pharmaceutical industry. It manufactures 90% of the main medicines applied in all branches of health care. Now Russia purchases foreign medicines to 1.6 bln roubles, of which Egypt accounts for just 0.5 mln (0.03%).

In addition, Russia can import chilled vegetables, which are much cheaper in Egypt than in Europe. In 1998 Russia imported this item to 145 mln roubles, including 37 mln (25%) from Egypt¹⁵.

Notably, almost all Egyptian goods are supplied to Russia by private companies, quite interested in expanding the cooperation with their Russian partners. In 1997 an Egyptian-Russian joint venture was founded to export Egyptian agricultural products to Russia with an authorized capital of \$ 100 mln, of which 60% were invested by the Egyptian party¹⁶. The Egyptian guarantor of the company was the Bank for Export Development. In 1998 four Russian-Egyptian private companies were founded in Moscow to export and import various goods and services, from supplying Egyptian oranges to Russia to transferring modern Russian technologies in light and food processing industry to Egypt¹⁷.

¹⁵ *BIKI*, No 89 (7979), August 3, 1999, p. 4-5.

¹⁶ *Al-Ahram*, February 17, 1999.

¹⁷ *Ash-Shaab*, Cairo. March 9, 1999.

Russia was and is a promising market for Egyptian goods. Russian private companies may get a fair return by creating joint ventures for manufacturing the following goods to be imported to Russia:

medicines;

light industry products, especially cotton articles, whose quality is much higher than in China or Turkey;

food products, including chilled vegetables and fruits, which are much cheaper than in Europe;

household chemicals.

In its turn, Egypt needs the Russian equipment and advanced technologies. The most promising items are cars, lorries, equipment for chemical and gas industry, metal-working machines, agricultural equipment and planes. The activation of the Russian-Egyptian trade heavily depends on the normal functioning of the port in Novorossiisk and cooperation in the transportation and custom functioning.

The creation of joint ventures and realization of investment projects are important spheres of the cooperation between Russian and Egyptian businessmen. In the future, they may become the main fields of cooperation. Since 1958 the USSR built 97 industrial, power and agricultural projects, including the Aswan High Dam, Helwan metallurgical plant and Nag-Hammadi aluminium plant, which play an important role in the Egyptian economy.

Another promising sphere for Russian entrepreneurs' activity in Egypt is the reconstruction of the projects built with the Soviet aid. In the late 1990s Russian state-run and private companies took part in two dozens of tenders for their modernization. In 1998 alone they participated in 19 tenders to the total amount of \$ 19.8 mln and won eight of them to \$ 1 mln¹⁸.

The Egyptian government is interested in foreign, including Russian, investments in the reconstruction of the Aswan High Dam¹⁹.

In addition, Russian private capital may take part in major Egyptian investment projects related to the reclamation of new lands, such as the Toshka canal and New Valley project.

Russian private companies may also take part in prospecting for oil, gas and various minerals, applying modern Russian technologies, which have no analogues in the world. They may create joint ventures in oil and gas production and processing of by-product gas. However, in this sphere they have

¹⁸ www.polpred.com.

¹⁹ www.uk.sis.gov.eg/online.

such strong competitors as the Amoco of the USA and Agip of Italy, which dominate the Egyptian oil and gas market.

One of the major Egyptian projects in Russia is the agreement between the Aviastar (Ulyanovsk) and Sirocco Aerospace International on the joint financing of the manufacturing and supply of 200 Tu-204 aircrafts. Three such liners already fly from Cairo, and five more were purchased by Egypt in 2000.

In 2000 a joint Egyptian-Russian company was created to produce new Russian landrowers on the basis of the technologies of the Ulyanovsk vehicle plant. Its authorized capital is 50 mln Egyptian pounds.

The rapid development of tourism in Egypt and numerous Russians' interest in visiting the country make it suitable to found mixed tourist companies and joint ventures for the construction of hotels, motels, holiday guest rooms, tourist centres and entertainment facilities.

It is quite promising to build container terminals, refrigerator warehouses, water-purifying facilities and granaries. An important new sphere for Russian investments is the development of the modern kinds of communications, such as cellular telephone networks and creation of software and internet services. Russia has accumulated a vast experience in this sphere in the recent five years, and the charge for these services is below the world level.

The main methods of attracting investments to Egypt are the schemes called BOT (build-operate-take profit), BOOT (build-operate-own-take profit) and BOO (build-operate-own). The credit and financial conditions offered to foreign participants of investment projects are quite attractive: 40% - donation, 20% - a soft credit (an installment plan for 17-20 years, the interest rate in first ten years is 2.5-4%) and 20% - budget financing plus the opportunity to supply a part of the manufactured equipment to Egyptian plants²⁰.

At the same time, the Egyptian investment legislation is characterized by some shortcomings, which should be taken into account by Russian investors. They will have to compete with Western and Arab investors. US, European, Japanese and rapidly developing South-East Asian companies are quite active in Egypt. At the same time, Russian citizens are treated favourably there, since the Egyptians remember the fruitful cooperation with the Soviet Union. To achieve a success, Russian entrepreneurs must take part in tenders, where their performance is quite weak in comparison with

²⁰ www.polpred.com.

their Western competitors. They must attend annual international fairs in Cairo, where they already have demonstrated their activity.

The 32nd International Fair was held in Cairo on March 9 to 19, 1999. Russia was represented there by ZAO Expocentre. The main exhibitors were 15 enterprises: the OAO BKMPO (a metallurgical plant), JV Kalitva from Belaya Kalitva (Rostov oblast), the Degtyarev plant from Kovrov (Vladimir oblast), OAO Sparkplug Plant from Engels (Saratov oblast), OAO Klinvolokno (a fibre factory) from Klin (Moscow oblast), OAO Krasnyi Yakor from Nizhnii Novgorod, OAO Lenprod mash (food processing equipment) from St. Petersburg, OAO Omskshina (tyre plant) from Omsk, OAO Rusich from Kurgan, ZAO Tyazhpessmash from Ryazan, FoMos Co. from Moscow, Fesko match factory and the Cherepovets plywood and furniture factory (Vologda oblast), as well as AO Zaporozhstal (a steel plant in Zaporozhye, Ukraine) and Kutaisi lorry plant (Georgia).

The participants of the 33rd International Fair, held in Cairo on March 1 to 10, 2000, were 16 enterprises: AO Voronezhobl gaz and AOOT FPK Kosmos-Neft-Gaz (Voronezh), OAO Lebedinsk GOK (an ore enrichment plant, Belgorod), AO Leningradskii Metallicheski Zavod (metal works, St. Petersburg), AO Radioavionika and JV Interturbo (St. Petersburg), ZAO Chelprom (Chelyabinsk), OAO Borets (Moscow), OAO Visko-R (Ryazan), OAO KZAE (Kaluga), Mashpriborintorg Signal (Moscow), ZAO Perm Electrotechnical Plant (Perm), OAO Teploobmennik (heat exchanger plant, Nizhnii Novgorod), OAO Fanplit (Cherepovets, Vologda oblast), OAO Sparkplug Plant (Engels, Saratov oblast) and Cherepovets plywood and furniture factory (Vologda oblast).

It is better to work at the Egyptian market through local agents; in addition to looking for customers, they can overcome numerous organizational and financial difficulties related to the participation in auctions. This practice is supported by the Egyptian legislation, which stipulates that foreign companies shall take part in auctions through duly registered Egyptian agents. Egyptian customers are interested in dealing with local agents, who easily solve the problems of guaranteed servicing and supply of spares.

A Russian private company that wants a success at the Egyptian market should pay attention to advertisement, whose present level is insufficient. It is impossible to penetrate the Egyptian market without spending money for advertisement, marketing and a reliable agent.

Notably, some Russian state-run and private companies are already active in Egypt. Russia exports machines and equipment to Egypt to the amount of \$ 130.8 mln (Table 2).

Table 2

Export of Russian machines and equipment to Egypt

Items	Amount, \$ mln	Supplier
MI-17-IV helicopters	50.0	Aviaexport
Metal-cutting machines	2.0	Stankoimport
Ural dumpers	2.9	Avtoexport
KAMAZ trucks with spares	6.3	KAMAZ
VAZ-2107, 2109, 21213 cars	5.7	Ladaexport
Ural motorcycles	3.0	Uralmoto
Ship diesel engines	3.7	Zvezda
Ship equipment	0.8	Sudoexport
Tractor equipment	3.2	Traktoroexport
Excavators	0.6	Stroidormashexport
Diesel locomotive spares	0.3	Energomashexport
Communication equipment	1.3	Mashpriborintorg
Medical and optical equipment	0.2	LOMO
Military equipment	50.0	Rosvooruzhenie

All these companies have permanent representatives in Egypt, who work in cooperation with the Russian trade representation. They maintain many years old contacts with experienced agents and are in knowledge of the situation at the Egyptian market.

Tourism is an important and dynamically developing sphere of the business cooperation between Russia and Egypt. The latter pins great hopes on the Russian tourist market, since tourism is a major source of hard currency proceeds there. In 1995, 113 thsd Russians visited the country of pyramids; in 1996 they numbered 130 thsd and in 1997 200 thsd. After November 1997, when the terrorist act committed in Luxore led to a drastic reduction in the number of Western European tourists, Russians saved the Egyptian tourist business from a catastrophic recession. In 2000 the number of Russian tourists was 400 to 500 thsd; in 2001 this number increased by 25%.

In the late 1980s there were just three tourist agencies in Egypt that received Russian tourists; official Russian-speaking guides numbered eight. Nowadays, some 300 private agencies deal with Russia, including such famous companies as Lucky Tours, Intergulf Travel, Misr Travel, etc. Two hundreds Russian-speaking guides do not cope with the inflow of tourists. In 1999 there were 240 agencies in Russia that offered tours to Egypt, and this number permanently increases; in Hurghada alone, there are some dozens of Russian hotel employees.

The most promising spheres of Russian-Egyptian cooperation in tourism are:

further development of traditional tourism in such new areas as the Red Sea and Mediterranean coasts of Sinai, Western desert oases and Aswan; construction and operation of hotels and other facilities for Russian citizens; combination of different kinds of tourism, introduction of new routes and development of elite tourism; business tourism, organization of various conferences, seminars and business weeks in Egypt.

As for the cooperation in science and technology, the Egyptian party is interested in Russian offers concerning environment protection, geology, natural resources and agriculture (perfection of the operation of reclamation and drainage systems).

In January 2000 a seminar was held in Cairo about the higher education in Russia. It discussed the opportunities for training Egyptian students in Russia, first of all, in engineering and sciences. The Egyptians want their students to undergo practical training at Russian enterprises, including private companies. This is a promising sphere for the Russian-Egyptian cooperation.

In addition, the Egyptian party is very interested in inviting Russian scholars and experts to Egyptian scientific research institutions. There are 16 Russian teachers in Egypt.

Joint economic seminars have become a new phenomenon in the Russian-Egyptian business cooperation. Their participants analyze the condition of the bilateral economic relations, suggest promising cooperation spheres and discuss how to overcome the existing difficulties.

It was noted at the Cairo seminar in 1998 that Egyptian entrepreneurs are ignorant about the features of the Russian market, relying on the obsolete ideas of the Soviet period.

The seminar observed that the transportation problems are a very painful aspect of the bilateral trade. In particular, its participants sharply criticized the Novorossiisk port for delays in cargo processing, its poor quality, bribery, theft, etc., emphasizing the necessity to accelerate the implementation of the understandings about creating a joint transportation company with ships of the 'river-sea' type.

The participants advocated the formation of a joint coordination body in order to facilitate mutual offset deals, necessitated by hard currency shortage (the so-called multilateral barter instead of clearing, widely used in the Soviet period).

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Notably, other CIS countries actively compete with Russia at the Egyptian market. One of them is Ukraine, which inherited almost all Black Sea ports after the disintegration of the USSR.

Despite objective and subjective difficulties, the cooperation between Russian and Egyptian businessmen has fair prospects. Russian entrepreneurs have expanded the geographical limits of their activity and demonstrate interest in Africa. The Russian and Egyptian business circles set great hopes on President Putin's forthcoming visit to Egypt. This meeting may result in new understandings, which will be helpful in expanding Russian private entrepreneurs' activity in Egypt and vice versa.

**THE KENYAN NATIONAL HISTORIOGRAPHY AND
ITS PROSPECTS: A LOOK FROM THE OUTSIDE**

*Andrei Pegushev**

It is necessary to emphasise from the onset that in this paper, I express only my personal point of view concerning the state and prospects of development of the Kenyan national historiography (1960s - 1990s).

I do not claim, of course, to "cover" this topic fully. A comprehensive analysis of the sources, origins, development and prospects of the Kenyan national historiography is a subject for special research, which has yet to be done. I take into consideration only published works, the visible, 'tangible' results of the efforts of Kenyan professional scholars. Outside the limits of this paper remain many publications which were written for general public consumption and very interesting 'unprofessional' historical publications, such as autobiographies, memoirs, and other works of Kenyan politicians, statesmen, participants in the struggle for independence, as well as some unpublished works by Kenyan historians, including M.A. and Ph.D. theses I am familiar with. I also leave for future discussions such related themes as 'historians and society', 'historians and politics', 'the training of historians-researchers of a high order' and some others.

I will concentrate on the following topics and problems:

The emergence of the Kenyan national historiography; its scientific foundation; its progression in the 1960s - 1970s; the overall results, achievements and limits.

A slow-down in its development: subjective and objective reasons for the decline.

Some unresolved and debatable problems and questions of the Kenyan national historiography.

Some possible general theoretical approaches to African, and particularly Kenyan, history.

Viable themes in Kenyan history.

The emergency of the Kenyan national historiography goes back to the 1960s - the beginning of the 1970s. It unfolded within the confines of the intellectual movement for the spiritual decolonisation which spread all over Africa and which had begun shortly after the end of World War Two and

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reached its height in the 60s. The Kenyan national historiography did not grow out of a ready and monolithic scientific foundation. Rather, the latter consisted of heterogeneous components: on the one hand, of African historical traditions, the so-called traditional historiography, and, on the other hand, of the theoretical and empirical experience accumulated by world Africanistics, this experience being diverse and sometimes controversial, and dominated, undoubtedly, by theoretical approaches, ideas, and concepts characteristic of the British and American schools of thoughts.

During its nascence, the Kenyan national historiography was developing along a quickly ascending line, just as other national social sciences and culture as a whole. This was a period of interesting concepts and ideas, like Ali Mazrui's well-known to-day 'theory of protests'¹. This was also when such hot historical topics as the origins and setting of Kenyan peoples, conflicts and collaboration in colonial Kenya, or the Mau Mau, a sensitive and still unresolved theme, and others, were seriously discussed². This was the time of the first so-called tribal histories, the book by Bethwell Ogot, Gideon Were and John Osogo, by Godfrey Muriuki and William Ochieng, by Henry Mwansi, Henry Ayot and Henry Mwaniki, which gradually formed an independent trend in the Kenyan historical research³.

The first generation of Kenyan professional scholars not only laid the foundation of the Kenyan national historiography but it also gave names which gained international recognition: historian Bethwell Ogot, historian, political scientists and philosopher Ali Mazrui, archaeologists and anthropologist Richard Leakey, who augmented the scientific reputation of his family. It is this same generation who continues to work in history to-day most successfully.

So, what, in brief summary, were the main scientific achievements in the Kenyan national historiography in the period of its making?

Firstly, the collection, publication and the introduction into scientific circulation of many materials of oral African traditions;

Secondly, the writing and publication of the so-called tribal histories of some peoples of Kenya, and the creation, in this way, of important premises

¹ Mazrui A.A. *Towards a Theory of Protest // Protest and Power in Black Africa*. Ed. by Rotberg and A.A. Mazrui (1970), New York.

² See, for example: *Some Perspectives on the Mau Mau Movement*. Special Issue (1977) // *Kenya Historical Review*, vol.5, № 2. Nairobi.

³ Ogot D.F. *A History of the Southern Luo*. Vol. 1. *Migrations and Settlement 1500-1900 A.D.* (1967), EAPH, Nairobi.

for the preparation of the general and complete history of this country;

Thirdly, the beginning of the formation of original theoretical approaches to the history of colonialism, anti-colonial resistance and the liberation movement in Africa as a whole, and in Kenya in particular;

In the fourth place, the opening up of the special theme of Kenyan colonial history, namely, the Mau Mau, and the publication of the first works on this subject;

And in the fifth place, the stimulation of creative atmosphere which favours an extensive and free exchange of opinions, even opposite ones, on many problems of African and Kenyan history. We should also mention the intense activity of the Historical Association of Kenya, the issue of *Hadhithis*, of special periodical editions of "Kenya Historical Review", "Transafrican Journal of History", and so on.

In subsequent years, this ascending movement decelerated. This did not happen suddenly. But the general trend of the Kenyan national historiography approximately from the end of the 70s – the beginning of the 80s up to comparatively recent time, I would characterise as a "slowing-down". Its signs, in my opinion, are the following:

Firstly, the general reduction of publications on historical subjects;

Secondly, the interruption, perhaps unwilling, of debates on some topical, not problems of Kenyan history, and of African history as a whole;

Thirdly, the brain-drain;

Fourthly, a lesser number of new significant names;

Fifthly, few ideas and concepts as compared to the previous period.

While speaking about the slow-down I am far from suggesting that everything in the Kenyan national historiography to-day is dim. In the last decade, a lot of attention has been paid to the study of economic history, a general trend in African historiography as a whole. In this connection one could mention two remarkable works: *An Economic History of Kenya* edited by William Ochieng and Robert W. Maxon⁴ and the *Jii-Speakers* by Bethwell Ogot⁵. In the 80s-90s other interesting books by Kenyan historians appeared. I shall mention only a few names which have attracted the attention of Africanists outside Kenya. These are Okete Shiroya⁶, Tabitha, Kanogo⁷, Wansa-

⁴ *An Economic History of Kenya*. Ed. by W.R. Ochieng and R.M. Maxon (1992), EAEP, Nairobi.

⁵ Ogot B.A. *Economic Adaptation and Change Among the Jii-Speaking Peoples of Eastern Africa* (1996), Anyange Press Ltd., Kisumu.

⁶ Shiroya O.J.E. *Kenya and World War II. African Soldiers in the European War* (1985), KLB, Nairobi; Shiroya O.J.E. *African Politics in Colonial Kenya: Contribution of World War II Veterans, 1945-1960* (1992), ERAP, Nairobi.

bari Maloba⁸, Macharia Munene⁹. One of the recent collective works by Kenyan historians, *Decolonisation and Independence in Kenya*, edited by B. Ogot and W. Ochieng¹⁰, I would like to see published in Russian in my country.

There could be manuscripts destined to amaze the world, lying now in some writers' desks. It may well be that complete *History of Kenya* will be the outcome, of such manuscripts. But to-day's reality is such that there are few Kenyan historians who actively publish. And in this small group, two names stand out – that of Ali Mazrui. Of course, it is not so important for a reader where this or that scholar works, a reader is interested in the results of a scholar endeavour, his books. But the fact of the drain-brain itself is alarming.

