Вторая международная конференция

*ИЕРАРХИЯ
И ВЛАСТЬ В
ИСТОРИИ
ЦИВИЛИЗАЦИЙ*

*(Санкт-Петербург,
4-7 июля 2002 г.)*

Тезисы докладов

Second International Conference

*HIERARCHY
AND POWER
IN THE HISTORY
OF CIVILIZATIONS*

*(St. Petersburg,
July 4-7, 2002)*

Abstracts

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Hierarchy and Power in the History of Civilizations

ОГЛАВЛЕНИЕ

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PANEL I
Conceptualizing Hierarchy in the "Prehistory"
and History of Anthropology
Convenor: *Robert Launay* (Northwestern University, Evanston, USA)

Ever since its inception, modern anthropology has been preoccupied with questions about the nature and origins of hierarchy and power. Morgan and Maine (not to mention Marx and Engels) were concerned, not only with the origins of the state, but also with the operation of pre-state societies. British anthropology was for a long time concerned with the differences between state societies and "tribes without rulers". Such concerns addressed a double set of preoccupations: the quest for the origins of "modern" European institutions, but also the means to define these "modern" institutions in contrast to exotic alternatives.

In fact, these concerns predate the founding of the modern discipline of anthropology, and also characterize the comparative approaches of early modern, especially Enlightenment thinkers – Montesquieu and Rousseau in France, Adam Ferguson and John Millar in Britain, for example.

The panel will explore the ways in which the conceptualization of hierarchy has itself evolved over the past few centuries, as well as the constant nature of certain preoccupations in the field.

Alexander A. Kazankov (Center for Civilizational and Regional Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
Matrilineal Kinship Organization and Integration of Power among
Austronesians and in South African Bantu Societies:
History and State of the Problem

R. Blust has shown that Proto-Austronesians, judging by data of comparative linguistics, had lineage organization by the time of their spread into the Pacific. *Ethnographic Atlas* data shows the absolute predominance of the matrilineal and bilineal patterns, in comparison with patrilineal ones, among Austronesian-speaking peoples. Thus we may conclude, that Austronesians, by the time of their migration to the Pacific, had matrilineal kin organization. Its presence supports R. Divale's thesis of the causal binding between external warfare, migrations and matrilinearity.

Migrations of the Austronesians began after their adoption of the rice production in at least 8 thousand years before present in the middle Yantsze river basin. It is known that after the transition from hunter-gathering to agriculture the population density rises manyfoldly. Thus a migration begins

due to the population pressure. In case of Austronesians it proceeded along the Yantsze flow to the South Chinese Sea coast. The advancing agricultural population had to assimilate and fight with the hunter-gathering autochtones. So the newcomers need to organize social structures suited for external warfare. Such a structure is (by R. Divale's thesis) the matrilineal lineage-based community, which precludes interethnic conflicts.

So Divale's hypothesis and the thesis of the presence among early Austronesians of the matrilineal kin structures are in well accord and corroborate each other. Matrilineal social structures facilitated the Austronesian advance on the autochtonous hunter-gathering populations of Southern China and Pacific islands who had lover levels of social and power integration.

Similarly the distribution in the Ethnographic Atlas of a data on the Bantu societies show high probability that the original Bantu of the interlacustrine region of East Africa had matrilineal social pattern. In particular the Central Bantu are characterized by almost complete predominance of such structures. Early Iron Age Bantu of the eastern stream migrated southwards and had to deal with the local populations of hunter-gatherers in a similar with the Austronesians way. Bantu differed from Austronesians in that they acquired their agriculture and iron-working from the Central Sudanic people (peoples). So they had much higher (in comparison with proto-Austronesians) levels of power concentration.

In later times many groups in the Southern African Bantu changed their social pattern for patrilinearity. Certain role in that could be played by the adoption of them of the specific ideological complex bound with cattle breeding (role of cattle as the prestige item universally accompanying all social events and transactions. South African Bantu adopted cattle-breeding and milking from the Khoi people of the Limpopo valley.

The analysis of the role of the migrations in the formation of the matrilineal kin structures in proto-Austronesians makes it probable that this center of the agriculture emergence was not independent. This hypothesis is also corroborated by some comparative linguistic data which is presented in our thesis.

Robert Launay (Northwestern University, Evanston, USA)
From Savagery to Decadence: Hierarchy and the Ambiguities of Progress in Late Enlightenment Britain

If the origins of modern anthropology are generally situated with the emergence of evolutionary social theory in the mid-nineteenth century, its

roots are conventionally traced back to the social theorists of the Enlightenment in the 18th century. In particular, late-eighteenth century British (especially Scottish) thinkers elaborated theories of progress by stages, from Savagery to Barbarism to Civilization, in terms that were later reprised by Lewis Henry Morgan and adopted wholeheartedly by Marx and Engels. Adam Ferguson's *History of Civil Society*, published in 1767, is generally hailed as a landmark of progressivist social theory. However, almost a third of the book is devoted, not to progress, but instead to decline. Whereas Ferguson tends to locate "savagery" in native America, "decadence" is prototypically "Oriental". If "savagery" embodies the qualities of liberty and equality without order, "decadence" represents order at the expense, precisely, of both liberty and equality. Ultimately, Ferguson's theory remains highly ambivalent about hierarchy and the state.

Ferguson's views were by no means an isolated expression of pessimism. Edward Gibbon's monumental *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, as its title suggests, is centrally concerned with decadence and decline. From the very beginning of the work, Germany and Persia respectively incarnate "barbarism" – liberty without order–and "decadence" – order without liberty. Seen in this light, civilization is a delicate balance between under-centralization and over-centralization. It was only in the course of the nineteenth century that "Asiatic despotism" came to be understood as a precursor, rather than as an outcome, of the "modern" European state. By reexamining these Enlightenment texts which first formulated a "progressive" approach to the origins of the state and civilization, we rediscover an alternative and perhaps more nuanced approach to the theoretizing of hierarchy and power in what was to become modern anthropology.

Glenn Petersen (City University of New York, USA)
Chieftainship and Classical Republican Theory

Chieftainship is commonly viewed as being organized around political forms and dynamics that are direct precursors to the despotic state. This paper argues that in many cases of chieftainship – particularly those in Pacific island societies – are in fact designed to prevent the centralization of power that characterizes states. Classic political theory from Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Harrington, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and others is marshaled to demonstrate that important aspects of republicanism are as fundamental to the organization of chiefdoms as they are to any other sort of polity. Ethnographic examples from Micronesia will demonstrate that chiefly

hierarchies create checks and balances that curb the abuse of power more readily than chieftainship can be used in processes of oppression. Although chieftainship is typically ignored by political theorists, careful study shows us that it should instead play a key role in explaining how societies develop and maintain constraints upon the institutions that manage power, even as they confer authority upon them.

Larissa P. Piskunova (Ural State University, Ekaterinburg, Russia)
Dynamics of Exchange as the Foundation of Social Hierarchy

1. Qualitative improvement of socialization at the end of the 20th century raised a question about changing of scientific paradigms: from functionalism and substantialism to dynamic and contextual approaches.
2. Thus hierarchy may be considered as a system of distinctions, the descriptive language of which is established by a sacred center created by sacrifice.
3. On the one hand, the sacred center is obviously expressed physically, on the other hand, it is transcendental at the same time. This dualism (bipartition) gives a possibility to various groups and classes to have their own perceptions of hierarchy which supplement one another.
4. Dynamics of situation is determined both by literal and figurative meanings as well as by the nature of social relationship built in accordance with the principle of gifts' exchange: a sacrifice as an exchange, and an exchange as a sacrifice.
5. Hierarchy is reproduced, kept and renewed through the system of sacrificial exchanges.

PANEL II
Hierarchy and Power in Ancient Eurasian Societies
according to Data of Archaeological Researches

Convenors: *Nadejda A. Gavriliouk* (Institute of Archaeology, National Academy of Sciences, Kyiv, Ukraine)
Nikolay N. Kradine (Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the Far East, the Far Eastern Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Vladivostok)

As difference discipline from anthropology and history the archeology studies the long period of human life. The history begins from the invention of writing. The anthropologists investigates with the pre-state peoples. This groups have already influenced of modernization. It is important advantage to archeologists. But archeological sources are more fragmentary than written sources and supervision of anthropologists. Ceramics, fragments of artifacts, levels of the ground are all that the archeologist has. How is possible to study authority on these poor data? What case does rich burial mean a property position of the person in, and what his higher public status. Is correlation between a public inequality, power and domination in a prehistoric and traditional society? How may we allocate between chiefdom and the state on archeological sources? What do the models of complex societies differ among themselves? All these questions excite archeologists. But archeologists excites not only how to allocate chiefdom or a tribe, but also how we think of it.

The main topics we propose for discussion are as follows:
1. Sources of power and domination in ancient societies;
2. Archeological criteria of power
3. Archeology and occurrence of an inequality;
4. Egalitarism, rank and stratification in an archeological projection;
5. Hierarchical and non-hierarchical (heterarchical) societies of Eurasia according to archeology.

M.S. Ahluwalia (Himachal Pradesh University, Shimla, India)
Archaeological Evidence of Feudal Hierarchy in Early Mediaeval India
(Rajasthan – A Case Study)

The paper makes an attempt to study a few important feudal titles of the twelfth century Rajasthan which were commonly used in northern and western India. The study seeks to ascertain the relative position of four

important feudal titles *viz. Rauta, Thakkura, Ranaka/Rana/Rai* and *Rajaputra* in the feudal hierarchy.

Many of the well-known 'Rajput' clans, by the time of the Turkish invasions during the close of the twelfth century, had come to be recognized as belonging to the 'Kshatriya' caste. Some of these clans began to connect themselves with Sun, Moon, Fire and Sea etc., with a view to prove their hierarchical status. Thus what one can dimly discern is the emergence of distinct categories of autonomous or semi-autonomous feudal chiefs with the above-mentioned titles.

Another important aspect of feudal hierarchy, which further developed lord-vassal relationship is traceable in the practice of granting land grants to sons, relatives and other members of the clan, military commanders and other officers. The system became fairly popular during the chief contenders of power like the Chalukyas of Anahilwara, the Paramaras of Malwa and the Chauhans of Sakambhari etc.

The archaeological and literary evidence of the period also indicate the hierarchical system of vassalage during the period under review. Although more than a dozen grades of vassals are found during this period, the most common titles are *Rajaputra, Rauta, Thakura, Ranaka, Smanata* and *Mandalika*, each having different hierarchical order and size of territory.

The paper seeks to explore the socio-economic factors leading to hierarchy and power in Indian context with special reference to the western Indian state of Rajasthan, which characterizes the climax as well as downfall of feudal hierarchy during this period.

V. Balambal (University of Madras, Chennai, India)
Chola Hierarchy as Gleaned Through Archaeological Sources

The Tamil Cholas of South India were powerful rulers. They ruled from the Sangam age to 13th Century. Though there were ups and downs, they had cared their names in the golden pages of Indian History. Stone and copperplate inscriptions coins and indigenous and foreign literature form the main sources of study to trace the power and hierarchy of the Cholas.

The Cholas conquered nearby regions and made the conquered rulers their feudatories, who were allowed to rule the regions without interference so long as they were loyal to the Cholas.

They had high sounding titles, flag, emblems etc to show their power. They started the practice of writing their conquests chronologically on temple walls and made donations to temples, brahmanas, hospitals, educational institutions, officials etc. It is interesting to note that to show their affinity

and respect to the rulers, officials, ministers, commanders, scribes, teachers, temple priests and others bore the titles of the Chola rulers. The Cholas were religious minded and they built many Sieve, Vishnu and Buddha temples which stand testimony to their religious zeal and tolerance. Even the temples and gods were named after the Chola rulers. Their power was established in overseas too and the Chola culture spread in far off lands.

Matrimonial alliances with the feudatories increased the bondage between the lord and the vassals. It must be the well understood that the Chola feudal system was different from that of European feudalism. In spite of wielding enormous power the overlord showed benevolence to their chieftains.

The socio-economic, cultural and political factors of the Chola period stand testimony to their power and hierarchy of the Cholas. The availability of Chola inscriptions and coins in various parts of India and abroad help us to understand the spread of Chola power and fame in those regions.

Hassan N. Fazeli (University of Tehran, Iran)
Robin A.E. Coningham (University of Bradford, UK)
Ceramic Specialization During the Late Neolithic and Chalcolithic Periods in the Qazvin and Tehran Plain (Iran)

This present work studies the relationship between craft specialization and cultural complexity during the Late Neolithic and Chalcolithic periods in the Tehran and Qazvin plain. Generally, it is accepted that patterns of craft activities within segmentary societies will be organized on a more or less self-sufficient mode of household production. Conversely, it is assumed that they will be arranged on a more centralized mode in more complex societies (Rice 1987, Costin 1991, Wason 1994). This study will test the applicability of such modeling to the Late Neolithic and Chalcolithic archaeology of the Tehran and Qazvin plain (c. 62000 – 3000 BC) and will focus on the role of craft specialization within the context of emerging social complexity. Its primary aims are to test the hypothesis that self-sufficient production was carried out by non-specialists during the late Neolithic period (c.6200-5500 BC) and was increasingly replaced by craft specialists within a highly standardized context by the Transitional Chalcolithic (c.5500-4700 BC).

Utilizing material from the excavations at Cheshmeh-Ali in 1997, settlement survey in the southern of Tehran in 1998, excavation at Zagheh 2001 and the re-analysis of materials from previous unpublished and published sites it is now possible to demonstrate that craft activities were increasingly controlled by elites during the Chalcolithic period. In contrast to

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previous studies in the region, this study illustrates and models the dynamic developments of the social and economic structures of the Neolithic and Chalcolithic cultures within the two regions. As this research utilizes both new and old data, provides both temporal and spatial perspectives, and applies a non-cultural historical perspective, it represents an original study of the archaeology of the Tehran plain during the Late Neolithic and Chalcolithic periods.

Nadejda A. Gavriliouk (Institute of Archaeology of the National Academy of Sciences, Kyiv, Ukraine)
Identification Problem of Social Hierarchy of Scythian Society

The reconstruction of a Scythian history should be carried out in spaces of a social, economic, political, ethnic histories, history of spiritual culture. The intensity of process of generalization of the Scythian *archaeology* data and converting it in to Scythian *history* is caused by progress of adjacent disciplines in particular general theory of nomades, paleoecology and paleoeconomic of Early Iron Age, ethnology of nomades and so on. Until recent time the Scythian economy was not investigated. Static external economic exploitation of neighboring and autochthonous population by nomads, "economic pyramids" were declared as essence Scythian economy. Such economy ostensibly was answered three-level social structure of Scythian community. However last results of reconstruction of Scythian economy testify to it dynamics. Their consecutive stages with growing degrees of hierarchical organization are allocated. It was established that in the economic plan Scythia of the archaeoic period was so poorly similar on Scythia which opened to Herodotos` eyes as Herodotos` Scythia on Scythia of the 4th century BC which reconstructed on the arrays of archaeological finds and information of the antique authors. The results of reconstruction of economy allow to assume complication of a social-ethnic structure and social-political history of Scythian nomadic community at each stage of its economic development. That is the structural transformations of Scythian economy are the reasons of the essential socio economical, ethnical and cultural differences of the early Scythia, Herodotos` Scythia and Scythia of the 4th century BC.

The success of study of an economic history steppe scythians was connected that written and archaeological sources on Scythia managed to be considered in a field of the general theory of nomads and to allocate general and especial in Scythian and Euroasian nomads. By analogy, we shall try to repeat such approach to study of a social history of Scythians remembering

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that the economic base of a society in a considerable measure forms its social landscape. To limitations of Scythian base of sources and imperfection of the general theory of nomads is not meaningful to solve problem in whole and expediently to concentrate on formulation and decision of a number of small problems of a social Steppean Scythia problematic. In particular the problem of identification of social hierarchy of Scythian society or even its separate parameters is most urgent at recent time.

Ю.С. Худяков (Институт археологии и этнографии СО РАН, Новосибирск)
Yu.S. Khudyakov (Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography, the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Novossibirsk)

Этнополитическая иерархия у енисейских кыргызов
в эпоху позднего средневековья[*]
Ethnopolitical Hierarchy among the Yenissey Kyrghyz
in the Late Middle Ages

В сложении государств в кочевом обществе степей Евразии важнейшую роль играли военные институты и система господства ведущего кочевого этноса над вассальными племенами номадов.

Характерные особенности этой системы наглядно прослеживаются на примере государства енисейских кыргызов, образовавшегося на рубеже эпохи раннего средневековья в Минусинской котловине и просуществовавшего до присоединения "кыргызской землицы" к Российской империи в новое время. В основе кыргызов лежала система господства кочевого тюркоязычного кыргызского этноса над таежными охотничьими племенами кетского и самодийского происхождения, находившихся в кыргызском государстве на положении кыштымов. Хотя термин "кыштым" тождественнен понятию "раб", реальное положение кыштымов было различным. Некоторых кыштымов кыргызы "ловили и употребляли в работу". Такие кыштымы находились на положении патриархальных рабов в кыргызском обществе, работали в хозяйствах знатных кыргызов.

Однако, большую часть кыштымов составляли таежные охотничьи племена, имевшие свою родо-племенную структуру, родовую знать и внутреннюю иерархию. Они были обязаны платить кыргызам дань, преимущественно, пушниной и железными изделиями, формировать

вспомогательные отряды легкой конницы в кыргызские войск, участвовать в войнах в составе кыргызских войск. За время обитания на Енисее сами кыргызы неоднократно попадали в зависимость от более могущественных кочевых государств древних тюрок, уйгуров, монголов, лишались государственности, становились частью Монгольской империи, управлялись монгольскими чиновниками, но при этом сохраняли в своем подчинении племена кыштымов. В эпоху позднего средневековья в Минусинской котловине существовало четыре кыргызских княжества: Алтысарское, Алтырское, Езерское и Тубинское. Во всех княжествах правили представители кыргызской высшей знати, княжеской аристократии. Правители Алтысарского княжества считались старшими среди всех других князей. В русских источниках XVII в. они называются "большими киргизами". Старшие князья избирались на съездах всех четырех княжеств. В подчинении князей и аристократии находились чиновники, судьи и сборщики налогов, воины, рядовое податное население и рабы-кыштымы.

Однако, все население кыргызских княжеств находилось в вассальной зависимости от правителей монгольских государств Алтын-ханов и Джунгарии. Монгольские правители имели на Енисее своего наместника, который играл важную роль в управлении. Кыргызы обязаны были поставлять войска и участвовать в войнах, которые вели монголы, и платить им дань.

Vladimir V. Koloda (Kharkov State Pedagogical University, Ukraine)
The Change of Hierarchical Dominant in Slavic-Khazar Relations
(Based on the Severskiy Donets Middle Current Middle Area Data)

The excavations of the last years at Verhniy Saltov and Mokhnach hillforts give us an opportunity to re-consider the dynamics of ethnopolitical process and change of accents of hierarchy of authority in the system of Slavic relations with the Khazar Khaganate:
- Migration of the North Caucasian Alans to the northwest territory of the Khaganate in the middle of the 7th century led to establishment of poli-ethnic population of the Khazar State in the forest-steppe region – the Alans, the Bulgars, the Slavs, the Turks, the Ugrians and the Iranians. It became reflected in such a phenomenon as Saltovo-Mayatsk archeological culture.
- The tributariness of the Slavs, recorded in the chronicle, is reflected in archeological materials: Volyntsevo arthefacts correlate with this stage of the Notherners' life. The Khazar State establish its dominance above

them by the support of military press and tribute collection, which was traditional for every nomad empire. The center of tribute collection and temporary location of the garrison of the khaganate was Bititsa-1 hillfort.

- With the new Slavic expansion to the left bank of the Dniper river from the right one in the 7th century and intensification of Slavs consolidation process, the Northerners got out of the tribute to the Khazars. We consider them to do it freely. Oleg's march (the beginning of the 10th century) hardly ever related to the Eastern Northerners, and Svyatoslav's march (965) was only the demonstration of the power.
- Stabilization of ethnopolitical situation in forest-steppe of the Left Bank of the Dniper by the end of the 8th century confirmed by well-defined boundary of Romny- and Saltov-culture monuments spreading.
- Then overcoming of confrontation took place and process of interaction of cultures began. It led to the appearance of syncretic (by their culture) population in the middle area of the Severskiy Donets. This process was developing more successfully, because for number of reasons the forest-steppe Saltov population was more progressive than the neighboring Slavs.
- The Petchenegs invasion into European steppes (X century) led to destabilization of ethnopolitical situation in the region. The Northerners and other ethnic groups incorporated into their structure left the banks of the S. Donets and away to the West to grand princes in Kiev, to be under their protection, gradually mixing in the Southern Russians.

Thus, the change from the domination of the Khazar State to dynamic balance between the khaganate and the Slavs quickened ethnoestablishing process on the adjoining territory. This process was stopped by the formation of new hierarchical structures.

Nikolay N. Kradin (Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the Far East, Far Eastern Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Vladivostok)
Power Symbolism in Anthropology and Archaeology

The power symbols are designed for a marking of the opposition groups in the political process, and fixing in the cultural-ritual form of actual political relations and structures. In the egalitarian and ranged societies, they have more pronounced sexual-age character (food taboo, the right to name, tattoo, carrying arms etc. only after initiation). In the complex societies (i.e. chiefdoms, state formations and their other analogs), the symbolism acquires a slightly different meaning. It emphasizes the vertical relations. The people

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have to establish relations with other unknown people and, therefore, the symbols should correctly suggest a social role of an individual (chief and member on a commune, free man and slave, knight and peasant). The specific symbols of the individual status appear in which the magic power features are concentrated. The economical and political power is fixed in the specific cultural symbols which can be reflected in the archaeological data (especially, in iconography, monumental construction and architectural planning). In this regard, it is of importance to relate a quite fruitful idea of A.Sauttholl of the elite symbolic-ritual monopoly of imaginary means of production with the attempts of the power to personify the real (palaces, castles, towns), sacral (temples, sanctuaries) and the next world's ("tsar's" burial mounds, burial-vaults, mausoleums and, finally, pyramids) spaces. The monumental palace, cult and funeral constructions structurize in a specific way the sacred space which symbolizes a divine, irrational status of the terrestrial power. By focusing a landscape "to themselves" and incarnating a "maximum sacrality" of society, the monuments should represent in the objectified form the political control and claims to property of considerable resources both during the life-time and after death.

Under the conditions of the real integration mechanisms' absence, control and compulsion of the great mass of the population, a person of the sacral ruler has performed the important consolidating and organizational functions. It has been no only key psychological mechanism of the ideology of arising state society but also important symbol uniting the whole polity. In the course of time, when the state system has been formed, more effective mechanisms of the prevention of the society split (army, police, courts, prisons etc.) have arisen. A necessity of the "sacral ruler" has fallen away. However, a respect, mysterious ceremonial and power symbolism were retained whose significance is by intuition realized but the functional meaning was already lost.

Alexander P. Medvedev (Voronezh State University, Russia)
Scythian Barrow Groups in the Eastern European Forest-Steppe (Problems of Interpretation)

For a long time scythologists have paid their attention to the paradoxical fact of the numerous presence of archaic Scythian barrow necropolises in the Forest-Steppe since the 7th century BC and their almost total absence in the Steppe (Scythia itself) till the 5th century BC.

I suppose, that some light can be thrown upon the social nature of this phenomenon by the research of correlation between barrow groups and

settled sites in every local variant of the Forest-Steppe Scythoid culture. Within the Dnieper-Don region this index considerably varies in time and space. In the Sula region large barrow groups appear in the second half of the 7th century BC and exist till the end of the Scythian epoch. Some very large hillforts are also known for this area, but they are not very numerous. *Vice versa*, in the neighboring Seim region there are about 50 small Scythoid hillforts of the 6-5th centuries BC and no simultaneous barrow groups, although Scythian swords are occasionally found. In the Forest-Steppe Don region both hillforts and barrow groups are known, but they appear a century after the Sula ones. There the space structure of some archaeological districts (hillforts and open settlements and simultaneous barrow groups) is well explored. It is found, that hillforts and barrows are situated in 2-8 km from each other and divided by natural bounds – rivers, ravines, etc. Such territorial isolation of hillforts and barrows is known in the Sula region, too. This can testify the belonging of barrows and hillforts to ethnically and economically different, but closely connected population groups.

Comparative analysis shows the coexistence in the Forest-Steppe of the culture of common settled population and the subculture of military-aristocratic elite, buried in barrows. This subculture had a distinct "Scythian" appearance and kept a lot of Steppe nomadic features till the end of the Scythian epoch. Moreover, recent anthropological research in the Middle Don region seems to confirm the biological difference between fortified settlement dwellers and people buried in the Voronezh barrows (Kozlovskaya, 1995).

Alicia Meza (Forest Hills, USA)
Ancient Egypt Before Writing

Archaeological evidence indicates that Ancient Egyptian Predynastic towns proliferated along the Nile river from the Delta to Nubia. The settlement ranking system of size distribution demonstrates that the growing centers interspersed along the Nile eventually derived into a distinctive regional system. This paper looks at the possibility of the innovation of writing as a crucial event of the four millennium BC. Written communication facilitated long range trade and cultural interaction between Egypt and Mesopotamia, prompting Egyptian Predynastic towns into a new era of social complexity. During the half of the four millennium BC, a progressive Egyptian state formation developed parallel to that of Mesopotamia.

Hekmatolah Molla Salehi (University of Tehran, Iran)
Ritualization as representation of power in prehistoric societies of Iran and Aegean Sea

This paper aims to address some key questions related to process of Ritualization as "hierophany" and representation of power in prehistoric societies of Iran and Aegean Sea in the Neolithic period according to some particular category of archaeological records from archaeological viewpoint. Power itself even secular and sacral or natural and cultural or individual and social as a sense or notion is deeply powerful dynamic and attractive subject matter for any kind of critical or analytical, philosophical inquiries. Power as a socio-cultural or historical fact belongs to those multi-dimensional and multi-functional as well as polysimic phenomenon.

Rite, ritual and Ritualization as well belong to same polysemic and multi-aspect socio-cultural phenomena. When, how and why Ritualization as cultural and social process of change has been appeared during the prehistoric times? What and how the processes of Ritualization has been symbolized as the representation of sacral power and those interaction with other processes of change in socio-cultural system? Was Ritualization as process of acculturation and "écosophie" of nature or theo-and ontophany of power with its multifunctional aspect? How can we demonstrate archaeologically such a deeply conceptual and ontological sense? What are our archaeological indicators to recognize empirically and to explain logically or finally to give reasonable interpretation with faithful statements for such complicated and polysimic issue as well as multifunctional phenomena?

As we know, notions concepts senses, facts or phenomena such as power rite, cult, identity, mentality, spirituality, sacredness thought, ideas, minds, meaning, cognition, context, structures and so on in archaeological discourse belong to the boundary of lost "arché" and lost "logos" or in more strict sense to lost "archai" and lost "logoi". How it could be possible to study or to give logical and reasonable answer to such non empirical data or "noetic" and "noematic" concepts from dichotomized, mute, silent and ambiguous archaeological records (archaeon)? Of course this is one of the fundamental complicated epistemological and theoretical problem of archaeological studies that archaeologists might surpassed from it and to built our construct logical and reasonable bridge between observable or empirical data and conceptual or non empirical data.

Anatoliy Ya. Shchetenko (Institute of the History of Material Culture, Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg)
To the problem of the social stratification of the society
Proto-Indian civilization (based on archaeological data)

The decipherment of Proto-Indian texts made by Yuri V. Knorozov and the recent excavations (especially Dholavira) characterizes the social stratification of the late phase of Harappan society (the 1st half II mil. B.C.).

The study of settlements patterns has revealed the variety of their schemes. "The Citadel", "the Lower town", fortifications and quarters division are evidences of the complex horizontal hierarchy of architectural ensembles which reflect a vertical hierarchy of the society consisting of a number of rural communities. Monumental public buildings, ritual basins, granaries, "fire-altars" and sacrificial pits were excavated in "the citadels". Specialized workshops for processing of a stone, manufacturing beads, melting and processing of metal were placed in the quarters of the "Lower cities".

On the basis of the analysis of the plans of settlements, parameters of architecture and artefacts it is possible to assume the existence of several categories of the population in the Harappan society. The priests who occupied the highest position in the society were governors. Scribes and seal cutters, manufacturers of seals, dancers and musicians were subjected to them. The architects, engineers, sculptors, builders of buildings and wells were controlled by administration of middle level. The local and international land and maritime trade served by the seamen, traders and translators was in their hands. The knowledge of astronomy allowed the priests to create a seasonal calendar for agriculture with " houses of the Moon ".

The votive inscriptions about sacrifices on the seals are evidences of a cult of the Great Gods replaced former spirits-hosts cult. The Lord of the world heads the Pantheon of deities (proto-Shiva looking like Pashupatu). He was the patron of one of the 12-years cycles in a 60-years cycle of Jupiter. The relay system of government was introduced on the base of these cycles.

The main part of community consisted of the farmers, cattle-breeders , handicraftsmen (weavers, carpenters, masons, joiners, smiths, *et al.*). The lowest strata of the society was occupied by the slaves which lived in "the rabbit holes " on the suburbs of settlements.

The social stratification of the society of the Proto-Indian Civilization is similar, in general, to "ancient" societies of Near East: free peasants organized into communities or the *polises*; dependent population (*i.e.* slaves); a religious ideology of ritual-magic type, created by priests.

Raj Somadeva (Postgraduate Institute of Archaeology, University of Kelaniya, Colombo, Sri Lanka)
Rise of the Social Complexity in Early Sri Lanka

The emergence of the social complexity in early Sri Lanka goes back to the middle and the latter part of the first millennium BC. It was a co-occurrence with the culmination of the peasant agricultural activities begun around the beginning of the first millennium BC in the island.

As an Island situated in the Indian Ocean and adjacent to the south Indian peninsular, Sri Lanka reflects the diverse environment potentials, which had been supported to develop the human settlements from the middle Pleistocene epoch (Deraniyagala 1958).

The beginning of the agricultural practice in the island goes back to the early centuries of the first millennium (Deraniyagala 1972). The continuous agriculture through about 600 centuries after its first emergence paved the way to raise the urbanism together with the formation of a social hierarchy for the first time in the Island. Both archaeological and inscriptional evidence (Paranavitana 1970; Somadeva et al 2000) furnish adequate information to survey the emergence of the social hierarchy and its causative factors within this formative period. This is an untouched field of archaeological research in the island. Therefore the present paper seek to survey the potentials to be appropriate to interpret the emergence and the subsequent development of the social hierarchy in the early Sri Lankan society.

The present paper also discusses spatial distribution of the early Iron age settlements of the different physiographical zones and makes an attempt to elaborate the communication and interaction milieu of them (Fletcher 1995). The expansion of the segmentary communities, which had practiced a horticultural subsistence economy in the dry zone of the Island and their transition towards peasant farming practice is to be highlighted. Finally the emergence of the Chiefdom state (Gunawardhana 1982) society and their activities, which had influenced the rise of social complexity is also to be described.

Serguei A. Vasjutin (Kemerovo State University, Russia)
The Role of Archeological Researches in Reconstruction of Nomadic Politary Systems

Having a great experience in sociological interpretation of archeological data, archeologists did not often applied to the reconstruction of

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administrative systems of ancient and mediaeval nomads. These problems were rather often solved basing on written information analysis, while archeological data were used as an illustration of scolar's conclusion. It can be explained by limited information of artifact. Really there are a few criteria giving a possibility for reconstruction of nomadic administrative system based on archeological objects' investigation:

1. The complexity of burial rite which reflects political and religious importance of the buried in central tomb (Arzhan, "tsar's" burial mounds of Scythes and Sacks, burial – funeral unities of ancient turks' khagans of Orhon).

2. Multi-level social stratification, traced on the content and quality of equipment, embattlement's size, tomb and intra-tomb constructions; horses' burial etc.

3. The fixation of local specifics of memorials' groups of archeological culture (tribal system).

4. Indirect data on dependent tribes.

5. The presence of settling complex - headquarters of the leader.

6. Discovery of direct attributes of power (paizsi, stamps, signet-rings).

7. Written texts used for official propaganda.

So it can be pointed out that a study of a certain archeological units on the criteria mentioned above gives some information of the complexity of politary systems of these societies.

Paul K. Wason (John Templeton Foundation, Radnor, USA)
Religion as a Variable in Dual-Processual Analysis

Anthropologists have successfully documented the near-universal importance of religion in people's lives, in cultures and in the social order. However, our classifications and our models of social evolution do not always make it easy to explore the influence of religion. The study of socio-cultural evolution cannot be carried out apart from a comparison and classification of societies. Not surprisingly, a great many models have been proposed. Nearly all are helpful for certain purposes, but surprisingly few are well suited to engaging religion as a causal variable. The recently developed dual-processual approach may be an important exception. Over the last five years, Blanton, Feinman and colleagues have been exploring the distinction between a corporate strategy in which leadership is focused on directing community activities and rituals, and a network strategy in which leaders emphasize and draw their power from a network of relations with other communities. This is primarily a comparative measure and is meant to complement, not replace, other approaches to differentiating and classifying

social variation. I argue that it is particularly well-suited to helping us investigate religion as an active influence and to the complementary task of helping us understand what it would be like to live in a particular social situation. This paper is therefore a preliminary exploration of what may turn out to warrant more extensive study -- religion as a variable in dual-processual analysis. Following a summary of the importance of religion and of the corporate/network approach to understanding political organization, I will devote most of the paper to outlining ways in which variations in religion are likely to influence the tendency toward either a corporate or a network strategy. Primary examples include Chaco Canyon of the American Southwest and two distinctive manifestations of the British Neolithic, the monumental complexes of Avebury, England and of Orkney, Scotland.

Gens de la terre, gens du pouvoir, rois divins et chamanes

Organisateur: *Gerald Gaillard* (Université de Lille I, France)

Alfred Adler (Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences sociales, CNRS, Paris, France)
La royauté sacrée en Afrique : une vue comparative à partir de trois exemples (Swazi, Moundang, Asante)

L'étude des rapports entre royauté sacrée et prêtrise de la terre suppose que l'on analyse de la façon la plus approfondie la position du roi et le rôle qui lui est dévolu au cours des rites agraires qui marquent le cycle annuel des travaux champêtres et autres activités dont l'importance économique peut être variable (en fonction des données écologiques, notamment) telles que la chasse et la pêche.

Mon propos sera d'examiner le cas de trois sociétés dans lesquelles sont célébrées avec le plus grand faste les fêtes des prémices. Il s'agira d'abord de la société moundang (à l'ouest du Tchad, au niveau du 8ème degré de latitude nord) dans laquelle j'ai poursuivi pendant des décennies mes recherches de terrain. C'est un pays où l'on cultive diverses variétés de mil et où l'élevage des bovins est surtout destiné aux prestations matrimoniales et à la consommation lors du partage des viandes sacrificielles. Le roi est le grand fournisseur des animaux qui sont sacrifiés et symboliquement, il est assimilé à la céréale nourricière dont il est censé assurer la croissance et la bonne maturation. Le prêtre de la terre qui est chargé de l'exécution des rites sacrificiels destinés à propitier les puissances chtoniennes dont dépendent les récoltes, est mis en danger par ces puissances. De ce fait il apparaît lui-même comme une sorte de victime sacrificielle prenant sur lui "le fardeau de la royauté" pour que le roi soit épargné et puisse assumer sa fonction de garant de la prospérité de son peuple.

L'analyse des rites de la fête des prémices permet de mettre en évidence les caractères fondamentaux de ce type de royauté sacrée particulièrement répandu dans les sociétés traditionnelles d'Afrique noire.

Les faits de ce genre sont bien connus mais il est assez rare de les soumettre à une étude comparative quelque peu rigoureuse et qui aille au-delà de leur accumulation et de leur juxtaposition, comme l'avait fait en son temps Frazer dont l'oeuvre encyclopédique garde pour nous une valeur inestimable.

Je me suis donc efforcé dans un premier temps de confronter au cas moundang dont je possède une connaissance directe et approfondie, deux

autres cas qui ont, à mes yeux, l'intérêt d'offrir les situations les plus contrastées du point de vue historique et socio-politique comme du point de vue de leur système de représentations religieuses. Il s'agit des Swazi (petit Etat enclavé dans la République d'Afrique du Sud) dont le rite des prémices – incwala – a fait l'objet d'une étude admirable que nous devons à Hilda Kuper. Les Swazi, comme les Moundang, sont des céréaliculteurs mais l'élevage des bovins joue un rôle essentiel, économiquement et symboliquement. D'autre part, j'ai choisi le cas des Asante (royaume le plus important du Ghana et qui eut Kumasi pour capitale) qui sont des cultivateurs d'ignames, trubercules qui sont la base de leur alimentation. La fête des prémices, l'odwira, dont nous possédons des descriptions qui remontent aux premières années du XIXe siècle, est l'occasion de nombreux sacrifices humains qui ont horrifié les observateurs étrangers. Historiens et anthropologues ont fait les plus grands efforts intellectuels pour essayer de comprendre de tels faits qui évoquent des pratiques bien connues du Mexique précolombien.

Je pense pouvoir montrer que l'analyse comparative peut apporter quelque lumière sur ces coutumes en en mesurant les principales dimensions : socio-économiques, politiques, cosmologiques. Mais aussi en considérant ce qui relève de la différence entre cultures céréalières (qui impliquent une reproduction bisexuée) et cultures des tubercules qui se reproduisent par clonage. A cet égard, les réflexions de Georges Haudricourt sont des plus suggestives.

Au terme de cette contribution, je voudrais proposer des hypothèses permettant une certaine hiérarchisation de l'ensemble de ces facteurs dont l'interaction est, on l'imagine, des plus complexes.

Rémy Bazenguissa-Ganga (Université de Lille I, France)
Français / Téké: Les fondements symboliques de l'ethnicité au Congo

En me centrant sur le cas du Congo, je proposerai une lecture de l'ethnicité qui utilise, dans certains Etats contemporains, l'opposition, classique en anthropologie, entre " gens du pouvoir " et " gens de la terre ". Alors qu'il existe plusieurs ensembles sociaux dans ce pays, les Congolais se représentent le monde politique, dans leurs pratiques d'assignation des identités ethno-régionales, selon un mode dualiste. Ils utilisent une série de trois oppositions : Kongo/Mbochi, Nordistes/Sudistes et Niboleks/Tchèques. Apparues successivement, elles se réfèrent à des constructions sociales correspondant à des contextes précis de luttes pour le contrôle des positions étatiques. Je montrerai comment toutes ces oppositions renvoient à une autre, plus implicite, que je formule de la manière suivante : Français /Téké. Cette

dernière renvoie aux fondements symboliques de l'Etat. En effet, les Congolais interprètent le pacte colonial comme l'effet d'un don de la terre fait par le roi sacré des Téké à l'officier français Savorgnan de Brazza. Sur le plan proprement idéologique, ceci renvoie à un système de valeurs bipartites hiérarchisées dans lequel la catégorie " Français ", désignant l'origine du pays (à partir d'une loi venue de l'extérieur) et du pouvoir étatique, fait face à la catégorie Téké qui renvoyait à la terre et à une identité locale. Certains aspects du modèle politique congolais se constituèrent dans ce rapport et, c'est sous cet angle, qu'il conviendra d'analyser les pratiques d'assignation des identités politiques.

Tatiana D. Boulgakova (Université pédagogique d'Etat A.I. Herzen de Russie, St. Pétersbourg, Russie)
Nanay Jangian. Ruler in the Society practicing Shamanism

The Nanay (predominantly dispersed fishers), had no stable traditional institutions of authority. At the same time there were some solitary rulers among them, the so called *jangians* who acted periodically in responce to spontaneously arising occasions. The conflicts which required interference of authorities, often sprang up as a result of a crime committed. That is why the *jangian* whose task was to resolve such conflicts, was percepted by the Russians as "judge". In reality the *jangian* did not only bring people to mutual consent, he also had to keep the social norms, and (as a possessor of the gift of eloquence) to be an exponent of social directions.

Unquestioned submission of the traditional society to *jangian* can be explained by the widely spread idea that *jangian* possessed supernatural spiritual forces and so that just the spirits but not he imposed negative sanctions. The Nanay *jangian* was considered as not only a ruler, but also a religious specialist like shaman. He was similar to shaman because his ability was inheritant and he was thought to be chosen not by people, but by spirits. Like in the case of shamans, a common person became a *jangian* after suffering a specific disease, the outcome of which was made during a shamanic ceremony aimed at finding of the destination to be a *jangian*. Like a shaman, *jangian* had spirits-helpers (*sewens*) and had to offer regular sacrifices to their images. A shaman could also use *jangian*'s spirits and this way aquire competence in social activity. In his turn, *jangian* could interfere not only conflicts among commoners but also those among shamans. According to the traditional opinion, the main difference between the *jangian* and shaman is that *jangian* acts not in the spiritual world (*dorkindu*) but in the visible world of people (*iludu*).

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It was considered that *jangian* got information concerning different social problems directly from his spirits-helpers and often through his dreams. *Jangian*'s self-will was inadmissible in these cases. If a *jangian* passed the information got from the spirits to people in a wrong way, the spirits punished him. And if a *jangian* acted unsuccessfully, the society could impose some negative sanctions against him.

Clara Carvalho (ISCTE, Lisbonne, Portugal)
Chefferie, royauté sacrée et actualité du pouvoir chez les Manjak de Guinée-Bissau

L'ouverture politique en Guinée-Bissau, au début des années 90, a eu pour conséquence secondaire la réalisation d'une série d'intronisations dans les anciennes chefferies (d'origine pré-coloniale et même coloniale) des populations non-islamisées de ce petit pays de l'Afrique Occidentale. Dans cette communication, je prétends aborder deux questions à propos des rituels d'intronisation et des manifestations du pouvoir local chez les Manjak de la région de Cacheu. En premier lieu, la définition locale du *régulo*, désignation créole des détenteurs du pouvoir dans ces petits royaumes et chefferies. Mais si la réalisation de ces cérémonies de rénovation du *regulado* (créole : royauté) évoquent les phénomènes de revitalisation de la tradition, elles signifient aussi des actes créateurs, d'affirmation d'une forme d'identité locale face au pouvoir de l'Etat. Les cas évoqués nous renvoient aux définitions locales de la royauté et du pouvoir, y compris le pouvoir de l'Etat, et à la modernité des actes dits traditionnels. D'autre part, les questions abordées nous conduisent à une problématique centrale de l'anthropologie aolitique, celle du rapport essentiel entre pouvoir et rituel.

Serge A. Frantsouzoff (Institut d'Etudes Orientales de l'Académie des Sciences de Russie, Filiale de St. Pétersbourg, Russie)
Gens du pouvoir et serviteurs du culte en Arabie méridionale antique

1. Malgré une certaine abondance des sources écrites sur l'histoire de la civilisation sudarabique (Ier millénaire av. è. chr. – milieu du Ier millénaire de l'è. chr.) qui sont présentées maintenant par plus de 15 000 inscriptions sur pierre et bronze aussi bien que par des milliers de textes gravés sur bois, plusieurs aspects de sa structure sociale, politique et administrative demeurent obscurs. Il s'agit, par exemple, des principes générales de l'organisation du pouvoir au Yémen antique.

2. Bien que les sudarabisants emploient traditionnellement des termes qui correspondent plutôt au régime monarchique, tels que " royaume ", " souverain " et même " roi ", l'existence de la vraie monarchie en Arabie du Sud antique, surtout au début de son histoire, devrait être mise en doute. Avant tout, les principes de la succession au " trône " (ou, plus correctement, aux magistratures supérieures) dans les Etats yéménites au Ier millénaire av. è. chr. ne sont pas connues avec certitude, mais selon toute probabilité le pouvoir suprême n'y était pas transmis de père en fils. Une brève remarque de Strabon (XVI, 4, 3) et quelques données indirectes relevées dans la documentation épigraphique font allusion au système des classes d'âge attesté chez certains peuples africains, mais complètement étranger au monde sémitique.

3. Il existait pour le moins encore une mode d'occuper des postes de magistrats au niveau moins élevé ou de prêtres qui, au contraire, avait des parallèles au Proche Orient antique. Dans ce cas telle ou telle candidature a été élue grâce aux décisions oraculaires.

4. Jusqu'au début du Ier millénaire de l'è. chr. le pouvoir suprême dans les Etats sudarabiques les plus considérables qui tenaient leur origine des grandes confédérations tribales se distinguait par un certain dualisme, notamment par la coexistence de deux chefs supérieurs à leur tête : le *mukarrib* qui assurait l'unité d'Etat et était étroitement lié avec l'exercice du rituel religieux et le *malik*, chef militaire et administratif.

5. La formation du régime monarchique en Arabie du Sud qui se caractérisait par l'accroisement du rôle du *malik* et l'affaiblissement de celui du " conseil des doyens " (*ms³wd*, *ms¹ḫn*) s'est accélérée vers la fin du Ier millénaire av. è. chr. sous une forte influence de l'hellénisme.

6. Quant à la divinisation des rois, quoique ce phénomène qui était d'occurrence extrêment rare au Yémen antique s'explique d'habitude par l'hellénisation, il pourrait avoir des racines locales, puisque la dédicace des inscriptions aux personnes divinisées qui évidemment ne régnaient pas est aussi attestée dans l'épigraphie sudarabique.

7. Le régime du pouvoir suprême en Arabie méridionale préislamique avait ses propres particularités qui témoignent en faveur de l'origine indigène du noyau de la civilisation sudarabique.

Gérald Gaillard (Université de Lille I, France)
Prêtre de la pluie et rois divins. Que peut-on dire ?
De l'origine de l'Etat Biafada (Guinée-Bissau)

Dans un article intitulé : "Morphologie sociale, migrations et clans

Biafada-Yola", j'ai tenté de montrer comment un pouvoir centralisé biafada s'établit à la fois depuis la migration mandé qui amène un nouveau modèle politique aux peuples côtiers et les débuts de la traite négrière dans la région qui nous occupe (et particulièrement les Biafada) fut le premier pourvoyeur (avant d'être relayé un siècle plus tard par les côtes plus septentrionales -golfe du Benin). Seul apparemment le noeud de ces deux évènements produisit l'avènement d'une royauté dont témoignent à la fois la tradition orale que j'ai recueillie et les textes des anciens négriers et des missionnaires portugais. On peut établir que le commerce de traite toucha successivement (en temps que prédateurs et à une vingtaine d'années de distance) les Bijogos, les Banhung puis les Biafada-Papel. Mais rien dans le cas des premiers ne se cristalisa comme royaume parce que justement manquait le modèle politique des Mandés qui propose une centralisation intégrant clan noble, et clan esclave et qui les avaient repoussés alors qu'ils s'étaient mélés aux Biafada. L'ensemble du processus aboutissant à l'Etat était dans cet article pensé depuis un principe de causalité externe alors que le roi biafada (selon les témoignages portugais comme ce que j'ai pu recueillir des traditions orales) reste un roi divin jusqu'à la lente dissolution des royaumes dû tout à la fois au progressif dépeuplement dû à cent cinquante ans de traite et à l'arrivée de plus en plus nombreux des Fulas (Peuls). A l'inverse par exemple de celui proposé par Lowie, les modèles de Hocart ou Frazer proposent la cristallisation de l'Etat à partir d'une dynamique interne s'originant du sacré et de rois à faire tomber la pluie, devenus rois-divins dont le régicide est progressivement remplacé par une victime sacrificielle (un bouc émissaire). Les témoignages écrits datant de 1594, 1625 etc. sont clairs sur le fait que les rois biafada étaient bien des rois dits divins, et nos recueils de la tradition que l'institution du régicide s'est perpétué y compris lorsque les royaumes biafada n'étaient plus que l'ombre d'eux-mêmes. Je me proposerai donc dans le cadre de ce colloque de reprendre ces question en m'efforçant d'établir de manière ferme un travail comparatif avec l'institution encore actuelle de roi à faire tomber la pluie chez les Diola de Casamance, chez les Papel et sous une autre forme chez les Bijagos. L'étude comparée de ces institutions permettra éventuellement de faire avancer la question des passages possibles de l'une à l'autre de ces étapes (?) du politique.

Nicolas Journet (Revue "Sciences humaines", CNRS, Paris, France)
Chefs et chamanes dans le Nord-Ouest de l'Amazonie:
de la séparation des pouvoirs, exemples historiques et ethnographiques

Dans les sociétés amérindiennes du Nord-Ouest amazonien, les deux

sources de pouvoir à être thématisées sont l'autorité politique du chef et la compétence magique du chamane. La reproduction de leurs rapports est, en principe, organisée par la parenté, et affirme la subordination du chamane. Dans l'histoire de cette région, située aux confins du Brésil, du Vénézuela et de la Colombie, la formation de pouvoirs dépassant l'échelle de la petite communauté a pris deux formes différentes : de grandes chefferies guerrières plus ou moins esclavagistes, dont la présence est attestée au tout début de la colonisation et – beaucoup plus tard – l'émergence répétée de prédicateurs messianiques mobilisant des populations importantes. Les deux dynamiques ne se sont jamais rencontrées, et le modèle de petites communautés paysannes sous la tutelle lointaine de l'État s'est stabilisé partout. On défendra la thèse que cette séparation des pouvoirs et des formes de mobilisation est sans doute à mettre en rapport avec la quasi inexistence, dans le panorama politique actuel de ces régions, du nationalisme indigène.

Eleonora S. Kormycheva (Institut d'Etudes Orientales de l'Académie des Sciences de Russie, Moscou)
Mariage sacré comme instrument du pouvoir en Méroë

1. L'institution du mariage sacré attestée parmi plusieurs peuples du monde au cours des stades différents du développement historique, avait en Méroe ses traits particuliers qui étaient étroitement liés avec le système social, le rôle des femmes dans la société et avec la tradition du couronnement du roi.

2. L'analyse des textes des rois koushites à partir de la XXVème dynastie et des images en *intaglio* des bagues de la reine Amanishakheto permet de reconstruire d'une manière conceptuelle un entourage mythologique de l'idée de la conception divine et de la naissance du successeur du roi.

3. L'usage des expressions phraséologiques et des formules stéréotypées dans la description du mariage sacré et leur transformation dans la partie intégrante inséparable des annales de rois ont fait du mythologème de la naissance du successeur du roi divin un instrument de l'accession au pouvoir. Le mariage sacré est devenu la phase initiale du couronnement du roi.

4. Dans les circonstances de la propagation du polythéisme et de l'existence du système des cultes locaux l'idée de la naissance de souverain infailliblement du même père (Amun) comme attribut nécessaire de sa biographie a mis cette divinité au prémier plan et a constitué un fondement de la conception du dieu national. Cette dernière a été bien inscrite dans le système de la parenté "père – fils" par rapport au conglomérat d'autres dieux créateurs d'origine indigène et étrangère. Donc le mariage sacré est devenu

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une base de consolidation des processus ethno-politiques dans le pays qui s'étendait le long du Nil et de ses affluents.

5. La série des images en *intaglio* des bagues de la reine Amanishakheto et les témoignages textuels en faveur de l'identité de la reine-mère avec Isis du point de vue de la naissance d'héritier permettent de relever un fondement théologique de l'insititution politique de "reine-mère" en Méroë, qui pourrait être utilisée en même temps comme instrument d'usurpation du pouvoir, si pour telles ou telles raisons une femme prétendait au thrône.

Eleonora S. Lvova (Institut des pays d'Asie et d'Afrique près l'Université d'Etat de Moscou, Russie)
Traditional Authority Institutions in Contemporary Ethiopia

Nowadays one can observe an increasing uplight of national and ethnic identity (both in industrial countries and in former colonies). Traditional political institutions are able to play an important part in this process. Ethiopia is a polyethnic country with long history. It enjoyed strong central authority of the *negus* for several centuries, then a totalitarian regime with its policy of nationalization of lands, villagisation and establishing of peasants' cooperatives. But traditional authorities of different non-Amharic peoples were existing during the whole history of the country, conserving their influence in shallow. They have traditional beliefs (even among officially Christians and Muslims) as their foundation as well as social organization based on the age class system in some cases. Nowadays one can see a new uplight of their power in the societies of the Konso, Afar, Surma, Boran, Mudji, Suri, etc. These institutions are this or that way modernized but they still preserve their traditional nature and act very actively. Traditional rulers go on to combine spiritual and political power, including control over the distribution of land and cattle.

Elena A. Okladnikova (Peter-the-Great Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography, Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg)
Psychotechniques as Potestal Strategies in Tlingit Shamanhood

Potestal strategies of the Tlingit shamans (North-West coast of North America) were based upon the series of psycho-techniques. Exploration of this strategies helped for them to obtain a high rank in the Tlingit society. The process of the Tlingit shaman's seances, texts of the shaman songs and the from of psycho-techniques as a way for realization of the shaman potestal

strategies were under the scope. The shaman activities were: to create of the tribe collective mythology, which consolidate the members of society; to strengthen shaman's leading role in the society competitive with chief role.

The means to gain the aims for the shaman were: 1. Manipulations with mass consciousness with the help of the "miracle", 2. Exploitation of the collective expectation or the quest for happiness; 3. "Mass hypnosis" as an "effect of the crowd"; 4. Use of the psychological pressing on the collective (with the help of demonstrations of the competitive shaman struggle between "strong" and "week" shaman, boasting of the shaman exploits, with the tales about possession of the spirits).

The analysis of the shaman texts, procedure of the seances, and specific of psycho-techniques of the Tlingit shamans depicted the potestal-aggressive structure of shaman's activity directed to struggle "against". It was the struggle against the competitive shaman, violation of ritual, against the "inner" mythology, opposed to "self" mythology.

To protect the out-of-control spread of shaman potestal-aggressive activity Tlingit society worked out the mechanism of social control over the shaman activity in the form of a collective mind. From the one side, ñollectivistic mind forced shaman to act, and from another - verified the results of shaman's activity.

Alexandre A. Tokovinine (Centre de recherches civilisationelles et régionales de l'Académie des Sciences de Russie, Moscou)
Les sajalob et les modèles non-royals de légitimisation du pouvoir chez les Mayas de l'époque classique récente

Les inscriptions de la région d'Usumacinta (Chiapas, Mexico) nous offrent une chance unique d'étudier un autre discours idéologique qui est différent de celui des 'rois divins'. C'est là où apparaissent les monuments des gouverneurs subordonnés (les *sajalob*) qui ne possédaient eux-mêmes un statut sacré.

En conséquence de cette 'dépendence idéologique' les *sajalob* introduisaient des nouveaux éléments dans le discours idéologique traditionnel. On déclarait la proximité de ces nobles au souverain (mais jamais à une divinité) dont la forme la plus répandue était leur participation dans les cérémonies où les sajalob pouvaient partager les offices rituels du roi. Il y a des modèles plus subtils: par exemple, on rédigeait des 'biographies parallèles' où la vie d'un *sajal* et celle du rois étaient présentées ensemble. Finalement, les textes font mention des prétentions aux origines royales (d'un lignage de roi ou d'une ligne royale en général) et à ses propres cours 'à la

royale'.

Les textes des *sajalob* prouvent que ce groupe de noblesse n'était pas bien intégré dans l'hiérarchie des 'seigneurs divins' et que les *sajalob* tâchaient d'élaborer de nouveaux modèles idéologiques pour interpréter la croissance de leur influence dans les royaumes classiques.

PANEL IV
The Community and above It:
Communal and Supracommunal Institutions
in Different Civilizational Contexts

Convenors: *Dmitri M. Bondarenko* (Center for Civilizational and Regional
Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
Andrey V. Korotayev (Center for Civilizational and Regional
Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)

The community is a universal socio-political institution whose historical existence embraces all the periods of human history, from early foraging communities and up to many modern states. No doubt during the period of its existence the community has demonstrated universality of some of its traits within the framework of the types usually singled out by anthropologists (clan community, extended family community, territorial community and various intermediate and mixed forms).

In the meantime, there is a long-lasting discussion among anthropologists on the historical sequence of the community forms. Evolutionists (Morgan, Kowalewsky, Engels etc.) maintained that clan community had developed into extended family one from which territorial community later evolved. In contrast with them, relativists of different schools argue that clan community cannot be regarded as a lower stage of community evolution in comparison with the extended family organization, whereas the latter cannot be regarded in this capacity compared with territorial community: various community types should be considered as basically different forms and not as universal stages of community evolution.

The second approach suggests to include community studies in the framework of civilization approach. On the one hand, there are evident differences even between communities belonging to the same type, but existing within different civilization contexts. On the other hand, there is a problem of civilizational determination of the community types themselves.

One may observe recent proliferation of views which consider communal institutions in complex societies as to a significant extent products of state activities. It is suggested that evolution of the state produces a significant (and often crucial) impact on the evolution of communal organization. In the meantime the problem of the influence produced by communal structures on evolution of supracommunal (including state) institutions appears to be not less important though understudied.

In the framework of our panel we suggest to pay special attention to the influence of communal political organization traditions on the formation of

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supracommunal political institutions. The hypotheses suggested for discussion are as follows:

Differences in basic principles of community organization dominant in various regions, may be considered as a significant factor determining "civilization outlook" of respective regions both as regards the formation of complex political organization forms and the emergence of specific political culture models;

In the context of spontaneous formation of supracommunal political institutions the latter are formed according to communal patterns;

In processes of secondary politogenesis from the very beginning principles of supracommunal organization and functioning may differ from the communal ones;

Communal traditions may influence significantly not the process of supracommunal institutions formation only but their subsequent evolution as well.

Reuven Aharoni (Tel Aviv University, Israel)
Tribal Leadership in Egypt of Mehmet Ali: Power versus State

An examination of the social and political reality in which the Bedouin tribes existed during the Mehmet Ali's rule (1805-1848), points at the fact that during most of the time, two conditions were fulfilled: an internal conflict and an external threat, which encouraged the emergence of tribal leadership. Mehmet Ali's centralized rule seemed as a factor which threatened the Bedouins from the outside, but the leadership which had crystallized was always the one that the authorities initiated or approved.

During this period, crystallization of an exclusive group identity became stronger in tribal society. It was the group of the *shaykhs*, notables and heads of clans who were owners of big herds of camels, horses and sheep and possessed lands in rural and urban areas. In socio-cultural terms, this group was a "sub-elite", within a tribal-Bedouin sub-culture out of the Ottoman-Egyptian ruling elite. They formed a tangled network of relationships between the elite members who had positions in the provincial administration, and the local inhabitants, as a result of the cramped administrative network, which was woven by the Pasha in the rural areas.

The tribal elite can be considered only from the aspect of the socio-cultural division of the Egyptian society. The territorial link is an integral part of this group's conception and should be related here to questions of space and geography. The sociopolitical organization, which the *shaykhs* formed was not designed to brake the tribal structure or to go beyond it. They

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remained connected to the tribal home front and culture, despite the fact that they partially adopted the style and symbols of the Ottoman-Egyptian bureaucratic culture. Political centralism in the tribes became more obvious the more the *shaykhs* became identified with their tribal territories. The more the involvement in the economic activities outside the tribal area was, the greater the crystallization of an outstanding elite group was established.

Herbert Barry, III (University of Pittsburgh, USA)
Cultural Customs in 88 Communities Associated with Levels of Government Hierarchy

The behavior of individuals in a community is influenced by levels of government hierarchy beyond the community. A world sample of 186 communities contains 88 that show evidence of slight or no acculturation due to contact with European invaders or visitors. Murdock and Provost (1973) classified each community as being politically independent or subordinate to one, two, or more than two levels of government hierarchy.

Ten ordinal scales of cultural complexity, defined by Murdock and Provost (1973), include government hierarchy. Most communities with high political complexity also have other types of high complexity, such as social stratification, a written language, agriculture, technological specialization, use of money, and a dense rather than sparse population. Several cultural customs have a higher degree of association with government hierarchy than with most of the other types of cultural complexity. The cultural customs selectively associated with government hierarchy include frequent external warfare, compact instead of dispersed settlements, separation of families into two or more dwellings, and several measures of behavior by adults toward adolescents. The behavior toward adolescents, selectively associated with government hierarchy, includes insistence on obedience, prohibition of sexual intercourse by unmarried girls, and infrequent displays of affection. A proposed interpretation is that the stressful effects of government hierarchy induce aggressive behavior by adults and strict, unaffectionate control of adolescents.

Some of the cultural customs selectively associated with government hierarchy have even higher correlations with social stratification. These two measures of cultural complexity are highly correlated with each other. Government hierarchy is probably the primary agent for high social stratification and for the associated cultural customs. Adoption of a lower level of social stratification might be a beneficial method for counteracting the stressful effects of government hierarchy.

Dmitri D. Beliaev (Center for Civilizational and Regional Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
Family and Community Evolution in Formative Mesoamerica

It is widely believed that in the archaic societies the community forms the basic social unit. The community structure and inter-community relations define to a great extent the character of supra-community institutes, vectoring the evolution of the society.