One can conditionally divide the reasons for the decline in the Kenyan national historiography into two groups. The first of these, we can call them subjective reasons, are mainly related to the worsening of the political situation in Kenya and some difficulties and hindrances this country has faced in its development in the last two decades. I leave to my Kenyan colleagues the analysis of these reasons: they should be the ones to decide “what went wrong in Kenya”¹¹. The other group encompasses reasons which I would call objective. They can be comprehended only in the context of the general laws of history and related social disciplines as such, and are connected with some special features of the Kenyan historiography. I would like to dwell at some length on them.

It is commonly known that historical science, like all scientific disciplines, especially the “living” social sciences which are the “closest” to human beings, undergoes in its development periods of rises, falls and crises. The transition through these periods, in my opinion, is conditioned by, among other reasons, the objective tasks the historical science in each particular country, as well as in the world as a whole, is called upon to fulfil. The

⁷ Kanogo T., *Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau* (1987), James Currey, London; Heinemann, Nairobi.

⁸ Maloba W.O. *Mau Mau and Kenya. An Analysis of a Peasant Revolt* (1993), EAEP, Nairobi.

⁹ Munene M. *The Truman Administration and the Decolonization of Sub-Saharan Africa* (1995), Nairobi University Press, Nairobi.

¹⁰ *Decolonisation and Independence in Kenya, 1940-93*. Ed. by B.A. Ogot and W.R. Ochieng (1995), James Currey, London; EAEP, Nairobi.

¹¹ See: Call for Papers. Keynote Address by Professor B.A. Ogot. Historical Association of Kenya Annual Conference (Theme: Missed Opportunities in Development: Kenya since the 1950s). Eldoret, July, 1998.

emerging national historiography of Kenya had to tackle the following main tasks, as I see them: firstly, the reconstruction of the pre-colonial history of the peoples who are at present inhabit Kenya, and secondly, the quest for approaches to the colonial period with the subsequent assessment of its place and role in Kenyan history. Within the framework of the latter task, the themes of resistance and struggle for independence acquired special significance.

During the 60s-70s the first of these tasks was in the main fulfilled, though the work in “tribal histories” still continues. But the research of present-day Kenyan historians in this area is much easier. They have the advantage of following in the foot-steps of their predecessors. I have in mind, in the first place, the adoption of methods of research.

The situation as regards the second task is more complex. The history of colonialism, anti-colonial resistance and national liberation struggle is one of the most politicised and ideologised themes in contemporary world historiography. The approach of some Kenyan historians to these themes, in particular to the history of resistance and struggle for independence, is not devoid of ethno-political subjectivism. Sometimes the points of view expressed are, in an ideological sense, diametrically opposed, including extreme leftist-radical ones (Maina wa Kinjatti). Probably it is because of this that such a theme as the Mau Mau still remains open. The colonial version of the Mau Mau has been rejected, invaluable new African information has become available, including evidences of participants and eyewitnesses of this historical event. But as is well known, not all relevant documents on the Mau Mau are accessible to researchers, yet a part of them still remains outside Kenya, in Britain. Besides, judging by materials in the press, especially Parliament reports, the Mau Mau remains a hot political question. I am convinced that both present and future generation of Kenyan historians will turn to it again and again.

One characteristic of the Kenyan national historiography is that up to now, Kenyan historians, with the exception of Ali Mazrui, B. Ogot and a few other scholars, have been mainly concerned with the study of the history of their own country. This was understandable and, in my opinion, completely justifiable in the first period after independence: every people, every nation strives, first of all, to come to terms with its own past, to comprehend who he or she is, where his or her roots are.

At the same time, “looking from without”, one cannot but see the thematic inclination of some Kenyan historians to their communities. I am not at all referring to a “relapsing into tribalism”, an unjust accusation levelled against the pioneers of “tribal histories”, and B. Ogot in particular, as

early as in the 60s. But such an inclination exists, it reflect, in a broader sense, the deep fragmentation of the Kenyan society, where the connection between a personality and a community determines a lot. Strictly speaking, there is nothing “vicious” in this, if this connection does not interfere with the realisation of such a task of Kenyan scholars as the study of Kenyan history as an integral whole.

Certainly, questions have been asked as to whether the history of one country is conceivable and what it is. When and “with what” does it begin? Is it possible to isolate the development of a country from its historical environment? Are the notions of “a history of a country” and “a history of people(s)” inhabiting it identical? These questions, abstract only at first glance, were raised by the Russian historian and philosopher B.F. Porshnev in his time¹². W. Ochieng has asked a similar question with reference to Kenyan history in his popular *History of Kenya*: “Can one legitimately talk of Kenyan history before 1900?”¹³ “... We are concerned, writes W. Ochieng, not with the history or legality of boundaries but with the history of the people who have been living on this particular piece of earth, stretching from headwaters of the Nile in the north to mount Kilimanjaro in the south and bounded to the west by Lake Victoria and to the east, by the Indian Ocean”¹⁴.

In the to-day’s Kenya, there are good specialists in various themes of Kenyan history as well as of the history of East Africa, but there are very few historians who would professionally study the history of foreign countries, including that of other African states, or the history of the former British Empire and the commonwealth, of which Kenya is a member.

I think that the concentration on one’s own history is possible and justified only up to a certain limit, beyond which the knowledge of it tends to become one-sided and even distorted. The widespread assertions in African historiography in the 60s-70s that only (or, in the first place) African historians can comprehend and truthfully interpret African history are as erroneous as the obsolete racist notions that African peoples had no history of their own and this history began only with the coming of the white man.

One could object that the Kenyan national historiography is not really afflicted by Afrocentrism, that it is not developing in a vacuum but in a close co-operation with British, American and other national histo-

¹² Porshnev B.F. *Mislina li istoria odnoi strani? // Istoricheskaya nauka i nekotorye problemi sovremennosti* (1969), Nauka, Moskva.

¹³ Ochieng’ W.R. *A History of Kenya* (1985), Macmillan Press Ltd, London, p. vii.

¹⁴ Ibidem.

riographies. This is certainly correct, the contemporary Western historiography of Kenya is rich in both names and ideas. But there is a Russian saying: one’s own experience is unique. With reference to our case, this means: in order to get to know the world where one lives, to look at oneself from without and to try to comprehend, without bias and objectively, the motives and goals of the surrounding world in its actions with respect to oneself. This is difficult, but possible.

The assessment of colonialism and its impact on Kenyan – and African – history is one of pivotal topics both in the Kenyan and the African historiographies. The attitude of Kenyan historians to colonialism is, on the whole, negative, and this could hardly have been otherwise in a former so-called white colony.

The motives of the critics of colonialism are clear, but I think that its exposal has exhausted its purpose. Everything that ought and could have been said about it has already been said. In the course of three decades the same arguments are being repeated over and over again. There is one example from a recently published and, in fact, very interesting and serious book: “... Politically, colonialism was a dictatorship. It was imposed by violence and maintained by violence... This system was socially racist... Culturally, colonialism operated from the racist principle... Westernization under colonialism was also a tool of control...”¹⁵.

Sometimes, one even gets the impression (I am referring not only to Kenyan scholars’ works) that some African historians would like “to blame” on colonialism all the problems African countries are facing to-day. The example quoted above is perhaps an extreme and rigid point of view on the colonial impact on Kenya. There are other, more moderate, assessments. For example, the authors of the already mentioned *Economic History of Kenya* concentrate on such topics from the colonial history as innovations and change, they seriously analyze the transformation that occurred in all spheres of life in this country after it had become a part of the world capitalist system. Of course, one can envisage the possibility of continuing with the study of the colonial (and post-colonial) history of Kenya within the theoretical framework of the dependency school, underdevelopment, or Marxism (non-dogmatic), though, in my opinion, their theoretical potential is considerably weakened.

But the idea of the different forms of Africa’s interaction with the outside world and, in particular, with Asia and Europe, in the pre-colonial and

¹⁵ *Decolonization and Independence in Kenya...*, p. 9-11.

colonial epochs, seems to me more attractive and potentially more fruitful for study. This idea makes it possible to focus not only on relations of subordination and dependence: there were other, in my opinion, nor less important forms of interaction, such as rejection and non-acceptance, resistance and painful synthesis, adaptation and mutually beneficial contacts.

This was an interaction between various “regional” civilisations, African, Asian and European, each was developing in accordance with its own laws. This was an interaction between different – both typologically and in terms of levels of development – socio-economical structures and cultures, political systems and mentalities. However, the globalisation of the historical evolution of peoples of different regions and whole continents gradually made their coming closer and interaction inevitable, isolated development became historically unviable and interdependence historically unavoidable; various peoples and whole races were historically “destined” to live together.

Such an approach to the history of Africa’s interaction with the outside world has, of course, its vulnerable points. It still does not fully explain the reasons for the “delayed” and “unequal” entry of Africa into the emerging global civilisation. But such an approach, it seems to me, would at least save African historians the trouble of proving the obvious fact: that Africa had, has and will have its own history. As to the question of which civilization, race or nation has made (and is making): the biggest contribution” to World history, it is better to leave it to posterity who will hopefully live in a united, and not a divided, world. I would like to refer in this connection to the sadly philosophical rhetorical question posed by W. Ochieng and Atieno-Odhiambo, which appealed to me: “Who in to-day’s world is culturally, economically and politically independent?”¹⁶

I raise this question also because up to now some problems of the pre-colonial history of Africa and Kenya, specifically, still remain open. Firstly, I have in mind the need for an adequate theoretical explanation the considerable gap in levels of development in the economy, technology, and scientific knowledge, between Africa and Europe in the pre-colonial epoch. The acknowledgement of the existence of this gap has nothing to do with eurocentrism, it was a historical reality. There is no consensus on this problem in the contemporary historiography, and such a consensus is hardly possible. In the contemporary African historiography, analysis of this problem until recently was reduced to the criticism of flagrant racist, eurocentric approaches to it. In the last three or four decades, a lot has been said and written con-

¹⁶ Ibid., p. xiii.

vincingly about eurocentrism in the approach to Africa’s history, including by Kenyan scholars. However, the critics of eurocentrism sometimes took the position of afrocentric pragmatism¹⁷. I am convinced that both eurocentrism and afrocentrism in the study of African history are equally non-productive; one cannot but see their dangerous closeness to chauvinism and racism, if we examine them in the context of the political and social life in Europe and Africa.

Obviously, the time has come to discuss the topic “eurocentrism and afrocentrism in the contemporary historiography of Africa” strictly professionally, without unnecessary emotions, ignoring the manifestation of relict racism¹⁸, which are, fortunately, becoming rarer and rarer in our days, but also avoiding obsolete trite exposals of the Western world for its “dehumanizing of Africa”¹⁹.

In the 60s, African historians introduced the concept of the African initiative in the history of Africa. It has subsequently undergone various modifications. For example, one popular thesis among African, including Kenyan historians, argues for Africa’s dynamic development in pre-colonial times,

¹⁷ For example, W. Ochieng’ writes: “... I believe, as he does (Mwalimu Nyerere) that the pursuit of so-called pure and objective learning can be, in certain circumstances, a luxury in society... African historians must delve deep into the past and select only those facts and ideas are in keeping with the aspiration and needs of the people... There is no sense or point in resurrecting facts of are no longer of interest or use to us... Our contribution to world civilization would be a spiritual one – as opposed to the cold, calculating and mechanical capitalist mind of the West. A truly African historian has a duty to recover for his race lots of self-pride. He must reconstruct a world in which his race can gain a sense of belonging, confidence, identity and direction”. Ochieng’ W.R. *Objectivity and Ideology in African History // The Second Word. More Essays on Kenya History (1977)*, EALB, Nairobi, p. 4-6, 11. “... I think, the challenge that the Kenyan scholar faces today is to stop being a clever ape of Western thought and to delve into the morass of our historic values and ideas to chart for the African peoples an ideology that will take them beyond the bottlenecks of current Western philosophies”. Ochieng’ W.R. *Knowledge, Tradition and Dependency in Kenya // The Third World. Essays on Kenya History and Society (1984)*, KLB, Nairobi, p. 6-7.

¹⁸ See, for example: “Thank Good for Colonialism! Meet the man who believes Uhuore came too soon...” by Mutuma Mathiu // *Sunday Nation*, Nairobi, June 15, 1997.

¹⁹ See “Four Ways of Dehumanizing Africa” by Prof. Ali Mazrui // *Sunday Nation*, Nairobi, October 20, 1996.

and the primary role of internal factors in its development²⁰. In my opinion, at the moment, one can regard this idea only as an interesting hypothesis, which if it works at all, is applicable only to certain periods in the history of particular African peoples. It can hardly be employed as a theoretical foundation for the analysis of the problem of the “encounter of African and European civilisation”, which ended, in the long run, with the colonial subjugation of Africa.

In any case, a question arises: if in pre-colonial times Africa was developing dynamically, then in what civilisational direction and with what hypothetical “civilisational” results, assuming that this development was not interrupted and (or) transformed by the colonial subjugation of Africa. The question is not an easy one and it is far from “provocative”, it simply logically follows from the unproved assertion. In any case, African historians, and Kenyan among them, especially those who have a theoretical inclination, are expected to have their say on the problem concerning the “encounter of civilisations”.

In my opinion, such a subject as the history of the anti-colonial struggle in Kenya, demands a broader approach, too. I have in mind one of the main principles of the Kenyan historiography concerning this subject. I quote: “That Kenya gained independence through the nationalist initiatives, is not in doubt”²¹.

Until recently, this thesis seemed indisputable to me. In my books about Kenya²², one of them about the Mau Mau history, I proceeded from this very idea. Even today, I consider invaluable the contribution to the achievement of Kenyan independence made by those whom we call nationalists, whether freedom fighters and such leaders as Kaggia, Kubai and Kimathi, or politicians-constitutionalists as Tom Mboya, Oginga Odinga and others. It is equally impossible to question the outstanding, unique role of J. Kenyatta.

But let us try to assess this problem more broadly. Kenya was a part of the British Empire which collapsed not only as a result of blows from within, something that nobody object to, but also owing to many other factors, each of them significant in its own way. I would point, for example, to the enor-

²⁰ See, for example: Zeleza P.T. A modern Economic History of Africa. Vol. 1: The Nineteenth Century (1993), CODESRIA, Dakar; Ogot B.A. Economic Adaptation and Change Among the Jii-Speaking Peoples of Eastern Africa...

²¹ Decolonization and Independence in Kenya... P. xiii.

²² Pegushev A.M. Kenya. A Political History, 1956-1969, (1972), Moscow (in Russian); Pegushev A.M. The Mau Mau Rebels. History of the Anticolonial Armed Uprising in Kenya (1978), Moscow (in Russian).

mous increase in military expenses, including on the nuclear armament of England, the rise of economic instability in that country and its isolation within Europe, to the pressure on the part of the superpowers – USA and USSR – demanding from it, for different reasons, to put an end to colonialism, and so on. I think that Kenyan historians could pay more attention to the analysis of this side of the problem.

I would like to mention one more problem Kenyan historians have not yet adequately interpreted in their works. It could be named “The role and the place of the Asian community in the historical development of Kenya”. This problem has its own “hidden rocks”, but this is not an argument for professional historians to ignore it²³. For instance, the authors of the already mentioned *Economic History of Kenya* more than once note that the role of the Asian community in the emerging colonial economy and in the economic life of Independent Kenya was and remains notable, but there is no chapter dedicated to Asians in this book. One gets the impression that this problem is of more interest to foreign scholars and Asian enthusiasts-amateurs than to African historians in Kenya. What is more, Asian authors tend to be in the defensive, trying to prove the obvious: that the history of Asians in Kenya is a part of the general Kenyan history²⁴. One would like to hope that Kenyan historians will finally say their objective and unbiased word about the role and the place of Asians in the history of this country²⁵.

²³ An African (non-Kenyan) scholar writes: “A principal lesson that may be drawn from a study of the Kenyan development process is the centrality of Kenyan Indian commercial and industrial capitalists – a group that has been largely left out of the existing literature”. Himbara D. Kenyan Capitalists, the State and Development. (1994). EAEP, Nairobi.

²⁴ See: Zarina Patel. Challenge to Colonialism. The Struggle of Alibrai Mulla Jeevanjee for Equal Rights in Kenya. (1977), Zand Graphics, Nairobi. The following extract from Kivuthwa Kibwana’s foreword to this book, which is dedicated to a prominent Kenyan Asian, fully reveals the essence of the political aspects of the ‘Asian problem’, both in the past and the present Kenya: “...Zarina (Patel) demonstrates that the Indian was very much one of the critical foundations of the land that was to become Kenya... Zarina’s and AMJ’s (Jeevanjee) tale should also tell Kenyan Africans that a history of struggle is shared with Kenyan Asians and that greater cooperation today must be sought to help us shape a common destiny. Segregation will not help what are two parts of one people...”.

²⁵ In this connection, one can only welcome the interesting paper by a young Kenyan historian, J.O. Osamba “A Forgotten Minority: the Case of Asian Sugar

In conclusion, some remarks about the future of the Kenyan national historiography, as I see it. I am convinced that its development will be marked by an increasing tendency toward internationalization, which is generally characteristic of the development of the world historical science today. I have in mind not only co-operation with historians from other countries. I am convinced that in real history there is no place for the isolation and opposition of national cultures, that no national historiography can develop in self-isolation, that the so-called historical egoism, by which I mean an interest only in one's own history, is destructive for the historical though in every country. It is my conviction that the history of Kenya can be comprehended and studied successfully only in the context of the history of both Africa and the world as a whole.

In this connection, it seems that in the near future the focus of historical research in this country will gradually move from internal, only Kenyan, themes to such ones as "Kenya and Africa", or "Kenya and the outside world". Of course, the study of the "Internal" problems of Kenyan history as such will continue, but it will not be the main and only task of Kenyan historians.

In the center of attention, I think, will be the history of the 20th century, especially the second part of this period. It was precisely at this time, that a drastic change in the course of world history was set in motion and it continues with intensity to this day. The outcome of these changes is still unpredictable, but what is possible and necessary even to-day is study their prerequisites and causes. In this connection, one can envisage the emerging outlines of such a theme as "Kenya in a changing world".

Chronologically, this theme is preceded by another one: "Africa and Kenya in the years of the Cold War, under the conditions of confrontation between two world blocs, and detente". Kenyan historians involved in the elaboration of these themes, would probably begin by asking themselves what it that USA and USSR wanted or sought to gain in African countries, directly or indirectly involved in this confrontation, pursued. These questions are not as easy as they may appear at first sight. In order to answer them, one needs access to American and Soviet documents that until recently were absolutely closed for researchers.

However, the present time offers unprecedented possibilities for the study of these themes. The archives of the former Soviet Union are being

Plantation Owners in Nyanza Province, Kenya", presented to the Historical Association of Kenyan Annual Conference, 1998 in Eldoret.

disclosed²⁶, hitherto strictly confidential materials on this subjects are being declassifying in USA²⁷, UK and other countries. But their study requires well-trained African historians who know Russian, German, and even Chinese languages.

In Kenya itself, probably not all the documents and materials relevant to the theme "Kenya in a changing world" are within the reach of historians as yet. But the time of their opening will come and historians have to be ready to begin working with them.