One of peculiar features of the social organization in Early Formative Mesoamerica was the community, which consisted of nuclear families. All the early villages were formed by one-house-households. A household unit covered an area of about 30-50 sq. m. This situation is observed in all the Mesoamerican regions: the Basin of Mexico, Oaxaca, Morelos, Tlaxcala, the Gulf Coast, the Pacific Coast and the Maya area. The analysis of the distribution of imported materials in Early Formative Oaxaca demonstrates that within the village nuclear families acted autonomously and the long-distance exchange was based on the nuclear families networks.

Transition from simple households to complex ones and from nuclear families to extended began in 700–500 BC. In the Maya Lowlands this process went slower and had ended by 400–300 BC. It was reflected in the appearance of groups of dwellings placed around a common courtyard or compound dwellings, which consisted of several rooms. So, the hierarchical extended family community, one of the basic socio-political units of Mesoamerican and Latin American societies appeared only in 700–300 BC.

Another specific Mesoamerican feature is that transformation of nuclear families into extended occurred after the formation of chiefdoms and was evidently caused by this phenomenon. The line "local band – nuclear family – extended family" seems to be one of the basic parameters of social evolution in Mesoamerica.

These conclusions are also supported by a world-wide cross-cultural study of the correlation between family organization, community structure, and organization of supra-community socio-political institutions. The societies which consisted of extended family communities are characterized by hierarchical socio-political systems, and the societies with territorial communities which consisted of independent nuclear families are characterized by heterarchical socio-political systems. However in the Murdock's "Ethnographic Atlas" Mesoamerica is included into the South American area where the correlation between the community type and the

structure of the communal and supra-communal socio-political institutions is not so strong.

Dmitri M. Bondarenko (Center for Civilizational and Regional Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
The Community and Central Authority in the Benin Kingdom
(13th − 19th Centuries)

The advent to power of the Second (Oba) dynasty in the early 13th century signified considerable increase of centripetal tendencies in the Benin society. However, the centuries of its rule did not result in the socio-political homogenization: communities (and chiefdoms) with political institutions of their own continued to exist within the country. The preservation of this situation for the whole space of the Oba Benin history proves that "multilayerness" was an essential feature of her socio-political structure and not an expression of a certain "transitional character" of the society.

The same should be said about the familial-territorial community as the groundwork of the society: it existed in this capacity till the occupation of Benin by the British in 1897. The community was its socio-cultural focus. The Benin society was the center of the whole Universe for the Bini, so the community turned out the Universal "core of the core" for them.

Communities preserved all the initial specific features of their internal organization. Though the central authority's potential of influencing the communities increased, it did not intervene in their internal affairs and reminded of itself only when the interests of the whole country (associated with those of the political center) were infringed. Communalists paid tribute, were enlisted to corvée labor and military service. There are no grounds for arguing the communalist's personal attaching to the land.

The supreme power over communities was exercised by all-Benin titled chiefs through local chiefs which did not transform into officials but remained chiefs with all the mechanisms of obtaining and exercising power, rights, privileges, obligations attributed to their status. The inseparability of the authority from the people is also testified by the fact that the idea of reciprocal service exchanges as the basis of social relations dominated in the community. Such an orientation of political culture corresponded completely to the general mental and behavioral paradigm, Weltanschauung of the Bini.

As the basic socio-political institution the community fastened together all the levels of the hierarchical socio-political structure. Ties and relations characteristic of the familial-territorial community, found forms and contents

similar to themselves on qualitatively other, supracommunal levels of the society's being, including the highest, all-Benin one.

Robert M. Carmack (State University of New York, Albany, USA)
Roberto J. Carmack (State University of New York, Albany, USA)
Power and Hierarchy in Mayan Civilization in Historical and Anthropological Perspective

Applying historical and anthropological concepts, such as World Systems theory and theories of Civilization, power and hierarchy are examined in the history of the Mayan civilization of Mexico and Central America. The following methods and historical phases of the Mayan civilization will be examined:

(1) through archaeological and epigraphic information, the origins of that civilization and its subsequent aboriginal developments;

(2) applying mainly ethnohistory methods, its encounter with Spanish colonizers and subsequent l9th century US and British powers;

and (3) through ethnographic and other kinds of social scientific data, the 20th century transformation of the Mayas into ethnic and national movements.

Mayan civilization will also be placed in its larger Mesoamerican context, including external influences on power and hieararchy; and its historical developments broadly compared and contrasted with select other civilizations in world history.

In theoretical terms, an attempt is made to examine the relationship between regional interaction networks (world systems) and their associated general cultural expressions (civilizations). The result is an "Interaction" approach that takes account of the interrelations between sociopolitical and cultural powers in the processes of history.

From a neo-Weberian perspective, the concepts of power and hierarchy are conceptualized as being in dynamic interactive relationships, hierarchy being the formal expression of legitimate authority rather than power. These several concepts are illuminated by historical and anthropological studies, and specifically so in the Mayan case. Comparison between the Mayas and other civilizations, however, has been relatively rare, especially with respect to such issues as power and hierarchy. It can be argued that on both theoretical and political grounds comparison between New World and Old World civilizations is of particular importance at this point in world history.

John F. Chamblee (University of Arizona, Tucson, USA)
The Role of Colonialism in Long Term Social Change:
A Cautionary Tale from the Southeastern United States

The recent publication, *Alternatives of Social Evolution* presents a number of models that adopt a multi-directional, or multi-linear view of social evolution. These approaches seem to share the idea that "human experience is unitary in the sense that cultural systems are part of the same universe whether they are know historically or archaeologically." (Kowalewski 2000:179). From such a principle emerges the desire to compare cultures known from historic and ethnographic records to those known archaeologically. Such an approach is justifiable and worthwhile, but the methods used in these comparisons require careful development.

Specifically, scholars must recognize that data collected in the recent ethnographic past often cannot be projected directly into pre-colonial settings. While colonial history is not the *only* history, as some postmodernists might argue, models that ignore the historical impacts of colonialism run the risk of building long-term explanatory frameworks around institutions or practices that did not exist prior to colonial contact. By combining an understanding colonial processes with a more long term view, it is possible to disarticulate social structures and processes at work in colonized indigenous societies into three categories: those which pre-date colonization and survive the colonial process, those which pre-date colonization and are removed from practice, and those which emerge as a direct result of colonial contact. Such dis-articulation is necessary before long-term models can developed from ethnographic data.

A case study from North America compares Mississippian societies from present-day Georgia to the Creek Confederacy. While patterns in settlement organization, subsistence, and even social relations survive into the colonial period, other practices, including a more hierarchical political structure, did not continue. Instead, more egalitarian political arrangements emerged in the colonial setting. This case is presented not as a critique of evolutionary perspectives generally, but as a tale of both caution and hope to those interesting in comparing ethnographic and archaeological data when developing long-term models of social change.

Loren Demerath (Centenary College of Louisiana, Shreveport, USA)
The Development of Formal Institutions and
the Declining Importance of Relationships

This paper presents a cross-cultural analysis that explores the following hypothesis: the importance of social relationships in a society is inversely related to the strength of political and economic institutions that facilitate individuals' access to power and economic exchange. Exemplifying the hypothesis would be societies with stable democracies and strong public education systems. In such societies individuals would need to rely less on social capital, and more on "human capital" acquired from formal institutions. The author uses secondary analyses of cross-cultural quantitative and ethnographic data to compare contemporary and historical societies. To assess the importance of relationships, special attention is paid to the frequency and importance of primary group interactions, the emphasis placed on social etiquette, the quality of intergenerational family relationships, and the skill and enjoyment taken in socializing. To assess the ability of institutions to facilitate access to power and exchange, special attention is paid to indicators of trust in government, quality of public education, perception of economic opportunities, and per capita gross domestic product. The analysis shows qualified support for the hypothesis, one such qualification being the unique interactions that can occur between established culture and newly developing institutional forms. In general, though, the analysis suggests a trade-off tends to occur with the development of formal institutions: while individual achievement is facilitated, and surplus wealth accumulated, what declines is the importance of relationships and the socializing done to maintain them.

Roxanne Easley (Central Washington University, Ellensburg, USA)
Opening public space:
the peace arbitrator and rural politicization, 1861-1864

The peace arbitrator (*mirovoi posrednik*) was conceived in the emancipation legislation of 1861 to act as the main administrative authority in the countryside during the period of implementation. The institution was charged with significant responsibilities: to supervise and verify land transfer charters (*ustavnye gramoty*), drafted in accordance with state-established norms; to convene and administer new organs of peasant self-administration; to investigate and resolve disputes arising from emancipation; to prosecute petty crime; and to maintain the peace. The tasks were daunting, given the conflicting interests and confounded hopes that emancipation evoked. Landowners and serfs had virtually no experience in direct communication, and still less in cooperation. In assuming their official duties, arbitrators found themselves under prolonged assault from former serfowners and serfs

alike. Despite such challenges, the creation of arbitration institutions appeared fully vindicated by late 1863. The emancipation process was irrevocably underway, and no major social disruption hindered its progress. The meaning of the institution of peace arbitrator in the post-emancipation period, however, extends beyond what the imperial state defined as the fulfillment of its mandate. Under the direction of the arbitrators, rural actors gained their earliest experience in opening cross-estate lines of communication, articulating and documenting group and individual interests, seeking alliances, and brokering resolutions. After the initial shock of confrontation, coercion, arbitrariness, and custom began to share public space with dialogue, process, and law in the solution of public disputes. The peace arbitrator, as the point of intersection for each group's ideology(ies) and as instructor in formal communication, was at the heart of this politicization.

Francisco Miguel Gil García (Complutense University of Madrid., Spain)
Monumentalization of Death and Ancestor Cult in Southern Andean High Plateau. The Chullpa Phenomenon and Construction of Inner Monumentality from the Mortuary Rites

From both the archaeological and ethnohistorical points of view, this paper attempts to disembowel the elements and mechanisms participating in the monumentality construction of chullpa towers from mortuary rituals.

The chullpa phenomenon will be interpreted in terms of a 'spatial tension' between the outer funerary monument and the inner sepulchral chamber. Thus, a "conflict horizon" will be shaped, first from the monument-environment relationships, second and, considering the monument's unity, from outer-inner dialectics and relationships between the funeral trousseau and the rest of the monument. In order to go beyond the archaeological record in search of the ideological dimension on which the underlying chullpa phenomenon rationality order is founded, this paper bets on a chullpa towers imaginary lecture from this resort of inner and outer confrontation in the monumentality construction.

In the context of material, ideological, and symbolic dimensions, the issue will be how in this monumentality construction different 'chullpa instants' were represented, depending on the importance of outer, inner or in-the-threshold positions. In this terms, depending on this 'instants' and the alive-and-deceased relationship and/or its expression in mortuary rites, this paper discusses the individual or the collectivist leadership in the chullpa phenomenon interpretation. For this reason, the idea of 'inner monumentality' beginning from the mortuary rites will lead directly to a

chullpa towers interpretation as ideological expressions of a particular cultural rationality that, in social practices, operates now for the hierarchical socio-political division stress, now for the identity reinforce and social non-division in spite of ethnic mosaics and territorial segmentation efforts. In any case, dealing both with elite burials interpretation and 'open sepulchres ayllus' models, this paper attempts to contribute to the ancestor cult archaeology definition from the monumentality construction idea and its spatial relationship and unleashed tensions.

Daria A. Khaltourina (Center for Civilizational and Regional Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
The Effect of Intensive Warfare upon Female Status in Simple and Complex Societies: A Cross-Cultural Research

The research is based on the analysis of Standard "Cross-Cultural Sample", which includes societies from all cultural areas of the world. The study rejects widely accepted Martin Whyte's theory that there is no connection between warfare intensity and female status indicators. Intensive warfare leads to socialization for aggression in boys, which, in its turn, positively correlates with wife beating. Societies with intensive warfare tend to polygyny in absence of religious prohibition (because of skewed gender ratio); polygyny declines female kin power. High warfare intensity leads to spatial segregation of genders and patrilocality, which do not influence female status positively.

However, it is only internal warfare, which highly corresponds to patrilocality. Purely external warfare leads rather to the rise of female status. The mechanisms of this process are matrilocal marital residence, matrilineal descent, higher female proportional contribution. These factors are partially caused with the "male absence" factor. The absence of large percent of males is possible either in simplest or in most complex societies.

Consequently, complex societies generally tend to lower the female status, while most simple and some most complex societies tend to higher it.

Serguei I. Klimovsky (Institute of Archaeology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv)
Southern Rus after Batu: Struggle of Two Systems

Batu's military campaigns of 1239-40 changed radically the political situation in Southern Rus. Such polities as Kiev and Perejaslav principalities had disappeared, the Chernigov and Galicia-Volyn principalities had fallen into the vassal dependence from the Golden Horde. The two latter principalities started fighting for the subservience of the whole territory of Southern Rus. The population of the Bolokhov land became ally of the Chernigov princes in this struggle.

From the mid-12th century the Bolokhov land represented a system of autonomous rural and town communities, the social organization of which was at the stage of military democracy. There was no integrated hierarchical structure for governing this system. Interaction between separate communities was realized on the principle of horizontal relationships. The power of Grand Prince of Kiev was recognized only nominal. During this period of its history the Bolokhov land was a self-governing social system, alternative to different hierarchical feudal polities of medieval Rus. The Boyar opposition in Galicia and the Chernigov princes tried to use its military potential in their own interests.

Communities of the Bolokhov land immediately recognized the power of Batu on the terms of paying tribute and supplies of auxiliary military contingents, thus avoiding devastation of its territory. Moreover, their influence increased due to the transition to similar forms of social organizations of the rest of the Perejaslav and Kiev principalities. Probably, Kiev (nominally a Novgorod's possession till 1271) represented a similar autonomous structure in those times.

After the Chernigov principality's entering a new stage of feudal division in 1246, the Bolokhov land and territories to the north-east from it remained the only local polity withstanding Prince Danil of Galicia though the latter also was a vassal of the Horde. The main reason for opposition was in the difference of social systems of the respective lands. The population of the Bolokhov land resisted to feodalization imposed by Danil of Galicia. Simultaneously, the Bolokhovs gave shelter to the Galicia opposition activists while the very existence of the confederation of autonomous communes was a challenge to the feudal state.

This caused military campaigns of Danil of Galicia to the Bolokhov land which resulted in its devastation in 1257. The feudal state gained

military victory in this opposition of the two social systems but the Bolokhov land had never become a part of that state.

A. Bernard Knapp (University of Glasgow, UK)
The Archaeology of Community on Bronze Age Cyprus

The study of human communities is central to a social archaeology. This paper critiques the ways in which social scientists have conceptualized 'community' and how such a concept may be relevant to archaeology. The primary focus falls on the socially and spatially remote mining community, which represents the work- and living-space of people drawn together by the imperatives of labour. Do the expediency and impermanence that characterize such communities in the modern world find echoes in the prehistoric past?

Citing evidence from recent excavations on Cyprus (Politiko Phorades), this paper considers how place was instrumental in structuring Bronze Age industrial landscapes, and how the smelting site at Phorades formed part of a nested, regional community with a distinct social organization and communication networks linked to other regional and supra-regional politico-economic entities.

Andrey V. Korotayev (Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
Communal and Supracommunal Democracy:
A Cross-Cultural Comparison

Could the communal political structure influence significantly the political organization of the supracommunal levels? Let us test statistically this hypothesis using the database for the *Standard Cross-Cultural Sample* as concerns the democracy of political organization of communities and supracommunal structures.

The results of the respective test are presented below (table 1):

TABLE 1. Communal Democracy * Supracommunal Democracy
Crosstabulation *(for the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample)*

Communal Leadership	Democracy of the Supracommunal Organization		Totals
	0 (absent)	*1* (present)	

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	52 (90%)	6 (10%)	58 (100%)
0 = Non-Democratic			
1 = Democratic	7 (35%)	13 (65%)	20 (100%)
Totals	59	19	78

NOTE: Fisher's Exact Test $\alpha = 0.000005$; $\varphi = + 0.56$

As one could see the correlation between the democracy of the communal organization and the democracy of the supracommunal political organization turns out to be really strong and significant beyond any doubt.

At this point we come to the most difficult problem of any cross-cultural research, the problem of the causation direction. I think that though the democratization of communal organization under the influence of the previously democratized state is perfectly possible (for example, this could be observed in the post-Communist Eastern Europe), the communal democracy in its turn could contribute to the democratization of the supracommunal political organization. Note that in Europe the development of democratic communal organization preceded the formation of modern supracommunal democracy. There are certain grounds to believe that the democratic organization of European communities facilitated the formation of democratic structures on the supracommunal level. On the other hand, the non-democratic communal organization appears to inhibit the development of democratic state organization as seems to be evidenced by Near Eastern data.

Stephen A. Kowalewski (University of Georgia, Athens, USA)
The New Past: From Region to Macroregion

Archaeology has produced a record of the past that was not knowable by even the best social scientists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Radiocarbon dating, excavation, and surveys contributed actual cases of regional societies changing over long periods of time, quite different from the fragmentary or shallow histories and comparative inferences from present-day cases that earlier scholars had at hand. In the last two decades, archaeology has begun producing sequences covering much larger areas composed of multiple, adjoining regions. This richer, more detailed "new past" requires new conceptual tools.

This paper presents results of twelve contiguous archaeological study areas in Oaxaca, Mexico, covering 7000 km2 from 1500 BC to AD 1500, the course of precolumbian Mesoamerican civilization. Full-coverage

archaeological settlement pattern surveys, excavations, and ethnohistoric studies provide the information. The combined block is composed of different physiographic and behavioral regions: small mountain valleys in the west where most of the human habitation was between 2100 and 2300 m above sea level; high, rugged mountains; the Valley of Oaxaca, the largest expanse of flat land in the highlands; the smaller Ejutla and Sola de Vega valleys at 1500 m asl, downstream from the Valley of Oaxaca; and the Cuicatlán Cañada, a narrow band of irrigable land in the hot country at 500-800 m. There were at least four languages spoken, Chocho, Cuicatec, Mixtec, and Zapotec, and the latter two had several distinct dialects.

In spite of their environmental and linguistic diversity, central Oaxacan regions shared a common history. Human groups were interdependent over wide areas, from the beginning. The transition from nomadic gathering-hunting to sedentism and farming occurred during the second millennium B.C. Formative settlement consisted of local variations on a pattern of a head town and surrounding cluster of villages and hamlets. About 500 B.C. the clusters in the Valley of Oaxaca added a new paramount capital, Monte Albán, initiating urbanization. Within 200 years, a tide of militarism affected all of central Oaxaca, especially in the west where all Formative settlement clusters were replaced by fortified hilltowns. By the first centuries A.D. rural abandonment and consolidation had resulted in only three large urban centers, Monte Albán, Yucuita, and Huamelulpan. Soon, in the Early Classic, the whole area was recolonized with small cities, towns, hillforts, and dispersed settlement. In the Late and Epiclassic, A.D. 600-900, this system broke down, with another episode of major regional abandonments, loss of integration, loss of population, and consolidation at a few nucleated settlements. Massive population growth and reintegration took place in the Postclassic, with strong urbanization in all regions, intense economic activity, and competition and alliances among multiple small states.

This case represents a bottom-up, demographic, settlement approach to civilizational studies. There are other macroregions where a flood of high quality archaeological data allows such analysis. The new past poses conceptual and cognitive challenges. One methodological response may be to do more population thinking and less typological thinking, that is, to preserve variation longer in analysis and comparison. It is difficult to hold in mind multiregional variation for a single time period, and even more so to keep track of the changes in each region over time. Graphics such as the experiments presented here may enhance comprehension. Macroregional study requires conceptual innovation. We need to know more about the flows of goods, people, force, and information, i.e., the institutions that make regions and their neighbors interdependent. As illustrated here, regions vary

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functionally in ways not comprehended by culture-history labels and core-periphery dichotomies.

Alexander V. Pakin (Center for Civilizational and Regional Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
Some Problems of Reconstruction of the Yucatec Maya Community Structure on the Eve of Spanish Conquest

On the eve of the Spanish conquest, the Yucatec Maya society was organized as an hierarchy of communities. But the Spanish conquest deformed the autochthonous forms of social organization. The extended family was to be destroyed, the number of community officials was strictly limited, let alone forced resettling of population closer to centers of the Catholic doctrine. In other words the social organization change drastically in a short time and many features of it were lost.

This makes the task of reconstruction of the Yucatec Maya community prior to the Spanish conquest complicated as the sources left to us open few possibilities for it. The great part of the colonial period sources describes the already reformed community, despite the survival of some offices and organizational principles of which the Spaniards had made use. In some publications it led to substitution of the pre-Hispanic reality by the colonial one (see, for example, numerous works by R.L. Roys, whose conclusions are based mainly on the terms of colonial documents).

Another approach which stresses the necessity of strong definition and demarcation of the Spanish and Indian "concepts" as related to different realities (T. Okoshi Harada) with particular attention to the Indian colonial "chronicles", seems to be more productive. However, this kind of sources though it describes in more detail the title hierarchy and settlement model, does not provide a clear description of the local community level structures.

Yet, the archaeologist L. Williams-Beck has pointed out basing on the results of her research in the west of the Yucatan peninsula (the Ah Canul region) that the settlement hierarchy had been more complicated in the Lat Postclassic period than the one Indian colonial chronicles describe.

It looks like there is much more similarity between the communal hierarchies of pre-Hispanic Yucatec Maya and modern Maya of Chiapas and highland Guatemala. This paper is an attempt to propose a possible reconstruction of the hierarchy of Yucatec Maya communal structures based on early colonial dictionaries and ethnographic comparisons with the Mayan groups of Chiapas and Central Peten of the late 17th century.

Mikhail A. Rodionov (Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography, Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg, Russia)
Chief, Judge, and Poet in Hadramawt: Sacred Roles in a Worldly Play

A social group in traditional Arab society is defined by having a shared honour (*sharaf*). Recognition of authority is seen as a more or less voluntary act. Power relations are shaped in the notion of protection and dependency, salient for those engaged in the mundane role-playing. Is there a sacred sanction for these roles? To answer the question I have chosen three social positions still effective in Hadramawt, South Arabia.

1. Tribal chief (*muqaddam*). In spite of a formal ideology of equality, most of the local tribes grade their lineages on a scale of prestige. The senior lineage provides a new paramount chief whose position has to be approved by minor chiefs. Usually a *muqaddam* possesses a cumulative charisma (*baraka*) of his noble ancestors as well as his individual reputation of moral and physical worthiness.

2. Tribal judge (*h.akam*), or arbitrator addressed by two parties to settle a dispute mostly by re-establishing consensus. The office is held by tribal chiefs. The elders of the *sada* (the Prophet's offspring) or *mashayikh* (religious scholars) strata perform the same functions. Be merit of their origin, arbitrators are believed to be invested with honourable credit (*fad.l*) which helps them to maintain justice.

3. Poet (*shâ'ir*). Contrary to chiefs and judges with their combination of ascribed and achieved statuses, poets in South Arabia belong to wider social strata. The Arabic tradition explains poetical acumen, or clairvoyance, by individual contacts of a poet with supernatural forces. Poetry casts implicit shared notions of the social order into explicit ones.

Under the Marxist regime in Aden there was a striking gap between the socialist rhetoric of the state and traditional values of the family, tribe, and strata. Today old values are gaining new strength.

Alice Schlegel (University of Arizona, Tucson, USA)
Socialization for Community Participation

Adolescence is a time of intensified preparation for adulthood. Schools provide formal instruction in the acquisition of facts, ideas and cognitive skills. Outside of school, or where adolescents are not schooled, young people gain practical knowledge through a combination of instruction and imitation. Social knowledge is acquired through social interaction, much of it

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with peers. However, peer interaction is not necessarily the best guide for adult life, for peer-approved behaviors and attitudes are not always valued by adults.

In most pre-industrial societies, adolescents are integrated into adult social structures. A cross-cultural study of 186 traditional societies (Schlegel and Barry 1991) found that antisocial behavior is less likely when adolescents' principal companions are adults. This and related findings suggest that integration into adult settings both provides surveillance and motivates adolescents to win the approval of adults, the dominant figures in the setting. Social apprenticeship in adult-centered settings prepares them for adult life.

In the United States, adolescents are segregated from adults. They are in school for much of the day, and after-school jobs fail to teach them important occupational and social skills. They are generally excluded from civil groups and institutions. Is this inevitable in modern industrial societies, where extended schooling is both valued and needed?

This paper examines two societies, Germany and Italy, in which adolescents are integrated into the civil institutions of their societies. In addition, an extensive apprenticeship program in Germany prepares adolescents for participation in economic institutions, through training and working alongside adults. The paper focuses on three topics: German apprenticeship in blue-collar industries; German adolescent participation in adult-centered social clubs and organizations; and Italian adolescent participation in the civic activities of the contrade, or city districts, of Siena. These examples show that inclusion of adolescents in adult settings is both possible and desirable in modern communities.

Euguenia A. Semakina (Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
Local Cults, Community Deities and Royal Ideology
in the Classic Maya Lowlands

Ancient Maya religious cults have always been connected with the power of Maya kings. During the Classic period in the Maya Lowlands (AD 250–900) we have many examples of these relations and changes in local cults and royal ideology. It is interesting to analyze the relationship between dominant polities and their dependencies.

The paper is dedicated to some specific features of the royal cult in the light of archaeological and epigraphical data. Many Maya deities who were considered as patrons of the ruling dynasties, are known from the

hieroglyphic texts. Every dynasty had a divine patron of its own and numerous royal rituals were related to these local cults (for example a frequent motif of gods' impersonation by rulers). Some of those deities could be connected to local communal traditions and were incorporated into the state "pantheon" for the sake of the royal authority's legitimation.

David B. Small (Lehigh University, Betleham, USA)
Factoring the Countryside into Models of Social Evolution

Most of our models which focus on the creation of social hierarchies and evolution, focus almost exclusively on urban contexts. An important, and often missed element is that of rural populations. When we factor rural contexts into our models of social evolution, we have an expanded and more nuanced view of social change. Often rural populations supply important counter-poised contexts of social power that challenge our facile notions of urban-based social hierarchy, and compel us to study social change on regional, rather than single-site level.

Yaroslav V. Tarasyuk (Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
Development of Political and Social Structure of Tamil Society under the Pallavas (6th –9th Centuries AD)

The Pallavas played a prominent role in the development of social, political and economic structures in South India during the first millennium A.D. A study of the Pallava time sources is significant for understanding the background and origins of the forms of political authority in mediaeval Tamilnadu, the development of agrarian institutions, as well as the rise of temples and temple-related beliefs.

According to the epigraphical sources, in the 6th – 9th centuries A.D the Pallava kingdom comprised the core territory in possession of the Pallavas, possessions of minor rulers, who recognized the suzerainty of the Pallavas, and peripheral areas, at the sway over which the Pallavas competed with other dynasties of the time. In the territories controlled by the Pallavas and minor rulers there were settlements of agricultural communities (*ur*) and their associations *nadus*. The zones of sway of these rulers and ruling bodies of *nadus* usually did not coincide.

According to inscriptions the process of formation of a new social, political and economic structure *kottam*, begins *ca*. the 6th century A.D.

Within its framework community associations *nadus* as well as community settlements enjoying the status of *brahmadeya* ("granted to brahmans"), *devadana* ("gift to god") and autonomous community centers (agricultural *ur* and, apparently, urban *nagaram*) had been united.

The development of social and political structures of the Tamil society under the Pallavas had two equally important directions:

– Gradual, increasing submission of community organizations by the Pallavas, having taken place in the frameworks of ordering mutual relation between communities and royal authority, conducted to the creation of trans-regional social and political structure (trans-regional kingship), *i.e.* integration "from above";

– Evolution of traditional, first of all communal structures gave new opportunities for regional co-operation within the frameworks of the *kottam* structure. This also demonstrates the tendency towards integration but "from below".

Denis V. Vorobyov (Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
Les tendances non hiérarchiques du développement sociale des Algonquins du Labrador

Il y a peu des données sur la population du Labrador précolombien. Selon l'opinion de quelques auteurs il y avait deux espèces de l'organisation sociale.

La première espèce de l'organisation sociale s'etait fondée sur la poursuite des troupeaux de caribous. La deuxième s'était adaptée à la chasse individuelle au gibier grégaire. Le commerce des fourrures n'exerçait aucune influence sur l'organisation sociale. Les autres auteurs soulignent justement les transformations dont la cause était la pratique du piégeage. Avant l'époque du commerce des fourrures la base de la vie socio-économique était constituée par un groupe qui se divisaient en 5-6 familles. Les members de ces familles menaient la vie nomade pendant l'hiver. En été quelques groupes s'assemblaient aux bords d'un grand lac.

Les savants soviétiques acceptaient la deuxième opinion. Ils supposaient que les Montagnais menaient la vie moins mobile auparavant et qu'ils avaient la structure tribale sous la direction des chefs parce qu'ils avaient eu besoin de résister les raids des Iroquois.

Cependent les Iroquois faisaient les raids contre Montagnais jusqu'au 17ème siècle, quand la traite des pelleteries avait été le fait ordinaire. Si les Montagnais avaient la structure militaire, ils ne l'auraient pas perdus. Les

sources historiques contient les descriptions des escarmouches entre les Iroquois et les Montagnais. Ils témoignaient que les Montagnais n'avaient pas de structure militaire.

Dans la vie quotidienne il existait deux catégories des chefs. Ceux de la première faisaient un chaînon intermédiaire entre l'administration coloniale et les bandes indiennes. Etant les leaders des groups errants d'hiver, les autres se nommaient les vrais chefs. Cependant la place des vrais chefs n'était pas constante, car les groups d'hiver étaient peu nombreux, instables et largement dispersés dans la fôret. Les members des groups se changeaient chaque année. Le groupe lui-même pouvait se diviser en quelques parties dont les chefs étaient déjà d'autres hommes. Les rassemblements d'été n'avaient pas de chef unique et de stabilité.

La hiérarchie existe même dans les societés égalitaires. A cause de ses capacités une persone a toujours le statut un peu plus haut que l'autre. Néanmoin la vie au sein de la bande avait la caractère democratique. Les conflits passaient très rarement. La position des femmes étaient plus basse que celle des hommes. Mais outre les traditions patriarcales il y avait des attestations du haut statut de femme.

Je pense qu'il faut expliquer l'absence de la hiérarchie par les conditions écologiques. Le milieu naturel oblige les chasseurs de la fôret boréale à mener la vie nomade. Ils se dispersaient par des petits groups. Cette condition est la cause de la flexsibilité des liens sociales. Néanmoins l'influence du milieu n'est pas toujours la cause de la hiérarchie.

En conclusion il faut dire que la structure socio-économique de la population du Québec-Labrador se distinguait par des tendances non hiérarchiques.

John Ademola Yakubu (University of Ibadan, Nigeria)
The Position of Communal and Supracommunal Institutions in Different Developmental (Supranational) Contexts in Nigeria

A community is usually made up of people with homogeneous culture or way of life. A community most often determines how disputes between people are to be resolved or how they should be governed. In the context of Nigeria, various communities were in existence prior to colonisation. Every community had its own judicial and governmental mechanisms. The colonisation of various countries in Africa, and Nigeria in particular led to putting in place of different values, judicial institutions, and modes of governance. These values, institutions, and modes of governance became supracommunal institutions so that the continuance, validity and usefulness

of the hitherto various communal values became subject to the permissive extent of the latter day supranational institutions. This paper will examine the position of communal and supracommunal institutions in different developmental (supranational) contexts in Nigeria.

Patricia Zuckerhut (University of Vienna, Austria)
Alliances and Contradictions in Old Mexican Society

In the history of Mesoamerica periods of dissipation where the power is spread among various local authorities alternate with times of centralisation where the power is concentrated within a ruling elite skimming the surplus product. Again and again single city-states (*e.g.* Teotihuacán, Tula and Azcapotzalco) manage to rule over relatively extensive areas which they will later loose again. What follows are periods of political instability in which the different city-states and groups of the region try to accumulate power and to reach the position of the previous, now disappeared metropolis.

At the beginning of the sixteenth century the so-called Triple Alliance is the ruling hegemonic power in the region. The structure of their empire includes the concentration of power as well as its dissipation.

In this context we have to see tensions and conflicts within Mexican society, as well as contradictions resulting from the imperial ideology. Basic changes were inevitable – whatever form they would take.

In my paper I will focus on the asymmetric interests between central authority and single households. There was a struggle for political power over the control of handicrafts. To illustrate the complexity of social relations it is inevitable to consider the intersections, the interrelations and the permeability of class, occupation and gender.

To exemplify this I will refer not only to the artisans, but also to the "pochteca": the merchants, a group whose status could be best characterised as in-betweens.

In my statement I will trace the conflicts and alliances within Aztec society that may result from this in-between status and their implications for social change.

PANEL V
Law, Power and Corporativism in the Ancient and
Medieval World: Secular and Sacral Interrelations

Convenor: *Nadejda A. Selounskaya* (Institute of World History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)

We plan that the session and the works of the contributors will be focused on the law, authority, political and juridical power in their relations with communes, communities and corporations in the ancient and medieval world. The contributors will have to concentrate the main attention mainly on the realization of secular-sacral interrelations in various spheres of social life. The nature of sacral and secular in different historical contexts of East and West arises several specific problems. One can opine out the inseparability of sacred and secular aspects of culture which have become antagonistic in modern times.

The importance of the problem mentioned above is generally recognized; but what strikes and stupefies is the multiplicity of forms of this cardinal interaction of laic and sacral components of the Ancient and medieval culture. The generalizations and stereotypes would be dangerous here, even if we deal with just one region in a short period of time. That's why we can be sure that the new works and source studies on the problem are constantly in demand. Our suggestion to the contributors is to demonstrate the representative value of their historical sources and to show all peculiarities and the nuances of the specific historical contexts.

Our intention is to treat such problems and themes of social life as: authorities and communities, secularization of the figure of the ruler, secularization of the links between the patron, senior and the submitted societies or individuals, the political role of saints' cult, the problem of justice, the law, and the collective and corporate juridical responsibility. For the first glance it seems that the study of the idea of the corporativism is not connected with problem of secularization of supreme power and the ruler's figure. But one should discover this connection following the Kantorowicz's idea of king's sacral body. Keeping in mind this concept, the ruler, the king should be regarded just as a personification of one-member-corporation of power-bearers. So, the two themes are supposed to be analyzed by the contributors.

Some studies could be aimed just to demonstrate the meaning and the ways of the linguistic and symbolic representations of such concepts as Power, Law, Freedom, Sacred and Secular in the different cultural traditions.

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The chronological frames of the studies could be rather vast: from ancient world up to Early Modern Time. We shall also try to avoid wide-spread attitudes of being focused just on West European heritage so the contributions dealing with history of Eastern Christian Civilization the Latin Slavonic East and non-Christian East are very welcome.

Kokunre (Kokie) Agbontaen-Eghafona (University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria)
Monarchy and Democracy; Relics of Ancient and Mediaeval World: The Case of the Benin Kingdom

In contemporary usage the concept of monarchy seems to suggest sacredness and traditionalism while democracy implies secularity and a modern world order. These two concepts seem distinct and incompatible to be fitted into a single political system.

The paper thus examines democracy as a concept that emphasizes checks and balances and participation of the majority of the people in decision-making and not merely elections. The focus is on the Benin Kingdom of the $13^{th} - 19^{th}$ centuries in West Africa. It discusses the monarchical set up, which reveals types of checks and balances and which though not necessarily democratic in the modern sense, reflects in a way the essence of a democratic political system.

The structure and pattern of the political system in the Benin Kingdom could then be described as a (democratic?) constitutional monarchy, especially when one examines the various institutional frameworks both secular and sacred.

Oleg V. Aurov (Russian State University for the Humanities, Moscow)
Secular and Ecclesiastical Elements in the Structure of the Castilian Territorial Community (Concejo) of the Xth – XIVth Centuries

The formation and development of the medieval European society with its own type of the social, legal and institutional structures was the result of the complex synthesis of the secular and ecclesiastical principles. Their proportion was determined by the real conditions and circumstances of every period of the Middle Ages, but in the same time we can see some common tendencies. When the secular feudal world had a military character, connected with war and destruction, the Church became an ideal of creation and it was the source of the models and principles, which were

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indispensables for the organization of the peaceful life. That's why both elements supplemented each other, and this supplement we can see in the history of the medieval institutions.

Castilian medieval territorial community (*concejo*), formed in the period of the Reconquest, was one of the institutions of this type. When the jurisdiction of the most part of the medieval city-communes was determined by the frontier of the city-walls, the medieval *concejo* of the kingdom of Castile and Leon had a character of the territorial subject, which inseparably linked in it's borders an urban center (*civitas* or *villa*) with the it's country (*tŭrmino*).

From the beginning of the process of the Reconquest, the secular and ecclesiastical principles were connected: the function of the feudal power was the defense and new conquests, and the Church (first of all – the monasteries) had to organize the population and economic development of the new conquered lands. But the new age of this inseparable unity began in the 10th and the beginning of the 11th centuries. In this period in the regions of Castile began the process of formation of the net of territorial communities, the classical type of which appeared in the borders of Extremadura – the region, placed to the South of the Duero river. In the first age of its history the *concejo* was the community of the dependent warriors, populated in the lands, conquered by lords (first of all – by the counts of Castile). In the sphere of law the status of the community was formed by the public agreement (*pactum* or *forum*), which regulated the mutual obligations of the lord, from one side, and of the warriors-settlers – from the other side.

11th – 12th centuries were the time of the development of *concejo* as the special element of the system of the feudal power. In the same time we can see the process of the complication of the community itself. The result was the constitution of the matured forms of relations between the community and lord, from one side, and the formation of the local knighthood as the lowest stratum of the feudal class, from the other side. But this local part of the feudal world, organized vertically, couldn't deal without some elements of the ecclesiastical nature, first of all – without parishes. From one side, the parish became an important part of the system of the maintenance of needs of the local military organization in the material sphere, because it was the only institution, which was able to organize the stable reception of military payments and obligations. From the other side, the forming of the collective consciousness of the community and the creation of the social relations of the horizontal type would be impossible without the part of the parish. But the identity of community itself couldn't exist without these consciousness and relations.

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13th–14th centuries were the time of the profound transformation of *concejo*, the result of which was the appearing of the municipal institutions in the system of the old territorial community. This process had a double nature, which connected the secular and ecclesiastical principles. From one side, in the system of community became more profound the material difference. The creation of new and new feudal privileges had as a result the growth of the fiscal weight, which fell to the stratum of descendants of infantrymen (*peones*), who became payers (*pecheros*). From the other side, the appearing of many ecclesiastical brotherhoods and communities influenced to the forming of the more matured forms of the collective consciousness and the group identity. The local clergy, integrated to the *concejo* as a special corporation, influenced directly to the development of this process. The most important result of the last was the opposition of the "communes of payers" to the local knighthood. These "communes" became an institution of defense of the interests of burghers. The final result of the evolution of *concejo* was the appearance of the municipal town councils (*ayuntamientos*) in the second part of the 14th century. These councils were created by the initiative of lords, who needed to finish interior conflicts in the borders of *concejo*. The membership in *ayuntamientos* received the representatives of knights, from one side, and of the burghers – from the other side. So, the councils were the result of compromise.

Shillony Ben-Ami (Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel)
Hierarchy without Power: the Strange Case of the Japanese Emperors

Kings and emperors in most countries occupied the top position in the power hierarchy based on pedigree, military domination, political supremacy, economic wealth, personal leadership, religious authority, or spiritual status. The emperors of Japan enjoyed only the first and the last of these attributes: pedigree and spiritual status, usually lacking all the rest. For most part of Japanese history, they did not possess military power, did not exercise political domination, were not particularly rich, had no outstanding personalities or achievements, and were often passive, mediocre, and minors. They performed religious rites but were not religious teachers. It is therefore difficult to regard them as rulers or leaders.

Nevertheless, this dynasty of weak emperors has never been replaced, at least for the last millennium and a half, continuing to maintain its undisputed status at the apex of hierarchy and prestige. All the military and political leaders of Japan, some of whom were extremely powerful, accepted the formal supremacy of the emperor and needed his approval to gain legitimacy.

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None of them dared to grab the throne for himself. Despite the many internal wars, the dynasty did not split, except once in the fourteenth century, into rivaling camps, so that almost always there was one emperor whom everyone recognized. This provided Japan with a nucleus of national unity both in the unification process of the seventeenth century and the centralization process of the nineteenth century. It facilitated modernization as well as aggression.

It is difficult to explain the exceptionally long survival of the imperial dynasty that lacked the usual attributes of power, unless we are ready to consider other, more passive, forms of authority that crystalized in the imperial institution of Japan.

Andreas E. Buss (Université Sainte-Anne, Church Point, Canada)
Hierarchy and Power in early Christianity and in Byzantium

The French anthropologist Louis Dumont has used the Indian material to develop his concept of an englobing hierarchy and the distinction between the religious and the political sphere, the brahmans and the ksatriyas. The Indian material was also used by Max Weber to coin his concept of *Eigengesetzlichkeit*, referring to the own laws and inner logic of different societal spheres.

In this paper it will be suggested that the concept of hierarchy in Dumont's sense was also developed by the pope Gelasius (5th century) and that it survived in Byzantium and to some extent even in Orthodox Russia.

But today, taking our concepts from Western tradition and from Political Science which analyzes it, we tend to think and to speak of the temporal and of the spiritual "power" and of the "struggle" between the two almost in the same way in which we talk of a war between two secular powers. This way of thinking has been common since the Papal Revolution (11th–12th centuries) when the Popes claimed not only religious authority but also political power and thus introduced a fundamental ideological change in Western society.

Satyanarayan Chakraborty (Rabindra Bharati University, Calcutta, India)
Formation and Role of Socio-Political Organizations
in India – Journey from the Vedas

As a result of the stress of war to lead the Aryans successfully against the non-Aryans the question of competent leadership came and kingship was evolved in the Vedic society itself. In fact the patrilineal organization of the

Vedic society had already started its journey to kingship. The *kulapati* s exercised wide powers. Several *kulas* s constituted a *Viś* and several *Viś* a *jana*. There was process of election for kingship in the early period and the power of the king was naturally not extensive. It increased later when choice for a king began to fall upon a particular family. But in the later Vedic period also king's power was considerably controlled by an assembly called *samiti*. There were also some other varieties of socio-political organizations like *sabhâ*, *vidatha*. These *samiti* s enjoyed extensive power so much so that the Vedic literature clearly mentions that a king should rule in agreement with the suggestions of the *samiti* too. Acceptance of the *viśpati* and *kulapati* s was *sine qua non* for consideration of nominee to kingship. We have reasons and references to believe in the existence of oligarchic or republic states. Existence of kingless state is also possibly referred to in the Vedic literature. The system of republic constitution continued in later Vedic period as well. A Thorough study in this regard may appear interesting to the scholars.

Т.В. Чумакова (Институт истории естествознания и техники РАН, Санкт-Петербург)
Tatiana V. Chumakova (Institute of the History of Natural Sciences and Technique, Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg)

Софократия в культуре Древней Руси
"Sophocracy" (Power of Wisdom) in the Culture of Old Russia

Всему византийскому макрорегиону была присуща идея единства народа и власти, симфония церкви и государства, что объяснялось принципом монотеизма, который распространялся на все уровни жизни, особенно ярко проявляясь в сфере власти, как светской, так и церковной. Монархия стремилась к созданию "политической теологии", и здесь несомненную роль сыграли идеи софократии - власти мудрецов. Само это представление восходит к античной традиции, к Платону ("Государство" и др.). Цитирование фраз из "Государства" об идеальном образе правления – правлении философов, встречается в Древней Руси часто, начиная с "Пчелы", где можно найти такую фразу: "великую власть принимающему подобает иметь великий ум". Древнерусские книжники даже включили ее в чин венчания на царство, которое трактовалось как государство философов, что ощущается уже в чине венчания на царство царя и великого князя московского Ивана IV. Также на формирование образа мудреца-правителя оказала сильное воздействие ветхозаветная традиция. В ветхозаветных текстах мы можем сразу вспомнить двух правителей, избранных Богом мудрецов и

хитрецов: Давида и Соломона. Сам образ Софии – Премудрости Божией восходит к притчам Соломона. Образ царя-мудреца включает в себя и христологические образы и образы царя-священника. Обретение этого образа напрямую связывается с актом вступления в права верховной власти. Процесс внедрения в культуру этого образа, истоки которого мы находим уже в первых произведениях русской книжности, становится чрезвычайно активным после падения Византии, когда актуализируется идея tranlatio imperia, и на русских царей переносятся функции византийских императоров. В результате сложился образ христианского правителя, "властью подобного Богу", каждый шаг которого мудр, поскольку подчинен идее служения Богу. Для чего не обязательно обладать внешним знанием, главное – духовное зрение. В идеале царь обладает им, несмотря на всю слабость своего человеческого естества, благодаря дарованной ему в определенных ритуалах (не от рождения) божественной благодати. Оценка деяний "справедливого государя" вне пределов человеческого разумения. Смысл и цель жизни подданных состоит в четком исполнении "службы и правды".

Alexander G. Emanov (Tyumen State University, Russia)
Trichotomy of Legal Space in Medieval civitas

Trichotomics structures of medieval thinking and social – legal behaviour have so fundamental importance, as well mastered by a humanitarian idea dichotomizing: the triune God, the threepartial transcendental world, the threestepped medieval society (*oratores*, *bellatores*, laboratories). Three-compound there is also West-European medieval city possessing the status *civitas*. It made *cives*, *burgenses* and *habitatores*. *Cives* had rank of noble, arms, tax immunities, privileges in use the property *civitas*. They are involved in secret of maximum management made for ritual meal (*cibus*). In conditions of military actions they occupied command posts; they lived at city centre always which is taking place on an eminence (*urbs*). *Burgenses* had the real estate, participated in management, occupying up to half of posts in offices and councils of city. They undertook by a military service, as a rule, horse; they lived at the second circle of city (*suburbium*, *burg*). *Habitatores* also had the real estate, the taxes paid, executed duties on construction and repair of fortifications structures, participated in urban home guard, used the privileges on employment by crafts and by urban trade, but the rights had no to be selected on a post; they lived in the third circle of urban space (*antiburgus*).

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Thus, for medieval city, as show our researches, there was paramount not so much the ethnic-confessional distinction of his inhabitants, how many distinction in prescription of development of the certain legal space of a urban settlement.

Vladimir Emelianov (St. Petersburg State University, Russia)
Authority in Sumer: Symbolic Aspects of Power and Legacy

In our report we shall deal with the subjects and the categories identified in Sumer with authority of the governor. They will be considered both in anthropological, and in the historical plans. Thus we shall touch the following basic themes:
1. Signs of authority and authority of a sign in Sumer (nature-centrism and empiricism of the Sumerian outlook).
2. Authority as external (difference, cover and protection), the governor as the owner (a name, an attire, property, a place).
3. Authority as ritual, the governor as the servant of gods, gods as servants of the order (Sumerian billuda and Akkadian belutu)
4. Authority as taming and a marriage, the governor as the husband and owner (en and belum).
5. Authority as realization of divine energy, the governor and ME's (evolution of ME-ideology).
6. Authority as destiny and mission (from sequence to a constancy, from a constancy to transitivity), the governor and NAM (evolution of a category nam - lugal).
7. Authority as an embodiment of perfection (Ur and Isin), the governor and culture, the governor and his upbringing.

Kevin M. Glynn (University of Chicago, USA)
Athenian Democracy

The Classical Athenian democracy stands as an anomaly in world history. A true democracy, not a representative one, fifth-century Athens was a society in which the *demos* (citizenry as a whole) truly had the *kratos* (power). Virtually all governmental and administrative positions were filled at random and at any given point a full third of the citizenry worked in some official capacity for an annual term for the polis. Following from previous social structures such as the rule of local kings (*basileis*) and more immediately a society with an aristocratic class, the unprecedented placement

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of substantial political power in the hands of the citizenry was a striking development.

What accounts for this shift of power? Was this the natural culmination of the developing dynamics of Athenian society and philosophy? What marks the stages of development towards this form of polity? The tensions within this democracy reverberate throughout the extant corpus of Athenian oratory. *Hybris* was the unpardonable transgression of a public speaker or leader, putting such a person in the position of having to simultaneously expound upon his merits while appearing self-deprecating. In a legal system where little formal law existed and even that could easily be disregarded, losing popular appeal was a formidable and constant concern. The lack of common-law tradition or *stare decisis* proved to be one of Aristotle's chief misgivings about democracy, which he sought to remedy through his concept of the rule of law.

This paper will discuss the development of Athenian society through the establishment and demise of its democracy. It will focus first on the development of the democracy itself; second, the paper will turn to this particular criticism of Aristotle, to evaluate the strength of his "rule of law" argument in the case of Athens at that time.

Sabine Grebe (University of Cambridge, UK; Universität Heidelberg, Germany)
Secular and Divine Authority in Virgil's Aeneid

The Roman poet Virgil (70-19 B.C.E.) wrote the Aeneid, the summit of Latin epic poetry. In a powerful writing, Virgil combines the secular and the divine. Divine means that throughout the whole epic the Olympian gods like, for example, Jupiter, Juno, Venus are present. The gods determine the events on earth and guide the human beings to act.

In twelve books of hexameter verse, Virgil tells about the flight of Aeneas from Troy to Italy to found a new home, the origin of Rome. Virgil also describes the battles of Aeneas in Italy against Turnus as Aeneas builds his new home. This is the mythological part of the Aeneid.

The historical part of the Aeneid focuses upon Roman history and, especially, upon Augustus. In particular, Virgil celebrates and legitimizes Augustus' power as an autocrat. A prime component of Roman ideology during the republican period involved the subordination of the individual to the collective secular authority. Three characteristic features of the Roman magistrates manifested this principle: the magistrates were elected, temporarily in authority, and organized into hierarchical colleges. Augustus'

newly introduced autocratic rule, however, defined a new relationship between the individual and community throughout Roman history. His authority created a new form of hierarchy. As Emperor, Augustus had a pre-eminent position and accumulated the authority (auctoritas) that had been distributed among many magistrates during the republican period. The Aeneid reinforces that Augustus, as the telos of Roman history and as the ultimate head of the secular authority, signifies the gods' will. The divine foundation of the Roman monarchy is very important because, for Romans, monarchy was linked to usurpation of power, tyranny, and oppression (cf. the assassination of Caesar). Thus, the Aeneid is a piece of propaganda, though a very sophisticated one, in that it reinforces the divine foundation of the secular authority of the Emperor.

My paper will analyse the following questions: how are religion and history connected with each other in the Aeneid? In which way does Virgil use the divine in the context of Augustus through whom the gods had carried out their plan of Rome's glorious history? How does Virgil privilege the divine foundation of Roman history and of Augustus' authority amongst secular institutions and officials? Which role do the gods play for Rome's destiny and, in particular, for Augustus' authority and position both within the Roman society and among the Roman institutions? How does Virgil's privileging of the divine character of Augustus' authority reflect or influence the historical events of his times? How does Virgil's connection of the divine and history in the Aeneid manifest and reinforce the propagandistic role of art, architecture, coinage, literature including Augustus' own Res Gestae, and sculpture as instruments of the Roman Emperor's power?

Augustus appears in three passages: 1.286-296 (within Jupiter's apocalypse of the future fame of Rome); 6.791-805 (within Anchises' revelation of Rome's glorious future); and 8.671-728 (within the description of Aeneas' Shield). The first two passages praise Augustus as the summit and telos of Roman history. The last passage describes the decisive naval battle between Augustus on the one hand and Mark Antony and Cleopatra on the other (at Actium, 31 B.C.E.). In all three passages Virgil elevates Roman history and Augustus to the divine level.

Tatiana M. Kalinina (Institute of World History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
East European rulers' titles according to the information of the Arabic-Persian geographers of the 9th – 10th centuries

The Arabic-Persian geographers of the 9th and 10th centuries were ill-informed about the distant East European areas. Neverthless some reports of the Islamic medieval sources has a unique character.

Modern scholars paid attention to the titles of the East European rulers, which are mentioned in the so-called "Risala" of an anonymous writer. "Risala"'s information repeats itself in the books of the numerous eastern authors. The sovereigns of the Chazars, of the Slavs, of the Magyars, of the Rus, of the Bulgars on the Volga were called by the title *malik* ("monarch" or "tsar"). The local title of the great *malik* of the Chazars was *chaqan*, but they had one more *malik* with the title *isha* (variants: *insa*, *abshad*, *shad*). Governor of the Slavs was called ra'is ar-ru'asa (Arabic and Persian variants: ra'is al-akbar, ra'is-e behter). This ruler was titled also *malik*. Two Arabic authors informed us, that the *malik* of the Slavs had the local title *knaz*, but this world is universally recognised conjecture. *Ra'is ar-ru'asa* of the Slavs had a deputy, who was called *sub.n.dj* (the variants: *sub.dj*, *sut.dj*). The Magyars were governed by the *ra'is* – the head, which called *k.nd*, but they were also ruled *malik*; his name was Dj.la (Djula, Gila?). The sovereign (*malik*) of the Rus was *chaqan-rus*. The Bulgar's monarch was designated only *malik*, and his name was Almush (variants: Almu(a)s, Amlan), and we know nothing about his "vice-president". The Burtas were subordinated to one or two *shaikhs* (Persian variant – *sir*), that is to say "elders".

The Arabic-Persian geographers also informed us about some others titles of the East European rulers of lawer ranges: *bak*, *tudun*, *elteber*, *djavshigar*, etc.

Thus, the Islamic medieval sources informed us about various forms of the authority of the East European peoples at the different stadiums of the social development.

Oleg I. Kavykin (Center for Civilizational and Regional Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
The influence of the legal status of Russian nobility on political evelopment of the Russian Empire in the 18th and early 19th centuries

The author asserts that the legal status of the Russian nobility influenced the political and cultural development of the Russian Empire in the 18th and early 19th centuries.

The intention of Russian Emperors and their governments to solve a series of problems (military and administrative reforms, acquisition of peasants` taxes, etc.) with the help of the nobility gave rise to the uniform culture and mentality of the Russian nobility. This mentality can be

characterised by such notions as honour, service, rank, "European" culture. The legal status of this estate was the decisive factor of nobility's self-determination.

Having realized itself as a separate estate, the nobility had to face the problem: which was the main factor of one's belonging to their estate – "blood" (identification by being of noble birth) or "service" (identification by execution of official duties)? The perception of service transformed from the conception of personal service to the Tzar to the conception of service to the state and the one's own estate. The latter helped the nobility to become the cultural elite.

The peculiarities of self-determination and legal status of this "estate of the realm" as privileged, though serving, of cultural elite influenced the political processes in the country.

Having realized itself as the elite, the Russian nobility in 1767-68 formulated assertions of political rights in the mandates to Catherine the Great. The nobility wanted to have its own estate corporation. They also wanted their corporations to take part in local self-government. These political demands were based on the conception of nobility's service to the state and the conception of nobility as the main supporter of the monarchy. The Constitution for Administration of Governorships (Uchrezhdenie dlja upravlenia gubernii) of November 7, 1775 and The Charter for the Nobility (Zhalovannaja gramota dvorjanstvu) of April 21, 1785 satisfied these demands. The nobility's corporations were allowed in provinces (the national corporation was allowed at the beginning of the 20th century). These organisations could elect the local officials. Until the second half of the 19th century the nobility had played the leading part in local government.

On the other hand, in the first quarter of the 19th century the ideology and the everyday life of the Decembrists (the first Russian revolutionists, noblemen by origin) showed another way to realize the idea of the serving estates' mission as the nobility's representatives (liberal in the case) saw it.

Thus, the legal status of the nobility influenced the self-consciousness of its representatives. This self-consciousness reflected in the estate's political ambitions which, in their turn, influenced the course of political development of Russia.

Sarah Klitenic (Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland)
Hierarchy and Power in the Thought of Pseudo-Dionysius

The word "hierarchy" was coined by the sixth century Christian philosopher Pseudo-Dionysius. "Hierarchy" was used to refer to horizontal

strata which comprised the entire universe: each stratum was connected to the one above it, the higher strata containing more power than the ones following because they existed closer to the source of energy from whence the strata originally descended (God). That is, in Pseudo-Dionysius' universe, God's energy pours forth and forms hierarchies as it descends. The more the energy falls, the less intense it becomes, so lower hierarchies contain less divine power.

While an individual hierarchy was distinct, each hierarchy could be grouped into two parallel universes: the celestial hierarchy included angelic beings arranged into three strata and the ecclesiastical hierarchy included sensible beings (i.e., humans), also arranged into three strata. The ecclesiastical hierarchy was the entire sensible universe seen as the Church, with human ranks divided according to initiation in the Church. Thus, bishops were in the highest rank of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, while catechumens were in the lowest. Metaphysically, this meant that the bishops contained the most power as they existed just one stratum away from the celestial hierarchy. That is, of all the members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, they contained the most power because they existed closest to the divine energy source. Metaphysically, this also meant that bishops were seen as existing in a hierarchy parallel to that of the highest angelic hierarchy in the celestial universe.

The socio-political ramifications of such a universe are manifold. This paper will examine the authority of the Church during the time of Pseudo-Dionysius to see how contemporary Church politics may have influenced Pseudo-Dionysius' thought. To what extent did early Byzantine Church officials claim divine power? Also, Pseudo-Dionysius' thought is known to have been highly influential in the Eastern Church. The paper will explore to what extent his invention of hierarchy and hierarchical power may have influenced notions of ecclesiastical hierarchy and power in the Byzantine Church.

Natalia B. Kochakova (Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia)
The Sacredness and Its Avoidance
in Sub-Saharan West African Early States

The early states of sub-saharan West Africa were emerging between the first and mid-second millenium A.D., but typologically they can be compared to the most ancient inchoate states of the archaic ancientness throughout the world. It can be said that sacralization of power was one of indispensable

factors of their formation and development in societies based on kinship ties and common descent. According to traditional conception the origin of the State was the result of Gods'will and the activity of supernatural forces – God and/or a mythical ancestor possessed of super-human abilities. It was believed that supernatural forces were the source of legitimation of sacred ruler's power. The latter was the living symbol of the legitimacy of the people's claims to the territory they occupied. Myths of the origin of state and the benevolence of supernatural forces served as an explanation of existed social order. These ideological stereotypes were closely bound up with the belief that the institutions of power could function both in temporal and in sacral time. Many rites and rituals reflect this belief. From the beginning of trans-Atlantic slave-trade the early states of West Africa were involved in international contacts (predominantly commercial), wars and conflicts. These new conditions entailed not only the development of ritual activity aimed at the consolidation of power institutions, but also many cases of avoidance of some sacral prohibitions in the frames of preserving traditional ideology.

Now the ritual aspect of the traditional culture is often used (sometimes in perverted forms) for political aims by politicians in modern West African States.

Irina G. Konovalova (Institute of World History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)

The title of qagan *among the Slavs*

The fact that a number of Old Rus' governors were titled *qagans* is usually considered to be an evidence of oriental influence upon the state system of Rus', a result of ethno-cultural Qazar-Rus' contacts. Meanwhile the adoption of a title is first of all a political act, which is not straightly depending on ethno-cultural interaction.

One can see it by comparing the fate of the title of *qagan* among the Slavs – the West and the South on the one hand and the East – on the other. In spite of the fact that the West and the South Slavs were for a long time under the influence of the Avar Qaganate, their rulers never used the title of *qagan* and the latter is not retained by any Slavic language of Central and South-Eastern Europe. After the collapse of the Avar Qaganate the title of *qagan*, the sole bearers of which in Central and Western Europe were the Avars, could not compete with deep-rooted European titles rested upon the ancient political traditions of the Roman Empire.

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Quite different situation arose in Eastern Europe where at the dawn of the Rus' state the title of *qagan* was the only significant title in the region that gave its owner an international recognition. The adoption of this title by Russian governors should be regarded not as a result of ethno-cultural Qazar-Rus' contacts but as a formal self-identification predetermined by outer circumstances.

Eugueni I. Kychanov (St. Petersburg Branch of Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia)
The Tradition of Charisma of Power
Among Central Asian Nomads

In its origins the property is appropriation and the power is force. In the world of the animals which live in associations everything was decided only by force and a stronger one became a leader. In the human society the brute force required a support, an ideological substantiation of the right to power. A leader or a strong man was backed up by a legend about the singularity of his clan's origin or of his own origin, about the extraordinary nature of his personality, of his personal virtues granted to him from outside by superhuman divine forces. Those qualities were also recognized for him by a general people's assembly, an assembly of warriors or an assembly of aristocracy.