And a few words about a highly promising historical work – creation of a series of scientific biographies of well-known statesmen, politicians, and other prominent Kenyans. Such a series, titled 'Makers of Kenya's History',

²⁶ "The end of the Cold War... may bring some benefits to African scholarship, – writes Dr D. Moore-Sieray (Maseno University College) – It appears that African researchers may finally be able to have access to important documents on the contributions of the Russians and other Eastern Europeans to decolonization in the continent...". Moore-Sieray, D. Towards a Decolonization of Scholarship in Africa and a Vision for the 1990s and Beyond // Journal of Third World Studies (1996), Vol. XIII, № 2, p. 36. From my own experience of research work with files of the former Central Party Archives at the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, I may confirm that in this one and some other archives of the former Soviet Union, there are documents containing invaluable information related to the plans and policies of the USSR in Africa. I was engaged, in part, in the study of the "Moscow period" of J. Kenyatta. See: Cingu Muagiru. Kenyatta's Moscow years. Special Report // Sunday Nation, Nairobi, September 1, 1996; Andrei M. Pegushev. The Unknown Jones Kenyatta // Egerton Journal (1996). Vol. 1, № 2. First well-documented studies have appeared, which cast a new light on the relationship between USSR and national-liberation movements in Africa. For example, in the International Conference "Historiography in Africa: New Tendencies, Approaches, Problems" (June 1997, Moscow), the paper by Dr V.P. Gorodnov "Heroes of the Past in the Archival documents of the Comintern" was presented, which examined unknown aspects in the activities of some leaders of the Communist Party of South Africa. The archive materials on the military-political co-operation of the USSR with the African countries in the 1950s-1991 and soon have disclosed. See: Shubin V. Military-Political Co-operation of the USSR with the African Countries (Introduction) // "The Seventh All-Russia Conference of Africanists. Africa in Changing World. Moscow, 1-3 October, 1997. Abstracts (1997), Russian Academy of Sciences, p. 112-113.

²⁷ The declassified official American materials on the American-Kenyan relation in the 60s were used, in part, in an interesting book by an Ugandan scholar. See: Okoth P. Godfrey. United States of America's Foreign Policy toward Kenya, 1952-1969. (1992), Giden S. Were Press, Nairobi.

has already been launched, but it appeals mostly to “the curious ordinary reader”, to use the words from the blurbs of the books. But I speak about projecting this work into the future since, in my opinion, the time for serious scientific biographies of such outstanding Kenyans as J. Kenyatta, Ojinga Odinga, Tom Mboya and some others, has not yet come because of the political controversies and sentiments surrounding their names. But it is possible to start the preparatory work even to-day, by publishing articles about some periods of their life, their political legacy and so on.

In this connection, I would like to dwell a little on such a project as the writing of a complete scientific biography of J. Kenyatta. At his death 20 years ago, Kenyatta had undoubtedly already entered the world history of the elapsing 20th century as one of the most remarkable politicians and statesmen of Africa. The public, political and scientific interest in Kenyatta has been steadily high in Kenya, as well as in Africa and beyond. The literature on him is expansive, incorporating hundreds, if not thousands, publications, including the well-known book by J. Murrey-Brown *Kenyatta* (1971). Still, we cannot say that there is a complete biography of Kenyatta. Ali Mazrui and Ngugi wa Thiongo, who intended to undertake this task in the past, apparently gave it up at some point²⁸.

However, the future biographers of Kenyatta should anticipate certain difficulties, “... because he did not leave a permanent legacy of leadership, statesmanship or ‘Kenyattais/Mzeeism’ in the form of an autobiography or any other writing...” – wrote Oby Obyerodhyambo – “... The details of his life, his conduct of business of government, personal relationship with his state and personal acquaintances are shrouded in mystery...”. All the same, “... his (Kenyatta) greatness would still be appreciated if his closest aides [and Mama Ngina Kenyatta] wrote theirs (autobiographies), so that we see the great man through their eyes...”²⁹

Any first-hand new evidences about Kenyatta should help historians to assess him more fully, both as a politician and a personality. However, many important documentary testimonies³⁰ related to the European period of his life and that of the Mau Mau, are kept outside Kenya, in England, Russia,

²⁸ See: Thiong’o Ngugi wa. *Detained: A Writer’s Prison Diary*. (1995, first published 1981), EAEP, p. 159.

²⁹ Oby Obyerodhyambo. *Tufile Search for Autobiography of an African Leader // The East African*, Nairobi, August 25-31, 1997.

³⁰ A brief, but interesting, account of the Padmore’s political legacy see in: Bethwell Ogot. *Africa and the Caribbean*. (1977), Anyange Press Ltd, Kisumu (Chapter 5: George Padmore – The Father of African Emancipation).

and, possibly, Germany and Ghana. There could be various explanations to the persistent unwillingness of Kenyatta, who was not only a prominent politician but also a man endowed with literary skills, to write his biography, or of his silence over some important events and even whole periods in his life, one of them is his sojourn in the former USSR.

Even today, Kenyatta’s deeds are variously assessed, both inside and outside Kenya, though nobody doubts his role as “the founding father of the nation”. Kenyatta is a nearly mythical figure in the eyes of present day schoolchildren and students of higher learning, while Kenyan radicals denounce him as a traitor of the people’s interests and an autocrat; at the same time, the opposition ethno-political groups in to-day’s Kenya employ his name as a weapon in their struggle for power.

That is why I think that even for professional historians, it is still difficult to rise above these circumstances and to overcome them. It is in this sense that the time for the writing of Kenyatta’s complete scientific biography has not yet come. But this time will come, and historians must be able to wait!

* * *

History, like medicine, is one of the most humane sciences, it is the one ‘closest’ to the human being. History helps humanity to get to know itself, including the mistakes made by it in the past, and to avoid repeating them in the future. But historical knowledge may not necessarily bring good, it can also cause harm, it can become a destructive weapon of politics and politicians. It is in the power of historians not to give this weapon to those who can use it for evil and ignoble purposes.

CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIUMS, ROUND TABLES

THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES ACADEMIC COUNCIL FOR THE PROBLEMS OF THE ECONOMIC, SOCIO-POLITICAL AND CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND ITS ACTIVITIES IN 2001

Lyubov Prokopenko *

The interest in African affairs weakened for a series of reasons in the 1990s. The theoretical and organizational crisis of social sciences in Russia affected, in particular, African studies. The lack of serious interest in contacts with Africa at the state level, the loss of Russia's political and economic positions in that region and domestic developments were not conducive to the progress in African studies.

Nonetheless, the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IAS), the Academic Council of the Russian Academy of Sciences for the Problems of Economic, Sociopolitical and Cultural Development of African Countries (further, ACA) and other Russian centres for African problems continued studies in the historical, socioeconomic, ethnocultural and political problems of African states. In 2001 they held several scholarly forums, which demonstrated an increase in the interest in African studies.

In 2001, the ACA celebrated its 35th anniversary.

This council was formed in 1966. Its host organization was the Institute for African Studies. The chairperson of the Council is the IAS director Alexei Vassiliev, Corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS). The position of the ACA executive secretary was held for over 20 years by Yuri Ilyin, Ph D (Hist.). Since 2000 to 2002 it was held by Lyubov Prokopenko, Ph D (Hist.), and an IAS senior research fellow. The membership of the council are 72 scholars, teachers of higher education institutions, officials of various ministries, agencies, scholarly societies and public organizations of the Russian Federation. They take part in studying

Prokopenko, Lyubov, Ph. D. (Hist.) former Executive Secretary, of the Academic Council of the Russian Academy of Sciences for the Problems of the Economic, Socio-Political and Cultural Development of African Countries, and currently Senior Research Fellow, the Institute for African Studies, RAS.

the problems of Africa and practical application of the study results. There are four corresponding members of the Russian Academy of Sciences and 67 academic degree holders among them. They work in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Ekaterinburg, Krasnodar, Nizhni Novgorod, Rostov-on-Don, Saratov and Volgograd.

The ACA's main task has been the coordination of researches carried out by the RAS institutes and Russian higher education establishments in the field of history, economics and foreign policy, Russo-African relations, political science, sociology, ethnology, philosophy, law, government organization, geography, philology and literature of the African states.

The ACA maintains contacts with the research centres in Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan that study the problems of Africa.

An important field of the ACA activities is the preparation of all-Russian and international conferences of Africanists.

Every two and a half years the Council and the IAS hold conferences of Africanists with the participation of numerous foreign scholars. The papers presented at these conferences and their abstracts have been published in Russian and English.

The ACA, IAS, St. Petersburg State University, RAS Centre for Civilizational and Regional Studies (CCRS) and the RAS Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography (Kunstammer) hold conferences in St. Petersburg to discuss the social, cultural and linguistic problems of Africa. These conferences are dedicated to the memory of D.A. Olderogge, an eminent Russian Africanist. The reports made at the conferences have been published in the Olderogge Readings series.

The ACA, IAS, Institute of Asian and African Countries, Moscow State University (IAAS), St. Petersburg and Saratov State Universities organize conferences of the School for New Africanists, which publishes collections of papers presented there.

The ACA publishes Summary reports on the conferences in the monthly *Vostok/Oriens*.

The information about the ACA activities is available in the Internet (www.inafr.ru).

In 1998-2001, the ACA has published:

* *Africa: Societies, Cultures, Languages (The Traditional and Modern Town in Africa)*, Papers of the Conference Held in St. Petersburg in May 1998. Moscow, 1999.

* Collection of Abstracts of the Eighth Conference of Africanists, *Africa at the Threshold of the Third Millennium* (Moscow, September 1999) (Russian and English). Moscow, 1999.

* The Eighth Conference of Africanists, *Africa at the Threshold of the Third Millennium (Moscow, September 1999): Final Papers*. Moscow, 2000.

* *Evolution of Traditional Institutions in Colonial and Postcolonial Africa*, Papers of the Conference Held in St. Petersburg in May 1999. Olderogge Readings, Vol. 1. Moscow, 2001.

* *Human in the Sociocultural and Political Space*, Papers of the Conference Held in St. Petersburg in May 2000. Olderogge Readings, Vol. 2. Moscow, 2001.

On 14 February 2001, the RAS Institute for African Studies held a plenary meeting of its Academic Council. Apart of the council members, the top officials and researchers of the Institute for African Studies took part in the meeting. The participants observed minute of silence in memory of the late members of the Council Igor Sergeevich Borisov, Yurii Dmitrievich Dmitrevskii, Gleb Vladimirovich Smirnov and Yurii Adolfovich Yudin.

The meeting approved of the report on the activities of the Academic Council in 2000 and the plan for 2001. The speakers were A.M. Vassiliev, A.A. Zhukov, V.G. Solodovnikov, L.V. Geveling, L.B. Kolokolov, I.V. Sledzevskii, P.K. Grechko, V.G. Shubin, N.B. Kochakova, A.M. Khazanov, K.P. Kalinovskaya, L.Ya. Prokopenko, etc.

The Academic Council decided to hold the Ninth conference of Africanists on 'Africa in the Context of the North-South Relations' in Moscow on May 21-23, 2002. The agenda of the conference included:

* United and Interconnected World: the Basis and Prospects of Internal Differentiation;

* Africa in the Contemporary World Set-Up: Challenges of the Globalization and Alternatives;

* Problems of African Economy. Domestic and External Development Factors. Positive and Negative Results of Restructuring;

* Currency and Financial Problems and the 'African Debt';

* Sustained Development, Social Progress and Environmental Problems;

* Informatics in Africa. Internet and Africa;

* Problems of African Integration. The African Union;

* Domestic and International Conflicts. Ethnic and Religious Factors. Security Problems;

* Problems of Political Modernization in Africa. Attempts of Democratization and Their Results. The Role of Ideologies. Nearchaism and

African Renaissance;

* Overcoming Antisocial Phenomena and Destructive Processes. Shadow Economy, Criminal World, Drug Business and Their Relations with the Surrounding World;

* Africa and Africans in the Context of World History;

* The Cold War in Africa;

* European Union and Africa. North Africa and South Europe.

* Africa and the Problems of the Indian Ocean;

* North (Arab) Africa: Development Models in the Global, Regional and National Dimensions;

* The South of Africa: Uneven Development of Regions. Is It possible to Even Them Out?;

* Russian-African Relations: Politics, Economics, Culture, Education, Military Cooperation;

* Russians in Africa and Africans in Russia;

* Federalism and Regional Development in Polyethnic and Polyconfessional Societies;

* Gender Problems of Transitional Societies;

* The AIDS Pandemia in Africa as a Regional and Global Challenge;

* Methodology of African Studies: from a Formation-based Approach to Variety of Methods. The Civilizational Approach to African Studies;

* The Present Condition and Development of African Languages and Literatures in the Setting of Globalization.

It was proposed to use the preparation of the conference for resuming the activities of the Russian Association of Africanists, holding its general meeting during the conference.

On 16-18 May 2001, the ACA, IAS, CCRS, the Peter the Great Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography (RAS) and the St. Petersburg State University held an international scientific conference on 'Africa: Societies, Cultures, Languages', which was dedicated to the memory of D.A. Olderogge, an eminent Russian scholar and a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences. Its topic was 'Africa in Russia, Russia in Africa'.

The conference was inaugurated in the Peter Hall of the St. Petersburg State University on May 16. The participants were greeted by M.N. Bogolyubov, Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Ch.M. Taksami, Director of the Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography, RAS, Dr. Sci. (Hist.), and Prof. V.B. Kasevich, Deputy Rector of the St. Petersburg State

University.

Over 100 researchers, postgraduate students and students from St. Petersburg, Moscow, Saratov, Ekaterinburg and other cities took part in the plenary meeting. Other participants of the conference were from the State Hermitage, St. Peterburg Spiritual Academy and African embassies to Russia, as well as postgraduate students from Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo, Mali, Morocco, Namibia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan and Tchad.

The conference discussed the following problems:

- * Contacts and Cooperation between the USSR/Russia and African Countries;
- * Images of Russia in African Cultures and Images of Africa in Russian Culture;
- * The African Diaspora in Russia and Russian Community in Africa;
- * African Studies in Russia: Sources, Traditions, Present Condition and Prospects;
- * Traditions and Novations in African Languages and Literatures;
- * Europe and Africa: Historical and Cultural Contacts.

The conference participants worked in two sections: the historicoethnographical section, headed by I.V. Sledzevskii (IAS) and V.A. Popov (the Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography, RAS) and philological section, headed by A.A. Zhukov (St. Petersburg State University).

The participants made 61 reports, including four reports made at the plenary meetings by A.B. Davidson (the Institute of World History, RAS) on 'Africa in the History of Russia's Foreign Policy (the Experience of Three Centuries)', I.B. Sledzevskii (CCRS) on the 'Cognitive Crisis in Russian African Studies: the Crisis of Methodology or of Consciousness?', V.G. Shubin (IAS) on 'The South of Africa: Rivalry of Superpowers or National Liberation Movement?' and Yu.M. Ilyin (IAS) on 'The History, Present Condition and Prospects of the Russian-African Cooperation in Science and Culture'.

A.B. Davidson (the RAS Institute of World History) described the most important trends and landmarks in the history of the relations between Russia and Africa, from Peter the Great's plan of an expedition of Russian frigates to Madagascar to the current developments. The speaker believed that Africa occupied an important place in Russian geopolitics as early as the 19th century, when it was necessary to find an oceanic way from St. Petersburg to the Far East and Russian America. Capetown and Simonstown became important ports for Russian ships. At the end of the century Russia established close contacts with Ethiopia.

The late 19th and early 20th centuries witnessed an interest of the Russian government and public in the Anglo-Boer War, Russians' sympathies with the Boers, participation of Russian volunteers in the war and Nicholas II's attempts to create an anti-British coalition of Russia, Germany and France. The most important periods of the 20th century were Comintern's activities in Africa in the 1920s and 1930s and Soviet support of anticolonial movements since the late 1950s. The speaker characterized these periods in detail, discussing also the dynamics of the level of the Russians' knowledge about African affairs.

Speaking about the Cognitive Crisis in Russian African Studies, Professor I.V. Sledzevskii (CCRS) has analyzed the key problems of the development of African studies in Russia in the recent decades, emphasizing that the stabilization trends in their development were succeeded by crisis trends in the 1990s. Destabilization affected their theoretical and methodological kernel, namely, the fundamental conceptual methodology of the research and connection between theoretical reasoning and description of individual objects. The relativization of methods, theories and conclusions is in a close correlation with the general crisis of African studies as a field of objective and reliable knowledge. In Russia this process is less open and more comprehensive owing to higher integrity of the interdisciplinary complex, connection between the individualizing and generalizing approaches and weakness of culturalist criticism.

The cognitive crisis in African studies and its possible results require special researches and discussions. At present, it is difficult to unambiguously evaluate the importance of relativism for the further development of African studies. For a long time the Africanists' methodological activities were aimed at enhancing reliability of the added knowledge based on sources. The condition and development of the so-called prerequisite-based *a priori* knowledge were neglected. This knowledge is related to the researcher's cultural self-consciousness and images and values of his own culture and that studied by him. Its scientific functions are purpose determination and sociocultural orientation. The crisis under discussion demonstrates, first of all, weakness and limited nature of the prerequisite-based knowledge. It is inadequate to the intricate processes that develop in Africa. It is for the first time that we face the acute problem of the relation between empiric and constructed objects in African studies.

According to I.V. Sledzevskii, there are several possible versions of this relation, each of which may make an impact of its own on the prospects of the development of African studies and their integrity as a field of research.

The version suggested as a new paradigm of studying peripheral societies (globalistics – culturology) emphasizes the topic of prerequisite-based knowledge and the necessity to renovate it. At the same time, it is unclear how the emphasis on the images and global and local cultural models of the world can affect the quality of knowledge about Africa.

V.G. Shubin (IAS) analyzed the sociopolitical development of the states of the south of Africa.

Both in Russia and beyond, many authors consider the developments in the South of Africa in the second half of the 20th century mainly through the prism of the Cold War and rivalry between the superpowers. The completion of the Cold War and the end of the confrontation between the East and the West seemed a beginning of peace and stability, which could eliminate or at least weaken the intensity of regional conflicts. This did not happen, however. The speaker held that our country has played a quite positive role in the liberation of the south of the continent from colonialism and apartheid and in achieving stability in the region. This is proved by the cordial attitude of many politicians, military and ordinary people of the region to Moscow, despite all troubles experienced by the USSR and then by Russia in the 1990s. In the speaker's opinion, one who analyzes our aid to the liberation movement must pay a special attention to our friendly attitude to the African National Congress in the RSA. Our citizens who worked at the ANC and SWAPO camps in Angola paid an important contribution to strengthening internationalist attitudes among the fighters for liberation. This was conducive to stabilization in the RSA and Namibia.

35 reports were made at the historicoethnographical section. Some of them exceeded the framework of history and ethnography. It was for the first time in the recent years that many reports dealt with the economic, political and historical aspects of the Russian-African relations. They were discussed at the subsection for Russian-African relations.

The speakers noted that the disintegration of the USSR negatively affected Russia's political and economic activity in the African region. At the same time, an upsurge was noted in the Russian-African relations in 2000-2001, partly because of increased interest of the world community in this continent.

Perhaps, Africa is more promising for Russia than other continents. Such Russian industries as ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, petrochemical and defence industries are competitive at the global scale. The new geopolitical situation makes Africa extremely important for Russia's national interests. T.L. Deich (IAS) noted that it is suitable to use other countries' (the USA, France, China) experience in Russia's relations with Africa and, rely-

ing on the legacy of the USSR's African policy, look for new forms of mutually advantageous relations, which may enhance Russia's political prestige in Africa.

Several reports dealt with little known and studied episodes of the Russian-African relations in the sphere of religion. A.A. Bovkalo, an employee of the St. Petersburg Theological Academy, spoke about the role of Russian Orthodox parishes in the spiritual life of African countries. I.L. Alexeyev (CCRS) narrated unique results of studies about African Islam at the Kazan Spiritual Seminary in the late 19th century, described in archive documents. A.D. Savateyev (CCRS) analyzed the researches about African Islam carried out by Russian scholars at present.

Some reports were united by a comparative approach to contemporary social transformation processes in Russia and Africa. They dealt with the processes characterizing new Diasporas and transformation of primary ethnonational areas. The former aspect was considered by E.B. Demintseva (CCRS), who compared the formation of the Arab Diaspora in France and Azerbaijani Diaspora in Russia. The latter aspect was the topic of the report made by V.V. Bocharov (St. Petersburg State University). Proceeding from the principles of the traditional type of political cultures in Africa, he analyzed the features of feeling for law and order in contemporary Russia.

The participants of the section demonstrated a lot of interest in the Africans' and Russians' mutual perception. A.A. Zhukov (St. Petersburg State University) told about a unique culturohistorical document, namely, a description of a travel of a merchant from East Africa in Russia in the late 19th century, written in Swahili. A.N. Moseiko (CCRS) substantiated the possibility of direct crosscultural comparison of the Africans' and Russians' mental features in the setting of globalizing world and crisis of the sociocultural fundamentals of the society in sub-Saharan Africa and Russia. The factors of this possibility are similarity of the Russian and African societies as specifically non-Western sociocultural systems, whose some features make it difficult to perceive the Western schemes of values, life styles and way of thinking; resemblance in the direction and scope of the processes of the destruction of the traditional value systems and life orientations based thereon; polyethnicity and polyconfessionality of the Russian and African societies. The speaker also mentioned the 'situational criteria' of comparative analysis: compelled close interaction with an alien culture and identity that claims domination (the Western culture, world understanding and system of values), changes in the identification dominants during a sociocultural crisis, the common challenges Africa and Russia face today, such as the global neoliberal ideology vs. domestic traditions, submission to standardization trends of

globalization vs. preservation of cultural identity. The speaker held that Russia and Africa share the condition of identity crisis and destruction of the culturomental fundamentals of life.

A.V. Pritvorov (IAS) described his experience of the formation and perception of the image of a Black, from the first impressions of childhood about an Afro-American nurse in New York to life in Angola in the late 1970s. The speaker summed up: 'My personal impressions strongly influenced my preception of Africa; the result was a deeper understanding of its peoples and of the attitude of their near and far neighbours to them. But the deeper became this understanding the more acute became the question: why is it that our education ignores the experience of researchers (not of mere visitors, who do not empathize with Africans' being)? This experience may teach the youth to respect other peoples' human dignity.'

More global and radical conclusions were drawn by V.R. Arsenyev (the Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography, Russian Academy of Sciences) in his report on Russia-Africa: Alternatives to Civilization (a Dialogue between a Neophyte and N.S. Gumilev's African Muse). In his opinion, 'in the setting of the global conceptual and axiological crisis of the late 20th century the rehabilitation of the imaginary paradigm in science' and turning to 'a synthetic picture of the world, which is going to replace the narrowly directed analytical picture,' has become a must. 'Russian science ... rather gravitated towards German cultural predetermination, especially in humanities.' At the same time, 'Russia as a whole was and is a country with an irrational dominant of thinking and predominance of belief over evinciveness. According to Uvarov's formula, the primary object is 'Orthodoxy', i.e., the dominant of a symbol over advantage...' Expressing his opinion about 'principal closeness' of the Russian mentality and Africans' behaviour ('Russia's African mind'), the speaker interpreted the 'African alternative to Russia' as something more than a 'myth', a paradox or a shocking image; this is a new cognition space, which promises a new structuralization of the pictures of reality, a new imaginary instrument of the organization of a scenario of the Future. N.S. Gumilev's 'African muse' can tell an insistent neophyte about this harmful movement of the Civilization and the vivid and reliable alternative in the world of Africa and Russian countryside, said the speaker. In the context of this quite Afrocentrist view on Russia science is just 'one of the possible cultural traditions.'

E.V. Kharitonova (CCRS) spoke about 'Africans in Russia: Sociopsychological Aspects and Methods of Study', considering the problem of the formation of a stereotype image of an African in contemporary Russians' mass consciousness. As a sociopsychologist, the speaker suggested some

sets of methods for empirical study of the interracial relations in Russia, forecasting their development and, given certain conditions, correcting their negative aspects.

V.V. Usacheva (CCRS) made a report on the Image of Africa in Russian Media. Analyzing newspaper publications and the sociopolitical section of the Today news programme (the NTV channel, September 1, 2000 to April 30, 2001), the speaker concluded that little attention is paid to Africa, and its general image is rather negative. However, the image of Africa is necessary to our media: it performs an important function, because the Western countries are portrayed as the ideal and yardstick for evaluation. The media the speaker analyzed contrasted the 'civilized West' to 'wild Africa' and appealed Russia to join with the 'civilized world', symbolically endowing it with allegedly unquestionable attributes of a civilized democratic state.

The participants paid a lot of attention to the South of Africa, as it was at all recent conferences. Six reports were made about this region, including the Secret Russian Military Agent Vandam (the 100th Anniversary of the Participation of Russian Subjects in the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902) by G.V. Shubin (IAS), 'New Political Elite of the RSA' by L.Ya. Prokopenko (IAS) and 'Missionaries in South Africa: Difficulties of the First Contacts (the Early 19th Century)' by A.V. Baranov (the Saratov State University).

One more topic was the history of the development of African studies in Russia. D.M. Bondarenko (CCRS) compared the stages of the study of Ancient Benin in the West, Nigeria and Russia. In his opinion, Russian scholars have achieved certain successes in studying many aspects of the history of Benin, such as the typologization of the religious beliefs and cults of its ancient population on the basis of historical and ethnographical data (B.I. Sharevskaya), early ethnocultural contacts between the Bini and their western neighbours, the Yoruba, on the basis of art pieces (N.N. Koshevsckaya) and historicoethnographical analysis of the mechanism of the functioning of 'royal' authority (N.B. Kochakova). However, the speaker summed up, despite considerable achievements of Western, Nigerian and Russian scholars, there is no integral picture of the history of Benin before the late 15th century.

I.A. Osnitskaya (the Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography, Russian Academy of Sciences) told about V.V. Yunker, a renowned Russian scholar, who collected art pieces in Central Sudan and donated them to the Russian Academy of Sciences. Now they are the main exhibits of the African department of the Kunstkammer, the oldest Russian museum.

S.B. Chernetsov (the Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography, Rus-

sian Academy of Sciences) reported about the first scholarly description of Ethiopia. It was a translation of *Historia Aethiopia, Sive Brevis et Succinta Descriptio Regni Habessinorum* by Job Ludolph, brought by Laurence Ringuber of Saxonia to Moscow in June 1684.

G.A. Balashova (St. Petersburg State University) analyzed the results of the 14th International Conference for Ethiopian Studies, held in Addis Ababa in November 2000.

The philological section, led by A.A. Zhukov, paid a special attention to the reports of the participants of the linguistic expedition to Cote d'Ivoire (January-March 2001). At the initiative of V.F. Vydrin (the European University of St. Petersburg // St. Petersburg State University) and T. Beart (the Zurich University), a programme of cooperation in the description of the little studied southern Mande languages (West Africa) was drafted in 2000. The expedition results were generalized by V.F. Vydrin in his report on Field Research of Mani-Bandama (southern Mande) Languages in Cote d'Ivoire. He emphasized that the expedition was sent in the cooperation with the Zurich University, Summer Linguistic Institute and Abidjan University; its purpose was to prepare a lexicographical description of four little studied languages (Tura, Guro, Van and Dan) and study the dialects of Dan, thus creating preconditions for the first stage of comparative-historical study of this subgroup of languages.

The expedition participants reported about the preliminary results of their field researches. A.E. Cherdyntseva (the St. Petersburg State University) made a report on Aspects of the Temporal System in Dan (the Santa Dialect), considering the functioning of a polysemantic connective word in Dan-Gueta. She was preparing a dictionary of this language as a part of the Petersburg-Zurich project. The speaker described the tonic characteristics, syntactic behaviour and etymology of this word. Preparing the dictionary of Guro, I.O. Zhuk (the St. Petersburg State University) faced the problem of the structure of entries for polysemantic verbs. Making her report on Polysemantic Verbs of Guro (the Zuenula dialect), she noted the necessity to pay attention to semantics, valence characteristics and limited combinability of verbs.

V.P. Khabirov (the Ural State Pedagogical University) also made a sociolinguistic report on the 'Characteristic of the Sociolinguistic Situation in Communicative Media of the Central African Republic'. In his opinion, the communicative situation in the CAR is characterized by the fact that Sango, a creolized language, is spread at the supraethnic level, and its communicative functions expand. This is the national language since 1961. Even before the colonization, it was the lingua franca of many ethnic groups. On the ba-

sis of a recent travel to Guinea, O.Yu. Zavyalova (the St. Petersburg State University) spoke about the Historical Narrations of the Inhabitants of Nyagossole (Guinea). The report on Personal Names and Address by Name in the Songai Culture, submitted by Ibrahim B. Maiga (Mali, Pushkin Institute of Russian) and F.I. Rozhanskii (the Institute of Linguistics, Russian Academy of Sciences). They demonstrated that the structure of Songai names is typical of the languages of West Africa, despite some characteristic differences in details.

The participants noted the high theoretical level, which is characteristic of Russian studies in African languages as a whole, of the report on Pronouns in Atlantic Languages, made by K.I. Pozdnyakov (the Sorbonne University). The topic of the report by A.Yu. Zheltov (the St. Petersburg State University) was 'Once Again about the Number of Noun Classes in Niger-Congo'. He considered the typology of noun classifications and its reflection in the Niger-Congo languages. O.I. Koshcheeva (St. Petersburg State University) spoke about the Expression of Semantic Roles of Agent and Patient in Some Bantu Languages, considering some problems of comparative study of these languages.

Several reports made by Petersburg scholars dealt with Hausa. Scholars' interest in this field considerably strengthened in the recent period. The topic of the report of N.A. Dobronravin and A.V. Lyakhovich (the St. Petersburg State University) was the Manuscript of the 'Message of Chancellor O. Bismarck to the Peoples of West Africa'. The authors carried out historicocultural analysis of the Arabic and German versions of this unique document, preserved at the St. Petersburg branch of the Institute for Oriental Studies (Russian Academy of Sciences). A.S. Grib (Repin Academy of Arts) dealt with a topic that is rare in Russian (maybe, not only Russian) African studies. She spoke about West African Qur'ans in Petersburg: Artistic Design, demonstrating photos of some copies of the Muslims Scriptures, found by N.A. Dobronravin in St. Petersburg repositories.

The annual conference of Africanists-philologists showed that they carried out their field studies in cooperation with their foreign colleagues. This is the source of the high level of our studies in linguistics and literature. St. Petersburg is the leading European centre of studies in Mande languages. Its scholars pay a lot of attention to theoretical problems and sociolinguistics. The interest in the Hausa language and literature has considerably strengthened. Our Africanists always paid keen attention to this topic.

Several dozens of young researchers, postgraduate students and students from various institutions of Moscow, St. Petersburg and Saratov, who specialize in African and Oriental studies, took part in the conference. The

participants formed the Organizing Committee of the next conference of new Africanists, which held its first meeting.

The discussion of the economic, sociopolitical, ethnoconfessional and cultural problems of the development of the African countries and their relations with Russia was constructive and successfully combined consideration of all-African and national problems.

Summing up the results of the conference, I.V. Sledzevskii, the CCRS Director and A.A. Zhukov, the head of the Chair of African Studies of the Oriental Faculty of the St. Petersburg State University, noted with satisfaction that the deliberations of the forum demonstrated researchers' sincere interest in the problems of Africa. In the 1990s, this interest weakened for a series of reasons. The present conference exceeded all conferences of the recent years in the number of reports (over 60) and participants (100), as well as in the quality of the reports.

The collection of papers of the conference 'Africa in Russia, Russia in Africa' will be published as the third volume of the Olderogge Readings, issued by the Institute for African Studies, RAS.

On 25 September 2001, the IAS Centre for Sociological and Political Studies and the ACA held a colloquium on 'African Migration to Europe: Dynamics, Scope, Consequences'.

The participants discussed a wide range of problems, including the historicogeographical parameters of the African migration to Europe, the African component of the European immigration, the impact of migration on the economic, sociopolitical and sociocultural situation in European and African countries, the ethnocultural aspect of the life of immigrant communities, 'alien' minorities and public opinion in Europe, legal and illegal immigration, warnings about the alleged menace of 'quiet' Islamization of Europe, the factors that determine the migration policy of European and African states, the migration problem in the Afro-European relations, the migration problem in Western and Eastern Europe, economic globalization and migration, the prospects of African immigration to Europe and implications of Western Europe's immigration experience for Russia.

The main report was made by Yu.V. Potemkin, the head of the Centre. He characterized the main reasons of the 'southern' migration to Europe and analyzed its present trends, results and prospects.

The participants were greeted by Charles Danioko, the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Mali to the Russian Federation and doyen of the African diplomatic corps in Moscow. He noted that the many centuries long migration from Africa was sometimes voluntary and sometimes

forced. The main form of forced migration was slave trade. Africa was colonized by the European states, which shifted its inhabitants to Europe at their discretion. The structure of migration changed with years. In the recent years, most of African migrants to Europe are intellectuals.

V.I. Gusarov (IAS) noted that the main reason of the African migration to Europe is the African and European demographical situation. The high birth rate in the Afro-Arab region and resulting unemployment lead to increasing migration of Africans to Europe. In the European countries, the low birth rate does not compensate the natural diminution of the population, and an inflow of manpower from outside is necessary to man the jobs with unskilled and nonprestigious work. Germany alone needs one million migrants a year to keep its economy and social sphere functioning. According to the speaker, the problem of African migration has no simple solution and will persist in the foreseeable future.

I.O. Abramova (IAS) spoke about the problem of Arab immigrants in Germany. She noted that the first Arabs, enlisted in the Prussian troops, appeared there in the late 18th century. After the World War II the rules of admission of immigrants became quite liberal. However, thereafter the policy towards the immigration toughened. The speaker analyzed the composition of the Arab community in Germany by countries of origin, motives of migration and geography of their distribution in the country. In her opinion, labour migration to Germany will increase, causing aggravation of xenophobia and toughening of the legislation on immigration.

A.A. Tkachenko (IAS) concentrated at the emigration from North Africa to Europe under the impact of a complex of contradictory factors. On the one hand, the prospects of overcoming economic backwardness of the North African countries are based on the liberal economic reforms carried out in the region in the recent two-three decades. Their success may weaken emigration to Europe. On the other hand, the migration processes are influenced by the development of integration with world economy, first of all, with the European Union. Rapprochement with the EU, especially after it adopted the New Integration Programme for the Middle Eastern countries in 1992, objectively facilitates migration of North African manpower to Europe.

The socioeconomic consequences of the 'demographic explosion' that began in the Arab countries 30-40 years ago have not been overcome; this will take decades even in the most successfully developing countries of the region, according to the most favourable scenario. Thus, the present migration factors will persist, especially in Algeria and Morocco, where the un-

employment rate is 25-30%. Even if the Western democracies decide to limit labour migration from North Africa, it will be very difficult to do so in practice. In addition, in some cases it is not easy to distinguish labour migration from that for political reasons.

The colloquium considered the problems of migration from Maghreb to France (S.V. Prozhogina, the Institute for Oriental Studies, RAS), historical and sociopsychological conditions of the emergence and activity of the Afro-American and African diasporas in Germany in the late 1920s and early 1930s (M.A. Pegushev, the Institute of World History, RAS), the problem of African refugees, who left the homelands not for socioeconomic or political reasons but because of insecurity as a result of political and ethnic conflicts (I.L. Lileev, IAS) and the policy of the Western European countries concerning the integration of immigrants in the European community (O.Yu. Potemkina, Institute for European Studies, RAS). The colloquium also discussed the reasons of Africans' 'propensity' for migration to Europe (N.G. Alabuzhina, O.B. Gracheva, V.I. Komar (all of IAS)).

Summing up the discussion, Yu.V. Potemkin emphasized the importance and usefulness of the European experience in solving the problems related to Africans' migration for Russia.

One of the dangerous manifestations of the crisis in African studies in Russia was a drastic outflow of the youth from the academic and higher education institutions in the late 1980s and early 1990s, combined with lack of interest in Africa in general and in African studies in particular. As a result, there is a shortage of successors to the elder generation of scholars. The loss of the succession of generations is the greatest danger to the destiny of academic research.

The ACA, IAS and other centres of African studies do their best to attract the youth to academic research.

On 28-30 November 2001, the first All-Russian School for New Africanists was held in Moscow, at the IAS. It was organized by the CCRS, IAS, IAAC and St. Petersburg and Saratov State Universities. Its main task was to preserve the traditions of African studies in Russia, to ensure the succession of generations of Africanists and to establish contacts among the young Africanists. 39 young scholars, postgraduate students and students from the IAS, Institute of Asian and African Countries (Moscow State University), Moscow State Institute of International Relations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation), Institute of History (RAS), Institute of World Literature and Art (RAS), Russian University of Friendship of Peo-

ples, State Government Academy and St. Petersburg, Saratov and Tyumen State Universities attended the School.

The plenary meeting began with reports and greetings of A.B. Davidson, Director of the Centre of African History of the Institute of Asian and African Countries, Moscow State University (IAAC), Prof. L.V. Geveling, Deputy Director of the same institute, V.G. Shubin, Deputy Director of the Institute for African Studies (RAS), I.V. Sledzevskii, Director of the CCRS, Dr. Sci. (Hist.), and G.A. Balasheva, senior lecturer of the philology chair of the St. Petersburg State University.

Reporting about the Traditions of African Studies in Russia, A.B. Davidson described the traditions of experience transfer in the academic circles, his own experience of the inclusion in Soviet African studies and his cooperation with D.A. Olderogge, a renowned Soviet Africanist. He told to his young colleagues about the men who stood at the sources of African studies in Russia. Making a report on Africa and Modern Academic Knowledge, I.V. Sledzevskii narrated the trends of the development of African studies, emergence of nonclassical science and discovery of new paths in science.

At the first meeting of the section of economy and history A.L. Sapuntsov, a postgraduate student of the State Government Academy, made a report on 'The Role of International Cooperation in Science and Technology in Enhancing Competitiveness of the African Economies'. B.E. Bunko, a postgraduate student (IAS), carried out a comparative analysis of the development of oil industry in Africa and Russia in the 1990s and demonstrated similarity of many trends as well as considerable differences between Russia and Africa in this field. E.F. Lukmanova, a junior researcher (IAS), reported on an unexpected topic of 'Export of Newly Cut off Flowers from African Countries', which was followed by the audience with vivid interest. She threw light on the history of flower export from Africa, mentioning the countries that occupy the leading positions in this field.