The process of the divinization of power the essence of which was identical in all the societies lasted for a long time and was distinguished by some specific features in different societies. The systematization, approval and propaganda of charismatic ideas about the nature of power and ruler's personality reached their full embodiment only with the appearance of statehood, though it were a monarchical regime (characterized by the predominance of divine principle) or a democratic one which required the recognition of a ruler's virtues in different forms by a part of the society or by the society as a whole.

The supreme deity in China and Central Asia who granted to a ruler one or another charismatic streak was the Sky.

The nomad statehood, all its institutions were developing in Central Asia during more than one thousand and a half years, from the Sün-nu (Huns) to the Mongols. It is possible to try to trace some changes in the charisma of ruler during this period.

In the epoch of the Huns the creative power of the cosmos was emphasized in the charisma of *shan-yü*, the Huns' ruler. The *shan-yü* "was born by the Sky and the Earth" and was enthroned by the Sun and the Moon.

As a ruler engendered by the cosmos the *shan-yü* possessed such qualities of the Sky as "spaciousness", "boundlessness" and was a "son of the Sky" (*tan-li-gu-tu*).

The idea of the engendering of a ruler by the Sky was valid also among the Sian-bi and even to a certain extent became more concrete. The ruler Tang-shi-huai was born after his mother swallowed a hail-stone fallen from the Sky and as a result became pregnant. The Sian-bi group called Toba bore in its very name an idea of having been engendered by the cosmos, since the word Toba signified those who "was born by the Sky and reared by the Earth". Among the Sian-bi group called Tu-gu-hun the title of *shan-yü* was replaced by that of kagan.

The Turkish kagans also considered themselves and their dynasty as "engendered by the Sky" (*tengri-de-belmïsh*), "similar to the Sky" (*tengri-tag*). A Turkish kagan possessed also the specific charismatic force given to him by the Sky – *kut*. The Sky endowed a kagan with the wisdom (*bilik*) and the courage (*ap*), granted to him the "power-force" (*küch*) as well. The Sky gave orders (*yarlik*) to a kagan. Not only the Sky, but also the Earth, namely the "earth-water" (*er-sut*), took part in a kagan's rise. It was the Turkish aristocracy who enthroned a kagan.

The Mongolian conception of charisma didn't postulate directly the engendering of a khagan/khan by the Sky. It was by the will of the Sky that Borte-Chino (the Skewbald Wolf), the mythical ancestor of the dynasty, was born. Chingis-Khan (Temujin) believed that the power had been granted to him by the Sky. As a khan he ought to possess and really possessed the "force" (*küchü*) and the substance of charismatic nature "sut", close to the analogical substance of Turkish kagans (*kut*). The power of a khan was confirmed by his election by the aristocracy at a kurultai. The title of Temujin – Chingis-Khan meant "khan of the khans", "ruler over the rulers" and it was an innovation in the charismatic substantiation of power. And what is more, the charisma of a Mongolian khan presupposed that he was a ruler over all the peoples, he who "became a ruler of men by order of the Sky". Not only the power of khan spread over his people, but also all the other peoples ought to be submitted to a Mongolian khan. Those peoples who didn't recognize this rule and didn't submit voluntarily ought to be "pacified", i.e. subdued by force, conquered.

Thus the charisma of ruler, the conception of power were developing from the engendering of a ruler by the Sky till the granting of the power over all the peoples to a khan by the Sky, till the conception of the power of a khan considered as a ruler of all the peoples of the world.

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Pramod Mishra (University of Delhi, India)
Jugal Mishra (Utkal University, India)
Strategy of Power Sharing in Ancient India
(With Special Reference to Kautilya's Arthasastra)

Ancient India had a unique tradition of identifying power and hierarchy within the holistic notion of the Universe as depicted in the four "Vedas" and the "Puranas" duly venerated by the Hindus.

The great ancient scholar at the court of the emperor Chandragupta Maurya who was called "Kautilya", in his famous work "Arthasastra" identified clearly various strategies of power sharing among the rulers and the ruled.

Our paper will try to explore these areas of well studied Indian traditions.

T. P. Sankarankutty Nair (Kerala University College, Trivandrum, India)
Feudal Hierarchy and Power in Early Modern India
(Kerala – A Case Study)

The paper makes an attempt to study feudal titles of early modern Kerala (18th century) which were in constant use in India. The study examines the comparative position of four important feudal titles – Menon, Dalava, Thampi and Kurup – in the feudal hierarchy.

Most of the Nair/Nayar clans from the medieval period were recognised as part of the 'Shudra' caste. They claimed their ancestry from ancient Gods and Maharajas to demonstrate their top hierarchical social position and power in the society. The eventual result was the rise of too many categories of autonomous or semi-autonomous feudal chiefs exercising and usurping power.

In the feudal hierarchy the Nairs began to play a leading part in the life of the people of Malabar, Cochin and Travancore. Through their peculiar matriarchal system they possessed almost all the land of the area. They divided it among their relatives, nephews and supporters. This system existed for about eight centuries. Even under the Portuguese, the Dutch and the English, the Nairs continued to retain their age-old hegemony so much that it ushered the epoch of Nair feudal paramountcy in the state. This feudal landlord-tenant pyramid-like hierarchy had not been studied dispassionately using all archaeological and literary data. The paper envisages a new look into the hierarchy and power in India context with particular reference to

Kerala where the rise and eclipse of feudal hierarchy was unique and unparalleled.

Nadejda A. Selounskaya (Institute of World History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
Communities, Rulership and Law in Medieval Italy: Secular and Sacred in the Social Order

The question of continuity of the "antique heritage", the continuity of *civitas* in the medieval period in particular, one can consider as having no answer. But since it has been under debate for two hundred years in the academic research tradition we shall start with it. So, the question is: Could we consider the medieval Italian commune as a self-sufficient phenomenon (or should we treat the medieval commune as a kind of reception of "antique *civitas*" while analyzing it in respect to ancient Roman history)? To overcome this difficult problem it is important to stress the role of the medieval *civitas* and to understand its position in the social hierarchy of the medieval world. The logic of the investigation leads us to the structure of the work with the emphasis on such themes as:

1. *Civitas* (commune) in medieval history and its reflection in historiography. Historiography as a cultural phenomenon. Here we shall try to analyze what aspects were of particular importance and which ones were ignored by scholars in different periods and why (among others, it is the problem of the medieval commune's origins).

2. Continuity in the tradition of corporativism.

3. Interaction of secular and sacred components of medieval corporativism; civic and ecclesiastical structures and traditions, and the corporate spirit (*universitas*, *comunitas civitas* and parish church).

4. Rulership, institutions, communes (including the problem of ecclesiastical institutions as the senior and patron of community).

The presentation will focus on the corporative background of social development of Italian medieval history as a reflection of interaction between the civic and sacred components. The goal is to discover the structural relationship of parish church and city commune.

An outstanding role of the Church in the making of European corporativism cannot be ignored. One cannot deny the fact that the medieval network of the corporations-and-guild system had sprung up from the institutions of scared character.

As far as the history of medieval communities is concerned, the phenomena in question can be observed in the collective homage as a specific

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type of agreement between the community and its "senior". The high importance was ascribed to the solemn oath (*juramentum*, *sacramentum*) which is accompanied by mentioning not only lay, but also sacral sanctions against possible transgressors and by a specific rite of administering the oath, whereby the scared objects (relics, cross, Gospel) were involved.

In the period of the 13th – 14th centuries *vassalagium* with *juramentum* had already been one of the most important instruments for the creation of the system of personal links, *i.e.* the individual as well as collective dependence.

Malati J. Shendge (Center for the study of the Indian tradition, Pune, India)
The Spectrum of Power Dissemination in the Indus Civilisation

In the paper presented at the First conference in 2000, it was shown that the so-called gods of the Vedic pantheon in fact were human functionaries of the government of "Asura empire". The Rigveda (= RV), as it has been shown previously (Shendge 1977), speaks mainly about the Asura culture which the author believes to be identical with the Indus civilization. Its authors knew the Asura culture intimately but not the Aryan culture and hence were of Asura origin.

The reconstruction of Asura government is the corollary of this main proposition. This council of functionaries seems to be the central government with a ruler as the supreme law-making executive and judicial authority at the apex. Despite this, the question of the means and personnel emloyed to execute the laws, i.e. the administrative apparatus, still remained unanswered.

The present paper shows that the emperor was assisted by a council of officers, of eight to ten persons of different ranks. There was also another council that appeared earlier, which was attended by the supreme ruler. One more administrative assembly consisted of a lord of the assembly (like contemporary speaker) and assembly members. The number of members and their duties are not known.

On the lower levels there were local settlements ruled by the representatives of the central government who belonged to the same ethnos. They were called "lords of settlements" and had 90, 99 and 100 settlements under their rule.

The third rank consisted of the non-Asura tribal chiefs who headed their tribes, but were vassals of the emperor. Archaeologically they belonged to the pre-Harappan strata which was absorbed into the Harappan socio-political structure. They are mentioned along with the tribes they headed.

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The fourth rank was that of the administrative heads of smallest settlements called *grama* ("village"). Their functions were redistribution, justice in local disputes, recruitment of soldiers etc.

The rank and status of settlements depended on their size. *Purah*, an enclosed fort, fortified settlement, city or citadel was the main architectural symbol of the power of government and also symbolized invincible protection. The *purah* of the Rigveda corresponds to Indus cities which were fortificated. *Vrijana* also indicated enclosure or fence; it was intermediate between the walled *purah* and undefended *grama*.

The most important outcome of this paper is that when looked at in this manner, all the groups, – the devas, the Asuras, the tribal chiefs, and the lower ranks spoken of in Rigveda form into a unity or unified socio-political structure, and once and for all, the mythology disappears copletely leavng behind a clear picture of the Rigvedic/Indus society.

Appendix deals with the concept and associations of purah and refutes objections raised to their being correlated to the Indus cities.

Safari Kh. Shomahmadov (St. Petersburg Branch of Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia)
Buddhist Concept of Royal Power

Buddhist philosophical thought produced its own concept of royal power in the form of the teaching about *Chakravartin* ("Great Wheel-roller", "The Lord of the Wheel") as a Universal King, who ruled in accord with the principles of Buddhist Teaching. *Chakra* is a divine gem wheel. There are one thousand spokes radiating outward from the hub. It is a symbol of imperial power. Besides the gem wheel *Chakravartin* possesses other six gems, such as gem elephant, gem horse, gem wife, gem treasurer, gem minister.

Teacher Vasubandhu placed the concept of Chakravartin in cosmological part of "Encyclopaedia of Abhidharma" (*Abhidharmakosa*) and gave the account of this theory according to characteristics of the periods of time. The emergence of Chakravartins as *weii* as the emergence of *buddhas* is peculiar for favourable periods of human civilization.

The author of "Encyclopaedia of Abhidharma" gives an account of typology of rulers of the Universe based on two signs: metalls of *chakra* (gold, silver, bronze, iron) and number of continents belonging to Chakravartin (four, three, two, one). Thus, although all Chakravartins has a "glorious appointment", the highest type of these rulers possesses gold *chakra* and the lowest possesses iron *chakra*.

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The concept of Chakravartin played a great role in Buddhist tradition because it was the main mechanism of religious legitimation of imperial policy of Buddhist rulers.

In distinction from legitimation of the royal power by the sanction of church (Catholicism, Brahmanism), Buddhist political tradition sacralized the royal power by itself and endowes the rulers with spiritual power as well as with temporal power. So, the goverment is a Buddhist institute *ex difinitio*. As the highest religious authority, the Buddhist ruler possesses the right for religious exegesis. The most famous examples of Buddhist monarchs are imperor Ashoka and the rulers of medieval Thai kingships.

Andrey V. Vdovichenko (Institute of Linguistics; Russian Academy of Sciences; Orthodox St. Tikhon Theological Institute, Moscow, Russia)
The Law by Moses Rules the Laws of Language.
Linguistic Approach versus Cultural and Historical Approach
to the Interpretation Problem of the Septuagint Text

The problem mentioned in the title of this paper is that the traditional linguistic interpretation of the Greek-speaking Jewish Law confronts the historical and cultural interpretation of it.

The linguistic approach implies that the "Greek" text of the Septuagint is not authentically Greek, because the Septuagint is the literal "slavish" translation of the Hebrew source. Thus, the common procedure of analysing the LXX language consists of carefully detecting the Hebrew-born irregularities in the Greek-speaking text. As a result, one gets the irregualar Jewish Law for the Jewish Diasporaic communities.

The historical and cultural approach can not state but the highest status of the Greek Torah for the Greek-speaking communities. It seems that the irregularities of the language which are usually detected in the modern linguistic approach would have been much more visible for the participants of the historical and linguistical situation. Nevertheless, all the Jewish social practices (the legal practices included) was based on the LXX text. So it is definitely impossible to state any irregualarity of the LXX text from the historical and cultural viewpoint.

These approaches obviously exclude each other. So, generally speaking, the problem mentioned in the title is to be formulated as follows: which criteria is more adequate when observing the question what kind of law the Diasporaic Jewish Community did use.

The solution of the problem is obtained by applying the methods of discourse linguistics. The fact is that the traditional linguistic approach implies primarily the analysing of the linguistic models (formal syntax,

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verbal forms, cases etc.) from the authentic Greek viewpoint which is artificially modulated. However, the viewpoint of the real participants of the real linguistic situation (that is, the Jewish religious communities strongly separated of the Hellenic life in its basis) was different. The Sacred Text could not be irregular for them. So the LXX text normalized the models which were used in it. One can state the process of giving the new norm of the literary language by the Text; the Law by Moses ruled the laws of the literary language in its formal objective component. It is the discoursive approach that states that the formal linguistic models means nothing untill the whole communicative situation (discourse) with its parameters is not put into account. Here the main important element is the convention of the participants in regard to the linguistic elements. The traditional method, therefore, lacks the historical and cultural components (that is, it lacks the theorizing of the parameters of the authentic discourse) and should be discoursively corrected.

The content of the paper proceeds *ad medias res* of the discourse linguistics in regard to the Septuagint text.

PANEL VI
Caste Discrimination: Perspectives and Outcome, Our Duty

Convenor: *Pratip Kumar Majumdar* (Calcutta, India)

It is hierarchy, just to be in power and to use power, which was introduced and nurtured by the people of vested interests and thereby caste-system came into being from the early period of civilization in the whole world. These people tried much to introduce this in the society in the name of religion, sometimes in the name of ancient social customs etc. Thus they made divisions among the common people and Hierarchy tried to have the chance to get maximum economic and social profit out of it. Gradually all these things made them more powerful with an added scope that, the common people then were lacking education. That is, illiteracy among the common people was one of the reasons behind this.

So caste-discrimination needs serious attention of the people with rational thinking and unconditional love for the Mankind of this world, as a whole. Right now, in the political background of the present- day world, where fundamentalism is trying to come forward almost in the most of the areas of Asia and Europe, we must pray for a love for mankind to exist and that is also without any limitation of class or caste, or religion or language or anything like those, mentioned above.

Caste is akin to class and this exists everywhere. This is based on individual propensity and intelligence levels and each group can rise to the higher group - like a poor labourer can educate his children who become rich and rise to a higher class. This is reality. What we call caste is based on above criteria. Rigveda clearly states: no caste is superior or inferior to the others and all are equal. In fact, no one can be a "Brahmin"(so called superior caste in Hinduism) or "Kshatriya" (same...) etc. just by being born to such parents. A brahmin who does not perform the prescribed duties cannot be a Brahmin. The essential nature of all living beings is emphasized in the Vedic Philosophies (Ancient Hindu Philosophy of India). But scientists in the west have always been talking about different races and how they differ in nature from each other. But at last, with the deciphering of the genetic code, scientists have started understanding the truth expressed in the Vedic texts, viz., that though people may be differently recognized as Africans, Caucasian,Nordic or Asian, beneath the surface, the difference dissolve at the genetic level.

In fact the colour and visage of these different racial groups are different because of environmental factors like climate, flora and fauna, food habits and so on. Scientists have finally declared that "Race" is a social concept, not

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a scientific one and there is only one Human Race. We can just go through the book - "Race, Evolution and Behaviour" written by Dr. Philippe Rushton, Psychologist at the University of Ontario, which speaks strongly in favour of this. Dr. Sonia S. Anand, an Assistant Professor of Medicine at the McMaster University, Ontario suggests that ethnicity is considered more than race, when seeking clues to how disease patterns differ from one group to another. Ethnicity encompasses both genetics and culture and it is about phenotype and genotype, according to Dr. Anand.

It is therefore, to get rid of the trouble of Hierarchy and its power, necessary for everybody, politicians in particular, to shun narrow issues like politics for scoring brownie points by using the caste-card and get on with the job of improving the quality of life of its citizens by educating them and providing basic social security, and healthcare to all.

Anna V. Bochkovskaya (Institute of Asian and African Countries, Moscow State University, Russia)
Casteism in the Contemporary Sikh Community of India

Analysis of history of the Sikh community in India enables us to define more precisely the popular thesis concerning one of the fundamental principles of Sikhism, i.e. rejection of caste. The negative attitude towards caste system and caste inequality undoubtedly constituted one of the most important features of the first Sikh Gurus' doctrine shared by their followers; at the same time none of them ever mentioned the total rejection of castes. Caste hierarchy of the society was interpreted as certain reality that created no obstacles for salvation of any person; it was not the caste itself being criticized but the unjust society comprising certain group of castes discriminated by the others. Rejection of caste in Sikhism contributes mainly to the sacral purposes.

Caste distinctions strengthen and intensify stratification and internal economic contradictions of the community. It is most evident 1) as far as the contacts of rural and urban population are concerned (in urban areas of Punjab, mostly in industry, Khatri and Arora Sikhs are dominant, with Jats being pushed back) and 2) in rural areas where caste-class distinctions coincide (landless peasants and small holders, mostly from scheduled castes, are opposed by wealthy landowners and Jat landlords).

Contemporary Sikh community in India demonstrates conservation of caste, the latter being an institution that divides and unites the society at the same time. Preservation of caste ties and orientations is obvious in every aspect of today's Indian Sikh community activities.

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Casteism is a traditional integral part of politics resulting in fractional clashes, in character of electoral campaigns of every level.

Caste orientations are dominant in everyday life (including matrimonial sphere, affiliation and management of gurdvaras, donations collection etc.). The obvious growth of communalism in India in 1990-s has imposed multiple impact on the Sikh community. Caste stratification is a sore subject for Sikhs regarding their self-identity and their relations with other religious communities, primarily with the Hindus.

Robin A.E. Coningham (University of Bradford, UK)
The Archaeology of Caste

The antiquity of caste within much of European literature has long perplexed scholars. Some have advocated its presence in prehistoric times (Dhavalikar 1995), others reserve its appearance for the Early Historic period (Kenoyer 1998) and others reject it as a construct of the Raj (Mendelsohn & Vicziany 1998). Despite these views, many would agree that it has a number of clear features despite its presence within Hindu, Buddhist and Muslim communities across a spread of environmental conditions (Leach 1960). Although the most widely used term to represent this system, caste is incorrect as it derives from the sixteenth century Portuguese word for species, tribes, races or lineages (Quigley 1993). More correct would be the two different terms, *varna* and *jati*, which it frequently represents and misrepresents. The former, *varna*, "refers to the four-fold division of society into Brahmana (priests), Ksatriya (warriors), Vaisya (merchants and craftsmen) and Sudra (labourers) which ensures social harmony and cosmic stability" and the latter "a shared common origin through birth" (Coningham & Young 1999: 84). Acknowledging flexibility within its definitions, the major features are that each caste is endogamous, there are restrictions on commensality between members of different castes and there is a hierarchical grading of castes, with the Brahman at the top (Hutton 1946: 49). In various kinds of context, especially those connected with food, sex and ritual, a member of a 'high' caste is liable to be 'polluted' by either direct or indirect contact with a member of a 'low' caste; castes are very commonly associated with traditional occupations. Finally, an individual's caste status is finally determined by the circumstances of his birth, unless expelled for some ritual offence; and the system as a whole is always focused around the prestige accorded to the Brahman (ibid.).

There is also a clear belief by a number of scholars that this socio-economic system has created a uniform and essentially timeless culture

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within south Asia. In the words of Gordon Childe "In architecture and industry, still more in dress and religion, Mohenjo-daro reveals features that have always been characteristic of India" (1928: 184). There is also a clear belief that this system is also used to justify the contemporary subordination of over 150 million people in India alone (Mendelsohn & Vicziany 1998). The aim of this paper is to investigate the archaeological visibility of caste through an examination of diet, craft specialisation, burial patterns, city plans and building materials to evaluate its presence and influence in the past and thus inform our present understanding of its workings.

Kanta Gupta (New Delhi, India)
Status of Indian Woman – A Study

Ancient Indian civilization, from the early Vedic period, is replete with such epitomes, as clearly bespeak the high status of women. Such couplets *"Naryastu yatra pujyante ramante tatra devata"* (Gods dwell, where women are worshipped) depict the lofty pedestal on which women were placed.

A long period of foreign invasions, growing complexities of rules and procedures of sacrifices and religious observances, discouragement of education, *Purdah* system, early marriage, theory of perpetual tutelage, prohibition of widow remarriage, *Sati Pratha*, etc., resulted in economic and social injustice, thereby producing disastrous and damaging consequences for women's status by 500 AD. All these social evils became more pronounced in the medieval period and completely curtailed the freedom and progress of women.

With the advent of British in India, close contacts with the West, their culture, traditions, literature and education made a great impact on the minds of social reformers, intellectuals and leaders, helping Indian women to regain their lost glory and prestige.

The paper presents:
a) An analytical and comprehensive study of high status of Indian
b) women in ancient Indian literature from the Vedic period.
c) Degradation in status, after 300 BC.
d) Social reforms and legislations for upliftment of women, after 18th century.

Pranay Majumdar (Calcutta, India)
Cast – Discrimination – Oppression and Oppressed – What We Should Do

Cast discrimination through the ages in all the corners of the world is hard fact. And with a basic sence of world history it can never be denied. Now it is time to speak about the cast system and thedegradations caused by it. It is not enough to listen only and sympathise. It is an worning that the Voices of victims are calls to action to greater efforts on behalf of those on the receiving end of racism, descrimination, Xenofobia and intolerance. That is the only way we can prove that we ae serious about shopping a world where such abuses of human rights are eliminated forever. The Dalits, the voiceless displaced persons of the world should be taken into account. We should be determined to eradicate the legacy of centuries of slavery, Colonisation and racial domination and the the caste discrimination despite the resistance of those who have benefited from injustice for many centuries. Even we should be frank enough to keep in mind that he superiority of those who were white and the inferiority of those who were black, was enforced, presented and justified as the natural order of the things which, we must admit, surely a form of Hierarchy.

As long as the so called lower caste of people do not have a voice, so long the upper class continue to present themselves or the select few who succeeded because they dared to work for their success, while the rest served because they were predestined to serve. This is as has been said, as long as the lions do not have their own historians, so long will the hundreds emerge as heroic, mighty and right.

This is what happens even today the cast issue rapes, humiliates, molests and murders in a manner that is simply not acceptable or tolerable at the beginning of the 21st century. This has not changed for millions of "untouchable" all over our country. If we don't try to wipe it out from the society our children's children, simply, will not forgive us. All the space, neuclear and Information Technology in the universe will not absolve us from the shame of our society as it stands today.

Pratip Kumar Majumdar (Calcutta, India)
Caste Discrimination: Perspectives and Outcome: Our Duty

The religious elite in energy religion and age has enjoyed the exclusive right to define and direct the religiosity of their people. As it to be expected, this is done necessarily with a view to rein forcing their own class interests. It is an irresistible temptation for the power - wielders of the world to turn their supporters into unthinking and ardent devotees, the substance of whose devotion can be directed at will.And in every sense of the term Hierarchy thus is closely related to power. Seen from this perspective,the spread of

rationality, free thinking, and intellectual objectivity are unwelcome intruders.The manipulators of all religious cominitues have abhorred the spread of light in various ways.They have had enviable success in persuading their followers into believing that this light is nothing but a deceptive form of darkness.

The self-appointed, bigoted leaders are allergic to modernity's insistence on human rights and dignity, free thinking and free movements,progress,equality and human welfare.They are quite comfortable, though, in putting up with mounting human suffering, pouerty, of human rights, illiterarcy, injustice and backwardness. It is time that this hypocrisy is seen for what it is.

The religious task is not to put the clock back. It is, instead to engage energy society and energy age from a pro-active outlook so as to infuse it with the values that are necessary to safeguard it health and to maximize the welfare of it people.

So what we can say Hierarchy, the tradition bound clergy are more keen to retain their control our the faithful than to equip therm to live amidst the challenges of times.By nature and culture, these people in all ages in general and culture, these people in all ages in general and in the ancient and medieval period in particular, are very much allergic to the ideas of thought and extression.

Untile the ordinary man is handed over the tools of objective thinking, analysis and decision – making, the archaic and lamentable situation is unlikely to change for the better.

Bright Chigozie Nnabuihe (Nigeria)
Caste and Social Discrimination among the Igbo People of Nigeria

Caste or biological stratification, albeit not a common universal phenomenon, is a social fact among certain world communities. The Igbo nation of Nigeria is one of such communities. Earlier researches have shown the subject matter an issue most pronounced among Indians, spotted with varying degrees of acceptance among some communities in Africa other than the Igbo; but not much appears to have been known about the phenomenon among the Igbo people of Nigeria.

My paper takes a keen interest to explicate what obtains in the Igbo society concerning caste system and how it operates. It identifies five distinct caste groups in Igbo society; discusses each in terms of their social,economic, political, and religious limitations; as well as the impact of these inhibitions and contend that caste system exists. My paper goes further

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to reveal the origin of each stratum; explicate their level of acceptance and why the system has defied all legislative laws, court orders, religious precepts, moral condemnations and public outcries aimed at stamping it out.

The report is based on the result of indept fieldwork carried out around Nkwere, Nsukka, and Owere culture areas of the Igbo nation mapped out for the study.

S. Pustovalov (Russia)
The Estate-Caste System and Northern Pontic Area Archaeology

The estate-caste societies were often phenomenon in an antiquity. The estate-caste system (ECS) on advantage arises as a product of interaction between ancient civilisational centers and the primitive periphery in the societies of complex ethnic structure.

The essence it lays on an intersection of *varna* and ethnos signs. All signs of *varna* are present in the caste: professional definite, hard position in social hierarchy, heredity of the status etc. The occurrence of the caste system is connected with selection of professional layers of a *varna* type in society. With the ethnos the caste is linked by endogamy, specific cults, stereotype of behaviour, difference in meal, wear, language, race, again a heredity of the status.

The association of the independent *varna* and ethnos systems into ECS passed in conditions of polyethnic society originating as a result of a gain.

The social unequality between the conquerors and conquested peoples, the high prestige of one sorts of labour and disrespecte other in a complex with advanced ethnic self-consciousness caused ECS to life. The psyhological basis of the derivation of ECS was the prohibition of compatriots oppression. At the same time it was authorized not only to oppress representatives of other ethnosis, but also it was encouraged.

The early caste system is traced in India of the Aryas epoch, on surrounding territories, in the many African societies, in the ancient China (nose), in the ancient Greece, in the ancient Egypt. The similar system can be traced in the ancient Iran society (*senar*), in the Jewish society of the 1st mill. B.C. (*gerim* or *toshawim*), in the ancient Mesopotamia (*shushanu*). As the vestiges of caste tradition it is possible to consider the prohibition of marriages between privileged layers and lower groups of population in the Sasanide Iran. The caste vestiges are so hardy they are, for example, in the USA.

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The catacomb society of the Northern Pontic Area was organized by the ECS principle.

All the conditions of the caste system were forming in Scythia. The ties between the Kemi-Oba people and the pit grave culture people are interesting. Perhaps the Novo-Danilovka people may be consider as the protocaste. The ECS may be discovered at the Chernjahov culture people, Khazaria and medieval Hungary.

Thus, the model of the ECS can be used in social constructions on the materials of the polyethnic societies.

Rowena Robinson (Indian Institute of Technology, Powai, Mumbai)
Hierarchy or Power: Narratives of Retributive Caste Violence in Village India

This paper will examine the tales of retributive violence that have emerged in recent decades from different parts of rural India. Retributive caste violence emerges when marriages or elopements across caste lines are attempted or when the lowest castes defy and refuse to perform servile duties towards the high castes. Retributive violence has been seen in many parts of rural India, but especially in the north-west of the country.

Such violence, public hangings or beatings, has been often reported in the press but rarely investigated further and legal action has very rarely been taken. This is mostly because of the inability to get people to act as witnesses. The public nature of such violence as well as the veil of secrecy covering it among the rural people attracts analytical attention.

Scholars, sociologists and anthropologists, have often written about caste and village 'panchayats' and the early monographs, of the 1950s and 1960s were full of references to the kinds of disputes they addressed and judgements they delivered. However, little reference is made to the brutal violence now being witnessed. And we must ask ourselves if this is a new phenonomen in the context of inter-caste relations in modern India.

If so, the examination of retributive violence will have to be made against the background of the radical socio-economic and political transformations affecting contemporary rural India. Certain scholars on caste have asserted that in modern India caste has shifted from being a wholistic phenomenon best understood, in Dumontian terms, in the framework of 'hierarchy' to a more fragmented phenomenon to be comprehended within the model of competitive political relations or 'interests'.

It has been suggested that the forms of caste violence being viewed today are part of this transformation. However, it shall be the argument of

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this paper that it is far too simplistic to view inter-caste relations as moving from a traditional model of harmonious hierarchy to one of modern competitive politics. Conflict existed in the past as well, and there were modes of dealing with it. The modern forms of violence that we see are clearly expressions of power, in a raw and brutal sense, but they have considerable symbolic force. Their public nature and the silence they manage to evoke (witnesses can rarely be found) speak of the appropriation of the powers of the state by the local managers of conflict. A peculiar cohesion is obtained at the local level in the management of silence. The state is kept out and the 'traditional' rights of rural elites to handle disputes is asserted. In other words, the violence that we see partakes of both worlds, the modern and the traditional. It is a result of the complex clash of these worlds, not a simple consequence of the new taking over the old. We need therefore more sophisticated ways of understanding the place of caste, gender and power in rural India in order to comprehend the 'how' and the 'why' of retributive violence.

V.S. Sreedhara (Vijaya College, Bangalore, India)
Contesting Hierarchies: Locating Community-Based Conflicts between Civil Society and Nation State

The relations between power and hierarchy have received a good deal of critical attention, most notably in the writings of Foucault and Gramsci. The concepts of 'micro-technologies of power' and 'hegemony' have been found particularly useful for a critical appraisal of the postcolonial predicament, as can be seen in the writings on subaltern historiography. In fact, the vast network of capillaries of power and its insidious operations have significantly altered our perception of nation state - civil society relationship in postcolonial societies. This relationship resonates with contradictions and ambivalence peculiar to traditional societies like India which have gained access to modern nationalism through colonialism. Indian nationalism's link with its long traditional past as well as its claims to the Euro-centric model of the modern nation has led to what Anthony Smith calls the 'dual legitimisation': a continuous and simultaneous evocation of cultural and civic nationalism. This dual legitimisation is the central problematic in the contestation for or against power and hierarchy in civil society.

History of Indian civilization is also the history of the struggle against power and hierarchy as can be expected in a densely stratified casteist society. The earlier struggles against caste hierarchy and power were undertaken largely in the realm of civil society, by an appeal to a certain

spiritual religiosity and divine power as can be seen in the Bhakti movement of the 12th and 16th centuries. It is only during, and more acutely after, the Independence movement that we see the site of struggles being shifted to the realm of the modern state. The shift is neither absolute nor tacit, for even now the struggles for emancipation, empowerment and identity continue to work under the rubric of dual legitimisation, drawing from the relative strengths of both traditional cultural ties and the modern nation state.

The paper tries to examine the latter, by analysing caste-based community struggles for identity and power within civil society in the South Indian State of Karnataka. It will be argued that their identity politics draws sustenance from the rational language of rights as well as from traditional non-rational cultural practices and belief systems.

PANEL VII
Problem of the State and Its Criteria
Convenor: *Dmitri N. Lielukhine* (Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)

The so-called "conceptual crisis" is one of the major features of the present-day situation in social sciences. This crisis reveals itself not in the specifics of research only but in their practical refraction, too. Disorder of the terminological apparatus complicates significantly concrete research, disputes and discussions inverted not only deep into a history, but also towards modern situation in society, the analysis of actual problems of its development, formation of programs for its modernization.

However, dissolving of some fundamental categories of the theory of history seems to be a natural process, not so much connected with dismantling of dogmatic ideological constructions but first and foremost with accumulation of immense amount of information on social transformations in past and present, with active work of researchers (historians, social anthropologists and others) that has resulted in further deepening of the vision of pathways and laws of historical process. The work on specification of the most general categories of the theory of history might become a possible means of overcoming the conceptual crisis. This work would promote a more adequate recognition and interpretation of historical facts as well as more strict analysis of many present-day phenomena and processes.

The approach to the notion of "state", the definition of this phenomenon employed by this or that scholar doing a case study usually stems from one of the theories of state origins. The theorists which assert the idea of the state's nature as "coercive and exploiter" (usually associated with Marxists), connect its appearance to the necessity of protection of the "ruling classes'" interests and to institutionalisation of social and economic stratification. Such scholars are inclined to see the state as a "tool of class domination" (F. Engels, M. Fried, L. Krader, etc.). Their opponents (E. Service, R. Lowie, etc.) proceed from a functional sight at the state relating its appearance to a certain form of the social contract. These traditions (especially in their extreme versions) reflect two different ideologies concentrating attention on different aspects of the same phenomenon (appropriateness of state appearance in the process of complication and development of social structure, a society's needs in organization intended to adjust social relations, to provide coordination of multidirectional interests and a mechanism of conflicts resolution, appropriate strengthening and protection of social inequality, exploitation, etc.). There also is a natural tendency to reconciliation of the

two specified above tendencies. In particular, it is evident in the works by H. Claessen and P. Skalnik, R. Cohen and their followers.

Notwithstanding the diversity of concepts, the nature of the state, its origins, functions, reasons for appearance, place and role in society, the state as the specific type of social organization is invariably understood as institution having similar characteristics. The three following basic criteria are usually meant:

1. Existence of the administration, "state machinery", a group of managers, obtaining means of subsistence and occupying an appropriate position in society exceptionally due to exercising certain administrative functions.

2. Division of population according to the territorial principle which is not conterminous with that by kin.

3. Existence of taxes and taxation.

The mentioned above (or other criteria) enable to represent the state as a specific type of social organization, to distinguish it from other types, to judge about formation of the essentially new organization replacing previous forms of social life. Precisely this organization, the institutions created during its formation which assisting to carry out objectively necessary mediative, redistributive, protective and other functions within the framework of vital activities of society, researchers usually denote as the state.

Both of the mentioned above traditions of state defining, as has been noted by J. Gledhill are based on similar "Western" vision of administrative authority enclosed to political territorial association (frequently equated to "society"). As to our mind, many aspects of representations about such criteria characteristic of representatives of various schools, look disputable and quite often cause doubts as for example identification of the state and state machinery, state and state administration, opposition of "kin" and "state", "state" and "communal", etc.

It is important to note that the doubts in adequacy of traditional definition of the state and its attributes have been expressed recently by a number of researchers including specialists in ancient and medieval history because shortcomings of the respective concepts become especially evident to historians studying preindustrial societies. The situation cannot be saved by attempts of social anthropologists to transform the concept by proposing models of gradual transition to the state (the "early state", "prestate" or other forms of political organization). Despite their undoubtedly important contribution to elaboration of the problem of state formation, just the general vision of the state (of the "mature state" in the majority of concepts) remains the weakest part of those theories.

It is especially remarkable that experts in classical history has been joined recently by scholars studying industrial states. This fact does not look occasional as far as the respective problem is important and expedient for the analysis of political processes in modern societies. For example, popular reasoning about the functions the state should carry out are not always supplemented by analysis of the mechanisms necessary for their realization. The mechanism of appearance of such important for political life concepts, as "state interests", "state policy", etc. are remarkable in the context of usual understanding of the "state" as a category. This problem seems to be actual for correct understanding of integrative tendencies in the modern world (for example for understanding of reasons for and mechanisms of formation and evolution of regional and continental transnational organizations).

Taking into account complexity of the selected theme, its specificity, abundance of existing theories and researches, it would be reasonable to exclude during the discussion a purely speculative statement of the problem of state and its criteria. In the meantime, we proceed from the general idea of the state as a universal form of socio-political organization.

In the framework of the present panel it could turn out productive to discuss the problem of place and role of traditional social collectives, their organizations in different states, an analysis of evolution of intercommunal administration, of its complex and inconsistent process of separation from the initial collectives. It would allow to present coherently two aspects of transformations - on the one hand, the society's movement towards association into more and more extensive collectives and, on the other hand, evolution of the society's socio-political structure, of relations within an hierarchy of such collectives. Reference to later periods of history when the real machinery of state has been forming and cardinal changes in relations between such collectives and in each of them have been taking place, look logical too.

Joan Manuel Cabezas López (Catalan Institute of Anthropology [ICA];
Center for African Studies, Barcelona [CEA], Spain)
Ethnogenesis and Politogenesis:
Social Identity, Frontier and Ethnosystem as an Ongoing Dynamic

Our paramount aim is to sample the embeddedness and dialectic interaction between ethnos systems, frontier realities and ethnogenesis, stressing the absolute centrality of power relationships. We will talk about frontier in the broad sense of social delimitation, including mark areas, frontiers, borders and boundaries. On the other hand, we will refer to

politogenesis linked to ethnogenesis and the frontier constructions, not only to state genesis, but referring to the "political" in broad sense of the word, inextricably related with the communication processes generated by social systems. Ethnogenesis and politogenesis often take place in areas where social interactions are highly densified, the frontiers, because the starting mechanism of each cultural group is centred on the relationship implementation. Moreover, each individualised space tends to generate an ethnos, and an ethnos is blured, at the beginning, with a space; and the territorialisation process endowed by the social system implies the building of diacritical frontiers. These frontiers have two specific functions: an homeostatic mechanism that regulates and filters the relations with the environment (then, a semic tool used by political collectivities), and a particular field of cultural interaction that allows social communication and, then, may be a place of new systemic structuration and social genesis. To sample our theoretical position, we will take examples from Subsaharian Africa and Eastern Europe, areas with a strong frontier character and, then, with a large number of ethnosystem cristallisations. In these areas we can see how political frontiers contribute to the genesis and durability of social systems, and how they are in dialectical relation with the ethnic fission and fusion processes.

Claudio Cioffi-Revilla (University of Colorado, Boulder, USA)
Origins of Political Systems: Modeling and Comparative Analysis from a Political Science Perspective

For the past decades, anthropological archaeologists and other social scientists have theorized and collected an impressive amount of cross-cultural data on the topic of origins of government, the rise of chiefdoms and states, and the like. However, to date, little progress has been made developing a formal model of polity formation that is both theoretically valid and empirically supported. This paper presents a new model of initial political complexity based on the theory of political uncertainty, the theory of collective action, and other pertinent principles from political science and related disciplines that are not frequently used by anthropological archaeologists and evolutionary theorists. The model is based on events, decisions, and games and has both analytical and computational versions. The model is tested for the set of cases (regions/periods) where agriculture first developed, in some cases also yielding the first pristine polities.

Leonid E. Grinin ("Uchitel'" Publishing House, Volgograg, Russia)
General Context of Social Evolution
at the Early State Formation

For solution of a range of political anthropological problems, it is necessary to consider the genesis of the Early State (ES) in the general context of social evolutionary processes coeval with it. This could assist to appreciate more exactly the correlation of general evolution and other reasons for the state appearance. Evidently, the ES formation is connected with general changes caused by passing from foraging to productive forms of economy such as growth in population and surplus product, urbanization, social stratification, amplifying of intersocietal contacts.

All this resulted in complication of societies. Hence an objective necessity for search of new means of societies' organization and of new forms of interaction between them arose. However it was happening differently in different societies. In some of them the administrative aspects came to the fore while in other these were social, religious, military or other ones. Most often a mixture of political and other factors dominated. In many cases the evolution was simply taking form of hypertrophization of ancient institutions and relations.

So, complication of social structure, exploitation of neighbours and waging wars, development of commerce, property inequality and private property, amplifying of the part of religious cults and corporations, etc. could be a sufficient alternative to merely administrative and political decisions of the above-mentioned evolutionary task. In these terms, the ES is only one of many forms of the new organization of society and intersocietal interactions. Polities based on other principles than the state but successfully solving the same problems can be considered the analogs to the state. Evolutionary advantages of the ES over its analogs could be ulterior during very a long time.

The character of politogenesis depends significantly on the time of state formation because the appearance of technical, cultural and other novations reduces the threshold of "requirements" to the conditions necessary for it. Closer to contemporaneity, easier this process goes. Therefore, the first states had appeared only at an exclusive combinations of conditions (in particular, only in sites of high farming, in fruitful river bottomlands), and then states arose in very different areas.

Yuriy M. Kobishchanov (Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
Social Complexes

Mausse, Lips, Herskowitz and other anthropologists had studied basic features of the archaic social complexes such as the harvesting complex, the cattle complex, the don complex, etc. I observed the phenomenon of the gafol-feorm type as a social complex of the greater feudal social and historical formation which combined some economic, political, judical, social, ritual, and religious functions, in my book Poljud'e: javlenie otechestvennoj i vsemirnoj istorii tsivilizatsij (Feorm: An Event of National and World History of Civilizations [Moscow, ROSSPEN, 1995]). I also employed this method in the studies of the communal and cast systems as a social complex in my other works. I described the distant trade complex with its routs and stations, merchant ships, caravans, bazars, warehouses, caravansarays and relating culture and structures in the new work Ocherki istorii rasprostranenija islamskoj tsivilizatsii (Essays of the Islamic civilization spreading), Vol. I (Moscow, ROSSPEN, 2001).

Flexible interaction between social complex functions and corresponding social institutions is characteristic of social complexes of the greater feudal formation. Every function is connected with one or more social institutions, and one of them plays the central part in the complex. It is the sacred king in the case of the gafol-feorm complex, superior and pure casts in the case of the communities-and-casts system, traditional merchant corporations in the case of distant trade. The social and political institutions carry out functions of more than one social complex. All (or majority) of these institutions were often present in early-feudal societies in which there were no corresponding social complexes. On the other hand, the institutions were connected with some other social complexes. They were the points of interaction and interviening of the complexes.

Collective projects for the study of the archaic and greater feudal (as well as capitalist) formations' social complexes are utterly actual for the present-day cultural anthropology.

Dmitri N. Lielukhine (Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
Structure of State in Ancient and Early Medieval India by Epigraphic Data

1. The notion of state is always reduced, obviously or implicitly, to its uniformal criteria. These criteria represent the state as a system and are used as a conceptual background for systematization of information and research. Analysis of their formation and evolution, the features of different institutions which distinguish the state society from the non-state one define the contents of researches on the state.

2. These criteria formulated in European philosophical tradition of the 19th century, in the 20th century theories were often reduced to the appearance of state apparatus, bureaucracy (what is sometimes directly identified with the state), of administrative-territorial division of state, and taxation. These theories are based on the mono-centric vision of state and society.

3. As to my mind, the logic of socio-political structure formation in ancient and early medieval India was determined simultaneously by two major tendencies: towards formation of the polycentric model (with preservation of a set of various, including hierarchisized, autonomous political centers), and the monocentric organization (one political center, government, sovereignty and so on). The proportion between the two models differed from one historical period and region of the country to another. which parity was displayed in various periods of a history of country and within the various territories differently.

4. Interrelation between and mutual influence of the territorial and kin relations had remained a significant factor in the history of India for a long time. The *territorial community* and its institutions had remained the most important structural element of the ancient and early medieval Indian state.

5. The majority of ancient and early medieval states in India were associations of territories controlled by different dependent rulers, aristocrats on the one hand, and territories of communities and quasicommunal units on the other hand. The communities formed territorial divisions of the state though they had not been so by origin and nature.

6. The fulfillment of the state administration's functions by local leaders, chiefs or representatives of various institutions, including communities and quasicommunities, is a significant feature of the socio-political structure and states in ancient and early medieval India. Ignoring this, a researcher, gets in the "trap of the sovereignty theory" which proceeds exceptionally from the monocentric conception of authority and administration.

С.Ю. Малков (Академия военных наук, Москва, Россия)
S.Yu. Malkov (Academy of Military Sciences, Moscow, Russia)
***Принципы логико-математического моделирования
процессов социальной самоорганизации**[*]*
***Principles of Logical-Mathematic Modelling of
Social Self-Organization Processes***

В работе проведен анализ возможностей использования логико-математического моделирования для исследования процессов самоорганизации эволюции различных социальных систем. Основные результаты анализа следующие.

1. Для социальных систем (СС) характерны закономерности, присущие нелинейным динамическим системам общего вида. Конкретизация закономерностей основана на учете специфических особенностей СС, к которым относятся следующие:

(i) *многоэлементность* систем, причем изначально (то есть физически или генетически) не существует явных преимуществ одних элементов перед другими, различия возникают и развиваются в процессе социальных взаимодействий;

(ii) *уязвимость* элементов систем к внешним дестабилизирующим воздействиям. Для того, чтобы выжить, элементам необходимо проявлять *активность* в борьбе за существование;

(iii) как следствие, стремление элементов *максимизировать индивидуальную "функцию полезности"* и добиваться постоянного пополнения имеющейся у них ресурсной базы;

(iv) *ограниченность* доступной к использованию ресурсной базы;

(v) как следствие, *антагонистичность* (противоречивость) интересов элементов систем, обусловленная необходимостью борьбы за ограниченный ресурс;

(vi) нелинейный характер взаимодействия элементов системы, характеризующийся положительной обратной связью: в конкурентной борьбе побеждает сильнейший (имеющий больше преимуществ), в результате чего становится еще сильнее (власть рождает власть, деньги делают деньги и т.п.). *Нелинейный процесс увеличения преимуществ* ограничен либо общим количеством ресурса, либо индивидуальными возможностями субъекта освоить и обработать приобретенный ресурс, а также обеспечить его охрану от посягательств конкурентов;

(vii) *пороговый* характер процессов: реальная отдача от усилий, приложенных для достижения какой-либо цели, возникает лишь тогда,

когда усилия превысят определенное пороговое значение. До этого отдача от прилагаемых усилий практически отсутствует;

(viii) *инерционность* поведения субъектов, наличие некоторого временного запаздывания реакции субъектов на изменение внешних условий;

(ix) способность элементов СС к осознанному *целеполаганию* и к *рефлексии* по поводу своих действий и действий других субъектов.

2. Нелинейный характер взаимодействия субъектов и ограниченность ресурсов (свойства [vi] и [iv]) определяют специфику динамических процессов в СС: диалектику развития отражает не формула "тезис – антитезис – синтез", а формула "тезис – антитезис – временный компромисс". *Противоречия перманентны*. Они не "снимаются" в процессе развития СС, а существуют всегда, являясь причиной *хаоса на микроуровне*. На макроуровне реализуется *временный компромисс,* формируемый внешними условиями и имеющимися ресурсными ограничениями. Когда они меняются, динамическое равновесие нарушается, начинается новая борьба субъектов с выходом на новый компромиссный уровень.

3. Общий принцип социальной динамики: *хаос на микроуровне – порядок на макроуровне*, пробуется все, что возможно (не запрещено какими-либо объективными законами), но закрепляется в виде социальных структур только то, что устойчиво к внешним и внутренним дестабилизирующим процессам и воздействиям.

4. Обеспечение устойчивости СС (необходимое для "выживания" системы) в условиях наличия перманентных противоречий между ее элементами (свойство [v]) является нетривиальной задачей. СС путем проб и ошибок вырабатывают механизмы сдержек и противовесов, *компенсации внутренних напряжений*, позволяющие достичь устойчивости системы в целом. К таким механизмам относятся:

властное регулирование отношений между элементами, осуществляемое органами управления СС (управление хаосом);

ограничение произвола действий элементов СС с помощью законов, нормативных установлений, требующих исполнения и направленных на сглаживание имеющихся противоречий (ограничение хаоса);

идеологические и социально-психологические средства сдерживания агрессивных интенций: религиозные императивы, нормы нравственности и морали и т.п. (сдерживание хаоса).

Те СС, которым удается выработать эффективную систему компенсации внутренних напряжений, выживают. Те СС, которым это не удается, в конечном счете распадаются или гибнут в конкурентной

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борьбе с другими системами. Конкретный вид системы компенсаций, обеспечивающий устойчивость рассматриваемого общества, характеризует его социокультурную специфику и отличие от других обществ.

5. Для СС характерна возможность *многовариантного развития*, обусловленная тем, что имеется, как правило, не одно, а несколько квазиустойчивых состояний (аттракторов) при заданных внешних условиях. Система через какое-то время окажется в одном из аттракторов (это свойство называется *эквифинальностью*), однако в котором из них – зависит от многих факторов, в том числе как от предыстории СС, так и от целенаправленной деятельности ее органа управления.

На основе данных положений проведен анализ процессов социальной самоорганизации в аграрных, кочевых и индустриальных обществах.

Mikhail P. Ostromenskiy (Novossibirsk, Russia)
Parties in Interventionistic State

Interventionistic model of the state is, perhaps, the most widespread one within the modern world. Russia clearly has gone in this direction too.

In the interventionistic states the parties, being a major element of representative democracy, essentially differ from classical examples of political and ideological organisations of the citizens.

The characteristic feature of the party in the interventionistic state is manifested in the narrow (socially and financially) representation force of groups of the population with the unique purpose - redistribution of public product in interests of these stratums. Therefore interventionistic parties can neither represent broad stratums of population, nor be nation-wide parties. In the titles, manifests and slogans they try to designate precisely that very group of the population, which representative they are.

As all agree with base principles of society, the construction of such a party proceeds not on an ideological basis, or proximity of interests principles. The concept of ideology is alien to interventionistic parties. The citizens during elections are compelled to sacrifice one interest for the sake of another, selecting between parties, represented in the selective list. It is one of the reasons of low level of the voters' participation in all elections in all interventionistic countries.

Decrease of the role and authority of parliament. The main strength of interventionistic parties lie in their ability to co-opt their representatives into governmental structures. The role of parliament has been restricted just to

one item – approval of the budget and redistribution of money resources between the articles of the budget. The main bulk of the laws are prepared and issued by executive structures of the state.

Appropriation by individual parties of huge layers of public consciousness. So the "green" parties attribute the care for ecological safety of the population only to themselves.

Interventionistic parties frequently declare themselves to be representatives of more broad social groups, than it is in reality. Interventionistic parties can be formed from several social groups with close interests. Then inside the party rather independent fractions constantly struggling for power will arise. A vivid example of a political formation of a similar type is the Japanese Liberal-Democratic Party. Along this paths the unifying Russian parties "Unity" and "Fatherland" appear to be moving too.

Vladimir A. Popov (Peter-the-Great Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography, Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg)
Power of Tradition and Traditions of Power

The paper is devoted to exposition and investigation of the major determinants (economic, social, and psychological) providing the power of tradition, the main regulative mechanism of political relations in archaic societies.

Among the economic determinants under scope are: economic aspects of polygamy, labor conscription governed on behalf of the leader, the "leader's treasures" as presentation of his power, prestige economy as a means of enlarging the leader's authority, inheritance of goods as a mechanism of reproduction of political relations in the society (including mechanisms of levirate and also the specific of majorat, minorat and the *ndugu* rule).

Among the social determinants the following are specified: the age-and-sex differentiations and labor units as the background of "initial" social stratification of the society, social kinship (clan, community, extended family), social-and-age or generational (age classes, age groups), and social sex or gender (men's societies, men's houses, women's associations, secret societies) units. Such principles of organization of political institutions in the collective of relatives are studied as linearity and laterality and first of all as relationship between matri- and patriforms.

The psycho-physiologically determined mechanisms of the habit and taboo as inner regulators of human behavior, as well as the phenomena of public opinion as an intra form of social control are opposed to each other.

Because psychological foundation of early ideology is the so called "complex way of thinking", the correlation of social psychology and traditional ideology as well as the idea of "magic force" as a reflection of magic thinking (relation between the magic force and power) is analyzed in the paper. The problem of interaction of power and the first social norms which originated in the course of anthropogenesis, is analyzed too. These norms are: the access to women and food for men, taboo as the border between positive and negative sides of social norms. The individual behavioral acts had formed the background for the appearance of the first social norms. Imitation and suggestion are the main psychological mechanisms supporting fastening of these acts as social norms; normality and abnormality are psychological subjects of power in traditional society.

Anatole V. Riassov (Institut de l'Asie et l"Afrique, Moscou, Russie)
L'Etat vu par M.Kaddafi et les révolutionnaires radicaux Russes. Analyse comparative

La conception de "pouvoir droit du peuple" est réalisé en Libye par Muammar Kaddafi après la révolution de 1969 comme alternative par rapport à l'Etat. La "Troisième Théorie Mondiale" de Kaddafi est implantée à la base da la structure des tribus kabiles pour qu'elle soit vitale sur le sol libyen, où les liens de tribu sont parfois plus structurale que les institution étatiques.

D'abord, M.Kaddafi a voulu utiliser le model de "socialisme arabe" de Gamal Abdel Naser, président egiptien, mais les conditions de la Libye n'etaient pas les memes qu'en Egypte, alors en quete de nouveaux models sociales, le leader libyen s'est adresse aux idees des autres philisophes dans le domaine politique, y compris les travaux des revolutionnaires radicaux russes : Michel Bakounine, Petr Kropotkine, Vladimir Lenin.

Alors on peut comparer les points de vue des anarchistes et communistes russes avec les idees de M.Kaddafi, trouver le commun et le specifique dans leurs pensees sur la notion d'etat, sur la possibilite d'organiser la societe sans structures etatiques. Bien sur notre but est aussi de voire si la conception de " Djamahiriya " realise vraiment cette organisastion non-etatique.

Les criteres de cet analyse sont la comparaison des idees sur la plan des opinions sur l'etat comme institut, sur les systemes politiques, sur le principe de division des branches du pouvoir, sur les partis politiques, sur la question nationnale etc.

En conclusion on peut dire, que la troisieme theorie mondiale represente une image eclectique des points de vue communiste et anarchiste sur le

probleme en question, le phenomene de Libye contemporaine n'est pas unique et on peut rouver les traces des idees de Kaddafi.

Alexei S. Shchavelev (Moscow, Russia)
Kin Suzerainty of the Rurikovichs Dynasty
(Structures and Attributes of Authorities in Ancient Rus')

The system of the political authority in ancient Rus' during the 11–14th centuries included two metasystem levels. The first level consisted of local self-governed urban (*ulitsa*) and rural (*verv'*) communities; foreign tributaries; special commercial and military organizations; feudal (*boyarskie*) possessions formed in the 11–12th centuries. The second one was the prince level. The second source of economic potential of the Ruricovichs' power was the tribute imposed on the first system of political authority. Prince's warriors (*druzhina*) and church corporation were included in both spheres. Then, since 12th century the church started emancipation and *druzhina* dissolute in administrative structures and lost it's corporative identity.

Absolute monopoly of the Ruric's clan to possess the supreme sovereign power and authority in Rus' and an exclusive right to get a part of the family lands were basic foundations of kin suzerainty (*corpus fratrum*). Any other members of the king's families had no right to live in Rus' without special permision.

Evolution of authority structures in ancient Rus' enjoyed the following stages:

the 9th –the begining of the 11th centuries — "two-leveled military state".

the 11th century — the formation of kin suzerainty, conflicts with princes warriors (*druzhina*), domination of clan's values.

the 12th –13th centuries — convergence of Ruricovich's dynasty's authority and the authorities of regional elites.

the 13th–14th centuries — disintegration of Rus', compensatory integration of regional powers.

Serguei P. Shchavelev (Kursk State University of Medicine, Russia)
The Annalistic Legend About Kiy as a Model of Early State Formation

Usually the story from "*Povest' vremennikh let*" about Kiy and his relatives was a subject of scolar's discusions. They tried to solve the problems of extent of it's legendary character and etimology of their names. But the

description of their fate in Russian annals reflected the typical stages of the evolution of power relationship of Eastern Slavs and their neighbours.

In the earliest stage the *polian* tribes were akefal: the authority of a leader was limited by the territory of his group, leaders were elected by members of these groups and the power was kept within the family.

One can observe the historical primarity of towns with fortresses in comparison with villages. The special fortresses gave a possibility to protect from foreing enemies and neighbouring clans or, after some time, from other families of their own clan. The foundation of a fortress marked the next level of the development of such communes, when one clan claim the authority in a whole tribe. This claim had a material form and symbol *i.e.* the rise and the modification of fortresses. After successful wars and welth accumulation a family headed the whole tribe. Their fortress became the capital, and Kiy and his relatives became leaders of the tribe.

According to archeological sources the same sequence of power hierarchization can be reconstructed in the other Slavonic regions.

The definition of such model of politogenesis as "primary" or "early" seems to be rather conventional.

Victor M. Victorin (Astrakhan, Russia)
Phenomena and Development Proceedings of Ethnopotestal Regulation: Areal, Stadial and Informational Approaches

In Russian science "potestal relationship" means the power of pre-political and non-political type. "Customary law", which is the earliest and inner social regulator of situational and later normative character, is connected with it.

They worked in the past and so they do nowadays all over the world, though they differ in a specific ethnic community especially in everyday life.

The study of these phenomena is urgent and actual. They often indicate the hierarchy of communities and at the same time are elements of developed policy-status systems.

Thus, the "areal" method of approach (S.P. Tolstov, N.N. Cheboksarov, A.Ya. Gurevich, L.S. Vassiliev, I.E. Sinitsina, so L.I. Lavrov, G.E. Markov and their followers, A.A. Popov, Yu.M. Kobishchanov, Kh.M. Dumanov) give a possibility to represent the universalism of these phenomena and their outstanding ethnic and regional manifestations.

The "stadial" approach (N.I. Ziber, M.M.Kowalewsky, S.A. Golunsky, Yu.V. Bromley, Yu.I. Semyonov, V.A. Alexandrov, S.S. Alexeev, A.B. Vengerov, A.I. Pershits, D.A. Kerimov, N.N. Kradin) deals with

correlation of evolutionary stages of ethno-potestal and customary law structures with the part they play in the modern situation.

The "informational" ("communicative", or "in-formal") approach (B.F. Porshnev, L.M. Drobizheva, S.A. Arutyunov, L.E. Kubbel, V.V. Ivanov and V.N. Toporov, V.V. Pimenov, N.R. Malikova) gives a possibility to use the advantages of the two previous methods and to eliminate their divergences. It also gives an opportunity to examine the supplementary character of potestal and legal systems in different countries, ethnic groups, and economic and cultural communities.

The spreading of potestal relationship and customary-law phenomena, their phasic changes (especially on the threshold of a state and its first development steps, mountainous, nomadic and other special ethnic spheres), their effects on consciousness, behavior and communication of people require much attention and deep study. Lawmakers and politicians have begun to make into account these important latent factors.

Damir A. Yagofarov (Institute of Pedagogical Jurisprudence, Ekaterinburg, Russia)
Human Law as a Criterion of Contemporary Statehood

1. One of the clearest tendencies of civilization development is the stable increase of the state' role in the society life. It is easy to understand such position, according that, firstly, the formation of civil society is impossible without statehood reinforcement of the appropriate society and, secondly, the establishment of contemporary statehood is the main condition of formed civil society. In this case it is necessary to reassess the traditional interpretation of civil society and it's elements. It becomes senselessly to oppose civil society and state.

2. One of the most important traits of contemporary statehood is the presence (development, functioning) of human law. The main element of this concept is the optimum combination of objective and subjective components of development and acceptance of the legislative act. There is an optimum combination of statehood and civil society in such law.

3. The essential signs of the human law are the following: a) it reflects both subjective will of the subjects taking part in legislative activity and objective will of the society members; b) human law is passed by overwhelming majority of subjects taking part in legislative activity; c) human law combines juridical and moral sides of society life. Moreover, on the one hand, the moral component shouldn't have temporary character, on the other hand, the formal components of legislative act shouldn't fix such

kind of destructive deviations; d) human law shouldn't contain double standards with regard to goals, tasks, methods etc.; e) human law doesn't contradict the other legislative acts including international laws, but at the same time it shouldn't copy them; f) human law is a creative rework of natural law bearing in mind the living conditions and spiritual factors of the society.

PANEL VIII
Civilizational Significance of Empires in the History of Hierarchical Societies of West and East
Convenors: *Janos M. Bak* (Central European University, Budapest, Hungary)
Patrick J. Geary (University of California Los Angeles, USA)
Viktor Komarov (State Naval Academy, St. Petersburg, Russia)

Mediaeval Europe inherited from (pagan and Christian) Rome the idea of one empire (imperium), outside of which only uncivilised and unorganised "Barbarians" exist. This notion was already challenged by the various divisions of the Empire (with one or two emperors at the peak and subordinate rulers below) in the third and fourth centuries, but was essentially put to trial after the establishment of the Western "Roman" empire of Charlemagne. That one, too, was built on the concept of one empire, but soon had to face the reality of independent and (at most theoretically subordinated) parts; only to be, by the eleventh century, surrounded by kingdoms with more or less complete disregard for the supremacy of the Roman (German) emperor. By the thirteenth century, some of their kings claimed to be "emperors in their own realm" (i. e. accepting no higher authority). The self-proclaimed heir of the antique Roman Empire-Byzantium-solved this dilemma by the construct of the "family of kings", while the West experimented with different explanations. Moreover, the monarchical rule in the single kingdoms was increasingly forced to accommodate local powers (dukes, princes, *de facto* independent city-states and counties), also claiming something of sovereignty. These originated either in traditional claims to local rule or emerged in the periods of weak central rule or other necessities for "self-help".

In this panel, we should like to discuss the modes of theoretical and practical solutions to these conflicting theories and claims, from the oft-debated *Zweikaiserproblem* (East and West) to the relationship of central authorities to regional ones (such as provincial assemblies vs estates general, etc.). It might be valuable to confront these European mediaeval and early modern arrangements with theoretically unchallenged imperial structures, such as the Chinese or pre-Columbian American empires. We invite both historians and anthropologists to address these issues, while the organisers will attempt to present and discuss the experience of Western and Central Europe in hitherto less explored aspects.

Janos M. Bak (Central European University, Budapest, Hungary)
Rex Imperator *in* Regno Suo*?*

The principle of empire-like "sovereignty," as pronounced first by the kings of France implied, in my reading, not only that the mediaeval kingdoms did not acknowledge any secular power above themselves, but also that the king claimed to be the only power within the boundaries of his realm. In my paper, I wish to query this theory in regard to the late mediaeval European kingdoms of central Europe, i. e. for the Hungarian-Croatian and the Polish-Lithuanian "empires." In the sense of the early mediaeval understanding, that a ruler of more than one *regnum* is *imperator*, they qualified for this title, even if they never used it officially. (Bohemia-Moravia was a different case, as it was the only "semi-independent kingdom" within the German-Roman Empire.) I wish to investigate the powers of local authorities, such as the noble county as well as the banates and the Transylvanian voivodship in Hungary, and the regional *sejmiki* in Poland. I will argue that because of the traditions of the noble communities, based on customary law, the kings' power was limited in many respects, above all, in defining the circle of privileged persons and their properties. I shall try to delineate the fields in which the rulers were in fact "emperors" and in which not. Comparing this type of hierarchy with the internal hierarchies of power in other polities, I hope to be able to contribute to the issues under review.

Yuri E. Berezkin (Institute of the History of Material Culture, Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg)
"Iconography of Terror" in Early Complex Societies

Profound differences exist between iconography of early complex societies of the Middle East and Ancient America. The very number of the known objects of art from New World is much greater. The reason could be the predominantly hierarchical structure of Amerindian middle range societies. With pronounced concentration of power in hands of particular persons, their burials usually contained more wealth than in the Near Eastern societies of equivalent demographic and technological dimensions (compare e.g. North Peruvian Moche and Mesopotamian Uruk). In America, however, the respective burials are often both more attractive and more accessible for the illegal digging. Because of this the difference in numbers of objects which had reached the museums can be delusive. Differences in style and content of the representations are more essential.

For Middle Eastern figurative art of Neolithic and Chalcolithic periods (in Eastern Iran also of Early Bronze Age), simple postures are typical. There are practically no scenes of devouring, swallowing, breaking apart. Body features characteristic to the predators such as claws and teeth are not exaggerated. Fitomorophic elements are widespread. In all these respects the American art from Alaska to Argentina stands in strict opposition to the Near Eastern one. It is biomorphic but the plant motifs are extremely rare. Fantastic and sincretic images occupy a prominent part. The composition is often complex, separate elements are interlocked. The earliest known representations created on the basis of a strict canon come from Peruvian Coast and date not earlier than to 2500-1500 BC. These are wall paintings, clay and stone sculptures and reliefs, representations on fabrics and gourd vessels. However, the profound similarity between the iconography of North and South America allows us to suggest that all American figurative styles have ultimately the same origin probably as distant in time as the period of the peopling of the New World. According to the above mentioned criteria, the Amerindian art is less different from Melanesian or Ainu styles than from the early Middle Eastern ones.

The Amerindian art is connected with rituals and not with narratives. In cases when the interpretation of the biomorphic images is known by ethnographic sources, the explanations suggested by different informants contradict each other and are usually based on minor details. The respective figures are mythical characters but not the protagonists of particular narrative episodes. With developed social hierarchies typical for American complex societies, the spectacular figurative art could easily find its consumer and develop to the extent evidenced by the hundreds of thousands of museum specimens.

For Amerindian art from Mississippi to the Northwest Argentina, the representation of objects and creatures associated with killing and death is typical. Some folklore (myths of Kogi of Northern Colombia) and iconographic materials (the similar and dissimilar motifs in Moche art on metal objects from the richest tombs and on Moche ceramics) permit us to guess that in some cases the ruling elite was intentionally demonizing itself. In any case, the "iconography of terror" in Amerindian art was better developed than the images of the primeval ancestors, the main heroes in the narrative texts.

In Asia, the Ancient Bactrian art also demonstrate some elements of the "complex of terror". Its sudden appearance about 2000 BC coincides in time with the crucial changes in the organization of the society in Eastern Iran and adjacent territories, the transition from horizontal links to vertical hierarchy. Complex figurative iconography with motifs of aggression and fighting is

not, of course, the obligatory attribute of just the societies where the military conflicts are normal, social stratification is highly developed, and rituals are public and involve great numbers of the participants. However, the tendency to such a connection probably exists.

Still a hundred years ago, Amerindian art was poorly known to Euroamericans. To the end of the last century, however, it became more understandable than most of the other "exotic" styles. During the very formation of Walt Disney iconography the direct borrowing of Pre-Columbian images had taking place. It goes without saying that we endow the ancient representations with other sense than their creators. However it can be supposed that ultimately the "iconography of terror" was playing the same role as our films of horror and catastrophes, i.e. it helped not to force the feeling of danger but to be used to it.

Chang Pao-min (National Cheng Kung University, Tainan, Taiwan)
Hierarchy and Power in Chinese Civilization: Unique Features and Their Implication

The absence of hereditary aristocracy in China for 2000 years has not only produced an unusually egalitarian society, but also rendered the struggle for power omnipresent, ruthless, and unpredicable. Although for centuries the government has sought to remedy such structural and cultural deficiencies of the Chinese society through institutional and other means, it has been successful only intermittantly and invariably at a high political cost.

Gao Jia (University of Melbourne, Victoria, Australia)
From the Imperial Examination to the Present Selection of Cadres. A Social Psychological Analysis of the Relationship between Power and the Post-Revolutionary Bureaucracies in Chinese History

This paper explores the relationship between socio-political power and the post-revolutionary bureaucracies in Chinese history. The search for an understanding of hierarchy and power in Chinese history has to begin with some peculiarly persistent and distinctive aspects of the traditional Chinese social and political order. The imperial examination system and the present method for the selection of cadres must be one distinguishing the Chinese from other civilisations. Past and present selections for prospective officials have created a socio-political system coexisting with autocracy and

aristocracy respectively, and have partially turned China's social control system into a meritocracy.

This paper will start with a review of the changes, in the words of Huntington, from revolutionary politics to political order, repeatedly occurring to Chinese socio-political control systems since the Qin and Han dynasties. The review focuses on the evolution of the selection process in its form and content. The discussion is then to analyse the power generated from the persistent utilisation of the system and its wide acceptance by people over many dynasties. Also to be considered are powers originating from within the selection process and bureaucracy itself. The social psychological roles played by the meritocracy in Chinese society are to be examined, including (1) its semiotic function, which not only shows people what to do, but also encourages them to act in the same manner; (2) its conflict reduction function, which channels and directs socio-political conflicts into less destructive, more potentially creative paths; and (3) its power-balance function, which balances power between itself and the autocratic or aristocratic class by forming a bureaucratic stratum. The paper is to concluded with a discussion of the extent to which both past and present selection processes for prospective officials and bureaucracies have served as a social control force, and the differences between a Western-style democracy and a Chinese meritocracy.

Patrick J. Geary (University of California Los Angeles, USA)
From **Regnum Francorum** *to* **Regna**

From late antiquity Europe knew a multiplicity of reges and regna, however not every rex had his own regnum, nor did regna normally have kings. As Karl Ferdinand Werner pointed out long ago, one must differentiate among three different senses of regnum: the Regnum Francorum as the totality of the kingdom of the Franks, regnum in the sense of a kingdom resulting from the divisions of the kingdom, and finally regnum in the sense of smaller geographical elements such as Bavaria, Aquitaine, or Burgundy which would be later identified as a ducatus.

But while the regnum Francorum in the sense of the totality of the kingdom was a relatively stable unity until it disappeared entirely in the later ninth century and the regna in the third sense proved enormously stable from the Merovingian period through the Middle Ages and beyond, the intermediary regna, those resulting from divisions of the whole, showed enormous fluidity as royal heirs and rival brothers drew and redrew boundaries constantly in the ninth and tenth centuries. There seemed no end

to the possible ways that the smaller regna might be grouped and divided. And yet in the course of the last decades of the ninth and early tenth centuries, this creative flux ended, with the regna of the East Franks and the West Franks emerging as unitary "empires" each composed of a relatively stable number of regna or duchies, while the regna of Lombardy and Burgundy-Provence also took on long-lasting contours. Exactly how the constant division of kingdoms of family patrimony came to an end has long been discussed: evidence of growing regional identity, changes in family structure, decline of royal authority, or necessity due to external threats have all been seen as contributing to this stability. In my paper I intend to return to the question how the divisions long characteristic of royal patrimonial politics disappeared, focusing not only on the causes but the effects as traditional representations of kingdom, precedence, and hierarchy dissolved before the new reality of a non-hierarchical divided Europe.

Victor D. Komarov (State Naval Academy, St. Petersburg, Russia)
Empire as a Form of Civilizations Development

Civilization is a specific post-primeval condition of society, and it is understood from the scholarly, *i.e.* ambivalent point view. This condition is characterized by the fact that accumulation of material wealth and development of social freedon ensure the humanistic progress of culture. Structurally, every civilized society includes a material basis, social and political institutions and forms of spirituality. The universal law of civilizational development is a wave-like combination of local civilizations into the global one by means of solving antagonistic contradictions.

The empire is understood as a centralized form of interethnic state power which ensures intensive management of resources of several indigenous territories on behalf of the carrier of the advanced local civilization. Typical features of an empire are: the only super-state power subject, forced way of formation, interethnic ruling hierarchy, pluralistic structure of the material basis, heterogeneity of social stratification, and heterogeneity of culture.

The history of development of Eastern, Western and marginal empires shows the basic trends of imperial influence on the civilized state of various social structures. This form of political power and rule intensifies the development and consolidation of material bases of local civilizations. Homogeneity of social structures increases in an empire, the humanistic vector in the development of social and political institutions being enhanced. In the civilization hoop of empire, development of spiritual freedom finds a

centrifugal force and facilitates the completion of the imperial cycle of local civilizations' development.

The cycle of an empire's existence includes a succession of several stages of development: occupational basis — comprador strengthening— political stability — spiritual delimitation — economic separation — governmental collapse. The phenomenon of "virtual empire" can be observed in history of the Russian Empire, German Empire and imperial traditions of the USA. It is a subject of further studies, for the basic principle of imperial rule, *divide et impera* is passing through its last decade. The 21st century is the end of history of any empires.

Jorge López Quiroga (Universidad de Alcalá, Madrid, Spain)
Hierarchy and Power among the "Barbarians" in Late Antiquity Europe (300-700 A.D.): An Explanation from Ethnogenese *Processes*

We intend to approach the study of "the End of Antiquity", denominated as a period of "transition" between Antiquity and the Middle Ages from 300 to 700 A.D. An essential event in this period, at least from the socio-political perspective, was the successive waves of invasions of more or less compact ethnic groups from within the frontiers of the Roman Empire and their later installation over there.

My analysis is not related straightly either to the military and political *evenementielle* history of such invasions or to the demographic aspects of installation of such ethnic groups, not even to important social transformations that such facts supposed for the Roman population. On these aspects an abundant scientific literature exists. On the contrary, our interest will be centered in the socio-political evolution the "barbarians" suffered due to these invasion processes, installation and political and cultural mutual accommodation of the populations and pre-existent structures in the diverse territories that had configured the Roman Empire.

From the point of view of *longue durée*, one of the most significant results would be an entire series of successive *etnogenese*, some of which resulted in the establishment of ethnic myths of several modern European nations. The "barbarian"'s *gentes* did not constitute big groups of population, in connection with the demographic situation in diverse counties of the Empire, then the problem of their installation, their socio-political accommodation with the Roman population and the several *etnogenese* processes, demand a differentiated social analysis of each ethnic group, with special attention to the importance of their *élites* in these processes, depending on if they were or were not constituted by the authentic "nobility

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of blood" (*Geburstadel*). From the comparative and interdisciplinary perspective our special objects of study are such well-known ethnic groups as the Suevi, Francs, Alamans, Burgunds and Lombards.

Denis S. Maternovski (Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
Cultural and Ecological Boundaries in Eastern Peru in Inca and Early Colonial Periods (cir. 1437-1572)

Interaction of Montana (tropical forest) tribes and Sierra (highlands) inhabitants is a key factor in cultural development of Eastern Peru in pre-Hispanic period. An important feature of this interaction is that an ecological boundary of Sierra and Montana does not entirely correspond with a cultural boundary that separates the inhabitants of these zones. This blurring of cultural boundaries is best explained by intense contacts between civilizations that are apparent in the history of the so-called Neo-Inca state.

The Neo-Inca state was created by Inca Manco Capac in 1535 after the anti-Spanish rebellion in a newly conquered Inca Empire had been defeated. Manco and his supporters fortified in a geographically isolated province of Vilcabamba, where a miniature state resembling the old empire was formed. The Neo-Inca state is an interesting case of cultural interaction. On the one hand, despite the isolationism promoted by Vilcabamba rulers, the Neo-Inca state was being assimilated by the surrounding colonial society: many of the Vilcabamba inhabitants were baptized, the Incas began using firearms and even the Spanish-style roof tile. On the other hand, because of its geographic location, Vilcabamba became a place for an active interaction of highlanders and lowlanders. This interaction was multi-faceted. Agricultural colonization was combined with military expansion. Trade and technology exchange were going on.

The Neo-Inca state is a unique example of cultural interaction, which allows us to see the possible way the Inca Empire could have been transformed had it survived the Spanish conquest.

Irina F. Popova (Saint-Petersburg Branch of the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences)
Tang Empire and Turkic world

The reign of the Tang dynasty (618-907) became one of the highest points in Chinese history which had a deep influence upon the posterior

history of many Asian states. That time the Chinese Empire implemented her geopolitical potential in the largest scale and spread its political influence over vast territories from Korea to Persia and from Vietnam to Tian-Shan.

The cosmopolitism of Tang dynasty corresponded to the Confucian ideal of "a world empire" with the Chinese Emperor as its center. Simultaneously new accents were introduced into official geopolitical doctrine. An unprecedented cultural synthesis with an idea of poliethnic state which became a core of the official political doctrine, provided a true foundation for a vast territorial expansion. The Tang emperors used impressive political actions to confirm serious challenge to create Chinese-Central-Asian civilization center.

In spring of 630 the emperor Tai-zong (627-649) assumed the title of "Heavenly khagan" (*Tian kehan*) with the implication of nominal suzerainty of the Chinese emperor over Turks-tujue. The ceremony of exaltation was the first step for consolidation of nomadic Turkic tribes on vast territories under the Chinese power. The Tang emperors tried to create an administrative structure that could be imposed effectively in the borderline areas as subordinated area-commands and prefectures (*ji-mi fu-chou*) and incorporate the aristocratic upper class of tribal leaders into the Chinese bureaucratic system (giving the tribal chiefs hereditary titles and rewarding "barbarian" commanders with the positions of general-governors).

After establishing a firm administrative control over the territory covering modern North-West China, the Tang Empire proclaimed nominal protectorate over a vast region in Central Asia. The Chinese side immensely understood the significance of formal administrative structures for the development of political dominance. In 659 and 661 about 300 nominal administrative structures were set up. In accordance with the logictics of Chinese official doctrine new military expansion should follow that step but by the beginning of the 8th century, the Tang Empire had exhausted the reserves of its military might. Later attempts to reform the social-military organization did not bring any effect.

The results of Chinese foreign policy in the Tang period were impressive, though active political contacts with the Turkic world did not produce social and cultural integration. In fact China tried to develop a new type of regionalism, but a true Chinese-Central-Asian regional unity was not actually produced.

Vadim G. Rudakov (Musée historique d'Etat, Moscou, Russie)
La ville de la Horde d'Or Saraï
et le rôle du pouvoir des khans dans son histoire

Le phénomène des villes de la Horde d'Or (l'Oulous Djutchi) était examiné plus d'une fois dans la littérature historique et archéologique (A.Y. Jakoubovskiy, V.L. Jegorov, M.G. Kramarovskiy, P.P. Byrnya etc.). C'était G.A. Fedorov-Davydov qui a accordé une attention particulièrement grande aux problèmes de l'apparition, du développement et de la décadence des villes et du rôle du pouvoir central dans leurs destins. Le but de cet exposé est à établir les étapes principales de l'histoire de la ville de Saraï et l'influence qu'elle a subie de la part du pouvoir des khans.

La résidence nomade des khans nommée *orda* était le principal centre politique du pays. Saraï (en turque "le palais") a apparu comme une résidence d'hiver sur les voies du déplacement des khans et, selon toute probabilité, représentait primordialement une petite ville qui ne se distinguaient pas par le développement du métier et du commerce. Selon la définition de G.A. Fedorov-Davydov sa situation se rapportait à celle "des villes des steppes", proprement des villes de la Horde d'Or apparues après la conquête mongole. Saraï (le site de Sélitrennoïé dans la région d'Astrakhan) a été construit au bord du fleuve d'Akhtuba, là, où auparavant il n'y avait pas des traditions de la culture sédentaire, agricole et urbaine. Mais, si la plupart des villes de steppe de la Horde d'Or appaissaient au XIVème siècle, Saraï-Batu aurait été fondée près de 1250. Elle était l'une des plus anciennes villes de la Horde d'Or. Les couches culturelles des XIIIème - début du XIVème siècles au site de Sélitrennoïé ne sont pas encore trouvées. C'est grâce à cette circonstance que certains investigateurs inclinent à chercher Saraï de cette période sur d'autres sites. Au XIIIème siècle le plus important centre économique du pays était apparemment la ville Bolgar (sur la Volga Moyenne). L'opinion de G.A. Fedorov-Davydov qui considérait Saraï comme capitale économique, culturelle et religieuse du pays est juste pour le XIVème siècle.

La centralisation considérable du pouvoir, l'adoption de l'islam, la grande attention des khans au développement du commerce et des métiers qui apportaient de grands revenus au Trésor ont amené à l'époque d'Uzbek (1312-1341) à l'urbanisation dont l'envergure était sans précédent. Tout cela a préparé le progrès le plus élevé dans le développement économique et culturel de la capitale ainsi que de l'ensemble du pays sous le règne de Djanibek (1341-1357). A partir des années 40 du XIVème siècle on a commencé à frapper des monnaies qui portaient la légende "Saraï al-Djedîd" (le Nouveau Saraï). Mais, à notre avis, aucune fondation d'une nouvelle capitale n'a eu lieu. Quant à l'épithète *al-djedîd* (en arabe " nouveau,

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renouvelé "), elle s'explique par la construction intense et l'élargissement considérable du territoire de la ville entre 1310 et 1330. Les recherches archéologiques montrent que l'épanouissement de Saraï date des années 30-60 du XIVème siècle.

G.A. Fedorov-Davydov écrit que, dès que le fort pouvoir central des khans s'est écroulée et des querelles ont commencé, les villes de la Horde d'Or sont tombées vite en décadence. Pourtant on peut diviser la période des querelles en deux étapes. Au début (1359-1367) la prospérité des villes de la Horde d'Or était encore en vigueur. La transition à la deuxième étape (1367-1380) a été marquée par une crise économique. Mais la décadence de Saraï n'était pas complète à la différence de plusieurs villes de steppe, où la vie a cessé totalement ou partiellement. Son grand potentiel économique et la présence des autorités centrales dans cette ville aussi bien que des moyens qui permettaient à la capitale de rester un centre assez grand du commerce et des arts. A l'époque de Tokhtamych (1380-1396) qui a réussi à unifier l'Etat et à ranimer sa puissance politique on observait une certaine animation de la vie à Saraï.

L'invasion de Tamerlan en 1395-1396 a amené à la destruction définitive presque de toutes les villes de steppe de la Horde d'Or. Cependant les khans sont parvenus à restaurer la capitale de leur empire, pour le moins, partiellement. Bien que Saraï existe encore au cours du XVème siècle, aucune comparaison de cette ville dévastée avec la splendeur de la capitale du siècle précédent ne paraît possible : presque tout son territoire était couvert désormais par des cimetières. La présence de la résidence (du palais) des khans à Saraï a déterminé dans une grande mesure le destin historique particulier de cette ville.

Charles Sabatos (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA)
Negotiating the Hierarchy of Imperial Identities:
Turkish and Orientalist Themes in Prague-German Literature

In the early years of the twentieth century, some of the leading writers of Central Europe, including Franz Kafka and his contemporaries Franz Werfel, Egon Erwin Kisch, and Leo Perutz, emerged from the primarily Jewish German-speaking minority of Prague. These writers were caught at the meeting point of the three imperial powers: as German-speakers, they identified primarily with Austria, yet they viewed their native Prague as a "gateway to the East," with its linguistic and cultural affinity to Russia, even as the growing interest in Palestine connected them to lands still held by the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish occupation of Eastern Europe had never

reached as far as the Czech lands, but Turkish, Islamic and Oriental themes appeared with striking frequency in the works of Prague-German writers. Kafka's travels to the East were wholly imaginary, and Perutz's references to the Turks reflected the historical period of the Emperor Rudolf II. Both Kisch and Werfel, however, portrayed the real effects of the decline of the Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth century: Kisch as a reporter in the Balkans, and Werfel in his 1935 novel "The Forty Days of Musa Dagh," describing a Westernized Armenian caught up in a resistance against the Ottoman attacks. Although these treatments of Orientalist themes generally reflect the prevailing Austro-German antipathy toward the Turks, emphasizing Turkish backwardness, sensuality, and cruelty, a certain ambivalence emerges, due to the desire of these assimilated German-speaking writers to separate themselves from the traditional Central European views of both Jews and Muslims as Eastern outsiders.

Yuri V. Seleznev (Voronezh State Technical University, Russia)
**Geopolitical Hierarchy and Relation of Authorities in the Late 14th –
Early 15th Centuries in the Russian Written Tradition**

In 1240 Russian principalities were switched on in structure of the Golden Horde.

In Russian written tradition of the late 14th – early 15th centuries one can find a precise formula, which had reflected a place of Russia in geopolitical hierarchy of that time. At a mention of death princess Wasilisa (1378), the wife of prince of Andrew of Nizhniy Novgorod a geopolitical hierarchy and place of Russia in this hierarchy in 1378 can be observed.

The Russian written tradition declared spiritual authority of the Byzantian Emperor and the Patriarch of Constantinople; according to this tradition the khan of The Golden Horde (Uzbek) had the highest secular authority; the following place in hierarchy was occupied by Great Prince Ivan Kalita; the last place was occupied by the Metropolitan Feognost.

This fragments of tradition describe also a change of geopolitical situation regarding to the Horde in the end of 14th - beginning 15th centuries. If in 1380 the highest authority of the Horde above Russia was declared (by analogy with the situation of 1330-1350 years), than by the middle 1390s its authority had fallen to such low level, that in Russian written tradition the Khan occupied last place. In the beginning of the 15th century the Khan occupied again one of last places.

Mohammed Umar-Buratai (University of Kano, Nigeria)
Durbar *as a Perfomance of Hegemony and Polity in Nigeria*
under the British Empire: Towards the Re-Assessment of
the Imperative of Culture in the Colonial Process

Modern nation states, especially those that experienced one form of colonialism or another, exhibit contestations over citizenship, governance and hegemony. In the process, democratic and integrative ideals and values as elements for the forging of nationhood become subverted, as ethnic cultural components are appropriated for the purposes of exclusive cultural politics. Faced with contests over "marginalization" and "domination", it becomes relevant to explicate patterns of identity and vision formation inhibiting the democracy movement in the multi-cultural nation state. This paper examines the court performance traditions of the northern Nigerian emirates- popularly referred to as *hawan sallah*, *jahi* etc, and which evolved as part of the military influence in the pre-colonial state formation processes. Traditionally used to secure loyalty and build a hegemony for the rulers in pre-colonial times, the British adopted the *hawan sallah* as *durbar* in the twentieth century, after India, and transformed it into a state ceremonial. Although officially moribund in India, the *durbar* continues to function in Nigeria as part of the ruling class culture. In view of the role of the court art form across time, there is a need to interrogate the performative elements of this art form to determine how it functions as ritual of reinforcement, before and during Brirish rule in Nigeria. The objective is to draw from the above lessons and implications in incorporative practices for effective governance in Nigeria.

Eugenia Yu. Vanina (Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
Pre-Modern India: Between "Imperial Order" and "Chaos"

Since the very beginning of pre-modern (ancient and medieval) India studies as a distinct field of research the scholars' attention has been primarily concentrated on the mighty empires that had come into being, flourished and collapsed throughout the centuries of Indian pre-colonial history. It has become traditional to denote the achievements and praise the "imperial order" in contrast with the "chaos" and "decadence" of the periods that followed the disintegration of the empires. The latter periods (especially the one that had followed the collapse of the Gupta or Harsha empires and preceded the Turkic invasion) have been and nowadays are in disfavour of the colonialist British historians, the nationalist Indian scholars and

Russian/Soviet researchers. In spite of their differences in theory and methodology all these three schools negatively estimated the "break-up period" between empires and treated every new attempt of integration as an undoubtedly positive development. This was intrinsically connected with the insufficient level of studies of the regional aspects of pre-modern Indian history and culture. Such a gap has only recently started to be filled in and this may help to detect the essential mechanisms of evolution of pre-modern Indian society and its concepts and practice of statehood. The present paper is aimed at discussing the real correlation between civilizational roles of both "imperial order" and "chaos" in the history of ancient and medieval India, to trace the reason why all the mighty empires, from the Mauryan to the Mughal, were relatively short-lived and what legacy did they leave to colonial and independent India.

PANEL IX
Civil Society: National Models of Political Culture Formation

Convenors: *Anatoly D. Savateev* (Center for Civilizational and Regional
                 Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
                 Stephen L. Schechter (Russel Sage College, Troy, USA)
                 Igor V. Sledzevsky (Center for Civilizational and Regional
                 Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)

The Western model of political culture with its support on the personality and democratic political institutions has proved its effectiveness for centuries and is becoming dominant in the world nowadays. The USA, countries of Western Europe try to spread worldwide the norms and institutions that they have grown up and regard their existence as a condition for rapid movement of the whole world to the civil society, the legal state, and prosperity. On their part, the majority of states and societies demonstrates the desire to join the proposed system of political and legal regulation. A small part of them rejects the enforced patterns of the civil society and legal state, applying to their own "democratic tradition, the people is devoted to".

However, it is clear that the construction of civil society when Western legal and political norms, institutions and values are to be transferred to non-Western countries directly, is pushed against serious resistance from the part of local societies up to tearing away in the most favorable conditions (Iran, Algeria). First of all, these obstacles are rooted in civilizational peculiarities of a receiving society, but partly they are born up by the position of the West itself which usually tries to transfer its formal and legal norms and institutions, cultural patterns, without considering cultural, historical and political conditions of the new soil.

In these terms, the problem of compatibility of the Western political norms with socio-cultural bases of a society-recipient arises, that is to be resolved by the adaptation of an alien political culture, to the new conditions. Inevitably the problem includes the following tasks:

• compatibility of the person-oriented political culture of the West and the collective paradigms of traditional non-Western societies;

• creation of national versions of the civil culture;

• interpreting cultural texts, i.e. regaining the language of the other civilization and making it available for mass consciousness;

• teaching young people the foundations of civil culture, combing universal principles and notions of democracy with the home socio-cultural values.

Thus, the enforced version of grafting the Western standards of political life is excluded.

The panel is called up to discuss general theoretic problems, evoked by the influence of the Western democracy upon the world and by the formation of a national version of civil society as well as scientific and practical goals of civics' development in the "third world", in European and Asian post-socialist countries. Within the framework of the panel reports and communications on the following topics are welcomed:

- relationships between the universal democratic principles and institutions with the values of "great" and local civilizations;
- importance of including of home socio-cultural values into the process of the civil political culture formation as a factor providing organic junction of purposes of the alien and own culture;
- problems of adaptation of the Western political culture to socio-cultural basements of non-Western societies (forms, methods, directions);
- process of the civil society or its elements' construction in the non-Western world (causes, necessary conditions, ways , historical experience, scientific conclusions);
- problems to be solved by civics in the "third world" and in the post-socialist countries (manuals, syllabus, methods, combination of knowledge and practical training).

Pat O. Agboro (Nigeria)
The Clash of the Titans: a Re-Examination of Ethnic Conflicts in Africa. Introduction

Men all over the ages, from all races and ethnic groups, have clamoured for the right to freedom, life, and equality. The universal Declaration of Human Rights crowns it all by its proclamation made in Article 1. However, at the bottom of every clamour for right is the assumption that one is equal to the other and as such has as much right as the other if not more. This is the bane of ethnic conflicts in Africa today. The assumption (rightly so) is that one ethnic group is equal to the other and as such entitled to every privilege granted to the other.

This paper therefore looks at the problem of ethnicity in Africa not with the historical or sociological perspectives but with the philosophical insight, which shall enable us to examine the concept of equality in Africa and its implications for development and for the resolution of conflict. We also looked at relevant concepts such as equality, liberty and the like.

Larissa A. Andreeva (Center for Civilizational and Regional Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)

Specific Features of the De-Christianization Process in Russia and Its Influence on the Origin of Quasi-Religiousness in the 20th Century

The process of secularization is characterized by weakening of the orientation of individuals, social groups, and the whole society toward supernatural powers and substances. The process of de-Christianization was part of the process of secularization, when Christian dogma and cult are rejected while consciousness can be orientated towards the supernatural. The process of de-Christianization is not always an effect of rationalization which implies giving up orientation toward the supernatural.

Rationalization of consciousness caused by the spread of scientific knowledge, the ideas of Enlightenment, the capitalization of economic life led to de-Christianization in Russia as the process constrained with rejection of orientation toward supernatural. On the other hand, one can see in Russia a manifestation of the process of de-Christianization, which is not constrained with the giving up of orientation toward supernatural, and therefore it is not an effect of consciousness rationalization. From the middle 19th century Synod fixed mass-renunciation of annual compulsory confession. In 1852, 9.1% of male members and 8% of female Orthodox Church adepts ignored execution of this important religious duty (registered dissenters are not included in these data). This process has become irreversible, and in 1916 the Synod officially recognized the fact of mass-falling away from Orthodoxy. This phenomenon was caused by protest against unjust social order, which was constrained by popular consciousness with the state religion, i.e. Orthodoxy. Starting with the first days of the revolutionary events of 1917, the mass-falling away from Orthodoxy resulted in filling the emerged vacuum with the totalitarian communist ideology, a specific form of quasi-religion.

Bolsheviks dreamed of the imagined model of the future (communism) and of the creation of new perfect "superman". The present and past were denied in the name of the Utopian "tomorrow". They gave the ideological completeness to the quasi-religious cult, which began forming in Russia yet in the 1860th. Still in Lenin's lifetime, his image began to acquire features of the "superman": a deity with the typical cyclical features: the Messianic purpose – suffering for the people – the victory which will create a new community. After the quasi-religious cult of Lenin had been established, Stalin, by his office, inherited the "sacred" nature of Lenin in accordance with the formula "Stalin is Lenin of our days". Within the framework of this cult, a new moral code and new rites were proclaimed. The new Messianic

idea was also formulated, it was embodied through the Third International. This transformation turned out an effect of the de-Christianized population's orientation toward the supernatural.

Tatiana V. Artemieva (St Petersburg Branch, Institute of Human Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia)
History of Idea of the "Civil Society" in Russia

The idea of "civil society" was introduced in Russia as a result of the influence of the famous work by Adam Ferguson "Essay on the History of Civil Society". The most zealous follower of this Scottish philosopher was Mikhail Muraviev, a father of the Decembrist Nikita Muraviev. Mikhail Muraviev (1757-1807) was a historian, poet and high level official. Since 1785 he was a teacher of Grand Dukes Alexander (the future Alexander I) and Constantine. He taught them Russian literature, Russian history and moral philosophy (after Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson).

Ferguson's work influenced the American anthropologist Lewis Henry Morgan (1818-1881) whose book "Ancient Society" (1877) was the main sources for Friedrich Engels' "The origin of the family, private property, and the state" (1884). It was natural that Ferguson's ideas have changed. The author was forgotten, many ideas lost their scholarly status and turned into political and ideological axioms.

Alan Baumler (Indiana University of Pennsylvania, USA)
Early Modern and Modern Citizens in East Asia: Opium

The opium trade was a vital part of capitalist accumulation and growing state power in 18th and 19th century Asia. Suppressing opium was a crucial part of creating modern states and citizens in both national and colonial states in the 20th century. This paper will demonstrate the commonalties between these processes by examining them in an international context, looking at China, the Japanese colonies of Taiwan and Manchuguo, and the Dutch East Indies. Each of these places dealt with the opium complex in similar ways on an economic level, in part because of the economics of opium and in part because they consciously and openly borrowed techniques from each other. Although the Chinese state was reluctant to admit it, they also borrowed much of the justification for their anti-opium campaigns for ideas about the role of the citizen developed in the colonial states. Ideas about public health and productivity were easily portable, but so too were the methods and goals

of rehabilitation, education and re-education. I will argue that the process of creating colonial citizens in colonies like Taiwan and the Dutch East Indies were comparable to those used in national states like China and pseudo-national states like Manchuguo. Histories of Asia have been constructed around nation-building and national liberation, but this focus obscures the similarities of hierarchies of power, forms of state control and forms of citizenship in these places. By demonstrating how these relations grew out the nature of opium as a commodity the paper will provide the beginnings of a theoretical grounding for understanding states and citizenship as categories rather than on a national or comparative level.

Mike Benbough-Jackson (University of Wales, Lampeter, UK)
Multi-Tiered Competition Between Regions in a Stateless Nation – Wales. Key Question: How are Regional Claims to National Prominence Made?

This paper outlines the development of regional contests throughout Welsh history. Wales is particularly interesting because of the absence of a definable 'centre' within the country for much of its history. Even now, with the capital, much of the economy and the recently established National Assembly in the south-east, Wales is essentially a 'coreless' nation. Indeed, it could be argued that all nations are 'coreless' - where, for example, is the 'heart of England'? Therefore, the case of Wales may shed light on other attempts and competitions to find or establish a 'core(s)'.

An early reference made to contested claims to represent the essence of Wales is made by Gerald of Wales in the 12th century. However, these latent regional claims became more explicit during the nineteenth century when national institutions, such as a national library, museum and university, were being established. At this time when Wales was asserting its identity within the British empire, regions of Wales were attempting much the same.

The paper will identify categories into which these struggles fit. There are cultural, political, economic and linguistic elements to these subtle regional confrontations. Geography is often called upon to define divides; especially North/South differentiation, but East/West as well. However, these geographical labels are unsatisfactory because some of the elements mentioned above cut across them.

A recurring theme in this arena is compromise. For example, the cultural event called the national eisteddfod moves between north and south every year. The decision to compromise on issues, such as placing the national library in Aberystwyth and the national museum in Cardiff, reveals a conscious attempt to placate regional aspiration.

Other themes will include: the economic versus cultural false dichotomy; the perceived contrast in cultural merit between highland and lowland; and, contrasting heritage centres.

Hopefully other nations can use the Welsh example to identify the regional manoeuvrings in nation building.

Victor V. Bocharov (St. Petersburg State University, Russia)
Intelligentsia and Authority

Social and national revolutions of the 20th century were accomplished by intelligentsia. It is true not only for Russia but also for most of developing states. It is possible to assume that such a social conflict is characteristic for all "peripheral" communities developing at the expense of the external factor. Conflict between intelligentsia and authority is permanently solved by revolution.

The understanding of this conflict as a class struggle (marxist approach) or as the opposition of elites does not reveal essence of a problem. Therefore revolutions are usually explained on the base of the subjective factor, i.e. as a struggle between the holders of western cultural values from one side and the holders of traditional (conservative) values from other. From such point of view the revolutionaries are idealized by the scholars ("fighters for happiness of the people"), or, on the contrary, demonized (fighters for their own interests).

The revolutions of the 20th century are considered within the framework of process of modernization. However, this process should not be reduced only to the phenomenon of growing modern types of the relations and social groups (first of all of intelligentsia), which are seen as the main agents of modernization. The activity of these people seems to be irrationale. I mean that declared aims purposes, connected with intensification of economic development and movement towards Western political and cultural ideals, had the opposite result.

From our point of view, the process of modernization should be considered, first of all, in close connection with change of traditional society. The conflicts intrinsic to it find a modern form. These conflicts determine logic of social and political dynamics of societies under modernization. The analysis of this dynamics convinces that the basis of all the revolutions of 20th century was the social-age conflict in the form of an opposition of "intelligency" and "authority".

William E Conklin (Cambridge University, UK; University of Windsor, Canada)
The Formation of the Nation-State as Civil Society: the Construction, Assimilation and Exclusion of the Ethnic Other

Beginning with the rise of the city-states of Renaissance Italy, the system of equal sovereign states has come to dominate the manner in which international society is organised. The city-state system expanded to Spain, France and the United Kingdom during the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries and eventually, to the Germanic peoples during the 19th century. The twentieth century experienced the dissolution of colonial empires into a multiplicity of sovereign states each of which declared the right to sovereign autonomy. Since the state possessed total authority inside its jurisdiction, the real possibility for violence seemed to lie in the relations between sovereign states. The problem is, though, that during the 20th century (actually from 1900 until about 1990, according to several different studies including one from the UN) the nation-state took formation at the cost of the killing of over 120 million peoples inside the territory claimed as it own by the nation-state. This contrasts with 40 Million killed in inter-state wars during the same period. The killing has usually been carried out under or in the quest for legitimate legal authority. Even when the outsider groups have protested the legitimacy of rulers as representatives of the nation-state, the protest has presupposed the nation-state as the formation of political culture. The ethnic cleansings and genocides of which we read each day in the news media merely manifest this deeper phenomenon of the propsensity of the sovereign state to imprison, execute, and expel residents in its own territory.

Of course, the temptation is to lay blame for the exclusion of ethnic outsiders in terms of the lack of liberal-democratic protections or on the inadequacy of a minimal economic prosperity. More psychological explanations have also been offered for the large-scale intra-state purging of ethnic groups inside the state. I do not wish, at this point, to down-play the complexity of the factors that have entered into the intra-state violence of the past dark century. My Paper, however, examines how political culture in the 20th century took formation through a nation-state and that the nation-state, in order to gain a cultural identity, depended upon its own construction of an 'alien' ethnic outsider. My thesis is that in order to possess a national identity, the sovereign state must create an ethnic outsider to the national-state in order for the nation-state to be recognised as a juridical person.

Т.А. Данилина (ГОУ - ЦРР №183, Москва, Россия)
Tatiana A. Danilina (Center for Kids Development №183, Moscow, Russia)

***Конвенция о правах ребенка
в дошкольном образовательном учреждении
Convention on the Child's Rights
in an Institution of Pre-School Education***

Проблема защиты прав ребенка имеет для дошкольного образовательного учреждения несколько аспектов: работа с сотрудниками по предотвращению нарушения прав ребенка; работа с родителями; знакомство детей на доступном для них уровне с Конвенцией и ее основными положениями.

Наше дошкольное образовательное учреждение имеет статус "Центр развития ребенка". Квалифицированные педагоги, однако, не всегда имеют достаточно полное представление, какой широкий спектр действий можно квалифицировать как психологическое давление на ребенка, как действие, нарушающее его права. Не внесены соответствующие позиции и в нормативные документы – должностные обязанности.

Общеправовая база для обеспечения сохранения прав ребенка на государственном уровне существует. Вместе с тем, родительские договора могут содержать более точные и подробные спецификации возможностей регулирования ситуации в семье сотрудниками ДОУ.

Знакомство детей дошкольного возраста с положениями Конвенции о правах ребенка требует разработки особых форм и методов, согласованных с возрастной спецификой детей. Обычные информационные занятия в данном случае неэффективны. Поэтому мы разработали серию плакатов, а также сценарий образовательного занятия-спектакля, которые позволят сделать эту работу интересной для маленьких детей (демонстрация).

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Иерархия и власть в системе возникновения каракалпакской государственности XX века
Hierarchy and Power in the System of the Formation of Karakalpak Statehood in the 20th Century

Политика национально-территориального размежевания Средней Азии, которое было проведено в 1924 г. по указу "сверху", сыграло помимо отрицательных явлений, о котором писали советологи, и положительную роль. В данном случае это отразилось на сохранении и восстановлении целостности территории каракалпаков. 27 октября 1924г. на II сессии ЦИК СССР была организована Каракалпакская автономная область в составе Казахской АССР. В его составе Каракалпакия находился до середины 1930 г.

В период проведения национально-территориального размежевания в Средней Азии, главной проблемой дня был вопрос, к какой из Среднеазиатских республик включить Каракалпакию. Он рассматривался на заседаниях Территориальной комиссии Средазбюро РКП (б) в сентябре 1924 г., затем был передан на рассмотрение вышестоящим органам.

Узбекистан предложил Президиуму ЦИК СССР включить в его состав Каракалпакию на правах автономной области. Данный вопрос обсуждался на уровне правительств Каракалпакии, Казахстана и РСФСР. После, было высказано, что с точки зрения хозяйственного положения Каракалпакии, выгоднее всего ему иметь тесные взаимоотношения с Казахстаном.

Ключевым моментом в решении этого вопроса явилась та политика, которую придерживалась Россия по отношению Среднеазиатского региона. Россия хотела иметь в Средней Азии свой опорный пункт, то есть форпост в лице Каракалпакии, потому и была согласна передать эту территорию в состав Казахстана. Так как, в то

время Казахстан находился в составе России, как автономная республика.

Каракалпакская государственность в 1924 г. получает единую административную автономию в составе Казахстана. С 1930 по 1936 гг. Каракалпакстан находился непосредственно в составе России и в 1932 г. преобразовался в политическую автономию. А с конца 1936 г. на основе "сталинской конституции" переходит в состав Узбекистана, и в декабре 1990г. он приобретает суверенитет.

Мы считаем, что за всеми этими процессами стояла система управления. Она строго наблюдала порядок подчинения низших, в данном случае административно-территориальных единиц, высшим. Таким образом, была налажена вся система иерархии власти, которая в дальнейшем отразилась во всех сферах жизни советского общества.

Isaie Dougnon (Center for Research on Local Knowledge, Bamako Mali)
Du temps des moniteurs au temps des Associations Villageoises : un transfert controversé de pouvoir à l'Office du Niger

La politique économique du Mali a eu comme philosophie de base au milieu des années 1980 le désengagement de l'Etat suivant le principe des Institutions financières internationales, BM, FMI, USAID : " moins d'Etat, plus de marché ".

Dans le milieu urbain, on a assisté à l'émergence des PME, petites et moyennes entreprises et PMI, petites et moyennes industries (document de synthèse ON-IMRAD 1988). Dans le monde rural c'était la recrudescence des organisations paysannes.

L'Office du Niger, qui est la plus vaste entreprise agricole réalisé en Afrique de l'Ouest francophone par une puissance coloniale s'est vu dotée de 150 Associations Villageoises (AV) et d'une dizaine de Tons villageois (TV). Avec l'avènement de ces structures paysannes, l'encadrement de base a été émoussé. L'agent de suivi n'était plus un agent de l'Etat mais quelqu'un dont les paysans ont besoin et dont les services sont rétribues par l'AV.

Cette nouvelle orientation devrait, selon ses promoteurs, offrir aux populations rurales des instruments institutionnels leur permettant de s'autogérer. Les mots clés étaient : syndicat, participation et autogestion. Soutenues et renforcées par le projet hollandais ARPON (amélioration de la riziculture paysanne à l'Office du Niger) les AV étaient chargées de prendre en charge des opérations qui, tout en étant nécessaires, coûtaient trop cher à l'entreprise. La politique de l'Office du Niger consistait à transférer ces charges aux paysans.

La question est aujourd'hui qu'en est-il des résultats escomptés ? La politique de transfert des fonctions de l'encadrement aux paysans est de plus en plus contestées à cause de la corruption qui gangrène les AV. Les sources de discordes sont la gestion des crédits accordés par les Banques locales, la redistribution des terres aménagées et la gestion du fonds social.

Selon les exploitants 10 AV sont efficaces sur les 150 que comptent l'Office du Niger. Les autres n'existeraient que de nom.

Tatiana V. Evgenyeva (Center for Civilizational and Regional Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
"Civil Society" Myth in Post-Soviet Russia

Contemporary social and cultural crisis in Russia destroys not only the system of rational values, dominating before, but also the traditional symbols and stereotypes. At the same time the revival of neo-archaic patterns of consciousness and behavior forms the background for social, cultural and political mythology.

In the 1980s the Soviet type of identity was already in a state of deep cultural, psychological and ideological crisis. The manifestation of this crisis was disintegration of the system of images, values and myths of Soviet political culture, which formed the foundation of Soviet identity, chaotic penetration of new values and stereotypes, and finally, practically complete destruction of the psycho-semantic space. Beginning in the second half of 1980-s the crisis of identity destroyed the system of values and myths dominating in the society without giving anything to replace this system.

Such state is not stable, it requires a compulsory compensation, without which a disintegration, degradation of the person can happen. The crisis of identity promoted the active process of the creation of myths in all the spheres of culture.

Modern human being in the circumstances of the crisis of identity is ready to refuse from his own individuality in order to get the feeling of security, safety, which can be given by real or mythological confluence with the group. Among the lately edited works on this problem the book of S.Luriye "Metamorphosis of Traditional Consciousness" examines the influence of the ides of community on the mass perception of political process in Russian state.

Category of "civil society", borrowed from the western political culture and transformed into the idea of a great number of non-state organizations opposed to political institutes, became the modern analogy for the communal image of the world. For the appearance of the myth of "civil society" not only

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objective mythological foundations, but also purposeful activity of politically engaged groups are necessary. Those groups consist as a rule of the representatives of cultural elite, devoted to active formation and spread of concrete mythology. The activity of those groups not always realized by all their representatives can strengthen the mythological elements of political culture thus making base for active manipulation with the myth of "civil society" by different political groups.

Mihai Viorel Fifor (Institute of Social Studies of the Academy of Romania, Bucharest)

Creating identities in New Europe.
In-between the "two cultures": a Romanian case

One of the most recent challenges for the Romanian anthropologist is, out of the question, the discovery of a new distinctive socio-cultural entity that manifests itself almost aggressive struggling to impose (and, we have to admit it, quite successfully) its own mentality patterns in a less and less coherent world that is Romania at the beginning of the new century. This entity, ignored not long ago, is the working neighborhood in the great urban agglomeration, a result of the 1950-s mass migration from the rural area to the urban one, migration generated mainly by the ideologically induced mirage of the new industrial city and the brutal politics of collectivisation. Hence, one of the greatest 'victories' of the communism in Romania was, undoubtedly, the creation of the 'new man', constructor of communism, of the multilateral developed society, meant to accomplish great strategies, result of an utopia ideology. Nothing would have been special here if all those would have been only propaganda and the projects simple aberrations put down on paper.

Incidentally, in the recent years, after 1989, the facts hasten and as if out of the blue the media market seems to be "broken" by a new cultural product, the *neighborhood culture* as in full pomp has been identified by TV stations seeking the sensational and which have excessively promoted and commercialized it. This allowed questions to arise and also made room for the need of some specialized answers. For surpassing the sensational aspect of such cultural products, we have to underline the fact that they have brought into the spot real problems of an ignored world that tend to become identity marks for a larger and larger social category. So far, so good, but the real problem arises only when in our attempt to decode the *neighborhood culture* we realize that the utopia has become reality, that the neighborhood culture's social actors are *hybrid individuals*, neither villagers, nor townsmen,

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neither workers, nor farmers, 'new men' results of a totally unsuccessful communist experiment.

I am perfectly aware that one can easily accuse me of being pathetic or of having a science-fiction perception of reality but the analysis in my paper will prove exactly the opposite by "X-raying" this new social and cultural entities focussing on class formation, new social stratum and the emergence of what we may call a new "life style" involving both individual and social identity change in post-communist Romania and in order to offer an accurate picture of the way the society has evolved since 1989.

Vassiliy R. Filippov (Centre for Civilizational and Regional Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)

Ethnocracy and Civil Society

Ethnocracy is a political regime exercised by the ethnopolitical elite in the name of the "main" ethnos. Characteristic feature of ethnocracy is the significant numerical domination of the representatives of the "main" ethnos in state administration and in the political and economic elite. Ethnocracy often causes revival of old, pre-industrial social relations; personal social mobility is based not only on the ethnic identity, but also on belonging to certain kinship group, association of countrymen or family. As a result, the representatives of "not titled" ethnic groups are gradually forced out of of such social relations is gradual forcing out the representatives of "not titled" ethnic groups from prestigious social niches. The ethnic model of the legitimation of the authority induces the *ethnocrats* to provide significant social preferences to the representatives of the "titled" ethnos, that is connected with the institutional or non-institutional discrimination of the representatives of "not titled" ethnic groups.

In a situation when the "main" ethnic group is not demographic majority**,** the preservation of the ethnocratic regime is possible only under condition of a manipulation of public opinion, dissociation of representatives of "not titled" ethnic groups and active use of "administrative resource" and "black" technologies during the elections. This, in its turn, induces ethnocrats to imitate the process of formation of a civil society.

The political structure of ethnocracies is constructed in a following way. As a rule, there is one or more radical nationalist parties, which proclaim themselves to be "national democrats" and act under the slogans of ethnic domination. The government usually keeps distance from these organizations, but in the crisis situations of authority frequently use them for mobilization of ethnicity. Besides, the authority incipates creation of a public

organizations or movements for "revival" of culture of the "titled" ethnos. If there are some public organizations which claim to represent interests of "not-titled" ethnos, the authority try to create of alternative public structures-ephemeris under its control to discredit the idea of "ethnic opposition". Such institutions are united in organizations loyal to the authorities with very pretending names (assembly, congress etc.), but in fact do not represent nobody. And finally, ethnopolitical elite create party structures loyal to the authority with no "ethnic" colours, but serving interests of the ethnocrats.

Nicolas N. Firsov (Centre de recherches civilisationelles et régionales de l'Académie des Sciences de Russie, Moscou)
La culture politique et la mythologie politique: les facteurs de la formation de la société civile dans Russie moderne

Les procès de la formation de la culture politique de la société russe s'appuient sous beaucoup de rapports sur les structures stables mythologiques de la conscience massive formée grâce à la transformation sociale - historique des éléments structuraux de la mentalité archaïque au modèle traditionaliste de la conception du monde. Il est naturel que la transformation pareille ne supprime pas en aucune manière les couches archaïques de la conscience moderne massive s'exprimant, avant tout dans les hésitations d'une manière émotionnelle chargées des mouvements publics, mais en même temps, cela définit à un fort degré l'image des formes de la culture politique et la conscience politique.

Il est naturel que la notion "la culture politique", avant tout, soit perçue comme le modèle de la démocratie européenne fondée pour le modèle rationaliste de la société civile. Cependant le modèle traditionaliste de l'installation publique aux mêmes degrés est la culture politique fondée pour une autre réalisation des structures architypiques de la mentalité, où la dominante sont les présentations collectivistes sur la structure mondiale, la perception du monde et la société comme de l'unité indissolublement liée à l'ordre mondiale spatial.

Le problème de l'intégration et de l'actualisation des structures mythologiques dans l'espace politique de la société par les instituts légitimes du pouvoir politique, en vue de la formation de la culture soi-disante politique du modèle d'Europe occidentale, consiste non seulement dans l'incapacité des structures impérieuses sur la tenue des réformes sociales - politiques, mais surtout dans le refus naturel du contenu rationaliste du pouvoir politique comme du système complexe des instituts de la gestion de la société par la mentalité traditionaliste, dans le refus du système de la

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démarcation des responsabilités impérieuses qui n'avait rien de commun avec les idées de la conscience massive sur le pouvoir magique, personnifique, total. L'image traditionaliste du pouvoir et l'image du pouvoir d'Etat de la société civile en Russie moderne se distinguent beaucoup. Le "pouvoir" du modèle traditionaliste, personnifié dans la figure du leader étroitement lié avec la source de cette force semble être une base de l'hiérarchie sociale et politique de la société. Il est total et ne pourrait pas être mis en doute et en choix, ainsi que la structure mondiale même et l'espace ne pourrait pas être mis en doute.

Cependant l'actualisation des éléments architypiques de la mythologie dans le cadre du modèle traditionaliste sur l'espace politique de la Russie peut être considérée comme un acte de la résistance de la culture politique du modèle donné à toutes tentatives de la modernisation et la rationalisation de l'installation sociale - politique de la société aussi bien que comme un instrument des instituts et les structures de l'Etat de l'intensification de ces procès. Ce dernier réduit à rien pratiquement n'importe quelle modernisation sociale - politique du modèle européen, en entrant à la contradiction profonde avec la culture politique en vigueur et avec la mythologie politique. La raison d'un pareil conflit s'explique probablement par ce que l'un des éléments principaux du modèle traditionaliste de la culture politique est l'image du "pouvoir" qui n'est médiadité par aucun institut de la société civile, du "pouvoir" comme une force transcendentale identique à l'espace. Proprement dit une pareille contradiction exprimée dans l'actualisation des éléments de la mythologie traditionaliste de la perception mondiale dans le cadre de la formation de la société civile du modèle européen porte un caractère dominant sur l'espace politique de la Russie. Cette circonstance exerce naturellement une influence sur le procès de la formation de la société civile démocratique avec ses instituts du pouvoir politique d'Etat et, avant tout, avec le fonctionnement de ces instituts.

Yekutiel Gershoni (Tel-Aviv University, Israel)

The Changing Pattern of Military Takeovers in Sub-Saharan Africa

Military takeovers have become a part of modern African history. The practice of changing regimes in Africa by means of armed force started with General Ibrahim Abboud's toppling of the elected government in Sudan in 1958, even before sub-Saharan countries had achieved independence, and has continued to the present day. Beginning in the mid-1980s, however, the way in which most coups were carried out underwent major changes. This paper

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compares and contrasts the two patterns coups employ, focusing on two specific military rebellions in Liberia as paradigms.

Christian Giordano (Universität Fribourg, Switzerland)
The social and Historical Roots of Mistrust in Southern Europe. Citizens Against the State or the State Against Citizens?

The paper will focus on the relevance of the anthropological approach in the study of political phenomena. Conceiving politics as the instrument of particular interests it will be tried to explain the negative attitude of the most member of Mediterranean and Balkan societies vis-a-vis the state and the aversion of the population towards local authorities. State rules and law representing justice are often treated as injustice. Bureaucracy and national/regional government are frequently called "kleptocracy". The confrontation and ambivalence between legality of the State and social legitimacy are constantly present.

Mistrust as an attitude connected with this gulf between legality and legitimacy will be interpreted as the result of "collective memories", namely as a consequence of the construction of an adverse historical destiny shared by several Mediterranean and Balkan societies. The lack of trust structures and the persistence of highly personalized protection networks explains the success in these societies of illegal vs. extralegal social practices (*mafia*, clientelism, informal economy, corruption etc.).

Dmitri V. Grushkin (Center for Civilizational and Regional Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
Local national-territorial self-government in conditions of transformation of Russian Federation. International legal experience and Russian realities

According to the international law, the ethnic groups can realize the self-government in two paradigms: super-territorial (more often "personal" or "nation-cultural" autonomy) and territorial.

In European countries where national minorities and indigenous peoples live compactly (Scandinavian states, Austria, Italy), as a rule we observe the trend to transfer some aspects of state authorities to the institutions of local nation-territorial self-government (LNTSG). First of all, local institutions are responsible for education, culture, use of languages of minorities, environment protection, local planning, assimilation of natural resources,

economic development, law-enforcement activity, medicine. The taxation, justice, development of tourism and transport are carried out jointly central and regional authorities.

In Russia there is an unique federal law referring to the regulation of LNTSG. According to this document, the indigenous people have the right to possess and to use different categories of the land in places of their traditional living and economic activity. Also they have right to create the institutions of local self-government".

The units of the Federation accepted the legal acts concewrning the rights of national minorities earlier – for example, Yakutia in 1992, Khanty-Mansi district in 1992), Buryatiya in 1991). These documents specify legal garantees for the ethnic groups of indigenous population.

In reality the LNTSG institutions in Russian Federation pursue the purpose to secure the rights of national minorities and indigenous peoples. However, there is no tradition of such a legal protection and realization of both regional acts and Federal law is still in a rudimentary condition.

Elena O. Khabenskaya (Center for Civilizational and Regional Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
The Tatar Intelligentsia and the Problem of "the National" State System (in the Context of Civil Society Formation in Russia)

The development of the political situation in the last decade showed that the "national" intelligentsia is a key player in the ethnopolitical process, being not only basic carrier of ethnic self-consciousness, but, in many respects, its forming principle.

In 1999-2001 a method of the "depth interview" was applied for the research among the Tatar intelligentsia of the three cities of Russia: Saratov, Kazan and Moscow. The representatives of the intellectual elite most authoritative in ethnocultural community, chosen with the help of rating selection, were interviewed.

At the turn of the century the Tatar intelligentsia do not take Tatarstan as their "own" (ethnic) state. For the majority of the interviewees it is "the republic of Tatarstan residents". About half of interviewed, mainly the representatives of the Tatar intelligentsia of Saratov and Moscow, perceive Tatarstan, first of all, as the mechanism of the ethnocultural identity realization, as a symbol of cultural and lingual revival of the Tatar ethnos, as the basic source of the information in the mother tongue (Tatar). For the part of the Kazan interviewees sovereignty also means economic advantages on the basis of the national attribute.

Nevertheless, most respondents (including those interviewed win Kazan) realize, that existing form of the national-state self-determination of the Tatar (Republic of Tatarstan) does not solve the problem of reproduction of Tatar culture and language in the scale of the whole ethnos, two thirds of which reside outside the limits of the "national" republic. Tatar diaspora, which is represented by the bigger part of ethnos, and being scattered on all the territory of Russia appears to be "switched off" the ethnocultural and language field.

In this connection, many Tatar intellectuals come to a conclusion, that a more successful form of ethnocultural self-determination of the Tatar in Russia could become an exterritorial national-cultural autonomy (NCA), realized in the form offered by the Austrian theorists in the early 20th century. Most "progressive" part of the Tatar intelligentsia (mainly Muscovites) believes that the NCA principle not only meets "the interests of the Tatar", but corresponds to modern political realities and norms of a civil society in a greater degree, than ethnocratic "national" republic.

E. V. Kharitonova (Center for Civilizational and Regional Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
Microlevel of Power: Leadership and Corporative Culture

Research of factors of person's political prospectivity showed that over 80% of them has psychological and socio-psychological nature. The rest of them – financial, political (availability of administrative support and financial resources), menthal (civil position, state thought) and "biographical" (family relations, national and/or clan identity).

As psychological factors, except "charisma", intellectual level, strategic thought, ambitions, activity and disposition to engage in ventures, potential of being leader and ability to create a "team" hold first place.

This is the situation about political leader on "macro-level". Well known that demand for a specific political leader depends on situation. Conditionally we may say that the same situation also exists on "micro-level", i.e. in concrete organizational structures.

Socio-political aspects of leadership, most interesting types of leadership and their correspondence to different types of organizational cultures will be examined in this report. We shell consider four models of organizational cultures examined by author during consulting of different administrative and business organizations.

The "culture of power" as a system of traditional hierarchy in organization, based on efficient subordination attitudes will be considered.