The next speakers were historians and culturologists. L.L. Yusova, a student of the State University of Humanities (Institute of World History, RAS), reported on the Ideas of Afrocentrism in the Works of African Scholars Ch.A. Diop and N.K. Asante, trying to define whether the Afrocentrism is a black racism or a stage of the national liberation movement at a higher spiritual level, or a method of self-expression, a sign of the formation of the so-called African national idea. D.A. Khalturina, a junior researcher (IAS), spoke about 'The Cross Cultural Study of the Influence of Intense Military Activity on Women's Status (the Case of African Societies)', analyzing the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample database, which includes societies from all cultural regions of the world. She illustrated universal cross-cultural regu-

larities by the examples of African societies of the precolonial, colonial and postcolonial periods.

N.A. Zherlitsyna, a senior research assistant (IAS), reported on 'Tunisian Piracy and Russian Policy in the Mediterranean at the End of the 18th and in the 19th Centuries (Materials of the Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation)'. The speaker traced the evolution of Russia's policy in this region pursued over more than 50 years. The materials of the archives enabled her to study the details of the domestic policy of the Tunisian Regency. E.B. Demintseva, a postgraduate student (IAS), considered the Formation of the Arab Diaspora in France in the 1960s to 1980s, noting that this diaspora became an integral community, a particular part of the society, a structural unity with ethnocultural features of its own at a definite stage of its development.

The meeting ended with a discussion on African countries' policy in oil production, Afrocentrism, France's policy towards North African immigrants and prospects of economic cooperation between Africa and Russia.

The second meeting began with the report on 'Models of Politogenesis in West Sudan' by A.A. Maslov and V.V. Ilyanin, students of the St. Petersburg State University. They noted that the relative geographical isolation of the region inhabited by the Hausa, permanent migrations and presence of influential 'neighbours' affected the historical process and integration and politogenesis models, as well as the role of state-forming institutions. The Hausa's 'urban revolution' determined the direction of integration. The territorial organization replaced clans as a result of a qualitative change in the composition of the population. O.A. Bulatov, a postgraduate student of the St. Petersburg State University, spoke about 'The Politogenesis in West Africa (the Hausa)' and considered the development of the West African community and man's role in it. A.B. Melnikov (the Tyumen State University) emphasized in his report on Political Parties of Ghana in the 1990s that, despite weakness of the socioeconomic and political structures, immaturity of the democratic traditions and influence of ethnoregional components, a multiparty system formed in Ghana by the early 21st century as the main element of a democratic law-based state. A.V. Denisov, a student of the Institute of Asian and African Countries (Moscow State University), spoke about the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo: 1998-2001 and analyzed its ethnic, regional and economic reasons.

B.N. Leonov (the St. Petersburg State University) considered the developments that took place in Nigeria since October 1999, namely, introduction of Shariatic legislation and Shariatic courts in several Nigerian states and the resulting interethnic and interconfessional conflicts.

R.Ch. Ekeoma, Ph D. (Philos.), Russian University of Friendship of Peoples demonstrated the importance of the topic 'Sociocultural Factors of the Formation of Family and Marital Relations in Contemporary Nigeria (the Case of the Igbo)'. The traditional institutions, especially family, retain many elements of the cultural traditions and are an instrument of social and moral protection of an individual in the setting of social and political instability. A.S. Zdanevich (St. Petersburg State University) noted in his report on 'The Sources of the Emergence and Spread of Islam in South Africa (the 17th and 18th Centuries)' that Islam influenced culture through the system of legal and moral standards. Their rigid observation is more characteristic of Muslims than of adepts of other religions. V.Yu. Khritinin (St. Petersburg State University) considered 'The Administrative System of the Cape Colony in 1652-1795'. In 1652 the Dutch East India Company founded a supply post for its ships near the Cape of Good Hope; in 1795 the 'free burghers' revolted against the Company's power and proclaimed creation of independent republics. A.V. Baranov (the Saratov State University) analyzed the views of R. Moffat, D. Philipp, Ch. Brownly and D. Stewart in his report 'Missionaries in South Africa: Evolution of the Conception of Africans' Civilization in the 19th Century'. A.Yu. Chernyaev, a postgraduate student (IAS), spoke about 'The Economic Policy in African States'.

The third meeting discussed the historical, economic and political problems of the south of Africa. L.V. Ivanova, a postgraduate student of the Institute of Asian and African Countries (Moscow State University), traced the reflection of the situation in contemporary Africa in Russian media.

V.V. Gribova, Ph D (Hist.), IAS, characterized the education system in the RSA and anti-apartheid movement of the 1970s and 1980s. M.V. Sivogorov (IAS), considered the relations between the USSR and the national liberation movement in Namibia in the mid- and late 1960s. D.A. Shornikov (the Institute of Asian and African Countries, Moscow State University), spoke on the Development of Black Bourgeoisie in South Africa and singled out several stages of its evolution, some its features and prospects of its development. N. Shevchenko (the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation) presented a review of 'The Opportunities and Prospects of Business Cooperation between Russia and the RSA', briefly describing the economic situation in that country.

There were several reports on political issues: 'The Foreign Policy of the RSA: Its Relations with Britain in 1961-2001' by T. Dubin (the Institute of Asian and African Countries, Moscow State University), 'Military Policy of France in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s' by N.V. Stepanchenko (IAS),

'Inkata as a Regional Party: Myth and Reality' by A.V. Yakunin (IAS), 'Characteristics of the System of Relation Terms in Yoruba' by T.G. Turkin (the Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography, RAS, St. Petersburg). O.G. Novikov (IAS) described the specific manifestations of Afro-Americans' counterculture in the mid-20th century. V.A. Mironova (IAS) has noted the role of the state in solving the North-South conflict in Sudan.

The section of philology discussed reports of young researchers from the St. Petersburg State University, Institute of World Literature and Art (RAS) and IAAC: 'Efras Kezilahabi as a Modernist: the Problem of Stadiality of the Literary Process in African Countries' by N.S. Frolova (the Institute of World Literature and Art, RAS), 'The Problem of Adjective in Bantu Languages' by I.G. Biryukova (the Institute of Asian and African Countries, Moscow State University), 'Expression of the Semantic Roles of Agent and Patient in Some Bantu Languages (the Case of Ganda)' by O.I. Koscheyeva (St. Petersburg State University), 'Causative Derivation in Guro (Cote d'Ivoire)' by I.O. Zhuk (St. Petersburg State University). 'Logophoric Pronouns in Wan (Materials of the Expedition to Cote d'Ivoire, January-March 2001)' by T.V. Nikitina (the St. Petersburg State University // the Institute of Literature and Art, RAS), 'Polyfunctional Morpheme aU in Dan (the Guetavo dialect)' by A.E. Cherdyntsev (St. Petersburg State University) and 'Linguistic Situation and Term Creation Processes in Contemporary Hausa' by E.V. Apanasenko (IAAC).

The conclusive meeting was addressed by A.M. Vassiliev, the director of the Institute for African Studies (Russian Academy of Sciences), corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He expressed the hope that such conferences would become a tradition.

The work of the conference demonstrated diversity of the problems that are of interest to new Africanists. The conference discussed reports in economy, history, anthropology, literature and linguistics. The young scholars demonstrated relaxed thinking, striving to work in a new way (but without subverting the forerunners!) and ability to employ almost inexhaustible information resources. It was a pleasant fact that African studies persist and develop not only in such traditional scholarly centres as the academic and educational institutions of Moscow and St. Petersburg but in Saratov, Tyumen and other Russian cities.

The participants decided to convene the second School for New Africanists in St. Petersburg in 2002.

ADVANCING NIGERIAN-RUSSIAN BILATERAL
RELATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY
CONFERENCE OF RUSSIAN AND NIGERIAN SCHOLARS

Igor Bolshov

On March 29-30, 2001 the conference of the Russian and Nigerian scholars was held in Lagos under the topic mentioned in the heading of this article. The meeting has become the sixth one in the series of the scientific debates organized jointly by the Institute for African Studies (IAS) of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) and the Nigerian Institute of the International Affairs (NIIA). The Russian side has been presented by the Director of the IAS, Corresponding Member of RAS, Prof. A. Vasiliev and the research fellows of the IAS RAS Prof. L. Bondareko, Dr. I. Lileev and Dr. I. Bolshov. The Director-General of the NIIA Prof. U.J.Ogwu headed the Nigerian delegation. It consisted of the NIIA research fellows as well as the scholars from the other research and teaching institutions of Nigeria represented by Prof. B. Ate, Prof K. Ogundowole, Dr. O. Agbu, Dr. B. Akintirinwa, Dr. C. Nwoke Dr. Ch. Dokubo, and Dr. D. Omoweh. The Guest of Honour – former Ambassador of Nigeria to the USSR and the USA Mr. A. Hamzat as well as the Ambassador of Russia to Nigeria Mr. G. Ilyichev and the members of the Russian Embassy staff took part in the proceedings of the conference.

Speaking at the conference opening ceremony *Prof. U.J.Ogwu* pointed out to the long standing ties of friendship and co-operation between our two countries in the struggle for development, peace, progress and prosperity. These bonds have been reinforced recently by a state visit of Nigerian President O. Obasanjo to Russia. As to the recent dialogue it is the sixth meeting of the research fellows of the NIIA and the IAS RAS, the base of which is the protocol on co-operation signed on September 30, 1993.

Referring to the NIIA history Prof. U.J.Ogwu emphasized the fact that the research fellows of the Institute headed by her had had more dialogue with the Russian colleagues than with any other scholars. It is indicative of mutual recognition of the place and role Nigeria and Russia in the world.

Describing the scholars' special responsibility to both the society and the government the NIIA Director-General pointed out that this responsibility is making the scholars to seek and to pursue truth, as well as to provide insightful inputs into the policy process. The gathering of knowledge is the supreme achievement of man. The main cause of the scientific institution is the business of gathering of knowledge and utilizing knowledge for the de-

velopment. The striking advance in science and technology has put enormous power in the hands of man that can be used either for the benefit of humanity or for its destruction. That is why the duty of scholars is to help policy formulators in a course of betterment of humanity. It is due to a fact that the central contest of this new century is the struggle against mankind's oldest oppressors – poverty, hunger, disease and ignorance. As a policy centres our institutions are to co-operate and collaborate in making progress in our struggle against these enemies. In this regard, the chosen theme of the dialogue – ‘Advancing Nigerian-Russian Bilateral Relations in the 21st Century’ is not only apt but also timely. It has been carefully chosen to enable Nigeria and Russia benefit from the outcome of the scientific discussion.

In spite of increasingly globalising international relations individual states are going through a delicate phase of relations. The reasons for it – the build-up of contrasts and conflicts deriving from the diversity of concepts and in part from the very advance on the world stage of new forces and struggle for limited resources. The scholars are to help in resolving this contradictions and delineating of a new course.

Prof. A.Vasiliev shared the ideas expressed by Prof. U.J.Ogwu as regards to the special responsibility of scholars working in a sphere of social sciences. He stressed the fact that the leaders of our two countries were inclined to pay more attention to the role of scholars and the results of their expertise in a policy course formulating. It can be proved by General O. Obasanjo pattern of activity. Before being elected the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria time and again he used to take part in numerous international scientific forums including those organized under the aegis of the NIIA as well as the IAS. In particular, he was a participant of the discussions held in the framework of dialogues between the scholars of two countries. Many times General O. Obasanjo paid visits to the IAS. As to the President of Nigeria attitude towards the Institute for African Studies it could be demonstrated by a fact that the gratitude for the greetings sent by the Institute on the occasion of being elected as a President of Nigeria was inked with his own hand.

In the presentation ‘Situation in Russia and Possible Lessons for Africa’ Prof. A.Vasiliev reviewed the socio-political and economic situation in Russia and highlighted issues on globalisation, privatisation and democracy as they affect Russia and Nigeria.

Touching upon the problem of Russia's socio-economic development in 90s he stressed that a gloomy picture of the country's economy, in particular, the information on the GDP recession by 50% over the past ten years painted by mass-media should be considered as being exaggerated. But the

publication of such a data is no more than a ‘brain washing’ attempt aimed to affect the popular way of thinking. The economic situation is not so gloomy. Characterizing the above-mentioned figure, confirmed by the official statistical sources, A. Vassiliev quoted R. Poincaré, French politician and statesman, who associated statistics with the peculiar form of lies. As a case in point, basing on indices of the railroads turnover and the electric power consumption the director of the IAS has shown that the setback in production in Russia has amounted a little more than 20 percent. Evidently, 30 percent allegedly ‘lost’ shall be looked for in ‘shadow’ or ‘grey’ sectors of the Russian economy. Non-received earnings shall be found at foreign banks' accounts, where they have been transferred to due to a ‘capital flight’ from Russia.

The same trend could be traced with the privatisation in Russia. Whereas it is expected that the privatisation leads to a greater efficiency of the economy we have witnessed a large-scale robbery of public enterprises by the representatives of wealthy class who are very poor managers and investors. The greedy and unproductive wealthy class prefer to siphon monies (between US \$ 200–300 billion in recent times) abroad.

The process of globalisation offers great opportunities for the highly developed, post industrial countries only. The countries of the ‘golden billion’ are the owners of the transnational corporations that drive the process. Thus, globalisation has increasingly marginalised some Third World countries, such as Nigeria.

As to negative outcome of changes we are witnessing both in Russia and in Africa (and in Nigeria as well) it is the result of the neo-liberal ideas imposed on us by the West. We are the victims of the imposition of the Western type of democracy foreign to our societies since the democracy depends on the nature of civil society, the nature of a middle class, the political culture, rule of law, etc., which are all differentially developed across societies. With respect to democracy, there is no even common basis on its definition.

So, any decision to succumb to market forces should be done with consideration of its social consequences. But, above all, both Russia and Nigeria must reject neo-liberal ideological impositions and seek their own solutions to modern problems. For example, while neo-liberal thinking is that the state is bad and shall be replaced, ‘what can replace the state in Africa?’ Destruction of the state would mean giving unfettered liberty to market forces whereas the development of market forces should be regulated by the state.

In a presentation ‘From Soviet-US Co-operation for Africa to Nigerian-Russian Co-operation for National Transformation’ *Prof. Bassey K. Ate* re-

called the failure of a joint enterprise involving Soviet, American and African experts aimed to develop a design in which the USSR and USA would co-operate and render joint support for African development efforts. One of the areas of the anticipated superpowers' co-operation was a regional conflict resolution and the other areas were the agricultural production and distribution, environmental protection, debt crisis; mineral exploitation; health and epidemic, nuclear non-proliferation arms transfers.

The first meeting was held at the Airlie House, Virginia, USA (spring of 1988). The last forum took place in Lagos, Nigeria in October, 1991. The general answer why did this venture fail to materialize is that the international humanitarian concepts don't mix well with calculations of national interests and world politics. In fact the only area where the two powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, achieved meaningful results through the co-operation was in Regional Conflict Management with particular reference to Southern Africa, where both had substantial strategic interests in South Africa, Angola and Namibia. The result was the Tripartite Accord of 1988.

Specific factors responsible for the failure of the Soviet-US co-operation for Africa Agenda include collapse of the USSR and consequently, the birth of unpopularity of the United States which as the only superpower did not require the co-operation with Russia to formulate a new security agenda for Africa. The new Russia had neither the resources nor the political inclination to participate in conflict management initiatives in Africa. The foreign policy of the emergent Russia was clearly anti-developing countries, especially anti-Africa: Russians felt their country had wasted resources in Africa during the cold war. Besides, it was the end of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa with the demise of apartheid in South Africa and the independence of Namibia as well as the emergence of globalisation as a powerful force in international economic diplomacy combined with the intensification of intra-state conflicts in the continent.

The emphasis today in the relations between Nigeria and Russia must be on building a bilateral partnership for the national transformation of the two countries and for strengthening Nigeria's leadership in Africa. So, the Nigerian-Russian co-operation for Africa must be premised on a different conceptual thinking and design. The Africans must now assume control in defining and managing their security agenda, with external actors complementing that responsibility.

As to the logic of the new partnership, based on national interests Russia's concern in economic/business interests in Nigeria, South Africa, Ghana, etc.; in reviving great power role in Africa especially in former al-

lies; in diminishing the impact of unipolarity – American hegemonism in Africa, Asia and Southern Europe should be taken into account. At the same time the Nigerian-Russian partnership is a suitable mechanism for executing a new Nigerian foreign policy approach. The use of foreign policy consciously as an instrument for transforming Nigeria's national economy, politics and power potential would lead to sustenance of a new democracy, transformation of industrial capacity and consolidating leadership in regional security managing by exploiting Russian military and technological assets.

Russia's role in enhancing ECOMOG's capacity, in peace-keeping via the UN system, in the demilitarisation of the continent, in training Nigeria's peace-keepers in Africa, in realising Nigeria's dream in augmenting the industrial profile of Nigeria's defence industry shall be considered on level with the Russian desire for African markets and investment outlets; helping to manage regional security is to sanitise the trading and investment climate in the region. Nigeria needs to diversify its outlets for acquiring military technology.

One important factor responsible for the failure of Soviet-US Cooperation for African Development Agenda was the collapse of the USSR. In the new unipolar world, the US, as the only super-power, did not therefore require the cooperation of Russia in any security agenda for Africa. Moreover, the new Russia had neither the resources nor the political inclination to engage in conflict management initiatives in Africa.

The Nigerian participant concluded that the emphasis today should therefore be on building a new Nigerian-Russian bilateral partnership for the national transformation of the two similarly politically and economically traumatized societies. Such a partnership will be based on the broad range of complementarities which exist in their national interests.

In a presentation 'President Olusegun Obasanjo's March 2001 Visit and the Future of Nigerian-Russian Co-operation' Prof. B.A. Akinterinwa defined the visit as historic in the sense that it was characterised by mutual determination to re-conceptualise how Russian-Nigerian relationship should evolve in the 21st century.

Nigeria and the Russian Federation reached agreements that have far-reaching implications for the development of their bilateral relationship. The first agreement, which was more or less a political declaration, emphasised friendliness and co-operation as the basis for future relationship. In the political declaration, both countries expressed the desire to boost their co-operation in all areas of human endeavour and at all levels. They agreed to promote political dialogue at all levels of governance.

The two countries signed the second agreement on promotion of trade and economic co-operation. This agreement provides for an increase in the volume and value of trade from \$50 million to \$500 million, to be achieved within the next four or five years.

Nigeria and the Russian Federation also signed a third agreement on military co-operation and technical assistance, especially in the area of training and military manufacturing.

There was the fourth agreement on the urgent need to complete the Ajaokuta Steel Complex. It is clear from the foregoing that President Obasanjo wants the problem of Ajaokuta resolved by 2003 at all costs. The purpose of his visit to Russia was to seek the understanding and support of Russians. Although the Ajaokuta project has suffered major setbacks, the visit of President Obasanjo and the signing of a protocol on the completion of the steel mill now puts Nigeria's relationship with Russia on a new path of development.

The future of the relationship is a function of many factors. The first and most important factor is the extent of commitment to the letters of the various agreements that have been signed. Nigeria's relationship with the Russian people has, since 1960, been very warm, in spite of some irritants. The visit of President Obasanjo has put paid to whatever problems of misunderstanding that might have existed. In this regard, the visit has laid a foundation for a brighter future.