This organizational culture is the most stable one. Actions of it's members are clearly determined and regulated. Center possesses all the power and regulates the politics of organization. Taking part in decision making and influence depends on position of a person in hierarchic structure.

Then the "culture of a personal initiative" will be examined. This type of organization has no strict controlling hierarchy, system is unstable and splits into sub-groups during crisis situations. It's members reach personal purposes, inner competition also exists.

Next type of corporative culture is a "culture of a task". Activities are based on a free circulation of information. Members and resources mobilize for concrete task and orientated to the concrete result. Influence is not based on status but on professionalism and competence.

The last one is the "culture of role determination" which has strict distribution of authorities and spheres of activities and the high level of standardization also. Resource of influence is the status. This culture is effective in stable environment and adopts changes badly.

The main conclusion is the necessity of accordance of a type of power into group, displaying in specific style of a leader, to the type of corporative culture of organization.

Alan Kimball (University of Oregon, Eugene, USA)
Village Taverns and the Russian
"Market Place of Ideas" (1855-1905)

We know a lot about salons, *kruzhoks* and other institutionalized expressions of Russian elite political culture. We need to know more about the political culture of the common folk. Perhaps the greatest historian of salon and *kruzhok*, Mark Aronson, long ago told us we needed to know more about the *kabak*. This presentation modestly takes up the Aronson challenge. My two main points will be:

Russians in the *kabak* (mainly village folk) and in the *kruzhok* (mainly an aristocratic/bureaucratic elite) responded to the same large social crisis of old regime Russia. As the revolutions of the twentieth century approached, Russia experienced a serious crisis within what I would call the traditional social/service hierarchies. I coin the phrase "social/service hierarchies" to signify the confused but formal social structures created by the intermixture of social estate [*soslovie*] with service rank [*chin*]. These hierarchies had grown to monstrous proportions in Russian life at just the time that *les étates* and *die Staende* were losing their grip on French and German life. But by the mid-19th century those Russian hierarchies were crumbling. Nonetheless

these hierarchies came under increasingly awkward official protection, creating a situation of flux, up and down the social scale, and a deepening political crisis. Both *soslovie* and *chin* were statist devices, ways of managing, manipulating and mobilizing subjects to state projects. Peasants and aristocrats, clergy and merchantry, and the miscellaneous social category *meshchanstvo* [middling urbanites] responded in their own ways to one central social and political challenge: how to clear a space for themselves.

As we search for possible meanings of civil society, we must look at the role of working majorities. We cannot isolate our attention to elites. This also suggests an adjustment in the way we look at the elites themselves. It is essential that we develop uniform habits of analysis in which we presume two things. First, elites (*e.g.*, members of that oft-described community of "intelligents"), like ordinary laboring people, have daily lives and quotidian interests. Second, ordinary laboring people, like elites, are influenced by concepts and manage their own worldviews. The motives of human life are a mulligan stew of consciousness and being, and this is as true of the elevated as of the downtrodden among us.

In *kabak* and *kruzhok*, Russians sought novel ways in novel settings to secure and protect a better life, to escape the confines of disintegrating social/service hierarchies, and to avoid confinement in new hierarchies designed to meet the every day needs of others than themselves. Both provided what might be called, in old-fashioned terminology, a "market place of ideas" where practical needs and ways of understanding the world were simultaneously addressed. Both were by their very nature public spaces (the *kabak* arguably more so than the *kruzhok*). Both represented different facets of a fledgling civil society and presented much the same political challenge to the Russian autocratic state.

Serguei V. Kretinin (Voronezh State University, Russia)
Ideology of the Western Social Democracy in 1918-1939: between internationalism and nationalism

The First World War struck on the socialist ideology based on the principles of internationalism, and the unfair national - territorial division within the framework of the Versailles system sharpened national feelings in the defeated countries (Austria, Hungary, and Germany). In these countries the social democracy was the strongest; such ideologists as Otto Bauer, Karl Kautsky, and Karl Renner were the leading theorists in the sphere of the ethnic questions. It is not by accident that they tried to reassess the

ideological bases of the Western social democracy; they tried to find "the golden mean" between the internationalism and nationalism.

The major components of the ideology of the Austrian, German, and Sudeten-German social democracy were the following:

- the concept of "Socialist Anschluss" (Otto Bauer, Joseph Zeliger, Ljudo Moriz Hartman);
- the theory of self-determination of the nations and peoples, their rights for the national - cultural autonomy (Otto Bauer, Karl Kautsky, Sigizmund Gluksman);
- the concept of "Danube Federation" (Karl Renner and others);
- the concept of the economic union of the countries of "Middle Europe" (Karl Renner, Zigmund Kunfi and others);
- the theory of "German national socialism" and "Socialist conservative revolution" (Emil Franzel and Venzel Yaksh).

However the Western social democrats could not develop the unified and harmonious theory of the ethnic question, gradually yielding the initiative to the right - radical forces, first of all to the fascists.

Kwang-ok Kim (Seoul National University, Korea)
Practice of Hierarchy and Communal Ideology in Contemporary China

This paper deals with the problem of definition of power and its materialization, and its correlation with communal tradition in political struggle as well as in everyday life. Stuctural transformation of the society is symbolically experienced through this social drama.

Using the concepts of "theatre state" and structure/anti-structure dynamics, I would like to focus on the fact that in China definitions of identity, position, rank, power and authority are materialized through the practice of propriety (*li*) in terms of seating arrangement, speech order, food, spatial division etc.

The paper concentrates on the study of *li*, on the one hand, in perspective of political anthropology and on the other hand on ethnographic analysis of conflict and compromise between official hierarchy and private tradition of the people in everyday life.

Ritual and banquet are treated not only as the space where the underlying power structure is defined and expressed but also as a terrain where the official power and social tradition are confronted and compromised. It is also discussed how the power and hierarchy are defined in the socialist revolutionary ideology and in the political reality.

Alexei G. Loutskiy (Centre for Civilizational and Regional Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
"Tatarstan model" in the System of Russian Federalism: Conflictogenous Factors Provocating Model's Crisis

The concept of "Tatarstan model" was introduced by state officials of Tatarstan. Realization of "The Tatarstan model" supposes the formation of economy, politics, interethnic and interreligious relations and culture as a whole in a way that is quite different from general Russian practice. Tatarstan elite also speak about "specific way " of Tatarstan.

This model in Tatarstan official opinionis is characterized by the following traits:

- a specific way of privatization (so-called "soft transition into the market economy");
- development of the Tatar nation "sovereignty", strengthening of Tatarstan statehood;
- stabilization of ethnic relations in Tatarstan;
- maintenance of good-neighbour relations between representatives of all confessions in Tatarstan;
- support of religious traditions of Islam, Orthodox Christianity and other traditional confessions.

However, functioning of "Tatarstan Model" seems to contain a number of contradictions. Its instability is determined by following factors:

- the separation of legislative and executive authorities does not exist in Tatarstan;
- Tatarstan economy is controlled by several "clans" which "have privatized" main branches of economy, first of all vital natural resources;
- an actual secession of Tatarstan from the sphere of legislative and fiscal control of the federal government in 1991-2000;
- claims of Tatarstan elite to establish independent international policy;
- counteraction to the introduction of Russian passports in the republic;
- unprevention to the activity of the nationalist organizations that called for full independence from Russia.

Serguei M. Markedonov (Institute of Political and Military Analysis, Moscow, Russia)

The Formation of Civil Society in the Caucasus. Problems and Perspectives

The Caucasus is a region where traditionalism has very deep roots. As a rule, its "Renaissance" took place in the context of a weakening of state institutions. The political liberalization in the region at the end of the 1980-s and the beginning of the 1990-s coincided with the processes of ethnic and clan mobilization. As a result it was not liberal values and civil institutions but mechanisms based on kinship and ethnicity that filled the vacuum formed by the weakening of the state.

A consistent realization of the "laissez-faire" principle in the region (beginning with 1991) did not bring along the reign of civil virtues and economic freedom. Once the constraints of the "Russian Leviathan" gone, different political forces of the Caucasus started fighting not for the priority of law, for equal game rules for everyone or for free competition but for the leadership of their *teip*, clan or ethnic group. This struggle reflected in the revival of such traditional methods as the vendetta, hostages, ethnic conflict. This result was to be expected, for Caucasian societies in their everyday practice had never followed the principles of the European Enlightenment, the Declaration of Independence or the ideas of Adam Smith. Legal regulation in the region was based on systems of *adats*, the *shariah* or "kinship diplomacy".

Currently the formation of the institutions of civil society in the Caucasus are blocked not so much by state bureaucracy as in other regions, as by traditional structures which have recently received a strong impulse and which have "privatized" different institutions of government and administration. Overcoming of this "traditionalist" challenge by creating a counterbalance in the form of civil institutions is a crucial task both for the Russian state and for the socially mobile part of the population, interested in the overcoming of all artificial limitation of economic and political freedom.

In the present report we shall analyze different projects aimed at formation of the basis of civil society in the Caucasus. The author criticizes existing projects of liberalization (splitting it into cantons, consocial democracy etc.). It seems that a mechanical transposition of European and American political and legal experience into the Caucasian sociocultural context without elaboration of adequate mechanisms of adaptation will lead not to social modernization or formation of civil institutions but to quite the opposite result. In the constructive part of the report the author proposes that the state would take an active part in the formation of civil institutions in the

region, what is inevitable in the context of a "catching up modernization". In search for solution of the problem of "blood principle" (*printzip krovy*) the author suggests that the idea of a civil nation as a supra-ethnic and supra-confessional principle of unification could consolidate the groups that are interested in overcoming the "mountainous Caucasian" model of democracy".

Aida N. Moseiko (Center for Civilizational and Regional Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow Russia)
The Mythology of the Power and the State in the Cultural and Mental Tradition of Russia

The mythological (illusory and Utopian) world outlook is one of the main peculiar traits of the cultural and mental tradition of Russia, which is reproduced in various forms in different periods of its history.

Stable archaic concept of the triad Leader (Tsar, Chief) – State – People always existed as the constant latent potential which is able to become actual under specific conditions. These concepts emerged on the base of patriarchal relations within the limits of which the power holder – the head of clan or the head of the state – was perceived as demigod with magic abilities and secret knowledge and, at the same time, as a father who is both benefactor and protector. A ruler, comprehended in this way, is identified with a state which is personified by his person. At the same time, disappointment in the ruler, which is usually coincide with disasters (bad harvest, starvation, epidemics, foreign invasions), leads to mass dissatisfaction and formation of the myth of non-authenticity of the sovereign, his substitution and the existence of the true and "natural" Tsar-deliverer in other place. This myth is accompanied by mockery over ruling sovereign.

The archetype of the cultural hero – the spirit of forbears, the bearer of the sacral values and organizer of life – and the archetype of the trickster – anti-hero, defiler of sacred objects and profanator of values and virtues as if he is paving the way for the new "true" hero – are realized in the archaic conceptions of leader. Apropos, the mythology of trickster was used on old NTV channel ("The Muppets").

The myth of false ruler and expected deliverer is the realization of the dominant, typical for the Russian mentality, i.e. the idea of non-definitive choice (personal, social and historical), possibility of change of history's course and possibility of beginning everything anew.

It is obvious, that typical Russian phenomenon – the pretence (i.e. the imposition) – is rooted in the people's collective subconscious and is the materialization of the myth of the hidden "true" Tsar. The "authenticity" of

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pretender is confirmed by the events of his life: persecutions, suffering, abnormality, threat of death – wonderful salvation, understanding of the great mission – to deliver people from disasters.

At the same time the ruler, who sits on the throne, could be suspected to be a pretender, if he stops to meet people's idea of "authenticity". Apparently, this is other side of the phenomenon of pretence. Peter the Great was suspected in pretence (the myth of his substitution during the Great Embassy). For contemporary Russia is typical the myth about doubles of Boris Yeltsin which is circulating in mass-media till now.

The examples of the realization of archaic conception and myths could be revealed in plenty both in Soviet as in post-Soviet periods of the Russian history.

Joseph Nevo (University of Haifa, Israel)
Civil society and public space in Jordan: the professional association vs. the government

The leading 13 professional associations in Jordan, forming a well organized 120.000-strong professional and political framework, is certainly the most important component of the nascent civil society in that country.

When between 1957 and 1992 the activity of political parties was banned under martial law, the associations, with partial government blessing, constituted an alternative outlet for political activity.

After parliamentary and political life had been restored, the associations were reluctant to settle for professional activity only and to abandon their role in politics. They are still engaged in political activity, occasionally of an oppositional flavour. Their major preoccupation is Jordan's relations with Israe, which they vehemently reject. They are the driving force behind most of anti-normalization activities.

In this work they take advantage of the democratization process that Jordan has undergone since 1989, carrying freedom of expression and freedom of protest almost to the limit.

The personal and political liberties now enjoyed by the Jordanian public have also resulted in the emergence of an indigenous civil society. The professional associations, under the leadership of Islamist and Pan-Arab left wing forces, have succeeded in becoming the backbone of this civil society. They lead the struggle against the government over the control of Jordan's public space.

This paper analyses the emergence of the professional associations as the leading civic force in Jordan and endeavours to explain the source of their

power and influence. It is also studies the trials and tribulations in their relations with the regime and the government's ambivalent attitude to their activity.

Ware Newaz (University of Tampere, Finland)
Dynamics of Promoting Political Participation of Rural Women in Bangladesh: NGO Programs and Experience of Civil Society

This paper is based on an empirical study which examines the activities of third sector organizations, particularly NGOs and their relations with and potentials of advocacy and social change by promoting political participation of rural women in Bangladesh.

Many argue that increased access to resources and income-generating activities are important variables that augment the productivity of women labour force of a country. And this has been seen as a comprehensive development activity within and beyond the mainstream development debate spreading in social, economic, and political spheres of human welfare. This argument is even more pertinent to women labour force in rural areas of a developing country like Bangladesh.

In this context, many NGOs in Bangladesh, through their micro-credit programs especially with credit-plus approach, which blends the access to credit with awareness raising programs, are working to bring about a significant change in the life of rural women. A number of studies have established that economic impact of such programs of NGOs are higher for women or at least the same for men and women in countries where most resources are directed to male counterpart. On the other hand, social impact of such credit-plus programs are found to be higher and exceeds those to male: it improves gender relations, family health, children's health and education; increases mobility; reduces the number of births and so on. Beyond these positive arguments, advocates of NGOs also view a positive relation between such comprehensive packages of credit-plus programs and political participation of women (in formal political system as contestant in elections), particularly of rural women.

Advocates of NGOs claim, that these programs, through conscientizaion, gradually enable rural women to raise their voices or make them vocal on social, economic, political, and legal right issues. This eventually helps to increase their decision-making capacities in household and in greater socio-political units.

This study examined the above line of argument in the field and the findings are presented in this paper. This paper, based on real life stories of

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rural women in the southwest region of Bangladesh, explains the way in which NGO approach of credit-plus-mobilisation eventually led to the active participation of rural women in the political process. It reviews the dynamics of NGO working with rural women and the subsequent participation of women in the direct local level elections in which a significant number of women won rural people's verdict as contestants.

Donnacha Ó Beacháin (Ireland; Tbilisi State University, Georgia)
Ireland and Georgia:
A Comparative Study in the Development of Political Culture

The paper will attempt to take the experiences of Georgia and Russia out of their traditional context of Post-Soviet transition and place them in a wider framework by comparing their relationship with that of Ireland and Britain since the 1920s. The main argument presented in the paper will be that post-independent Georgia and Ireland faced similar problems in developing and sustaining a mature political culture and civil society. Furthermore, I will argue that the conflicts in Abkhazia and Northern Ireland, though highly predictable, were not inevitable.

Most of Georgia's and Ireland's post-independence problems can be attributed to the weakness of centralised authority and the absence of a sufficiently developed civil society. Both states were ill-prepared for independence, politically, economically, culturally and psychologically. Acute divisions emerged within the revolutionary elite leading to civil war, an inflated sense of national importance was fostered, and an abstentionist political culture flourished which damaged the state-building process in both states.

Russia and Britain found it difficult to accept Georgia and Ireland as fully independent states and considered them part of a sphere of influence. Both Russia and Britain shared a fear for their respective diasporas and the rump of loyalists who were cut off after the dissolution of their empires. Loyalists were used by both states to exert pressure on the political elites of their former colonies.

It will also be argued that symbolism has played a crucial role in the development of a collective identity among the secessionist groups in Georgia and Ireland. Among the items compared will be "double-minority" characteristics, Georgian and Irish attitudes to the Commonwealth of Independent States and British Commonwealth respectively, the importance of language, religion, ideology, and territorial integrity.

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The paper will be based on personal research conducted in Georgia, Abkhazia, Russia and in both parts of Ireland.

М.П. Остроменский (Новосибирск, Россия)
M.P. Ostromenskiy (Novossibirsk, Russia)

О значении капитала в переходе народов от примитивных к более совершенным экономическим формам внутри- и межцивилизационного взаимодействия
On the Importance of the Capital in the Transition from Simple to Complex Economic Forms of Inner- and Intercivilizational Interaction

Деятельность правительства по стимулированию научно-технического прогресса или помощь ООН беднейшим странам мира, исходит из одного предположения – важна не проблема, а усилия. Однако ресурсы, истраченные государствами мира на научные и технические исследования, не приносят плодов в виде новых экономически оправданных благ. Деятельность международных организаций не приводит к сокращению количества нищих стран, или к уменьшению масштабов помощи.

В этих и подобных случаях переходы на новый уровень взаимодействия (промышленные, экономические революции) происходят, когда объем накопленного обществом капитала (денежные, материальные, людские ресурсы, весь комплекс навыков, знаний и культурных традиций населения) достаточен для отвлечения части его от производства благ традиционным методом, без снижения объемов, на создание и продвижение благ с более длительным и сложным циклом производства. Иначе расход ресурсов будет чреват замедлением экономического роста, спадом, понижением уровня жизни, утерей многих навыков, технологий и знаний. Тоже происходит, когда в обществе очень велики трасакцизные издержки, например, на содержание государства. Подобные крушения происходили в истории человечества не раз: падение Римской империи и последовавшие темные века, тысячелетний сон Китая, развал СССР.

Успехи западной цивилизации связаны с тем, что благодаря буржуазной революции и либеральной модели экономики резко упали внутрицивилизационные трансакцизные издержки. Высвободившийся капитал направлялся на создание экономически состоятельных благ, что вело к лавинообразному росту капитала. Трудности современного мира связаны с возросшими издержками западных стран, пошедших по интервенционистскому пути.

Причина плачевного состояния так называемых окончательно отставших стран в том, что объем накопленного ими капитала достаточен лишь для поддержания жизни населения. Выделение его, даже незначительной, части, на нужды функционирования государства, приводит к катастрофе. Человечество вынужденно будет кормить их постоянно, но такое иждивенчество приведет к полной деградации народа и не остановит его вымирание, ибо будут потеряны даже те навыки, что позволяли обеспечивать объем капитала достаточный для физического выживания.

Nadezhda K. Radina (Nizhniy Novgorod Institute of Management and Business, Russia)
Perception of Local Authorities in the Russian Province: the Nizhniy Novgorod Region

Scholars who analyze the relationships between power and society need empirical data. The social-psychological research carried out by the author in 2000 in 15 districts of the Nizhniy Novgorod region included 517 men of different age and education. This research allows us to see how provincial inhabitants identify themselves with local government officials. Following essential indications of the population-to-authority attitude were found:

1. The rigid separation of the social world into those who have power and so-called "average" people. The world of power is impenetrable and incomprehensible for the latters but the "average" people consider themselves to be invisible and not understood by authorities as well. These two worlds exist as if in different dimensions.

Local authorities are outside of moral categories. They are neither influential, nor powerless. They do not call neither respect nor contempt. This perception looks like the perception of some natural phenomena which one can not affect, but only adapt to. The only certain characteristic feature that describes the attitude of the people to the authorities is the estrangement. In public opinion all the representatives of the power are closely interrelated and even are considered to belong to one "family".

There are several possible interpretations of the data of present research. One of them is definition of public consciousness of Nizhny Novgorod region as consciousness of the "closed social community", when status instead of the personal characteristics determines the relations between the people. The closed social community is characterized by indistinct social norms, extreme solutions aptitude, acceptance of violence as a norm. Another model of explicaton is postauthoritarian society analysis.

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From both approaches we see that modern public consciousness of the Russian province is characterized by high anxiety, low tolerance, discrimination of ethnic minorities, migrants and women. We suppose that the origin of such a situation are placed in the Soviet period. Contemporary Russian state is responsible for creation of favorable conditions for further development of public consciousness.

Liza Rivera (University of Paris Sorbonne and University of South Brittany, France)
Damien Erceau (University of Rennes, Saint Cast, France)

Relations de pouvoir et de violence à l'intérieur de la société colombienne. Une tradition de cinq siècles

A l'aube du XXIème siècle, le spectacle qu'offre la Colombie est d'une extrême gravité : effondrement partiel du pouvoir étatique, montée en puissance de groupes armés se disputant de vastes territoires et leurs ressources, graves crises institutionnelles et politiques favorisant les inégalités socio-économiques, exode et déplacement de populations lié à la violence et à l'insécurité, etc.

Dans ces conditions, on peut affirmer que la viabilité de l'état colombien est mise en cause. Il est donc intéressant de se demander comment la Colombie est arrivée à cette situation, cas unique dans le contexte occidental.

Nous ne nous sommes pas contentés de limiter notre champ de recherche à des phénomènes récents, susceptibles d'expliquer la dégradation de la société colombienne, car ils ne nous semblent être que la conséquence de phénomènes beaucoup plus profonds, pouvant remonter au XVIème siècle, lorsque s'installèrent en Colombie (ancienne Nouvelle Grenade) les premières institutions Ibériques. Ces institutions peuvent, en effet, être caractérisées par des relations de pouvoir issues de l'Espagne de la Reconquête (711-1492) où la valeur et le prestige d'un individu étaient déterminés par sa capacité à combattre l'ennemi, à s'approprier ses biens (pillage systématique de Maures et de Juifs) et à dominer une main d'œuvre gratuite.

Les attitudes et les comportements du *conquistador* espagnol se poursuivront en Amérique mais tout particulièrement en Colombie, où les mentalités ataviques des Européens vont avoir plus d'incidence que dans les autres colonies. La formation particulière des villes et des villages, les conditions physiques propres de la région mais surtout le métissage extrêmement rapide, font disparaître la majorité de la population indigène. Ce

processus détermine le maintien d'un ordre hiérarchique qui ne peut fonctionner que sur des mécanismes sociaux intégrateurs ayant comme assise la violence réelle ou symbolique.

Le système d'organisation sociale mis en place pendant la période coloniale institue comme valeurs suprêmes l'autoritarisme, la soumission inconditionnelle à son supérieur et le paternalisme comme facteurs d'accès au pouvoir et au prestige social. Ces valeurs prévalent dans l'actuelle société colombienne, sous des formes recomposées et parfois diffuses, interdisant la mobilité sociale des populations entraînant le développement de la violence et de l'exclusion.

Lev N. Rytow (Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
Botswana: The Successful Transformation from the Traditional Structure to the European Model of Democracy

Until achieving independence in 1966 Botswana had a very strong and stable system of traditional rule. Seven main tribes were headed by paramount chiefs who resisted any attempts of reforms by British administration because they considered reforms as a danger to their autocratic rule and to the archaic social structure with the elements of cast system. Chiefs gave a hostile reception to political parties which appeared in early 1960-th and were suspicious to the introduction of the Constitution and the Presidential form of power. Now after 35 years of independence Botswana is a unique example of uninterrupted democratic development in Africa. Since 1966 the Constitution has not been seriously changed, the authorities have not prohibited any political party or a newspaper.

The transition of real power from chiefs to democratically elected institutions as well as the adaptation of tribal aristocracy to the Parliamentary system and to market economy deserves our attention. Such a transition became possible due to the coincidence of some circumstances that were favorable for the modernisation of society. Perhaps the most important was an administrative-territorial reform. It foresaw the division of tribal territories into districts, some districts including lands of adjacent tribes. As a result the traditional administrative structure was wrecked. Firstly the chiefs rejected such a reform and they were not alone. White settlers demanded autonomy for their areas (blocks) which had been tom away from the Tswana, and a local referendum for joining racist South Africa. The chiefs had to accept recarving administrative boundaries just not to lose lands that were considered by the Tswana as their own.

The second favourable factor had a subjective character. The movement for independent democratic Botswana was headed by Seretse Khama who received western education. In 1948 the British authorities prevented him from becoming the Ngwato Paramount chief and send him into exile for many years. In the consciousness of many Tswana he was a hero with a martyr's halo. In spite of Khama's democratic convictions other chiefs thought him a man of their circle. So they didn' t apprehend losing their privileges if Rhama would have become the head the state.

Thirdly, it is important that until independence there was existing Tswana's tradition to solve important issues by the democratic way. The chiefs put a problem at the meeting of all tribe's men (*kgotla*). Moreover, in 1948 there was a precedent of democratic alternative elections when Kahama was elected as a chief of Ngwata. The people' s memory tied the procedure of election with the idea of fairness and the introduction of general election was acceptable for all population except chiefs but they were soothed by the creation of the House of chiefs . By 1990-s the House of Chiefs became just a consultive body, while the National Assembly did not reflect at all the influence of chiefs but that of political parties. The chiefs successfully adapted to changed conditions.

Anatoly D. Savateyev (Centre for Civilizational and Regional Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
Values of Local Civilization, Education and Civil Society

There is a widespread opinion that West European (American) model of social-political structure is ideal, and that all the societies should reach it earlier or later, that all other political systems are damaged à priori and that they are to reconstruct themselves urgently according to the sample. The present goal may be attained by copying of already existing ideal model only.

But an experience of the civil societies' effective action in the Eastern Asian States and, on the contrary, unsuccessful attempts of the western-based political structures in some other political cases shows that direct implantation of the western model of civil society with its especially personal responsibility of individual doesn't bring the desirable result. On the contrary, it provokes rejection of the western norms and institutes as of heterogeneous body in the inner civilization's strata.

In the global context this phenomenon is presented as a clash of civilizations. Events development trend is conditioned by aspiration of non-western societies to defend their original nature and social organization and

by unconditional confidence of the West in infallibility of its own paradigm of civil society.

Consequently, we are to understand the task of the civil society's creation in the non-western States as an adaptation of western political culture to the values and structures of the civilization. It presupposes inclusion of socio-cultural and even religious potential in the process of political modernization. That means socio-cultural inversion – a development of the values of modernization on the base of traditionalism and of the values of traditionalism on the base of modernization.

In connection with it, we consider indispensable, unconditionally recognizing a self-value of the civil culture, to develop it firstly instructing children and youth, and, secondly, realizing coordinated politics, taking into account the national civilizational values.

Stephen Schechter (Russell Sage College, Troy, USA)
Democratization and the Reformation of National Political Culture: A Call for Comparative and Historical Research

This paper is dedicated to the memory of Daniel J. Elazar who died in December 1999. Daniel Elazar was one of the foremost scholars in the field of comparative federalism, but he also made significant contributions to other fields including the study of political culture. Dan and I were close friends and colleagues for nearly thirty years.

We collaborated on numerous projects and books, we traveled the world together, and we shared a deep appreciation for political culture as a subject of study and an approach to the study of political things.

When Daniel Elazar and I met in 1972, he had just developed a typology of political subcultures in the United States. Over the years, I assisted Dan in the development of a broader typology of political culture that could be applied to the study of national cultures around the world and over time. As a result of this collaboration, we share similar views of culture and political culture, and we share a common commitment to Dan's typology of political culture. However, we differ somewhat in the way we explain and apply that typology. Academe is, after all, a free country!

With this in mind, I will first define culture and political culture. The view of culture presented here is hardly revolutionary. Culture is our second nature; it is the way we are raised, typically today by families and communities in national contexts, to see (perceive) and order (prioritize) the world around us. I use the term "political culture", as a dimension of general culture, to refer to the way we see and order the political world around us.

How we perceive the political world and the priorities we place upon its contents also help explain what we come to expect from the real world. I do not want to turn this human interpretation into a formula, but political perceptions and political values or priorities help explain political expectations.

In the second part of this paper, I will present Elazar's typology of political culture. I will distinguish four political cultures. First is the individualistic political culture (found in much of the United States) that sees the political and legal world as a marketplace in which public goods are exchanged. Second is the political culture (such as ancient Sparta and modern Russia) that sees the political and legal world as a military or bureaucratic state in which public goods are produced and distributed by government. Third is the civic republican political culture (such as ancient Athens, early modern Florence, and modern Switzerland) that sees the political and legal world as a commonwealth or civic republic where emphasis is placed not on the individual but on the community. Fourth is the traditionalistic political culture that existed in pre-modern times but also exists today in many economically developing societies. Traditional cultures see and constitutionalize the family as the primary civic unit, though they differ in the larger social world within which the family operates.

In the process of explaining each political culture, I will also attempt to show how different political cultures perceive, authorize, organize, limit, and direct political power, which is one of the main themes of this conference.

In the third part of this paper, I will flesh out this typology by turning to the field of comparative legal systems and searching out the similarities between political and legal cultures. I will compare four legal traditions: Anglo-American common law of the individualistic culture, Euro-Russian civil law of the statist culture, biblical covenantal law of civic republican culture, and fundamentalist law of traditionalistic culture.

In the final part of this paper, I will turn to the field of comparative political systems, and the implications of this expanded typology of political and legal culture for the future study of the relationship between political culture and democracy. The subject area of interest for me, cast in terms of the theme of this conference panel, is the re-formation of national political cultures, particularly when an existing culture meets some kind of democratic imperative. I am thinking of two political challenges widespread today: first, polities with a non-democratic past that are in the process of democratization; second, polities with long democratic histories that are in the process of redefinition. What can the cultural approach presented here contribute to our understanding of these two contemporary challenges?

Lyazzat K. Shotbakova (Karaganda State University, Kazakhstan)
Multiparty System of Kazakhstan as an Element
of Democratization of the Society

Kazakhstan like many other post-Soviet states officially proclaimed construction of democratic society as one of the main problem of national development. One of the components of democratization is the existence of multiparty system and political opposition.

At first sight, both of these conditions are present in Kazakhstan. Nowadays there are 14 political parties (10 of them took part in the last parliament elections) which can be subdivided into 3 (three) groups: parties of the authority, loyal parties loyal to the authorities and opposition. The utmost active participants of political life of the country are the republican party "Otan", the Communist Party and the democratic party "Azamat" (its members consider it to be "party of extreme opposition"). The movement "Democratical choice of Kazakhstan" may be considered as the latest example of opposition party, registered in November 2001. As far as Kazakhstan is the polyethnical state, national and political movements must play an important role in formation of civil society and take significant place in the political life of country. Such organizations began to appear in early 1990-s and at present the Association of Russian, Slavic and Cossack organizations is the greatest one. It consists of the Slavic Movement, the Russian Society, the Cossacks, the Germanic cultural center, "Tabigat" movement etc. Practically all of them (except is the Germanic centre) are in the opposition to existing power.

The existence of opposition supposes its influence upon the decision making by the authorities through political debates, parliamentary activity etc. But actually political parties and organizations do not constitute civil society in Kazakhstan and occupy one of the less important places among social institutions. It can be explained by the absence of concrete aims and tasks of these parties. Very often the absence of concrete programs does not allow to identity social base of one or another party. Another weak point is the absence of concepts referring to the ethnic problems.

Vladimir G. Shubin (Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)

Civil society in South Africa:
stages and features of the development

This paper will examine the basic stages of the formation of civil society in South Africa, beginning from the colonial times. It will show how the elements of civil society appeared, initially among the white population under the conditions of Dutch, and then English colonial system, and in the independent Boer republics.

Primary attention will be given to formation and to the functioning of this society after creation of united state (since 1910, the Union of South Africa, and since 1961, the Republic of South Africa) in the territory of South Africa. The paper will determine special features of existence of its structures during the segregation of the population of the country according to the racial and (partially) ethnic criteria. It seems that among the white population they acted within the framework of Western type democracy (although with the amplifying authoritarian tendencies), while among the black majority under the conditions of authoritarian regime, and sometimes, in particular, in some bantustans, under the conditions, which were close to totalitarian.

The paper will examine specifically the role of civil disobedience during the long struggle against the racist regime and the role of public (non-governmental) organisations in the creation of the United Democratic Front, a main legal force, which opposed to the state of apartheid in 1980s.

The final part of the report will be dedicated to the activity of civil society in South Africa during radical political changes in 1990s, and to the discussion, which is conducted in that country on the problems of the civil society at present.

Gennady V. Shubin (Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)

South Africa: Creation of a Non-Racial State (1984-1994)

The paper is devoted to the process of creation of a non-racial state and the talks on political settlement in South Africa. It determines the reasons which forced the South African government to start talks with the African National Congress. It also considers the evolution of the forms of anti-apartheid struggle and the conditions which allowed the ANC to change its tactics and to pass from the armed and political struggle to the negotiations

accompanied by mass actions. The paper compares democratic and non-democratic forms of social and political organisation in modern South Africa.

The history of indirect and later direct contacts between the government and the ANC as well as between the government, the ANC and Inkatha (Big Troika) and other minor political forces is also under research and the experience of finding compromises between the different forces which were confronting each other, both politically and military, is analysed. The research was based on documents of the South African government and the ANC, archive materials and the works by South African, Russian and Western researchers, as well as the reminiscences of participants.

Raj Kishore Singh (Agra University, India)
K.S. Singh (R.B.S. College, Agra, India)
Cultural Influences and Constitutional Goals In India:
A Socio-Cultural Perspective

We analyse socio-political and cultural influences that hinder the constitutional goals of: equality of status and opportunity, justice - social, economic and political, liberty of: thought, expression, belief, faith and worship. Ways to overcome them have also been discussed in detail. Socio-cultural interactions with the state determine achievement of liberty, equality and justice and both culture and society affect the identity of an individual. Although social domain has major control over the political groups and individual in most modern societies, many problems in India are a result of the failure of social influences. Formation of social and cultural boundaries and more particularly the authority of cultural over social has led to a number of problems: Socio-political power inequalities, socio-political exclusiveness, dominant subordinate group relationship. Cultural diversity of Indian society must be appreciated but it should not be allowed to prevent the translation of the dream of equality, freedom and justice into reality.

Igor V. Sledzevsky (Center for Civilizational and Regional Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
The civil society and absolute values. Is it possible to build
the civil society on the premises of moral relativism?

The modern discussion on the perspectives of the formation in Russia of the civil society is determined by the rigid opposition of the "westernizers-antitraditionalists" and "soil-traditionalists". The "Bone of Contention" is the

question of the proportion between the market reform and the cultural identity in the context of globalization. For the former the globalization is associated with the notion of almost universal social benefit, the formation of the global "market and democratic space", for the latter – with the reign of the world cultural chaos, spread of criminal, shade and semi-legal societal structures.

Notwithstanding all the content and discourse distinctions between these two viewpoints they both have common elements: dichotomial world picture (globalization versus culture), fissure between the everyday life, its phenomenology and culture and their normative-value core. Both westernizers and traditionalists perceive this fissure as the alternative to the modern development, rather then integral phenomenon brought into life by the disintegration of the supraempirical hierarchy of values, the discreditation of the absolute values, the moral relativism of the post-Christian (secular) civilization.

"Orientation to the absolute", comparison of the society and history with the higher values determine the "quality" of civilization without which it can not preserve its basic foundations and independent position in the world civilizational process. The formation of the civil society in the neo-European civilization become possible only in the process of the development of the personalist principle of reality and absolute value of the human individuality. This principle as an absolute one, however, is slipping from the understanding of the modern civil society, the life of which ever more confines to the concrete pragmatic situations and realities, to the life of an atomized individual rejecting the very possibility of the sharing of the responsibility for the course of history and preservation of absolute values.

The pragmatic strategies of the formation of the civil society are dominant in modern Russia: material wealth is placed higher than social and spiritual values, the growth of capital has higher value in comparison with the human solidarity and spiritual ties, the society is raised upon the ideas of "usefulness" and beneficial influence of the shade capital. Can the pragmatism and moral relativism serve as a base for the formation of the civil society? May be it lowers, as a the principle of the social philosophy, the ability of the society to reform itself and be historically stable?

Elena V. Solovyova (Moscow, Russia)
Developing Citizenship in Pre-School Age
(Program for Kindergarten Teachers)

"Citizen education" is a new idea in the field of pre-school education for Russia. Before the social reforms the curriculum for kindergartens (which was one and the same for all of them all over the country) had fixed the goal of "patriotic education" and it had been intrinsically connected with ideology. Since 1990 we have made great efforts for citizenship education of schoolchildren.

The countries which have a long experience of building up a democratic society had already developed curriculum that starts from the pre-school age.

The main goal of citizenship education is to prepare children for becoming active participants in social and political life in future. The first decisions on future life are made by a person when he/she is really very young – at the age of about five. That is why it is so important to make an early start. The basic values are also developing in the pre-school childhood. Just these values are the foundation of modern society.

We believe that a citizen is to feel responsibility for the destiny of his/her country and also be capable to think globally, sharing democratic political culture and values.

Pre-school age is the period when a child is developing attitudes towards other people, nature, his/her native culture and other cultures.

He/she studies to respect different points of view; be tolerant to differences in ideas, appearances, manners, traditions; to find information and estimate its validity, to compare and analyse; to make choices and decisions, and be aware and responsible for the sequences; to use democratic patterns of exchanging ideas, speaking to public, expressing of disagreement, communicating with officials; to be aware of his/her human rights and be able to defend them if necessary, to understand links between nature and society.

In pre-school age the effectiveness of intellectual learning is closely connected with emotions. That is why it is necessary to relate teaching with cultural education. We share our experience in introducing the curriculum titled "The Heritage".

Е.Б. Спорышева (Москва, Россия)
Elena B. Sporysheva (Moscow, Russia)
Воспитание будущих политиков
Education of Future Politicians

Идеалы гражданского и демократического общества должны быть усвоены теми, кто собирается связать свою карьеру с государственным управлением. В настоящее время уже в старших классх школы выделяются дети, которые ориентированы на работу именно в данной сфере.

Школа "Лицей молодых политиков", начавшая свою работу в тесном творческом контакте с Московским государственным университетом им. М.В.Ломоносова сформировала свою концепцию воспитательно-образовательной работы. Задача воспитательной работы заключается в формировании экологического мировосприятия, глобального мышления, личностной зрелости и ответственности будущего гражданина России. Для гражданина 21 века оно предполагает наличие гуманитарного, ориентированного на учет "человеческого фактора" подхода к решению любой проблемы – от политической до производственной.

Важнейшей задачей представляется развитие умения воспринимать и учитывать различные точки зрения, воспитание терпимости, формирование умения анализировать решения и их возможные последствия с позиций более широкого социального контекста. С этой целью мы предполагаем строить учебные планы и работу с классами на основе негуманитарной направленности.

Классический вариант гуманитарной специализации предполагает углубленное и расширенное изучение традиционных предметов гуманитарного цикла: истории, литературы, языка. Однако в последнее десятилетие возросла заинтересованность детей и их семей в получении начальных знаний в области более широкого круга дисциплин, которые с той или иной позиции аккумулируют знания о человеке и обществе. Это психология, социология, право и политология, экономика, а также философия. Циклы новых для школьной ступени образования дисциплин будет разрабатываться для детей, начиная с младшего школьного возраста (с учетом преемственности с дошкольной ступенью) с учетом возрастных возможностей и особенностей мышления и восприятия ребенка на каждом этапе развития. Разработка будет проводиться на основе интеграции дисциплин с целью избежать возможных перегрузок детей и увеличение общего учебного времени.

Формирование общекультурного кругозора требует активного и двустороннего сотрудничества школы с учреждениями культуры. Экскурсии, а также стажировки и образовательный туризм – важнейшие составляющие образовательной программы школы.

Elena Yu. Staburova (Latvian University, Riga)
Initial Period of Civil Society Formation and the Role of Tradition in China

The logic of the development of one of the most exemplary social systems in the world history, which existed in China for centuries did not bring into existence a civil society. China elaborated its own forms of social self-regulation and self-control different from the model of the West.

The ideas of civil society were introduced in China in the 19th and became relatively widespread during the revolution of 1911-1913. However, influence of traditional social behavior and political institutions made this Chinese civil society rather peculiar. Zhang Taiyan was the most insistent protagonist of civil society with Chinese characteristics. He suggested legal system based on five powers with direct expression of the people's will and exclusive status of a president resembling Shun's type sage.

George Tarkhan-Mouravi (Centre for Geopolitical and Regional Studies, Tbilisi, Georgia)
Democratic Transition and Power Structure in Post-Soviet Societies

Today it became fashionable to speak about the failure of post-Soviet countries to build democratic states, free of corruption and of latent instability. Although all major political forces in most of these countries claim to adhere to values of liberal democracy, building stable, sustainable, democratic and prosperous states is still a remote target. Governments have to solve a number of inter-linked tasks before the public will have confidence in the democratic processes and policy reforms undertaken by their governments, and subscribe to legitimate institutions of governance. Making of a nation is a complicated process, involving both the development of respective institutions and structures, and the establishment of the appropriate sets of value orientations, skills and responsibilities among the population.

Priority is the development of grass-root democracy and of effective system of local and self governance at various levels. Today central governments abstains from passing over downwards real levers of local

power, mistrust is strong between center and periphery, élites and masses. Decentralization and democratic redistribution of power will not only serve as the most effective democracy school for the population, it will improve now strenuous relations of the centers with various levels of power. Still, there are many questions that require reflection.

In what sense is post-Soviet states' democracy different from its western prototypes, what is the developmental profile of the general characteristics of democratic society and how respective features are actualised in post-Soviet reality? What are the reasons and factors that determine existing differences, including those seen in cross-cultural, regional and temporal perspectives? What are current trends and determinants of change, and what could be the implications for possible external interventions? What is the real power structure, as distinct from the idealistic image of a linear hierarchy mixed with classical mechanism of division of powers and checks and balances?

Yi Li (Tacoma Community College, USA)
Guo Songtao in His Retirement from the Qing Bureaucracy between 1878 and 1893: A Case Study

My research is a case study of Guo Songtao in his retirement from the Qing (1644-1911) bureaucracy between 1878 and 1893. By examining Guo's inner and immediate outer worlds, I will uncover the making of the power structure and its functioning in a para-bureaucratic level, one that was profoundly rooted in the political culture of Confucianism and closely interacted with different social dynamics in the late-Qing period. In the light of comparing it with the Western and other models, my finding will contribute to the reconstruction of the Chinese model of civil society.

Most previous studies identify civil society as a realm that is organized along a different principle from the one of the state, and therefore stands antagonistic to the state power. An examination of the experience of Guo Songtao in his retirement, however, seems to suggest a different pattern in the Chinese cultural context. It appears that the local power as well as its functions, which Rankin suggested were expanding in the 19th century at the expense of the state power, were exercised by a group of people, like Guo, who in fact continued to hold a considerable share in the "state power" even they were no longer on the government's payroll. They did so through an elaborate personal network stretching vertically from the top to the bottom, transcending the horizontal divisions of the state and society. Remotely under the influence of the Confucian ideology, such personal network was centered on people. It expanded and shrank corresponding to the rise and fall of its

core member in the late-Qing political world. Rankin's finding helps us understand the breakdown of the Manchu empire in the early 20th century, but a reconstruction of the vertical personal network that permeated the Chinese society will help us explain better the subsequent re-unification, as well as the working of today's state power in China.

И.Ю. Замула (Институт монголоведения, буддологии и тибетологии Бурятского научного центра СО РАН, Улан-Удэ)
Irina Yu. Zamula (Institute of Mongolian, Buddhist and Tibetan Studies, Buryat Scientific Centre, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Ulhan-Ude)

Социальные ресурсы городского самоуправления XIX – конца XX века (на примере Улан-Удэ – столицы Бурятии)
Social resources of urban self-government in the 19th – late 20th centuries (Ulhan-Ude, the capital of Buryatia)

Исторически сложилось, что деятельность местного самоуправления активизируется в периоды ослабления государства. Организация современного местного самоуправления требует учитывать этот исторический опыт, а также многонациональность России. Местное самоуправление сегодня способно решать вопросы сохранения языка коренных народов, национальной культуры, образования, культурных традиций, не выводя их только на уровень государственных проблем, выступать в значительной степени буфером в межнациональных противоречиях. Решение многих проблем национальной жизни посредством создания различных форм общественного самоуправления позволяет развести некоторые возникающие острые вопросы.

В Бурятии, как и в других национальных субъектах, этот фактор становится еще более значимым, т. к. Западное Забайкалье, является уникальным полиэтническим регионом. Здесь возникли города, ставшие центрами ремесла, торговли и транспорта, культуры и духовной жизни, в которых зародились и утвердились ценные, во многом своеобразные традиции в быту, культуре, хозяйстве и во всей жизни народов.

Со второй половины XYIII в. в городах Западного Забайкалья и в Верхнеудинске были созданы городские органы самоуправления. Их деятельность ограничивалась хозяйственным руководством. Городские сословия в основной массе не принимали участия в управлении городом, которым фактически руководили несколько десятков

состоятельных горожан, а деятельность самоуправления была строго регламентирована.

Местное самоуправление в Улан-Удэ развивалось и развивается как целостное явление в соответствии с общероссийскими тенденциями. Уровень и интенсивность этого развития определяются рядом факторов географических, экономических, наличием культурного потенциала горожан. Сочетание разумных интересов общества и каждого гражданина, налаживание контакта между властью и горожанами позволяет городу Улан-Удэ избегать заметных социальных стрессов, обострения политической и общественной ситуации, межэтнических, национальных отношений. В этом заключается главная задача городских властей.

Обобщение опыта прошлого, сопоставление его с современностью, помогает определить причины и истоки социальных и культурных проблем, установить воздействие на них как объективных, так и субъективных факторов, оценить предлагавшиеся методы решения тех или иных вопросов. Без глубокого изучения динамики социальных и этнокультурных процессов вряд ли достижимо объективное и полное представление об их современном состоянии, достоверное прогнозирование возможных сценариев политического развития событий.

Возрождение местного самоуправления как важнейшего института демократии является актуальной проблемой современного развития России, так как в сегодняшних условиях необходимо создать инициативную, предприимчивую нацию, обеспечив тем самым высокие социальные стандарты общества. Без самоорганизации граждан невозможно сформировать гражданское общество и укрепить государственную целостность России.

Constantine F. Zavershinski (Novgorod State University, Great Novgorod, Russia)
The concept of "legitimacy" in Russian and Western civilization

The comparative analysis of semantic structures of Western and Russian concept of "legitimacy" is obviously necessary in connection with socio-cultural urgency of the integration of civilized communities and existing methodological problems in a theoretical field of the researches of the phenomenon of cultural, symbolical legitimation of the political order in Russia.

In civilized space of the countries (historically focused on the pattern of the "public contracts") the development of semantic complex connected with the use of the concept "trust" has resulted to formation of specific socio-cultural concept. Discourse contents of its concept became some kind of cultural "constant" of political ability to live without destruction and degradation of the social order. Cultural-historical experience of the development of the Russian civilization obviously testifies in the contents of Russian practices of cultural legitimation the semantic contexts interfering maintenance steady and civil consent.

To the opinion of the author just specificity of cognitive and estimated structures which have been usual in the period "critical time" (R. Koselleck), which is necessary in the end of the 18th in the early 19th centuries, have determined the vector of the further evolution and specificities of the semantic contents practises of cultural legitimation of Russia and Western civilization. The methodological bases, incorporated during such a research, can become good base for study of specificity of political development of Russia, both on earlier stages, and on the subsequent stages of historical development.

The author believes, that the contents of the concept of "legitimacy" can be presented by two crossed semantic spaces: "a semantic horizontal of trust" ("equivalent crediting by trust"), when "the symbolical capital" allocates also other participants of socio-cultural communications, and "the semantic vertical of trust", in which semantic installation on "obedient delivery of positions" before the authority of social elite dominates.

Cultural-historical reconstruction of dynamics of semantic structures of the concept of "legitimacy" allows to look differently at cultural development of the Russian civilization in comparison with Western. It reveals the backwardness of "horizontal" of trust and the necessity of detailed research of the reasons and such consequences of the development.

Theories of Power; Power of Theories: Anthropological Approaches
Convenor: *Steve Reyna* (Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale, Germany)

The goal of this session is not to privilege some particular theory of power as the best and most powerful. Rather, the goal is confrontational. The anthropologists in the session take different theories of power – Parsonian, Foucauldian, Habermasian, their own – and investigate how well what such theories imagine to theoretically go on in the world actually is ethnographically observed to do so. In sum, theories of power confront realities of power. Hopefully, as a result of such confrontations, certain theories will prove less imaginary and, hence, more powerful. Thus it is hoped that out of this confrontation of theory with observation that the power of theories of power may be extended.

Erdmute Alber (Institue für Ethnologie, Freie Universität, Berlin, Germany)
The modality of power and domination or:
Do Max Weber (and others) help in the situation of empirical research

In this paper I deal theoretically with the concepts of power and domination. My aim is to find analytical definitions for power and domination which make them useful in empirical research.

I understand 'domination' as an analytical term when defined in a Weberian sense. However, according to Heinrich Popitz, domination constitutes one pole of a continuum of power relations, situated at the side of institutionalization and control. Non-institutionalized power relations constitute the other pole. Domination is neither self-evident nor a product of an evolution process. Rather one has to investigate the processes of rising and decaying relations of domination, as well as the fulfilling of or non-fulfilling of certain criteria of institutionalization.

The term 'power', as distinguished from domination, seems to be not an analytical category, as Max Weber had suggested when he called it 'sociologically amorph'. Power is a quality that cannot be seen isolated from society-specific modalities, as money, violence, intelligence, gender and so on. I put these ideas into empirically useful forms first through re-readings of Max Weber, Steven Lukes, Michel Foucault and Richard Adams and second by illustrating them with examples from my Baatombu field research in Northern Benin.

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Galina Yu. Amanbayeva (Karaganda State University, Kazakhstan)
Ideological Preconstruct in Political Discourse

Discourse analysis is considered to be one of actual trends in modern linguistics. The priority of this field determined by a number of factors, the most important of which are the following:

a) transformation of the paradigm, predetermined the dominance of language studies in functional mode and anthropodetermined racurs;

b) diversity of discourse phenomenon, determined the separation of various aspects of individual linguistic mental activity analysis.

Discourse analysis presupposes research of texts, produced in institutional frames, which impose certain limits, that is specify the structure and content of historic and social texts. The object of such research is a type of texts, which complicated and relatively stable way of constructing is very important for certain community. Texts are considered not separately but as a part of a recognized institute, which determines conditions of utterance acts for the given social, economic, geographical and linguistic sphere.

Referring to discourse as a text, "deeped in life", it has differential parameters of discourse variants. This presupposes the following:

• rendering the term "discourse" in the synchronic aspect;

• delimitation of the researched type of texts in discourse typology;

• explication of constants of discourse position in extralinguistic, cognitive and pragmatic mechanisms.

The synchronic interpretation of discourse is based on two mode of objectivization:

• process mode, including the realization of discourse as a communication event;

• written mode, presupposing discourse as text collection.

The combination of integral properties of a text such as thematic cohesion, coherence, intentional determinance, situational character, genre markedness, forms the paradigm of ontological constants.

Besides content and structural organization the variable characteristic of discourse is discursive strategy. A variable characteristic of political discourse is an ideological preconstruct with the understanding of ideology as a linguistic and wider semiotic fact, which is interpreted as social interests and in which social values are stated.

In connection with it "ideological preconstruct" is interpreted as an ideological substratum, formed in social political medium and which determines the relation with features, interests and values, characteristic for a

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definite society or social group. According to French linguists, in each utterance can be found political science.

From the anthropocentric position discourse obtains a political status, if it realizes the corporate interests and is directed to the realization of pragmatic strategies, which form certain ideological stereotypes and conventions. Political discourse is a specific form of linguistic mental inclusion of a subject in ideological continuum.

Pavel L. Belkov (Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography, Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg)
Political Anthropology: The Subject of Study

It is something of a paradox that a question of subject or field of investigation is implicitly of long standing in the political anthropology. What most usually concerns a political anthropologist is a promlem of origins of state. But it is only an aim of inquiry; but it is not a subject of study.

The history of the studies of "early state", "proto-state", "chiefdom" etc. manifests that a primary subject of study may effectively be what I term as centralization of power to emphasize the main idea of so called "political organization". If so, political anthropology has nothing to do with primitive societies where the power is synonimous with the ownership (*i.e.* performance) of local myth and ritual. The notion of centralization of power and of social stratification form a clearly associated pair.

There are two general ways that a subject of study is deployed at the level of political anthropology. One is to explore the evolution of decision-making systems in the primitive societies to early forms of the centralization of power in the stratified societies. The other way features the problem of origins of state or, to put it properly, European state. The state is completely European phenomenon. In such a case the problem should be reduced to the question: what peculiarities of the European mediaeval culture did help constitute a historical basis of state. The key words are "estate", "monarchy", "vassalage", "fief", "burgh". It is such unique properties that explain why European state became a universal model of power.

Svetlana A. Borinskaya (Institute of General Genetics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
Infragroup Hierarchy as Mechanisms
of Behavior pattern Evolution in Primates

Primate group is a social organism which possess a group-specific set of behavior patterns (a collection of behavior patterns of group members). Social transmission (through imitation and learning) allows to reproduce the set of those patterns from generation to generation. As is known primates tend to imitate behavior of high range individuals where as specific future of low range individual behavior is reproduced by their progeny (if it exists). New patterns of behavior usually arise among young low range individuals (which is well described among macaque). New behavioral pattern can only spread to significant extent if their bearer achieves a high range. The range depends on age and individual psychological traits. Thus, before an individual achieves a high range, its behavior goes through a "test" by natural and infragroup environment. It is evident that non-adaptive behavioral forms leading to death or to social disorganization will not become imitation object for the whole group as their bearer will not achieve a high range. At the same time, behavioral patterns which make it possible to their bearer to achieve a high range will be reproduced. Hence, to the evident function of hierarchy in regulation of social interaction we add an evolutionary function in selection behavior patterns, characterizing the given primate group.

Andreas Dafinger (Max Planck Institute of Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale, Germany)
Keeping a Low Profile: Fulani Strategies of Non-Power

When analyzing power relations one is tempted to describe scenarios in terms of winners and losers. Little attention is paid to the fact that not all social strategies aim at gaining power. Actually, not being "in charge" seems in many cases desirable. Why does it pay to be the weaker party? Why do some social groups work at keeping a "low profile"?

This paper examines one case in a particular setting: that of Fulani cattle-herders in Burkina Faso (West Africa), as they relate to the dominant farming population. Although the Fulani are the second largest ethnic group in the country, their dispersed settlement pattern insures that they are a minority in any one locality. In this situation, they have developed an elaborate ideology (the *pulako*) of keeping a low profile, which is expressed

through a reluctance to participate in the local and national political infrastructure; a remarkably unpretentious behavior in everyday life; a limited (and covert) use of their economic wealth; and use of strategies to avoid far-reaching interethnic contacts. Theories that explain this situation power avoidance – such as those of negative identity, division of political and social power, control over natural and modern resources – are shown to at best only partially explain the ethnographic specifics of the Fulani case. An integrative approach is offered which better accounts for them.

John Eidson (Max Planck Institute of Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale, Germany)
Explaining Power and Powerlessness: an East German Example

The *Südraum* (southern region), near the city of Leipzig in eastern Germany, has traditionally been the home of small farmers, who, since the early twentieth century, have been joined by coal miners and workers in the chemical and energy industries. Over the last 150 years, this region has been subject to a series of externally imposed political measures and economic pressures, which have caused radical upheavals in property relations, rapid industrialization, massive labor migration, environmental pollution, the physical destruction of many rural communities (due to strip mining), the collapse of heavy industry, and mass unemployment. Can existing theories of power provide an adequate explanation of the recent history of the *Südraum* and the experiences of its residents? In this paper, ethnographic and historical data from this field site will be used to test the explanatory power of theories of power, from the classics to more recent authors such as Bourdieu, Foucault, and Eric Wolf. While adequate treatment of the regional case study requires reference to developments in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the temporal focus will be on the last 50 years.

Tilo Graetz (Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale, Germany)
A Social Anthropological Critique of a Political Science Approach to Power: the African Case

This paper challenges, from the perspective of social anthropology, theories of power in Africa popular in the political science. Common to these contributions – whether made by Chabal, Schatzberg, Bayart and Mbembe

and others - is a tendency to re-essentialise the notion of power in a way reducing the multitude of its manifestations in African today. They do not take sufficiently account for diverse and competing local perspectives on power, wealth and accumulation within these societies. Political scientists assume that Africans generally hold a zero-sum, game theory perspective on political power. Therefore neopatrimonial power holders, the argument runs, are not able to concede or delegate power. Furthermore, fashionable notions of the "politics of the belly", although stemming from many relevant observations on corruption, assume a general common "African" sense of both doing and conceiving politics in all parts of everyday life. These perspectives promote essentialist cultural notions. By doing this they also understate the historicity of national and local political developments since independence which shows considerable differences. The first part of my paper challenges these shortcomings on the basis of recent theoretical and empirical studies. The second part aims to point at the many diverse local discourses on power, on the basis of empirical data derive from Northern Benin.

М.С. Киселева (Институт человека РАН, Москва, Россия)
Marina S. Kiseleva (Institute of Human Being of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia)
Самодержавие как проблема книжной культуры XV-XVI вв.
Autocracy as a Problem of the Book-Lore Culture
in the 15th – 16th Centuries

Прологом к обсуждению проблемы самодержавия среди русских книжников можно считать "Послание" Федора Карпова, дипломата и царедворца сначала Ивана III, а затем его сына Василия III, написанное митрополиту Даниилу. Автор различает две сферы жизни: мирскую и монастырскую, считая, что в монастырях "никогда не должно оскудеть терпение". В мирской же жизни подданные царя имеют много обязанностей, для исполнения которых они должны иметь уверенность, что их собственная жизнь и их дело не будет подвергаться унижению, разорению и нищете не по закону. Если полагаться только на терпение. а не на закон (или правду, для автора это - синонимы), то царство, город и другие объединения людей держаться будут не крепко, а сама власть царя станет сомнительной.

В отличие от Карпова его современник и антагонист Иван Пересветов был не столько дипломатом, сколько "воинником",

служившим в разных землях. Им написаны несколько произведений, самыми известными из которых являются *Малая и Большая Челобитные*. Идея его достаточно проста: государь должен быть грозен и мудр. Царь Иван IV, которому адресовались эти слова, стал, как известно, грозен, но стал ли он мудр, и что Пересветов понимал под "мудростью"? Пересветов считал, что "мудрость государя" определяется его щедростью к сословию "воинников": "Какова щедрость государя к воинам, такова и мудрость его".

Пройдет совсем немного лет и как будто бы воплотится идеал пересветовского царя: "мудрый" царь Иван Грозный создаст опричнину. И уже другой книжник-воинник князь Андрей Курбский будет писать ему не челобитные послания, а гневные обвинения, ядро которых - идея о том, что царь "Богом препрославленный и среди православных всех светлее явившейся" ныне стал "супротивным", предъявляя Ивану список его преступлений. Царь в ответ воспользовался поводом, чтобы выступить как *идеолог самодержавия, завершив тем самым линию русских книжников, искавших основания этого нового типа правления*.

В результате катастрофы, пережитой Россией в Смутное время начинает пусть робко, но заявлять о себе *новое* настроение. Книжник начала XVII в., берет на себя роль вполне светскую - "писателя", *наблюдающего и анализирующего события, способного различить* характеры, оценивающего деяния высших властей, "невзирая на лица". Прерыв самодержавной династии обернулся для русской культуры страшными войнами, разорениями, самозванничеством, бунтами, разбоями и грабежами. Мир перевернулся: насилие, которое еще недавно позволял себе лишь самодержец по отношению к своим подданным, теперь стало общедоступным и повсеместным явлением. Но книжность, всегда стоявшая на страже порядка, по-своему отреагировала на этот разгул стихии: всеми силами сохраняя традицию, русский книжник позволил себе *самостоятельность*, пусть слабо выраженную, но все же *авторскую позицию*.

Ted Lewellen (University of Richmond, USA)
Power and Historical Contingency: Micro and Macro Perspectives

Among a number of communities of the Aymara Indians of the Titicaca Basin of southern Peru a tiny minority of Seventh Day Adventists were voted in as community leaders, although for most of the twentieth century Protestants were ostracized and actively persecuted. From the early 1980s

neo-liberal globalization, long intensely resisted by Third World countries, took off at an astounding rate. To understand the Aymara situation requires an analysis of the particular manner of Adventist missionization since 1914; to comprehend the Third World's acquiescence to globalization as dictated by the World Bank and IMF necessitates a very focused look back at the "oil shocks" of 1974. What these micro and macro examples have in common is that they illustrate the importance of specific and unforeseeable events, rather than general forces, in the determination of power. Building on Sidney Tarrow's ideas of "political opportunity structure," it is suggested that the microprocesses of historical contingency may strongly limit the analytic and predictive value of abstract theory.

Robert S. McElvaine (Millsaps College, Jackson, USA)
"Prehistoric" Sources of the Assumption of Male Superiority over Females as the Model upon which Hierarchy and Power have been Based in World Civilizations

The deep source of hierarchy, power, and authority is to be found in events that occurred before we conventionally begin history. The invention of agriculture drastically altered the environment in which humans live. These changes established what people have taken to be the givens of human existence, but in fact are the consequences of (pre)historical developments.

The misleading metaphor of a seed being planted into the furrowed earth being analogous to a man "planting" a "seed" in the furrowed vulva of a woman led to men being seen as the possessors of procreative power. The seed metaphor reduced women from the apparent creators to dirt. As is suggested by the fact that the root of the word authority is author, it is the false idea that men are the "authors" – the creators – that has formed the basis for male authority throughout history.

The belief that procreative power is male meant that the Ultimate Creator – God – must also be male. The combination of the belief that God is male with the notion that humans are created in God's image yielded the inescapable conclusion that men are closer than women to godly perfection. This, in turn, established a concept of hierarchy: God above men, men above women.

Finally, the belief that men are superior to women provided the model on which systems of dominance and hierarchy among men could be established. A man asserts his dominance over another man by claiming that he is to the second man as a man is to a woman. This can be seen in the

language men use when asserting their superiority over other men. Such language invariably contains sexual images that translate to something like: *I am sufficiently dominant over you that I can symbolically treat you as if you were a woman.*

Kulshat A. Medeuova (Shakarim Semey State University, Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan)

The mechanics of power

1. Context. According to Gilles Deleuz the new functional analysis which has been used by Michel Foucault is directed against traditional the left and also the bourgeois conceptions of power. And although the problems of overcoming the "classical" power theories have been "banally actual" (Gilles Deleuze) still, new re-reading Foucault is not just respecting his heritage as a "classic" it is discovering a new "context" of power's microphysics.

Foucault using "classical" for poststructuralists marginal epistemological strategies defines the problem of power as having its own strategies, "disciplinary technologies" and maneuverability of the cultural unconscious. Instead of parade, ceremonial and emotionally full demonstrations of monarch power Foucault uses such modalities of power which impress us by their natural scientific terminology: anatomy, technology, mechanics, dynamic, physics and optics. Though all these instrumental categories are used rather in aesthetic context than in scientistic one. But due to them Foucault's texts have their famous metaphorical lightness and rhetorical beauty.

Foucault' new power ontology destroys the latent basis of that conception of rationality which solution ability demonstrates itself in vertical institutional versions for example in Marxism. In this mechanics power itself is autonomous. It can not be reduced only to the social forms because power is a relation in which there are not obvious rivals (participants of power). Nobody struggles against anybody personally but everyone is involved by the mystical impulse of power. Power is objected "from the bottom", from "side", from "everywhere" but not only from "center" and "from the top".

2. The body of text: "Discipline and Punish" (Appendix). Power in the discourse of passion and mystics; in mechanics of disciplinary possibilities of order. Uncovering of power: instead of pantheism there is panoptics; visibility of invisible – "hierarchy of discipline". Examination as an epistemology of power. Political individualization: rising and falling.

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Motives and clinics of power: imaginary, anonymous, economical, anthropological and political parts. Serial production of power, power creating reality, operational possibilities of power.

Pseudo humanistic interpretation of transition from public execution to more restrained practice of execution. Affects of publicity, surplus and passion of power. New juridical anthropology. Utopia of judicial shame. Momentary death. Political economy of power: strategy instead of property, causal demonstration of power, truth-power, fast-truth, political capture of body and physics of power.

Victor C. de Munck (SUNY-New Paltz, USA)
The Transformation of Sources of Meaning and of Power: From Agape to Eros

In this paper I explore romantic love as a source of meaning that shapes individual life choices and how it functions as a master motive in the lives of people. I compare Eros to other forms of love, particularly agape. Borrowing from Durkheim, I see Agape as love directed either to a deity or to society. I compare these two forms of love as they are expressed and shape the lives of informants in the U.S. My hypotheses is that these two forms of love are inversely related to each other. The more that individuals make life choices on the basis of Eros, the less likely they are to consider public society or religion as sources of meaning or arenas in which to direct meaningful effort. Eros is tentatively defined as a passionate enduring committed relationship with another person. Agape is tentatively defined as a passionate enduring and committed relionship with society or a deity.

Serguey A. Nefedov (Institute of History and Archaeology, the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Ekaterinburg)
The Theory of Demographic Cycles and Origins of Autocracy

As it is known, the theory of demographic cycles considers the development of preindustrial society under the conditions of natural resources circumscription. It is the ecological theory of population cycles, but the subject of this theory is human society. F. Braudel called demographic cycles "centuries-lasting trends", R. Cameron called them "logistic cycles", and J. Goldstone employed the "ecological cycles" concept. The demographic cycle begins with tilling of free lands what leads to the increase in

population, and thus the shortage of soil occurs. The overpopulation generates famine. Peasants sell fields to usurers during famine. This leads to the appearance of the new class of landlords who invite tenants to till the fields. Many bankrupt peasants leave for cities, they try to earn living by means of crafts. The cities grow and flourish, crafts and trade increase. Such a society which is based on traditions of private property is usually called "capitalist". However crafts can not support all poor people, the number of unemployed and beggars increases. In the years when the harvest is poor hunger disturbances begin. Socialist parties demanding restrictions of private property are forming. Eventually, overpopulation and famine bring about revolts and civil wars. Wars, famine, epidemics turn into one cataclysm which ruin the majority of the population. A lot of free lands appear then, and a new demographic cycle begins. The war gives authority to a victorious commander, who becomes an emperor. The policy of the new monarch may be different depending on the party to which the emperor belongs.

A) If he belongs to the party of landlords, he does not interfere with the relations of property, and the new cycle repeats the previous capitalist cycle.

B) If the emperor belongs to a socialist party, he can limit or ban private landownership. The socialist state, which is called the *oriental despoty* appears.

C) The third pathway is the one on which disintegration of the state leads to the country's conquest, usually by nomads. The conquerors become a privileged military class, and the natives become the oppressed class of peasants. Thus, the feudal state appears.

The present paper contains statistical data of the A-B-C transformations based on an analysis of fifty demographic cycles.

Gísli Pálsson (University of Iceland, Reykjavik, Iceland)
Arcticality: Gender, Race, and Geography
in the Writings of Vilhjalmur Stefansson

Between 1906 and 1918, anthropologist and explorer Vilhjalmur Stefansson (1879-1962) went on three expeditions into the Alaskan and Canadian Arctic, each of which lasted between sixteen months and five years. Here I attempt to situate Stefansson's writings and practice in the context of the dynamics of the team of explorers, the standards of anthropological work among his contemporaries, and the power relations of early twentieth-century expeditions. Stefansson's popular works, I argue, along with the writings of some contemporary explorers, managed to firmly establish the Arctic Zone as

a discursive space, analogous to the Orient and the Tropics. The notion of arcticality implicit in many of his writings made the Arctic both exotic and domestic, emphasizing its lessons for "us" (Westerners) and the future opportunities it provided for "civilizing" missions – in particular mining and international travel by airlines and submarines. My analysis is based on Stefansson's field diaries, his publications, archival material (letters and photographs), and a series of interviews during a brief field-trip to Inuvik, Northwest Terriories, Canada, in July 2000.

Stephen Reyna (Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale, Germany)
The Fate of "Civilization", Whatever that Might Be

This paper develops a theory of the development of state forms of power under current conditions of rapid globalization. The objective of the theory is to address a largely overlooked topic in globalization theory. This is the neglect of the role of different forms of violence that have continually occurred between and within states since 1945. The theory relates micro-level and macro-level concepts. The central micro-level concepts are desire, *délire*, and life-world. The key macro-level concept is that of informal empire. Notions of logics of predatory and capital accumulation, flexible domination, and comprador imperialism are introduced to explain the dynamics of informal empire. It is theoretically argued that informal empires create life-worlds where many desire to, and the powerful are positively *délire*-ious about, warring to accumulate capital and accumulating capital to war. Information concerning the September 11, 2001 World Trade Centre attack is argued to be consistent with this theory. It is suggested that this theory has implications for the fate of 'civilization', whatever that might be.

A.L. Salagaev, A.V. Shashkin (Kazan State Technological University, Russia)
Victimization in the Street: Masculine Hierarchies Under Construction

The phenomenon of a street is not only a unique arena where different gender identities are constantly constructed and reconstructed; gender regime of the street reflects the gender relations of power in society and the related discourse and practices by which they are reproduced. Consequently, gender differences here are connected with social constructions of gendered dominance and subordination in gang arrangements

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The proposed paper discusses the process of building hierarchies of the street gender regime, which is performed by the members of youth micro-cultures that represent dominant type of masculinity (in our case - juvenile delinquent gangs). Power relations are set by the means of victimization of other actors of a street youth scene. Our conclusions are based on the qualitative research held by the authors (43 non-formalised in-depth interviews with active gang members in the cities and towns of the Middle Volga region of Russia - Kazan, Naberezhniye Chelny, Aznakaevo, Ulyanovsk, Dimitrovgrad).

Gang members have formed a recognizable image of potential victim, and worked out the special techniques of thrusting the role of victim in dialogues, therefore establishing power/subordination relations. Dialogue is a sort of a funnel, when only a single marker of subordinate masculinity (sign of a 'fish') is founded at the beginning, and then the whole image is constructed around this marker. When a victim internalizes his role being under the threat of physical violence, he becomes psychologically and financially dependent from gang member. This phenomenon could be described with the new term "deconstructed sense of victim's masculinity".

Nina Glick Schiller (Max Planck Institute of Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale, Germany)
Globalization and the Apparent State:
An Analysis of Power and Non-Governmentality

The debates about the decline or continuation of the nation-state as a result of globalization often accept as given the equality of states within an international system. This paper critiques the way in which discussions of nation-states, transnations, and transnational citizenship within contemporary globalizations continue rhetorics of state sovereignty and obscure discussion of the constitution and localization of political power within the global capitalist economy. A Foucouldian notion of a 'regime of truth' is utilized to analyze these obscuring rhetorics. The concept of the 'apparent state' is introduced to conceptualize the absence of power in an apparently sovereign state. Specifically, the paper addresses the ways in which continuing processes of governmentality such as passports, organizations of civil society, democracy promotion programs, and the development of offices and institutions of migrant sending countries to organize their diasporas contribute to a current regime of truth. Data from Haitian political history and

the current political and economic situation of Haiti will be used to illustrate the concept of the apparent state.

Günter Schlee (Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale, Germany)
Purity and Power: African Examples of Competition and Exclusion in the Spheres of Religion and Politics

The link between purity and power in African systems of ideas can be rather direct: one may loose one's (ritual) power (*i.e.* a potent blessing and curse) by not maintaining a standard of purity, *i.e.* by violating a food avoidance. Social hierarchies between clans with and without specific ritual or political powers and between professional groups of high and low status are constructed along such lines. In other contexts the relationship between purity and power is not direct but mediated by moral notions: ritual compliance is seen as an indicator of a moral standard which qualifies a person for political power. Conversely, non-compliance leads to the exclusion from power. In situations of competition for power in settings where such forms of legitimization are relevant, this may lead to rapid rigidification of beliefs and ritual practice. Examples can be found in recent developments within Islam and Christianity. Purity tends to go along with rhetoric of exclusion of the "impure".

Alexander Shvarts (University of Toronto, Canada)
The Russian Mafia: Do Rational Choice Models Apply?

Many philosophers, sociologists, and political scientists defend the claim that rational choice theory can provide the basis for a unified and comprehensive theory of social behaviour. The purpose of this paper is to determine whether rational choice models can be applied to be explain a specific case of collective behaviour, such as that exhibited by the Russian Mafia. According to Gambetta, forms of behaviour traditionally associated with the Mafia can all be explained by an economic theory of private protection. In this paper, I will explore to what extent the data available on Russia and the former Soviet Union are consistent with Gambetta's model of the Sicilian Mafia and can be used to explain the emergence of the Russian Mafia. I have added the historical context, in particular, the former Soviet Union's dysfunctional political structure to Gambetta's model because

centuries of economic centralism, isolationism and autocracy have shaped Russian culture as a unique phenomenon.

Michelle Stein-Evers (University of Wollongong, Australia)
Theocracy is a Disease of the Flesh and not the Skeleton: Thoughts on Theocratic Jewish Politics

Diaspora communities take their shape from the host communities in which they reside.

By Christian Western Europe "indulging" in theocracy and then passing through the enlightenment, Western Jews shared the experience and were "immunized". However, that is not the case in Eastern Europe. Eastern European Jews in Poland (Catholic Church) and Russia (Russian Orthodox Church) had a different experience. The Western Enlightenment made little difference to those churches and their experiences. For some reason, Slavic Christian cultures were (and remain) for the most part, very resistant to enlightenment concepts. I would argue that religious Jewish communities residing within those spheres took on that particular "inoculation" and have carried it with them. We can see this in marked clarity looking at the newly arrived Russian communities in Israel. They have traveled through the theocracy of the Orthodox Church and autocracy of the Russian Empire through to the authoritarianism and totalitarianism of the Soviet period. They have never received the "inoculation" of the Enlightenment. Their present community and political attitudes, whether in Israel or the United States or Australia are remarkably predictable and almost always leaning to the side of strict authoritarianism.

In addition, one can see how that anti-Enlightenment, theocratic stance has translated itself and flowed on into contemporary Eastern European politics.

One must also take into account the Sefardi and Mizrachi experiences. Neither of these Jewish communities had any experience of the Western Enlightenment. Their weight of their cultural baggage also can be seen as an imprint on contemporary Zionism and Israeli cultural life.

In looking at Zionism and its development, while the skeleton of the ideology arose out of the experiences of Western, secularised Jews, its flesh has been created of the encounters, thoughts, and aspirations of those shaped by the Eastern European experience. Those experiences of the culture of autocracy and theocracy became the ethos which ultimately shaped the Zionist experience.

One must also admit that Israel, as the meeting place of the Western and the Eastern, the collision ground of the Ashkenaz/Sefard/Mizrach viewpoints, as a landscape of realities within realities and cultural and community visions within even more cultural and community visions, in the manner of Matrioshka dolls. This, though, is a collateral concept.

Ima J. Stephens (Appalachian State University, Boone, USA)
Cherokee Power and Hierarchy in the Face of Holocaust

Much has been written about the Cherokee, but little has focused on eighteenth century treaties, the pretentious nature of these documents, and how they affected eventual removal of the Cherokee to Indian Territory in the 1830s-40s. White settlers sought treaties out of "land hunger," so they sought Cherokee signers who would agree to cede land to them, whether these Cherokee had the authority to or not. United States leaders, as well as the British, did not understand Cherokee hierarchy and power. They sought a Cherokee "emperor" to serve as a central figure to answer for all Cherokee, when no such title existed. Cherokee villages, each distinct, had a hierarchy - every Cherokee member had a duty and knew where his/her responsibilities lay, and each village had sovereignty while connecting to other Cherokee groups through their common Cherokee heritage. The "old way" of Cherokee society embraced a social and political system rooted in harmony, equality, and the common welfare. With European colonization, the Cherokee faced a great threat from those who believed themselves both racially and religiously superior. In the new world of the colonial period, the traditional worldview of the Cherokee faced a consumptive ideology of conquest and colonialism. If the Cherokee and the Euro-American settlers truly understood the hierarchy and power within each other's society, agreements between them would have been better understood and many mistakes made through treaties may have been prevented.

The main milestones of Cherokee-American relations were the Treaty of Hopewell (1785), the Treaty of Holston (1791), the defeat of the Chickamauga in November 1794.

The United States Supreme Court and all other courts lacked significant enforcement power. Since the discovery of gold on Cherokee lands, White settlers wanted this property being farmed by the Cherokee in Georgia. The Cherokee, by then a highly civilized tribe of small farmers, embraced Christianity, and had their own written language, did all they could to assimilate into White society. White settlers prevailed upon Congress to

order the Indians to move to a reservation in Indian Territory (present-day Oklahoma). The Cherokee filed suit with the Supreme Court arguing that they had been unconstitutionally deprived of their property by the United States government without just compensation and won the case. But President Jackson simply refused saying, "John Marshall [the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court at the time] has made his decision. Now let *him* enforce it."

Oksana V. Timoshchuk (Centre for Civilizational and Regional Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
Multidimensional Phenomenon of Authority

A number of researchers regard a power as eternal, insuperable immersibility into a man-made environment with social important institutions, with numerous conditions and ways of living a "swarm life".

A power appears from objective distinctions and in the objective conditions of differences between peoples statuses in a community, in the conditions of division of their role functions. And the real roots of the authority are the following: in an objective course of socio genesis, where by means of customs, laws, other external levers of practical human activity is gradually consolidated the mechanism regulating individuals behavior.

The majority of the modern concepts of power are based on representations of Max Weber, who defined the authority as ability to realise their own will and to achieve determined objects even contrary to others resistance.

In modern trends of sociology of the authority and political anthropology are holding many aspects of Max Weber, in particular, there are such strategies in accomplishment of authority distinguished as belief and coercion, legal and illegal forms of authority.

Considering the sources of authority Max Weber believed, that authority, based on coercion is frequently inefficient. That is why ruling regimes, based on authority of belief prove to be more steady, from what follows that the ruling elite's always aspire to legitimate their own authority, using different strategies of transformation of inefficient forms of coercion (direct violence or a threat of it application etc) into efficient forms of authority.

Weber concerns the various kinds of authority, which based on traditions, charisma, right and reason. Later - *examination* was added to this list of kinds of authority, based on possession by the specialised knowledge.

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At the end of 1950th, time of behaviorism treatments of authority, there was a following definition: A has authority above B in that degree, in which it(he) can force B to make something, that B under other circumstances would not make.

Later this definition was complemented by one more aspect, it was marked, that the subject can not only be forced to "made" something, but also to force him to refrain from action, that is can interfere to carry out freedom of action.

To the end of the 19th century scholars began to take attention to authority of belief. In this concept of authority affirms, that carries out authority even with the voluntary cooperation.

Peter Turchin (University of Connecticut, Storrs, USA)
Demographic-Structural Theory: Models and Empirical Test

The demographic-structural theory of state breakdown, proposed by Jack Goldstone, postulates that population growth in excess of land productivity leads to persistent price inflation, spiralling state expenses, increased intraelite competition and rural immiseration. These structural consequences of population growth eventually cause state bancruptcy, elite factionalism and conflict, and popular rebellion. I propose that, in addition to the direct effect of population growth leading to political instability, as postulated by Goldstone, there is a feedback effect of political instability causing population decline. I explore these proposition with two models, a simpler one examining the interaction between population dynamics and state's fiscal health, and a more complex one, in which commoner and elite populations are modeled with separate variables. Models predict somewhat irregular oscillations with an average period of 2-3 centuries. These predictions are tested with long-term cliometric data from Western Europe and China.

Julia Ouliannikova (Central European University, Warsaw, Poland)
Totalising Power Concept in the 20th Century Social Thinking: Its Origins and Consequences

Social thinking of the last century has a strong tendency to totalize the concept of power. Starting with power as part of political or polit-economic relations (Marx, Weber, Polany), the theorists proceeded with much broader

inclusion of power relations into social system. Simmel shows the power as unalienable constituent of every interaction, this is followed by Foucault, Bourdieu, Elias and others, and finds its utmost representation in radical theories of feminism, for example, when every social relation tends to be derived from domination and submission couple.

However, the question is not if the theory reflects upon the changes in social situation through the century, but, in the contrary, how this tendency for totalising the power concept is utilised by the power itself and by the public. Contemporary social situation is characterized by unprecedented rise of cynicism in power reflexive discourse. The power appears to be fully aware of its (mis)conducts and still continue its practice citing correspondent (pseudo)theoretical explanations. In its turn, the public tends to explain those in power's and its own (mis)conduct following the same theoretical pattern of total power concept.

Thus, this essay consists of three parts. The first part defines 'politeconimic' and 'total' concepts of power as corresponding to the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. The second part analyses the total concept of power, and the third deals with its implications in the situation of current socio-political reflexivity.

Lale Yalçin-Heckmann (Max Planck Institute of Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale, Germany)
Political Power at the Center and Periphery
of Post-Socialist Azerbaijan: Perspertives on Longing for a State

Azerbaijan is a country which is socially, culturally, demographically and politically highly polarised between the 'countryside' and metropolis, Baku. This polarisation is reflected in resource distribution as well as access to national resources. Baku is seen to be the center of the best and the worst: where the rich live and dominate and where the jobs and possibilities are abundant on the one hand, but also where the political power is monopolised by the ruling elite, spreading corruption from top to bottom on the other. The strong nostalgia expressed by rural people for some lost Soviet system to be as closely related to the contemporary economic difficulties as to the distance felt to the political center in Baku. Nevertheless, the nostalgia is articulated in symbols and language that recalls images of some patrimonial state system as well as corporate state power. This paper looks at these dimensions of imaging power at the center and periphery of post-socialist Azerbaijan through the case of the recent history, philosophy and policies of land

privatisation and distribution in the country. Through the discussion of the case it is intended to consider and re-assess the theories of power which are used for analysing post-socialist countries with and Islamic background.

PANEL XI
Ideology as Priority in Civilizational Process
Convenor: *Mikhail N. Shchelkonogov* (St. Petersburg, Russia)

Hierarchical structure of society (the system of social and political institutions) is forming during a long period of time on the basis of a dominant ideology, which embodies unity of all the citizens. Ideology is a General Plan of a state building to which all the structures of society must be submitted. A change of ideology precedes a change of political, economic orientation and formation of new governmental structures.

Ideology qualifies the situation and gives a notion of the proper order. It consolidates the society, makes people closer to each other, reduces the threat of social conflicts. It gives an aim which spreads over every aspect of state and society's functioning, it defines directions of further development.

In the time of scientific and information revolution the inter-disciplinary approach is taking shape while solving the problems of contemporary society. This approach has synthesized the experience of the past generations, cultural traditions of different cultures, European and Asian first and foremost. As a result of the inter-disciplinary analysis, a basically new hierarchical system of power relations can be identified. This is the model of the pyramid-and-net structure, within which the middle class is the main actor. The middle class creates the welfare of the state, defines its ideological, political, and financial condition, its developmental prospects.

Seven main stages of introduction and formation of the new hierarchical system are as follows: interaction, mutual influence, mutual reflection, mutual definition, mutual penetration, mutual formation, mutual assertion. The theoretical and practical implications of these conceptions are proposed for discussion at the panel.

Alexey V. Antonov. (Saint-Petersburg, Russia)
Hierarchy as an Organizing Force

The hierarchical structures penetrate different spheres of human relations. While analyzing accumulated knowledge, three systems of hierarchy are marked out: political, spiritual and intellectual.

The principle of social inequality can be considered as a basis of hierarchical structures. The principle is the moving force of gradual widening of the sphere of competence and, as a result, the sphere of influence. This concerns the individuals as well as the whole human community.

In this paper a sociological background of the Schelkonogov's Law (ET=AS) is given to show an equality between human and nature in terms of uncertain future. The Law reveals a full value of life, showing a possibility of inward and outward person's development in hierarchical systems.

The appearing and construction of power structures is regular and necessary. Hierarchy sets out as an uniting and organizing force aiming at surviving of human community. It fulfils managerial function, controls money supply, protects people against nature and technogenous catastrophe.

In terms of deep political and cultural mutual penetration, growing mutual dependence, realizing the commonness of human fate, it is necessary to form effective global structure which will unite all the states on the basis of mutual respect and fulfil a special function of human conscience.

San`at N. Kibirova (St. Petersburg, Russia)
Hierarchy in the Musical Culture
of Ancient and Medieval Eastern Turkestan

The musical culture of Eastern Turkestan, described in written sources of the Han - Sun epoch (the 2nd century BC – 13th century AD) and reflected in numerous material monuments, had enjoyed initially complex internal differentiation in the system of social hierarchy, the top layer of which is represented by secular aristocratic music. There was a rigid hierarchy among the musicians who served the ruling strata. We know the names of outstanding people who were honored not only in Eastern Turkestan, but also in China. They had arrived there by the Silk Road and played a leading part at the imperial court. One of them was Sujipo, a wonderful musician, lute player and composer. He introduced in China the musical system from Kutcha called "five *dan*". Having become traditional in China, this system was used there in musical practice from the Sui dynasty time for several centuries on and formed the basis for flourishing of solemn music at the Tang dynasty. It also played an important part in the development of musical culture of Eastern Turkestan, China, and Japan. Another legendary personality was maestro Bo Mingda from Kutcha. He occupied high posts during the reigns of four emperors of two dynasties, Sui and Tang. Being responsible for music and dances at the court, he was also engaged in active creative work and composed many melodies and songs, performed a great number of dances and musical performances ordered by the emperors. Today one can hear the sound of five *dan* in classical music of China (*jue*) and Japan

(*gagaku*), as well as one can also still hear compositions by Sujipo and Bo Mingda.

Competition for leadership is observed in the evolution of musical instruments, too. The straff and combinations of instruments of temple and court orchestras were regulated strictly. Their differentiation within an orchestra into solo and accompanying ones was introduced from Kutcha in China, and then in Japan. Sounds of musical instruments arose the special thoughts and feelings, accompanied ritual movements. Membranophones played the leading part in antiquity. The most important was a little drum, usually placed in the centre of an orchestra. From the 2nd century BC the oboe from Kutcha has begun its triumphant procession along the Silk Road. During more than millennium and a half it has been occupying the principal positions in the instrumental culture of China (*bili*), and then of Japan (*hitiriki*). From the early Middle Ages the lute (*pipa*) has begun to play an increasing part. In the Middle Ages the lute became the principal instrument of *makam*, and occupies the central place in treatises on music written by philosophers of the East.

Evidently, the high level of musical culture of Eastern Turkestan characterised by the presence of "pure" elitarian music far from everyday life, had promoted its fast and inspired acceptance in China, where it could satisfy the exquisite-refined tastes of the emperors and aristocracy.

Asja Nina Kovacev (University of Ljubljana, Slovenia)
Theatrical Representations of Power Relations and Social Hierarchy

The theatrical drama is based on the social structure of a contemporary society and can be defined as its social metacommentary. The nature of the plot is namely reflexive. Still, it implies the transformation of complex social reality, which enables theatrical performance (and other representational systems) to develop their own (complex and multidimensional) meaning structures. So performative genres can be regarded as self-regulating and self-critical representational systems of social hierarchies, power relations, etc., which reflect social problems, values, and crises in a different, genre-specific way. Each reflection can be taken over by another genre, which presents another aspect of the objective reality and reflects other facets of its surface. Societies are continuously producing new – diverse and multiple – forms of representation, and because of that nothing escapes the spectacle.

Spectacular behaviour can be found in reality as well. Because of that, different forms of spontaneous theatre are recognisable on several levels of

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social experience. During the processes of segmentation and differentiation, the society's substructures are opposed to each other and their confrontation raises conflicts among them. It is almost impossible to fix the very moment of the transformation of ordinary social life into drama. During the development of social drama in a certain community the emotional climate is getting more and more unstable and it is full of extremists' outbursts. This leads to the uncovering of the society's latent structure and stratification, *i.e.* division into hierarchically ordered social groups and categories.

The theatralisation of social structures and power relations can enable the subjects' awareness of their socio-cultural consequences and even bring to a revolt of the masses. Because of strong influence which theatre has had on the spectators' convictions and actions, it has always been given a special attention by the leading structures and social elite. These have often tried to devaluate it or to control its functioning.

Rotem Kowner (University of Haifa, Israel)
Racial Hierarchy, Relative Power, and Their Effect on Western Perceptions of the Japanese Body, 1548-1948

Our perceptions of corporal beauty of members of any ethnic group derive from a long categorization process linking its status, power and stereotypes of appearance. The higher the status of a given group, the more beautiful its members will be perceived. To demonstrate this statement, I examine 400 years of Western writings on the Japanese body and show that the position of the Japanese people and their national status within Western racial hierarchy greatly affected the way their body was perceived.

This presentation investigates the transformation of the European racial discourse on the Japanese since the landing of the first Europeans in the archipelago until the post-WWII period. The initial encounter is fascinating since Europeans had still been devoid of racial categories and so they barely "noticed" the Japanese body. Although their writings on Japan were a mere offshoot of a greater discourse, an evolving scientific worldview which placed mankind within a natural system and classified human variety in terms of unequal races, they had some unique features. Notably, Japan's remoteness and unbroken independence served to delay the very negative attitudes that were formed toward other non-white peoples.

During the latter half of the 19th century, which followed the opening of Japan's ports, Westerners scrutinized the rediscovered archipelago and attempted to classify its inhabitants within their racial system. Despite the

claim for "scientific" objectivism, Western racial views of the Japanese were largely dictated by contemporary political and moral attitudes toward Japan. Hence, writings on the Japanese "race" reflected not only the racial knowledge of the period but also the asymmetry between the West and Japan. Since the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) however, fears of the Japanese and respect to their rising status affected the perceptions of their body.

Frederick Lembeck (New York, USA)
Instructions for the Buckeye Game (Capitalist Version)

The Buckeye Game is a financial/political game for students, designed to motivate the players to study harder and pay more attention to their school work, to improve the quality of the graduates the school turns out. If the standardized test scores go up, the game is judged as having gotten results.

The game organizes a student body into a toy economy which the students themselves control and regulate. Studying is an integral part of game strategy: the better a player's grades are, the better he'll do in the game, the higher a position he'll hold, the more money he'll make, the more political power he'll have, etc.

The game begins in September when school opens and is played out over the course of the school year. Players drop in and out of the game as they please, playing whenever they don't have classes, or not playing if they'd rather use their free time for studying.

The individual player's position in the game, that is, in the school economy, begins when he enrolls at the school and ends when he graduates. Throughout the time between his position advances according to how good a player he is.

No one loses. Everyone wins. But some win more than others. On Graduation Day, all the seniors' Bank balances get turned into real money, the gift of the state to each new graduate upon completion of his education.

There are four different versions of the Buckeye, the Capitalist Version, the Marxist Version, the Laissez-Faire Version and the Deist Version. They compete to see which does the best job of improving the quality of the graduates the school turns out.

Б.В. Марков (СПбГУ, Россия)
B.V. Markov (St. Petersburg State University, Russia)
Человеческие формы солидарности

в первобытных и современных обществах
Forms of Human Solidarity in Primeval and Modern Societies

Античное определение человека как политического животного акцентирует то обстоятельство, что человек отличается от других животных прежде всего тем, что ведет общую жизнь с другими. Что означает здесь предикат "политическое"? Он указывает на то, что с самого начала человек живет не один, а вместе с другими. Сегодня трудно представить себе тот способ единения людей, о котором говорил Аристотель. С точки зрения индивидуализма общество вторично, оно возникает как продукт общественного договора. Напротив, утверждение Аристотеля, что люди живут обществом по природе, в корне отличается от теории Гоббса, у которого утрачена догадка о нередуцируемости человеческой общности, и недооценивается роль сильных взаимосвязей в антропологическом исследовании. Отсюда либеральные политики вообще не понимают, что за "дело" заставляет индивидов жить сообща, что за априорное стремление тянет живые существа друг к другу? На этот вопрос можно отвечать как с микрологической, так и макрологической позиции. Первая опирается на анализ внутреннего тела, которое формируется в лоне матери и всегда ищет своего двойника, родного брата, которого любят преданно и безрассудно. Вторая исходит из того фундаментального факта, что на протяжении всей своей эволюции от каменного века до современности именно внутренние когерентные связи каждодневно связывали людей воедино. Императивная форма жизни людей, принадлежность к группе определялась связями, гораздо более сильными, чем те, что описывает теория коммуникации, и даже коммунитаристские или организационные теории. Так же как в христианской теологии единство троицы не поддерживалось никакими стенами, также первобытное поселение не нуждалось для манифестации своего радикального желания быть вместе в городской ограде, которая не только задерживала врагов, но и исключала бегство своих. В древности стены были не нужны, потому, что никто не хотел убежать. В то время, когда люди не огораживались стенами, каждая группа, образующая эндогенное единство, формировала ландшафт сообразно собственной форме. И без массивных архитектурных скреп каждая мы-группа закрепляла и сохраняла себя специфическим гештальтом, для которого были характерны центростремительные силы и движения, сохраняющие целостность. Все первичные культурные единства могут быть поняты как самовоспроизводящиеся морфогенетические процессы. Из

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большого числа тех или иных кланов и первобытных орд лишь немногие достигли того состояния, которое называется "народом" – единством макросферного уровня, и тем более полисной или даже имперской формы, которую вслед за Шпенглером и Тойнби можно назвать "миром". Но и они были сильны не только дисциплинарными и организационными мерами, но и человеческой солидарностью.

Taysir Nashif (Chief Verbatim Reporting Section of the United Nations, New York, USA)

Intellectual Dogmatism as a Means to Bolster Patriarchal and Despotic Systems: The Case of South-West Asia

Dogmatism, by refusing to admit intellectual options, leads to a dichotomy of opposing views and is oppressive in all spheres of life: political, social, cultural, economic and emotional. It is commonly associated with restriction, unilateralism and narrow-mindedness. This may be contrasted with the broad-minded acceptance of opposing points of view, associated with liberalism and freedom of thought.

Dogmatism entails the polarization of beliefs, approaches and interests in various fields. In many parts of the world, intellectual bigotry is used by despotic regimes and patriarchal systems to bolster their authority. In South-West Asia, patriarchal and governmental systems continue to rely on this means. The stronger the dogmatic approach, the more authoritarian the character of a social system is; conversely, the stronger the liberal-minded approach, the less authoritarian and the more democratic the system is.

The paper at hand, drawing on the socio-political realities of South-West Asia, sets out to show that patriarchal and despotic systems employ dogma and bigotry to strengthen their authority.

С.А. Никитин (Российский государственный гуманитарный университет, Москва)
S.A. Nikitin (Russian State University for the Humanities, Moscow)

Отображение многообразия систем социально-политических институтов в шумерском искусстве и литературе
On the Possibility of Reconstruction of People's Ideas Regarding Power and Hierarchy on the Basis of Sumerian Fine Arts and Literature

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Цель доклада состоит в том, чтобы на основе имеющихся материальных памятников шумерской цивилизации представить отношение людей к власти и иерархии и их роль в ее становлении в данном регионе. Задачи работы включают в себя описание памятников литературы и искусства, которые затрагивают тему власти и иерархии, дальнейшее их сравнение и анализ письменных источников и рельефных изображений.

Lioudmila I. Nikonova (Institute of Language, Literature, History and Economics, Saransk, Russia)
Folk Medicine in the Life-Support System
of Peoples and Its Relations with Authorities in Russia

In the recent years a steady tendency towards the exceed of the death rate over the birth rate has developed, being determined by a wide range of causes (pollution, bad health care, other social problems). At the same time the ways to form a healthy way of living are being searched out. Thus the attitude towards the folk ("ethnic") medicine, which is an integral part of every people's culture and its life-support system, has changed under the influence of a range of social, economic, ecological and other factors. The authorities and the science have exercised different attitudes towards the folk medicine (up to the persecution of its followers). However, the negative attitude towards the folk medicine in this country had changed by the mid-1990s thanks to the raising attention to the Oriental medicine schools, the healing powers of healers, and partly thanks to the inefficiency of the scientific medicine in healing some diseases. Along with this we think it is necessary to create special laboratories on the base of the regional health departments and attract a wide range of specialists, which could work fruitfully supported by the authorities. Nowadays scientists perceive more and more that the problem of saving an ethnic group cannot be solved separately from its environment, the relations of the society and the nature, the climate, the economic activities and other factors of living, what would help keep the nation healthy in the whole.

Oleg G. Novikov (Center for Civilization and Regional Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
Hierarchy and Power Relations in the Russian Bikers' Sub-Culture

Russian bikers' sub-culture is a poorly researched phenomenon. The current period of its history has begun at the end of the 90-s and participants of the sub-culture realized that the main problem is to choose the way of development. Now two main points of view exist:

- the bikers' sub-culture must be as democratic as possible;
- to call himself a biker, a person must be admitted into a motorcycle club with appointed structure.

The second of these concepts is the most interesting one. Hierarchical structure appeared in the first motorcycle club (MC) in the world "Hells Angels" and floated to all other clubs. The first degree intermediate between a participant and non-participant is "support". Then follows the ranks of "hang around", "prospect" and "member". "Officers" are appointed from "members". Each MC has its own symbols – patches on the back of leather vest. They are not only markers but distinguish rank signs also. "Hang around" has a right to wear one patch, "prospect" – two and "member" all the three. Attitudes inside MC are built on hierarchy principle, lower-ranked submitted to higher-ranked and all ranks submitted to regulations, "officers" and president. The main encouragement is promotion and release from the membership payment. The main penalties are corrective works, fine, and expelling from MC. The environment is also specifically organized. MC territory gets borders and splits into two parts. There is a free access to the "aggregate" area, "sacral" apartment called "club house". Meetings are held there and only ranked members have a right of free access into that house. Power in MC implements according to hierarchical structure. The main figure is the president, "officers", the next link, has executive, legislative and justice power.

Russian bikers' sub-culture differs from foreign ones. It is less brutal to people, especially to females. Females in US bikers' sub-culture split into two categories and are deprived of all the rights, but there is nothing similar in Russia at the moment. Nevertheless Russian bikers share the same archaic thought as their European and American colleagues. Organization of environment, hierarchical structure, the idea of power and its implementation are very archetypal.

It is difficult to give a prognosis about the way of development of Russian bikers' sub-culture but the probability of winning of hard centralism conception is low.

Kalli Paakspuu (University of Toronto, Canada)
A Photo Legacy of Desire – West or "West"

Early photographic imagery of Canada documents how a nation through its representation in photographs created a modern legacy of desire consistent with an imperialist project. Utilizing a post-colonial and post-structuralist framework, this paper revisits several pioneer western photographers and early artists and examines how visual language and new art forms promoted a concept of nation and identity in Canada. The modernization of vision was significantly accelerated by the "realism" and positivism of the photograph, which within a discourse of early portraiture occupied a position congruent with the existing cultural order and was dependent on narrative. Clearly demarcated boundaries within the construction of the photographic images reduced the public's emotions to conventional responses bounded in a single subjectivity where only one interpretation was possible.

Barthes emphasizes that the classic text depends upon a linear viewing and that rany deviation from that norm threatens its existence. The classic text requires viewers to identify with the subjects and agree to be spoken through them. A desire for closure and a belief in revelatory endings is initiated in an imaginal discourse within stable relations. Thus the horizon of each photographic image evokes a desire which in early Canadian colonial portraiture meant respectability and a positive stoical image that counteracted fears of illness, scandal and poverty.

Using post-structuralist methodologies this paper examines some of the challenges to the classical and illustrative readings of visual history through early Canadian and American photographs and visual art.

Talia Shay (The College of Judea and Samaria, Israel)
Hierarchy and Powers As Reflected by the Burial of Russian Immigrants in Israel

Russian immigrants are buried in Israel in special cemeteries or in special lots within regular cemeteries. Furthermore, it can be seen that the tombs of these immigrants represent not only Jewish symbols, as it is traditional in Israel, but also Russian symbols. The planning of these cemeteries and the elements appearing on the stone tombs will be analysed in accordance with the componental analysis method. It will be argued that these phenomena reflect hierarchy and power both in the old homeland of these emigrants as well as in the new sojourn of the immigrants in Israel.

Nelly F. Shchelkonogova (St. Petersburg, Russia)
Woman and the Hierarchical System of Government in Russia

Complete and equal participation of women in political, economic, social, and cultural life on the regional, federal and international levels is to be the principle aim of governmental policy in the sphere of the women's position improvement in the Russian Federation.

The traditional organization of the administrative pyramid oriented mostly to men, does not show the really forming balance of public powers, new roles of men and women, opportunities for women to influence the affairs in the society, state, and family. It does not allow to provide correct orientation of social development and the society's democratization.

In fact, the number of women represented on the high level of governmental hierarchy and at executive positions is extremely small.

A sight at any problem from both the internal and external sides is necessary. Sagacity of men needs perception of women. Thanks to common efforts it is possible to make right decisions and to elaborate tactics in governing.

The basis of women's independence is economic freedom. Lack of confidence in the future does not allow a woman to be active socially. Inequality on the labour market that is existing now, discrimination of women during career making influence the woman's moral condition and aggravate her dependency in the family. On the contrary, economic freedom gives the woman an opportunity to make her own independent choice in society. It is necessary to promote women entrepreneurship, professional and career growth.

Aida M. Suleymenova (Far Eastern State University, Vladivostok, Russia)
Masuraoburi *and* Taoyameburi *(Power and Weakness) Styles in Poetry by Yosano Tekkan and Yosano Akiko*

Power – weakness, masculinity – femininity, authority – subordination, hardness – mildness as characteristics of the *waka* poetry (songs of Yamato) was introduced in the works by Kamo-no Mabuchi, the poet and scientist of the national school *kokugakuha*. These characteristics of *masuraoburi* and *taoyameburi* have been extrapolated by us to the anthologies by Yosano Tekkan (1872 – 1935) and his wife, Yosano Akiko (1878 – 1942). The Yosanos were considered to be successors of the tradition of these two classical trends.

Yosano Tekkan appealed to Japanese poets and writers to come back to the style of the *Manyoshu* (*The milliard of leaves*, the 7th – 19th centuries) in his critical works and in some poetic anthologies before 1901. His style was a glorification of the strong Japanese. But in the *Murasaki* (*Purple*, 1901) Tekkan changed his style into rather soft and full of "stars and violets". We have analized these changes and proposed an explanation for them on the assumption that strong nationalistic ideas had came from *Manyoshu* and a weak feminine style had come from *Kokinwakashu* (*The old and new songs of Yamato*, the 10th – 11th centuries).

The works by Tekkan include brilliant masterpieces such as *Tekkanshi* (1898) and *Murasaki* (1901), *Aogikoe*(1911), *Karasu to ame* (1914) notwithstanding the poet's psychological crisis of 1908 and his silence at the end of life. It should be noted that some nationalistic-colored works represent an organic component of his talent, which was just enriched by the support of Akiko. The famous pair of poets created original verses which suited to the atmosphere of Meiji and contained elements of power and sophistication.

Vyacheslav Y. Sukhachev (St. Petersburg State University, Russia)
Concept of the Alien in the Situations of Power

The image of the Alien is manifested in any situation in which power practices are invested.

There are two types of conceptual articulation of the Alien phenomenality. The first tradition declares that the problem of cognition, understanding and recognition of the Alien is based on rigid power practices which transform the Alien into the Other as *alter Ego*. These processes consist in enclosure of social toposes and in temporal linearization by power structures; as a result, the Alien is perceived only through "ours", as something to be utilized by power Law. At the same time the Alien is institutionalized within the space of multicultural identities, but it is possible only when the Alien is ready to demonstrate his ability to be a "participant", or a "social solidarity partner" with "Us" by his *a priori* recognizing the truth of "our" sociality.

Another conceptual scenario is connected to interpretation of the Alien as ontic positivity which is manifested beyond our being as rapture and involves us into a radically new strategic situation. Instances of the Alien refer us to such a situation when all fine differentiated differences are fading, and "We" are surrounded with lacunas and distances which are impossible to come through. The Alien is always a provocation, a challenge to transform

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and transcend ourselves. But the question is "Are "We" able for such a transfiguration, because this is a problem of power and abilities which we may have or may have not. And if we have power, we accept this challenge; if we have not it, we begin to cry out: "This is a horror that should be exterminated!"

Joan Wang (National Taiwan Normal University)
The Response of Chinese American Newspapers
to the Anti-Japanese Movement in the United States, 1905–1924

The paper is concerned with the perceptions Chinese Americans had of the development of the anti-Japanese movement in the United States and the framework that forged their relations with Japanese immigrants. I investigate the relationship of Chinese and Japanese immigrants in three areas: the social and economic interactions between Chinese and Japanese immigrants, the issue of Chinese nationalism, and, most importantly, the potential for cooperation with Japanese Americans and its predicament. During the first quarter of the twentieth century, suspicion, jealousy, and conflict dominated the relations between Chinese and Japanese immigrants. Opportunities for cooperation between the two did emerge, with no concrete results however.

The type of relationship that Chinese Americans had with Japanese Americans was fundamentally a product of the racial hierarchy in American society under white domination. After the exclusion of Chinese labor, given the influx of Japanese immigrants, Chinese Americans suffered negative biases against them from the *Issei* (the first generation of Japanese Americans). Nevertheless, with the rise of the anti-Japanese movement on the Pacific Coast, Chinese Americans were prudent to maximize their social and economic position at the expense of their Japanese counterparts. Thus, rather than combating against white American hegemony in cooperation with Japanese immigrants, Chinese Americans struggled to differentiate themselves from their Asian peers and keep the existing racial system intact. In the early twentieth century, the anti-Japanese movement in the United States, demonstrated in the San Francisco school board crisis, the enactment of the Alien Land Laws, and the 1924 Immigration Law, deflated Japanese arrogance and thus provided possibilities for alliance. Nonetheless, the shaky alliance with Japanese immigrants only promoted the victimization of Chinese Americans in the context of deteriorating international position of their homeland and the racial hegemony of American society.

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Natalia A. Zavershinskaya (Novgorod State University, Great Novgorod, Russia)
The Anthropological Discourse of Performative Phenomena in Culture

Performance appeared within the field of academic interest in the middle of the 20-th century. It lets us open new unexplored earlier aspects of culture comprehension connected first of all with the principle of magic effectiveness of performance language. Though language describes the world, its real function is essentially performative. Consequently, social world is constructed through verbal structures.

PANEL XII
Democratic Control of Technology:
The Historical Evolution of Democratic Theory and Technocracy
Convenor: *Gary Bryner* (University of Colorado, Boulder, USA)

The purpose of the panel would be to explore the challenges that the development of new technologies have posed for democratic governance. The panel would include examples of successful and unsuccessful attempts and societal shaping of the development of technologies from different historical eras, different regions, and different kinds of technological developments, including technologies of war, bioengineering and health, and those posing major environmental threats. My interest in particular is to explore the question of what can history tell us about achieving the goal of a well-run technological society, and what models can be constructed from a historical review of how societies have grappled with the implications of scientific advances and technological change. What would a well-run technological society look like? What would be its primary institutional features? How would it ensure social direction of technological developments? How would corporate, political, and technocratic governance interact and power exercised? My interest also focuses on modern democratic political theory, its evolution during the past few centuries, and ideas strong democracy, participatory democracy, and other variants of democracy that suggest how individuals and communities can participate in the shaping of technologies that affect them.

Serguei V. Arkhipov (North-Ossetian State University, Vladikavkaz, Russia)
Culture and Technics in Post-Soviet States

Basic trends of cultural and technical evolution in the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) have been analyzed in the submitted paper. *Intraevolution* have been singled out as a dominant tendency. Under such kind of condition societies in CIS send all resources off to develop domestic industry, create new technologies, and centralize scientific and technical knowledge. At the same time technocratic approach predominates at power structures. Engineering methods of resolving issues become widely accepted in policy, social sphere, education, and nurturing. Such type of communal evolution is conductive to speeding-up economic growth, but people in CIS undergo punishment for good industrial ratings. Liberal values are used to going down as well as democratic reforms holds up

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implementing. Insufficient investment into culture leads to closing some libraries, theaters, publishing houses, and so on. Pseudo-religious sects such as *Aum Sinrikie*, *David's Branch*, *White Brotherhood*, *Wahhabism* and some others become to a great extent active against such background. There could be some upheavals in the CIS under strong influence from these groups as far as intellectuals who usually curried out duty resisting to manifestations of extremism have already lost their influence in the countries because of distress they have been living in since the collapse the former Soviet Union.

Comparaevolution is the next trend that becomes apparent last decade. There are not any visible shortcomings under such kind of up-growth like that what were described above. Good-tempered approach to the maturing all sphere of live is advantage of such kind of social augmentation. Consequently the cost for industrial growth becomes substantially lower. Inside this tendency it is possibly to single out some elements for the third flow of cultural and historical evolution in the CIS. *Extraevolution* is a type of community growth that was very connected with forming open society and transiting, as Bergson put it, "from civic community to mankind". Democratic society should be an outcome of the prevailing such kind of development over all the others. Extraevolution does not copy past cultures, but it shapes up culture of present in akin with words of Toynbee who coined the culture as "the essence of civilization" while all other economic "triumphs" and "victories" were relatively trivial display of life and they would remain misunderstood and unnoticed by people for a long time until they would come to life in art works of modern culture.

Igor N. Ionov (Institut de l'Histoire Générale, Académie des Sciences de Russie, Moscou)
Le rôle des relations du pouvoir et de la communication en formation de l'identité civilisatrice (l'Antiquité, l'Orient, l'Occident, la Russie)

L'analyse du contexte des relations du pouvoir joue un rôle important dans l'étude de la formation de l'identité civilisatrice et de la théorie des civilisations. Son rôle est souvent plus grand, que celui du contexte culturel ou epistemologique.

Des oppositions binaires de l'identité tribale (le même – l'autre) ne sont pas obligatoires pour former l'identité civilisatrice. Quand on commence se juger civilisé, les autres pays et leur population à l'absence des heurtes directes sont souvent estimés positivement (par Hérodote, Mencius, Voltaire, Tchaadaev). "La découverte" d'une autre civilisation grâce à la

communication peut etre une impulsion importante à la formation de son propre identité civilisatrice.

L'accroissement de l'utilisation de la force en train de l'offensive de l'empire et de sa crise suivante engendre la domination des oppositions binaires opposant la civilisation à la barbarie, au "despotisme oriental", à la "décadence occidentale", etc. (Aristote, Wang Fuzhi, Bucle, les eurasiens). La perception dite "objective" de l'autre culture, proposée par la méthode de la science classique ne fait ces oppositions que plus rigides. En même temps on ne fait que des éloges à sa propre culture. On peut dire que l'opposition rigide de la civilisation à la barbarie de toutes sortes n'est pas primitive et qu'elle est une suite du développment de la conscience et des relations politiques.

Le discours national et même nationaliste est beacoup plus favorable pour la formation des représentations de la multiplicité des civilisations que le discours imperialiste. La théorie de la multiplicité des civilisations a été formée sous l'influence du discors national par Herder, Guizot, Kireevskiy, H. Rukkert, Danilevskiy, Spongier. Les méthodes de l'analyse de la structure des civilisations furent élaborées pour développer l'identité nationale allemande par Hegel et Lamprecht.

La position du pays qui forme un type tolérant de l'identite civilisatrice par rapport aux autres pays est un facteur important. La situation optimale consiste dans l'opposition au pays qui joue un rôle de l'avant-garde de la modernisation. La tentative de contester la domination de l'Autre, lui imposer un dialogue et le gagner produit une aspiration à le comprendre. Ainsi la lutte pour le pouvoir fait naître la stratégie communicative. L'impulsion de comprendre est si forte, qu'elle compense l'influence de l'identité imperialiste de l'auteur (les différences des identités de Rukkert et de Danilevskiy sont grandes, mais leurs théories des civilisations sont bien pareilles).

Le dialogue descend maintenant du niveau des civilisations au niveau des individus particuliers. En même temps d'autres cultures sont étudiées à l'Occident souvent en cadre du discours du pouvoir, comme des objets de la transformation. Le monde de l'Orient répond par la critique de l'état spirituel de l'Occident et de ses perspectives dans le genre de Danilevskiy (S.C. Malik).

Marina G. Pouchova (St. Petersburg, Russia)
Authorities and Information Resources

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In the situation of scientific, technical, and information revolution the state has to restrict the citizens' access to the information resources. This necessity is determined by the situation when people are not ready to perceive and cope with the huge flow of information. The amount of information has grown to large extend for the recent decade.

The development of the industrial and technological base in the second half of the 20th century and introduction of the newest scientific technologies and research elaboration have given a practically unlimited choice of further ways of the personality's development in the society. Numerous inventions have led the mankind to the new information level on which people are not able to be orientated yet. As a result, the instability of world view is characteristic of them nowadays.

Due to the very human nature, the uncertainty of choice provokes fear which prevents people from efficient activity. Consequently, the civil initiative lacks what reflects in the development of the state as a whole.

In the meantime, the lack of information and limits imposed on the access to it provoke the same negative phenomena as in the case when the information is excessive.

So, the state enjoys the problem of dosing the information. The dosing must provide the necessity and sufficiency of information for every social stratum. The crucial difficulty is how to determine the sufficient measure of access to information.

Veronica V. Usachyova (Center for Civilizational and Regional Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
The Mass Media and the Russian Authorities

At the beginning of the 1990s, a transfer to a libertarian model of relations among the mass media, authorities and society was declared to be the goal for transforming the mass media in Russia. It endowed the media with the role of a "fourth power" that is economically and politically independent of the state and controls it in the name and interests of its citizens. This understanding of the functions of the mass media implies the social responsibility of journalists, who are obligated to reflect the plurality of opinions and, in the event of an acute conflict, channel contradictions into debate in order to prevent extreme aggravation of social tension. The declared goals were not achieved. The mass media were unable to overcome completely the heritage of the Soviet totalitarian model. The electronic media are still dependent on the authorities, the journalistic community has not

developed efficient mechanisms of self-defense and self-control, and society does not have levers to influence and control the media. Only the authorities can have a direct and effective influence on them. During the past decade, it was only the inside struggle within the power elites that made it possible to create the illusion that the Russian media had become the "fourth power." But as soon as the powers that became more or less consolidated and realized their interests in their relationships with the mass media, their policy in this sphere instantly acquired distinct authoritarian features.

PANEL XIII
Testing a Model of Civilizational Analysis:
'Globalization' and Civilizational Change

Convenors: *John Cerullo* (University of New Hampshire at Manchester, USA)
              Ahmad Sadri (Lake Forest College, Lake Forest, USA)

The panel's purpose is to test the conceptual rigor, predictive utility, and prescriptive value of a model of civilizational analysis developed by Prof. Ahmad Sadri. This model was first presented in his article *Civilizational Imagination and Ethnic Coexistence* in the *Handbook of Ethnic Coexistence* (Eugene Weiner, Ed.; New York: Continuum 1998). Presenters will address questions generated by Professor Sadri's model.

Outline of Model. Within this model, "civilization" is understood as an accumulated set of rational responses to a range of problems facing all urbanized human collectivities. That is: "civilization" consists of a set of received ideas by which urbanized societies adapt to a given physical environment; maintain internal socio-political order; and deal with other collectivities.

This implies two levels of civilizational analysis.

One addresses what Professor Sadri calls the "crust" of civilization. This is the site of practical and visible responses to the quotidian questions facing urbanized collectivities: technological arrangements; written law; the daily administration of economic and political institutions; the organization of kinship and family networks; military systems; architectural forms; and all that anthropologists classify as material culture. Most scholars who have attempted civilizational analysis have sought a unified vision of these varied activities by proposing that a few cultural norms are common to all.

Professor Sadri's model, however, proceeds below that civilizational crust to its "core," where the ontological and theological axioms, moral values, and, basic approaches to questions of meaning in the world are generated. This realm has existed in all civilizations, extant and vanished. It is the realm of scribes, priests, sages, philosophers, scientists, artists – in short, "intellectuals." The Sadri model posits the core as inherently unstable, and therefore the site of ceaseless contestation over the shape of "culture."

What Professor Sadri's model underscores is the core-crust dialectic. It focuses on the ways in which intra-cultural struggles affect the civilizational crust; and, at the same time, the ways in which developments within the crust affect the stakes and dimensions of intra-cultural contestation. In particular, the model highlights the clash between the practical, instrumental rationality

prevailing within the civilizational crust, and the substantive reason characterizing the core.

The model directs further attention to the ways in which power is configured or reconfigured through the core-crust dialectic.

We can illustrate with a brief glance at "globalization." In terms of the Sadri model, what "globalization" has actually entailed has been a merger of civilizational crusts: a widening diffusion of common technologies (especially in communications and transportation), economic systems (capitalism), and political structures (parliamentary democracy). But this mostly benign merger brings what may be incommensurable civilizational cores into closer proximity than ever before.

That proximity galvanizes important new activity within cores. What happens when intellectuals decide to resist the alien, often threatening cultures they can no longer ignore? What if they choose to embrace them? What are the effects in either case at civilizational crusts? How are core activities, in turn, in affected by developments originating at those crusts?

The nature and exercise of power, we propose, is profoundly shaped by answers to these questions. Our panelists will be discussing them, and many others.

Mohammad Abdollahi (International Center for Dialogue among Civilizations, Tehran, Iran)
Civilization as a Social System (With Emphasis on the Effects of Dialogue among Civilizations on the Integration of the Global Civilizational System)

Civilization as a complex social system has cultural, social, political and economic dimensions which rarely have been considered as the complementary and interrelated components of the civilizational system in the past and present literature, therefore the typologies of civilizations and the explanation of their emergence and disintegration have suffered from the lack of a systemic approach. I will try to show these dimensions through a multi-dimensional scale including a combination of the interrelated indicators.

It is through this systemic point of view that we can distinguish the deficiencies of the global civilizational system which is predominately based on the monologue and instrumental (hardware) aspect of human social life.

Dialogue among cultures and civilizations is one of the most appropriate means for the development of the cultural and social (software) aspect of globalization. It can bring about a multi-dimensional and sustainable development for human social life through an integrated global civilizational system.

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Pattamaporn Busapathumrong (Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand)
Gender Hierarchy and Feminist Praxis in Global Context

Gender hierarchy, as a form of sexual oppression, has existed in history and civilization. Women's bodies have been colonized, controlled, and disciplined in several manners within discourses of profit maximization. As global workers, sex workers, criminalized as prostitutes/lesbians and within the state's discourses of the originally as nuclear family as wives and mothers. In some cases, such as being trafficked and returned women in the Mekong Region, the state discourses still play role. My paper will examine contemporary feminist theories such as liberal feminist, Marxist feminist, radical feminist, socialist feminist, postmodern feminist, and postcolonial perspectives including their arguments on gender hierarchy and feminist praxis in global context. Data will be primary drawn from current studies on feminism and my experiences by involving in the Mekong Region Law Center Project on Illegal labor movements: A case of trafficking in women and children in the Mekong Region.

John Cerullo (University of New Hampshire at Manchester, USA)
Globalization and the Universal Human Rights Movement:
Beyond the Juridical

In 1948, the fledgling United Nations adopted what was to become a seminal document in international law and international relations: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Its framers hoped the Declaration would be followed by binding, multilateral covenants and the formation of international agencies to translate its principles into practice. That hope has, in fact, been largely realized. The international human rights movement has woven itself into the fabric of international relations, at times playing a very consequential role (e.g., in the agitation against apartheid in South Africa).

The movement today stands at a crossroads, and the direction it takes will depend on the way it interprets its own history. Do the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, for instance, suggest that advocates have erred in adding national self-determination for stateless peoples to their list of universal human rights? How should the movement s failure in Rwanda be interpreted? Is it time to retrench and pursue a minimalist agenda, or does the current international climate warrant an entirely different approach?

Underlying these questions, however, are cultural and moral issues that have become increasingly acute as the pace of globalization has quickened.

The framers of the UDHR deliberately avoided any statement of intellectual and moral foundations for the list of rights they compiled, in order to secure the widest possible assent to it. But in the absence of that clear and firm grounding, supporters have always been ill-equipped to respond to the charge that the moral individualism implicit in their concept of universal human rights represents Western moral imperialism. Now, as economic and social globalization intensify, some critics reject the entire idea of universal human rights as an hypocritical rationale for the global depredations of Western capitalism.

How valid are those charges? Has a trans-cultural grounding for the idea of universal human rights become necessary? Is it possible? Can it be sought in secular moral thought? In religious thought? In addressing these questions, we address some of the most perplexing, and significant, questions raised by the globalization process.

Ambrish Dhaka (Government College Kotputli, Jaipur, India)
The Making of Global Hierarchy Amid Spatial Contradictions of Globalisation: A Geopolitical Perspective

Hierarchy is spineless without ideology, if taken as a civilisational process. The vertical stratification of world order has been quite evident in terms of economic strength and conflict zones revealing the ordering of nations along a principal interest, i.e., economic gains. But this has always been within oligarchic parameters devoid of any 'Third World' participation. There had never been any hierarchy among these nations nor they have been participant to the game of hierarchy sponsored by superpowers.