The extent of the use of the IAS and the NIIA in the promotion of Nigeria-Russian understanding shall be uplifted. Both institutes can still play a major role in the conduct and implementation of policy decisions in many ways.

- They can be required to carry out in-depth joint research on the problems of Nigerian-Russian relationship re-conceptualisation and to make recommendations to both governments.
- The right thing for Nigeria and Russia to do is to work together and ensure Nigeria's election into the UN Security Council on a permanent basis.
- The NIIA and the IAS can be depositories of Nigerian-Russian accords and other open documents. They can be centres for monitoring developments and research on Nigerian-Russian relations.
- The NIIA and the IAS will also need to go beyond the mere organisation of periodical dialogues to actual implementation of their 1993 co-operation agreement. They shall explain, for instance, why the Russian company that successfully built the iron and steel complex in India and in Algeria has spent more than 2 decades to carry out Ajaokuta Steel Project and still not yet completed it.

- The dialogue at the level of the NIIA and the IAS should be upgraded to the level of Nigeria-Russia Dialogue to be held, not at the level of scholars, but at the level of government to government.
- Taking into account a dearth of information on Nigerian-Russian relations the agreements signed between two parties ought to be well studied for the purposes of recommendations for implementation.
- It is necessary to promote the mutual understanding of one another through language culture. The provision of a multi-lingual language laboratory at the NIIA, where Nigerian researchers can study Russian and other working languages of the UN, will go a long way in promoting Nigerian-Russian Dialogue.
- The NIIA and the IAS should re-conceptualise their dialogue and use it as a problem-solving framework. The researchers of both institutions are to be able to articulate the perspectives, publish joint publications sponsored by the two institutions and to be edited by the chief executives of them.

In a presentation 'Typological Features of Conflicts in the Post-Soviet Space' *Dr. I.L. Lileev* pointed out that a number of regional conflicts emerged due to a collapse of the Soviet political system and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, the roots of all the conflicts were hidden in the distant historical past and were being restrained exclusively thank to the force of a state machine of the Soviet Union that acted as an exterior stabilising power.

Regarding to the world practice the situation may always be turned into escalation of the conflict in case when borders of the community are established as a result of bloody wars. The history of Africa illustrates numerous examples of the similar conflicts after colonial empires fall. The approximately the same situation one witnesses in the territory of the former Soviet Union. The might of the Federal centre, including the armed forces, a mechanism of re-distribution of the gross national product and the unanimous ideology guaranteed security of borders within the frameworks of the Soviet Union. All the above factors create situation of an illusory long-term stability without conflicts.

Nowadays, many politicians and wide circles of population of the CIS countries worried by the escalation of conflicts turn to Russia's assistance in preserving their territorial integrity, the others – in recognition of the self-declared independence, the third – in joining Russia by their countries as subjects of the Federation.

Russia's role as mediator in conflicts, e.g. in Karabakh, Tajikistan, Abkhazia, Dniester region, etc. hardly can be overestimated. One cannot say that Russia has finally left all those territories. Up to the present moment

Russia continues to support a certain order in these regions, uses to send some military contingents there. Such a behaviour of Russia fits the Western powers as well as the world community owing to several reasons.

First of all, within the framework of the world geopolitics these countries are still considered, to a more or less extent, as zone of the Russian influence. That corresponds much to the actually established historical practice.

Secondly, the contemporary interpretation of 'compulsion for peace' so far not often leads to efficient results. According to the prevailing existing opinion, the interference of the 'third force' requires to reach a consent of the both parties that is unrealisable in practice. As an obvious example in this case may serve a situation in Abkhazia.

Thirdly, one should also take into account the fact that those classic models and methods of peace making by means of compulsion for peace do not work at the present time either in the Post-Soviet space or in the world in general. Such being the case, we may come to conclusion that 'vacuum of force' may be considered as one of the most important factors leading to an emergence of conflicts in the Post-Soviet space, or the fact that, back to 1959, American famous scientist and one of the most prominent figures in theory of the international relations M. Rostow defined as 'diffusion of power'. In this case they mean a crisis of the central power and a strengthening of peripheral centres of force.

In particular, this trend was realised in practice in different regions of the planet in the recent decade of the 20th century including the Post-Soviet space as well, e.g. in conflicts around Abkhazia, Mountain Badakhshan, Nagorny Karabakh, South Osetia and Dniester. The Chechen conflict that became a direct consequence of the paralysis of power in Russia in the beginning of the 90es could also be mentioned.

The situation is getting more complicated also due to the fact that in recent years the world economy was experiencing an increasing pressure of the 'world underground' – a multiplying archipelago of communities suffering a degradation of the traditional types of social and economic organisation due to various reasons.

A prevailing form of activities becomes in this case a repeated regressive usage of civilised resource, i.e. a destructive economy using actively criminal and terrorist technologies are being formed. An analogous type of economy is typical of various pseudo-state formations vigorously developing under conditions of 'vacuum of force'. The existence of the similar kind of communities being, in essence, a challenge for the established system of the international relations demands the use of force that is fraught with consequences for the system of the international relations both on the regional

and global levels. Nowadays, it becomes clear that a realistic process of formation of the New World order, except for elements of charity, must include also elements of control over some processes having a direct relation to the universal security, including a regulation of regional conflicts using military contingents.

In a paper «Nigerian-Russian Co-operation in Fighting Organized Crimes» presented by *Dr. Ch. Dokubo* an attempt is made to succinctly deal with some of the transnational crime, and how Nigeria and Russia could jointly set up a bilateral regime to monitor and contain the spread of these crimes.

By taking advantage of the dominant economic trends of the 1990s, namely globalisation and liberalisation, perpetrators of organised transnational crime are becoming a major force in international finance, with the ability to affect the destinies of nations at critical stages in their economic and social development. Law enforcement agencies in a growing number of countries are ill-prepared to control or combat organised crime, particularly its transnational dimensions. Unilateral and even bilateral measures are regarded as ineffective in the face of criminal groups engaged in such activities as international car thefts, black-market trade in nuclear materials, smuggling of migrants, arms trafficking, drug trafficking, trade in human organs, environmental crime, money laundering and advance-fee frauds.

It is against this background that the Nigeria-Russian dialogue would conceptualise a new strategy for combating organised transnational crime. Nigeria and Russia had for long experienced extensive periods of authoritarian and centralised rule and are both experiencing an upsurge in transnational crime. It might be stated that transnational crime is not a new phenomena, and while the authoritarian nature of the Soviet regime had clamped down on such activities, in Nigeria, the collapse of the oil-based economy only provided an avenue for such crimes.

There are two options open to Nigeria and Russia to combat organised transnational crime. The first option deals with internal legislation while the second explores avenues for international co-operation.

As to internal legislation Efforts should be made to evaluate the adequacy of national legislation to deal with the various forms of organised transnational crime, including preventive strategies, substantive and procedural legislation, special programmes and law enforcement methods.

In connection with prevention emphasis must be placed on strengthening the values of morality and legality, noting that the continued operation of criminal groups in the territories where they are traditionally located requires a social consensus that lowers the risk of prosecution and facilitate the recruitment of new members. Measures should be taken for the protec-

tion of the criminal justice system against corruption, violence and fear of violence so as to gear towards restoring legality. Furthermore, the economic system must be made more transparent in order to reduce the vulnerability of legitimate industry to criminal infiltration and exploitation. This includes successful policies involving a good chemistry of regulation and deregulation which in turn should be regularly monitored and adjusted.

With regard to substantive criminal law, key changes including the criminalisation of participants in criminal organisation and the confiscation of assets acquired through the act must be strengthened. Although most governments have enacted measures to outlaw the soliciting and taking of bribes, embezzlement of public funds and abusive exercise of official functions, but international corruption was growing in relation to the expansion of transnational crime. Many countries have in some ways legalised corruption practised outside their borders by a system of financial and tax advantages. The contradiction between domestic and international morality is thus a stark one.

However, while certain countries have made considerable progress in establishing and implementing suitable legislation for combating organised criminal activities, there are still a number of countries that lack any adequate legal provisions as well as the judicial and investigative means and structuring required to fight organised crime.

It will be in the interest of Nigeria and Russia to co-operate and coordinate their fight against organised transnational crime. The two countries should 1) adopt a common conception of organised crime as a precondition for bilateral co-operation, and the harmonisation of efforts against international crime; 2) encourage personal exchanges between Nigeria and Russia law enforcement agencies, e.g. in a form of bilateral seminars and conferences, to overcome difficulties in cross-border communication. And finally, since the challenge posed by organised transnational crime can only be met if law enforcement agencies are able to display ingenuity and innovation, organisational flexibility and co-operation, it is therefore imperative for Nigeria-Russian co-operation led to the signing of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties. These are legal instruments providing for the exchange of evidence and witnesses between countries. If seriously implemented, international subpoena arrangement between Nigeria and Russia could be an effective check on organised crime.

Dr. *D. Omoweh* presented a paper «Strengthening Technical and Scientific Ties Between Nigeria and Russia» prepared by him together with Dr. O. Agbu. They stated that the collapse of the Soviet Union and re-emergence of Russia as an independent country, the reforms, which caused

the adoption of market-based economy, introduction of plural political system and other changes in Russia, had posed challengers for the country internal political stability and her relationship with countries outside the Commonwealth of Independent States. On the other hand, in Nigeria the return to the civil government in 1999, privatisation and deregulation projects of state, liberalization of trade, development of export processing zones, industrialization, etc. have created a fresh basis for re-examining the country's relations with Russia. Addressing to the example of the technical and scientific co-operation between the two countries the authors of the presentation tried to reveal, judging by their own words, the 'real' but neglected issues in Nigerian-Russian Technical and Scientific Co-operation.

As to the Nigerian governing elites, the anti-communist orientation the British gave to them in the colonial period partly explained the slowness in the technical relationship with Russia. Together with the absence of an industrial policy, the politics and mode of surplus extraction have largely defined the content and direction of the country's technical and scientific ties with Russia. One of the consequences of this, is that, the nature of most of the technical agreements that Nigeria signed with Russia, among other developed countries, brought very limited benefits to the country [if any], leaving the root cause of its industrial underdevelopment not touched.

On its part, then Soviet Union, in spite of its communist ideology, was not really sincere with its claim in eradicating western capitalism from the global through its technical ties with the developing countries like Nigeria. Likewise capitalist countries, the Soviet Union did not believe in the transfer of technology, and merely used technical agreement to market some of the products of the heavy industries. It is not likely, that Russia being embraced now the market-based economy strategy of development will undergo a re-think the country's earlier approach to technical co-operation.

Since November 1968, when Nigeria signed the first technical agreement with then Soviet Union the Ajaokuta Steel project has become a landmark in the Nigerian-Russian bilateral ties. Some Nigerians were of the view that Nigeria's political independence would be a sham without a virile steel sector. Instead, the West and the World Bank were in support of a mini-steel mill and a machine tool company in Nigeria. The Nigerian authorities went to the Soviets for assistance, and in 1968, invited Soviet geologist and geophysicists to map the country's iron ore reserve. It took ten years before the government signed the contract with Russia to construct the blast furnace unit of the Ajaokuta Steel Company. With an initial capacity of 1.3 million metric tonnes of crude steel at its first phase, this was to be increased to 3 million and 5 million metric tonnes at the second and final stages respec-

tively. Ajoakuta's blast furnace was planned to rely exclusively on the iron ore from the Itakpe mines. Russia was not only involved in the manpower development planning and equipment supply and installation of the company's main iron and steel producing unit, but also, influenced the product mix of the company, which was basically made of rods and wire.

In essence, the real intention of the Russians was to undermine the country's capacity to use its steel sector as a basis for its industrial take-off. Twenty years after the start of the blast furnace construction it is still not completed. Recent technical re-validation of the blast furnace showed that it was 80 percent ready. But that is even questionable as the life span of most of its parts, which ranged from 10 to 20 years had expired over five years ago. Re-engineering the technological capacity of the company would require the introduction of facilities that would produce flat steel sheets, I-Beams, Channels and Angles, among other intermediate and capital goods.

In the Nigerian oil and gas industry, the Soviet Union also had technical and scientific co-operation with the Nigerian government. In 1972, the Soviet Union assisted Nigeria to establish the Petroleum Training Institute. Over 10,000 Nigerians have been trained. The most of the Institute's graduates have no jobs. The Russians have no company operating in the country's oil sector and the Western ones that dominate the industry hardly employ them on the ground that they were poorly equipped for the sector.

The Soviets also got the contract to construct 900 kilometer long oil pipelines, which were laid from Warri to Lagos and Ilorin, and had five pumping stations to distribute 18.7 million tons of petroleum products in the country annually. About 1000 Nigerians had been trained over the years by the Russians in the maintenance of oil pipelines and refineries. Yet, the flow-lines in the country's oil industry are suffering from poor maintenance due to the state has neither an industrial policy, nor a clear-cut policy on technology in the oil industry. As a consumerist society, Nigeria's oil sector takes in technologies from all parts of the world but does not care on how to indigenise any of them.

There are still areas of immense possibilities for future technical and scientific collaboration between Nigeria and Russia like oil and gas, steel, agriculture, military, finance, insurance, shipping, and banking. But the issue at stake is not continue to sign more agreements, but how to strengthen the existing ones. In order to strengthen the ties between Nigeria and Russia the Nigerian State has to be re-organised along the line of democratisation and re-orientation of the state's philosophy of industrialisation away from the western approach to harnessing its resources to build the economy.

The presentation 'Russia – Nigeria: Economic Co-operation: Problems and Prospects' by *Dr. Igor G. Bolshov* stressed that the results of the President O. Obasanjo visit to Russia should be called historic since everything was done to create a solid legal and operational framework for the revival and rapid expansion of the Russian-Nigerian economic co-operation.

In the year of 2000 Nigeria occupied nothing but 0,05% (five hundredths percent) of the Russian external trade overall turnover and the share of Russia in the external trade of Nigeria totaled 0.4% (four tenths percent) only. Similar results have been achieved by Russia in her economic relations with other African countries as well as with the vast majority of Third World countries. The motives and reasons for it are due to a complex factors of internal and external nature.

By the beginning of the third millennium Russia has lost the superpower status, the influence in the world the USSR had. To say more, during the last decade Russia could not find her position within the framework of the international division of labour. Some very clear signs show that in case the effective emergency measures are not taken Russia will enjoy the possibility for to be marginalized in the world economy under the process of globalisation.

The attempts of radical structural changes of liberal nature in the conditions of the post-Soviet society undertaken in Russia together with the inconsistency in carrying them out, and occasionally – errors, have produced the extremely negative results. The sharp droop in economic performance, the decline of GDP, the cut-back of industrial and agricultural production followed by a severe worsening of socio-economic problems, growth of political instability, downfall of our country international status, and etc. The manufacturing and intellectual potential acquired during the Soviet period has been broken down. Primarily only raw materials' resources (as it is known, 35% of their global reserves are located on the territory of Russia) are exploited. The process has been accompanied by the transformation of Russia into a raw materials appendix of the industrialized countries, the country ceased to be an investor and turned into one of the largest foreign aid user.

To reconstruct Russia as the economically strong and influential state, one of the prime tasks to be solved is a perfection of her foreign economic relations. It is an imperative to improve commodity structure of export, to realize a series of high-tech joint-ventures and investment projects in foreign countries. The development of the comprehensive economic co-operation with foreign countries requires integrated economic and political efforts to be undertaken. It is due to a fact that within this sphere politics and economics, diplomacy and commerce, industrial production and trade are interlacing.

The possibility of using of foreign economic relations with the purpose of internal economic problems solution largely depends on a selection of foreign markets. It is natural that the main partners of Russia in economic co-operation (nowadays it is industrialized countries) will not stand the appearance in their markets of machinery and equipment, modern know-how, other high-tech products produced by such a competitor like Russia is. It is necessary to pay attention to the markets of less developed countries, and on a pioneering stage – countries, ranging noticeable economical potential and, accordingly, effective demand.

It is necessary not to forget a foreign-policy aspect of a proposed economic co-operation, i.e. about an «economic diplomacy». The development of relations with this group of countries will demand: to understand critically and to use experience gained during the Soviet period in development of such relations, to obtain an assistance to be rendered by the government agencies and state organs to the Russian exporters in advancing the Russian goods, services and capitals to the markets of the above-mentioned countries, to elaborate a complex of measures aimed to assist in promoting relations with this or that country at a government-to-government level and, at last, and to elaborate a concept of Russia's national interests in this or that country.

The Federal Republic of Nigeria completely conforms to the above-mentioned conditions applied to the potential partner of Russia on economic co-operation. Nowadays Russia and Nigeria resemble two very sick persons but on a path leading to a recovery. The reasons of their sickness are different but the treatment shall be somehow equal. To say more, it is a usual practice when sick persons help each other to recover as soon as possible.

Prof K. Ogundowole in a paper «Strengthening Democracy Through Individuation Process as a Framework for Promoting Nigerian-Russian Political Co-operation» emphasized the fact that the co-operation between the two countries, could be productive, fruitful and mutually beneficial when it was free from the prejudices of third parties and was rooted in each other's perception and judgments. This view could be justified for two basic reasons.

First, in the past the prejudices of the Western countries for instance heavily influenced the perception, nature and character of the contact Nigeria had with the Soviet Union. So, the Soviet scholarships offered to Nigeria were either suppressed, rejected or scarcely utilised. Alleging Soviet education to be inferior Western one, the Nigerians, qualified with various degrees and certificates from the Soviet Union were being discriminated, e.g. with placements on job. But, practical experience on the performances of the Soviet-trained Nigerians in various areas of Nigeria's economic, socio-cultural, military, industrial, educational, etc, sectors had since proved detractors wrong.

The other reason is that self-reliance has become a vital fruitful paradigm in the twenty-first century. Self-reliance in thought and action emerges in a people at a particular level of self-cognition, self-awareness, self-knowledge concerning their worth and readiness to act in accordance with such knowledge. This symbolises a definite degree of freedom, and by extension of democracy.

Self-reliance is the cornerstone of the current process of individuation of nations, now taking place along side the globalisation process. Individuation of nations is to be seen as a practical unfoldment of some latent principles entailed in democracy. Individuation of nations is meant the disengagement of a uniform nation-state from an agglomeration of nations or ethnic nationalities widely known and called multi-, or poly-national states.

To hark the logic of the individuation process, Nigeria and Russia have to forgo their efforts at empire-building and/or nation-building.

Individuation of nations like globalisation is a world wide process. The two contrasting processes, the opposites, are taking place more intensely at the same time, demands of serious scholars the need to take an utmost in depth analysis of the two opposing phenomena of human inter-community relations.

The dynamism with which nationality interest groups pursue the issue of self-determination and resource-control in our days in Nigeria is a manifestation of the unfoldment of mind. After forty years of self-manipulative existence and of eighty-six years of imposed togetherness the right time has come for the amalgam, Nigeria, to let go and flow into a new structure of absolute self-definition and self-determination of each of the nations the amalgam is constitutive of.

Following strict scientific criteria in accordance with the individuation logic we are likely to be able to determine some definable nationality areas that bear strict singular uniform identities. These are:

1. Hausa-Fulaniland (Sokoto, Katsina, Kano, Zamfara, Jigawa and relevant are of Kaduna State)
2. Igboland (Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi. Enugu, Imo and related area of Delta State)
3. Yorubaland (Ekiti most Kogi & Kwara, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, Oyo, plus the Itsekiri area of Delta State, Akokoedo part of Edo state and Borgu area of Niger State)
4. Kanuri land (Borno and Yobe)
5. Ijaland (Bayelsa State)
6. Tivland (Benue excluding Idoma and relevant area of Taraba State)

7. Nupeland (Kebbi, Niger excluding Borgu and Gbagyi areas) Plus Nupe parts of Kwara and Kogi)
8. Edoland (Edo State and appropriate area of Delta State – excluding Akokocdo)
9. Ogoniland (relevant area of Rivers State)
10. Iomaland (relevant part of Benue)
11. Urhobo/Isokoland (Urhobo, Isoko and some part of Kwale areas of Delta State)

On the basis of mutual historical sympathy and/or solidarity, the following grouping of people and nationalities may be (brought together) in the interim pending the time the full force of individuation process is caught up with them:

1. Qua and Ogoja peoples (Akwa Ibom and Cross River) as Quago-jaland.
2. An integral group of nationalities of Bauchi, Gombe and Adamawa may form a confederation.
3. The group of nationalities in Plateau, Nassarawa, part of Kaduna including all territories of the Gbagyi people both in Niger and FCT Abuja, may also form a confederation.
4. Peoples of Rivers (excluding Oginiland) may as well go into a confederation.

The Russian Federation already possesses the networking of structure along nationality boundaries. Perhaps what is needed now is to loosen the knot further, give greater autonomy to each of its constituting units. For a greater and unhindered unfoldment of the spirit and creative energy of each of the federating ethnic nationalities. This way democracy is further strengthened and freedom enhanced.

To the opinion expressed by *Prof. Dmitri M. Bondarenko* in his presentation 'Polygyny and Democracy: a Historical Anthropological Perspective', all the reforms for democratisation of the political system and of modernisation of social institutions like the rural community and polygynous family remain fruitless until the historical and socio-anthropological preconditions for the present-day situation are taken into account and given serious consideration.

The negative correlation between the communal democracy and the family size cannot be completely explained by the fact that both of them have rather a similar curvilinear relationship with the cultural complexity. Hence, the latter one has some independent influence on the communal democracy and via it on the supra-communal democracy in complex societies.

It appears natural that within undemocratic communities the members

of their elites would use their monopoly over the power resources in order to maximise the number of their wives; hence, the polygyny would appear as just one more dimension of undemocracy of the respective communities.

For instance, under the data came from the Circum-Mediterranean region, that could be easily divided into two sub-regions – the Christian and Islamic ones, the communal elites in the Christian part of it had no option of having more than one wife, as this was most strongly prohibited by the Christian Church. So, in the Christian Circum-Mediterranean sub-region the negative correlation between the polygyny and communal democracy reveals itself as evidently as with respect to all the other regions. Hence, the monogamy could well be one of the possible factors of the development of the communal democracy and not only its result.

The 'non-democratising' influence of the polygyny might be connected, among other factors, with 'father-absence' factor. The boys raised within the environment consisting mainly of women tend to develop personalities inclined towards aggressive domination-oriented behaviour.

The polygyny could influence the society power structures through certain socialisation practices. In the polygynous societies the maternal warmth towards boys would be significantly lower than in the monogamous ones. The societies characterised by more maternal warmth towards boys would tend to be more democratic. The test of this hypothesis has produced revealed that in this case the correlation turns out to be so strong that, though the extremely small sample size here has even decreased, the correlation appears to be unequivocally significant.

The family structure (determined in its turn by a large number of independent factors, both material [e.g. economic] and ideal [e.g. religious]) could affect significantly the overall political evolution of the respective societies. So, the family structures affects primarily the political organisation of the community. The communal political structure could influence significantly the political organisation of the supra-communal levels. The correlation between the democracy of the communal organisation and the democracy of the supra-communal political organisation turns out to be really strong and significant.

Thus, the family structures could influence the communal political organisation through the socialisation practices associated with them. In its turn, the communal political organisation appears to influence the political structure of the supra-communal levels. Hence, one would expect to find the significant negative correlation not only between the polygyny and family size, on the one hand, and the communal democracy, on the other, but also with the democracy of the highest level of the political structure.

The family structures influence the political organisation of the society first of all through the communal political organisation. However, within the complex multi-communal societies the family structures could influence macro-political organisation directly – as the elites placed outside the normal communal organisation still get their socialisation in families whose structure should affect the modal personality type of the members of the respective elite groups. Hence, within such societies the family structure would influence the macro-political organisation in two ways – both through the community, and directly.

The negative correlation between the occasional polygyny vs. monogamy and the communal democracy also appears significant. On the one hand it is not so easy to understand how the socialisation of a rather small number of the society members in a very restricted number of polygynous families could produce significant impact on the overall political structure of the respective societies. On the other hand, it appears reasonable to take into consideration the simple fact that within complex stratified occasionally polygynous societies these are almost invariably the elites who practice the polygyny. In addition to this it appears reasonable to take into consideration that within such societies such families normally constitute a rather closed circle with their own socialisation practices significantly different from the socialisation practices of the commoners. However, within the framework of such societies it would be precisely this closed circle of families which would produce persons occupying the positions of authority. Hence, the polygynous organisation of the respective restricted number of families could well influence the political organisation of the respective societies in general.

It is possible to consider the strict prohibition of the polygyny by the Christian Church as one of the causes of the development of the modern democracy in Europe. Of course, when in the 4th century AD the Christian Church imposed the regulations which made the monogamous nuclear family the predominant family form it in no way tried to contribute to the development of modern democracy in Western Europe more than one millennium later. The unintended consequence of those actions was the formation of a relatively homogenous macro-region consisting of nuclear monogamous families. It could hardly be a coincidence that a few centuries later this region was consisted predominantly of democratic communities where the modern supra-communal democracy originated.

BOOK REVIEWS

Kleptocracy. Corruption and Negative Economy Socio-Political Dimension. Struggle of an African State against the Destructive Forms of Power Formation, by Leonid V. Geveling, edited by L.A. Fridman, 'Humanitarian' Publishing House of the Academy of Humanitarian Studies, Moscow, 2001. 592 pp. [Гевелинг Л.В. Клептократия. Социально-политическое измерение коррупции и негативной экономики. Борьба африканского государства с деструктивными формами организации власти. / Отв. ред. Фридман Л.А. М.: Изд-во 'Гуманитарий' Академии гуманитарных исследований, 2001. 592 с.]

An obvious crisis in Russian African studies, first of all, in general theoretical studies, made itself felt in the early 1990s. The earlier approach to the Black Continent as the main reserve of the 'socialist orientation' demonstrated its unsoundness together with the socialist ideas of the Soviet type. To adapt the methods of their studies to the world standards, our scholars had to energetically master new theoretical approaches and methodologies, which were criticized earlier as attributes of 'bourgeois social science'. Doing so, they found that the problems of Russia and Africa are similar in many respects: the issues of transitional societies, sociocultural inversions, formation of democracy and multiparty system, political mythology in crises, etc. This has given boost to the development of African studies in Russia, making our scholars turn to new subjects. An example is the reviewed book.

This fundamental work about the most socially dangerous forms of the organization of kleptocracy (thieves' power), lutocracy (looters' power) and plutocracy (the rich's power) was written on the basis of numerous sources and publications (the bibliography consists of 1249 entries). The object of study was Nigeria, often called 'mini-Africa' because of variety of ethnic and confessional groups, unevenness specific features of the development of each region; in addition, this country invariably leads the list of the most corrupt states. Although the author himself avoided overt parallels and direct allusions to similarity of destructive phenomena in Nigeria and Russia, one who reads this book would inevitably draw an analogy to the contemporary Russian reality. The epigraphs from stories and plays by M.E. Saltykov-Shchedrin, N.V. Gogol, A.S. Griboedov, A.N. Ostrovskii and other Russian classics, who exposed traditional Russian corruption, support the trend towards perceiving the book in this way.

In the first section of the monograph (Kleptocracy and Corruption) the author pays a lot of attention to the analysis of the main conceptual works

dealing with the theoretical aspects of corruption and related social phenomena. It is the first in Russia detailed, civil and systematic description of all main teachings, viewpoints and theories regarding corruption. Therefore, this book is useful to those who want to grasp the essence of this phenomenon. Summing up various views, L.V. Geveling concludes that corruption as a social phenomenon has deep historical roots. In the 20th century it acquired a global character and became an undoubted factor of the formation of kleptocracy, which is defined as

‘a method of power organization that forms on the verge of the commercialization of the political process, brought to an absurd level, and institutionalized corruption in material and nonmaterial forms’ (p. 487).

One of the main conditions of the formation of kleptocracy in Nigeria is the state's intervention in economic life, ensured by the topmost officials' monopoly for preparation, making and control of strategical and tactical decisions in the sphere of the regulation of the market segments of economy. Nigerian economic corruption is a many-faced phenomenon, realized mainly through state officials' extortion, bribery, personal interest in making contracts, concealed receipt of commissions and presents, purchase and sale of public offices, embezzlement of public property by officials, interference with legal entrepreneur activity and approval of wittingly illegal deals. The ever impressive scope of illegal self-enrichment by Nigerian kleptocracy varied depending on the policies pursued by the regime that ruled the country in a given period.

The author analyzes political corruption (POLCORR) in detail. It relies to a great extent on negative economy (a kind of ‘antieconomy’, which functions contrary to social standards) and economic corruption. He writes: ‘The functioning and development of POLCORR led gradually to the formation of a peculiar *culture of political corruption*, generated by practical interests and intellectual, moral and aesthetical requirements of kleptocracy and related social groups and their subjective concepts about politics’ (p. 77).

Proceeding from the degree of negative influence on the political system, L.V. Geveling singled out two forms of POLCORR, namely, moderate and extreme. The former (slander, diffamation, false accusations against political and public figures, bribe provocation, interference with the realization of citizens' election rights, imposition of unfounded prohibitions of and limitations to pre-election meetings, falsification of election results, illegal limitation of journalists' and public organizations' access to information, etc.) are aimed at distorting the principles of the power organization and re-evaluation of cultural values but are not meant for full destruction of the political institutions and communication systems of the society; the latter

(hooliganism and vandalism with a political background, organization of mass riots on order of definite political forces, individual political terror, formation of underground terrorist organizations, propaganda of religious and ethnic exclusiveness, public appeals for mass refusal from fulfilling civil duties or violent changes in the constitutional system, etc.) lead to the disintegration of the state system, collapse of the state and social anomia (p. 77-78). Both forms are widespread in Nigeria, and their social carriers are kleptocracy and lutocracy. In this context, the author advances an interesting hypothesis about the possibility of creating a kind of ‘antistate’ by kleptocracy of some African countries by forming a political antisystem in the setting of a crisis of the state idea and spread of antietatist attitudes (p. 98-111).

A special chapter deals with the use of money in Nigerian politics, first of all, in financing election campaigns and political parties and organizations. L.V. Geveling notes that ‘as the ‘political function’ of money expanded in Nigeria and some other countries, wealth became not only the purpose and instrument of power but the main path towards the upper echelons of the party and state machinery and even was identical to this path in a sense’ (p. 131).

On the basis of the Nigerian materials the author analyzes the problems of political financing, which have acquired a global character. This makes his monograph an important help in combatting this evil in many countries, including Russia.

Singling out kleptocracy as a particular group, rejected socially and politically by other social strata and therefore inclined for mimicking decent groups, L.V. Geveling considers the interaction between Nigerian kleptocracy and elite, bureaucracy, ‘political classes’. He concludes that Nigerian kleptocracy functions in its present form in the hypostasis of an influential element of the social cryptostructure and a component of the informal sector of the social development (p. 225).

In the second section (Lutocracy and Negative Economy) the author considers symbiosis of lutocracy and negative (shadow) economy (NEC), beginning with a detailed classification of the NEC manifestations. He considers NEC not only as the totality of economic crimes but socially abnormal entrepreneur activity, which does not recognize freedom of labour, internal sovereignty of personality and free will. NEC relies on organized crime. The author analyzes the activity of Nigerian criminal syndicates (CS) from the viewpoint of the formation of lutocracy and features of NEC development and divides it into four sectors: (1) illicit drug trafficking, manufacturing and circulation of false banknotes, smuggling and tax evasion;

(2) pseudolegal entrepreneur activity, including loan and credit operations, sale of adulterated medicines, copyright violations, mass illegal manufacturing of various products, illegal business with antiques and environmental crimes; (3) game industry, illegal business in the sphere of entertainment and services, illegal arms import and production, etc.; (4) blackmail, marauding and robbery in Nigerian ports, racket, kidnapping, commissioned murders and slave trade.

L.V. Geveling coined the term **negative management**, applying it to Nigerian criminal syndicates as organizations with sophisticated management systems, and noted that most of plutocrats are a social embodiment of the negative management function (p. 309). He considered similarities and differences between negative and positive (legal) managements and analyzed various power types in CS, attracting the readers' attention to 'global managers' of NEC, who emerged as a result of the expansion of the Nigerian CS to other countries, including Russia.

Lutocracy's inclination for concealed activity enabled L.V. Geveling to describe the social elements that represent NEC as cryptosocial. On the basis of this thesis the author developed an original theory of cryptosocial communities. His attempts to find the roots of contemporary lutocracy in hunter communities of the review of the **mesolithic** epoch (racket, robbery, brigandage) are of an immense interest. The author represents lutocracy as a result of the self-organization of reviving archaized social structures and reproduction of the respective models of consciousness and culture (p. 314). The original explanation of the development of cryptosocial organizations in the terms of parasitology lends obviousness and persuasiveness to this theory.

Noting that organized criminal activity politicizes together with society, L.V. Geveling came to the important conclusion that, on the one hand, NEC makes a destructive impact on the social structure of the Nigerian society as a whole and, on the other, it is the basis of the formation of a parallel cryptosocial structure. He does not rule out that 'this criminal social 'pyramid' will become an independent and quite terrible political force' (p. 330).

The third section (Plutocracy as a Reference Group of Kleptocracy and Lutocracy) contains more theoretical material than other ones. Proceeding from structural logic of the analysis of 'the rich's power', L.V. Geveling constructs three models of this phenomenon stage by stage: (1) logic (abstract, reference-related); (2) genetic (averaged ideal, general-historical, planetary); (3) national (country-related, concrete-historical). All they are analyzed in close interconnection and can serve as a methodological landmark for studying any national forms of plutocracy. The author pays special

attention to the logical model of plutocracy within the framework of systemic theory. He considers and generalizes various methods of studying plutocracy (from intuitive to structural-functional) and advocates the interdisciplinary character of the analysis of this phenomenon.

L.V. Geveling's conception about the primary and secondary levels of the power organization is a sizable contribution to the study of the political systems of West Africa. The former unites individual principles and institutions of the traditional and pro-bourgeois forms of democracy and autocracy, as well as elements of nonpolitical archaic ruling, in a single whole. According to the author, this method of exercising power developed as a structural-horizontal system, as a kind of bearing structure of the political sphere; 'as a whole, it reflects the degree of correspondence of political systems and the whole political space to the main direction of the development of social progress of the West African countries in the current historical period' (p. 361).

The secondary forms of power organization emerged in the course of the self-determination and self-realization of the social groups that matured for the active and purposeful participation in the system of political relations, namely, bureaucracy, kleptocracy, lutocracy, partocracy, etc. Plutocracy and other parallel forms of power compete for the control of the main method of power organization but are able to cooperate constructively.

Defining plutocracy as the rich's power, exercised by them in their narrow corporative interests, L.V. Geveling demonstrated similarity and differences between the social characteristics of financial oligarchy and plutocracy and observed that the notion of plutocracy inevitably remains more vague and amorphous conceptually; it reflects numerous social atavisms and archaisms that are inherent to the object. Plutocracy is interested not in ruling formally but in managing really. 'This is why the main task of its political existence is the expansion of the scope of its participation in managing social resources and establishing ... overt or covert control of the process of making politically important decisions' (p. 377).

It is quite interesting to read L.V. Geveling's reasonings about the formation of the NEC culture, characterized by a high level of the society's tolerance for many kinds of economic crimes. This counterculture not only acts as a social pathology but strives to lay foundations of its own morality and develop social and cultural standards of its own. Considering 'tolerance for corruption' a decisive imperative of the development of kleptocracy, the author states that this condition of the Nigerian society testifies not to its silent consent with corruption among the upper crust but only to its traditional obedience to the authorities, political 'fatigue' and indifference, as

well as to overabundance of defamatory information (p. 402). This is one more of the numerous analogies with the Russian reality.

At the beginning of the last section (Evolution of the Strategies of the Nigerian Governments' Crusade against Kleptocracy and Lutocracy: The Second Half of the 20th Century) the author generalizes the experience of curbing these destructive phenomena, including the activity of various international organizations. One chapter deals with the policy of the Nigerian civil and military regimes (since the attainment of independence to our days) and considers the positive and negative schemes of the offensive against antisocial standards of ruling. Undoubtedly, this experience is of a great interest for those who combat corruption and negative economy in any country.

Summing up the results of his studies, the author formulates moderately optimistic forecasts concerning the future of kleptocracy and lutocracy in Nigeria and in the whole world; he proceeds from the growing understanding of harmfulness of these antisocial phenomena at both national and global levels. He does not believe that a 'great criminal revolution' is possible in Nigeria and advances a series of persuasive arguments; the main of them is the difference between the fundamental purposes of lutocracy and kleptocracy and general conflict between them. Most probably, these destructive forms of the power organization will disappear at the systemic level after the establishment of the new world order. However, the fight against them, which presupposes combination of national and international efforts, will be prolonged and obstinate. One of the pledges of victory in this fight must become decoding the 'genetic codes' of kleptocracy and lutocracy and getting a clear idea about the mechanisms of their reproduction. There is no room for doubts about this.

L.V. Geveling's monograph has become an important contribution to the creation of the political theory about the destructive methods of power organization. It is not easy to grasp this book, because the problems the author analyzes are very sophisticated; the readers, especially those of them who have not yet developed tolerance for evil and believe in a better future, clearly see similarity of these problems to those of our country.

Yu.G. Smertin

Modern African Leaders. Political Portraits. edited by Nikolai D. Kosukhin. '21st Century – Concord' Publishing House, Moscow, 2001. 217 pp. [Современные африканские лидеры. Политические портреты. / Отв. ред. Н.Д. Косухин. М.: Изд. дом XXI век-согласие, 2001. 217 с.]

The collection of articles (chief editor and the composite authors' head: Prof. N.D. Kosukhin, Dr. Sci. (Hist.)) consists of 15 works with brief English summaries and information about the authors, most of whom are researchers of the Institute for African Studies, RAS. The heroes of the articles played or play the leading or notable roles in the life of their countries and Africa as a whole. Their political biographies are narrated against the background of the modern history of African states. Each essay reflects professional competence and style of the authors, who have, in my opinion, fair knowledge of the available sources and literature. Some of them relied on their own experience of working in Africa.