Mackinder in his famous anecdote demarked the precepts of the world order that further materialized as Cold War struggle for supremacy. This seemingly simplistic argument remains conspicuous even after the departure of Cold War politics and the current process of hierarchy among the leading nations on world forum is seen as its successor.

There have been two important implications of such process. The process of deconstruction of balance of power in multi-polar world and the simultaneous arrangement of principal actors (states) under the global hierarchy is evident with the collapse Third World organizations such as NAM, G-77 and organizations of Africa and Latin American countries as well as nations of erstwhile Warsaw pact. On the other hand there has been energized attempts to externalize from such hierarchy by nations such as under EU through stronger transnational political-economic institutional structures. The other example is southeast Asia under ASEAN, which has

consciously preserved its economic and political role in world body as a separate interest group.

The globalisation has generated a criss-cross pattern of hierarchy of nation states and nation groups. It is on the subtle suitability of interest that certain nations may remain in the group or opt out for mainstream hierarchy at various points of time. China and France are its premier examples. The pattern generated by the globalisation of trade and finance has been the key underpinning to these developments. The quest for a higher order in hierarchy has become one of the major focuses of international relations. The share of world market has become its yardstick and the degree of orientation towards the US interests, the sole commanding power, has been its sense.

Amid these major geoeconomic world patterns, there are certain states that represent a group of nations that appear anomalous in this integration. India and Russia have been of its stark examples. These nations have anti-hierarchy mode of understanding to international order. Thus, there has been a triumvirate of dimensions emerging from the ongoing process of globalisation. Its spatial understanding goes much closer to what geopoliticians fantasized with the image of world order merely in military terms. The economic forces have increasingly acquired similar dimensions.

The paper presented here intends to discuss these issues in ideological terms as well as in the light of current international situation. The scheme of thought shall acquire finer picture with the later stages of development and analysis.

Seyed Javad Kafkazli (University of Bristol, UK)
The Civilizational Problematique in Alvin Gouldner's Sociology

The Irano-American sociologist, Ahmad Sadri argues that the concept of civilization has been used by philosophers of history, anthropologists, sociologists and archaeologists. Here, I have chosen the field of sociology and related the civilizational problematique to the sociological imagination of Alvin W. Gouldner. I have attempted to assess if there is any notion of 'inter-civilizationality' within Gouldner's sociology? What is the horizon of Gouldner's civilizational imagination? Every theoretical work, argues Ahmad Sadri, is to some extent a biography. In this paper I have argued that the entire "The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology" is a drawing of Gouldner's own 'bios' in its widest possible sense. Further I have argued that Gouldner's sociology entail a very viable and feasible notion of dialogue; although the very structure of his dialogue is of significance, nevertheless it should be analyzed and revisited. Because I have found that the infra-structure of his

sociological dialogue is construed along 'intra-civilizational dialogue' (a dialogue between Europe and America, or rather former Soviet Union and West) and has not been substantially concerned with 'inter-civilizational dialogue' or what Ahmad Sadri rightly depicts in terms of 'Ethnic Coexistence' based on a vivid civilizational imagination. That is to say, his sociological civilizational quest has overcome monological tendencies, but it is not adequately equipped in terms of inter-civilizational dialogue and 'Ethnic Co-existence'.

Oleg I. Kavykin (Center for Civilizational and Regional Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)

Mythology of Russian Neo-Paganism as Reaction to Globalization

The author asserts that the mythology of Russian neo-pagans is impenetrable for rational cognition.

Contemporary situation in Russia is characterized by the creation of various mythologies which reject the ideological foundation of the political and economical globalization and are based on archetypes. Such a wide distribution of new mythologies was caused by the collapse of Soviet identity and freedom of speech and liberty of conscience. These mythologies serve as a foundation for the modern non-state social networks.

These events are included into the global process of change of historical-cultural types. New type of culture is similar to the archaic type dominated by mythological consciousness. The absence of division between subjectivity and objectivity is the realization of this similarity. It takes place both in social sciences and in mythologies.

The mythological system of neo-pagans is based on the reconstruction of Slavic mythology with the help of historical sources, fairy-tales, and academic research. Authors of these texts can not deny their knowledge of scientific theories of the myth. But they assert that the creation of the myth is a subconscious process in which myth is sensually experienced and embellished with a new interpretation or new images.

Thus, scholar should not describe mythology in a formal way in order to comprehend modern pagans' worldview. So, one who attempts such an analysis has to believe in myths and sensually percept the world in the neo-pagans' way. As a result, some difficulties emerge. Observers can percept the world differently from the author of the myth. So, an adequate comprehension is impossible. On the other hand, perception mythology and the world in the way neo-pagans do, scholar immerses himself in the world of mystic intuitions and starts creating a myth. This way is adequate to both

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global processes and contemporary mythology, but it requires a new procedure of verification of the research results.

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Andrey A. Kazantsev (Centre of International Studies of Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Pushchino, Russia)

Глобализация социальных сетей и феномен коррупции на постсоветском пространстве
The globalization of social nets and the phenomenon of corruption on the post-Soviet area

В настоящее время накоплен значительный эмпирический материал, касающийся проблемы коррупции на пространствах бывшего СССР. Существуют также данные, позволяющие увязать интенсификацию этого феномена с глобализацией. В то же время отсутствует общая модель, позволяющая объяснить взаимосвязь между этими двумя феноменами. Исключением служит общее соображение о "разрыве" между двумя уровнями: глобальным уровнем протекания реальных социальных процессов и национальным уровнем их регулирования. Однако в данном случае остается открытым вопрос о социальном субстрате этих процессов.

Данный доклад посвящен одной из возможных моделей, позволяющей ответить на поставленный выше вопрос. Она выработана на основе теоретического синтеза двух различных социально-политических концепций: модели коррупции на постсоветском пространстве и мир-системной теории Валлерстайна, а также близкой к ней идее "времени" и "пространства" мира Броделя.

Броделевская интерпретация Валлерстайна указывает на исторические корни феномена "глобализации", позволяя понять его как отнюдь не уникальное явление в мировой истории. Структура мира-экономики представляется Броделю иерархичной. В "центральной точке" концентрируется в большей или меньшей степени промышленная, торговая, морская, военная и финансовая мощь, она также служит центром финансово-кредитной системы, основанной на таком когнитивном факторе, как доверие и таком социальном факторе, как устойчивые связи. В частности, иерархичность систем можно проследить путем отслеживания интенсивности и направленности корреспондентских и торговых связей крупнейших коммерческих и банкирских домов. Если представить возможность создания

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синтетической карты или базы данных, демонстрирующей связи хотя бы крупнейших международных экономических акторов, то она во многом позволила бы представить степень иерархизированности мира и отдельных регионов и уровень их представленности в международных сетях.

В данной точке теория Броделя-Валлерстайна стыкуется с теорией "социальных сетей", понимаемых как устойчивые неформальные социальные связи, имеющие когнитивную природу. Социальные сети (доверия, влияния, информации) выстраиваются между людьми, которые доверяют друг другу, согласны взаимодействовать друг с другом на основе общих ценностей, онтологии или операционального опыта. Социальные сети как носители культуры особо важную интегративную роль начинают играть в переходные периоды, когда единство общества рассыпается, а транзакционные издержки в социуме в целом оказываются запредельно высокими. Причиной этого является появление "серых зон", т.е. зон, не регулируемых четко государственными органами в силу разрывов между законами, административными практиками и культурой общества.

Abbas Manafy (New Mexico Highlands University, Las Vegas, USA)
The World System vs. Human Rights

This study is devised to promote analytical and critical thinking and contribute to the status of knowledge on Human Rights, which is in the process of obliteration. The claim is that the world system, which is defined by Wallerstein as capitalistic, is divisive and conflictual. It has been dividing the world for the last five hundred years and still continues to do so. Hence, the world system and human rights do not mix. The two are contradictory.

Human Rights as such is used as a political tool to insure the continuity of the prevailing system and the world system to undermine human rights. This is the major hypothesis to be proven. It is an acceptable proposition to say that there is a link between self-determination and the realization of rights, but given the contradictory nature of the world system, the right to self-determination is very rare. It is not made by self by the powerful economic elites at the centers of the world system beyond their borders, will, consent and determination.

Therefore, the peripheries of the world system are not free to acquire their rights to sovereignty and the self-centered autonomy. What is more, the states in the peripheries of the system are authoritarian and totalitarian structures that severely limit, through a highly centralized hierarchy of socio-political control, any prospects for the realization for human rights. These

systems exercise a monopoly control over the use of the illegitimate means of violence. In the peripheries of the system, common people not only do not have a right to their possessions or liberty but to their lives. These autocratic and dictatorial governments, who terrorize dissenting/non conformist social forces, are closely associated with the centers of the world system that lends support to the state sponsored violence, on the other hand and on the other, whenever its market values are threatened, the world system tends to contain it. In this type of contradictory situation, Human Rights has only instrumental value. In reality, the world system does not promote human rights in dependent social formation; its overriding passion for political control over peripheries lead to deprivation, rather than realization, of human rights. Hence, a country's independence or self-determination is a necessity or a must if human rights are to be realized. Indeed, the world system has a poor record with regard to the promotion of human rights.

The imperial domination of the peripheral countries is not conducive to democratization and promotion of human rights, especially given mass poverty, inequalities and a class system based on vertical definitions of society, and ethnic conflict that are very much the leading features of the dominated societies. In fact, state power, as an effective and coercive tool, is used to protect the opulant minority, while the majority of the people of the peripheral countries suffer from misery repression, and economic exploitation. As Richard Falks puts it "... is it not a serious matter that an embassy is used to subvert the constitutional order of a country ..." and bring to power one's own dictator to defend certain political and economic order? "Is it not also serious to set up, train and equip secret police to torture and imprison dissenting democratic forces and promote crimes against the opposition? Violations of national sovereignty, generally do not promote democracy and human rights.. This assertion of Richard Falks is further supported by George Kannan the leading containment strategist of the State Department on the former USSR. For him "we own 50 percent of the world's wealth, but only 6.3 percent of its population ..." In order to maintain this disparity, we have to stop talking about human rights and democratization. (Quoted in MR, v. 48, December, 1996 by L, IXing, p. 30). In sum, it must be emphasized that the prevailing world order is not compatible with the realization of human rights in the peripheries of the system. Hence it is badly in need of restructuring and redefinition.

Mehdi Mozaffari (University of Aarhus, Denmark)
Globalization, Civilization and World Order.
A World-Constructivist Approach

There is a general consensus among scholars that globalization is first and foremost of economic character. The advanced technological progress contributes largely to the acceleration of economic globalization as well as to globalization of certain sets of values; e.g. human rights. In this respect, the world system theory may be applied to explain the evolution of parochial economic systems to the rise of capitalism and the world economy. The world system theory - especially in its Braudel-Wallerstein ramification – goes even further and deals with questions related to civilization, culture, democracy etc. (Braudel 1979, 1993; Wallerstein 1992, 1995). However, the primary focus remains on economy.

The problem with the world system theory resides in the fact that it does not pay much attention to the international system, to phenomena such as anarchy, polarity, international law, international ethics, and in general to questions about the identity of the world. A main part of these aspects of the problematics enter within the field of social-constructivism (Wend 1994, 2000) which focuses sufficiently on the interaction between international actors as well as on the quality of anarchy and the identity of states. Therefore, a synthesis of these two approaches is assumed to make a useful theoretical explanatory tool to clarify relations between globalization and civilizations, the rise of a new standard of civilization, and also the question about the new identity of the world. These two different sets of theories will be operationalized without entering into a theoretical discussion on the selected theories.

In other words, theories are not applied here for sake of theories; they are used with regard to explaining relations between globalization, civilization and world order. In this study, we will first demonstrate how the world economy influenced civilizations and how it determined the path of globalization. Second, the purpose is to focus on the impact of globalization on the identity of the world and states.

Char Miller (George Mason University, Fairfax, USA)
Terror/tory: Power and Place in Examinations
of Contemporary Political Action

When the towers disappeared over New York City, some of the intellectual power of national geography went with them. Americans (and

much of the world) faced new consequences of a world in which modern transportation and communication have made possible innovative (and in this case terrifying) forms of political action. We will examine politics removed from (or reoriented towards) territory: terrorism on the one hand and Internet communities on the other. While seemingly far removed from one another, both are made possible by modern forms of transportation and communication and both present intellectual challenges to ideas of political power grounded in the territory of a nation/state. This sub-panel will examine the problems and possibilities of non-territorial political communities and power as well as the demands on scholars to reorient their work to a world of terror/tory.

E. Kolawole Ogundowole (University of Lagos, Nigeria)
Individuation versus *Globalisation: A Paradox of Complexity?*

Viewed from the perspective of micro- and macroevolutionary processes the on-going globalisation in co-evolution with the process of individuation of nations (as typified by the new wave of nationalism in East and Central Europe, Africa, Asia, etc.) appears to be a paradox of complexity: intensive globalisation on the one hand, and unrelenting individuation on the other hand.

What seems to be a paradox is just the superfluous external surface appearance of the essence of the process. When examined from the viewpoint of evolution as a holistic phenomenon in which micro- and macroevolution are interdependent moving in the direction of increasing complexity, the intensity with which the process of individuation of nations is registering itself in contemporary times (despite the ferocity and aggressiveness of the globalisation) demands a keen in depth reflection on the part of scholars who are concerned with civilisational trends, and are equally concerned about what these trends hold in stock for humankind.

Considering human civilisation not only as a self-organising but self-regulating organism, the paper probes into the very nature, content, and characteristics of the globalisation process *vis-à-vis* the individuation process and concludes that in order to check-mate and curb the inimical tendencies, characteristics and excesses of the globalisation process, and for the humankind could affirm and uphold genuine universal features of the nature, characteristics and behavioural patterns of the human species (being specific human creative counter-civilisations) are an imperative antidote.

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Osman Metin Öztürk (Gazi University, Ankara, Turkey)
**Hierarchy and Power in Turkey
from the Point of View of International Relations**

When hierarchy and power are examined from the point of view of international relations, Turkey appears to be an interesting example because of two reasons. The first reason is the negative effect of 1990 and the second one is an unexistent chance of weak and powerless governments to live due to the impact of Anatolian geography.

Turkey is situated in the neighborhood with the three countries which are suspected by US in the support of terrorism. Besides it is necessary to evaluate ethnic, religious, historical and cultural discrimination which was nourished as a result of 1990 events in Turkey.

On the other hand since 1990 strategic importance of Turkey have been substantially increased. So, it is necessary to pay more attention to hierarchy and power in Turkey geopolitics.

Ahmad Sadri (Lake Forest College, Lake Forest, USA)
**The application of the theory of Civilizational Imagination
to the Wahhabi-inspired terrorism**

In this panel I would like to apply the theory of Civilizational Imagination to the new brand of terrorism that we have witnessed in the Wahhabi-inspired terrorism rooted in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and a network of loosely connected operatives around the world.

In a setting like the present crisis we can gauge the viability of a cross-Civilizational analysis that would lay bare the hidden genetic as well as generic connections that under gird the apparently many disjointed cultural phenomena. In my paper I will follow the roots of Terrorism in the Western tradition of Counter-Enlightenment and the four activist schools of thought that resulted there from (Anarchism, Syndicalism, Fascism and Communism.) I shall then follow the idea of terrorism as it mutates from an intra-national to an international setting and is picked up by nationalist terrorist movements from IRA and Basque to Zionist and Palestinian types. The role of crucial links like Frantz Fanon and Ali Shariati will be emphasized. The second mutation of this intercivilizational virus takes place as the secular terrorism is wedded to religious fanaticism, creating the basis of *Al-Qa'idah* in the Middle East. Here Weber's sociology of religion must assist us to prevent facile ideas about the connections between ideas and interests.

There are Jewish Christian and even Buddhist varieties for this twice mutated virus of Neo-Terrorism. As an inter-civilizational approach underlines the connections that brought about this new world problem, I would propose, it takes an inter-civilizational cooperation to address. I will end by moving into the area of applied sociology and look to a long-term solution to the problem.

Andre Delport Slabbert (Cape Technikon, Cape Town, South Africa)
Power, Human Rights and Democide: An Equation

Power is a phenomenon which becomes a reality of itself and for itself. Its purpose throughout history focussed on the subjugation of others and it has therefore come under intense scrutiny. The individual who is subjugated sacrifices a degree of freedom and becomes vulnerable, even if such an individual exercises voluntary choice with regard to losing this freedom.

It is proposed that four distinct structural forms of power can be identified: political, economic, ideological and personal power. If these four are owned by an individual/group, the possibility of power abuse to the extent of democide (the killing of individuals by their government) becomes a distinct reality.

The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights identifies certain inviolate human rights, stating that amongst others, everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person. Despite the proliferation of a large number of treaties focussing on human rights, the abuse of power has resulted in atrocities. Approximately 174 million people have been murdered through democide during 1900-1987. Absolute power kills absolutely.

Globalisation and internationalisation are fundamental forces which cannot be denied - it permits obvious benefits to large number of people, but conversely threatens life in its broadest sense. Society is manifesting diverse ills, and it is postulated that protracted civil disturbance and revolutions could isolate governments from its subjects. In the process, democide could surface on a number of fronts.

A suggestion is raised that a world governing body, or central government, could function to the benefit of all humankind. Such a body would consist of individuals who are elected/appointment on the basis of a humanitarian track record. The secretariat would rotate through various portfolios, and after a specified time period, not be eligible for re-election.

Power could benefit humanity greatly, or eventually destroy it. The choice is clear.

Ali A. Al-Tarrah (Kuwait University)
Authoritarianism among Kuwaiti and American University Students: A Comparative Study

An earlier study (Alothman 1969) using F scale for measuring authoritarianism in two samples of American and Kuwaiti male and female university students reported that Kuwaitis, especially females, were significantly higher in authoritarianism than their American counterparts. The higher level of authoritarianism amongst Kuwaiti students was explicated as an upshot of living in an authoritarian culture, as indicated in Kuwaiti society.

During the past three decades, Kuwaiti society has witnessed immense economic, social and cultural developments. This evolution may have affected its citizens and gives rise to the following question: Do these economic, social and cultural changes pose as an influence or affect the labeled authoritarian attitudes of Kuwaiti people and its traditional culture?

In response, the present researcher administered the F scale to measure authoritarianism to a sample of Kuwaiti male and female university students, aged between nineteen and twenty-five. These responses have been compared to the Alothman's (1969) findings. The results of this comparison have showed a significant influence of the economic, social and cultural changes that had affected the Kuwaiti society during the past thirty years, validating authoritarianism.

Vladimir K. Vigand (Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
Reflection of Authoritative Domination in Economic Processes

The author expresses some non-orthodox ideas about the origin of human societes: (1) not labour, but coercion created *homo sapiens*; (2) Eastern civilizations have been characterized not by exchange of goods but by distribution of surplus product under the Asiatic mode of production; (3) not three or five social-and-economical formations but two alternative types of human societies (Eastern despotic and Western democratic) have originated in the course of social evolution; (4) the possibility of "orientalisation" of the whole post-industrial 21st century society does exist nowadays.

Igor V. Yankov (Ural State Professional Pedagogical University, Ekaterinburg, Russia)

Phenomenon of Ritual: On the Problem of Searching the Language of Describing the Post-Contemporary Situation

Events of the early 21ˢᵗ century problematize traditional dichotomy of the East and the West and common foundations of classification and hierarchy. A new situation is usually linked to the process of globalization which, at the first sight, leads to the united and uniform world. However, if we look at the problem differently, we will see the globalization leads to the breaking up of traditional division into *We* (civilization) and *They* (barbaric periphery). Under these conditions the co-existence of different worlds becomes a fact. The space of civilization is homogeneous and is made central by the sacred meaning. In these new conditions differences are mixed and lead to compressing the violence. In this connection it can be supposed that the actions of antiglobalists and growing up of fundamentalism are the symptoms of crisis set by breaking up the mechanisms of distinction. The problems of compatibility during giving history to the transcendental signifier consists not only in deconstruction of the West and all Western European concepts as well. That's just this possibility includes the Answer of civilization to the Challenge of post-contemporaneity. The language of Roman law, equivalent exchange, division of word and thing, social things and natural ones, reveals its own limits and arbitrariness.

Traditionally Europe has opposed to the East and Archaics. But a new situation demonstrates in the first place the conditional character and construction of these terms, and secondly, their co-existence at same "place". The presence of unreduced constructing elements one in another results in re-actualizing of Archaics. We can understand Archaics differently: either as wildness or as genesis (*arche*). A dialogue with *arche* realized in ritual forms could be an answer to the global Challenge. The most interesting thing in methodological aspect is the fact of the dynamics of ritual language. The obile and agonic ritual not only gives a great number of meaning, but it let different social bodies co-exist in a dialogue. In this connection the description of different social and hierarchic institutions of both the "East" and the "West" as forms of ritual process.

PANEL XIV
Islamic World: Concepts of Power and Models of Socio-Political Evolution

Convenors: *Igor L. Alexeev* (Center for Civilizational and Regional Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow),
Andrey V. Korotayev (Center for Civilizational and Regional Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow),
Rafik M. Mukhametchine (Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of Tatarstan, Kazan, Russia)

Islam has determined the development of socio-political systems within a considerable part of the Old World Oikumene since the 7th century A.D. In the last few centuries the influence of the Islamic factor is felt within the socio-political evolution of all the main regions of the world.

In the meantime the influence of Islam on the power hierarchies has not been appropriately studied within Social Anthropology.

In the framework of our panel we suggest to pay special attention to the influence of *shariah* and *adat* traditions on the formation of both communal and supracommunal political institutions. We suggest to discuss such problems as:
1. Dynamics of power sacralization in the Islamic World;
2. The *shariah* and *adat* influence on the evolution of democratic structures (both communal and supracommunal) in the Islamic World;
3. The *shariah* influence on the evolution of traditional forms of socio-political organization in the Islamic World.
4. *Shariah – adat* interaction.

Dmitri Yu. Arapov (Moscow Lomonosov University, Russia)
Romanov's Empire and Administration of Ecclesiastical Affairs of Muslim Community in Russia

Striving for the complete control over all religions in the country was the main trend of the religious policy of the Russian Empire. In 1773 the Romanovs declared the right of Russian Muslim community to the authonomous religious life and at the same time they began to construct the clerical hierarchical structure of Muslim administration "from above". In spite of contradiction of this measure to Islamic traitions, but it corresponded to the Russisn imperial interests and so it was successively put into practice.

At the end of the 19th century Mohammedans of European Russia and Siberia were administrated by the *muftiats* of Orenburg (1788) and Taurida (1831), Caucasian Muslims were under the rule of the Sunni and Shi'i

ecclesiastical boards (1872). The general control made by the state authorities over all Muslim affairs in the Russian Empire was excercised by the Department of Ecclesiastical Affairs Foreign Confessions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (1810-1917). The status of heads of Muslim ecclesiastical boards was equated with the status of Russian military generals. The staff of religious functioners confirmed by the Russian government was submitted ti them. All of them were released from taxes and duties, exempted from military service; they could get salary from the state treachery and imperial orders and medals.

At the beginning of the 20th century the Muslim circles of Russia made a number of suggestions aimed to the broadening of their independence. They wanted to establish the all-Russian Muslim religious board which would be put out of the control of imperial bureaucracy and personally submitted only to the Emperor. However, right up to 1917 the system of administration of Muslim community in Russia hadn't undergone any cardinal changes.

Naida N. Azizova (St-Petersburg State University, Russia)
Some Notes on Arab Influence on Evolution Social Institutions in Daghestan (Sources and Contemporary Situation)

The first Russian scholar, who asked questions concerning the Arab presence in Daghestan was A. N. Genko. Relying on the 1926 census of Daghestan he discovers that one of the Daghestanian villages had 1223 inhabitants who spoke Arabic and considered it to be their mother tongue. On studying Arabic mediaeval written sources, where reveals the information that in the 7th century Arab *amir* Abu Muslim had settled many Arabs from the different parts of the Middle East in Derbend and environs, A.N. Genko brings out the idea that above mentioned Arabic-spoke villagers were more likely the offspring of these Arabs. Very important facts, which confirm hypothesis of A. N. Genko are to be found in the local Daghestani chronicles of the 17th – 20th centuries, which contain the legends about how every single village appeared. Among the sources: *Derbend-nameh* by Muhammad Avabi Aktashi (XVII cent.), *Gulistan Iram* by Abbas-Kouli Bakikhanov (XIX cent.), *Athar-i Daghestan* by Hasan al-Qadari (XIX-XX centuries). There are legendary news about where from were the Arab emigrants, the number of them, where exactly they were settled, what was their occupation, etc. in these chronicles. Another important sources which can be added nowadays to the mentioned ones are local oral accounts, that still exist in the different parts of Daghestan. Unfortunately, many of these facts appear to be fictive on two main reasons: 1)it is considered to be very prestigious to originate from

these first Arab conquers among Daghestani people; and 2)in practice, as it show the recent field research works, there was no any descent of the Arabs discovered on the area.

Pierre Bonte (CNRS, Ecole des Hautes Etudes dans les Sciences Sociales, France)
La tribu arabe. Une relecture d'Ibn Khaldoun. Tribus et dynastiies dans le monde arabo-musulman. L'exemple du Sahara occidental.

Même si les œuvres de civilisation sont dans le monde arabo-musulman majoritairement d'origine urbaine, l'organisation tribale est une référence majeure dans les représentations que ce monde se fait de lui-même. Elles se manifestent clairement à travers la *Muqqadima* d'Ibn Khaldoun. Dans la perspective évolutionniste de l'anthropologie (définie par Morgan et Engels), l'organisation tribale est aussi une référence envahissante, si bien que le bébé tribu est souvent rejeté avec les eaux usées de cette théorie évolutionniste (Godelier). Le terrain ethnologique au sein des sociétés arabo-musulmanes – en l'occurrence mon travail depuis trente ans sur les sociétés sahariennes – m'a conduit à restaurer la valeur heuristique de cette notion de tribu mais aussi à la réévaluer profondément. Une partie de la communication sera consacrée à ce travail de réévaluation.

Il doit opérer d'abord au sein de la théorie anthropologique. Une fois rejetée la perspective évolutionniste, il reste à emprunter aux auteurs de la fin du XIXe siècle (W. Robertson Smith, I. Goldziher, etc.). Il reste surtout à revenir sur le modèle d'organisation tribale des sociétés arabo-musulmanes qui a constitué la principale grille de lecture anthropologique contemporaine à travers le modèle lignager et segmentaire défini par E. Evans-Pritchard chez les Nuer, appliqué par lui aux bédouins de Cyrénaïque, puis par E. Gellner aux sociétés maghrébines. Une relecture attentive d'Ibn Khaldoun montre que, dans le langage de son époque et à travers ses propres représentations, il a mis en évidence, à l'encontre des idées d'égalitarisme, de fixisme historique et en dernière analyse d'archaïsme de la tribu arabo-musulmane que développent Evans-Pritchard, Gellner et leurs nombreux exégètes, ses dimensions à la fois égalitaire et hiérarchique et son dynamisme politique.

La seconde partie de la communication réexaminera à travers les acquis de cette réévaluation de la notion de tribu, les réalités historiques et contemporaines. Une part importante sera accordée à la situation au Sahara occidentale, véritable laboratoire des développements politiques possibles de l'organisation tribale. Elle s'intéressera aussi à des représentations et pratiques inscrites dans la modernité, telles qu'elles sont abordées dans

l'ouvrage dont j'ai récemment contribué à la publication (P. Bonte, E. Conte et P. Dresch, *Emirs et Présidents. Figures de la parenté et du politique dans le monde arabe*, Paris, CNRS-Editions, 2001) et à travers d'autres textes édités en français (*La Pensée*) et en arabe (*Iraq forum*).

Mehmet Oguz Cebeci (Yeditepe University, Turkey)
Challenging cultural hegemonies:
Memoirs of Ottoman Turkish women writers

The West has come to know about the East through travelers. Over the centuries, these accounts (some favorable, most unfavorable) accumulated into a wealth of travel literature and, as literary theorists such as Said have shown, came to dominate the mind of the Western man concerning his standing with the East. Largely forged and/or supported by the political structure, compared to the Easterner, the Western man appears in that narrative as the superior power both in intellectual and moral terms, armed with a virile strength to penetrate, and, hence, to understand and to dominate a feminine East, inferior to the West in every respect. This image reached its apogee in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and, is still influential in the minds not only of many contemporary Westerners but also Easterners through their contact with and assimilation of the former.

Yet the memoirs of two Turkish women writers from this same era represent an opposing point of view, reacting on their part towards what they perceived as the Western pretense of superiority over the Near East, practically the late period Ottoman Empire, and more specifically its foremost element: the Turkish nation. The two volumes of Halide Edip Adivar's memoirs appeared in the 1920s, and the memoirs of Selma Ekrem appeared in the 1930s, in an era when women were only beginning to be emancipated around the world. These writers challenged the Orientalist approaches to accounts of the Ottoman Empire. They also challenged men in general, be it their compatriots or non-Muslims, through assuming a strong and self-reliant female persona and hence dealing a blow to the preconceived notion in the West of women's absolute slavery in the East, in the setting of a disreputable harem. On the contrary, they represented their country in the West as a sovereign and dominant socio-cultural power, if not a technically advanced one, with enough military muscle for self-defense. They also wrote in English and proved masterful in what should have, from an Orientalist point of view, appeared as the medium of the stronger "other".

Ekaterina B. Demintseva (Center for Civilizational and Regional Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
Adaptation of Traditional Maghrebi Social Institutions in Modern French Society (on example of the Maghrebi Family)

Having lived for over 50 years in an "alien" France, the Maghrebi families face various difficulties. They have formed a new subculture which is a product of Oriental and Muslim traditions on the one hand, and modern French culture, on the other hand.

1. Francis Lesme, a French sociologist, defines *algerianitǔ* as a "desperate attempt to keep the identity intact, desire to prove one's existence, and at the same time to secure the 'roots' for young immigrants".

2. The younger generation often cannot speak the language of their parents what provokes problems in communication between the old and the young generations.

3. Misunderstanding grows between senior and younger family members. Attempts to bring kids to their "roots" (often via religion) are viewed by children as a mere disciplinary measures but not bearing any conceptual meaning. For kids who have first seen the Qur'an in France it means nothing more than a part of their parents' tradition and culture.

4. The Beur women (i.e. women born in France to the families of immigrants from Maghreb) present the most interesting object for study. The French perceive them as "victims" oppressed by their own families. However they are the ones whom the French society looks forward to see assimilated with the best results.

Irina N. Driga (Institute of Oriental Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine)
The Linguistic Data on the Social and Political Status of Muslims and Christians in the Balkan Peninsula and Crimea (2nd half of the 19th century)

Dealing with the Crimean Tatar and Balkan Muslim mass-media texts (Tercuman, Ahali, Deli Orman, Elfab, Gayret, Muvazene, Qoca Balqan, Ragbet, Rehber, Rodop Sesi, Uhuvvet) the paper comprises the study of the following questions investigated:

- how the Muslims from the regions mentioned used to describe the Christians (both eastern and western) - *rumi, nasrani, Hırıstıyan, reaya, dhimmi, merhum/haliq*?

- which forms would be more or less stylistically negative - hostile?
- what are the discours-districtions for them?
- if there are terms existing only in Ottoman Turkish and not in Arabic or Persian should we consider them as a result of the non-Turkish influence?
- and finally, do Christians or Muslims were and became the real power holders in later half of XIX century Balkan and Crimean societies?

One look at the ethnic nominations and their usages between both Muslims and non-Muslims outside the Ottoman methropoly while taking into consideration the absence of any comparative study on the topic are significant because it helps to understand the development of various ethnic nationalisms and, moreover, possibly show how ideology can exclude or include them due to the language's usages.

How can or not be changed the nominations for non-Muslims by the Pomaqs and Crimean Tatars after ending the Crimean war and under influence of the decree of *Hatt-i Humayun* (1856)?

We tried to pay a possible attention to the influence of e.g. fashions allafranca, nominations traditional seats expected for Muslim or non-Muslim authorities and their social ranges, or the motivations of the advertisements made in the media as well. Some conclusions about regulations concerning minority rights in the Balkans and Crimea are made too.

Schirin Fathi (University of Hamburg, Germany)
Ali Shariati's Work and the Reception of his Thoughts among Muslims in South Africa

The paper will deal with one of the political aspects relevant to the theme of your conference. It will touch upon issues of sovereignty, rebellion and revolution and inform the ongoing debate on hierarchy and power. More specifically, it will study the interrelations within the frameworks of different models of socio-political organization. I am going to look at Ali Shariati's writings and sociological models and in how far they were received and possibly applied in South Africa among the Muslim minority in their struggle towards equality and against apartheid. The Muslim minority of South Africa began to organize and develop a specific minority consciousness in the middle of the 1970s. The reform movement among them looked specifically to authors such as Sayyid Qutb, Maududi and Shariati, who figured quite prominently. The paper is going to look at key concepts of Shariati's work

and in how far they were transformed or adapted to fit within the particular South African context. It will address questions pertaining to the particular Shi'a character of his writing and if they could be adjusted within a non-Shi'a setting, or in how far the reform/revolutionary content is applicable universally. The paper to be presented is part of a wider research project - a Habilitation, necessary to attain full professorship at German universities. This project will be a comparative study on Shariati and his reception in Iran and his role in preparation of the Iranian revolution, on the one hand and his reception among Muslims in South Africa and the Shia population of South Lebanon on the other hand. It will analyze and compare the same ideas or their adaptation in three very different settings and contexts, namely internal revolution, the system of Apartheid and national liberation against outside intrusion.

Т. Г. Гриценко (ИСАА при МГУ им. М.В. Ломоносова, Россия)
Tatiana G. Gritsenko (Institut des pays d'Asie et d'Afrique, Université Lomonosov de Moscou, Russie)

Религиозные меньшинства Магриба и колониализм:
трансформация внутренней структуры и политической роли
Les minorités religieuses du Maghreb et le colonialisme :
transformation de leur structure interne et de leur rôle politique

Пестрая этноконфессиональная мозаика является характерной чертой магрибинского общества с древнейших времен. Различные средиземноморские народы и цивилизации оставили свой след во всех странах Северной Африки. Задолго до арабского завоевания здесь появляются крупные общины иудеев и христиан, которые, с приходом ислама, терпимо относящегося к ним как к "людям писания", составляют основные религиозные меньшинства.

С течением времени христианские общины, в отличие от иудейских, сокращаются, и к XIX веку для религиозной ситуации Магриба характерно сосуществование мусульманского большинства и иудейского меньшинства. Проживающие компактно (как отдельно, так и в среде мусульман) иудеи Магриба составляют особую прослойку местного населения, экономически, социально, культурно и даже религиозно связанного с мусульманским большинством. Внутри иудейских общин выделяют несколько подгрупп, связанных со временем прибытия и местом изначального пребывания: палестинские, андалузские, ливорнийские евреи.

С увеличением числа европейцев в Северной Африке в связи с растущим экономическим и политическим влиянием европейских держав, важную роль вновь начинает играть христианство, которое становится мощным политическим орудием в руках великих держав, стремящихся укрепиться на этой стратегически важной территории.

С началом колониального периода в Алжире, Тунисе, Марокко христиане создают новые общины, строят новые соборы, церкви, монастыри, развивают миссионерскую деятельность (без особого, впрочем, успеха в среде местного населения), ведут образовательные программы. Христианство в Северной Африке представлено различными национальными церквями (французские, итальянские и испанские католики, немецкие и английские протестанты, греческие и русские православные и др.) и политическая роль отдельных религиозных групп варьируется в зависимости от роли того или иного национального меньшинства в социальной и культурной жизни страны.

Колониализм несомненно радикально влияет на внутреннюю структуру и политическую роль иудейских общин в Магрибе. С одной стороны, национальная политика Франции, направленная на натурализацию магрибинских иудеев, и с другой стороны, обширные экономические и культурные связи с иудеями метрополии, отделяют часть иудеев Магриба от местного мусульманского населения. Происходит внутреннее расслоение общин на традиционную часть, сохраняющую иудаистские религиозные обряды и культы, иврит (часто смешанный с арабо-берберскими диалектами), тесные связи с соседями-мусульманами, и вновь образовавшиеся слои, стремящиеся приблизиться к европейской культуре, не соблюдающие иудаистские традиции, выбравшие французский языком общения и стоящие на социальной лестнице выше местного мусульманского населения блягодаря постоянным контактам с колониальными элитами и колонистами.

Таким образом, колониальные власти используют в своих политических интересах религиозные меньшинства, представленные в Магрибе, что, несомненно существенно трансформирует их внутреннюю структуру и структуру магрибинского общества в целом.

Patimat O. Gousseinova (Russian State University for the Humanities, Moscow

Muslim Religious Elite and Russian State Authority
in Daghestan (the 19th –beginning of 20th centuries)

After Imam Shamil defeat in 1859 and pacification of Daghestan in 1860 the Daghestani *oblast* was formed with the administrative center in Temir Khan Shura. The main strategy of *oblast* administration was to keep the indigenous population in political subordinance. The *oblast* was divided into territories under military supervision (*okrug*, *na'ibstvo*). The Gouvernor was responsible for civil and military administrating. One of the tasks of such system of administration was to eliminate Muslim elite influence. The elite was under severe control of Russian officials that suspected them in anti-governmental activities hidden by Arabic language teaching. The officials tried to eliminate its prerogatives in the sphere of administration, loyal practice, education and to give them to upper class (*khan*s and *beks*). Daghestani leaders got salary for their service and were free from taxes. The Russian administration conducted only general supervision not interfering into domestic affaires. The loyal practice of aboriginal courtes was based on customary law norms (*'adat*). Only the cases of religious and family character were regulated by Muslim religiuos law (*shari'ah*). Muslim lawyers (*qadi*) were appointed by the Governor from those representatives of Muslim elite to whom the Russian officials trusted. The same situation was characteristic for the the educational sphere. Religious schools (*madrasah*) where the Arabic language and Islamic law were taught were regarded as a source of fanaticism and social disintegration. The administration efforts made to establish a network of secular educational institutions with the teaching process based on the Russian language. Some of them however could keep courses of basic Muslim disciplines.

Rahim Habibeh (St. John's University, New York, USA)
The Institution of the Spirit. The Theory and Context of Hierarchy and Power as Presented in the Mathnavi of Rumi

Sufism, the mystical path of Islam, has had an enduring socio-cultural, linguistic and philosophical impact on various Muslim societies. Over the centuries, as the devout searched for the Transcendent path, an important issue was the nexus between the religious community or spiritual institution and the political authority. What connection was the pious seeker of God to have with the larger society and with the structures of political power within the context of his allegiance to the spiritual authority? This question assumed great significance as various Sufi orders became increasingly powerful both as spiritual beacons for the faithful as well as repositories of wealth and socio-political influence. While some of this influence was direct, much of it

was indirect and was projected via the allegiance of disciples or *murid*s who had political power.

In time a supracommunal context of power arose within the hierarchy of the Sufi orders. The connection between the two bases of power, the political and the spiritual-communal was varied. Sometimes it was affable as was the case of several Mughal rulers, or was one of mutual antagonism as with the later days of the mystic al-Hallaj. Al-Hallaj was charged with heresy only after he became a political liability. Also in some cases, until recent history, influential mystical orders appeared as repositories of authority that vied with the state, as was the case in Turkey. Ataturk outlawed the Sufis in order to curtail their supracommunal power. In my paper, I shall present the views of the popular mystic Jalaluddin Rumi (d. 1273) with regards to the idiom and source of *actual* power. Rumi's ideas serve to define the popularity of the Sufi hierarchy of power. His notions of the *real* or spiritual power verses the *false* or political power provide a theoretical basis for understanding the popular notions of the "institution of the spirit" that remains valid and reverberates even today in some contemporary religious movements.

Enver Kisriev (Center for Civilization and Regional Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
Main Tendencies of Hierachization of Islam in Dagestan

The concept of power in Islam is extremely complicated and ambiguous while religious communities do not have any stable formal institutes of their general administration. The absence of institutes of vertical and horizontal clerical hierarchy explains the diversity of historical forms of functional arrangements in Muslim communities all over the world.

Presently Dagestan is the most islamized region in the Russian Federation. During the process of the transformation of the Soviet society Islam started to regain its influence upon the population and acquire important functions, including political and administrative ones. The growth of Islamic organizations' authority has brought about a rather strong tension between adherents of traditional Islam (*tariqatists*) and preachers of a doctrine for pure Islam (*Wahhabites*). General tendencies of political processes in Russia resulted in the crushing defeat of the main hotbed of *Wahhabites* and legal prohibition of their activities.

Recently the tendency of transformation of the Muslim Religious Board of Dagestan (DUMD), that until now remained as a relic of the Soviet imperial Muslim organization controlled by a group of Sufi brotherhoods members (*tariqatists*) in Dagestan, into a quasi- state structure has become

the main tendency of the situation developing in Dagestan. There are two counter-current ways leading to it: 1) The DUMD strives to become the only religious organization to guide the spiritual life of Muslims in Dagestan; 2) the political authorities strive to create a republican religious organization that could supervise all Islamic public worships and religious services in the Republic.

These concurrent strives contain a potential for conflicts. The point is that the DUMD leaders wish to become an independent political and ideological power while the republican authorities want have the DUMD as an obedient agency intended for ritual services that protects the society from extremist trends. These factors intensify tendencies leading to the islamization of the civil society and politization of the religious life in Dagestan.

Apart from it, Islam having its particular doctrinal peculiarities and historical tradition actively resists the tendency of its instituialization and hierachization. The growing influence of a small bureaucratic and ethnically restricted group of religious activists intensifies the tension between them and many other respected *Sheikhs* and *Alims* who have found themselves at the edge of these quasi-state structures with all their privileges and, therefore, provoke interest among Muslims to the radical Islamic trends.

Andrey V. Korotayev, Igor L. Alexeev (Center for Civilization and Regional Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
The Ruler Sacralization Dynamics
in the Islamic World (7th – 9th Centuries A.D.)

In early Islam prior to the death of the Prophet Muhammad the absolute level of ruler sacralization (acceptable within Islam) can be observed. After his death the ruler sacralization level automatically went down because the main source of Muhammad sacralization was his prophetic status whereas the Qur'an excludes explicitly any possibility of new prophets appearance after the Muhammad's death. However the first caliphs *al-khulafā' al-rashīdūn* had a certain priority in the interpretation of the Revelation.

Though the Omayyad caliphs attempted at the ruler sacralization (which was manifested e.g. in the adoption of the *khalīfat Allāh* title), this trend was counted by the successful anti-Omayyad movement. The Omayyad dinasty was overthrown in 750-751 and their successors (the 'Abbasids) had to restrict themselves to the use the *khalīfat rasūl Allāh* title. The ruler desacralization was supported by the *'ulamā'* movement which effectively striped the califs from the legislative power. Caliph Al-Ma'muns attempt in

the earlier 9ᵗʰ century to regain the rulers right to interpret basic religious dogmas was successfully counted by the 'ulamā'.

Though within the Shi'a we can observe an extremely high level of the the Shī'a leaders' (Imāms') sacralization, this came to its end with the "Great Disappearence" (*al-ghaybah al-kubrā*), as the Shī'a doctrine contains strong checks and balances preventing any post-ghaybah Shī'a leader from assuming the Imām's position.

Note that in the pre-Axial civilizations we observe a trend towards growing ruler sacralization with the development of political organization. In early Islamic history we seem to observe an opposite trend typical for mature Axial civilization: between A. D. 632 and A. D. 850 the political organization of he Islamic State experienced immense development, whereas the sacral status of the ruler experienced a comparably immense decline.

Uri M. Kupferschmidt (University of Haifa, Israel)
Imperialists and **Efendî**s:
Ernest Bevin's Inquiry into the "**Effendi** *Problem" (1947)*

In 1947, Ernest Bevin, the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, decided to conduct a survey among British diplomatic and consular representatives in the Middle East. The object was to device solutions to what he called the "*Effendi* Problem".

The Ottoman title *efendī* (a term of Greek origin) for a graduate of a secular government high school, who had subsequently adopted Western dress and habits, had assumed different meanings in the various countries of the region. Since the WWI, British policy makers in the Middle East had followed the emergence of the so-called new "class" of educated and "semi-educated" professionals with increasing anxiety. The term "class" too is, of course, debatable. What perturbed Bevin's mind in particular was that this politically articulate young generation, though educated on Western lines, turned against the British Empire instead of becoming a (hoped for) pillar of support.

Here also Daniel Lerner's parallel poll in six Middle Eastern countries, sponsored by the US Information Agency comes to mind (published in the form of his influential but controversial *The Passing of Traditional Society*). While Britain was looking for ways to stem the loss of support in the region, the United States, as a rising power in the region, were concerned to conquer public opinion.

In any case, Bevin failed to receive a coherent set of answers from British representatives in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq and Saudi-

Arabia. An analysis of the different memoranda in this paper proves that there existed much confusion about the term *efendī* itself, and all the more so about practical approaches to the solution of the "problem".

Indeed, to some extent it was a problem of their own making, which was an outcome of mistaken political choices (today seen as "Orientalist") made after the WWI (*e.g.* betting on "desert Arabs" and conservative leaders, as well as the *effendi*zation of the Arab nationalist movement). Maybe, this was also the inevitable sort of conceptualization by a dominant world power of its – genuine or potential – antagonists (*cf.* today's "Islamic fundamentalists").

Yana S. Melnikova (Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
The Islam Religious Specialists in Politics of Alawi Morocco in 19th - 20th centuries

Morocco (Arabs call it *al-maghrib al-aqsa* – "the Far West") combines in itself the traits of the past as well as the present. Among all the countries of Maghreb Morocco is remarkable for its most ethnic and cultural diversity, the most original combination of stable historical, political and religious traditions.

There were no distinct religious institutions in Morocco, like it was in the Ottoman empire. It can be explained by the fact that the Far Maghreb was not conquered by Turkey and never admitted even formal dependence from Istanbul, on the contrary remaining rather strong independent state Morocco tried not to let the foreign ideas pass in the country protecting not only political and national, but also religious originality.

At the end of XX century Islam became more than religion in the Far Maghreb. After the crisis of state authority and the failure of pan-arabic ideas Islamism became an ideology of the opposition to the western domination and the sole right of the authorities to construe the religion matters. But the well thought politics of the government is oriented for the peaceful coexistence with the Islamist groups and all the Islam branches in Morocco. Such tactics together with the historical traditions successfully prevent from the mass dissemination of the Islamist ideas. The researchers of the present-day political reality in Morocco hold the opinion that Islamism can become the menace for the central authorities on the assumption of the inner instability, so the main task for the government is the settlement of the economic questions and social problems.

The author of this work has set as an object to characterize the main Islam religious branches in Morocco and to analyze their interaction with the political institutions of the Far West during the last two centuries.

Valeria A. Mironova (Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)
Formation of Political Culture of the Ruling Elite in Sudan

Sudan is a presidential republic based on the forms of representative democracy and corresponding political institutions (parliament, political parties, organized opposition, pluralistic press etc.) which were introduced by British. Later politicians' trend to oppose the "sinful" West, thinking of the Sudanese society as of a specific one influenced the introduced by the colonialists system and brought to the formation of a powerful heard of the state, who carried out personal administration of all possible ways of life and got used to ruling with an "iron hand".

As one ruler in Sudan changed another in coup d'etat it is important not to lessen the role of the army in coming this or that political leader to power.

The greater part of the population of Sudan (96%) is Muslim, so the greatest desire of all Muslim politicians was to create a fair state on the basis of renovated Islam (for example the 80th were marked by the beginning of the process of Arabisation, and an attempt to introduce Sharia as the basis of the legislature).

Sudan is also a multi religious country so the introduction of Islamic values and moral principles wasn't welcomed by representatives of other ethnic groups. Nowadays the necessity to resolve the south Sudan problem and social-political instability brought to realization of political reforms and attempts to carry out such country ruling that will be considered by the world community as democratic.

Haideh Moghissi (York University, Toronto, Canada)
Woman, modernity, and social change in Islamic cultures: Iran as a case

Feminists have long argued that the outcome of modernity, associated with the set of ideas and worldviews known as modernity has been paradoxical for women. One of the main outcomes of modernity, the privatization of the family, led to the legitimation of patriarchal authority in the private sphere to the detriment of women. Thus modernity was emancipatory to men but oppressive to women. The positive impact on women of capitalism and modern industry,

rationalization of the market, separation of the domestic and private from the public and social, also was not accompanied by a challenge to patriarchy or male power.

In this paper, looking at the experiences of Iranian women in a historical context, I will argue that while capitalism, in itself, cannot secure gender equality and that improvements in women's legal and social status even in the West have been partial, conditional and formal, but the exploitative and discriminatory nature of bourgeois development can hardly convince us of the superiority of the 'good old days' and the advantages of pre-modern social formations for women. The paper would emphasize that it is a selective and highly-critical presentation of what modernity has entailed for women in the West, combined with a nostalgic and exceptionally romantic notion of experiences of women in the Islamic world that obscures the fact that while entry into the work force exposed women to exploitation, it broke down male power and control within the family and challenged overtly misogynist social and legal practices which denied to women full citizenship status. It may be that under the present circumstances, the majority of women in the Middle East, including Iran have not fully benefited from the forces of modernism, despite the fact that their lives have been touched by modernization processes, one way or another. But this is because modernization projects did not create the socioeconomic structures necessary for change in gender relations. In fact, the persistence of pre-capitalist, pre-industrial socio-cultural and political structures, including Islamic practices and legal traditions guarded by the Shi`i clergy, were not conducive to changing gender roles and to transforming relations of domination and subordination between the sexes. The modernizing state, as 'the big patriarch' co-opted women's quest for equity, generated and reinforced class division among women, and fragmented women's rights activists. However, the post-revolutionary events and Islamization policies of the Iranian state illuminate, one hand, the incomplete, deformed and debased character of the 'modernity' to which the *ancien regime* championed. On the other hand, the resistance of women against Islamization policies, demonstrates the impact of modernization forces on the lives of women and their persistent demand for change.

Pete W. Moore (University of Miami, Coral Gables, USA)
Business-State Coordination in the Arab World:
Organizational Requisites and a Logic of Hierarchy

Successful economic restructuring in the developing world requires intense coordination between state officials and business elites. State officials

require policy information and feedback that can only come from those most involved with the market. Business requires investment confidence that comes from involvement in the policy process and signals from state officials. The issue is how to bring about successful coordination without devolution into collusion and particularist, self-serving policies. This issue forms a core of the growing literature on economic governance; that is, how associations, organizations, and networks interact with the efficient functioning of a market. One of the most influential theories connecting an organizational logic with policy participation comes from the late economist Mancur Olson and his work on collective action. Olson posits that organizations more encompassingly created (i.e. with more inclusive memberships) should espouse broader policies in dealing with state officials. Organizations more narrowly constructed (i.e. with more exclusive memberships) should demonstrate greater skills of policy advocacy but their policy content is deemed more particularist and rent-seeking. The goal of this paper is to critically analyze Olson's hypothesis based on evidence from two cases of business-state interaction in the Arab World: Kuwait and Jordan. The analysis examines how business and state coordinated toward economic policy reform during times of fiscal and economic crisis.

In short, the outcomes in each case challenge Olson's logic. In Jordan, a more encompassing business association nevertheless espouses particularist policies that serve only a minority of its members. In Kuwait, a more exclusive business association not only crafts more catholic policy recommendations but succeeds in creating an alliance with state officials to formulate and implement economic reform. Clearly, something more than Olson's hypothesis is at play. My paper will explain how Olson's logic is altered by consideration of how associational hierarchy is determined, what shapes elite cohesion, and what political dynamics inform the nuts and bolts of policy debate.

The goal is to provide a better understanding of what drives business-state coordination aside from the lean organizational logics Olson laid out. It reorients our analysis to the importance of political context and how state-society relations, more generally, are historically constructed.

Vladimir V. Orlov (Institute for Asian and African Studies, Moscow State University, Russia)
***Hierarchy and political influence of ulama corps
in the centre of Ottoman Empire and Alawi Morocco
(mid-XVIIIth – early XIXth centuries)***

Comparison of traditional principles of organization and hierarchy, formed in the milieu of Ottoman and Moroccan Muslim theologians (*ulama*), allows to reveal difference both in their social status and level of participation in power structures.

In the 18th century the Ottoman system of "learned social group" (*ilmiye*) went through the culmination point of its development, and all the stages of *alim*'s career – recruitment, education, assignment to and retirement from various positions, conferment of ranks and titles of honor etc. – were under state control. Therefore the involvement of Ottoman *ulama* into functioning of state machinery was almost universal and strictly regulated; religious education in circumstances of Ottoman center gradually lost its independence. Owing to this ulama turned to become a kind of "Islamic functionaries" and were able to unite in a political pressure group. Having created, according to relevant definition of H.A.R.Gibb and H.Bowen, "a check-and-balance system" between Sultan's court and metropolitan bureaucracy, leaders of the *ulama* acted in the political structure of Ottoman capital as a real "center of power".

The *ulama* of Morocco unlike their colleagues of Asia Minor did not dispose of neither clear internal organization nor tradition of regular intervention in state affairs. Acting as a corporate community only in case of working out and signing of the population's allegiance act to the new Sultan (*bay'a*), they enjoyed a considerably greater extent of autonomy from the Sherifian government (*makhzen*). The polycentric nature of scholarly tradition, caused by centuries-old division of the western part of Maghrib into territories subjudated to Sultan's power and revolting against it put considerable obstacles in the way of unifying the recruitment and education of *ulama* under state control. Besides that, low level of stratification of Moroccan society favored rather social mobility of individual theologians than rise of the coherent group of *ulama* united by common interests. Spiritual and political features of Morocco in the 18th and 19th centuries – low level of power centralization, prevalence of unformal relations in political process, lack of universally recognized criteria of affiliation to the *ulama* corps, – prevented local scholars from elaboration of bases of corporate self-perception. In historical and cultural reality of the Maghribi region *ulama* did not turn themselves into an independent political group. Neither their economic autonomy nor close links with upper strata of urban society did not allow them to exert collective influence over ruling Sherifian elite and rudimentary bureaucracy of the Moroccan state.

Yehudit Ronen (Bar-Ilan University, Israel)
Hierarchy and Power in Sudan's Socio-Political Culture

Encompassing more than 2,5 million square kilometers, Sudan is the largest country in Africa and the Middle East. Located at the crossroads of these two regions, it is a microcosm of civilizations from the Arab Muslim world, and Christian and animist sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, Sudan is a veritable kaleidoscope of culture, language, race, religion, political practices, societal patterns and other basic factors.

The combination between the particularly heterogeneous community, and the huge distance between the political center and the periphery, has created interesting, albeit often problematic, socio-political processes and complicated interrelations within the country. This, in turn, has largely affected not only internal affairs, such as the prolonged civil war, but has also shaped, to a large effect, Sudan's regional and international relations.

The proposed paper seeks to explore the patterns of human history in Sudan and its wider socio-cultural vicinity. The paper intends to examine the subject in the widest possible sense, using various theoretical models, as well as combining the disciplines of history and political science – the two areas of my professional expertise.

Boris D. Semashkin, Natalia Massalova, Irina S. Bogodukhova (Transbaikalian State Pedagogical University, Russia)
Islamic Family: Upbringing of Warriors:
Analysis of Main Research Methods

September's events in the USA stimulated new detailed studies of the familiar, as it seemed, Muslim world.

One of the factors of Muslims' aggressive behavior reproduction is their system of education and upbringing.

The Qur'an and Islamic theological literature pay much attention to regulation of the family relations.

Birth of the son is a big, solemn holiday.

There is a special rite known as circumcision, symbolizing one's joining into the Muslim community.

Because of absence in many towns kindergartens the educational function belongs to mothers, which is one of the main channels of reproduction of the religious consciousness in young generation.

Modern educational conception:
- wide and successful invocation of Islamic traditions ;

- the purpose of the basic education is the help children in getting necessary moral power and religious conviction in spirit of Islam;
- the main factor of the education is the family which provides a child with principal cultural values;
- attempts to strengthen the Islamic family as the main factor of preservation of monopoly of spiritual leaders in education.

Negative moments of the educational system are:

The Qur'an is the main source of the Muslim religion and its maintenance is very contradictory; because of it the sacred book of Islam has become the platform for different political and social actions, which are directly relevant for education.

Educational conception officially adopted in Islamic countries becomes a beautiful facade which hides pragmatism, political calculations, military moods.

Numerous trends and sects inside Islam interpret the Qu'ran's dogmas as they want, according to their own views on world's modern situation.

For example, one of the main ideas as *jihad* meaning the fight with own drawbacks becomes the equivalent of physical violence.

So, the educational system which grounds on permanent suggestion of Islamic dogmas from the early childhood is religious fanatics' or fundamentalists' dangerous weapon.

Vitaly I. Sheremet (Institute of Oriental Studies, Moscow, Russia)
European Turkey as inter-civilizational contact zone of the Ottoman period. 14th—20th centuries

The usage of civilizational viewpoint within the study of specific aspects of foundation and development of the Ottoman imperial phenomenon in South-East Europe in the 14th—20th centuries is based on the need of the most correct study of the region. For more than five hundred years different spiritual and cultural trends coexisted in this area. Their interaction was one of the main reasons for centuries-old functioning of the Ottoman imperial institutions. Some residual manifestations of this factor can be seen in the contemporary ethno-political processes in the Balkans.

Civilization is a stable, developing community of people that has reached a certain level of material and spiritual development (which allows to structure their conceptions of Space and Time) and has mastered modes of receiving, storing and transmitting information. Every type of civilization has its own socio-cultural pivot around which civilization coils are woven. The paper is dedicated to the socio-cultural pivot of European Turkey.

The conventional character of the geographical and ethno-political term "European Turkey" (meaning mainly the Balkans) is described in this paper. The author shows the region as a contact zone of interaction mainly of two socio-cultural types: the Eastern Christian version of Transatlantic civilization and the Ottoman-Turkish version of Islamic civilization.

Further on the author explains (using both Ottoman and European materials) the socio-economic difference and development variation of the characteristics of the Balkan contact zone within the Ottoman political system. He also shows the after-effects of this disbalance for the different elements of the Ottoman imperial system.

The factors of the high vitality of the Balkan contact zone (European Turkey) are described in the paper. The author also shows the role of the "exchange – fight" process in the national resurrection of some of its participants and in the Westernization of the others (non-Turkish peoples subjugated by the Ottoman imperial center, on the one hand, and the Ottoman Turks, on the other).

The conclusion is that European Turkey played a meaningful and highly important role in the relatively steady inter-civilization exchange processes of the Ottoman period.

Maxim V. Shkurko (Russian State University for the Humanities, Moscow)
Power and Religion in Libyan Jamahiriya

Coming into the power in 1969, revolutionaries, headed by Muammar al-Qaddafi, began to create a new political state structure, according to the principles of socialism. Considering the fact that religion in Libya historically played a key role in the life of society, these ideas inevitably experienced its influence.

Consequently, in the *Green Book*, where the Third World Theory is described, religion and tradition are considered to be sources of the true law, whereas direct democracy is regarded as the best form of government. These notions laid the foundation for the concept of *Jamahiriyyah*. In accordance with this concept legal functions are exercised by the Basic People Congresses (*al-mu'tamarat al-sha'biyyah al-asasiyyah*) through which people rule without any intermediaries. The system of these congresses is headed by the General People Congress. The role of executive organs is taken by People Committees, which are elected by the Basic People Congresses. People Congresses are headed by the highest specialized people's committees (*al-lijan al-sha'biyyah al-far'iyyah*). Judicial system is based on

the laws of *shari'ah*. Islam is considered to be a state religion and the Quran supposed to be the main law.

Thus, the concept of Jamahiriya was based on the principles of Islam and was aimed at providing people with an opportunity to exercise power by themselves. On the other hand, al-Qaddafi tried to use religion to strengthen his own power in the state:

1) in accordance with the religious tradition, he formed the concept of separation of revolution from power. It released him from responsibility for the any defects within the internal development of the country, and gave him unlimited power in Lybia.

2) he made revolutionary committees (which are not mentioned in the *Green Book*) the base of his power. People who join them had to swear on the Quran personally to al-Qaddafi. This fact became a symbol of al-Qaddafi's exceptionality both as a political and as a religious leader.

3) in order to raise his religious authority he positioned himself as a "head interpreter" of Qur'an. Due to this, al-Qaddafi managed to concentrate in his hands both political and religious power.

Nowadays Libya is theoretically under the power of *Jamahiriyyah*, which was proclaimed by al-Qaddafi, and people exercise direct power. In fact, there was created a totalitarian system headed by al-Qaddafi and "revolutionary committees", which is in contradiction with the *Third World Theory*. The first structure was created under the influence of Islam, the second - with the help of adopting religion to the leader's interests. Therefore, we can come to the conclusion that the role of religious factor in forming the political system of Libyan Jamahiriya is very contradictory.