The introductory article *Modern African Leader: the Common and Personal Features* (pp. 7-23) deals with the theoretical aspects and problems of leadership in Africa. Proceeding from the findings of political science of the past and new achievements of Russian and foreign political science and sociology, such as works by Al-Farabi Abu Nasser, Niccolo Machiavelli, E. Spranger, M. Weber, G.V. Plekhanov, L.N. Gumilev, N.B. Kochakova, N.I. Vysotskaya, L.V. Geveling, F. Burlatskii, I.V. Sledzevskii, S.M. Lipset etc. and Africa Leadership Forum publications, the author considers the features of the evolution of traditional authority in the African society and the African leaders' traditions of political culture in different periods. The leaders of the 'first wave, who fought for independence' (p. 18), were succeeded by the second generation, including those who 'resorted to Marxist rhetoric' (p. 19). The leaders of the 'third wave' were characterized by turning to the liberal-democratic values while retaining the features of authoritarian rulers (pp. 19-20).

The main features of the 'first wave' leaders, brilliant public figures and revolutionary romantics, are described in *J.K. Nyerere, the First President of Tanzania* (pp. 36-44). The author ranks him with Gandhi, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Kwame Nkrumah and L.S. Senghor, who 'belong to the history of the mankind' (p. 36). This is undoubtedly correct, because Nyerere's both practical activity and literary heritage make him an eminent African politician of the 20th century. It may be added that he was among the few African leaders who resigned voluntarily, like Senghor in Senegal and Mandela in the RSA.

The leaders of the 'third wave', politicians 'of democratic formation with authoritarian inclinations' (p. 20), are exemplified by J. Rowlings, who led Ghana for 20 years up to late December 2000. His political portrait is drawn in the introduction with a special emphasis on his reputation of an honest and incorruptible politician, which made him a popular and charismatic leader. He was reluctant to capitalize on the popularity of Kwame

Nkrumah's name in the country. The author also claims on the basis of his own impressions that the ideas of the final decolonization of the continent and pan-Africanism were not alien to Rowlings.

The author of the introduction also suggests a tentative classification of the modern African political leaders, based on the circumstances of their coming to power (p. 19). It is as follows:

(1) the leaders who came to power as a result of a military coup or civil war;

(2) the leaders who came to power as a result of democratic transformations;

(3) the leaders who remained in power after political transformations;

(4) the leaders who remained in power without substantial changes in the political set-up.

The political portraits of some state leaders are drawn on the basis of this typology. Two of them belong to the first type. The article *D. Sassou-Ngessou, the Twice President of Congo* (pp. 86-123) evaluates him as an 'unconditionally charismatic leader, who, however, did not reach the all-African level' (p. 86). The question remains open if he will manage to 'retain power and put an end to the crisis, turning the country to the path of sustained development' (p. 103).

The article *President of the DRC Loran Desire Kabila: the Portrait with Black Border* is a picture of Kabila's short 'starlet rule'. He deposed Mobutu, the notorious president of Zaire. Yet Kabila himself was murdered by a terrorist owing to the reasons analyzed in the article. He became 'the most famous victim of the crisis that affected the region of the Great African Lakes and killed a million of his compatriots within 2.5 years' (p. 122).

The hero of the article *F. Chiluba: the Zambian Pragmatist* (pp. 123-140) belongs to the second type of the above classification. The main conclusion is as follows: Chiluba's ten years long rule has not yet answered the question about his future place in the history of the country: will people remember him 'as the president who proclaimed the ideas of democracy or as a politician who neglected the democratic norms to retain power' (p. 140).

The article *L. Konde: the Democratic President of Guinea* notes that the president of the 3rd Guinean republic, who speaks little and avoids reporters, has not yet demonstrated his abilities in great political games, but what he has done enables the Guineans to hope for a better future.

The political portrait of another leader of the second type is drawn in *Thabo Mbeki: Difficult Path towards Victory* (p. 149-172). Its author, who met his hero, relies on his personal knowledge of the situation in South Africa. He thinks that Mbeki 'has not yet demonstrated his potentials com-

pletely' (p. 169), although his condition will be more difficult than that of other new politicians, because he had a great predecessor in the person of Nelson Mandela.

The article *Political Portrait of Zin al Abedin ben Ali* (pp. 58-70) characterizes a leader of the third type, who remained in power after a transformation of the political system. According to the author, ben Ali reached political and economic stability in Tunisia and wants to make it 'an extension of the European space' (p. 70), i.e., to integrate it in Europe but not at the expense of the Tunisians or loss of their national identity.

Another portrait of a third type leader is drawn in *A. Diouf against the Background of Senegalese Democracy* (pp. 173-186). The author describes him as 'courageous and unordinary [politician], who strives for the democratic development of the country' (p. 186), which was predetermined to a great extent by the high (by the African standards) level of political culture in Senegal, the motherland of such an eminent leader as L. Senghor.

An example of a fourth type leader is described in *H. Mubarak: a President Who Does Not Need Rating* (pp. 45-57). This is a capacious characteristic of a former military and then the Egyptian president, who was in power for 18 years by 1999. He followed 'a balanced and pragmatic course... of gradual reforms in domestic policy and made energetic attempts to restore Egypt's leadership in the Arab world' (p. 57).

Since the author of the introduction reserved that his classification of leaders is tentative, he could avoid mentioning some renowned African politicians whose portraits are described in the collection. In the article *King of Morocco Hasan II: Traditions and Modernity* (pp. 24-35) we meet an Islamic traditionalist who inherited the royal throne. Ruling the state for 38 years (d. 1999), he 'earned the reputation of an eminent public figure, skilled and cautious reformer of the political system' (p. 34).

The author of *Bouteflika: the New Old Leader of Algeria* (pp. 141-148) writes about the anything but simple conditions of the first years spent in power by the renowned politician and international official, who came to power in 1999 as a result of the preterm election, carried out in a strained political and socioeconomic situation. Like some other contributors to the collection, this author is rightly cautious in evaluating the prospects of Bouteflika, including his intention 'to put an end to the confrontation with the Islamic opposition' (p. 147).

The collection also includes political portraits of some opposition leaders who left a notable trace in the political history of their countries. The article *Who Are You, Dr Savimbi?* (pp. 197-214) deals with a legendary figure of Africa of the 20th century, who claimed the role of a national hero,

‘the father of all Angolans’ (p. 207). Savimbi, the leader of the UNITA, a party that really fought against the Portuguese colonialism, was widely known abroad and enjoyed the support of several countries, but in the course of time, after Angola won independence, he became the ‘symbol of the anti-government opposition’ (p. 207).

The article *Oginga Ajuma Odinga: Politician and His Epoch* (pp. 187-196) is about an eminent Kenyan public figure and politician, who had a chance to occupy the topmost post in the country. In the author’s interpretation, O. Odinga (d. 1994) was among the few African politicians who placed the national interests above the narrow interests of ethnoses and tribes.

Specialists in African countries may find some mistakes in the collection or disagree with some evaluations, the more so that interesting and serious works about the leaders whose names appear in the collection have been written both in Russia and abroad. The most important is that the collection successfully develops the tradition of studying biographies of political figures that exists in Russian African studies. There are no insignificant or casual figures among its heroes. Varied and original information about them replenishes the readers’ knowledge about the ‘great Africans’. The articles of the collection form a collective portrait of the modern African political elite, who played, play and will play an important or even determining role in the social and political life of the continent

Natalia Matveyeva

Ghana. Reference Book, edited by Yuri N. Vinokurov, Oriental Literature Publishing House of the RAS., Moscow, 2001. 320 pp.: map. [Гана: Справочник. / Отв. ред. Ю.Н. Винокуров. – М.: Издательская фирма ‘Восточная литература’ РАН, 2001. – 200 с.: карта.].

The series of reference books on African countries published by the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences has been enlarged recently. Senior research fellows of the Institute’s Centre for Tropical Africa Studies Dr. Natalia Kochakova, Dr. Boris Petruk and Dr. Yevgeny Smirnov with Dr. Pyotr Kupriyanov, one of the leading Russian authority on Ghanaian affairs, as the programme co-ordinator have created a handbook on Ghana that is reputed to be a comprehensive and useful study. The Centre Director Dr. Yuri Vinokurov acted as an Editor-in-Chief of the book.

It shall be mentioned that the handbook self-descriptiveness has been increased greatly due to a courtesy of HE the Ambassador of the Republic of Ghana to Russia Mr. John E. Bawah and Minister-Counsellors (economic)

of the Embassy Mr. Samuel K. Forson and Mr. Iaw S. Amankwah who have provided the authors with a great deal of information on the country.

To say more, the publication of the full-scale complex reference book on Ghana has occurred in Russia for the first time. To be sure, it has helped to bridge a gap in Ghanaian studies in our country. So, nowadays the students on African affairs, i.e. research workers, civil servants, businessmen, etc., are equipped with this very informative study.

The handbook has been executed under the layout traditional to the reference books published in the series. It contains data characterising the physical and geographic features of the territory occupied by the Republic of Ghana, the composition and structure of its population, short outline of the Ghanaian history as well as the contemporary political structure and social order, basic trends in its foreign policy. The outlook of the economy and cultural life of this West African state is described too. Chronology and geographical and ethnicity index are supplemented.

It is impossible to retell in this article all the facts and figures described in the handbook. It is obvious. The authors of the study have managed to fulfil a very difficult task. The handbook user will find a lot of data to specify the peculiarities and other distinctive features attributed to Ghana only alongside with the characteristics common to the other African states. So, it will be useful to dwell on a few key points of the former authors paid attention at.

One can agree with the idea expressed in a preface to the book that the Republic of Ghana has played and plays a very prominent role in life of the African continent. For example, it is enough to recollect that Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, President of the Republic of Ghana, initiated the idea to form the Union of African States at the beginning of the 1960s. To realise it he proposed to form the Continental Government for Africa. In spite that the idea has not materialised it had inspired a strong impulse for the creation of the Organisation of African Unity [p. 70]. Note that even nowadays in spite of the modest size of its population (18 million in 2000) and territory (238,537 sq. km) the Republic of Ghana still ranks as one of the leading countries in Africa. It is not a chance that Mr. Kofi Atta Annan, current Secretary General of the United Nations, is a native of Ghana [p. 3].

It happened so that the country was the first nation in Black Africa and the first British colony in the region to achieve self-government in February 1951. The country was the first also to attain the political independence as far as on 6 March 1957. Starting from the Day of Independence under the name of Ghana the former British colony of the Gold Coast has been serving as a leader of independent African nations. The strong desire of Dr. Kwame

Nkrumah, the first Prime Minister and then, the first President of Ghana, to remove the colonial toponymy associated with the name of the Gold Coast from the minds of his compatriots made him chose the name of Ghana. It is a name of a medieval African empire in what are now eastern Senegal, Southwest Mali, and southern Mauritania. It used to be rich and prosperous in the 3–8th centuries. By choosing this very name Dr. Kwame Nkrumah maximised his idea of succession between the achievements of the great African civilisations of the medieval Sudan and the contemporary Ghana [p. 36].

A lot of interesting conclusions and findings could be found in the handbook. For instance, before being colonised the peoples who lived at the territory of contemporary Ghana had the state formation under the name of the Asante Confederation. The authors of the book consider the formation of the original state organisation in the Asante society to be a result of European navigators and merchants coming to the Gulf of Guinea coast, and especially of the transatlantic slave trade that had been started from the 16th century. The participation in slave trade as mediators and suppliers of the ‘living merchandise’ as well as of gold, ivory and cola nuts provided the Asante Confederation with the powerful incentive for development and for growth of its military power. Those factors had predetermined the military-parasitical nature of the Asante statehood. The authors conclude: ‘...the war has become a way of being and a main source of a surplus product and social prestige’ [pp. 41-42].

The handbook users will find a proved testimony for the fact that the Gold Coast played a very important role for the Europeans. The Portuguese gave the above name to the seashore from the mouth of Tano River to the mouth of the Volta River as early as in the 15th century. The Europeans’ eagerness to be settled there is shown by the fact that after creation by the Portuguese of the first Fortress of Elmina in 1481–1482 till the beginning of the 19th century the Europeans had erected more than 40 fortresses (under some other evidence about 200 castles, fortresses and sentry posts) at that very spot. It is more than in some other place in Africa [p. 42].

Ghana shall be considered a unique among the Black African countries due to a spread of freemasonry. At first masons (of the European origin) made their appearance in the Gold Coast at the beginning of 18th century but the registration of their first lodge dated back only to 1792. Nowadays a number of Masonic brotherhoods are operating in Ghanaian territory. One can find there a queer conglomerate of Western type freemasonry combined with the traditions of the African secret societies. Many Ghanaians consider freemasonry as a source to inspire corruption, nepotism, and to widen the

gap between the rich and the poor. In the 80’s the government of Flt-Lt. J.J. Rawlings tried to lessen the masonry influence on the society. The meetings of the masons’ lodges were banned, the buildings owned by them were destroyed, and the articles of their worship were displayed and laughed at in public. But the state authorities have not managed to defeat freemasonry and up to now it still plays certain role in the country social life [pp. 34-35].

Undoubtedly, after attaining of an independent statehood the Republic of Ghana has achieved some positive results in its economic development. There is a lot of evidence in the handbook that illustrates the growth in the output of food crops and mineral production, the certain development of manufacturing and power industry, etc. Nevertheless, the authors argue that the dynamic of the economic development has been unstable due to miscalculations and errors of different political forces in power in the country. ‘The strategy of the economic development under the frequent political regimes’ change was a subject of fundamental modifications depending on the country leaders’ political opinions ranging from the free market orientation and the foreign capital attraction to the elements of the socialist society creation’ [p. 95].

It is emphasised in a preface to the handbook that ‘the Ghanaian model, which has provided the political stability and the dynamic development of the economy for the country is attractive for the other countries of the region’ [p. 3]. To be sure, one can agree with the thesis on considering the sample of the Republic of Ghana socio-economic development during the final two decades of the 20th century. It could not be denied that almost all of the recent achievements of Ghana shall be connected with the name of Flt-Lt. J.J. Rawlings who first came to power in June 1979.

Some unique results of the economic development have been achieved since 1983 when the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) sponsored by the IMF and the World Bank has been initiated in Ghana. The handbook user will find a lot of evidence on how the J.J. Rawlings administration has managed to make the ERP fruitful and to avoid failures familiar by the experience of the other African states in a course of implementation of similar programmes [pp. 100-103].

As to the political organisation of the Ghanaian society it has been transforming towards a real democracy. In 1992 the country returned back to a civil rule. J.J. Rawlings and the National Democratic Congress formed by him won the Presidential and Parliamentary elections. Once again he and his party won the 1996 elections. The roots of democracy planted by J.J. Rawlings and his administration proved to be strong. Under the provision of the Ghanaian Constitution J.J. Rawlings could not run for presidency

for a third term after his term of office expired in the year of 2000. And in a tense struggle the Presidential and Parliamentary elections have been won by his former rival Mr. John Agyekum Kufuor and his New Patriotic Party [p. 69].

On outlining the handbook's numerous merits its some minor weak points shall be mentioned too. It would be desirable to shorten some parts of it (e.g. physical and geographic survey) and to enlarge some others (e.g. the outline of the foreign policy), to update some data, etc. For instance, in the economic section of the handbook one can find text passages overloaded by figures. In a sense, it makes the text a bit boring and the trends that are characterising the development of this or that branches of the Ghanaian economy difficult to understand.

Nevertheless, the basic aim of the study has been achieved: thank to the contribution of the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences the users whether they are the professional research workers or the ordinary persons paying interest in African affairs have obtained a solid and reliable source of information on the Republic of Ghana, one of the leading countries of Africa.

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Compiled by Igor Bolshov

OBITUARY

MARINA V. RAIT (1922 – 2001)

Rait, Mariya Veniaminovna one of the leading Russian Ethiopianists and a scholar of an international reputation, deceased on March 9, 2001.

M.V. Rait was born in Moscow on March 1, 1922.

Her interest in Ethiopia manifested itself as early as her school years, when our country empathized with this state's resistance to the aggression of fascist Italy. After graduating from the school she entered the ethnography chair of the historical faculty of the Lomonosov Moscow State University. The World War II interrupted her learning. M.V. Rait went to the front as a volunteer. The student became a nurse; by the end of the war she was a junior lieutenant of the medical service and was decorated with orders and medals.

On her return to the university Mariya Veniaminovna began serious studies in ethnography and languages of the African peoples. She learned (and later taught) Amharic and Swahili; to study the latter, she had to go regularly to the Leningrad university. In 1946 M.V. Rait became the first Moscow Africanist with higher education.

Mariya Veniaminovna dedicated whole her scholarly life to the destinies of the peoples of Ethiopia, a remote African country. Her studies logically continued the centuries-old traditions of Russian scholars, who studied the languages, history, religions and economic life of the Ethiopian society.

Completing her education, M.V. Rait became a researcher of the Institute of Ethnography, the USSR Academy of Sciences. She was among the authors of Peoples of Africa, the first major work of Soviet Africanists, published in the series Peoples of the World. This monograph, in whose preparation M.V. Rait played an important organizational role, has not lost its academic value even at present. Her Ph D. dissertation on the ethnographical findings of the Russians who visited Ethiopia opened a new field of scholarly researches, namely, the study of the Russian-Ethiopian contacts.

M.V. Rait was the first among Soviet researchers (together with E.G. Titov) who carried out field observations in Ethiopia in 1958-1959. The result of the expedition was a collection of materials, preserved at the Institute of Ethnography, and a monograph that covered almost all aspects of the life of the peoples of this country, followed by a series of articles.

Her activities found recognition abroad: the monograph and some articles were translated into foreign languages. For her merits in Ethiopian studies M.V. Rait was decorated with the medal of Haile Selassie I, the Ethiopian emperor.

Obituary

M.V. Rait took part in the establishment of the Institute for African Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Starting in 1959 her work at the institute, when it was founded, she remained with it for over 30 years. For many years Mariya Veniaminovna headed the team of researchers who dealt with the problems of Ethiopia. Her activity was characterized by profoundness of research, strict scholarly approach to the problems of ethnography, history and, later on, conflictology and, finally, lively attitude to and love for Africa and the Africans.

M.V. Rait actively participated in most of the conferences of the International Congress for Ethiopian Studies and remained a member of its Executive Committee until the last days of her life. M.V. Rait initiated the convocation of the International Conference for the Problems of Ethiopian Studies, held in Moscow in 1986, and was among its leading organizers.

M.V. Rait authored 'The Peoples of Ethiopia', a fundamental monograph, and over 60 articles in Russian and foreign languages. She guided the preparation of an academic directory concerning Ethiopia.

Mariya Veniaminovna's energy and organizing talent enabled her to lead the first historico-ethno-sociological expedition to Ethiopia in 1991–1992. To organize it, M.V. Rait invited experts from several institutes and universities; they collected unique field material.

M.V. Rait brought up a galaxy of Ethiopian and Russian researchers, paying a lot of attention to teaching students and post-graduate researchers, many of whom became eminent scholars; she also maintained permanent contacts with the employees of the Ethiopian Embassy in Moscow.

M.V. Rait was characterized by adherence to principles, benevolence, respect for the colleagues and readiness to share her knowledge and experience with the youth. It is very difficult to believe that this active, diligent and merely kind woman will be no longer among us.

The blessed memory of Mariya Veniaminovna, a bright, energetic and humane personality will ever live in our hearts.

A group of friends