N.K. Smagulov (Karaganda State University, Kazakhstan)
Identification of Jihad: its Social and Political Conditionality

To understand contemporary political processes related to such world-scale religion as Islam, to predict the actions of its believers on the political scene is simply impossible without studying historical development of the specified religion.

For fourteen centuries of its existence, Islam has been functioning as the only ideological system defining various aspects of the believers' lives, and as a result, the close correlation between the secular and the spiritual, the political and the religious. Islam is quite a complex and controversial phenomenon; the preaching of "mercy and tolerance" is often accompanied by the Muslims' violent methods of political struggle. The reason, probably,

could be the proclamation of *jihad* doctrine by Islamic followers. Jihad appears to be idée fixe for *ummah*.

Jihad is a quintessential part of Islam; it is actually considered to be the "sixth pillar" of this religion. However, it is *jihad*, which represents polymorphous conception in Islam.

"Holy war" as the object of permanent studying will apparently continue to be an ambivalent phenomenon. As a conception for struggle, *jihad* has been put forward by various political forces in the Islamic regions on many occasions. Jihad was used to mobilize Muslims to achieve certain aims and to justify certain actions creating dissonance in the religion itself.

During its existence, *jihad* set the mood for Islam in social and political development aspects representing the Islam ideology in its following forms:

- The ideology of "submissiveness" – the substitution of the pagan cults of the Arabian tribes with a monotheistic religion; consolidation of Arabian tribes into a nation; the establishment of the Arab Caliphate.
- The ideology of "conquest" – the militant expansion of Islam beyond *Ummah*; the diffusion of political influence.
- The ideology of "resistance" to the colonization policy, paternalism and westernization of Muslims in the age of the World Pacification imposed by the imperialist powers.
- "Outcast" ideology – social basis for supplying terrorist organizations with their supporters.
- "Opposition" ideology – in case of collision between certain religions.

A profound study of *jihad* could let one observe this multi-faceted phenomenon at a different angle.

Oksana A. Solovieva (Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography, Russian Academy of Sciences, St. PetersburgRussia)
The Emirate of Bukhara in the 19ᵗʰ – early 20ᵗʰ Centuries: Government Structure and Authority of Administrative Posts

After the break-up of the USSR, the Central Asian republics became independent states. To understand contemporary political and economic processes in these states it is necessary to be aware of the traditional political culture in Central Asia. Studying traditional authority permits one to become better aware of the foundations of the Soviet and post-Soviet era policy. Tradition has to a certain extent influenced the development of the statehood in these countries. In this connection this paper treats the following problems.

Each historical period of Central Asia contributed to the formation of its political culture. Undoubtedly, the adoption of Islam is reflected in the

political culture. In the 19th and 20th centuries (in the pre-Soviet period) there were three levels of government hierarchy: (a) central authorities, (b) regional authorities, and (c) local government. Traditions of settlers and nomads co-existed in the government structure.

The authority of administrative posts played an important role in the Emirate of Bukhara's policy. It was a part of administrative power. The coefficient of authority of administrative posts is used to describe three levels of governmental hierarchy. It is obvious that the reputation of the official, both personal and professional, determined his authority. A special attention is paid to an analysis of the changes of the reputation of officials.

А.Л.-А. Султыгов, Г.А. Хизриева (Российский государственный гуманитарный университет, Москва)
Ahmed L.-A. Sultigov, Galina A. Khizrieva (Russian State University for the Humanities, Moscow)

Социальная структура мюридских обществ вирда Кунта-Хаджи
Social Structure of **Murid** Communities of **Qunta-Hajji** Wird

Известно, что общины мюридов, как и любые мужские сообщества, имеют достаточно жесткую иерархию и отчетливую социальную структуру. Одним из наиболее распространенных и старейших вирдов на территории Чеченской и Ингушской республик является вирд Кунта-Хаджи.

Главной проблемой изучения социальной структуры вирда является отсутствие письменных свидетельств, проливающих свет на динамику и специфику развития этого вида сообществ. Основным источником изучения социальной иерархии в них является "устное предание", зафиксированное в "правдивых" рассказах носителей данной традиции народного суфизма.

В данном исследовании нам удалось охватить период с начала XIX в. по начало XXI в.

В это время начали складываться первые суфийские братства (*кадириййа, накибандиййа, шазалиййа, батал*). Это процесс совпадал с политической консолидацией горцев, вторжением русских войск на Северный Кавказ и колониальной политикой России, появлением и возвышением на политической арене Северного Кавказа первого строителя горской государственности имама Шамиля в Дагестане. Период смут и попыток иноземцев взять под политическую опеку горские народы оказали весьма существенное влияние на образование и укрепление суфийских братств. Народный суфизм стал идеологией

низов. В то время как большинство *тарикатов* стали частью социальной структуры нарождающейся горской консолидированной государственности, *вирд* Кунта-хаджи шел против этого общего и однонаправленного движения, составляя ему альтернативу политического и духовного развития, а с поражением Шамиля укрепил свои позиции на териитории Чечни и Ингушетии.

В докладе рассматриваются основные понятия социальной структуры общин Кунта-Хаджи: *шейх, устаз, тамад, турк, мюршид, мюрид, тоаб, вирд* и др.

Г.Т. Телебаев (Министерство культуры, информации и общественного согласия Республики Казахстан, Акмола)
Gaziz Telebayev (Ministry of Culture, Information and Public Consent of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Akmola)

Концепция власти Юсуфа Баласагуни
The Concept of power of Yusuf Balasaguni

Значение концепции Баласагуни заключается в том, что он соединил в ней элементы исламского и тюркского стилей правления, моделей властной иерархии, имеющих основание в различиях мусульманского (оседлого) и кочевнического типов политической идеологии. Анализ этой концепции позволяет более предметно изучать специфику властных отношений, политическую иерархию в современных постсоветских государствах Центральной Азии, в которых контроверзы "исламизма – степной демократии – советской системы – западной демократии" составляют сегодня основное поле организации власти и государственного управления.

Юсуф Баласагуни жил в конце X – начале XI века в государстве Караханидов, основу которого составляло тюркское племя карлуков, а государственной религией был ислам. Свой основной философский и политический трактат *Кутадгу билиг* ("Благодатное знание") он написал на карлукском (чагатайском) языке уйгурским и арабским алфавитом. Работа была закончена при дворе правителя государства Караханидов Табгач-Богра-хана, в Кашгаре, примерно в 1015 году.

В многогранном труде Баласагуни политическая тематика занимает значительное место, причем можно выделить два уровня ее представленности: концептуальный и практический. Концептуальная схема аллегорически представлена автором в виде четырех персонажей поэмы: Кюнтогды, Айтолды, Огдулмиш, Огдурмыш.

Первый из них – Кюнтогды – является главным и олицетворяет Солнце, Власть, Справедливость, Бесстрашие, Волю, Доблесть, Закон. Для Баласагуни все эти качества воплощены в правителе (Элике). Подобный подход есть выражение позиции государственника, сторонника единоличной и сильной власти. Вместе с тем, особое внимание уделяет Баласагуни такому принципу, как справеливость власти: "для достойного управления государством нужен справедливый закон, позволяющий "разделить вдоль волос".

Второй принцип – Правдивость, Знание, Речь. Во властной иерархии ему соответствует должность Визиря, Советника, которая была при дворах как мусульманских, так и тюркских правителей. Сам Юсуф Баласагуни имел почетное прозвище Хас-Хаджиба (Мудрого Советника) за свою деятельность при дворе Табгач-Богра-хана. Только мудрое правление может принести народу Богатство, Благоденствие, Счастье, которые также означают Айтолды.

Третий принцип олицетворяет Огдулмиш – Ученость, Мудрость, Ум. Здесь Баласагуни имел в виду ученых, значение в целом знаний, в том числе технических, для существования и развития государства.

Наконец, Огдурмыш – Непритязательность, Отрешенность, Удовлетворенность – передается им термином *канагат*, вбирающем в себя эти смыслы. В политической иерархии – это отшельники, религиозные деятели, пастыри. Их значение в жизни государства Баласагуни видел, прежде всего, в нравственном воспитании народа.

Практический аспект политических идей Баласагуни заключается в том, что в его книге собрано немало советов, полезных в деле государственного управления. Например: "Когда над собаками лев – голова, Любая собака похожа на льва", "Есть право владыки: он – людям глава, Но есть и у подданных долг и права", "Счастье правителя – сделать народ счастливым". Итак, иерархию власти у Баласагуни составляют Правитель – Советник – Ученые – Религиозные деятели.

Yosef Tobi (Haifa University, Israel)
The Leadership of the Jewish Community
under Muslim Rule in the Middle Ages

As early as the time of Greek rule in the Land of Israel in the 2nd century BCE Jewish leadership was composed of two elements: (a) the *nasi* (president) and (b) the *av beth din* (the president of the Jewish court). It was then that the Jewish community leadership assumed its characteristic form for many generations. This dual model was adapted under the Muslim Abbasid

Caliphate from the middle of the 8th century CE. In fact, this was simply a continuation of the situation under the Sassanid dynasty in Persia. There the Jewish *Resh Galuta*, a scion of the Davidic royal family who headed the Jewish community, was acknowledged by the government as the leader of the Jews; the *ga'on* (a prominent scholar) headed the Jewish academies (*yeshivas*), being appointed independently within the Jewish community. Although political power was in the hands of the *Resh Galuta* (or the *nagid*, as the Jewish temporal leader was called in Muslim countries apart from the Abbasid Caliphate), the real Jewish leader, whose fame and impact became inscribed in Jewish memory, was the religious leader, the head of the internal rabbinical hierarchy.

At root, these two factors of the Jewish leadership were mutually antagonistic. This was because the temporal leader derived his power from the external – in terms of the Jewish community – oppressive Muslim government. His chief function was to collect the protection tax (*jizyah*) from the Jewish community and to serve as the vehicle by which the Muslim ruler imposed his orders on it. By contrast, the rabbi, the religious leader, was wholly independent of the Muslim suzerain, and his primary duty was to attend to the welfare of his community, spiritually as materially. Actually, the position of the temporal leader was somewhat unrewarding, and even dangerous as it was virtually impossible to satisfy the Muslim government and the Jewish community at the same time.

The paper examines the precarious condition of the Jewish *negidim* in medieval Muslim countries and attempts to demonstrate the difficult circumstances in which they were obliged to operate. This should likewise provide a reasoned explanation for the quite common phenomenon in medieval times of Jewish negidim converting to Islam, or being executed by beheading.

Barbara Waldis (Université de Neuchâtel, Suisse)
On the Problem of Power in the Handling of Differences

The question of power structures of interlocked social systems can be seen as a problem of power in a multicultural society. What is at stake then is how members with culturally different group affiliations, based on contradictory principles of action, handle conflicts. In what ways do these different logics of action restrict the rights of the other groups involved in a conflict? Which are the criteria for a mutually valid agreement beyond the limits of the groups or even the construction of a supra-structure? Does one have to accept that there is always a monocultural logic of action at the top

level of a multicultural society or dare one imagine a perception of a multicultural society with a peacefully negotiated multicultural space? In other words: what role does power play in the handling of differences? This problem can be illustrated with examples of binational, christian-muslim marriages or, to be more precise with Swiss-Tunisian divorces. These divorces are settled by international private law. In the cases of binational marriages everybody emphasises the linking elements of cross-cultural love. However, some of the binational - actually just as private - divorces become real national state affairs in which all the differences instead of the commonalities are emphasised. Thus, in these discussions one can perceive the different principles of action, which on the one side are effective in a christian european, so called laicistic national culture as Switzerland, and on the other side determine a rather religious orientated muslim national society as Tunisia. The analysis of these different principles of action reveals some problems relevant to the creation of a supra-national, supra-religious structures.

Ilia V. Zaitsev (Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)

Desht-i Kipchak padishah *in the Ottoman Turkish titulature: ideological demonstration and the real meaning in the Ottoman power concept*

The only legal bearer of *Desht-i Kipchak padishah* title was the Crimean Khan. Thus this title was used by Gazi Giray II in form of *Desht-i Kipchaknin Ulugh Padishahi* and *Desht-i Kipchak Khani* in 1592. But in several letters of sultan Suleiman to the Polish king Sigizmund (1527, 1529, 1536) the Ottomans used it also. Actually the Ottomans had not any legal rights for that, because they possessed only narrow maritime belt of the Crimean peninsula, and their jurisdiction was not distributed outside its boundaries.

In this case from the Ottoman point of view the using of this title in correspondence with the Polish king reflected the subordinate position of the Crimean Khan (neighbour of Poland, permanent source of danger for its southern boundaries) in relation to the sultan: his title was adopted in a title of his sovereign.

PANEL XV
Locality, Hierarchy and Power in Southeast Asia
Convenor: *Gerald Sullivan* (George Washington University, Washington DC, USA)

> Indeed it is easy to see that, among the differences that distinguish men, several are taken to be natural although they are exclusively the result of habit and of the different kinds of life men adopt in Society.
>
> (Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Discourse on the Origins of Inequality among Men*. Part 1, § 48)

Arjun Appadurai's notion of the ongoing reproduction of locality has particular salience for Southeast Asia. Scholarly theories of indigenous Southeast Asian states (e.g. those of Heine-Geldern, Geertz, Tambiah and Adas) and western histories of the region (e.g. that of Reid) have often emphasized exemplary centers, divided by forest but joined by water, competing with one another for prestige (social and metaphysical), labor and trade. These states elaborated systems of hierarchy and power, center and periphery, with both important local roots and substantial connections in the world system long before the advent of European conquest and colonialism in the region.

Some Southeast Asian peoples were only tangentially related to these indigenous states; these same states were often small or weak, not necessarily able to expand their control over population and dependant upon systems of patron/client relations to maintain what control they could muster. Crucial to the ongoing reproduction of both these states and the so-called "house societies" which also occupied the region, locality concerns not just the organization of particularly spaces but also those understandings of history or time, the movements of people, spirits and goods, which generate again and again relations between localities.

Anderson's discussion of the concept of power in Java, and in a variety of ways recent events in Indonesia, suggest that the theories and organization of political and social life in Southeast Asia retain important connections to pre-colonial theories and organization. This does not imply in any fashion that current Southeast Asian political and social theory or organization are somehow unambiguously or unproblematically reproductions of earlier theories and organizations. Indeed if Mus's idea of a more or less unified so-called pre-colonial monsoon Asia holds any merit, then one of the most striking features of current Southeast Asia is its apparent lack of unity. The region today is divided into states with various colonial histories as well as

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being religiously and ethnically disparate, even as it appears to be regaining some of its pre-colonial centrality to the wider world system because of its arrangement around strategically and economically important waterways.

This panel will take up the consequences of the ongoing reproduction of locality and its relation to hierarchy and power both locally and in the wider world in Southeast Asia. While full coverage of such a various region is not possible, the papers will address circumstances in a number of different areas within the region and local societies with differing sorts of integration into the current world system as well as various degrees of articulate hierarchies.

Haejeong Hazel Hahn (Seattle University, USA)
"Vichy Urban Planning in Hanoi and Local Reaction, 1942-1943: Resisting Colonial Narratives of Civilizational Evolution"

This paper focuses on the power structure of Hanoi in the early 1940s, specifically the dynamic between the French colonial administration and the community of indigenous people of Hanoi, the capital of French Indochina. Narratives of civilizational evolution formed a significant part of French imperialist discourse. Supposedly empirical findings of social scientists contributed in the shaping of colonial policies. In actuality the colonial administration did not exercize monolithic power, and French social scientists also produced some very pessimistic views of civilizational evolution as results of imperialism.

The bulk of the paper focuses on a little-known aspect of the French Vichy regime in Indochina, a major urban planning project developed between 1942 and 1943, an extremely ambitious plan for developing Hanoi for the next century. When the government announced a new authoritarian set of regulations for existing buildings and future construction, a turmoil ensued. This case points to the avenues through which Hanoians expressed their opinions and resisted colonial power, in ways similar to the methods explored by Brenda Yeoh in Contesting Space: Power Relations and the Urban Built Environment in Colonial Singapore (1996). The case also establishes colonial urban planning as an important part of Vichy ideology that sought imperial and urban grandeur. The plan represented a Vichy version of an ideal city, with European and Asian quarters neatly segregated, and all buildings strictly regulated in size.

The paper places this case in the context of the development of a national community, which Benedict Anderson described as "imagined community," a public sphere that gave rise to a hierarchy simultaneously alternative and juxtaposed to the colonial hierarchy. It also tests an alternative

model of the development of a community, that of a supranational--Indochinese-- community investigated by Christopher Goscha in Vietnam or Indochina: Contesting Concepts of Space in Vietnamese Nationalism, 1887-1954 (1995).

Brigitta Hauser-Schäublin (University of Göttingen, Germany)
The Relationship Between Irrigation and the State in Bali (Indonesia).
Theories on the Pre-Colonial State Reconsidered
and an Alternative Perspective

The anthropological discussion about the pre-colonial Balinese state and its relation to the control of manpower, labour and the irrigation system has concluded so far that the organisation of wet rice agriculture laid almost exclusively in the hands of the farmers and the priests of the democratically controlled water temple system (Lansing 1987, 1991, Lansing and Kremer1993, Scarborough et al. 2000). This theory took as a starting point Geertz' famous analysis of 19th century Balinese "theatre state" in which "power served pomp and not pomp power" because "the kings were the impresarios, the priests the directors and the peasants the supporting cast, stage crew and audience" (Geertz 1980:13).

In my paper I am going to argue that the analysis of such a "weak state" rests on a series of premises and fateful interpretations that were developed as an antithesis to the "Asiatic mode of production". The notions of "the state", "kingdoms" and "kings" used in these theories bore the assumptions that kingship implies political authority, functionaries, a clear-cut and homogenous territory with subdued and dependent peasants living on it; all these features seemed to be missing in Bali's "theatre state" Moreover, the Western construction of separate categories of politics and religion blurred the vision of a different form of rulership. It was a rulership, as I will show, that was based on the ritual control of water – irrigation as well as holy water. In fact, the most important "water temples" were linked in intricate ways to royal power.

In my contribution I shall outline – based on Anderson's concept of the state as imagined community and Appadurai's concept of locality – an alternative perspective of the nature of the pre-colonial Balinese state. I will show that the regular, cyclical mobilization and organization of migrations brought hundreds and thousands of people from a large number of neighborhoods from different areas to specified sites – temples, ordered in a hierarchical-segmentary manner These temples became localities where the pilgrims, although coming from different neighborhoods each with its own

adat ("customary law"), produced and experienced the feeling of belonging by participating in the same ritual, by spending days and nights together in an atmosphere of social immediacy and spiritual revelation. It was the feeling of belonging that was essential also for the imagined community of the pre-colonial Balinese state. It was in these rituals that kingship and the representation of royal power were displayed. Therefore, networks of temples, pilgrimages and locality, rather than (mere) "political" kingship, bureaucrats and a bounded territory constituted the organisational principles of the pre-colonial state.

Anna Horolets (Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Science, Warsaw)
Global and Local Dimensions of Political Rhetoric: Aung San Suu Kyi

The key terms of political discourse acquire different meanings when moved from one culture to another. In the globalizing world politicians are increasingly compelled to balance between the expectations of the local and international audiences. The figure of Aung San Suu Kyi shows the chances and limitations of such balance.

On the one hand, she is an internationally recognized fighter for democracy and human rights in South-East Asia. In her speeches she shows gratitude to the people "outside Burma" for their concern with establishing democracy in Burma. She often finds support and admiration among the Western public. Simultaneously, the image created in the Western mass media sometimes makes her a martyr hero and removes her from the sphere of real politics.

On the other hand, she belongs to Burmese political elite "by birth": her father is a praised national independence hero. The image of Aung San Suu Kyi, a delicate woman dressed in lungy and a practicing Buddhist, is congruent with Burmese national identity. The population might consider her a mystical leader because she is still alive despite numerous attempts at her assassination. However, her Western education and marriage to a foreigner put the sincerity of her intentions under the question mark for many Burmese. At least, the official propaganda regularly recurs to this Achilles' tendon calling her an agent of colonizers.

The rhetoric of her speeches is aimed at creating images and symbols that would act both for the Burmese people and for the international community. Democracy and freedom are the key concepts of her speeches. Aung San Suu Kyi advocates these values with the help of the traditional notions of Burmese society. Representative democracy, for instance, and

control over the government are replaced by the trust in good government. Typically western maxims acquire Buddhist meanings (*nothing ventured nothing gained*). Pragmatic discourse is replaced by normative. She often refers to the authority of her father. She sees politics as duty and destiny and explains her political career by being "born into particular circumstance". Still, as a politician Aung San Suu Kyi finds more followers in the West than in her own country where she is practically unavailable a public figure.

James F.Ongkili (Universiti Kebangsaan, Malaysia)
The Struggle for Power and Independence in Sabah Malaysia: Its Impact on Socio-Political Development in Kadazan Society

This paper looks at the development of politics in the East Malaysian state of Sabah and its influence on Kadazan society between 1963 and 1974. The multi-tribal Kadazan people, the state's largest ethnic group, first mobilized as a political force in the early 1960s when the proposal to form Malaysia was put forward. After agreeing to help establish Malaysia in 1963, the Kadazan elite had to deal with several issues which threatened the state's security and sovereignty. The study looks at Indonesian and Philippine opposition to Sabah's new found status within Malaysia. The Philippines and Indonesia's anti-Malaysia stand on Sabah continued up to 1966. Only after the external threats had subsided, were Sabah's leaders able to concentrate on the task of governing the state. Party politics, a process which had only begun in 1961 became more accelerated as the Kadazan elite evolved a culture of politics that was to become uniquely Sabahan in style and make-up. Although Sabah's leaders took their cue from political parties in the Malay peninsula, the tradition and development of Sabah politics differed pragmatically from the Malayan process. The paper will discuss the impact of direct elections, relations with the Federal Government and the struggle for power between the Kadazan, the Chinese and Malay groups in Sabah. A significant episode in Sabah's political history is the era of Tun Datu Mustapha, once the state's foremost Muslim political leader. His autocratic rule and its implication on the political process, in particular the suppression of Kadazan-based opposition towards the state government is discussed. In short, the aim of such a study is to provide an accurate historical evaluation of the growth of post-independence politics by relating it to how Kadazans were out-manoeuvered in the struggle to rule Sabah. These accounts, it is hoped will give one an understanding of the potential turmoil and instability often faced by ruling parties in Sabah. The Kadazan elite itself is politically divided and

tries hard to implement nation-building policies emanating from Kuala Lumpur without ignoring the calls for greater state autonomy.

Arlette Ottino (Université de La Rochelle, France)
Enjeux politiques et pratiques rituelles – aspects hiérarchiques des minorités balinaises

La société balinaise peut être divisée en deux grandes factions: d'une part le système de castes (*Triwangsa*), dominé par la suprématie rituelle des prêtres brahmaniques, et d'autre part les groupes dits "roturiers", qui forment la majorité de la population, parmi lesquels se situent plusieurs communautés minoritaires dont le trait commun est le refus de cette suprématie. Tenues pour représenter l'idéal démocratique et égalitaire du village indonésien, dans le discours colonial et anthropologique classique; on a longtemps opposé ces minorités à la hiérarchie intrinsèque à la société de caste. En m'appuyant sur plusieurs exemples, je montrerai que cette approche est erronée, qu'en anthropologie elle reflète le discours idéologique du gouvernement indonésien dans les années '60, et qu'en fait les groupes minoritaires balinais exhibent les mêmes caractéristiques que les groupes appartenant au système de castes (pureté rituelle, prohibition de l'hypogamie, etc..), sauf une. Ils demeurent loyaux envers les dynasties royales anciennes avec lesquelles ils associent leur origine et leur présence sur le territoire, où ils occupent souvent une fonction de gardiens des forces naturelles de l'environnement. Cette loyauté se manifeste au niveau des rituels villageois et agraires, lesquels font intervenir directement le pouvoir divin des rois pour assurer la prospérité de la communauté et la fertilité des champs, par la médiation de prêtres locaux, issus de familles souches du groupe. Dans ce contexte, les prêtres brahmaniques représentent un système politique récent dont la légitimité n'est pas reconnue.

Devanayk Sundaram (University of Madras, Chennai, India)
Culture of Hierarchy & Power - Local Socio-Historical Perspectives - Indian Case Study

In all discourses on inequality, there is an uncritical assumption on (a) dynamic nature of hierarchy, power and thereby (b) on the socio-economic and cultural co-ordinates of hierarchy in local historical situations.

With this background, an analytical study of Indian social structure and institutions within a specific time and space has considered the significance

of the cultural tradition on which Indian society was based. The methodological understanding of this process was through description of the issues. The traditional methodological approaches appear to be an excessively reductionist one in terms of style and process rather than that of the context and content of the process. This descriptive focus is a modest one to study the culture and society in India marked by a form of social structure which has a selective incorporation of cultural elements constructing a general civilisation process within a specific historical event. Indian society through the historical dynasties is an abundant source to state that hierarchy is not a static concept. It is as dynamic as the culture of tradition in Indian society. The social structure and institutions were in fact subordinating the cultural tradition of hierarchy in Indian system to such an extent that subsumption of power into status took place more by an act of individuals, and not through the textual prescription of the social order. Thereby, the form and shape of hierarchy got transformed over the cultural bases.

Thus, the understanding of the issue of inequality through the culture of hierarchy is of how the hierarchy as a component of inequality is a locally variant one with the potentials of continuity and change. The knowledge and scholarship on such local variant of the hierarchy within a historical and cultural context will be an added input into the inequality dimensions of the development paradigm. The current inequality eradication programmes of development paradigm are of income generation and of delinking the occupation from the traditional characteristics with a symbolisation towards material advancement. The cultural connections of hierarchy particularly of the culture at the local dimensions of inequality is given due significance as is in the case of Backward classes and weaker sections development and welfare in Indian society. The issue of Culture and power over the issues of inequality has to be analytically taken up not necessarily within the model of culture and modernisation theory, nor even within the pronounced economic determinist model of Marxian followed by an engagement of this by a host of scholars like Sahlins, Frank, Wolf, Laclaw and Wallerstein, Banaji and Hindess. Rather, it is on the other side i.e. beyond the determination model. The issue is not in contesting, rebutting, challenging or negotiating the issue of culture as is practised by social action groups. It is within the framework of continuity and change of the form and shape of culture connections over several social dimensions of society, which include inequality, hierarchy and social stratification.

PANEL XVI
The Rise and Fall of State-Systems in Precolonial:
The Struggle for Power

Convenor: *Godfrey N. Uzoigwe* (Mississippi State University, Mississippi State, USA)

Africa south of the Sahara was an area of great historical activity from the 1st millennium AD to the European conquest. That activity resulted in the formation of centralized and semi-centralized state systems of varying degrees of power among political scale. Inevitably, these states struggled for power among themselves. We hope to (a) make a contribution to the nature and character of state-building in pre-Europian Africa; (b) demonstrate the strengths weaknesses of oral traditions in historical reconstraction; (c) provide a comparison of the nature of hierarchy and power in pre-colonial African kingdom states; (d) call attention to the urgent need of more archaeological excavations; and (e) demonstrate the dangers of bestowing credibility to written sources by authors who, unaware that they were being used as pawns, were quick to make generalizations and judgements about societies they hardly understood. "The secret of writing about and understanding other ways of life," Alan Beals has written with much propriety, "does not involve neutrality so much as it involves and ability to withhold judgment."

Julia A. Balashova (Astrakhan State Pedagogical University, Russia)
On the Relations of English Missionaries and Local Rulers
in West Africa in the 2nd Half of the 19th Century

The 19th century is not only the period of heyday in commercial and colonial expansion of European powers but also the age of the missionary movement growth when evangelizing became the principal task of the Church. In the second half of the 19th century the centre of missionary activity moved to Great Britain due to her industrial and sea leadership. Many missionaries (D. Hinderer, T. Maccaulay, D. Taylor, etc.) felt that military expeditions would do no good, and their relationship with native population would be more effective in the result of accustoming the natives to the Christian morality and European civilization. Under the influence of missions there came a transformation of the indigenous society, including the institution of traditional rulers.

The West African rulers can be divided into two categories according to their attitude to the missionaries: some of them were quite benevolent to the

missions, others were afraid of the rise of missionary activity as they considered it a threat to the native traditions. In particular, many Ibo and Yoruba chiefs believed that missionaries can raise their prestige being instrumental in economical development of their regions. So they converted to Christianity, sent their children to schools at missions and consulted Christian doctors in case the native healers proved inefficient. Some examples of long-lasting friendship between missionaries and African rulers are known, *e.g.* between the Wesleyan missionary T. Freeman and the king of Dahomey Gezo. King Manuva of Ijebu protected missions so that his city might become the trading centre for Ekiti, Ondo and Ijesha.

Quite often the attitude of traditional rulers towards missionaries depended on their political interests. Under the rulers' control missionaries sustained their politics. A vivid example of this is the Ijai war of 1860 between Egba and Ibadan. Missionaries in Ibadan supported the agressive politics of the local ruler while their colleagues in Abeokuta fought for Egba.

Thus we must admit the existence of missionaries' marked influence on the political structure of traditional societies. At the same time this process was complex and sometimes invoked a strong negative reaction of the rulers which makes it possible to conclude that the relations in question were ambivalent.

Richard A. Bradshaw (Centre College, Danville, USA)
Hierarchy and Power in Pre-European Central Africa

The precolonial societies of North Central Africa (the Ubangi-Shari region north of the Congo forest) appear to have become increasingly decentralized during the period between c. 500 BCE and 1800 CE. The oldest evidence with regard to settlements in the region during this period are associated with a series of megaliths in the western borderlands of the Central African Republic (CAR). These megaliths and the artifacts found near them suggest the existence of a relatively stratified society with rulers who could control surplus food and labor. Evidence from c. 700 CE suggests the existence of settlements of about 300 persons, but by c. 1800 CE most settlements in the region consisted of small hamlets of 20-30 people. These stateless societies were divided into clans, but had no organized clan segments (such as segmentary lineages), nor hereditary rulers. There was no hereditary hierarchy or power.

The precolonial history of North-Central African thus provides an example of an evolution in the direction of greater decentralization, diminishing hierarchy, and less concentration of power.

Charles Gore (London, UK)
The Power of the Oba, The Hegemony of the State:
Reflections on Kingship in the Edo Kingdom of Southern Nigeria

Despite the emergence of the Nigerian nation state, the Oba of Benin is still considered the political and spiritual head of the Edo kingdom, which comprises a core Edo speaking area located in Edo state, Southern Nigeria. The Oba is the descendant of a dynasty that has ruled since at least the 14th century. The boundaries of the kingdom have fluctuated (both during and between reigns) as has his political authority. Much of the literature on Edo kingship has taken its specific constitution as unproblematic as exemplified in Fagg (1970) description of it as a form of divine kingship. Where there has been indepth investigation this has focused on the political hierarchies that have underpinned him (Bradbury, 1973) or the processes by which the unique category of the Oba is constituted (Nevadomsky 1980). Many commentators have contrasted the forms of kingship of the adjacent Yoruba kingdoms where kingship is limited by the jurisdiction of elite councils or secret societies with the Edo kingdom where the king has at least theoretically "absolute power."

This paper considers critically how kingship is in fact constituted in the key dialectic between the office of kingship and the person of the king, irrespective of the actual power that a particular monarch holds at any given moment. The paper analyses how a hegemony of kingship is established and maintained, both within the urban sphere of elite political power and also how it is articulated with outlying regions. In the process this paper deconstructs the concept of divine kingship which, it is suggested, is of limited conceptual validity and flawed assumptions about the organisation of the polity to highlight a far more complex dialectic between kingship, the state and the peoples, Edo and non-Edo, it claims to rule.

Alexander Lopasic, (University of Reading, UK)

Hierarchy and Power in Traditional Africa

Paper deals with the role of hierarchy and power in traditional Africa presenting an interesting development from segmentary systems widely spread in Africa to highly developed state-founding societies, like the Lacustrine States in East Africa, Southern, Southern Bantus or the highly sophisticated states in West Africa. An important issue discussed, is the real continuity between the segmentary and state-founding societies as kinship

represents the basis of thew both. Among the state-founding societies kinship organisation is still prevent in most levels with the exception of some officials appointed by the king or members of the king's kin group. However, even some of these appointment were made on basis of kinship affiliation.

The paper also discusses development of hierarchy and power with example from different African states, most of them created through conquest. Military leaders achieved power and became kings and founders of royal dynasties. That explains why weapons became often symbols of power and inequality even being provided with magical powers. We are talking here about "the charisma of weapon". In this way the weapon producers and smithes achieved high position in the hierarchical order. Describing African states as "conquest states". Jan Vansina has certainly made an important contribution toward understanding of African political structures.

On the top of the hierarchy was the king who enjoyed a number of privileges and his power was often symbolized by special clothes, insignias, and sophisticated court etiquette. Political powers were strongly supported through religion and mythology. Many of these rulers were considered to "divine rulers" making their position unique. They were identified with the country and had to perform a number of rituals to deities or their own deified ancestors. The whole problem of sacralization is closely connected with stratification and inequality among different social strata representing the hierarchical system in traditional Africa.

At the bottom of the hierarchical structures were slaves and the role of slavery in such systems is discussed with examples.

The paper concludes with some comparisons between traditional Africa and European political systems.

Joseph Nevadomsky (California State University Fullerton, USA)
Art, Myth and Ritual: The Path to Political Authority in Ancient Benin

Questioning Marx's view that power flows from control of the means of production and cultural materialist theories that emphasize the critical role of technological development, this paper demonstrates that political power in ancient Benin was accumulated gradually by particular chiefs because they controlled what they claimed was access to local and regional deities, to divination and ritual power, and thereby to control over the land and its products. Employing the perspectives of Antonio Gramsci, and his critical sociology of the politicization of culture, K.C. Chang, who provides a counterargument to the standard environmental framing of archaeological theories, and fieldwork evidence from mythology, art iconography,

archaeology, and contemporary palace rituals, the paper argues that in pre-dynastic Benin cultural hegemony provided the path to political authority.

Godfrey N. Uzoigwe (Mississippi State University, Mississippi State, USA)
The Bunyoro-Kitara Kingdom and the reasons for its decline and fall

The earliest history of Bunyoro-Kitara is imperfectly remembered. It is believed, however, that people have inhabited this region since the Stone Age. The traditions of Bunyoro-Kitara suggest strongly, indeed, that their ancestors founded the earliest state-system in East Africa's Lake region. This state was called Kitara Kya Nyamenga.

Between the 13th and 19th centuries the boundaries of this state expanded erratically and equally shrank erratically. With its decline the Abakama (kings) retreated farther north of the interlacustrine region and consolidated what was left of the original Kitara empire into what was known, until 1967, as the Kingdom of Bunyoro -Kitara. After the Uganda Republican Constitution (1967) abolished all the Uganda kingdoms and pensioned off the kings, the kingdom of Bunyoro Kitara ceased to exist and became known as Bunyoro. In 1993 the government of President Yoweri Museveni decided to restore the kingdoms. Consequently, on June 11, 1994 Prince Solomon Gafabusa Iguru was crowned the 27th Omukama of the Ababiito dynasty of Bunyoro-Kitara. The Banyoro are currently engaged in the "Rebirth of Bunyoro-Kitara Kingdom" in the context of its reduced circumstances.

The aim of this paper is to revisit critically the reasons for the decline and fall of this important African kingdom.

PANEL XVII
Hierarchy and Power in Pre-European Polynesia
<u>Convenor:</u> *Serge Dunis* (Université de la Polynésie française, Tahiti)

The aims and claims of this panel are to tackle the twin themes of hierarchy and power from different angles and in different archipelagoes in order to obtain a general view of the vast area which, at the time of contact, represented the new planetary frontier following the 1769-1779 decade Cook devoted to mapping the watery third of the globe.

The Polynesian triangle, with summits radiating 4000km away from their Tahitian centre of gravity : Hawai'i up North, Easter Island (Rapa Nui) due East and New Zealand (Aotearoa) 'down under' in the South West, offers a vivid illustration of the navigational skills of the pioneers abiding by nature alone, with an intimate knowledge of winds, stars, swells, clouds and birds as their only instrument.

World famous for their despotic chiefdoms, the Polynesians inspired the founder of modern anthropology, Marcel Mauss, whose seminal essay *The gift, forms and functions of exchange in archaic societies*, triggered off Levi-Strauss's structuralism and Maurice Godelier's contemporary reappraisals of kinship and power in the Pacific.

Georges Adassovsky (Port la Nouvelle, France)
Hierarchy and Power in the Marquesas

The only really scientific observations made on the Marquesan island of Nukuhiva before it bore the brunt of culture clash were undertaken by members of the first Russian voyage around the world. The circumnavigators departed from this very city where their achievements were also published. The most complete collection of Nukuhivan original artifacts are to be found in the Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography of Saint Petersburg: the collection Captain Lissiansky brought back. The Russians are historically the first to have taken interest in scientific ethnology. Concerning the Marquesas islands, they really broke new ground.

In each valley were characters that from a European standpoint seemed to be kings. Nothing in their costume or behaviour, however, distinguished them from other people who, in turn, did not pay them any particular respect. There were no government, no laws, no judiciary, no police and no organized army. The only power was the absolute power of *tapu* that each individual

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had known from times immemorial and which had always determined one's station in life and behaviour in society, whatever the circumstances.

A rigid hierarchy was nevertheless obvious. The king, *haka'iki*, was on top. The members of his family: brothers, uncles, aunts seemed to form a kind of gentry, *papa haka'iki*. In theory, the king possessed all the land but he delegated tenure of part of it to members of his family. Ordinary men devoted themselves to agriculture and were fed on surpluses in case of famine. The fishers formed a kind of underclass. Running parallel to this social organization were men, *tau'a*, who performed religious functions. They were called priests, sorcerers, shamans by European visitors who rarely seized the opportunity to see them or talk to them.

This hierarchy stemming from the creation of the world was entirely cemented by *tapu.* The one man who really wielded power was the *tau'a* who could set up or lift a *tapu* or launch a war. The source of this power was in the supernatural world with which the *tau'a* maintained constant communication.

Martin A. van Bakel (Leiden University, Netherlands)
Complex Interaction and Evolution in Polynesia

More following the original insights of Charles Darwin than those of Herbert Spencer we no longer can see evolution as growing towards greater complexity, but instead define it as structural change. This means evolution in essence does not have any direction, but just is such a change that the whole of the organism (or institution, or society) is essentially different from the foregoing one.

In this paper I also want to study the processes of evolution with the aid of the Complex Interaction Model (CIM) as developed by Claessen and van de Velde. With the CIM they study the processes of evolution of the socio-political structure of societies as a complex interplay of several factors. These factors are: the ideological system, the economic system and what they call the societal format. In order also to take into account the specific historical, environmental, and other conditions of a given society they use the term context.

With the help of foregoing premises I study some five societies in the Pacific region in order to see if these premises offer insights into the processes of evolution these societies went through in aboriginal (= prehistoric) times. The societies researched are Hawaii, Mangareva, Marquises, Rapa and Samoa. Hawaii, Marquises and Rapa were chosen as they fitted nicely in the existing evolutionary sequences that made use of the

Spencerian evolutionary paradigm. Samoa and Mangareva were chosen as they at first sight did not fit in as readily as the other ones. This can be seen in the following overview.

TABLE: Overview of the land surface, population numbers and population density in the five archipelagos

Archipelago	km^2 numbers	population per km^2	density km^2	product. %	surface inhabitable	density per km	socio-political system
Hawaii	16.638	300.000	18	3328	20	90	state
Marquises	1.000	35.000	35	250	25	140	(petty) chiefdom
Rapa	39	2.000	51	8	20	250	petty chiefdom
Mangareva	28	2.500	89	10	35	250	state-like
Samoa	2.800	50.000	17	840	30	60	petty chiefdom

In Hawaii we can see a fairly smooth and more or less uninterrupted evolution through its prehistory from a petty chiefdom when the Polynesians first arrived there to an almost full-grown state when the first Western people arrived.

In the Marquises archipelago each time further evolution was hampered by recurrent climatological and further environmental hazards leading to almost incessant wars.

On Rapa environmental circumstances (deep rugged valleys, leaving little productive space) led to stretching the economy to its limits. To few people made a more complex socio-political system not viable. Also the rugged terrain made conquest of other groups virtually impossible. The result of this so was that almost no evolution of the socio-political system was the consequence.

In the Mangareva archipelago recurrent environmental hazards combined with an economic system that was little productive led to wars. The result of this all was that just one family gained the supremacy over the whole of the archipelago. This family was the *de facto* owner of all the resources and reigned as a supreme ruling family. They even introduced some kind of wage labour for the rest of the population. This meant the population could be dispensed with at will as much as the circumstances required.

Of the Samoa archipelago we can draw a clear picture of what happened. The environmental circumstances there were relatively favourable. Together with a very low population density this occasioned vast tracts of good lands that were not in use at any given time. This posed a problem for people striving to gain power. They were dependent upon the goodwill of

their followers. If they asked to much from their people they easily could depart and find favourable fields elsewhere. All of this led to a very low degree of socio-political organisation. Yet this explanation suffers from one drawback. We are left with the problem that in Samoa the population did not expand rapidly. This is the case almost everywhere else in the world, when there are favourable circumstances. Some indication can be given, yet the data as yet are very meager.

In summary, we now can pose that the old Spencerian paradigm of 'growing complexity' is not sufficient to explain what happens in evolution of societies. Evolution as 'structural change' offers a better explanation.

Jean-Guy Cintas (Lycée Paul Gauguin, Papeete, Polynésie française)
Power and Hierarchy in the Tahitian Creation Myth

Is a creation myth the mere projection of a human group imagining its own beginning? Is this cultural process simply channeling the passage from the great inane to a meaningful existence?

Apart from the fact that we are not dealing here with an Augustinian void, several indicators reveal another purpose: the presence of the Tahitian society is taken for granted from the very outset in so far as its primordial god is introduced, albeit in utter solitude. The creation myth stages an appeal, a search. First and foremost is expressed a sexual duality required by creation whose process demands order and hierarchy. We gradually become aware that gender is at stake, that the relationship between man and woman conditions relations with nature and relationships within society. The *raison d'être* of the creation myth consists less in telling how things were originally created than setting up a society. Founding a society thus amounts to defining its reproduction. This foundation, however, entails the supremacy of men over women which sets the pattern of all future relations.

The order to reproduce themselves is given to female realities which refuse to obtemperate. The male godhead then steps in. Sexual polarity is thus equated with progress, provided the masculine element has the upper hand in terms of both knowledge and action. Unity, differentiation and reproduction belong to the centre: god first, then the king or chief. The creation myth is about political authority, an authority whose task is to monitor all productive couplings. To crown it all, the production of unity and duality, differentiation and mating, affinity or desire is voiced in a poetic form, as if sheer mythical efficiency was bent on embodying rather than just showing.

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Albert Davletshin (Russian State University for the Humanities, Moscow)
From Kohau Rongorongo *Tablets to Rapanui Social Organization: From Rapanui Social Organization to* Kohau Rongorongo *Script*

The study of *Kohau Rongorongo* Script – a unique writing system invented by the Easter Island natives – is still in its infancy. Many interpretations have been given, but it can be said today that there is the only reasonable one, that is the one offered by Yuri Knorosov and Nikolai Butinov in 1956. The Knorosov and Butinov's idea about a genealogy on Small Santiago Tablet works perfectly, many ethnographic and linguistic data support it. Nevertheless, some questions – function of the sign 076, absence of <'a> possessive marker, and others – remain unresolved. A structural analysis of the KRR tablets shows that some signs, which frequently appear in a certain position in names must be titles. Many names are complemented with different titles, and some names are not. This fact suggests that it is a rank system what is reflected in the KRR tablets.

The three survived texts – Small Santiago Tablet, Santiago Staff, and Honolulu Tablet 3629 – represent name lists. Basing on ethnohistorical and combinatory data, it is possible to conclude that they are probably lists of defeated and sacrificed enemies or newborns. Remarkably, the famous genealogy on Small Santiago Tablet consists of six names marked by the same title, which follows a passage free of names. The structure of the KRR texts can be explained in view of the Polynesian social organization. It is frequently described as conical clan, where the status and rank of a person depend on the genealogical distance from the lineage founder. In this sense the KRR texts were one of the most important media of social-political integration. The genealogical fragment inserted into the name list, evidently referred to the most prominent person mentioned in the text.

Serge Dunis (Université de la Polynésie française, Tahiti)
**Incest, Hierarchy and Power
in Pre-European Hawai'i and New Zealand**

Incest was the fountain of power in both Hawai'i and New Zealand. Acted out in the hierarchical circles of Hawai'i, it remained within the mythological realm in New Zealand, although its illustrations could be found at all levels of society: economic practices, rites, language, art and architecture.

The Maori sun Tane emerges from primeval darkness to separate the loving couple of the sky father and the earth mother. Spending half of his time in the sky, the other half in the earth, he supersedes his torn parents, maintains his bivalence. Two human halves are sacrificed by the time the third generation is reached: the demi-god Maui and Tane's daughter and spouse who regress into the earth to look after the Dead. Whether active (Maui's) or passive (the earth mother's and daughter's), incest is banned forever, Tane being the only one able to survive it. The Maori chief and priest was the inheritor of Tane's fertilizing power.

In Hawai'i, kingship originated from Wakea, the sun at noon, who mates with Papa the earth mother and with their daughter Full Moon. The Hawaiian King was born from the union of a brother and a sister, the ideal match requiring twins. Incest between Prince and Princess begot gods, started the world anew.

We can thus propose a synthesis equating twinship with bisexuality. Splitting the universe into two halves to install the primordial couple of sky and earth amounts to sexualizing duality. Incest between the royal twins thus re-enacts the very beginning of the world. As opposed to its imaginary counterpart of bivalent divinity, this sexual twinship stands for a superlative equality between man and woman, a real bivalence in flesh and blood. The new dilemma is now between the idea of god and the idea of a society of equal men and women. Incest is however too thorough an equalizer to be allowed to humans. Sexual parity and hierarchy are mutually exclusive. Hence polygamy and the rejection of motherhood implied by the incestuous passage from mother to daughter. Creation is fine, reproduction boring: both King and Virgin are above birth!

Odile Gannier (Université de la Polynésie française, Tahiti)
In Search of Chief and Kings. How Bougainville, Lapérouse and Marchand Made a point of Always Looking for the Right Contact

This reappraisal of the French travelers' journals in the Pacific will show that men in charge of exploring missions, living up to their high status, were bent on singling out their local counterparts when landing on new territories. Enjoying full power on board, Captains of the calibre of Bougainville in Tahiti, Lapérouse on Easter Island and in Hawai'i, Marchand in the Marquesas, could not envisage to deal with ordinary men and women.

They were thus given to identifying the insignia of royalty at each of their landfalls: costumes, badges, precedence, commanding speeches.

The French Captain or Lieutenant addresses his chosen counterpart, paradoxically welcoming him as a newly appointed ambassador who then receives the presents on behalf of the group, channels the intercourse. His name is asked, he is invited on board, the Captain responds to his initiatives. Possession of the land is often taken through this novel ally and at his own risk. The recipient can exceptionally be a group of distinguished persons, the latter occurrence being no coincidence at the time of the French Revolution.

This highly artificial and destabilizing individuation process can of course misfire when the target is not properly identified. When successful, however, it enhances the station in life of the chosen few who had hitherto merely wielded the more prosaic power of age, strength or oratory. The Captain, in turn, acts as a real ambassador on a par with his commanding role. Logbooks equate these contacts with relationships between nations, offering interesting insights into the observed societies, tackling at one and the same time the immediate exchange needs of the expedition and wider philosophical considerations befitting an era of political upheaval.

Sandhya Patel (Université Blaise Pascal, Clermont Ferrand, France)

Lapita to Tapa : Women, Socio-economic Status, Power and Authority in Pre-Contact Tahiti

Determining the extent of female socio-economic status, power and authority in pre-contact Tahiti may even mean delving back into prehistory, to an era when the Lapita cultural complex was expanding to the Pacific, precursor to the social systems that later came into being in Melanesia and Polynesia. Yvonne Marshall's archaeological study of this particular period in time brings to light the relationship between the division of labour and various aspects of social order and as far as we are concerned, gender-defined status and power.

This approach obviously involves putting to one side sometimes androcentric ethnography and underlining the social influence of the division of labour. Annette Weiner points out that Teuira Henry and Douglas Oliver, considered authorities on pre-contact Tahiti, only very succinctly refer to elements which point in this direction, thus perpetuating the academic *idee fixe* of a polluting female quality in pre-contact Polynesian societies which rendered women inferior to men. Linnekin and Marshall, like Weiner, point out that until recently little scholarly attention has been paid to evidence which demonstrates significant female status, power and socio-economic authority.

In her paper on Hawaiian society, Jocelyn Linnekin shows that female production of cloth and other objects like feather cloaks, meant that women were fully engaged in social, economic and ritual relations. Like Marshall in prehistory, Weiner in the Trobriands, Linnekin in Hawaii, this paper will attempt to shed light on female productive and reproductive power in precontact Tahiti and this with a view to demonstrating that the ownership of cloth and other objects meant control of means of production (including land) which jointly conferred socio-economic status, power and authority on women, comparable and equal to men's.

The Intellectual Legacy of Ernest Gellner

Convenors: *Declan Quigley* (University of St. Andrews, Fife, UK)

                     Peter Skalník (Charles University, Prague; Pardubice University, Czech Republic)

No doubt several disciplines would claim Ernest Gellner as their own: philosophy, social anthropology, political theory, sociology. For some years at the London School of Economics he ran a seminar with John Hall and Michael Mann entitled 'Patterns of History and he was convinced that his major work was the book he published in 1988 on this theme: *Plough, Sword and Book* (London: Collins Harvill) even though *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1983) was to become much more widely known. The convenors of this panel invite contributions which address Gellner's interpretation of historical processes.

Contributors may be as theoretical or as empirical as they please but are asked to address an issue which in some way or another introduces an historical dimension.

Jackie Assayag (Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, France)
How does one become European? Wittgenstein and Malinowski or Ernest Gellner's Method against Discourses

Ernest Gellner's fruitful work on nations and nationalism fits into the frame of the modernisation theory and the cultural program on modernity which developed in modern Europe. Evidence of this is found in Gellner's reflection on "Habsburg dilemma", opposing the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein to the ethnologist Bronislaw Malinowski: Gellner saw the former as a representative of unrooted cosmopolitic idealism and the latter as an advocate of universalism, respectful of cultural diversity and experience. Gellner's neo-Weberian approach, based on a positivist and Eurocentric view of social sciences, shows its limitations when applied to the study of Islam and nationalism.

André P. Czegledy (University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa)
Gellner's Panoramic Vision

This paper examines Ernest Gellner's intellectual legacy chiefly with reference to the academic discipline of Social Anthropology. In the process of such examination, it compares the panoramic tendencies of Gellner's *oeuvre* with respect to Anthropology's wider traditions of analytical perspective and places his work within the discipline's history of analytical thought. The paper questions the significance of Gellner's repeated confrontations with both the empirically particularist trend preserved by the British School and the American interpretive positions that dominated the discipline during much of his lifetime. To what extent can Gellner's anthropology be placed within a broader historical framework of anthropological studies? Is Ernest Gellner's central legacy is not in his writing of the details, but in his writing as a whole?

John Davis (Oxford University, UK)
States and Tribes. Exploring a Gellnerian Dichotomy

One of Earnest Gellner's achievements in Saints of the Atlas was to develop a new generation of segmentary model (the pedigree is: Hanoteau & Letourneaux → Durkheim → Evans-Pritchard → Gellner ...) that allows us to understand better the (hesitant, ambivalent) rejection of states by peoples with an alternative way (fragile, partially effective) of securing law and order. I shall try to explore the intricacies of this theme; to relate it to other Gellnerian dichotomies; and to see whether it does better than other segmentary derivatives in explaining recent events in non-Hobbesian (Lockeian, Rousseauian) nominal states. But I may have to settle for only part of this program.

Dale F. Eickelman (Dartmouth College, Hanover, USA)
Culture and Its Discontents: The Intellectual Legacy of Saints of the Atlas

Ernest Gellner's *Saints of the Atlas* (1969) is a foundation text in social anthropology. Although elements of the argument were published earlier in journal articles or as chapters in edited works, the book's 1969 publication (along with Clifford Geertz's 1968 *Islam Observed*) contributed significantly to making Morocco a *locus classicus* for anthropological writing. Like other

foundation texts, *Saints* can be read at multiple levels. It is Gellner's only effort to create an ethnographic text. It is not without flaws of description and interpretation, but remains good to think with. For Gellner, the basic assumptions in *Saints* shaped his later thinking on Islam and Muslim "society. Like other ethnographies, *Saints* is shaped both by Gellner's field research and preceding and concurrent ethnographic writing, mostly French and including Jacques Berque's *Structures socials du Haut-Atlas* (1955). Much like Evans-Pritchard's *The Nuer* for an earlier generation, which made the southern Sudan familiar to generations of anthropologists, Gellner's *Saints* linked mainstream issues in European political thought to the ethnographic specifics of Morocco's High Atlas. French ethnographic writing on Morocco remained almost exclusively local in interest. Although hotly contested, Gellner's characterizations in *Saints* of tribe and state, religion and society, and "high" and "low" Islam succeeded in shaping major debates about Moroccan society and made Morocco a basic point of reference in anthropological research. *Saints* is a dated ethnography only in a narrow sense of the term. Its lasting value is to suggest how ethnographies can reach audiences beyond the confines of anthropology.

John A. Hall (McGill University, Montreal, Canada)
 Identity Politics: Gellner's Troubling Theory of Modernity

Gellner at all times believed that the transition to modernity involved fundamental change in identity, akin to that undergone by Gregor Samsa in Kafka's *Metamorphosis*. I examine Gellner's reasons for this view, note biographical circumstances that may explain it, but then try to consider whether it is right. For the view is troubling. It lies at the back of Gellner's insistence that utilitarian/liberal/rational standards only work within a particular world. Initial consideration of some empirical issues suggests that Gellner is not completely right, but that his position most certainly cannot be ignored.

Christopher M. Hann (Max Planck Institute of Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale, Germany)
 Gellner on Civil Society: The Sickness, Not the Cure?

I suggested recently (in "Gellner's Structural-Functional Culturalism", *Czech Sociological Review*, 2001), that Gellner's theory of nationalism depends upon a theory of culture, which shows him to belong in the

"romantic-holist" slot, in the tradition that runs from Herder to Malinowski and beyond. This element in his work betrays his roots in Central Europe.

In this paper I suggest that the late writings on "civil society", notably in *Conditions of Liberty* (1994), complement and correct his writings on nationalism and culture. However, in addressing the integration problems faced by mature industrial societies, I shall argue that the concept of civil society is inadequate. Gellner's take on it is far better than some others, but in this context he ultimately betrays his more general Enlightenment, European roots. It is becoming increasingly obvious, even within European societies themselves, that Eurocentric models derived from a preindustrial age offer no solutions to contemporary dilemmas; they are, to paraphrase another late Habsburger, an instance of the disease rather than the cure (Kraus).

Patrick Heady (Max Planck Institute of Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale Germany)
Gellner's Ideal Kinship Language in the Light of Evolutionary Psychology

In *The Concept of Kinship* (chapters 11 and 12) Gellner proposed an *ideal kinship language* as a way of clarifyimg the respective contributions of biology and social factors to actually observed kinship systems. In this paper I query whether the role he assigned to biology would satisfy contemporary evolutionists. But I go on to argue that, with some additions, an ideal kinship language would provide a rigorous way of stating both evolutionist and non-evolutionist kinship theories – and, as well as clarifying their differences, might reveal potential complementarities. The argument is illustrated by reference to data on incest prohibitions.

Anatoly M. Khazanov (University of Wisconsin Madison, USA)
Gellner and the Study of Pastoral Nomads

Gellner's long-lasting interest in pastoral nomadism, apparently, was connected with three main reasons: his own ethnographic fieldwork in Morocco; his interest in Russia's history and consciousness, and in Soviet anthropology; and his attempts at assessing the role that nomads played in human history. Gellner suggested that because of the relative strength of pastoralism on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean the "tribal solution" prevailed there, whereas the feudal alternative, which segregated rulers and warriors from peasants, prevailed in the north. This elegant model may be contested on several grounds, but it calls for more

attention to the divergences of development in different cultural-historical regions and to the reasons for these divergences.

Benyamin Neuberger (Open University of Israel, Tel-Aviv)
Ethnicity, Nation, Nationalism and the Nation-State
in Colonial and Postcolonial Africa

The paper will deal with the applicability of the concepts of ethnicity, nations, nationalism and the nation-state to Africa. It will explore "old" and "new" ethnic groups created in colonial Africa, the connection between ethnicity and modernization and the role of ethnicity in anti-colonial nationalism. It will further relate to ethnic, territorial or "mixed" nationalism in the postcolonial state and to the problematics of "nation-building." It will relate these topics to Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism*.

Declan Quigley (University of St. Andrews, Fife, UK)
Ernest Gellner and Modern Anthropology

Ernest Gellner was famed in three areas: (a) his anthropological work on Muslim societies; (b) his theory of nationalism; (c) his unremitting opposition to epistemological relativism.

By any standards, his work in any one of these areas made him an intellectual star with whom few could compare. Yet he was deeply unpopular among many social and cultural anthropologists. In this paper I want to trace the reasons for this by looking at the development of anthropology through the lens of the rationality-relativism debate. I will argue – with numerous examples – that cultural anthropology has now proceeded to the nadir which Gellner always feared and which he spent so much of his intellectual energy trying to prevent. I will also show that, in many departments of social and cultural anthropology, those who attempt to bring about a genuine rapprochement of anthropology and history are regarded with either incomprehension or derision by their "colleagues".

David Shankland (University of Wales Lampeter, Ceredigion, UK)
Ernest Gellner's Muslim Society

Of Gellner's wide-ranging output, his fieldwork amongst Islamic societies is that most clearly linked to the ethnographic and anthropological

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traditions with which he came to be linked professionally for a large part of his life. Yet, of his major theories, those outlined in *Muslim Society* have drawn the most scepticism and the least secondary analysis. Indeed, the approach that he employed, with its emphasis on social organisation, has come to be regarded as outmoded. In the light of current fieldwork amongst the Alevi Muslim community in Germany, this paper looks at this scepticism once more. It asserts, quite simply, that the critics are wrong twice over: Gellner's work amongst Islamic societies may be demonstrated to be ethnographically prescient and logically coherent. The paper concludes by suggesting that this exercise, far from simply a vote of support for his position, provides an insight into the way he achieved a distinctive and academically robust view of human history.

Peter Skalník (Charles University, Prague; Pardubice University, Czech Republic)

Gellner's Encounter with Soviet Etnografija

The paper will evaluate Gellner's involvement with Soviet *etnografija* during the 1970s and 1980s which culminated with his one year stay in Moscow in the middle of the Gorbachov era. As is well known from his published works, Gellner was interested in Soviet theories of primeval (*pervobytnoe*) society, in their theories of the emergence of the state (including the question of nomadism), and of course in Bromley's notorious theory of *etnos*. Through examination of Soviet *etnografija*, he also tried to understand the nature of the Soviet form of Marxism. This paper will critically examine Gellner's attitudes towards Soviet-Marxist (and non-Marxist) theories as they appear in *etnografija* and his attempts to find communication channels and some kind of common language which might bridge the gap between Soviet and Western scholarship, between *etnografija* and social anthropology.

Eftihia Voutira (Macedonia University, Thessaloniki, Greece)

Diaspora Nationalism, Transnationalism and the Dynamics of Post-Soviet Diasporas

In Gellner's theory of nationalism Diaspora nationalism is a species-specific type of nationalism contrasted with the Eastern and the Western types. In this paper I consider the relevance of Gellner's concept of diaspora as an "urban, specialized or dispersed group with few or no rural links" both

in light of recent theoretical debates about global diasporas and with respect two examples of post Soviet diaspora formation: (i) a "new" diaspora (the Russians of the Near Abroad) and, (ii) the transformation of an "old" historical diaspora (the post-Soviet Greeks). I argue that such processes of diaspora configuration, both abroad and upon return to their respective homelands, where they often act as "reverse diasporas", involve 2 parallel though not necessarily congruent processes of cultural mobilisation: a) the formation of transnational kin networks which support decision making about migration, and b) the creation of corporate groups (cultural associations) that act as the main spokesmen of group interests in the new arenas of global diaspora politics (international congresses) where traditionally the historical homeland has played a key role in setting the agenda. Though the former process is compatible with Gellner's culturalist diaspora model, the latter requires a reconceptualisation of both "culture" and "dispersal".

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